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2 vulnerabilities by tidewave-ai
CVE-2026-109823 (GCVE-0-2026-109823)
Vulnerability from nvd – Published: 2026-10-27 15:47 – Updated: 2026-10-27 15:47
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Host filesystem path disclosure via DNS rebinding
Summary
An attacker can read the name of filesystem paths of your application present via Tidewave configuration via /tidewave/connect or via the rendered toolbar.
Neither response checks the Host header. A web page that rebinds its own domain to the loopback address can therefore read the tag with a same-origin request, which carries no Origin header. The paths usually reveal the local username and the project layout.
This issue affects tidewave: from 0.8.0 before 0.9.2.
Severity
CWE
- CWE-497 - Exposure of Sensitive System Information to an Unauthorized Control Sphere
Assigner
References
4 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-109823.html | relatedthird-party-advisory |
| https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-109823 | related |
| https://github.com/tidewave-ai/tidewave_phoenix/c… | related |
| https://github.com/tidewave-ai/tidewave_phoenix/c… | patch |
Impacted products
2 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| tidewave-ai | tidewave |
Affected:
0.8.0 , < 0.9.2
(semver)
cpe:2.3:a:tidewave-ai:tidewave:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
|
| tidewave-ai | tidewave |
Affected:
f78352b56d19cd4ae49999aa385011cef73e8b93 , < 80159536f752dc4d34797934d1516f29cea12b50
(git)
cpe:2.3:a:tidewave-ai:tidewave:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
{
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"\u0027Elixir.Tidewave.Router\u0027"
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"credits": [
{
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"value": "Neil Berkman"
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{
"lang": "en",
"type": "reporter",
"value": "Neil Berkman"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "coordinator",
"value": "Jonatan M\u00e4nnchen / EEF"
}
],
"dateAssigned": "2026-10-23T13:15:52.000Z",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
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"value": "\u003cp\u003eAn attacker can read the name of filesystem paths of your application present via Tidewave configuration via /tidewave/connect or via the rendered toolbar.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eNeither response checks the \u003ccode\u003eHost\u003c/code\u003e header. A web page that rebinds its own domain to the loopback address can therefore read the tag with a same-origin request, which carries no \u003ccode\u003eOrigin\u003c/code\u003e header. The paths usually reveal the local username and the project layout.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects tidewave: from 0.8.0 before 0.9.2.\u003c/p\u003e"
},
{
"base64": false,
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"value": "An attacker can read the name of filesystem paths of your application present via Tidewave configuration via /tidewave/connect or via the rendered toolbar.\n\nNeither response checks the `Host` header. A web page that rebinds its own domain to the loopback address can therefore read the tag with a same-origin request, which carries no `Origin` header. The paths usually reveal the local username and the project layout.\n\nThis issue affects tidewave: from 0.8.0 before 0.9.2."
}
],
"value": "An attacker can read the name of filesystem paths of your application present via Tidewave configuration via /tidewave/connect or via the rendered toolbar.\n\nNeither response checks the Host header. A web page that rebinds its own domain to the loopback address can therefore read the tag with a same-origin request, which carries no Origin header. The paths usually reveal the local username and the project layout.\n\nThis issue affects tidewave: from 0.8.0 before 0.9.2."
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"value": "\u003cp\u003eA malicious web page that a developer visits while the Phoenix development server runs can learn the developer\u0027s username, project location, and dependency layout on disk. This information helps an attacker prepare further attacks against the machine.\u003c/p\u003e"
},
{
"base64": false,
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"value": "A malicious web page that a developer visits while the Phoenix development server runs can learn the developer\u0027s username, project location, and dependency layout on disk. This information helps an attacker prepare further attacks against the machine."
}
],
"value": "A malicious web page that a developer visits while the Phoenix development server runs can learn the developer\u0027s username, project location, and dependency layout on disk. This information helps an attacker prepare further attacks against the machine."
}
]
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV4_0": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"baseScore": 2.3,
"baseSeverity": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "PASSIVE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
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"format": "CVSS",
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"value": "GENERAL"
}
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}
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"descriptions": [
{
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"description": "CWE-497 Exposure of Sensitive System Information to an Unauthorized Control Sphere",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
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}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-27T15:47:36.862Z",
"orgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"shortName": "EEF"
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"references": [
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"name": "EEF CNA record for CVE-2026-109823",
"tags": [
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"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-109823.html"
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{
"name": "OSV record EEF-CVE-2026-109823",
"tags": [
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"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-109823"
},
{
"name": "Introducing commit f78352b in tidewave-ai/tidewave_phoenix",
"tags": [
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],
"url": "https://github.com/tidewave-ai/tidewave_phoenix/commit/f78352b56d19cd4ae49999aa385011cef73e8b93"
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{
"name": "Fix commit 8015953 in tidewave-ai/tidewave_phoenix",
"tags": [
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"url": "https://github.com/tidewave-ai/tidewave_phoenix/commit/80159536f752dc4d34797934d1516f29cea12b50"
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "UNKNOWN"
},
"title": "Host filesystem path disclosure via DNS rebinding",
"x_proofOfConcept": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eRun a Phoenix or Plug application with \u003ccode\u003eplug Tidewave\u003c/code\u003e on \u003ccode\u003e127.0.0.1:4001\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eFrom a loopback peer, send \u003ccode\u003eGET /tidewave/connect\u003c/code\u003e with \u003ccode\u003eHost: attacker.example:4001\u003c/code\u003e and \u003ccode\u003eSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\u003c/code\u003e, and no \u003ccode\u003eOrigin\u003c/code\u003e header. This is the request a DNS-rebound page makes.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe server answers \u003ccode\u003e200 OK\u003c/code\u003e. The \u003ccode\u003etidewave:config\u003c/code\u003e meta tag contains the absolute project root and the dependency paths.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eSend the same request to any HTML route of the application. The injected toolbar tag contains the same data.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e"
},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "1. Run a Phoenix or Plug application with `plug Tidewave` on `127.0.0.1:4001`.\n2. From a loopback peer, send `GET /tidewave/connect` with `Host: attacker.example:4001` and `Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin`, and no `Origin` header. This is the request a DNS-rebound page makes.\n3. The server answers `200 OK`. The `tidewave:config` meta tag contains the absolute project root and the dependency paths.\n4. Send the same request to any HTML route of the application. The injected toolbar tag contains the same data."
}
],
"value": "* Run a Phoenix or Plug application with plug Tidewave on 127.0.0.1:4001.\n* From a loopback peer, send GET /tidewave/connect with Host: attacker.example:4001 and Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin, and no Origin header. This is the request a DNS-rebound page makes.\n* The server answers 200 OK. The tidewave:config meta tag contains the absolute project root and the dependency paths.\n* Send the same request to any HTML route of the application. The injected toolbar tag contains the same data."
}
],
"x_technicalAnalysis": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e1. Data collection.\u003c/strong\u003e \u003ccode\u003eTidewave.tidewave_config_meta/1\u003c/code\u003e builds a map with \u003ccode\u003eroot\u003c/code\u003e (\u003ccode\u003eTidewave.MCP.root()\u003c/code\u003e), \u003ccode\u003eframework.app_paths\u003c/code\u003e (\u003ccode\u003eMix.Project.deps_paths()\u003c/code\u003e), \u003ccode\u003ewsl_distro\u003c/code\u003e, and \u003ccode\u003ehost_path\u003c/code\u003e. It HTML-escapes the JSON encoding of the map into \u003ccode\u003e\u0026lt;meta name=\"tidewave:config\"\u0026gt;\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2. Exposure.\u003c/strong\u003e \u003ccode\u003eTidewave.Router.control_html/1\u003c/code\u003e serves the tag on \u003ccode\u003eGET /tidewave/connect\u003c/code\u003e. For all other routes, \u003ccode\u003eTidewave.call/2\u003c/code\u003e registers a \u003ccode\u003ebefore_send\u003c/code\u003e callback that injects the tag into every \u003ccode\u003etext/html\u003c/code\u003e response when \u003ccode\u003etoolbar: true\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e3. Read access.\u003c/strong\u003e \u003ccode\u003echeck_origin/2\u003c/code\u003e accepts any request without an \u003ccode\u003eOrigin\u003c/code\u003e header, and no code validates \u003ccode\u003eHost\u003c/code\u003e. After DNS rebinding, the browser sends a same-origin \u003ccode\u003eGET\u003c/code\u003e from a loopback peer.\u003c/p\u003e"
},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "**1. Data collection.** `Tidewave.tidewave_config_meta/1` builds a map with `root` (`Tidewave.MCP.root()`), `framework.app_paths` (`Mix.Project.deps_paths()`), `wsl_distro`, and `host_path`. It HTML-escapes the JSON encoding of the map into `\u003cmeta name=\"tidewave:config\"\u003e`.\n\n**2. Exposure.** `Tidewave.Router.control_html/1` serves the tag on `GET /tidewave/connect`. For all other routes, `Tidewave.call/2` registers a `before_send` callback that injects the tag into every `text/html` response when `toolbar: true`.\n\n**3. Read access.** `check_origin/2` accepts any request without an `Origin` header, and no code validates `Host`. After DNS rebinding, the browser sends a same-origin `GET` from a loopback peer."
}
],
"value": "1. Data collection. Tidewave.tidewave_config_meta/1 builds a map with root (Tidewave.MCP.root()), framework.app_paths (Mix.Project.deps_paths()), wsl_distro, and host_path. It HTML-escapes the JSON encoding of the map into \u003cmeta name=\"tidewave:config\"\u003e.\n\n2. Exposure. Tidewave.Router.control_html/1 serves the tag on GET /tidewave/connect. For all other routes, Tidewave.call/2 registers a before_send callback that injects the tag into every text/html response when toolbar: true.\n\n3. Read access. check_origin/2 accepts any request without an Origin header, and no code validates Host. After DNS rebinding, the browser sends a same-origin GET from a loopback peer."
}
]
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"assignerShortName": "EEF",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-109823",
"datePublished": "2026-10-27T15:47:36.862Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-10-23T13:00:02.150Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-27T15:47:36.862Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
CVE-2026-109823 (GCVE-0-2026-109823)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-27 15:47 – Updated: 2026-10-27 15:47
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Host filesystem path disclosure via DNS rebinding
Summary
An attacker can read the name of filesystem paths of your application present via Tidewave configuration via /tidewave/connect or via the rendered toolbar.
Neither response checks the Host header. A web page that rebinds its own domain to the loopback address can therefore read the tag with a same-origin request, which carries no Origin header. The paths usually reveal the local username and the project layout.
This issue affects tidewave: from 0.8.0 before 0.9.2.
Severity
CWE
- CWE-497 - Exposure of Sensitive System Information to an Unauthorized Control Sphere
Assigner
References
4 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-109823.html | relatedthird-party-advisory |
| https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-109823 | related |
| https://github.com/tidewave-ai/tidewave_phoenix/c… | related |
| https://github.com/tidewave-ai/tidewave_phoenix/c… | patch |
Impacted products
2 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| tidewave-ai | tidewave |
Affected:
0.8.0 , < 0.9.2
(semver)
cpe:2.3:a:tidewave-ai:tidewave:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
|
| tidewave-ai | tidewave |
Affected:
f78352b56d19cd4ae49999aa385011cef73e8b93 , < 80159536f752dc4d34797934d1516f29cea12b50
(git)
cpe:2.3:a:tidewave-ai:tidewave:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
{
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"collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:tidewave-ai:tidewave:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"\u0027Elixir.Tidewave\u0027",
"\u0027Elixir.Tidewave.Router\u0027"
],
"packageName": "tidewave",
"packageURL": "pkg:hex/tidewave",
"product": "tidewave",
"programFiles": [
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],
"programRoutines": [
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},
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},
{
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],
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"vendor": "tidewave-ai",
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"status": "affected",
"version": "0.8.0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://github.com",
"cpes": [
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],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
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],
"packageName": "tidewave-ai/tidewave_phoenix",
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"product": "tidewave",
"programFiles": [
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},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Tidewave.Router\u0027:call/2"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/tidewave-ai/tidewave_phoenix",
"vendor": "tidewave-ai",
"versions": [
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"status": "affected",
"version": "f78352b56d19cd4ae49999aa385011cef73e8b93",
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"credits": [
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"type": "finder",
"value": "Neil Berkman"
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"lang": "en",
"type": "reporter",
"value": "Neil Berkman"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "coordinator",
"value": "Jonatan M\u00e4nnchen / EEF"
}
],
"dateAssigned": "2026-10-23T13:15:52.000Z",
"descriptions": [
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"value": "\u003cp\u003eAn attacker can read the name of filesystem paths of your application present via Tidewave configuration via /tidewave/connect or via the rendered toolbar.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eNeither response checks the \u003ccode\u003eHost\u003c/code\u003e header. A web page that rebinds its own domain to the loopback address can therefore read the tag with a same-origin request, which carries no \u003ccode\u003eOrigin\u003c/code\u003e header. The paths usually reveal the local username and the project layout.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects tidewave: from 0.8.0 before 0.9.2.\u003c/p\u003e"
},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "An attacker can read the name of filesystem paths of your application present via Tidewave configuration via /tidewave/connect or via the rendered toolbar.\n\nNeither response checks the `Host` header. A web page that rebinds its own domain to the loopback address can therefore read the tag with a same-origin request, which carries no `Origin` header. The paths usually reveal the local username and the project layout.\n\nThis issue affects tidewave: from 0.8.0 before 0.9.2."
}
],
"value": "An attacker can read the name of filesystem paths of your application present via Tidewave configuration via /tidewave/connect or via the rendered toolbar.\n\nNeither response checks the Host header. A web page that rebinds its own domain to the loopback address can therefore read the tag with a same-origin request, which carries no Origin header. The paths usually reveal the local username and the project layout.\n\nThis issue affects tidewave: from 0.8.0 before 0.9.2."
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},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "A malicious web page that a developer visits while the Phoenix development server runs can learn the developer\u0027s username, project location, and dependency layout on disk. This information helps an attacker prepare further attacks against the machine."
}
],
"value": "A malicious web page that a developer visits while the Phoenix development server runs can learn the developer\u0027s username, project location, and dependency layout on disk. This information helps an attacker prepare further attacks against the machine."
}
]
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV4_0": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"baseScore": 2.3,
"baseSeverity": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "PASSIVE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-497",
"description": "CWE-497 Exposure of Sensitive System Information to an Unauthorized Control Sphere",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-27T15:47:36.862Z",
"orgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"shortName": "EEF"
},
"references": [
{
"name": "EEF CNA record for CVE-2026-109823",
"tags": [
"related",
"third-party-advisory"
],
"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-109823.html"
},
{
"name": "OSV record EEF-CVE-2026-109823",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-109823"
},
{
"name": "Introducing commit f78352b in tidewave-ai/tidewave_phoenix",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://github.com/tidewave-ai/tidewave_phoenix/commit/f78352b56d19cd4ae49999aa385011cef73e8b93"
},
{
"name": "Fix commit 8015953 in tidewave-ai/tidewave_phoenix",
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/tidewave-ai/tidewave_phoenix/commit/80159536f752dc4d34797934d1516f29cea12b50"
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "UNKNOWN"
},
"title": "Host filesystem path disclosure via DNS rebinding",
"x_proofOfConcept": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eRun a Phoenix or Plug application with \u003ccode\u003eplug Tidewave\u003c/code\u003e on \u003ccode\u003e127.0.0.1:4001\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eFrom a loopback peer, send \u003ccode\u003eGET /tidewave/connect\u003c/code\u003e with \u003ccode\u003eHost: attacker.example:4001\u003c/code\u003e and \u003ccode\u003eSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\u003c/code\u003e, and no \u003ccode\u003eOrigin\u003c/code\u003e header. This is the request a DNS-rebound page makes.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe server answers \u003ccode\u003e200 OK\u003c/code\u003e. The \u003ccode\u003etidewave:config\u003c/code\u003e meta tag contains the absolute project root and the dependency paths.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eSend the same request to any HTML route of the application. The injected toolbar tag contains the same data.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e"
},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "1. Run a Phoenix or Plug application with `plug Tidewave` on `127.0.0.1:4001`.\n2. From a loopback peer, send `GET /tidewave/connect` with `Host: attacker.example:4001` and `Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin`, and no `Origin` header. This is the request a DNS-rebound page makes.\n3. The server answers `200 OK`. The `tidewave:config` meta tag contains the absolute project root and the dependency paths.\n4. Send the same request to any HTML route of the application. The injected toolbar tag contains the same data."
}
],
"value": "* Run a Phoenix or Plug application with plug Tidewave on 127.0.0.1:4001.\n* From a loopback peer, send GET /tidewave/connect with Host: attacker.example:4001 and Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin, and no Origin header. This is the request a DNS-rebound page makes.\n* The server answers 200 OK. The tidewave:config meta tag contains the absolute project root and the dependency paths.\n* Send the same request to any HTML route of the application. The injected toolbar tag contains the same data."
}
],
"x_technicalAnalysis": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e1. Data collection.\u003c/strong\u003e \u003ccode\u003eTidewave.tidewave_config_meta/1\u003c/code\u003e builds a map with \u003ccode\u003eroot\u003c/code\u003e (\u003ccode\u003eTidewave.MCP.root()\u003c/code\u003e), \u003ccode\u003eframework.app_paths\u003c/code\u003e (\u003ccode\u003eMix.Project.deps_paths()\u003c/code\u003e), \u003ccode\u003ewsl_distro\u003c/code\u003e, and \u003ccode\u003ehost_path\u003c/code\u003e. It HTML-escapes the JSON encoding of the map into \u003ccode\u003e\u0026lt;meta name=\"tidewave:config\"\u0026gt;\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2. Exposure.\u003c/strong\u003e \u003ccode\u003eTidewave.Router.control_html/1\u003c/code\u003e serves the tag on \u003ccode\u003eGET /tidewave/connect\u003c/code\u003e. For all other routes, \u003ccode\u003eTidewave.call/2\u003c/code\u003e registers a \u003ccode\u003ebefore_send\u003c/code\u003e callback that injects the tag into every \u003ccode\u003etext/html\u003c/code\u003e response when \u003ccode\u003etoolbar: true\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e3. Read access.\u003c/strong\u003e \u003ccode\u003echeck_origin/2\u003c/code\u003e accepts any request without an \u003ccode\u003eOrigin\u003c/code\u003e header, and no code validates \u003ccode\u003eHost\u003c/code\u003e. After DNS rebinding, the browser sends a same-origin \u003ccode\u003eGET\u003c/code\u003e from a loopback peer.\u003c/p\u003e"
},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "**1. Data collection.** `Tidewave.tidewave_config_meta/1` builds a map with `root` (`Tidewave.MCP.root()`), `framework.app_paths` (`Mix.Project.deps_paths()`), `wsl_distro`, and `host_path`. It HTML-escapes the JSON encoding of the map into `\u003cmeta name=\"tidewave:config\"\u003e`.\n\n**2. Exposure.** `Tidewave.Router.control_html/1` serves the tag on `GET /tidewave/connect`. For all other routes, `Tidewave.call/2` registers a `before_send` callback that injects the tag into every `text/html` response when `toolbar: true`.\n\n**3. Read access.** `check_origin/2` accepts any request without an `Origin` header, and no code validates `Host`. After DNS rebinding, the browser sends a same-origin `GET` from a loopback peer."
}
],
"value": "1. Data collection. Tidewave.tidewave_config_meta/1 builds a map with root (Tidewave.MCP.root()), framework.app_paths (Mix.Project.deps_paths()), wsl_distro, and host_path. It HTML-escapes the JSON encoding of the map into \u003cmeta name=\"tidewave:config\"\u003e.\n\n2. Exposure. Tidewave.Router.control_html/1 serves the tag on GET /tidewave/connect. For all other routes, Tidewave.call/2 registers a before_send callback that injects the tag into every text/html response when toolbar: true.\n\n3. Read access. check_origin/2 accepts any request without an Origin header, and no code validates Host. After DNS rebinding, the browser sends a same-origin GET from a loopback peer."
}
]
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"assignerShortName": "EEF",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-109823",
"datePublished": "2026-10-27T15:47:36.862Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-10-23T13:00:02.150Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-27T15:47:36.862Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}