CVE-2026-118988 (GCVE-0-2026-118988)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-30 12:34 – Updated: 2026-10-30 15:05
VLAI
Title
CallBackery versions before 0.60.1 for Perl let unauthenticated clients read the POD of any file via path traversal in the /doc route
Summary
CallBackery versions before 0.60.1 for Perl let unauthenticated clients read the POD of any file via path traversal in the /doc route. Every CallBackery application mounts its documentation plugin at /doc, ahead of any session check. The route passes the requested name to Pod::Simple::Search->find without validation. find splits the name on "::" and joins the parts into a file path, so a name such as "..::..::..::etc::motd" escapes @INC. Any file the server process can read is reachable. Only POD is rendered, but a file with a POD directive and no "=cut" is POD to the end of the file.
Severity
No CVSS data available.
CWE
  • CWE-22 - Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Assigner
CPANSec CNA under the redhat root
CNA scorecard C 62/100 over 343 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
Affected: 0 , < 0.60.1 (custom)
Show details on NVD website

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