GCVE-1988-2026-0348
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-11 07:55 – Updated: 2026-09-11 07:55| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | SCHUTZWERK-SA-2025-001 Authentication Bypass |
Affected:
unknown
|
guessed |
- related CVE-2025-4994
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"product": "SCHUTZWERK-SA-2025-001 Authentication Bypass",
"vendor": "unknown",
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"type": "finder",
"value": "Jan H\u00fcber via Fulldisclosure"
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"lang": "en",
"value": "-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----\nHash: SHA512\n\nAuthentication Bypass for SafeLine SL6 and SL6+\n===============================================\n\n\ngain unauthorized administrative access to the device configuration.\n\nMetadata\n========\n\n* Affected product: SafeLine SL6/SL6+\n* Affected version: Introduced in version 4.82, patched in version 4.97\n* Vendor: SafeLine\n* Problem type(s): CWE-305 Authentication bypass by primary weakness\n* CVE ID: CVE-2025-4994\n* CVE URL: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-4994\n* CVSS 4.0 score: 8.7\n* Advisory URL: https://www.schutzwerk.com/blog/schutzwerk-sa-2025-001/\n\nDetails\n=======\n\n\ndepending on the \"Auto Enable BLE\" configuration setting:\n\n\n\u00a0 by a configurable PIN.\n\n\u00a0 enabled by a reboot.\n\n\nto the target device and is fully reproducible.\n\nRisk\n====\n\n\nan incident.\n\nWorkaround\n==========\n\n\ninterface.\n\nSolution/Mitigation\n===================\n\n\n\n\nshould be applied.\n\nTimeline\n========\n\n* 2025-03-28 Vulnerability discovered\n* 2025-04-14 Initial contact with vendor\n* 2025-04-16 Vulnerability reported to technical support of vendor\n* 2025-05-08 Follow-up meeting was canceled by vendor\n* 2025-05-16 Initial contact with CTO of vendor\n* 2025-05-28 Vulnerability presented to CTO of vendor\n* 2025-06-16 Vendor informed SCHUTZWERK that the patch is currently tested\n* 2025-07-03 Follow-up meeting was canceled by vendor\n* 2025-07-31 Follow-up meeting was requested by SCHUTZWERK\n* 2025-08-21 Vendor informed SCHUTZWERK that the patch was postponed\n* 2025-08-28 Vendor informed SCHUTZWERK that the patch is currently tested\n* 2025-12-19 Vendor informed SCHUTZWERK that the patch was released\n\n\u00a0 scheduled maintenance windows\n* 2026-06-19 Advisory released by SCHUTZWERK\n\nCredits\n=======\n\nThe vulnerability was discovered by Jan H\u00fcber of SCHUTZWERK GmbH\n-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----\n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\nMUv9NZtj3B224OsNyt8EhjA=\n=JAMF\n-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----\n\n--\nSCHUTZWERK GmbH, Pfarrer-Wei\u00df-Weg 12, 89077 Ulm, Germany\nZertifiziert / Certified ISO 27001, 9001 and TISAX\n\nPhone +49 731 977 191 0\n\nadvisories () schutzwerk com / www.schutzwerk.com\n\nGesch\u00e4ftsf\u00fchrer / Managing Directors:\nJakob Pietzka, Michael Sch\u00e4fer\n\nAmtsgericht Ulm / HRB 727391\nDatenschutz / Data Protection www.schutzwerk.com/datenschutz\n\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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