Vulnerability-Lookup

FKIE_CVE-2026-115477

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-10-23 15:17 - Updated: 2026-10-23 15:17

Severity

7.1 (High) - CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Summary

obsidian-tc is a governed, agent-ready Model Context Protocol server for Obsidian vaults. From 1.13.0 until 1.31.4, on a Streamable HTTP deployment with `auth.jwtSecret` configured and a 2026-07-28-era client declaring `elicitation.form` support, a dispatch-gated tool call offered an `inputRequired` confirmation could still complete after the human declined or cancelled, or the elicitation response was omitted or malformed, provided the client echoed the validly bound `requestState` on resubmission. The server trusted an authentic, call-bound state as proof of approval even though that state was minted before the `elicitation/create` leg was asked and proved only that the resubmission belonged to the same call. A client behaving incorrectly or under an attacker's control could therefore execute dispatch-gated destructive vault operations without the human's approval, while still requiring the caller's ordinary tool permissions. Only tools marked `destructive: true` or requiring a scope with a human-in-the-loop floor were reachable through this bypass. The sixteen handler-side conditionally gated tools, including `write_note` overwrite and `move_note`, did not read elicitation state on the modern wire and let neither approval nor decline through that path. Affected deployments using stdio or leaving `auth.jwtSecret` unset instead used the CLI `elicit_token` fallback and did not offer this `requestState` round trip. The fix does not prevent a malicious client from reporting a fabricated approval, because the server cannot verify that the client displayed the form or that a human saw it. This issue is fixed in version 1.31.4.

References

	URL	Tags
	security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/blob/v1.31.4/CHANGELOG.md
	security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/commit/101c91c656e2c2b88bcf3696a5da035f8c032c71
	security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/issues/967
	security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/pull/969
	security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/releases/tag/v1.31.4
	security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/security/advisories/GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc

Impacted products

	Vendor	Product	Version

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "obsidian-tc",
          "vendor": "The-40-Thieves",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 1.13.0, \u003c 1.31.4"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "obsidian-tc is a governed, agent-ready Model Context Protocol server for Obsidian vaults. From 1.13.0 until 1.31.4, on a Streamable HTTP deployment with `auth.jwtSecret` configured and a 2026-07-28-era client declaring `elicitation.form` support, a dispatch-gated tool call offered an `inputRequired` confirmation could still complete after the human declined or cancelled, or the elicitation response was omitted or malformed, provided the client echoed the validly bound `requestState` on resubmission. The server trusted an authentic, call-bound state as proof of approval even though that state was minted before the `elicitation/create` leg was asked and proved only that the resubmission belonged to the same call. A client behaving incorrectly or under an attacker\u0027s control could therefore execute dispatch-gated destructive vault operations without the human\u0027s approval, while still requiring the caller\u0027s ordinary tool permissions. Only tools marked `destructive: true` or requiring a scope with a human-in-the-loop floor were reachable through this bypass. The sixteen handler-side conditionally gated tools, including `write_note` overwrite and `move_note`, did not read elicitation state on the modern wire and let neither approval nor decline through that path. Affected deployments using stdio or leaving `auth.jwtSecret` unset instead used the CLI `elicit_token` fallback and did not offer this `requestState` round trip. The fix does not prevent a malicious client from reporting a fabricated approval, because the server cannot verify that the client displayed the form or that a human saw it. This issue is fixed in version 1.31.4."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-115477",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-23T15:17:29.967",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV40": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackRequirements": "NONE",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "baseScore": 7.1,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
          "version": "4.0",
          "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "LOW",
          "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
        },
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-10-23T15:17:29.840",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/blob/v1.31.4/CHANGELOG.md"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/commit/101c91c656e2c2b88bcf3696a5da035f8c032c71"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/issues/967"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/pull/969"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/releases/tag/v1.31.4"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/security/advisories/GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-285"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-863"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Primary"
    }
  ]
}

CVE-2026-115477 (GCVE-0-2026-115477)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-23 14:04 – Updated: 2026-10-23 14:04

Title

obsidian-tc: Declined human-in-the-loop confirmations can permit destructive calls over HTTP

Summary

Severity

7.1 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

CWE

CWE-285 - Improper Authorization
CWE-863 - Incorrect Authorization

Assigner

GitHub_M CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard C 72/100 over 7761 records in the last 180 days details

References

6 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/sec…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/iss…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/pull/969	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/com…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/blo…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/rel…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
The-40-Thieves	obsidian-tc	Affected: >= 1.13.0, < 1.31.4

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "obsidian-tc",
          "vendor": "The-40-Thieves",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 1.13.0, \u003c 1.31.4"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "obsidian-tc is a governed, agent-ready Model Context Protocol server for Obsidian vaults. From 1.13.0 until 1.31.4, on a Streamable HTTP deployment with `auth.jwtSecret` configured and a 2026-07-28-era client declaring `elicitation.form` support, a dispatch-gated tool call offered an `inputRequired` confirmation could still complete after the human declined or cancelled, or the elicitation response was omitted or malformed, provided the client echoed the validly bound `requestState` on resubmission. The server trusted an authentic, call-bound state as proof of approval even though that state was minted before the `elicitation/create` leg was asked and proved only that the resubmission belonged to the same call. A client behaving incorrectly or under an attacker\u0027s control could therefore execute dispatch-gated destructive vault operations without the human\u0027s approval, while still requiring the caller\u0027s ordinary tool permissions. Only tools marked `destructive: true` or requiring a scope with a human-in-the-loop floor were reachable through this bypass. The sixteen handler-side conditionally gated tools, including `write_note` overwrite and `move_note`, did not read elicitation state on the modern wire and let neither approval nor decline through that path. Affected deployments using stdio or leaving `auth.jwtSecret` unset instead used the CLI `elicit_token` fallback and did not offer this `requestState` round trip. The fix does not prevent a malicious client from reporting a fabricated approval, because the server cannot verify that the client displayed the form or that a human saw it. This issue is fixed in version 1.31.4."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV4_0": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackRequirements": "NONE",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "baseScore": 7.1,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
            "version": "4.0",
            "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "LOW",
            "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-285",
              "description": "CWE-285: Improper Authorization",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-863",
              "description": "CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-10-23T14:04:33.518Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/security/advisories/GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/security/advisories/GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/issues/967",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/issues/967"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/pull/969",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/pull/969"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/commit/101c91c656e2c2b88bcf3696a5da035f8c032c71",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/commit/101c91c656e2c2b88bcf3696a5da035f8c032c71"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/blob/v1.31.4/CHANGELOG.md",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/blob/v1.31.4/CHANGELOG.md"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/releases/tag/v1.31.4",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/releases/tag/v1.31.4"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "obsidian-tc: Declined human-in-the-loop confirmations can permit destructive calls over HTTP"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-115477",
    "datePublished": "2026-10-23T14:04:33.518Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-10-22T15:06:52.738Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-10-23T14:04:33.518Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

Order JSON

Publication & reservation Sightings KEV catalogs Other timestamps

Loading timeline…

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

Action not permitted