CVE-2026-126624 (GCVE-0-2026-126624)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-11 08:31 – Updated: 2026-11-11 08:31
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Unverified Ownership in hMailServer
Summary
Unverified ownership in the Windows installer of Progressive Robot hMailServer 6.3.7 allows a local authenticated user to run code as the mail server's service account or as an administrator when setup installs into, or upgrades, a program folder that accounts other than the administrators could write before, such as one made beforehand at the root of a drive. 6.3.7 fixed CVE-2026-107571 by giving the program folder, Bin and ControlPanel permissions that only administrators may change, but setup refused nothing that was already in them, or in the folders that hold the event script, the add-ons and the database scripts: a program, a library, a script or a settings file that another account owns, or whose own permissions let another account change it, is kept with that owner and those permissions, which the hardening of the folders does not take away. Setup then runs programs from Bin with the administrator's elevated rights, and the service, which runs as LocalSystem or as its virtual account, runs them and the event script, so that a library such an account placed in Bin is loaded in place of the system's; the account can still change the file after the installation. The default installation under Program Files is not affected.
Severity
7.3 (High)
CWE
- CWE-283 - Unverified Ownership
Assigner
References
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Progressive Robot Ltd | hMailServer |
Affected:
6.3.7
|
guessed |
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"product": "hMailServer",
"repo": "https://gitlab.com/hmailserver/hmailserver",
"vendor": "Progressive Robot Ltd",
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"value": "Unverified ownership in the Windows installer of Progressive Robot hMailServer 6.3.7 allows a local authenticated user to run code as the mail server\u0027s service account or as an administrator when setup installs into, or upgrades, a program folder that accounts other than the administrators could write before, such as one made beforehand at the root of a drive. 6.3.7 fixed CVE-2026-107571 by giving the program folder, Bin and ControlPanel permissions that only administrators may change, but setup refused nothing that was already in them, or in the folders that hold the event script, the add-ons and the database scripts: a program, a library, a script or a settings file that another account owns, or whose own permissions let another account change it, is kept with that owner and those permissions, which the hardening of the folders does not take away. Setup then runs programs from Bin with the administrator\u0027s elevated rights, and the service, which runs as LocalSystem or as its virtual account, runs them and the event script, so that a library such an account placed in Bin is loaded in place of the system\u0027s; the account can still change the file after the installation. The default installation under Program Files is not affected."
}
],
"metrics": [
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"cvssV3_1": {
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"baseScore": 7.3,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
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"providerMetadata": {
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"orgId": "ceab7361-8a18-47b1-92ba-4d7d25f6715a",
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},
{
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},
{
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-107571"
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"solutions": [
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"lang": "en",
"value": "Upgrade to hMailServer 6.3.8, whose setup looks, before it stops the service and again once the folders are hardened, at everything in Bin and ControlPanel, on the program folder\u0027s own level, and in Addons, Events, DBScripts, WebAdmin, Languages and MySQL, and refuses with exit code 7 to install where a program, a library, a script, a settings file or a folder there is owned by anybody but SYSTEM, the Administrators or TrustedInstaller, has an owner that cannot be read, or has an entry of its own that lets another account change it, naming each with the icacls that deals with it and a restart of Windows before setup runs again. Until then, install hMailServer under Program Files, or into a new folder inside one that only administrators may change. Before running setup into or over a program folder that other accounts could write, list the owners from an elevated Command Prompt - dir /q /a \"\u003cprogram folder\u003e\" and dir /q /s /a over its Bin, ControlPanel, Events, WebAdmin, DBScripts, Addons, Languages and MySQL, as the hMailServer documentation, ServiceAccount.md, \"Before upgrading an installation at a drive\u0027s root\", gives them for all but MySQL - and the entries of their own, with icacls \"\u003cprogram folder\u003e\" and icacls \"\u003cfolder\u003e\" /T over the same folders, where an entry not marked (I) that gives anybody but SYSTEM, the Administrators or TrustedInstaller a right to change the item is another account\u0027s (the service\u0027s own Modify on hMailServerApiKeys.ini in Bin apart); where anybody but those owns anything there, or has such an entry, do not install over it: reinstall into a new folder as that page\u0027s \"Reinstalling into a new folder\" says."
}
],
"title": "Unverified Ownership in hMailServer"
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
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"datePublished": "2026-11-11T08:31:52.133Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-11-11T08:31:02.145Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-11T08:31:52.133Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
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"date": "2026-11-13",
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"percentile": "0.02353"
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"descriptions": [
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"value": "Unverified ownership in the Windows installer of Progressive Robot hMailServer 6.3.7 allows a local authenticated user to run code as the mail server\u0027s service account or as an administrator when setup installs into, or upgrades, a program folder that accounts other than the administrators could write before, such as one made beforehand at the root of a drive. 6.3.7 fixed CVE-2026-107571 by giving the program folder, Bin and ControlPanel permissions that only administrators may change, but setup refused nothing that was already in them, or in the folders that hold the event script, the add-ons and the database scripts: a program, a library, a script or a settings file that another account owns, or whose own permissions let another account change it, is kept with that owner and those permissions, which the hardening of the folders does not take away. Setup then runs programs from Bin with the administrator\u0027s elevated rights, and the service, which runs as LocalSystem or as its virtual account, runs them and the event script, so that a library such an account placed in Bin is loaded in place of the system\u0027s; the account can still change the file after the installation. The default installation under Program Files is not affected."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-126624",
"lastModified": "2026-11-12T19:05:35.013",
"metrics": {
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"published": "2026-11-11T09:17:14.690",
"references": [
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"source": "cve@gitlab.com",
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}
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Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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