CVE-2026-4867 (GCVE-0-2026-4867)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-03-26 16:16 – Updated: 2026-03-26 16:52
VLAI
Title
path-to-regexp vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service via multiple route parameters
Summary
Impact: A bad regular expression is generated any time you have three or more parameters within a single segment, separated by something that is not a period (.). For example, /:a-:b-:c or /:a-:b-:c-:d. The backtrack protection added in path-to-regexp@0.1.12 only prevents ambiguity for two parameters. With three or more, the generated lookahead does not block single separator characters, so capture groups overlap and cause catastrophic backtracking. Patches: Upgrade to path-to-regexp@0.1.13 Custom regex patterns in route definitions (e.g., /:a-:b([^-/]+)-:c([^-/]+)) are not affected because they override the default capture group. Workarounds: All versions can be patched by providing a custom regular expression for parameters after the first in a single segment. As long as the custom regular expression does not match the text before the parameter, you will be safe. For example, change /:a-:b-:c to /:a-:b([^-/]+)-:c([^-/]+). If paths cannot be rewritten and versions cannot be upgraded, another alternative is to limit the URL length.
Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator (v2.0.3)
CWE
  • CWE-1333 - Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity
Assigner
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
path-to-regexp path-to-regexp Affected: 0 , < 0.1.13 (semver)
Create a notification for this product.
Credits
EthanKim88 blakeembrey UlisesGascon
Show details on NVD website
To clipboard 

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  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
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