CVE-2026-119078 (GCVE-0-2026-119078)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-09 20:11 – Updated: 2026-11-10 00:11
VLAI
Title
Apache Commons Codec: Blake3 doFinalize is stateless; the documented KDF example derives identical keys
Summary
Apache Commons Codec's Blake3 class documented the output of its doFinalize methods as depending on any previously finalized bytes, so that consecutive calls would return different output. In fact, doFinalize does not change the hash state: calling it again without supplying more input returns the same bytes. The key-derivation example in the class Javadoc, shipped since 1.16.0, derives two keys with two consecutive doFinalize calls. Code that follows it gets identical keys, so the separation between the derived keys is lost. The same applies to any application that calls doFinalize more than once on one instance and expects new output each time. This issue affects Apache Commons Codec from 1.16.0 before 1.23.0. Version 1.23.0 corrects the documentation, but the behavior of doFinalize is unchanged. Upgrading alone does not fix affected code. Users should check their applications for repeated doFinalize calls on the same Blake3 instance and derive multiple keys by requesting the combined length in one call and splitting the output, as the updated Javadoc shows.
Severity
No CVSS data available.
CWE
  • CWE-684 - Incorrect Provision of Specified Functionality
  • CWE-1068 - Inconsistency Between Implementation and Documented Design
Assigner
apache CNA under the mitre root
CNA scorecard B 76/100 over 1236 records in the last 180 days details
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
Apache Software Foundation Apache Commons Codec Affected: 1.16.0 , < 1.23.0 (maven)
guessed Create a notification for this product.
Credits
Claude Security Gary D. Gregory
Show details on NVD website
To clipboard 

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