GCVE-1988-2026-0351

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-11 07:55 – Updated: 2026-09-11 07:55
VLAI
Title
pwnlift: symlink following and TOCTOU in privileged upload handler allow arbitrary file write as root
Summary
1. Advisory information ----------------------- Title: Symlink following and TOCTOU in pwnlift upload handler allow arbitrary file write as root Advisory: https://github.com/GregDurys/security-advisories GHSA: GHSA-2v7v-rhpw-m9w4 CVE: CVE-2026-56815 Class: CWE-59 (Improper Link Resolution Before File Access), CWE-367 (Time-of-check Time-of-use Race Condition) CVSS: 7.8 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Date: 2026-06-27 Author: Greg Durys <https://github.com/GregDurys> 2. Affected software -------------------- Project: pwnlift Repository: https://github.com/rasta-mouse/pwnlift Runtime: .NET / Blazor (ASP.NET Core, Kestrel) Component: pwnlift/Components/Pages/Home.razor Tested: commit 211f2b3 (2025-08-29) Fix: d7a95449d9ee1ea09ec1529286685f6187afbbed (merged 2026-06-18), (initial remediation e3eddac addresses CWE-59 but not CWE-367) 3. Testing scope ---------------- All exploitation testing was performed in a local testbed. The known affected downstream lab deployment has been mitigated by removing the privileged sudo entry. The upstream follow-up fix has been merged. 4. Summary ---------- pwnlift is a small .NET/Blazor file upload server. Its upload handler constructs the destination path from the caller's working directory (Directory.GetCurrentDirectory()) and writes uploaded files without validating symlinks, canonicalising paths, or sanitising filenames. When pwnlift runs as root via sudo without a cwd= directive, a local user can exploit this in two ways: (a) Symlink following (CWE-59): pre-stage an Uploads symlink pointing at a privileged directory. The elevated process follows the symlink and writes uploaded files into the target. (b) TOCTOU bypass of initial fix (CWE-367): the initial fix added a ReparsePoint check and StartsWith containment. Because the destination is still caller-controlled, a race script alternates Uploads between a real directory (passes the check) and a symlink (catches the write). The StartsWith check has a separate flaw: prefix matching without a trailing separator means /tmp/Uploads-evil passes StartsWith("/tmp/Uploads"). Both variants achieve arbitrary file write as root. For example, writing to a privileged configuration path such as /etc/sudoers.d/ can grant the attacker full passwordless sudo. 5. Remediation -------------- Replace Directory.GetCurrentDirectory() with AppContext.BaseDirectory. Enforce path containment with Path.GetRelativePath rather than StartsWith. Retain the ReparsePoint check as defence in depth. Ensure the application directory and Uploads are root-owned and not writable by lower-privileged users. If Uploads already exists as a symlink, remove and recreate it as a real directory before applying ownership changes. 6. Disclosure timeline ---------------------- 2026-04-30 Privileged deployment observed during normal lab usage 2026-05-07 Initial contact with upstream maintainer 2026-05-08 Reproduced end-to-end in local testbed; reported to upstream maintainer and downstream deployment operator 2026-05-12 Initial fix committed upstream (e3eddac) with reporter credit 2026-05-19 Downstream operator declined CVE on CNA scope grounds 2026-05-20 TOCTOU bypass reproduced and reported to maintainer 2026-05-28 Downstream operator confirmed lab patched, sudo removed 2026-05-30 CVE requested via GHSA 2026-06-09 GitHub rejected CVE request 2026-06-09 GHSA re-review requested 2026-06-15 CVE request submitted to MITRE 2026-06-18 Follow-up fix merged upstream; CVE re-requested via GHSA 2026-06-19 GitHub rejected second CVE request 2026-06-22 GHSA advisory published without a CVE 2026-06-23 Advisory posted to oss-security 2026-06-23 MITRE assigned CVE-2026-56815 7. Current status ----------------- Downstream deployment: patched (sudo entry removed, 28 May 2026) Upstream final fix: merged (d7a9544, 18 June 2026) CVE: CVE-2026-56815 (assigned by MITRE, 23 June 2026) 8. References ------------- - https://github.com/rasta-mouse/pwnlift - https://github.com/rasta-mouse/pwnlift/commit/e3eddaca42b4b3e9c69f2d7aa024b6c82e27a5a2 - https://github.com/rasta-mouse/pwnlift/commit/d7a95449d9ee1ea09ec1529286685f6187afbbed - https://github.com/rasta-mouse/pwnlift/security/advisories/GHSA-2v7v-rhpw-m9w4 - https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/06/23/2 - https://github.com/GregDurys/security-advisories - https://payloadforge.io/beyond-crto-pwnlift/ _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 576 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
unknown pwnlift symlink following Affected: unknown
guessed Create a notification for this product.
Relationships
reference GCVE-1988-2026-0351 (this record)

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          "value": "1. Advisory information\n-----------------------\nTitle:  Symlink following and TOCTOU in pwnlift upload handler allow arbitrary file write as root\nAdvisory: https://github.com/GregDurys/security-advisories\nGHSA: GHSA-2v7v-rhpw-m9w4\nCVE: CVE-2026-56815\nClass:  CWE-59 (Improper Link Resolution Before File Access), \nCWE-367 (Time-of-check Time-of-use Race Condition)\nCVSS:  7.8 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H\nDate:  2026-06-27\nAuthor:  Greg Durys \u003chttps://github.com/GregDurys\u003e\n\n\n2. Affected software\n--------------------\nProject:  pwnlift\nRepository: https://github.com/rasta-mouse/pwnlift\nRuntime:  .NET / Blazor (ASP.NET Core, Kestrel)\nComponent:  pwnlift/Components/Pages/Home.razor\nTested:  commit 211f2b3 (2025-08-29)\nFix: d7a95449d9ee1ea09ec1529286685f6187afbbed (merged 2026-06-18),\n(initial remediation e3eddac addresses CWE-59 but not CWE-367)\n\n\n3. Testing scope\n----------------\nAll exploitation testing was performed in a local testbed. The known\naffected downstream lab deployment has been mitigated by removing the\nprivileged sudo entry. The upstream follow-up fix has been merged.\n\n\n4. Summary\n----------\npwnlift is a small .NET/Blazor file upload server. Its upload handler\nconstructs the destination path from the caller\u0027s working directory\n(Directory.GetCurrentDirectory()) and writes uploaded files without\nvalidating symlinks, canonicalising paths, or sanitising filenames.\n\nWhen pwnlift runs as root via sudo without a cwd= directive, a local\nuser can exploit this in two ways:\n\n  (a) Symlink following (CWE-59): pre-stage an Uploads symlink\n      pointing at a privileged directory. The elevated process follows\n      the symlink and writes uploaded files into the target.\n\n  (b) TOCTOU bypass of initial fix (CWE-367): the initial fix added\n      a ReparsePoint check and StartsWith containment. Because the\n      destination is still caller-controlled, a race script alternates\n      Uploads between a real directory (passes the check) and a symlink\n      (catches the write). The StartsWith check has a separate flaw:\n      prefix matching without a trailing separator means\n      /tmp/Uploads-evil passes StartsWith(\"/tmp/Uploads\").\n\nBoth variants achieve arbitrary file write as root. For example,\nwriting to a privileged configuration path such as /etc/sudoers.d/\ncan grant the attacker full passwordless sudo.\n\n\n5. Remediation\n--------------\nReplace Directory.GetCurrentDirectory() with AppContext.BaseDirectory.\nEnforce path containment with Path.GetRelativePath rather than\nStartsWith. Retain the ReparsePoint check as defence in depth. Ensure\nthe application directory and Uploads are root-owned and not writable\nby lower-privileged users. If Uploads already exists as a symlink,\nremove and recreate it as a real directory before applying ownership\nchanges.\n\n\n6. Disclosure timeline\n----------------------\n2026-04-30  Privileged deployment observed during normal lab usage\n2026-05-07  Initial contact with upstream maintainer\n2026-05-08  Reproduced end-to-end in local testbed; reported to upstream maintainer and downstream deployment operator\n2026-05-12  Initial fix committed upstream (e3eddac) with reporter credit\n2026-05-19  Downstream operator declined CVE on CNA scope grounds\n2026-05-20  TOCTOU bypass reproduced and reported to maintainer\n2026-05-28  Downstream operator confirmed lab patched, sudo removed\n2026-05-30  CVE requested via GHSA\n2026-06-09  GitHub rejected CVE request\n2026-06-09  GHSA re-review requested\n2026-06-15  CVE request submitted to MITRE\n2026-06-18  Follow-up fix merged upstream; CVE re-requested via GHSA\n2026-06-19  GitHub rejected second CVE request\n2026-06-22  GHSA advisory published without a CVE\n2026-06-23  Advisory posted to oss-security\n2026-06-23  MITRE assigned CVE-2026-56815\n\n\n7. Current status\n-----------------\nDownstream deployment: patched (sudo entry removed, 28 May 2026)\nUpstream final fix: merged (d7a9544, 18 June 2026)\nCVE: CVE-2026-56815 (assigned by MITRE, 23 June 2026)\n\n\n8. References\n-------------\n- https://github.com/rasta-mouse/pwnlift\n- https://github.com/rasta-mouse/pwnlift/commit/e3eddaca42b4b3e9c69f2d7aa024b6c82e27a5a2\n- https://github.com/rasta-mouse/pwnlift/commit/d7a95449d9ee1ea09ec1529286685f6187afbbed\n- https://github.com/rasta-mouse/pwnlift/security/advisories/GHSA-2v7v-rhpw-m9w4\n- https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/06/23/2\n- https://github.com/GregDurys/security-advisories\n- https://payloadforge.io/beyond-crto-pwnlift/\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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