Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-RV28-228V-C565

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-09 21:32 – Updated: 2026-11-10 03:30

Details

This issue affects Apache Commons Codec from 1.16.0 before 1.23.0.

Version 1.23.0 corrects the documentation, but the behavior of doFinalize is unchanged. Upgrading alone does not fix affected code. Users should check their applications for repeated doFinalize calls on the same Blake3 instance and derive multiple keys by requesting the combined length in one call and splitting the output, as the updated Javadoc shows.

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-119078"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-684"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-09T20:18:04Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "Apache Commons Codec\u0027s Blake3 class documented the output of its doFinalize methods as depending on any previously finalized bytes, so that consecutive calls would return different output. In fact, doFinalize does not change the hash state: calling it again without supplying more input returns the same bytes. The key-derivation example in the class Javadoc, shipped since 1.16.0, derives two keys with two consecutive doFinalize calls. Code that follows it gets identical keys, so the separation between the derived keys is lost. The same applies to any application that calls doFinalize more than once on one instance and expects new output each time.\n\n\n\nThis issue affects Apache Commons Codec from 1.16.0 before 1.23.0.\n\n\n\nVersion 1.23.0 corrects the documentation, but the behavior of doFinalize is unchanged. Upgrading alone does not fix affected code. Users should check their applications for repeated doFinalize calls on the same Blake3 instance and derive multiple keys by requesting the combined length in one call and splitting the output, as the updated Javadoc shows.",
  "id": "GHSA-rv28-228v-c565",
  "modified": "2026-11-10T03:30:24Z",
  "published": "2026-11-09T21:32:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-119078"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/ol71kdgopfxwlxgqmkd0jrfcw05wdq5z"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/11/09/29"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

CVE-2026-119078 (GCVE-0-2026-119078)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-09 20:11 – Updated: 2026-11-10 00:11

Title

Apache Commons Codec: Blake3 doFinalize is stateless; the documented KDF example derives identical keys

Summary

Apache Commons Codec's Blake3 class documented the output of its doFinalize methods as depending on any previously finalized bytes, so that consecutive calls would return different output. In fact, doFinalize does not change the hash state: calling it again without supplying more input returns the same bytes. The key-derivation example in the class Javadoc, shipped since 1.16.0, derives two keys with two consecutive doFinalize calls. Code that follows it gets identical keys, so the separation between the derived keys is lost. The same applies to any application that calls doFinalize more than once on one instance and expects new output each time. This issue affects Apache Commons Codec from 1.16.0 before 1.23.0. Version 1.23.0 corrects the documentation, but the behavior of doFinalize is unchanged. Upgrading alone does not fix affected code. Users should check their applications for repeated doFinalize calls on the same Blake3 instance and derive multiple keys by requesting the combined length in one call and splitting the output, as the updated Javadoc shows.

Severity

No CVSS data available.

CWE

CWE-684 - Incorrect Provision of Specified Functionality
CWE-1068 - Inconsistency Between Implementation and Documented Design

Assigner

apache CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard B 76/100 over 1236 records in the last 180 days details

References

2 references

URL	Tags
https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/ol71kdgopfxw…	vendor-advisory
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/1…

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
Apache Software Foundation	Apache Commons Codec	Affected: 1.16.0 , < 1.23.0 (maven)

Credits

Claude Security Gary D. Gregory

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

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Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

Order JSON

How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Publication & reservation Sightings KEV catalogs Other timestamps

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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

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