CVE-2026-44500 (GCVE-0-2026-44500)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-05-08 15:10 – Updated: 2026-05-08 19:41
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
ZEBRA: Allocation Amplification in Inbound Network Deserializers
Summary
ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to zebrad version 4.4.0, prior to zebra-chain version 7.0.0, and prior to zebra-network version 6.0.0, several inbound deserialization paths in Zebra allocated buffers sized against generic transport or block-size ceilings before the tighter protocol or consensus limits were enforced. An unauthenticated or post-handshake peer could therefore force the node to preallocate and parse for orders of magnitude more data than the protocol intended, across headers messages, equihash solutions in block headers, Sapling spend vectors in V5/V4 transactions, and coinbase script bytes in blocks. This issue has been patched in zebrad version 4.4.0, zebra-chain version 7.0.0, and zebra-network version 6.0.0.
Severity
5.3 (Medium)
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: yes
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-05-08 19:41 UTC
CWE
- CWE-770 - Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
Assigner
References
1 reference
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security… | x_refsource_CONFIRM |
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ZcashFoundation | zebra |
Affected:
zebrad < 4.4.0
Affected: zebra-chain < 7.0.0 Affected: zebra-network < 6.0.0 |
guessed |
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