CVE-2026-44436 (GCVE-0-2026-44436)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-07-16 22:44 – Updated: 2026-07-17 10:48| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/h2o/quicly/security/advisories… | x_refsource_CONFIRM |
| https://github.com/h2o/quicly/commit/8b178e692c51… | x_refsource_MISC |
{
"containers": {
"adp": [
{
"metrics": [
{
"other": {
"content": {
"id": "CVE-2026-44436",
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "none"
},
{
"Automatable": "yes"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-07-17T10:48:23.373806Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"type": "ssvc"
}
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-07-17T10:48:33.974Z",
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP"
},
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
}
],
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "quicly",
"vendor": "h2o",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 8b178e6"
}
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Quicly is an IETF QUIC protocol implementation intended primarily for use within the H2O HTTP server. Prior to commit 8b178e6, Quicly is vulnerable to a Denial of Service attack through connection state corruption. In QUIC Invariants, the maximum length of a Connection ID is 255 bytes, while QUIC version 1 further restricts the maximum to 20 bytes. Quicly implements QUIC version 1 and therefore its CID buffers are limited to 20 bytes. However, to be able to respond to unknown versions of QUIC, its packet decoder accepts Connection IDs of up to 255 bytes. As its CID buffers are merely 20 bytes long, Quicly must reject QUIC version 1 packets with Connection IDs longer than that. The command line tool bundled with Quicly has had that check, however the library itself lacked such enforcement. As a consequence, when used by applications that lack their own enforcement, the connection state becoming inconsistent to buffer overrun. Fortunately, the overflow stops within the allocated chunk of memory, but nevertheless, the bug leads to assertion failures. This issue has been fixed by commit 8b178e6."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.5,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
}
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-120",
"description": "CWE-120: Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input (\u0027Classic Buffer Overflow\u0027)",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
},
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-787",
"description": "CWE-787: Out-of-bounds Write",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-07-16T22:44:34.254Z",
"orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
"shortName": "GitHub_M"
},
"references": [
{
"name": "https://github.com/h2o/quicly/security/advisories/GHSA-v55w-59qx-2v78",
"tags": [
"x_refsource_CONFIRM"
],
"url": "https://github.com/h2o/quicly/security/advisories/GHSA-v55w-59qx-2v78"
},
{
"name": "https://github.com/h2o/quicly/commit/8b178e692c51a3b1031612ef89f03a53aac63c15",
"tags": [
"x_refsource_MISC"
],
"url": "https://github.com/h2o/quicly/commit/8b178e692c51a3b1031612ef89f03a53aac63c15"
}
],
"source": {
"advisory": "GHSA-v55w-59qx-2v78",
"discovery": "UNKNOWN"
},
"title": "Quicly is vulnerable to connection state corruption"
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
"assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-44436",
"datePublished": "2026-07-16T22:44:34.254Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-05-06T14:40:00.954Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-07-17T10:48:33.974Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2",
"vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
"epss": {
"cve": "CVE-2026-44436",
"date": "2026-11-14",
"epss": "0.00493",
"percentile": "0.42949"
},
"nvd": {
"cve": {
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "quicly",
"vendor": "h2o",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 8b178e6"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:h2o:quicly:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "FD025CC7-B866-4C0E-873A-86908DC9E6BD",
"versionEndExcluding": "2026-05-29",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Quicly is an IETF QUIC protocol implementation intended primarily for use within the H2O HTTP server. Prior to commit 8b178e6, Quicly is vulnerable to a Denial of Service attack through connection state corruption. In QUIC Invariants, the maximum length of a Connection ID is 255 bytes, while QUIC version 1 further restricts the maximum to 20 bytes. Quicly implements QUIC version 1 and therefore its CID buffers are limited to 20 bytes. However, to be able to respond to unknown versions of QUIC, its packet decoder accepts Connection IDs of up to 255 bytes. As its CID buffers are merely 20 bytes long, Quicly must reject QUIC version 1 packets with Connection IDs longer than that. The command line tool bundled with Quicly has had that check, however the library itself lacked such enforcement. As a consequence, when used by applications that lack their own enforcement, the connection state becoming inconsistent to buffer overrun. Fortunately, the overflow stops within the allocated chunk of memory, but nevertheless, the bug leads to assertion failures. This issue has been fixed by commit 8b178e6."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "Quicly es una implementaci\u00f3n del protocolo QUIC de la IETF destinada principalmente para su uso dentro del servidor HTTP H2O. Antes del commit 8b178e6, Quicly es vulnerable a un ataque de denegaci\u00f3n de servicio a trav\u00e9s de la corrupci\u00f3n del estado de la conexi\u00f3n. En QUIC Invariants, la longitud m\u00e1xima de un ID de Conexi\u00f3n es de 255 bytes, mientras que la versi\u00f3n 1 de QUIC restringe a\u00fan m\u00e1s el m\u00e1ximo a 20 bytes. Quicly implementa la versi\u00f3n 1 de QUIC y, por lo tanto, sus b\u00faferes CID est\u00e1n limitados a 20 bytes. Sin embargo, para poder responder a versiones desconocidas de QUIC, su decodificador de paquetes acepta IDs de Conexi\u00f3n de hasta 255 bytes. Como sus b\u00faferes CID tienen solo 20 bytes de longitud, Quicly debe rechazar los paquetes de la versi\u00f3n 1 de QUIC con IDs de Conexi\u00f3n m\u00e1s largos que eso. La herramienta de l\u00ednea de comandos incluida con Quicly ten\u00eda esa verificaci\u00f3n, sin embargo, la biblioteca misma carec\u00eda de tal aplicaci\u00f3n. Como consecuencia, cuando es utilizado por aplicaciones que carecen de su propia aplicaci\u00f3n, el estado de la conexi\u00f3n se vuelve inconsistente debido a un desbordamiento de b\u00fafer. Afortunadamente, el desbordamiento se detiene dentro del fragmento de memoria asignado, pero, sin embargo, el error conduce a fallos de aserci\u00f3n. Este problema ha sido solucionado por el commit 8b178e6."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-44436",
"lastModified": "2026-10-24T20:10:00.137",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.5,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 3.6,
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-44436",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "yes"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-07-17T10:48:23.373806Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-07-16T23:16:17.143",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/h2o/quicly/commit/8b178e692c51a3b1031612ef89f03a53aac63c15"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Third Party Advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/h2o/quicly/security/advisories/GHSA-v55w-59qx-2v78"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-120"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-787"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
},
"vulnrichment": {
"containers": {
"adp": [
{
"metrics": [
{
"other": {
"content": {
"id": "CVE-2026-44436",
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "none"
},
{
"Automatable": "yes"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-07-17T10:48:23.373806Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"type": "ssvc"
}
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-07-17T10:48:30.484Z",
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP"
},
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
}
],
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "quicly",
"vendor": "h2o",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 8b178e6"
}
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Quicly is an IETF QUIC protocol implementation intended primarily for use within the H2O HTTP server. Prior to commit 8b178e6, Quicly is vulnerable to a Denial of Service attack through connection state corruption. In QUIC Invariants, the maximum length of a Connection ID is 255 bytes, while QUIC version 1 further restricts the maximum to 20 bytes. Quicly implements QUIC version 1 and therefore its CID buffers are limited to 20 bytes. However, to be able to respond to unknown versions of QUIC, its packet decoder accepts Connection IDs of up to 255 bytes. As its CID buffers are merely 20 bytes long, Quicly must reject QUIC version 1 packets with Connection IDs longer than that. The command line tool bundled with Quicly has had that check, however the library itself lacked such enforcement. As a consequence, when used by applications that lack their own enforcement, the connection state becoming inconsistent to buffer overrun. Fortunately, the overflow stops within the allocated chunk of memory, but nevertheless, the bug leads to assertion failures. This issue has been fixed by commit 8b178e6."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.5,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
}
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-120",
"description": "CWE-120: Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input (\u0027Classic Buffer Overflow\u0027)",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
},
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-787",
"description": "CWE-787: Out-of-bounds Write",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-07-16T22:44:34.254Z",
"orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
"shortName": "GitHub_M"
},
"references": [
{
"name": "https://github.com/h2o/quicly/security/advisories/GHSA-v55w-59qx-2v78",
"tags": [
"x_refsource_CONFIRM"
],
"url": "https://github.com/h2o/quicly/security/advisories/GHSA-v55w-59qx-2v78"
},
{
"name": "https://github.com/h2o/quicly/commit/8b178e692c51a3b1031612ef89f03a53aac63c15",
"tags": [
"x_refsource_MISC"
],
"url": "https://github.com/h2o/quicly/commit/8b178e692c51a3b1031612ef89f03a53aac63c15"
}
],
"source": {
"advisory": "GHSA-v55w-59qx-2v78",
"discovery": "UNKNOWN"
},
"title": "Quicly is vulnerable to connection state corruption"
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
"assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-44436",
"datePublished": "2026-07-16T22:44:34.254Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-05-06T14:40:00.954Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-07-17T10:48:33.974Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
}
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.