CVE-2026-115477 (GCVE-0-2026-115477)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-23 14:04 – Updated: 2026-10-23 14:04
VLAI
Title
obsidian-tc: Declined human-in-the-loop confirmations can permit destructive calls over HTTP
Summary
obsidian-tc is a governed, agent-ready Model Context Protocol server for Obsidian vaults. From 1.13.0 until 1.31.4, on a Streamable HTTP deployment with `auth.jwtSecret` configured and a 2026-07-28-era client declaring `elicitation.form` support, a dispatch-gated tool call offered an `inputRequired` confirmation could still complete after the human declined or cancelled, or the elicitation response was omitted or malformed, provided the client echoed the validly bound `requestState` on resubmission. The server trusted an authentic, call-bound state as proof of approval even though that state was minted before the `elicitation/create` leg was asked and proved only that the resubmission belonged to the same call. A client behaving incorrectly or under an attacker's control could therefore execute dispatch-gated destructive vault operations without the human's approval, while still requiring the caller's ordinary tool permissions. Only tools marked `destructive: true` or requiring a scope with a human-in-the-loop floor were reachable through this bypass. The sixteen handler-side conditionally gated tools, including `write_note` overwrite and `move_note`, did not read elicitation state on the modern wire and let neither approval nor decline through that path. Affected deployments using stdio or leaving `auth.jwtSecret` unset instead used the CLI `elicit_token` fallback and did not offer this `requestState` round trip. The fix does not prevent a malicious client from reporting a fabricated approval, because the server cannot verify that the client displayed the form or that a human saw it. This issue is fixed in version 1.31.4.
Severity
7.1 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
CWE
Assigner
GitHub_M CNA under the mitre root
CNA scorecard C 72/100 over 7761 records in the last 180 days details
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
The-40-Thieves obsidian-tc Affected: >= 1.13.0, < 1.31.4
guessed Create a notification for this product.
Show details on NVD website
To clipboard 

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "obsidian-tc",
          "vendor": "The-40-Thieves",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 1.13.0, \u003c 1.31.4"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "obsidian-tc is a governed, agent-ready Model Context Protocol server for Obsidian vaults. From 1.13.0 until 1.31.4, on a Streamable HTTP deployment with `auth.jwtSecret` configured and a 2026-07-28-era client declaring `elicitation.form` support, a dispatch-gated tool call offered an `inputRequired` confirmation could still complete after the human declined or cancelled, or the elicitation response was omitted or malformed, provided the client echoed the validly bound `requestState` on resubmission. The server trusted an authentic, call-bound state as proof of approval even though that state was minted before the `elicitation/create` leg was asked and proved only that the resubmission belonged to the same call. A client behaving incorrectly or under an attacker\u0027s control could therefore execute dispatch-gated destructive vault operations without the human\u0027s approval, while still requiring the caller\u0027s ordinary tool permissions. Only tools marked `destructive: true` or requiring a scope with a human-in-the-loop floor were reachable through this bypass. The sixteen handler-side conditionally gated tools, including `write_note` overwrite and `move_note`, did not read elicitation state on the modern wire and let neither approval nor decline through that path. Affected deployments using stdio or leaving `auth.jwtSecret` unset instead used the CLI `elicit_token` fallback and did not offer this `requestState` round trip. The fix does not prevent a malicious client from reporting a fabricated approval, because the server cannot verify that the client displayed the form or that a human saw it. This issue is fixed in version 1.31.4."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV4_0": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackRequirements": "NONE",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "baseScore": 7.1,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
            "version": "4.0",
            "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "LOW",
            "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-285",
              "description": "CWE-285: Improper Authorization",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-863",
              "description": "CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-10-23T14:04:33.518Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/security/advisories/GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/security/advisories/GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/issues/967",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/issues/967"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/pull/969",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/pull/969"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/commit/101c91c656e2c2b88bcf3696a5da035f8c032c71",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/commit/101c91c656e2c2b88bcf3696a5da035f8c032c71"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/blob/v1.31.4/CHANGELOG.md",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/blob/v1.31.4/CHANGELOG.md"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/releases/tag/v1.31.4",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/releases/tag/v1.31.4"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "obsidian-tc: Declined human-in-the-loop confirmations can permit destructive calls over HTTP"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-115477",
    "datePublished": "2026-10-23T14:04:33.518Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-10-22T15:06:52.738Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-10-23T14:04:33.518Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2",
  "vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
    "epss": {
      "cve": "CVE-2026-115477",
      "date": "2026-10-24",
      "epss": "0.00496",
      "percentile": "0.41722"
    },
    "nvd": {
      "cve": {
        "affected": [
          {
            "affectedData": [
              {
                "product": "obsidian-tc",
                "vendor": "The-40-Thieves",
                "versions": [
                  {
                    "status": "affected",
                    "version": "\u003e= 1.13.0, \u003c 1.31.4"
                  }
                ]
              }
            ],
            "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
          }
        ],
        "cveTags": [],
        "descriptions": [
          {
            "lang": "en",
            "value": "obsidian-tc is a governed, agent-ready Model Context Protocol server for Obsidian vaults. From 1.13.0 until 1.31.4, on a Streamable HTTP deployment with `auth.jwtSecret` configured and a 2026-07-28-era client declaring `elicitation.form` support, a dispatch-gated tool call offered an `inputRequired` confirmation could still complete after the human declined or cancelled, or the elicitation response was omitted or malformed, provided the client echoed the validly bound `requestState` on resubmission. The server trusted an authentic, call-bound state as proof of approval even though that state was minted before the `elicitation/create` leg was asked and proved only that the resubmission belonged to the same call. A client behaving incorrectly or under an attacker\u0027s control could therefore execute dispatch-gated destructive vault operations without the human\u0027s approval, while still requiring the caller\u0027s ordinary tool permissions. Only tools marked `destructive: true` or requiring a scope with a human-in-the-loop floor were reachable through this bypass. The sixteen handler-side conditionally gated tools, including `write_note` overwrite and `move_note`, did not read elicitation state on the modern wire and let neither approval nor decline through that path. Affected deployments using stdio or leaving `auth.jwtSecret` unset instead used the CLI `elicit_token` fallback and did not offer this `requestState` round trip. The fix does not prevent a malicious client from reporting a fabricated approval, because the server cannot verify that the client displayed the form or that a human saw it. This issue is fixed in version 1.31.4."
          }
        ],
        "id": "CVE-2026-115477",
        "lastModified": "2026-10-23T15:17:29.967",
        "metrics": {
          "cvssMetricV40": [
            {
              "cvssData": {
                "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "attackComplexity": "LOW",
                "attackRequirements": "NONE",
                "attackVector": "NETWORK",
                "availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "baseScore": 7.1,
                "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
                "confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
                "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
                "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
                "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
                "userInteraction": "NONE",
                "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
                "version": "4.0",
                "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "LOW",
                "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
                "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
                "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
              },
              "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
              "type": "Secondary"
            }
          ]
        },
        "published": "2026-10-23T15:17:29.840",
        "references": [
          {
            "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
            "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/blob/v1.31.4/CHANGELOG.md"
          },
          {
            "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
            "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/commit/101c91c656e2c2b88bcf3696a5da035f8c032c71"
          },
          {
            "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
            "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/issues/967"
          },
          {
            "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
            "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/pull/969"
          },
          {
            "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
            "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/releases/tag/v1.31.4"
          },
          {
            "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
            "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/security/advisories/GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc"
          }
        ],
        "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
        "weaknesses": [
          {
            "description": [
              {
                "lang": "en",
                "value": "CWE-285"
              },
              {
                "lang": "en",
                "value": "CWE-863"
              }
            ],
            "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
            "type": "Primary"
          }
        ]
      }
    }
  }
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.




Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON

Loading timeline…




    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.