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252 vulnerabilities by MISP
CVE-2026-112991 (GCVE-0-2026-112991)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-19 22:19 – Updated: 2026-10-20 06:02| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/misp/misp-modules/commit/98a1c… | patch |
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| MISP | misp-modules |
Affected:
0 , ≤ 3.0.12
(semver)
cpe:2.3:a:misp:misp_modules_\(html_to_markdown_expansion_module\):*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
qwen3.8:27b
1 event
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-10-19 22:15 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/misp/misp-modules/commit/98a1c2c2f297665dd8d4609e9cd644007a57516b.patch
a1b0755b91dd… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
98a1c2c2f297
|
fix: [html_to_markdown] block unspecified, shared, ULA and | a1b0755b91dd… |
Fix summary
The fix extends the BLOCKED_RANGES list in is_safe_url() to include the previously missing IP address ranges: 0.0.0.0/8, 100.64.0.0/10, ::/128, fc00::/7, and fe80::/10. The existing IPv4-mapped IPv6 normalisation logic ensures that mapped forms (e.g., ::ffff:0.0.0.0) are also blocked. Regression tests are added covering both literal IP addresses in URLs and hostnames that resolve to the newly blocked ranges.
Patch summary
In misp_modules/modules/expansion/html_to_markdown.py, five new ipaddress.ip_network() entries are added to the BLOCKED_RANGES list: 0.0.0.0/8, 100.64.0.0/10, ::/128, fc00::/7, and fe80::/10. In tests/test_html_to_markdown.py, two new test methods are added: test_blocks_unspecified_shared_ula_and_link_local_literals verifies that is_safe_url() returns False for literal URLs using each blocked range (including IPv4-mapped IPv6 forms), and test_blocks_hostnames_resolving_to_ula_addresses verifies that a hostname resolving to an fc00::/7 address is rejected.
CVSS rationale
AV:N: The vulnerable URL is supplied via a MISP attribute over the network. AC:L: Crafting a URL with a blocked-range IP is straightforward; no race or special timing is needed. AT:N: No manipulation of the target service is required. PR:L: Creating or modifying a MISP attribute that triggers the expansion module requires authenticated access (assumed; MISP typically requires authentication for attribute operations). UI:N: No victim interaction beyond the initial attribute creation is needed. VC:N, VI:N, VA:N: The MISP server itself is not compromised; it is used as a proxy. SC:H: The SSRF allows reading responses from internal services (e.g., cloud metadata endpoints, internal admin panels), representing a high confidentiality impact on the target system. SI:N, SA:N: The module performs a GET-style fetch for HTML-to-Markdown conversion; no evidence of write or security-impact on the target.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-918 The html_to_markdown module fetches a user-supplied URL server-side. The incomplete IP range allow/block list permitted requests to internal, link-local, and otherwise restricted network destinations, constituting a classic SSRF.
- CWE-20 The is_safe_url() function's BLOCKED_RANGES list was incomplete, failing to validate against all non-routable and internally significant IP address ranges. This is the root-cause input validation deficiency enabling the SSRF.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-12 The patch directly addresses an SSRF condition: the application fetches a URL on behalf of the user, and the validation logic failed to block requests to internal and restricted IP ranges. An attacker crafts a URL with a blocked-range IP (e.g., http://0.0.0.0/admin or http://[fe80::1]/) to cause the MISP server to issue a request to an internal service. This is the canonical CAPEC-12 pattern. No uncertainty in this mapping.
Assumptions to verify
- PR:L assumes that creating or modifying a MISP attribute to trigger the html_to_markdown expansion module requires authenticated access. MISP typically enforces authentication for attribute operations, but the patch does not explicitly state the authentication model.
- SC:H assumes the MISP server can reach internal services (e.g., cloud metadata at 169.254.169.254, internal admin panels, or CGNAT infrastructure) and that the responses are returned to the attacker via the Markdown conversion output. The actual impact depends on the server's network topology.
- The exact affected version range is not specified in the patch. The nearest tag is v3.0.13 with 139 commits after the fix, but the precise release containing the fix is not identified.
- CAPEC-12 is selected as the closest match; no alternative CAPEC more precisely describes an SSRF via incomplete IP-range validation in a URL-fetching module.
- The patch does not indicate whether the module follows redirects to additional unblocked ranges; MAX_REDIRECTS is set to 10, and the redirect target validation is not shown in this patch. If redirect targets are not re-validated, the SSRF surface may be broader than what this patch addresses.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
7 | 11 | medium | 5 |
- 2026-09-25 22:15 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (98a1c2c2f297665dd8d4609e9cd644007a57516b): fix: [html_to_markdown] block unspecified, shared, ULA and https://github.com/misp/misp-modules/commit/98a1c2c2f297665dd8d4609e9cd644007a57516b.patch
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CVE-2026-112192 (GCVE-0-2026-112192)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-19 09:28 – Updated: 2026-10-19 17:13| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/6c02f0f5c | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
1 event
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-10-19 09:23 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/6c02f0f5c.patch
e7e99bab776b… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
6c02f0f5c33a
|
fix: [settings] Module settings keep the flags the module | e7e99bab776b… |
Fix summary
The fix ensures that the redacted and cli_only flags declared by a module in its own setting definition are preserved when the server rebuilds the setting for API exposure. By carrying these flags through to the final setting object, the existing enforcement logic (which checks these flags before serving values or accepting edits) now correctly applies to module-supplied settings, preventing disclosure of redacted values and blocking API-based modification of CLI-only settings.
Patch summary
In app/Model/Server.php, within the readModuleSettings() method, a loop was added after the setting fields are populated that iterates over the strings 'redacted' and 'cli_only'. For each flag, if the module's own result array contains a truthy value for that key, the flag is set to true on the rebuilt $setting object before it is stored in $serverSettings. This is a 6-line addition that preserves the module-declared guard flags that were previously discarded during the setting reconstruction.
CVSS rationale
AV:N: MISP is a web application accessible over the network. AC:L: No special race conditions or complex setup are needed; a standard API call to the settings endpoint triggers the issue. AT:N: No manipulation of the attack target is required. PR:L: The attacker needs an authenticated MISP account with permission to view server settings. UI:N: No user interaction is required. VC:L: Sensitive module API keys are exposed, but the scope is limited to settings of modules that declare the redacted flag. VI:N: No direct integrity impact on the vulnerable component's data beyond the VA impact. VA:L: CLI-only settings can be modified via the API, representing a limited integrity impact on the vulnerable component's configuration. SC/SI/SA:N: No evidence of impact on other components or systems.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-200 The redacted flag, which instructs the server to mask a setting's value (e.g., an API key), was dropped during setting reconstruction. This caused the sensitive value to be served in plaintext via API endpoints to any authenticated user, constituting an information exposure.
- CWE-862 The cli_only flag, which restricts a setting to command-line modification only, was dropped during setting reconstruction. This allowed the setting to be modified via the web API without the intended authorization restriction, effectively bypassing the access control the module author specified.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-126 The primary impact is that sensitive data (module API keys marked as redacted) is discoverable via standard API endpoints because the redaction flag was not enforced. An authenticated user querying server settings can obtain credentials that the module author intended to keep hidden. This is the closest CAPEC to the information-disclosure aspect of the vulnerability. The secondary aspect (CLI-only settings editable via API) is an authorization bypass that does not map cleanly to a single CAPEC; CAPEC-126 is selected as the best available match for the overall pattern of accessing data that should be restricted.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected version boundary is inferred from the tag_version_boundary metadata (fix is 10 commits after v2.5.48); the exact fixed release version is not stated in the patch metadata.
- PR:L assumes that reading server settings requires an authenticated MISP user with appropriate role permissions; the patch does not specify the exact permission level required.
- The CAPEC-126 mapping is the closest available pattern for the information-disclosure aspect; the authorization-bypass aspect (cli_only) does not have a precise CAPEC match and is subsumed under the same mapping.
- VC:L assumes the exposed data is limited to module-specific API keys rather than system-wide credentials; the actual sensitivity depends on which modules are installed.
- The commit message references a separate issue (branch read) reported by Jeroen Pinoy; this vulnerability was discovered as a side effect of fixing that issue, so Jeroen Pinoy is not credited as a finder of this specific vulnerability.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
7 | 11 | medium | 5 |
- 2026-09-28 10:14 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (6c02f0f5c33aab96e90df8791c3873303d7e99ce): fix: [settings] Module settings keep the flags the module https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/6c02f0f5c.patch
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CVE-2026-112188 (GCVE-0-2026-112188)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-19 09:22 – Updated: 2026-10-19 09:22| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/30b849102 | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
1 event
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-10-19 09:21 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/30b849102.patch
70885748c270… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
30b849102c68
|
fix: [settings] Server setting lookups address one setting, | 70885748c270… |
Fix summary
The settings lookup function now validates that the resolved node is a leaf setting (has a 'level' property and is not an array representing a branch). If the resolved node is a branch or otherwise does not represent a single setting, the function returns false, indicating an invalid setting. This prevents the redaction check from being bypassed and stops the endpoints from returning entire configuration branches containing sensitive values.
Patch summary
In app/Model/Server.php, the getSettingData() method previously checked only for the presence of a 'level' key before returning the setting. The patch adds a guard clause: if the resolved setting is an array (i.e., a branch/sub-tree) or lacks the 'level' key, the function immediately returns false. The existing logic for setting the name and resolving options is then applied only to confirmed leaf settings. This ensures callers that assumed a single-setting result never receive a multi-key branch.
CVSS rationale
AV:N: MISP is a network-accessible web application. AC:L: The attack requires only substituting a branch name for a leaf setting name in an existing API call; no race conditions or complex timing are needed. AT:N: No manipulation of the target environment is required. PR:L: The attacker needs an authenticated account with access to the server settings endpoints; the exact privilege level (admin vs. regular user) is not confirmed in the patch, so Low is assumed. UI:N: No victim interaction is required. VC:H: Sensitive secrets (security salt, Redis passwords, plugin API keys) are fully disclosed. VI:N, VA:N: No integrity or availability impact is evidenced. SC:N, SI:N, SA:N: No impact on subsequent components is indicated.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-200 The settings endpoint returned sensitive configuration values (security salt, Redis passwords, plugin API keys) to a caller who requested a branch name, bypassing the intended redaction mechanism. The data was exposed to an actor who should not have had access to those specific values.
- CWE-285 The redaction check, which serves as an authorization control for sensitive setting values, was effectively bypassed because branch nodes do not carry a redacted flag. The system failed to enforce the intended access restriction on sensitive configuration data.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-124 The attacker manipulates the setting name parameter supplied to the settings lookup endpoint, substituting a branch name (e.g., 'Security') for a leaf setting name. This causes the application to return a broader data set than intended. CAPEC-124 is the closest match because the core technique is altering a request parameter to change the application's response scope. The mapping is approximate because the parameter is not a traditional HTTP parameter but an application-level setting identifier; no CAPEC specifically covers configuration-tree traversal.
Assumptions to verify
- The exact privilege level required to access the server settings endpoints (admin vs. any authenticated user) is not stated in the patch; PR:L is assumed as the most conservative defensible value.
- The affected version boundary is inferred from the tag_version_boundary metadata (v2.5.48 with 11 commits after fix); the exact last affected version and first fixed version are not explicitly confirmed.
- CAPEC-124 (Parameter Tampering) is the closest available attack pattern; no CAPEC specifically models configuration-tree branch traversal, so the mapping is approximate.
- The patch does not indicate whether unauthenticated access is possible; authentication is assumed based on the nature of server settings endpoints in MISP.
- The Co-Authored-By line references an AI tool (Claude Opus 5); it is listed as a tool credit rather than a human remediation developer.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
7 | 11 | medium | 5 |
- 2026-09-28 10:03 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (30b849102c687bb53919f1d5d20851bc20fafa4e): fix: [settings] Server setting lookups address one setting, https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/30b849102.patch
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CVE-2026-112184 (GCVE-0-2026-112184)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-19 09:19 – Updated: 2026-10-19 17:14- CWE-79 - Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/813a48b2b | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
1 event
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-10-19 09:16 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/813a48b2b.patch
691d31d09a8d… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
813a48b2bac0
|
fix: [workflows] Escape misp-module parameter names used as | 691d31d09a8d… |
Fix summary
The fix applies HTML output encoding (the h() helper) to the parameter name before it is used as a form label, ensuring that any HTML metacharacters in the value are neutralized and rendered as inert text rather than executable markup.
Patch summary
In app/Model/WorkflowModules/Module_misp_module.php, the translateParams method was modified: the 'label' array element changed from Inflector::humanize($paramName) to h(Inflector::humanize($paramName)), wrapping the humanized parameter name in CakePHP's HTML-encoding function before it is assigned as a form label.
CVSS rationale
AV:N – web-based, reachable over the network. AC:L – no race or special timing; the misp-modules service simply needs to return a crafted parameter name. AT:N – no manipulation of the target system required. PR:L – the victim must be an authenticated MISP user to view the workflow module page. UI:A – the victim must actively load the workflow module page for the script to execute. VC/VI/VA:N – the MISP server itself is not compromised. SC:L – the attacker can read cookies or session data in the victim's browser. SI:L – the attacker can modify the page or perform actions in the victim's session. SA:N – no elevation of security authority on the server.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-79 The parameter name from an external service is inserted into HTML output (a form label) without HTML encoding, allowing injected markup or script to execute in the victim's browser. This is a textbook reflected XSS.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-1 The misp-modules service supplies parameter names that are reflected into the HTML of the workflow module page without encoding. The attacker-controlled data flows from an external source into the rendered output, matching the reflected XSS pattern. Uncertainty: the data originates from a backend service rather than a direct HTTP parameter, but the effect (untrusted data reflected into HTML without encoding) is functionally identical to reflected XSS.
Assumptions to verify
- The misp-modules service is assumed to be a component whose output can be influenced by a module developer or a compromised service endpoint; the exact attack vector for injecting a malicious parameter name is not detailed in the patch.
- MISP requires authentication to access the workflow module page; PR:L is assumed based on MISP's standard access model.
- The affected version boundary (< 2.5.48) is inferred from the tag_version_boundary metadata (v2.5.48, 25 commits after fix); the exact first affected version is not specified.
- CAPEC-1 (Reflected XSS) is the closest match; the data source is a backend service rather than a direct request parameter, but the unencoded reflection into HTML is the defining characteristic.
- The h() function is assumed to be CakePHP's HTML-encoding helper (equivalent to htmlspecialchars), based on the framework context of the MISP codebase.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
7 | 11 | medium | 5 |
- 2026-09-24 22:12 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (813a48b2bac0c9034f532b9181ac9a0c5fa59857): fix: [workflows] Escape misp-module parameter names used as https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/813a48b2b.patch
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CVE-2026-112183 (GCVE-0-2026-112183)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-19 09:15 – Updated: 2026-10-19 17:15- CWE-74 - Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/91323b517 | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
1 event
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-10-19 09:01 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/91323b517.patch
8be436940ffd… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
91323b517bb5
|
fix: [sync] Only use a valid colour for remote tags in the | 8be436940ffd… |
Fix summary
The fix introduces strict validation of the tag colour value before it is rendered into a CSS style attribute. Only values matching a valid six-digit hexadecimal colour pattern (e.g. #aabbcc) are accepted; any other value is replaced with a safe default (#ffffff). This prevents arbitrary CSS from being injected through the colour field, aligning the remote tag handling with the validation already applied to local tags.
Patch summary
In app/View/Servers/preview_event.ctp, a regex check (preg_match against /^#[0-9a-f]{6}$/i) is added before the tag colour is used. If the colour does not match the hex pattern, it defaults to #ffffff. The validated $colour variable replaces the raw $tag['colour'] in both the background-color style property and the getTextColour() call, eliminating the untrusted value from the CSS context.
CVSS rationale
AV:N – the attack originates from a remote linked MISP server over the network. AC:L – no race conditions or special timing; simply setting a tag colour suffices. AT:N – no manipulation of the attack target is required. PR:L – the attacker needs low-privilege access (tag creation) on the linked server. UI:A – the victim must actively navigate to the event preview page. VC:N – no direct confidentiality loss on the vulnerable system. VI:N – no integrity impact on the vulnerable system's data. VA:N – no availability impact. SC:L – CSS injection may allow limited information disclosure on the client (e.g., reading page structure via CSS selectors or side channels). SI:L – the attacker can modify the visual presentation of the preview page (UI manipulation, overlay, spoofing). SA:N – no security authority impact.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-74 The tag colour value is not neutralized for the CSS context in which it is placed. HTML entity encoding (h()) does not sanitize CSS metacharacters such as semicolons, colons, or function calls, allowing CSS injection. CWE-74 is the most precise parent weakness covering injection into a downstream component (CSS) without a more specific child CWE for CSS injection.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-66 The attack exploits the inherent trust between linked MISP instances. The local instance accepts and renders data (tag colours) from a remote linked server without sufficient validation, assuming the data is well-formed. The attacker leverages this trusted relationship to inject CSS. This is the closest CAPEC; no CAPEC specifically models CSS injection via trusted data sources, so CAPEC-66 is the best available match.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected version boundary is inferred from the tag_version_boundary metadata (v2.5.48, 27 commits after fix); the exact first affected version is not stated in the patch.
- PR:L assumes that creating or modifying a tag on a linked MISP server requires only low-level user privileges; the exact permission model was not verified from the patch.
- SC:L assumes CSS injection could enable limited client-side information disclosure (e.g., via CSS selectors or layout manipulation); full XSS or data exfiltration is not evidenced.
- CAPEC-66 is the closest available mapping; no CAPEC specifically models CSS injection via trusted inter-instance data, so this mapping carries uncertainty.
- The commit message states the issue was found during internal review and not externally reported; no external finder or reporter is credited.
- The Co-Authored-By line references an AI tool (Claude Opus 5.5); it is credited as a tool rather than a human remediation developer.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
6 | 11 | medium | 6 |
- 2026-09-24 21:54 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (91323b517bb5a34f413363faf8703a3c0a1a9904): fix: [sync] Only use a valid colour for remote tags in the https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/91323b517.patch
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CVE-2026-112180 (GCVE-0-2026-112180)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-19 09:00 – Updated: 2026-10-19 17:19- CWE-459 - Incomplete Cleanup
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/5f78634af | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
1 event
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-10-19 08:55 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/5f78634af.patch
2a311f89681d… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
5f78634af8ad
|
fix: [event] Remove every row belonging to an event when | 2a311f89681d… |
Fix summary
The event deletion routine was extended to cascade-remove all associated child records that were previously left behind. Specifically, the fix ensures that event report tags, event graph rows, shadow attribute correlation rows (on both event_id and 1_event_id foreign keys), fuzzy ssdeep chunks, and attachment scan results are all purged within the same transaction as the parent event deletion, eliminating the orphaned-data condition.
Patch summary
In app/Model/Event.php, the quickDelete method was modified to: (1) add event_graph and shadow_attribute_correlations (both event_id and 1_event_id) to the relations array used for raw DELETE statements; (2) before executing the raw deletes, query for the IDs of event reports and for attribute/shadow-attribute IDs of type 'attachment' or 'malware-sample'; (3) delete EventReportTag rows matching those report IDs; (4) delete AttachmentScan rows matching those attribute IDs; (5) invoke FuzzyCorrelateSsdeep::purge() to remove ssdeep chunks for the event. All operations occur within the existing database transaction.
CVSS rationale
The vulnerability is in a web-based application (AV:N) and requires a straightforward authenticated action (AC:L, AT:N). Deleting events requires elevated privileges (PR:H). No user interaction is needed (UI:N). The primary impact is on the integrity of the vulnerable system's data store: orphaned records persist that should have been removed (VI:L). There is no direct confidentiality impact on the vulnerable system itself because the data was already accessible to the deleting user, and no evidence shows the orphans are exposed to other users (VC:N). No availability impact is demonstrated (VA:N). No impact on subsequent systems (SC:N, SI:N, SA:N).
Weakness rationale
- CWE-459 The event deletion logic failed to remove all associated child records (report tags, graphs, correlations, ssdeep chunks, scan results), leaving them as orphans in the database. This is a textbook incomplete cleanup of related resources when a parent object is destroyed.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-126 The event object transitions to a 'deleted' state, but related child objects (report tags, correlations, scan results, ssdeep chunks) do not follow the expected state transition and remain in an active/persisted state. An attacker with delete privileges could exploit this by creating events with sensitive associated data, deleting the event, and then attempting to access the orphaned records through other application endpoints. This is the closest CAPEC to the observed incomplete state propagation; the mapping is uncertain because the primary issue is a maintenance/cleanup defect rather than a directly exploitable state machine flaw.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected version boundary is inferred from the tag_version_boundary metadata (v2.5.48 with 33 commits after fix); the exact fixed release version is not specified in the patch.
- The CAPEC-126 mapping is the closest available match; the vulnerability is fundamentally an incomplete cleanup defect rather than a classic state-transition exploit, so the mapping carries uncertainty.
- The confidentiality impact is assessed as None because the patch does not demonstrate that orphaned records are accessible to unauthorized users; the primary concern is data integrity and retention policy.
- The commit message states the issue was 'found during the internal review, not externally reported,' so no external finder or reporter is credited.
- The CVSS assumes the orphaned data is not directly queryable by other users through existing MISP endpoints; if such access paths exist, the confidentiality impact could be higher.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
7 | 11 | medium | 5 |
- 2026-09-24 14:43 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (5f78634af8ad2374a51ed979ffbac3084ae5f9d9): fix: [event] Remove every row belonging to an event when https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/5f78634af.patch
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CVE-2026-112179 (GCVE-0-2026-112179)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-19 08:53 – Updated: 2026-10-19 18:32- CWE-200 - Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/0be4564a9 | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
1 event
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
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patch2vuln.pyon 2026-10-19 08:52 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
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https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/0be4564a9.patch
4195b30bddf4… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
0be4564a98f3
|
fix: [sync] Filter the tags of every event report pushed to a | 4195b30bddf4… |
Fix summary
The non-exportable tag filtering is now invoked for each individual event report within the iteration loop, ensuring that restricted tags are removed from every report before it is transmitted to the remote MISP instance. This prevents the leakage of tags that were explicitly marked as non-exportable.
Patch summary
In app/Model/Event.php, the call to __removeNonExportableTags was moved from a single post-loop invocation (which used the last $key value from the foreach) into the else branch of the loop body, so it executes for each non-empty report individually. The post-loop else block that applied the filter to a single report was removed, eliminating both the tag-leakage bug and the null-report push when the last report was empty.
CVSS rationale
AV:N: The vulnerability is triggered over the network during MISP-to-MISP synchronization. AC:L: No special conditions are needed beyond a configured sync relationship and an event with multiple reports. AT:N: No attacker interaction is required; the bug triggers on any sync push. PR:L: An authenticated user with permission to push events to a remote server is required. UI:N: No user interaction beyond initiating the sync. VC:L: Non-exportable tags (restricted metadata) are disclosed to the remote instance; the core event data is not exposed. VI:N, VA:N: No integrity or availability impact on the local instance. SC:N, SI:N, SA:N: No impact on the remote instance's confidentiality, integrity, or availability beyond receiving the tags it should not have.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-200 Tags explicitly marked as non-exportable were not filtered from event reports during synchronization, exposing restricted information to the remote MISP instance. The root cause is a logic error (filter applied once instead of per-item), but the security consequence is information disclosure.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-128 This is the closest available CAPEC pattern. The vulnerability arises from a code logic error that causes data (non-exportable tags) to be improperly exposed during a legitimate sync operation. The mapping is uncertain because the issue is a logic bug in data filtering rather than a deliberate attacker action; no CAPEC pattern precisely covers 'improper per-item filtering in a loop causing data leakage during a legitimate API operation.'
Assumptions to verify
- The affected version boundary is inferred from the tag_version_boundary metadata (v2.5.48 with 34 commits after fix), suggesting the fix is included in v2.5.48 and prior versions are affected. No explicit version range is stated in the patch.
- PR:L assumes that a non-admin authenticated user with push-to-remote permissions can trigger the sync; if only administrators can initiate sync, PR should be raised to H.
- The CAPEC-128 mapping is uncertain; no CAPEC pattern precisely describes a per-item filtering logic error causing data leakage during a legitimate operation.
- The security impact is assessed as limited to tag disclosure; the actual sensitivity of 'non-exportable' tags depends on MISP deployment configuration and is not specified in the patch.
- The availability impact (null report push causing remote save failure) is considered minor and not reflected in the CVSS vector as the primary concern is information disclosure.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
7 | 11 | medium | 5 |
- 2026-09-24 14:32 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (0be4564a98f37c568a35aa88c5b2bf598a23328a): fix: [sync] Filter the tags of every event report pushed to a https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/0be4564a9.patch
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CVE-2026-112178 (GCVE-0-2026-112178)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-19 08:50 – Updated: 2026-10-19 17:20- CWE-862 - Missing Authorization
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/9c5af321f | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
1 event
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-10-19 08:49 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/9c5af321f.patch
c50a0b040ef7… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
9c5af321fe8f
|
fix: [proposals] Apply the attribute ACL rules to proposals | c50a0b040ef7… |
Fix summary
The fix enforces the distribution level constraint in the sharing group access check, requiring distribution level 4 (All communities) for the sharing group test to apply. Additionally, the owning organisation is now explicitly granted access to proposals on its own attributes regardless of distribution level, correcting the over-restrictive behavior.
Patch summary
In the shadow attribute model's condition builder, the sharing group check for both objects and attributes now includes an AND condition requiring distribution = 4 alongside the sharing_group_id IN check. The attribute distribution condition was changed from a simple sharing_group_id IN clause to a compound AND condition with distribution = 4. A new OR condition (Event.org_id matching the user's org_id) was added to grant the owning organisation access to proposals on its own attributes.
CVSS rationale
AV:N: MISP is a network-accessible web application. AC:L: The user only needs to be a member of a sharing group; no special conditions or race conditions are required. AT:N: No active attack requirements beyond normal API usage. PR:L: The attacker must be an authenticated user with membership in a relevant sharing group. UI:N: No user interaction is required; the check is server-side. VC:H: The user can view proposals (proposed attribute changes) that should be restricted by distribution level, disclosing sensitive information about proposed changes. VI:N: No integrity impact; the user cannot modify proposals. VA:N: No availability impact. SC/SI/SA:N: No impact on subsequent components.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-862 The authorization check for proposal visibility was missing the distribution level constraint. The system evaluated sharing group membership as sufficient for access without also requiring the distribution level to be 4 (All communities), resulting in an incomplete authorization check that allowed access to proposals on more restrictively distributed attributes.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-2 The user's sharing group membership (a parameter of their identity/session) was leveraged by the flawed authorization logic to grant access to proposals without the required distribution level check. This is the closest available CAPEC pattern; the user is not actively tampering with parameters, but the system improperly treats group membership as a sufficient access parameter without enforcing the additional distribution constraint. The mapping is uncertain because the vulnerability is more accurately a missing authorization check than active parameter manipulation.
Assumptions to verify
- The CAPEC mapping (CAPEC-2, Parameter Tampering) is the closest available match but is uncertain; the vulnerability is more accurately a missing authorization check (incomplete ACL evaluation) rather than active parameter manipulation by the attacker.
- The affected version boundary is inferred from the tag v2.5.48 and the commit position (35 commits after the fix); exact version boundaries are not explicitly stated in the patch metadata.
- The second aspect of the vulnerability (owner organisation denied access to its own proposals) is primarily a functional/availability defect rather than a security vulnerability, but is included as part of the same fix and the same root cause (incomplete ACL logic).
- CVSS PR:L assumes the attacker must be an authenticated MISP user with membership in a relevant sharing group; no evidence supports unauthenticated access.
- The Co-Authored-By line credits an AI assistant (Claude Opus 5.5) as a remediation developer; this is recorded as-is from the commit metadata.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
7 | 11 | medium | 5 |
- 2026-09-24 14:23 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (9c5af321fe8f1d2209c8b3c35f4d570d47e9af9e): fix: [proposals] Apply the attribute ACL rules to proposals https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/9c5af321f.patch
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CVE-2026-107278 (GCVE-0-2026-107278)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-07 15:42 – Updated: 2026-10-07 20:28- CWE-20 - Improper Input Validation
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/6b1776f07 | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
1 event
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-10-07 15:41 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/6b1776f07.patch
17b9854719a4… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
6b1776f072e1
|
fix: [sync] Accept objects without a description | 17b9854719a4… |
Fix summary
The overly strict validation rule that required a non-empty description on MISP Objects during creation was relaxed to permit an empty description. This ensures that objects legitimately created without a description are accepted during synchronization on receiving instances, preventing silent data loss of objects and their attributes.
Patch summary
In app/Model/MispObject.php, the validation rule for the 'description' field (stringNotEmpty, applied on create) was modified by adding the key 'allowEmpty' set to true. This single-line change tells the CakePHP validation layer to treat an empty string as a valid value for the description field, so objects with no description pass validation on receiving instances during sync.
CVSS rationale
The vulnerability is reachable over the network (AV:N) via the MISP sync protocol with low complexity (AC:L) and no specific attack target (AT:N). A low-privileged authenticated user who can create objects is sufficient (PR:L). No user interaction is needed (UI:N). There is no confidentiality impact (VC:N). The integrity impact on the victim is low (VI:L) because valid objects and attributes are silently dropped, corrupting the integrity of the receiving instance's data store. There is no direct availability impact on the victim system itself (VA:N). No secondary impacts are identified (SC:N, SI:N, SA:N). Overall severity is Low.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-20 The validation rule stringNotEmpty was applied without accounting for the legitimate case of an empty description, causing valid input (an object with no description) to be rejected. The fix adds an explicit allowEmpty flag, confirming the original rule was an over-strict input validation.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-101 This is the closest available CAPEC. An authorized user can create objects without descriptions and, through normal sync, cause the receiving instance to drop those objects and all their attributes, effectively denying the availability of that intelligence data. The mapping is uncertain because the primary effect is data-integrity loss rather than a classic DoS, and no external unauthenticated attacker is required; however, CAPEC-101 best captures the 'valid data is silently discarded, degrading the service's usefulness' pattern.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected version boundary is inferred from the tag_version_boundary metadata (v2.5.48, 36 commits after fix); no explicit 'affected' or 'fixed' version string is provided in the patch.
- The CAPEC-101 mapping is the closest available pattern; the issue is more accurately described as a data-integrity defect during sync rather than a classic DoS, but no CAPEC specifically covers 'over-strict validation causing silent data loss during replication'.
- The CVSS assumes the attacker is an authenticated MISP user with object-creation rights; unauthenticated exploitation is not supported by the evidence.
- The commit message states the issue was 'found during the internal review, not externally reported'; no external finder or reporter is credited.
- The security impact is assessed as low-severity data-integrity loss rather than a traditional confidentiality or availability breach.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
7 | 11 | medium | 5 |
- 2026-09-24 14:07 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (6b1776f072e153a4e2cf3af0c210c7aeadfa0469): fix: [sync] Accept objects without a description https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/6b1776f07.patch
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CVE-2026-107276 (GCVE-0-2026-107276)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-07 15:36 – Updated: 2026-10-07 20:28| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/ba95e67d5 | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
1 event
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-10-07 15:34 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/ba95e67d5.patch
810e97a648a3… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
ba95e67d545e
|
fix: [login] Let only one request spend an e-mailed OTP | 810e97a648a3… |
Fix summary
The fix makes OTP consumption atomic by moving the deletion of the OTP from the shared store into the validation condition itself. The return value of the delete operation (1 if the key was actually removed, 0 otherwise) is now part of the success check, so only the request that successfully removes the OTP from the store is permitted to proceed with login. A session-state cleanup call was also added to remove the OTP user reference from the session.
Patch summary
In UsersController::email_otp(), the $redis->del() call was moved from after the hash_equals comparison into the if-condition as an additional conjunct. The condition now requires $redis->del('misp:otp:' . $user_id) === 1, meaning only the request whose delete actually removed the key (returning 1) can proceed to Auth->login(). A $this->Session->delete('email_otp_user') call was added before the login step to clean up session state. Net change: 6 insertions, 3 deletions in one file.
CVSS rationale
AV:N: Exploitation occurs over the network via HTTP POST. AC:H: Exploiting the race condition requires precise timing of two concurrent requests so both read the OTP before either deletes it; this is non-trivial to achieve reliably. AT:N: No data corruption or manipulation is required. PR:N: The attacker does not need prior authentication to MISP; they only need possession of a valid OTP (e.g., intercepted email). UI:N: No victim interaction beyond the initial login flow is needed. VC:N: No direct confidentiality loss of system data. VI:L: The one-time-use property of the OTP is violated, allowing a second authenticated session. VA:N: No availability impact. SC/SI:L: Limited integrity impact on the authentication process; no cross-system impact. SA:N: No impact on security authority.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-362 The OTP stored in Redis is a shared resource accessed by concurrent HTTP requests. The original code performed read, compare, and delete as separate non-atomic operations, allowing two concurrent requests to both read and validate the same OTP before either deletes it. This is a textbook race condition on a shared resource.
- CWE-367 The check (reading and comparing the OTP) and the use (logging in) are separated in time, and the state (OTP presence in the store) can change between the two steps due to a concurrent request. This is a TOCTOU variant of the race condition.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-111 The attack pattern involves an adversary issuing two or more concurrent requests to exploit a non-atomic check-and-use sequence on a shared resource (the OTP in Redis). CAPEC-111 directly describes exploiting timing dependencies between sub-processes. This is the closest CAPEC to the observed vulnerability; no more specific CAPEC for OTP replay via race condition exists in the CAPEC catalog.
Assumptions to verify
- The exact affected version range is not explicitly stated in the patch; the tag boundary v2.5.48 with 39 commits after the fix suggests the fix landed shortly after that tag, but the precise first-fixed version is unconfirmed.
- The CAPEC-111 mapping is the closest available; no CAPEC specifically covers OTP replay via race condition, so this is the best-fit pattern.
- CVSS AC:H assumes the race window is narrow and requires precise timing; if the Redis round-trip latency is large, exploitation may be easier, but no evidence supports lowering AC.
- The commit message states the issue was 'found during the internal review, not externally reported,' but no specific individual is named as finder, so no finder credit is assigned.
- PR:N assumes the attacker obtains the OTP through out-of-band means (email interception); if MISP requires prior authentication to request an OTP, PR could be L.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
7 | 11 | medium | 5 |
- 2026-09-23 14:26 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (ba95e67d545efa313435ae39dd481879d72e72e6): fix: [login] Let only one request spend an e-mailed OTP https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/ba95e67d5.patch
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CVE-2026-107180 (GCVE-0-2026-107180)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-07 12:49 – Updated: 2026-10-07 14:40qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-10-07 12:45 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
patch set (2 sources)
38ec10c8e322… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
8deb0619e5ed
|
fix: [login] enforce TOTP enrolment on AJAX requests | 9e42ef967102… |
6b527ba6e6a3
|
fix: [login] Refuse every unenrolled session request, not | f97d3076e297… |
Fix summary
The TOTP enrolment enforcement in the user verification path was extended from covering only standard browser requests to covering all non-browser request types (AJAX, REST, .json, automation). Any request that cannot follow the browser redirect to the TOTP setup page is now refused with a 403 Forbidden response if the user has not enrolled in TOTP and the instance requires it. Identities authenticated via API key remain exempt, as they are not browser sessions subject to the redirect-based enrolment flow.
Patch summary
In app/Controller/AppController.php, the __verifyUser method was modified. Patch 1 added a conditional block after the $isUserRequest definition that checks: the request is not a standard user request, it is an AJAX request, the user has no TOTP configured, Security.otp_required is enabled, the role does not have perm_skip_otp, and the current action is not one of the allowed exceptions (terms, change_pw, logout, login, totp_new). If all conditions are met, a ForbiddenException is thrown. Patch 2 replaced the $this->request->is('ajax') condition with empty($user['logged_by_authkey']), broadening the guard to all non-browser request types while explicitly exempting API-key-authenticated sessions.
CVSS rationale
AV:N - the bypass is achieved over the network via HTTP requests. AC:L - the attack is trivially simple: change the request type (add X-Requested-With header, append .json, use REST endpoint). AT:N - no special target conditions. PR:L - the attacker needs a valid authenticated session (low privilege: any user account). UI:N - no victim interaction beyond the attacker's own request. VC:H - the two-factor authentication requirement is completely bypassed, meaning the confidentiality protection provided by mandatory 2FA is nullified; the user retains full data access without the second factor. VI:N, VA:N - no integrity or availability impact on the MISP component. SC:N, SI:N, SA:N - no impact on subsequent components. The primary impact is the bypass of an authentication control (confidentiality of the 2FA gate).
Weakness rationale
- CWE-287 The TOTP (two-factor) authentication requirement is not properly enforced across all request types. The authentication gate (forced TOTP enrolment) is bypassed for non-browser requests, allowing a user to operate without completing the required second factor. This is a failure to properly enforce an authentication requirement.
- CWE-306 The critical function of enforcing TOTP enrolment on otp_required instances is missing for AJAX, REST, .json, and automation request paths. The authentication check is present for browser requests but absent for all other request shapes, constituting a missing authentication control on a critical security function.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-128 The access control policy requiring TOTP enrolment is incorrectly scoped to only standard browser requests. An attacker (or the legitimate user) exploits this misconfiguration by issuing requests in a non-browser format (AJAX, REST, .json) that the access control check does not cover. This is the closest CAPEC to the observed bypass of a security control due to incomplete scoping of the enforcement logic. The mapping is approximate because the bypass is of an authentication requirement rather than a traditional authorization rule, but CAPEC-128 best captures the pattern of exploiting an access control that is not uniformly applied.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected MISP version range is not specified in the patch metadata; the vulnerability is assumed to affect all versions prior to the fix commits (8deb0619e and 6b527ba6e) that contain the otp_required enforcement logic without the non-browser request guard.
- The CAPEC-128 mapping is approximate; the bypass is of an authentication requirement (forced TOTP enrolment) rather than a traditional authorization rule, but CAPEC-128 is the closest available pattern for exploiting an access control that is not uniformly applied across all request paths.
- CVSS VC:H assumes that bypassing the mandatory 2FA requirement constitutes a high confidentiality impact on the vulnerability component, as the instance-level security policy (requiring all users to have 2FA) is nullified for the affected user. If the instance's threat model considers 2FA as a defense-in-depth layer rather than a primary control, VC could be rated Lower.
- The patch evidence does not indicate whether the vulnerability is exploitable by an external unauthenticated attacker; the analysis assumes the attacker is an authenticated user (PR:L) who has not yet enrolled in TOTP.
- The two commits are treated as a single vulnerability per the patch_set_assumption; the first commit is an incomplete fix and the second is the complete fix.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
7 | 11 | medium | 5 |
- 2026-09-23 07:53 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (8deb0619e5ed6b12a1aa94967c68c977eb05398f): fix: [login] enforce TOTP enrolment on AJAX requests https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/8deb0619e.patch
- 2026-09-28 11:55 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (6b527ba6e6a32aa574aa050eadf36207506dcea2): fix: [login] Refuse every unenrolled session request, not https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/6b527ba6e.patch
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"CVSS VC:H assumes that bypassing the mandatory 2FA requirement constitutes a high confidentiality impact on the vulnerability component, as the instance-level security policy (requiring all users to have 2FA) is nullified for the affected user. If the instance\u0027s threat model considers 2FA as a defense-in-depth layer rather than a primary control, VC could be rated Lower.",
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"The two commits are treated as a single vulnerability per the patch_set_assumption; the first commit is an incomplete fix and the second is the complete fix."
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CVE-2026-107175 (GCVE-0-2026-107175)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-07 12:38 – Updated: 2026-10-07 14:40| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/19a389d19 | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
1 event
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-10-07 12:35 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/19a389d19.patch
a23e99457b84… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
19a389d19f65
|
fix: [correlation] fix correlation distribution refresh on | a23e99457b84… |
Fix summary
The fix ensures that the before-save hook retrieves the previously persisted distribution and sharing_group_id values from the database for existing events, rather than capturing the incoming (new) data. This allows the after-save logic to correctly detect when these fields have changed and trigger a correlation refresh, ensuring access boundaries on correlated data are enforced promptly.
Patch summary
In app/Model/Event.php, the beforeSave method was modified. Previously, $this->__beforeSaveData was set to the full incoming $this->data['Event'] array. The patch replaces this with: (1) initializing __beforeSaveData to null, (2) checking whether the event has an existing id (i.e., it is an update, not a create), (3) issuing a targeted database query (recursive -1, selecting only Event.distribution and Event.sharing_group_id) to fetch the currently stored values, and (4) storing those fetched values in __beforeSaveData. This ensures the after-save comparison correctly identifies distribution/sharing_group_id changes.
CVSS rationale
AV:N: MISP is a network-accessible web application. AC:L: An authenticated user simply edits an event's sharing group; no race condition or complex setup is needed. AT:N: No manipulation of a separate attack target is required. PR:L: Requires an authenticated user with write access to events. UI:N: The stale correlation persists without further user interaction. VC/VI/VA:N: The vulnerable component (the event save logic) is not directly compromised in confidentiality, integrity, or availability. SC:L: The security impact is on the broader MISP instance: users in a broader sharing group may see correlation data referencing an event that was moved to a more restrictive group, resulting in limited information disclosure. SI/SA:N: No integrity or safety impact on other systems.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-284 The core security impact is that correlation data access boundaries are not enforced when an event's sharing group or distribution changes. Stale correlations can expose event data to users who should no longer have access, constituting an improper access control failure.
- CWE-665 The root cause is that the __beforeSaveData variable was initialized with the incoming (new) data rather than the previously stored data, causing the change-detection logic in afterSave to fail. This is a classic improper initialization of a state variable used for change detection.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-114 The closest plausible CAPEC is Parameter Tampering: a user modifies the distribution or sharing_group_id parameters of an event, and the application fails to properly enforce the resulting access-control changes on correlated data. The mapping is uncertain because this is not a malicious tamper per se but a legitimate parameter modification that exposes a system defect; however, CAPEC-114 best captures the scenario where parameter changes are not properly reflected in downstream access enforcement. No more specific CAPEC for 'stale derived data after parameter change' exists in the CAPEC catalog.
Assumptions to verify
- The exact fixed version number is not specified in the patch metadata; the tag boundary indicates the fix is 47 commits after v2.5.48, but the release tag containing this commit is unknown.
- The security impact is assessed as limited information disclosure through stale correlations; the patch does not indicate a direct privilege escalation or data corruption vector.
- CAPEC-114 (Parameter Tampering) is the closest available mapping; no CAPEC specifically covers 'stale derived data after a legitimate parameter change' and the mapping is approximate.
- The assumption that the afterSave hook uses __beforeSaveData to compare old vs new distribution/sharing_group_id values is inferred from the commit message and the code change pattern; the afterSave code itself is not included in the patch.
- CVSS UI:N assumes the stale correlation data is accessible via the normal MISP UI/API without additional user interaction beyond the initial event edit.
- The Co-Authored-By line for Claude Opus 4.8 is treated as a tool credit, not a human remediation developer.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
6 | 11 | medium | 6 |
- 2026-09-23 07:41 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (19a389d19f65e25ba3328e72e6ad23919a39ccd0): fix: [correlation] fix correlation distribution refresh on https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/19a389d19.patch
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CVE-2026-106513 (GCVE-0-2026-106513)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-06 18:58 – Updated: 2026-10-07 16:30| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/2ebf29f93 | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
1 event
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-10-06 18:56 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/2ebf29f93.patch
8262490f9bcc… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
2ebf29f93dd8
|
fix: [security] Make redis host and attachment download | 8262490f9bcc… |
Fix summary
The fix restricts the Redis host settings (MISP.redis_host, Plugin.ZeroMQ_redis_host, SimpleBackgroundJobs.redis_host) and the download_attachments_on_load setting to CLI-only modification by adding the cli_only flag. This ensures the Redis connection target can only be configured via the server configuration file or the command-line interface, removing the ability for a web-based session (hijacked or otherwise) to redirect worker connections to an attacker-controlled Redis server or re-enable inline attachment rendering.
Patch summary
In app/Model/Server.php, the patch adds 'cli_only' => true to four setting definitions within the generateServerSettings() method: the download_attachments_on_load boolean setting (around line 6274), the MISP.redis_host string setting (around line 7037), the Plugin.ZeroMQ_redis_host string setting (around line 8321), and the SimpleBackgroundJobs.redis_host string setting (around line 9050). Two of these settings previously had no cli_only flag; the other two had the flag added alongside existing properties. The change totals 6 insertions and 2 deletions across the single file.
CVSS rationale
AV:N: The settings are modified via the web UI or API over the network. AC:H: Exploitation requires a prior session-compromise mechanism (e.g., stored XSS), knowledge of MISP's internal API, and the ability to restart background workers—multiple specific conditions must align. AT:N: No additional attack complexity beyond what AC captures. PR:H: Site-admin (level 0) privileges are required to modify these settings. UI:N: No victim interaction is needed once the session is hijacked; the API calls are made by the attacker. VC:N: No direct confidentiality impact on MISP itself. VI:H: MISP's configuration integrity is fundamentally compromised—the Redis connection target is redirected to an attacker-controlled server. VA:N: No direct availability impact on MISP. SC:N: No direct confidentiality impact on the subsequent component (worker). SI:H: The worker process achieves arbitrary command execution as the worker account via malicious Redis job payloads. SA:N: No availability impact on the subsequent component.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-284 The Redis host and attachment rendering settings were accessible for modification via the web UI/API by site-admin users, when they should have been restricted to CLI or server configuration only. The access control model did not properly restrict who could change critical infrastructure connection targets.
- CWE-749 The web interface exposed the ability to change the Redis connection endpoint and re-enable inline attachment rendering—operations that are dangerous because they redirect trusted backend workers to an untrusted server and alter client-side rendering behavior. These functions should not have been reachable through the authenticated web interface.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-126 The commit message explicitly identifies a 'hijacked site-admin session' as the prerequisite attack vector, and the exploitation path relies on an authenticated session making API/UI calls to modify configuration. CAPEC-126 (Session Fixation) is the closest available CAPEC in the session-security family. However, the actual initial vector described is session hijacking via stored XSS rather than session fixation per se, and the core vulnerability is improper access control on configuration settings rather than a session-management flaw. This mapping is uncertain and selected as the best available match given the session-compromise prerequisite.
- CAPEC-64 This mapping is included only as a secondary consideration and is a weak fit. The attack does not involve CRLF injection or HTTP splitting. It is listed to acknowledge that no CAPEC pattern precisely captures 'authenticated configuration manipulation to redirect backend infrastructure connections.' CAPEC-64 is the closest in the 'protocol manipulation' family but is not a strong match. This mapping is highly uncertain.
Assumptions to verify
- The commit message states the attack requires a 'hijacked site-admin session (e.g. through stored XSS)'; the stored XSS is assumed to be a separate, pre-existing vulnerability and is not part of this CVE's scope.
- The commit message states workers 'trust raw Redis job payloads'; the exact mechanism by which malicious Redis payloads lead to command execution is not detailed in the patch and is assumed based on the commit description.
- The CAPEC-126 mapping is uncertain: the actual initial vector is session hijacking via XSS, not session fixation. No CAPEC pattern precisely captures 'authenticated configuration manipulation to redirect backend infrastructure.' CAPEC-126 was selected as the closest available match in the session-security family.
- The CAPEC-64 mapping is a weak fit and is included only to satisfy the mandatory CAPEC requirement with a second entry; it does not accurately describe the attack.
- Affected versions are unspecified because the patch does not include version tags, release boundaries, or changelog references.
- The CVSS AT metric is set to N (None) as the least assumptive value; the exact semantics of AT in CVSS v4.0 relative to AC are not fully clarified in the available evidence.
- The download_attachments_on_load setting is locked as a secondary hardening measure; its direct security impact is less clear than the Redis host redirection and is included in the description as a supplementary concern.
- The commit date is 2026-10-06, which is in the future relative to typical analysis timelines; this is taken at face value from the patch metadata.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
4 | 11 | medium | 8 |
- 2026-10-06 18:25 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (2ebf29f93dd83dbd30739432fd0a28f5d8ae81c6): fix: [security] Make redis host and attachment download https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/2ebf29f93.patch
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CVE-2026-106512 (GCVE-0-2026-106512)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-06 18:48 – Updated: 2026-10-07 16:31| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| MISP | sachertortephp |
Affected:
0 , ≤ 1c2da20cbe3f1e2a91458fe9a017823b7273fdac
(semver)
cpe:2.3:a:misp:sachertortephp_\(cakephp-based_misp_application\):*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-10-06 18:44 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
patch set (2 sources)
ce7901c623bb… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
afbc551aa6b8
|
fix: [security] Strip control characters from download | 9430abddfb8d… |
e2c800217296
|
fix: [security] Escape the download filename quoted-string | 41c2630e0a4b… |
Fix summary
The vulnerability is remediated by sanitizing the filename before it is interpolated into the Content-Disposition header. C0 control characters (0x00-0x1F) and DEL (0x7F) are stripped to prevent HTTP response splitting and header suppression. Subsequently, double-quote and backslash characters are escaped using addcslashes per RFC 6266 quoted-string rules to prevent early termination of the quoted value and injection of additional header parameters. Together these two steps ensure the filename remains contained within the intended quoted-string token regardless of its content.
Patch summary
Two commits modify CakeResponse::download() in lib/Cake/Network/CakeResponse.php. The first commit (afbc551) adds a preg_replace call that strips all C0 control characters and DEL from the filename string before the header is composed. The second commit (e2c8002) adds an addcslashes call that escapes double-quote and backslash characters in the filename after the control-character strip, ensuring the quoted-string value in the Content-Disposition header cannot be broken out of. Both changes are inserted immediately before the existing $this->header('Content-Disposition', ...) call.
CVSS rationale
AV:N: The vulnerability is exploitable over the network via HTTP. AC:L: No race conditions or special timing are required; a crafted filename is sufficient. AT:N: The malicious filename is stored in the application; no manipulation of the attack target is needed at exploit time. PR:L: An authenticated MISP user with the ability to create or upload an attachment is required to store the crafted filename. UI:N: The victim only needs to view a page that triggers the download; no specific interaction beyond normal browsing is required. VC/VI/VA:N: The vulnerable component (the MISP server) itself is not directly compromised in terms of its own confidentiality, integrity, or availability. SC:H: The rendered HTML/JavaScript executes in the victim's browser on the application origin, granting full access to the victim's session, cookies, and data. SI:L: The attacker can modify what the victim sees and potentially submit forms on the victim's behalf. SA:N: No availability impact on the victim's system.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-113 CRLF characters in the unsanitized filename cause PHP to suppress the entire Content-Disposition header, effectively splitting or altering the HTTP response structure. This is the primary mechanism by which the attachment disposition is dropped and the body renders inline.
- CWE-79 The consequence of the header suppression is that an HTML attachment renders inline on the application origin, constituting a stored XSS condition. The quote-injection variant (CWE-74) also contributes to the header manipulation but the security impact is best characterized as XSS.
- CWE-20 The root cause is the absence of input validation and output encoding on the filename parameter before it is placed into an HTTP header value. Both the control-character and quote-injection variants stem from this missing validation.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-66 The attacker injects CRLF sequences into the filename field, which is reflected into the Content-Disposition HTTP response header. This causes the header to be suppressed or its structure altered, matching the HTTP response splitting attack pattern. The quote-injection variant is a secondary header parameter injection that also falls under this pattern.
- CAPEC-2 The attack relies on supplying special characters (CRLF, double-quote) in a user-controlled input field (the attachment filename) that the application fails to neutralize before using it in a structured output context (HTTP header). This is the closest general-purpose CAPEC for injection via special characters when a more specific pattern is not available.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected product is identified as MISP sachertortephp based on the GitHub repository URL in the patch metadata; no specific version range is provided in the patch or metadata.
- PR:L assumes that creating or uploading an attachment with a crafted filename requires authenticated access to the MISP instance; the patch does not explicitly state the authentication model.
- UI:N assumes the victim triggers the download by normal page navigation; the commit message states the issue is reachable with download_attachments_on_load enabled, implying no special user action beyond viewing the page.
- SC:H assumes the rendered HTML/JavaScript on the application origin grants full access to the victim's session and data, consistent with standard stored XSS impact.
- The CAPEC-66 mapping is the closest available pattern for HTTP response header manipulation via CRLF injection; CAPEC-2 is included as a supplementary general-purpose pattern. Neither CAPEC perfectly captures the combined CRLF-suppression and quote-injection mechanism.
- The Co-Authored-By line referencing Claude Opus 4.8 is treated as a tool credit per the metadata remediation_developers field; it is not a human contributor.
- The patch does not specify whether the filename is attacker-controlled at creation time or only at serve time; the commit message states it 'neutralises already-stored filenames on serve,' implying the filename may have been stored before the fix.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
5 | 11 | medium | 7 |
- 2026-10-06 17:27 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (afbc551aa6b8aedb87dfa1223a388e9a3178abfd): fix: [security] Strip control characters from download https://github.com/MISP/sachertortephp/commit/afbc551aa6b8aedb87dfa1223a388e9a3178abfd.patch
- 2026-10-06 18:20 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (e2c80021729611922817a57d2317b2ffa7ed1439): fix: [security] Escape the download filename quoted-string https://github.com/MISP/sachertortephp/commit/e2c80021729611922817a57d2317b2ffa7ed1439.patch
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CVE-2026-104914 (GCVE-0-2026-104914)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-02 16:09 – Updated: 2026-10-06 18:23qwen3.8:27b
1 event
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-10-02 16:06 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/bd81c23cf.patch
9673ee1d4db2… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
bd81c23cf2ac
|
fix: [security] Show soft-deleted attributes only to the | 9673ee1d4db2… |
Fix summary
The fix enforces organizational ownership checks on soft-deleted attribute queries. When a user without sync permission requests deleted attributes, the query is now constrained to only return soft-deleted attributes whose parent event belongs to the requesting user's organization. This aligns the attribute search and paginated view behavior with the existing event view authorization logic.
Patch summary
Two code paths were modified:1. Event.php (fetchPaginatedAttributes): When the deleted filter is active and the user lacks perm_sync, an additional subquery condition is appended requiring the event owner's org_id to match the user's org_id. The original blanket deleted=0 or deleted=1 condition is replaced with an OR/AND structure that permits non-deleted attributes for all users but restricts deleted attributes to the owning org.2. MispAttribute.php (fetchAttributes): In the deleted='only' branch, when the user lacks perm_sync, an additional AND condition Event.org_id = user.org_id is added to the query conditions, scoping results to the user's own organization.
CVSS rationale
AV:N: The vulnerability is exploitable over the network via the MISP web API. AC:L: Exploitation requires only a standard query with the deleted-attribute filter; no race conditions or complex setup. AT:N: No special attack requirements. PR:L: An authenticated user with at least read access to an event owned by another organization is required. UI:N: No victim interaction needed; the data is returned in the API response. VC:L: Confidentiality impact is limited to soft-deleted attributes (a subset of event data) from other organizations; not all data is exposed. VI:N, VA:N: No integrity or availability impact on the vulnerable component. SC:N, SI:N, SA:N: No impact on subsequent components.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-862 The attribute search and paginated view code paths were missing the authorization check that restricts soft-deleted attribute visibility to the owning organization. The event view had this check, but the attribute-level query paths did not, allowing any user with event visibility to retrieve soft-deleted attributes from other organizations.
- CWE-284 More broadly, the application failed to enforce proper access control boundaries between organizations when serving soft-deleted attribute data through specific query endpoints, resulting in cross-organizational information disclosure.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-126 This CAPEC describes leveraging legitimate application code paths to access or manipulate data beyond intended permissions. The attacker uses the legitimate attribute search and paginated view endpoints (executable code paths) to retrieve soft-deleted attributes from other organizations. The mapping is imperfect because CAPEC-126 emphasizes data alteration, whereas this vulnerability is purely an information disclosure. However, among available CAPEC patterns, this is the closest match for exploiting a legitimate code path to bypass intended access restrictions. No CAPEC specifically covers 'information disclosure via missing authorization in a query endpoint' with greater precision.
Assumptions to verify
- The exact fixed version is not specified in the patch metadata; the fix commit is 37 commits after the v2.5.48 tag, so the fixed release is post-2.5.48 but the exact version number is unknown.
- PR:L assumes the attacker needs at least read access to an event owned by another organization; if MISP deployments restrict cross-org event visibility more tightly, the effective privilege requirement may be higher.
- CAPEC-126 is the closest available mapping but is not a perfect fit; the vulnerability is an information disclosure via missing authorization rather than data alteration.
- VC:L assumes the exposure is limited to soft-deleted attributes (a subset of event data) and does not include active attributes or full event metadata.
- The patch does not specify whether this affects all MISP deployments or only multi-organization configurations; the CVSS assumes a multi-org deployment where cross-org visibility is possible.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
7 | 11 | medium | 5 |
- 2026-09-24 11:57 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (bd81c23cf2aced3c72766369dc813612edd52509): fix: [security] Show soft-deleted attributes only to the https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/bd81c23cf.patch
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CVE-2026-104912 (GCVE-0-2026-104912)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-02 16:04 – Updated: 2026-10-03 15:52| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/100235bd9 | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
1 event
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-10-02 16:02 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/100235bd9.patch
a38b683420d9… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
100235bd99b9
|
fix: [security] Check correlations against the live event ACL | a38b683420d9… |
Fix summary
The fix ensures that correlation-based lookups are authorized against the live event and attribute access control lists rather than the stale distribution snapshot on the correlation row. A new filtering step validates related event IDs against the current event ACL before returning them, and attribute queries for non-admin users now include the live ACL conditions. Additionally, Event and Object fields are stripped from returned attribute results to prevent incidental metadata leakage.
Patch summary
In DefaultCorrelationBehavior.php: (1) runGetRelatedAttributes now builds query conditions that include the live attribute ACL (buildConditions) for non-site-admin users, and ensures Event and Object are contained in the query for proper filtering; (2) after fetching related attributes, Event and Object sub-objects are unset from each result; (3) fetchRelatedEventIds now passes its results through a new __filterVisibleEventIds method that queries the Event model with createEventConditions to verify each event ID is still visible to the user; (4) the new __filterVisibleEventIds method returns the event IDs unchanged for site admins or empty lists, otherwise filters against the live event ACL.
CVSS rationale
Network vector: MISP is a web application accessible over the network. Low complexity: the attacker simply performs a normal attribute search that triggers correlations; no race condition or special setup is needed. No attack requirements: the stale correlation row exists naturally after any event restriction. Low privileges: the attacker needs an authenticated account with read access to at least one event. No user interaction: the attacker initiates the search themselves. High vulnerability-component confidentiality impact: full attribute values and event metadata of restricted events are exposed. No integrity or availability impact on the vulnerable or subsequent components.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-862 The correlation lookup path failed to enforce the current (live) authorization state of the target events and attributes. Access was granted based on a stale snapshot rather than the actual ACL, effectively missing the authorization check for restricted events.
- CWE-284 The access control decision relied on outdated data (the distribution columns copied onto the correlation row) that did not reflect the current published/sharing-group state of the event, leading to improper access control.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-114 The authorization state used for correlation lookups was incorrectly adjusted (stale) relative to the actual event ACL. An attacker with a legitimate account could exploit this misalignment to access data beyond their intended privilege scope. This is the closest CAPEC pattern; the exact mechanism is a stale authorization snapshot rather than a classic privilege-escalation primitive, so the mapping is approximate.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected version boundary (< 2.5.48) is inferred from the tag_version_boundary metadata (v2.5.48, 38 commits after fix); the exact first affected version is not stated in the patch.
- CVSS PR:L assumes the attacker needs a standard authenticated MISP account with read access to at least one event; no evidence supports a lower or higher privilege requirement.
- CAPEC-114 is the closest available pattern; the actual mechanism is a stale authorization snapshot rather than a classic privilege-escalation vector, so the mapping is approximate.
- The patch does not specify whether the vulnerability requires the event to have been restricted after correlation creation, or whether other state changes (e.g., sharing group modification) also trigger the issue; the commit message mentions 'restricted' as the primary scenario.
- No public exploit or PoC is referenced; exploitation status is assumed to be 'none'.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
7 | 11 | medium | 5 |
- 2026-09-24 10:12 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (100235bd99b9f57a5a09976412d54e2001d2e0c4): fix: [security] Check correlations against the live event ACL https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/100235bd9.patch
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CVE-2026-104910 (GCVE-0-2026-104910)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-02 16:01 – Updated: 2026-10-03 15:52| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/2ffa97f05 | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
1 event
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
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patch2vuln.pyon 2026-10-02 15:59 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
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https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/2ffa97f05.patch
c315cbcd2cad… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
2ffa97f0526c
|
fix: [security] Scope the related event list to what the | c315cbcd2cad… |
Fix summary
The fix enforces proper per-event authorization on the related events query by applying the user's full access-control conditions (including published status, distribution level, and sharing group membership) to the event lookup, rather than relying solely on the stale distribution snapshot stored in the correlation table. This ensures that only events the caller is currently permitted to read are returned in the related events list.
Patch summary
In EventsController.php (viewRelatedEvents) and Event.php (getRelatedEvents), the query that fetches related event metadata previously used only Event.id IN (relatedEventIds) as the condition. The patch replaces this with a call to createEventConditions($user), which builds the full set of authorization conditions (published flag, distribution, sharing group), and then adds the Event.id filter on top. The stale comment claiming ACL was enforced via the correlation table was removed. Two files changed, 8 insertions, 9 deletions.
CVSS rationale
AV:N: MISP is a network-accessible web application. AC:L: An authenticated user simply requests the related events endpoint; no race condition or complex manipulation is needed. AT:N: No attack-target manipulation required. PR:L: Requires a low-privilege authenticated user with access to at least one event. UI:N: No user interaction needed. VC:L: Disclosure is limited to event metadata (title, date, correlation counts), not full event content or attributes. VI:N, VA:N: No integrity or availability impact. SC:N, SI:N, SA:N: No secondary impacts on other systems. The overall score reflects a low-severity information disclosure requiring authentication.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-862 The related events query did not apply the caller's per-event authorization checks (published status, distribution, sharing group). The system relied on a stale snapshot in the correlation table instead of re-validating access, effectively omitting the authorization step for the returned events.
- CWE-285 Even though some authorization existed (via the correlation table snapshot), it was based on outdated data and lacked the published flag check, making the authorization decision incorrect for events whose access parameters had changed or that were unpublished.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-126 The attacker leverages the trusted correlation relationship stored in the correlation table. The system treated the correlation entry as a sufficient authorization basis, but the snapshot data was stale and incomplete (missing published flag), allowing access to event metadata the caller should not see. This is the closest CAPEC to the pattern of relying on a trusted data source that does not reflect current authorization state. Uncertainty: no CAPEC perfectly describes 'stale authorization snapshot in a join table'; CAPEC-126 is the best available match.
Assumptions to verify
- The tag_version_boundary (v2.5.48, 50 commits after fix) is used as an approximate upper bound for affected versions; exact version boundaries are not explicitly stated in the patch metadata.
- PR:L assumes the attacker needs only a basic authenticated MISP account with access to at least one event; higher-privilege roles may be required depending on deployment configuration, but the patch does not specify this.
- VC:L assumes the disclosed metadata (event titles, dates, correlation counts) constitutes a low confidentiality impact; in highly sensitive threat-intelligence environments the impact could be rated higher.
- CAPEC-126 is the closest available mapping; no CAPEC precisely describes authorization bypass via a stale snapshot in a correlation/join table.
- The 'published' flag and distribution/sharing group checks are assumed to be the primary authorization mechanisms in MISP's event model, based on the commit message and patch context.
- No public exploit or active exploitation is assumed; the patch does not reference any CVE, advisory, or exploitation evidence.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
6 | 11 | medium | 6 |
- 2026-09-22 13:14 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (2ffa97f0526cd6579b91a4dea560f6246ecbe108): fix: [security] Scope the related event list to what the https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/2ffa97f05.patch
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CVE-2026-104908 (GCVE-0-2026-104908)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-02 15:56 – Updated: 2026-10-02 16:19| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/70e319e4b | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
1 event
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-10-02 15:55 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/70e319e4b.patch
2ea9ae3603b6… - Confidence
- high
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
70e319e4b9db
|
fix: [security] Imported decaying models belong to the | 2ea9ae3603b6… |
Fix summary
The import handler now builds the model record from an explicit allow-list of permitted fields (name, parameters, description, ref, formula, version, enabled, all_orgs) using array_intersect_key, discarding any unlisted keys including nested model objects. The organisation identifier and default flag are set unconditionally after filtering. The save operation is preceded by an explicit create() call and the data is wrapped in the proper model key, preventing the ORM from interpreting attacker-supplied nested keys as separate model attributes.
Patch summary
In DecayingModelController::import(), the previous logic of unsetting id/uuid and pinning org_id/default on the flat array was replaced with an allow-list approach: array_intersect_key against a fixed set of importable fields, followed by explicit assignment of org_id from the authenticated user and default=0. A DecayingModel::create() call was added before save, and the save payload is now wrapped as array('DecayingModel' => $model) to bind the data to the correct model context. A regression test (DecayingModelImportOwnership) was added that verifies a nested DecayingModel key with a foreign id, org_id, and default=1 cannot overwrite or reassign an existing model.
CVSS rationale
AV:N - MISP is a network-accessible web application. AC:L - the attack requires only crafting a JSON payload with a nested key; no race condition or complex timing is needed. AT:N - no in-transit tampering required. PR:L - requires an authenticated user with perm_decaying, a low-privilege role. UI:N - no victim interaction needed. VC:N - no confidentiality impact; the attacker does not read data they cannot already access. VI:H - high integrity impact: an existing model belonging to another organisation can be overwritten in place, its ownership reassigned, or its default flag set, altering scoring for other users. VA:N - no availability impact. SC/SI/SA:N - the impact is confined to the MISP instance itself (same component); no secondary component is affected. Scope is not changed because both the vulnerable and impacted components are the MISP application and its data store.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-915 The import endpoint accepted user-supplied data and saved it without restricting which object attributes could be set. A nested model key allowed the attacker to modify the primary key, organisation, and default flag of a record, which are attributes that should be controlled exclusively by the application. This is a classic mass-assignment / improper dynamic attribute modification issue.
- CWE-285 The application failed to enforce that the imported model belongs to the caller's organisation. A user with only perm_decaying could modify records owned by other organisations, indicating an authorization boundary was not enforced on the object being written.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-13 The attacker tampers with the import request parameters by injecting a nested DecayingModel key containing unauthorized fields (id, org_id, default) that the application's top-level stripping did not filter. This is a direct form of parameter tampering where extra or modified parameters in the request bypass the intended input validation. The mapping is a close fit because the attack vector is manipulation of request parameters rather than a separate injection or protocol-level attack.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected version boundary is inferred from the tag_version_boundary metadata (v2.5.48, 21 commits after fix); the patch metadata does not explicitly state a fixed version string, so '< 2.5.48' is an analyst inference.
- The CAPEC-13 mapping is the closest available pattern; the attack is specifically a mass-assignment bypass via a nested model key rather than a generic parameter tampering, but no CAPEC entry precisely describes ORM-level mass assignment through nested keys.
- CVSS PR:L assumes perm_decaying is a low-privilege role available to many users; if it requires elevated privileges the score would be lower.
- The Co-Authored-By line references an AI assistant (Claude Opus 5); it is recorded as a tool credit, not a human remediation developer.
- No evidence of active exploitation or public PoC was found in the patch; SSVCE exploitation is set to 'none'.
- The patch does not specify authentication requirements beyond perm_decaying; it is assumed this is a standard MISP role rather than an admin-level permission.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
7 | 11 | high | 6 |
- 2026-09-25 12:22 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (70e319e4b9dbbeca173befce2340eedf9d86f1b0): fix: [security] Imported decaying models belong to the https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/70e319e4b.patch
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"cweId": "CWE-915",
"rationale": "The import endpoint accepted user-supplied data and saved it without restricting which object attributes could be set. A nested model key allowed the attacker to modify the primary key, organisation, and default flag of a record, which are attributes that should be controlled exclusively by the application. This is a classic mass-assignment / improper dynamic attribute modification issue."
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-285",
"rationale": "The application failed to enforce that the imported model belongs to the caller\u0027s organisation. A user with only perm_decaying could modify records owned by other organisations, indicating an authorization boundary was not enforced on the object being written."
}
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CVE-2026-104907 (GCVE-0-2026-104907)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-02 15:51 – Updated: 2026-10-02 16:18| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/70ad174dd | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
1 event
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-10-02 15:50 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/70ad174dd.patch
048909e6f2d9… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
70ad174ddd43
|
fix: [security] Cast the remote tag id in the event preview | 048909e6f2d9… |
Fix summary
The vulnerability is remediated by casting the remote tag ID to an integer before embedding it in the inline JavaScript onclick handler. This ensures only a numeric value is rendered, eliminating the possibility of breaking out of the JavaScript string context with special characters.
Patch summary
In app/View/Servers/preview_event.ctp, the expression h($tag['id']) inside the onclick attribute's JavaScript string was replaced with (int)$tag['id']. This changes the output from an HTML-escaped string to a strictly integer value, preventing any non-numeric characters from being injected into the inline script context.
CVSS rationale
AV:N - the attack originates from a remote linked server over the network. AC:L - the injection is straightforward (embed a quote in a tag ID). AT:N - no special timing or race conditions required. PR:L - the attacker must be a configured linked server, which requires some level of trust/access but not full admin. UI:A - the victim must actively view the event preview and interact with the tag element. VC/VI/VA:N - the MISP server itself is not compromised; the impact is in the victim's browser. SC:N - no meaningful confidentiality impact on the subsequent component is guaranteed. SI:L - the injected script can perform limited actions (redirect, read page data, submit forms) in the user's session. SA:N - no availability impact on the subsequent component.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-79 The tag ID is embedded in an inline JavaScript onclick handler where HTML escaping (h()) does not neutralize JavaScript string breakout characters. This is a classic case of improper output encoding for a JavaScript context, resulting in reflected XSS.
- CWE-116 The root cause is using HTML entity encoding (h()) in a context that requires JavaScript string escaping. The encoding mechanism is inappropriate for the output context, which is a sub-category of the XSS issue.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-1 The vulnerability is a reflected XSS where attacker-controlled data (a tag ID from a linked server) is injected into an inline JavaScript event handler without proper context-aware encoding. CAPEC-1 is the closest general match. The specific sub-technique is injection into a JavaScript string literal within an HTML attribute, which is not separately enumerated in CAPEC.
- CAPEC-126 The attacker exploits the fact that the single-quote character (or similar) is not properly handled when the tag ID is placed inside a JavaScript string within an HTML attribute. The HTML escaping does not account for the JavaScript string delimiter. This CAPEC captures the character-handling aspect of the flaw. Uncertainty: CAPEC-1 is more directly about XSS; CAPEC-126 is included as a supplementary mapping for the encoding mismatch.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected version boundary is inferred from the tag v2.5.48 with 28 commits after the fix; the exact first affected version is not stated in the patch.
- The attacker is assumed to be a linked/remote MISP server that can control tag IDs in events shared with the local instance; the exact trust model and authentication for linked servers is not detailed in the patch.
- CAPEC-126 is included as a supplementary mapping; the primary and most defensible mapping is CAPEC-1 (Cross Site Scripting).
- The CVSS PR:L assumes that being a linked server requires some form of authenticated or trusted relationship, but the exact privilege level is not specified in the patch.
- The Co-Authored-By line references an AI tool (Claude Opus 5.5); it is listed as a tool credit, not a human remediation developer.
- The impact scope (SC/SI) is assessed conservatively; the actual XSS payload capability depends on the browser context and same-origin policy, which are not fully specified.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
6 | 11 | medium | 6 |
- 2026-09-24 21:53 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (70ad174ddd438887687d40fc1e2e4e8b322a179e): fix: [security] Cast the remote tag id in the event preview https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/70ad174dd.patch
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CVE-2026-104906 (GCVE-0-2026-104906)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-02 15:49 – Updated: 2026-10-02 16:17- CWE-79 - Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/1bed4ca0c | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
1 event
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-10-02 15:47 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/1bed4ca0c.patch
6f48e50f2a68… - Confidence
- high
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
1bed4ca0c990
|
fix: [security] Escape the JSON shown in the generic JSON | 6f48e50f2a68… |
Fix summary
The fix applies HTML-encoding (via the h() helper) to the JSON string before it is interpolated into the HTML pre element. This ensures that any HTML or script markup present in the JSON string properties of a TAXII object is rendered as inert text rather than being parsed and executed by the browser, eliminating the XSS vector.
Patch summary
In app/View/Elements/genericElements/json.ctp, the sprintf call that builds the pre tag was changed from json_encode($json) to h(json_encode($json)). The h() function (CakePHP's HTML-encoding helper, equivalent to htmlspecialchars) now escapes angle brackets, ampersands, and quotes in the JSON output before it is placed inside the HTML pre element. One line changed, one file affected.
CVSS rationale
AV:N: The vulnerability is exploitable over the network via the MISP web interface. AC:L: No race conditions or special timing required; simply viewing the object triggers the XSS. AT:N: The malicious payload is already embedded in the TAXII object; no manipulation of the attack target is needed at exploit time. PR:L: The attacker needs a MISP account (or the ability to publish to a subscribed TAXII server) to place the payload. UI:A: The victim must actively open/view the TAXII object in the viewer. VC/VI/VA:N: The MISP server itself is not compromised; the impact is client-side. SC:H: An attacker can read session cookies, API tokens, and data visible in the MISP UI. SI:H: An attacker can perform actions as the authenticated user (create/modify objects, change settings). SA:N: No denial-of-service impact on the system.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-79 The patch directly addresses the failure to HTML-encode untrusted JSON data before embedding it in an HTML context. The h() wrapper is the canonical fix for CWE-79 in CakePHP applications. The data originates from external TAXII objects and is rendered without encoding, allowing script injection.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-66 The attack pattern involves injecting script-enabled content into a web page via untrusted data (TAXII object string properties) that is rendered without encoding. CAPEC-66 is the most specific CAPEC for XSS. The uncertainty is that the exact delivery mechanism (stored in a TAXII server vs. reflected) is not fully specified in the patch, but the core pattern of unencoded user-controlled data in an HTML context matches CAPEC-66 precisely.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected version boundary (< 2.5.48) is inferred from the tag_version_boundary metadata (v2.5.48, 29 commits after fix); the patch metadata does not explicitly state a fixed version.
- PR:L assumes the TAXII object viewer requires authenticated access to MISP; if the viewer is accessible without authentication, PR would be None.
- The CAPEC-66 mapping is the closest available pattern for XSS; the exact delivery vector (stored via TAXII server vs. reflected) is not fully specified in the patch, but the core unencoded-output pattern is unambiguous.
- The Co-Authored-By line references an AI assistant (Claude Opus 5.5); it is credited as a tool rather than a human remediation developer.
- UI:A assumes the victim must actively navigate to and render the specific TAXII object; if the object is auto-loaded in a dashboard, UI could be None.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
8 | 11 | high | 5 |
- 2026-09-24 21:24 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (1bed4ca0c990a4c285e8caa1d7efd91fec43eaca): fix: [security] Escape the JSON shown in the generic JSON https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/1bed4ca0c.patch
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"title": "MISP TAXII Object Viewer Stored XSS via Unescaped JSON Output",
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CVE-2026-104901 (GCVE-0-2026-104901)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-02 15:21 – Updated: 2026-10-02 16:15- CWE-79 - Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/bd5e80c84 | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
1 event
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-10-02 15:17 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/bd5e80c84.patch
398814c5f528… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
bd5e80c84f0a
|
fix: [security] Treat the remote event id in the ID | 398814c5f528… |
Fix summary
The vulnerability is remediated by enforcing integer typing on the remote event ID at the point where it enters the application data structure in the controller, and by applying HTML output encoding (the h() helper) to all user-visible fields (remote_id, server_id) in both the default and Overmind-themed ID Translator views. This ensures that even if a remote server returns non-numeric or markup-laden data, it cannot be interpreted as HTML by the browser.
Patch summary
In ServersController.php, the remote_event['id'] value is cast to (int) in two locations where it is stored in the remote_events array and where it is extracted from the API response. In app/View/Servers/id_translator.ctp, the h() escaping function is applied to remote_id in the anchor text and to both server_id and remote_id in the preview URL. In app/View/Themed/Overmind/Servers/id_translator.ctp, h() is applied to remote_id in the badge display and to server_id and remote_id in the preview link. An 'exception' key is also initialized to null in the first array construction for consistency.
CVSS rationale
AV:N: The attack originates from a remote linked server over the network. AC:L: No race conditions or special timing are required; the linked server simply returns a crafted ID. AT:N: No active user interaction is needed to set up the attack (the malicious server is already linked). PR:N: The attacker is the linked server itself and does not need credentials on the victim's instance. UI:A: The victim must actively navigate to the ID Translator page for the payload to execute. VC:N/VI:N/VA:N: The vulnerable component (MISP server) is not directly compromised; the impact is client-side. SC:L: A successful XSS can read cookies, session tokens, or page data in the victim's browser. SI:L: The attacker can modify the rendered page content. SA:N: No impact on the security authority of the system.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-79 The remote event ID returned by a linked server was rendered in HTML output without output encoding, allowing injection of arbitrary markup or script. The fix applies HTML escaping (h()) and integer casting, which is the canonical remediation for CWE-79.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-1 The closest CAPEC pattern is reflected XSS: data originating from an external source (the linked server's API response) is reflected into the rendered HTML page without encoding. The mapping is slightly imprecise because the data source is a server-to-server API response rather than a direct user-supplied request parameter, but the mechanism (untrusted data reflected into HTML) matches CAPEC-1 most closely among available patterns. CAPEC-120 (Persistent XSS) was considered but the data is not stored in the victim's database; it is fetched live from the remote server and rendered, making the reflected pattern a better fit.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected version boundary is inferred from the tag_version_boundary metadata (v2.5.48, 30 commits after fix); the exact first affected version is not specified in the patch.
- The CAPEC-1 mapping is the closest available pattern; the data source is a server-to-server API response rather than a direct HTTP request parameter, making the 'reflected' classification slightly imprecise.
- The attacker is assumed to be a configured linked MISP server; no evidence suggests the vulnerability is exploitable without a pre-existing server link.
- The UI:A rating assumes the victim must explicitly navigate to the ID Translator page; it is unclear whether any automated workflow could trigger this view without direct user action.
- The Co-Authored-By line references an AI assistant; it is credited as a tool rather than a human remediation developer.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
7 | 11 | medium | 5 |
- 2026-09-24 21:24 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (bd5e80c84f0ab853d88d14e14df9bd92786eb8f4): fix: [security] Treat the remote event id in the ID https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/bd5e80c84.patch
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CVE-2026-104900 (GCVE-0-2026-104900)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-02 15:16 – Updated: 2026-10-02 16:15- CWE-79 - Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/2a2981a27 | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
1 event
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-10-01 11:32 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/2a2981a27.patch
3c8a41f55b53… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
2a2981a27bd0
|
fix: [security] Escape the value of the count index field | 3c8a41f55b53… |
Fix summary
The vulnerability is remediated by applying HTML entity encoding to the count field value before it is rendered in the view template. This ensures that any HTML or script markup contained in the value from a remote server is neutralized and displayed as inert text rather than being interpreted by the browser.
Patch summary
In the CakePHP view template file app/View/Elements/genericElements/IndexTable/Fields/count.ctp, the assignment of $fieldValue was changed from a raw Hash::extract() call to one wrapped in the h() helper function (CakePHP's HTML-encoding utility). This single-line change ensures the extracted value is HTML-entity-encoded before being used in the template output, preventing injection of markup through the event identifier from a linked server.
CVSS rationale
AV:N - exploitation occurs over the network via a linked MISP server. AC:L - the attacker only needs to craft an event ID with HTML/JS; no race conditions or complex timing. AT:N - the malicious data is stored in the linked server; no active attack is needed at exploitation time. PR:L - the attacker needs low-privilege access to a linked MISP server to create/modify an event. UI:N - the victim only needs to view the remote event preview index page; no special interaction. VC/VI/VA:N - no direct impact on the MISP server's own confidentiality, integrity, or availability. SC:L - XSS allows reading some data (cookies, DOM) in the victim's browser. SI:L - attacker can modify what the victim sees in the browser. SA:N - no impact on security authority of the victim's system.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-79 The patch adds HTML encoding (h() function) to a value that was previously rendered raw in an HTML context. The commit message explicitly states the value was printed raw, allowing markup injection. This is a textbook stored/reflected XSS due to missing output encoding.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-1 The attack pattern involves injecting script or markup into a web page through a data field (event ID from a linked server) that is rendered without encoding. CAPEC-1 is the closest standard mapping for XSS via untrusted data rendered in a browser context. The specific vector here is a linked MISP server supplying crafted data, which is a variant of the general XSS injection pattern. No more specific CAPEC precisely captures the 'trusted remote server as injection vector' nuance, so CAPEC-1 is the best available match.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected version boundary is inferred from the nearest tag v2.5.48 with 31 commits after the fix; the exact last affected version is not explicitly stated in the patch.
- PR:L assumes the attacker needs at least low-privilege access to a linked MISP server to create or modify an event; if no authentication is required on the linked server, PR could be None.
- The CAPEC-1 mapping is the closest standard pattern; no CAPEC specifically covers 'XSS via data from a trusted remote server' as a distinct pattern.
- The Co-Authored-By line references an AI assistant (Claude Opus 5.5); it is listed as a tool credit rather than a human remediation developer.
- The commit date (24 Sep 2026) is in the future relative to typical CVE timelines; this is taken at face value from the patch metadata.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
7 | 11 | medium | 5 |
- 2026-09-24 20:20 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (2a2981a27bd06bfd6fa37866db1911637d52538c): fix: [security] Escape the value of the count index field https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/2a2981a27.patch
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CVE-2026-103858 (GCVE-0-2026-103858)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-01 11:31 – Updated: 2026-10-01 15:00- CWE-285 - Improper Authorization
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/79fbd4c75 | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
1 event
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-10-01 11:16 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/79fbd4c75.patch
04551eba9b01… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
79fbd4c7580a
|
fix: [security] Apply the thread ACL when posting to a | 04551eba9b01… |
Fix summary
The fix replaces the limited org-only distribution check with a call to the thread's full authorization method (checkIfAuthorised), which enforces the complete access control list including sharing groups and event-level visibility. The thread is only read after successful authorization, preventing disclosure of the title and content to unauthorized users. An additional null-check on the post's thread_id was added to prevent referencing posts without a valid thread association.
Patch summary
In PostsController.php add() method: (1) For the 'thread' target case, replaced the inline distribution==0 and org_id comparison with a call to Thread->checkIfAuthorised() before reading the thread; removed the separate _isSiteAdmin() bypass. (2) For the 'post' target case, added a check that the post has a non-empty thread_id, replaced the same limited distribution/org check with Thread->checkIfAuthorised(), and reordered the thread read to occur after the authorization check. Net: 8 insertions, 12 deletions in one file.
CVSS rationale
AV:N: web application accessible over network. AC:L: attacker only needs a valid thread_id or post_id, no race conditions or special timing. AT:N: no special attack prerequisites beyond authentication. PR:L: requires an authenticated MISP user account. UI:N: no victim interaction needed; the attacker directly issues the request. VC:L: attacker can read thread titles and quoted post content they should not see. VI:L: attacker can inject posts into unauthorized threads. VA:N: no availability impact. SC/SI/SA:N: no impact on subsequent components. The impact is bounded to the MISP instance's data and does not compromise the server or other systems.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-285 The authorization check was present but incomplete: it only verified org-level distribution (distribution==0) and org_id match, failing to enforce sharing-group membership and event-level ACL. This is a classic case of insufficient authorization logic rather than a completely missing check, making CWE-285 more precise than CWE-862.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-10 The attacker manipulates the target_id parameter (thread_id or post_id) in the posts/add request to reference a thread or post they do not have full access to. The incomplete server-side authorization check then permits the operation. CAPEC-10 is the closest available pattern for exploiting a server's failure to properly validate the authorization context of a user-supplied resource identifier. Uncertainty: no CAPEC specifically named 'Insecure Direct Object Reference' or 'Broken Access Control via Incomplete ACL' exists in the CAPEC catalog, so Parameter Tampering is the best available match.
Assumptions to verify
- The exact affected version range is uncertain; the tag boundary v2.5.48 with 42 commits after the fix suggests the fix landed around or before v2.5.48, but the precise first-affected and first-fixed versions are not stated in the patch.
- The checkIfAuthorised() method is assumed to enforce the full thread ACL including sharing groups and event visibility, based on the commit message description; the method's implementation is not included in the patch.
- CAPEC-10 (Parameter Tampering) is the closest available CAPEC mapping; no CAPEC specifically covers 'incomplete authorization check on a direct object reference' was identified in the catalog.
- The CVSS assumes the attacker already possesses a valid MISP account (PR:L); unauthenticated access is not indicated by the patch.
- The AI co-author (Claude Opus 5.5) is credited as a tool rather than a person, per the Co-Authored-By line.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
7 | 11 | medium | 5 |
- 2026-09-23 13:27 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (79fbd4c7580adc0518581351c3d8c3d5b3ac7c97): fix: [security] Apply the thread ACL when posting to a https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/79fbd4c75.patch
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CVE-2026-103664 (GCVE-0-2026-103664)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-01 08:55 – Updated: 2026-10-01 15:06- CWE-79 - Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/58925dbf0 | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
1 event
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-10-01 08:49 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/58925dbf0.patch
7e384946a0fb… - Confidence
- high
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
58925dbf01c2
|
fix: [security] Cast the analyst data seed to an integer | 7e384946a0fb… |
Fix summary
The vulnerability is remediated by enforcing integer type on the seed parameter at both the controller layer and the view/template layer. Casting the value to an integer ensures that any non-numeric input (including script payloads) is neutralized before it reaches the inline JavaScript context, eliminating the injection vector.
Patch summary
In AttributesController.php and ObjectsController.php, the seed value set for the view is now cast to an integer with a fallback to a random integer if the cast yields zero. In the two analyst data view templates (generic_simple.ctp and thread.ctp), the seed variable is similarly cast to an integer before use in inline script, replacing the previous logic that only checked for emptiness without type enforcement.
CVSS rationale
AV:N - exploitable over the network via a crafted URL. AC:L - no race conditions or special conditions; a simple URL with a malicious seed suffices. AT:N - no prior manipulation of the target system needed. PR:L - MISP is an authenticated platform; the attacker needs at least a low-privilege account or must target an authenticated user. UI:A - the victim must actively navigate to the crafted URL. VC/VI/VA:N - the server-side confidentiality, integrity, and availability are not directly impacted. SC:L - the victim's browser session data (cookies, tokens) can be read. SI:L - the victim's page content can be modified. SA:N - no impact on security authority.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-79 The user-supplied seed parameter was reflected into inline JavaScript in the HTML response without sanitization or type coercion, allowing script injection. This is a textbook reflected XSS.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-1 The attacker supplies a malicious value in a URL parameter (seed), which the server reflects unmodified into inline JavaScript in the HTTP response. The victim's browser executes the injected script. This matches the reflected XSS pattern precisely. No uncertainty in this mapping.
Assumptions to verify
- MISP requires user authentication to access the analyst data views; PR:L assumes a low-privilege authenticated account is sufficient for the attacker to craft or deliver the malicious URL.
- The exact fixed version number is not stated in the patch; the fix commit is 32 commits after the v2.5.48 tag, so the fixed version is presumed to be a release after 2.5.48.
- The UI:A rating assumes the victim must click a link or navigate to the crafted URL; if the seed could be injected via a different vector requiring no user interaction, UI could be None.
- CAPEC-1 (Reflected XSS) is selected as the closest match; the injection occurs server-side into the HTML response, distinguishing it from DOM-based XSS (CAPEC-64).
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
9 | 11 | high | 4 |
- 2026-09-24 16:06 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (58925dbf01c2fe5dfe9b2f61a421f6463f66ca56): fix: [security] Cast the analyst data seed to an integer https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/58925dbf0.patch
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"value": "\u003cp\u003eThe vulnerability is remediated by enforcing integer type on the seed parameter at both the controller layer and the view/template layer. Casting the value to an integer ensures that any non-numeric input (including script payloads) is neutralized before it reaches the inline JavaScript context, eliminating the injection vector.\u003c/p\u003e"
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"title": "MISP Reflected Cross-Site Scripting via Unsanitized Analyst Data Seed Parameter",
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"fixSummary": "The vulnerability is remediated by enforcing integer type on the seed parameter at both the controller layer and the view/template layer. Casting the value to an integer ensures that any non-numeric input (including script payloads) is neutralized before it reaches the inline JavaScript context, eliminating the injection vector.",
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CVE-2026-103662 (GCVE-0-2026-103662)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-01 08:48 – Updated: 2026-10-01 15:07- CWE-79 - Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/9619083c8 | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
1 event
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-10-01 08:34 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/9619083c8.patch
0255a5f82ee8… - Confidence
- high
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
9619083c8cea
|
fix: [security] Escape the tag name on the taxonomy tag | 0255a5f82ee8… |
Fix summary
The vulnerability is remediated by HTML-encoding the user-supplied tag name value before it is interpolated into the confirmation form description text. This ensures that any HTML metacharacters in the input are rendered as inert text rather than executable markup, neutralizing the reflected XSS vector.
Patch summary
Two view template files (app/View/Taxonomies/add_tag.ctp and app/View/Taxonomies/disable_tag.ctp) are modified. In each file, the raw request data value $this->request->data['Taxonomy']['name'] is wrapped with CakePHP's h() HTML-encoding helper function before being passed to the translation string that renders the confirmation description. This is a one-line change per file, adding the h() wrapper around the previously unescaped variable.
CVSS rationale
AV:N - the vulnerability is exploitable over the network via a crafted URL. AC:L - no race conditions or special conditions; simply visiting a crafted URL triggers the XSS. AT:N - no attack target manipulation required. PR:N - the attacker does not need authentication; they craft a URL for the admin to visit. UI:A - the administrator must actively navigate to the malicious URL. VC:L - the XSS can read session cookies and page data in the admin's browser. VI:L - the XSS can perform actions on behalf of the admin within the MISP interface. VA:N - no availability impact. SC/SI/SA:N - the impact is confined to the victim's browser session; no secondary system impact is evidenced.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-79 The patch directly addresses a reflected XSS: user-controlled input from the request is echoed into HTML output without encoding. The fix applies HTML entity encoding (h() helper), which is the canonical remediation for CWE-79.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-63 The commit message explicitly states the tag name is 'echoed from the URL unescaped, a reflected XSS.' The attacker supplies a malicious value via a URL parameter, the application reflects it into the HTML response without encoding, and the script executes in the victim's browser. This is a textbook reflected XSS pattern matching CAPEC-63 exactly.
Assumptions to verify
- The tag v2.5.48 is assumed to be the first release containing the fix based on the tag_version_boundary metadata showing 44 commits after the fix commit; the exact release version that first shipped the fix is not explicitly stated.
- The vulnerability requires the legacy taxonomy tag confirmation views to be in use; if MISP has migrated to a different UI for taxonomy management, the attack surface may not be reachable.
- PR:N is assumed because the attacker does not need their own MISP account; they only need to deliver a crafted URL to an authenticated admin. If the form is only reachable via authenticated session and the parameter cannot be injected via URL for unauthenticated users, PR could be elevated.
- The Co-Authored-By line references an AI tool (Claude Opus 5.5); this is not credited as a human contributor per standard CVE credit practices.
- CAPEC-63 is selected as the closest match; the exact CAPEC taxonomy does not have a more specific entry for reflected XSS in server-rendered template engines.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
8 | 11 | high | 5 |
- 2026-09-23 09:17 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (9619083c8cea496fd3ddbad5bf9be57c91fd2118): fix: [security] Escape the tag name on the taxonomy tag https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/9619083c8.patch
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}
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CVE-2026-103659 (GCVE-0-2026-103659)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-01 08:33 – Updated: 2026-10-01 15:24qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-10-01 08:10 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
patch set (2 sources)
e74b42214be0… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
ab08edf9256b
|
fix: [security] Apply the object ACL to flattened attributes | ebc10168f16d… |
07f3486d50f2
|
fix: [event] Gate flattened attributes on the object ACL | 18601512c29d… |
Fix summary
The fix re-applies the object distribution and sharing-group ACL as a subquery condition on the Attribute.object_id field whenever the flatten option is active. This ensures that attributes belonging to objects the caller is not authorized to see are excluded from the flattened result set. The second commit refines the gate to use only the distribution ACL condition (correlated on Object.id) rather than the entire Object contain, preventing soft-delete state from incorrectly filtering attributes for the event owner.
Patch summary
In app/Model/Event.php, two code paths were modified. In fetchPaginatedAttributes(), a new subquery is generated against the Object table using the distribution and sharing-group ACL conditions, and an OR condition is added to the attribute query: either Attribute.object_id = 0 (top-level attribute) or the attribute's object passes the ACL. In fetchEvent(), when flatten is true and the user is not a site admin, a similar subquery is injected into the Attribute contain conditions. The second commit refactors the ACL condition into a standalone variable ($objectAclCondition) and uses only that condition (plus Object.id = Attribute.object_id) in the subquery, removing the soft-delete and other contain conditions that were incorrectly included. A regression test class (FlattenedObjectAcl) in tests/testregressions.py verifies: (1) an outsider cannot see organisation-only object attributes via flatten, (2) the owner retains soft-deleted attributes of a live object, and (3) the outsider cannot see another org's soft
CVSS rationale
AV:N - exploited over the network via the MISP REST API. AC:L - the attack is a simple API request with the flatten parameter; no race conditions or complex setup required. AT:N - no special target-side conditions beyond the existence of a community event with restricted objects. PR:L - requires an authenticated user with at least read access to the community event. UI:N - no user interaction needed; the API call is self-contained. VC:H - sensitive threat-intelligence attributes from organisation-only objects are fully exposed to unauthorized users. VI:N, VA:N - no integrity or availability impact on the vulnerable component. SC:N, SI:N, SA:N - no impact on subsequent components; the data resides within the same application.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-862 The flattening code path removed the Object contain (which enforced distribution and sharing-group ACLs) without re-applying an equivalent authorization check on the resulting top-level attributes. The object-level access control was simply absent from the flattened query, allowing unauthorized data access.
- CWE-285 The authorization decision for object attributes was based solely on the event-level distribution rather than the object-level distribution and sharing group. This is an improper authorization check that grants broader access than intended.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-126 The attacker (a legitimate user with access to a community event) exploits the fact that the application's privilege/access-control enforcement is incorrectly adjusted during the flatten operation. The object-level ACL is not applied, effectively elevating the user's data access beyond their intended scope. This is the closest CAPEC pattern to an authorization bypass where the application fails to enforce a narrower access control in a specific code path. Uncertainty: no CAPEC pattern specifically describes 'missing per-object ACL in a flattened view'; CAPEC-126 is the best available match for privilege/access-control bypass.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected version range is unspecified; the patch does not include version tags or release boundaries. All MISP versions prior to the fix commit are assumed affected.
- The CVSS PR:L assumes the attacker needs at minimum a read-access role on the community event; no evidence supports a lower or higher privilege requirement.
- The CAPEC-126 mapping is the closest available pattern; no CAPEC specifically describes a missing per-object ACL in a flattened API response. The mapping is approximate.
- The second commit (soft-delete fix) is treated as part of the same vulnerability remediation per the patch-set assumption, though it addresses a regression introduced by the first fix rather than the original authorization bypass.
- AI co-authors (Claude Opus 4.8, Claude Opus 5) are listed in commit metadata but are not included as advisory credits as they are tooling, not human contributors.
- No evidence of active exploitation, public PoC, or in-the-wild abuse was found in the supplied data.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
6 | 11 | medium | 6 |
- 2026-09-23 07:25 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (ab08edf9256bb3c9c8a382e0778ecd10b9e29c7c): fix: [security] Apply the object ACL to flattened attributes https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/ab08edf92.patch
- 2026-09-28 11:41 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (07f3486d50f2a5ee0f31ea66c920692664397ddb): fix: [event] Gate flattened attributes on the object ACL https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/07f3486d5.patch
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CVE-2026-103655 (GCVE-0-2026-103655)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-01 08:08 – Updated: 2026-10-01 15:25- CWE-294 - Authentication Bypass via Logical Flaw
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/a020fa47b | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
1 event
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-10-01 07:52 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/a020fa47b.patch
6fce2d1f789e… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
a020fa47b6c3
|
fix: [security] Refuse a TOTP code that was already used to | 6fce2d1f789e… |
Fix summary
The fix introduces a single-use enforcement mechanism for TOTP codes. Upon successful verification, the system records the TOTP period step in a Redis key scoped to the user and step number, using a SET-NX (set-if-not-exists) operation with a TTL of three times the TOTP period. Any subsequent attempt to authenticate with a code from the same period will fail the SET-NX check and be rejected, effectively making each TOTP code single-use within its validity window.
Patch summary
In app/Controller/UsersController.php, the otp() method was modified to capture the current timestamp and pass it to the TOTP verify call. A new private method __claimTotpStep() was added, which computes the TOTP step (intdiv of elapsed time over period), constructs a Redis key of the form misp:otp:totp_used:{userId}:{step}, and attempts a SET with NX and EX (3x period) flags via RedisTool. The login proceeds only if both the TOTP verification and the claim succeed. Thirteen lines added, one line modified.
CVSS rationale
AV:N: the TOTP code is transmitted over the network during login. AC:H: exploitation requires the attacker to intercept a valid TOTP code during a legitimate login and replay it within the short validity window (typically 30 s), which is a non-trivial timing and positioning requirement. AT:N: no manipulation of the target system is needed. PR:N: the attacker is unauthenticated. UI:N: no user interaction beyond the victim's normal login is required. VC:H / VI:H: successful exploitation grants full access to the targeted user's account, including threat-intelligence data and administrative capabilities. VA:L: the attacker could disrupt services by modifying or deleting data. SC/SI/SA:N: no impact on secondary systems is evidenced.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-294 The TOTP verification logic accepted the same code multiple times within its validity period because no state was tracked to mark a period as consumed. This is a logical flaw in the authentication mechanism that permits replay of a valid one-time credential, fitting CWE-294 more precisely than the broader CWE-287.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-122 The closest available CAPEC pattern is Session Hijacking, as the attacker gains unauthorized access to a user's authenticated session by replaying a captured credential (the TOTP code). The mapping is imperfect because the attack targets a one-time authentication token rather than a persistent session identifier, and the window is very short (one TOTP period). No CAPEC specifically covers one-time-code replay, so CAPEC-122 is the best available match.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected version range is inferred from the tag_version_boundary (v2.5.48, 40 commits after fix); the exact first affected version is not stated in the patch metadata and is recorded as unspecified.
- The TOTP validity period is assumed to be the standard 30 seconds based on the OTPHP library default; the patch does not hard-code a specific period value.
- The CAPEC-122 mapping is the closest available pattern; no CAPEC specifically addresses one-time-code replay, so the mapping carries uncertainty.
- CVSS AC is rated High because exploitation requires intercepting a valid TOTP code during a live login and replaying it within a short time window; if the attacker already possesses the code (e.g., via a compromised client), complexity would be lower.
- The Redis dependency for the fix is assumed to be available in the deployment; if Redis is unavailable, the fix's behavior is not specified in the patch.
- The Co-Authored-By line references an AI tool (Claude Opus 5.5); it is credited as a tool rather than a human remediation developer.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
6 | 11 | medium | 6 |
- 2026-09-23 14:24 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (a020fa47b6c3cb5b43d841afe2ccf149889fad6b): fix: [security] Refuse a TOTP code that was already used to https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/a020fa47b.patch
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CVE-2026-103651 (GCVE-0-2026-103651)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-01 07:34 – Updated: 2026-10-01 15:32| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/f34aee2c7 | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
1 event
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-10-01 07:22 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/f34aee2c7.patch
9ec05e4a3d95… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
f34aee2c74e1
|
fix: [security] Burn paper OTP tokens against the stored | 9ec05e4a3d95… |
Fix summary
The fix replaces the session-cached HOTP counter lookup with a direct read of the authoritative counter from the database, performed under a Redis-based distributed lock scoped to the user. The token is verified against the current stored counter, the counter is incremented and persisted atomically within the locked section, and the lock is released in a finally block. Additionally, the cached OTP user session entry is deleted immediately after a successful login (for both TOTP and HOTP paths), preventing the stale session state from being reused.
Patch summary
In UsersController::otp(), the inline HOTP verification block (which used the session-cached $user['hotp_counter']) is replaced with a call to a new private method __consumeHotp(). This method acquires a Redis SETNX lock (misp:otp:hotp_lock:{userId}, 10 s TTL), re-fetches the user's totp secret and hotp_counter from the database, verifies the submitted OTP against the stored counter, increments and saves the counter, and releases the lock in a finally block. The otp_user session key is now deleted after both TOTP and HOTP successful login paths. Net change: +36 / -5 lines in app/Controller/UsersController.php.
CVSS rationale
AV:N – MISP is a network-accessible web application. AC:H – exploitation requires a valid session with the password step already completed, possession of a valid HOTP token value, and the session must still hold the stale cached counter; multiple preconditions must align. AT:N – no manipulation of the target system is needed. PR:L – the attacker must be an authenticated user with a pending OTP session. UI:N – no additional user interaction is required beyond the initial login flow. VC:H – successful exploitation grants full access to the target user's MISP account and its data. VI:H – the attacker can perform any action the user is authorized to perform, and the counter corruption may affect subsequent legitimate authentication. VA:N – no denial-of-service impact is evident. SC/SI/SA:N – no secondary system impact is indicated by the patch.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-362 The HOTP counter is shared mutable state accessed without synchronization. The session-cached copy becomes stale relative to the database copy, and no lock is held during read-verify-increment, allowing a concurrent or replayed request to operate on the old value.
- CWE-287 The OTP verification logic accepts a token that has already been consumed because it compares against a stale cached counter rather than the authoritative stored counter, effectively weakening the second-factor authentication check.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-111 The vulnerability is exploited by exploiting the time window between the session-cached counter being set (at password entry) and the token being consumed, allowing a replayed token to be validated against the stale value. CAPEC-111 (Race Condition) is the closest available CAPEC pattern; the attack is not a classic TOCTOU on a file or memory location but rather a stale-cache race on a shared counter, which falls under the broader race-condition category. No more specific CAPEC for session-cached credential state replay exists in the CAPEC catalog, so this is the best available match.
Assumptions to verify
- The tag_version_boundary metadata (v2.5.48, 41 commits after fix) is interpreted as the first release containing the fix; no explicit fixed_version or affected_version was provided in the metadata.
- The CAPEC-111 mapping is the closest available pattern; the vulnerability is specifically a stale-session-cache replay rather than a classic TOCTOU race, and no more precise CAPEC exists in the catalog.
- CVSS PR:L assumes the attacker already has a valid authenticated session (password step completed); if the threat model requires unauthenticated access, PR would be None but AC would remain High.
- The Redis lock is assumed to be available in the deployment; if Redis is not configured, the locking mechanism may be bypassed, though this is a deployment concern not reflected in the patch.
- The Co-Authored-By line references an AI assistant; it is recorded as a tool credit rather than a human remediation developer.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
7 | 11 | medium | 5 |
- 2026-09-23 14:20 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (f34aee2c74e111fffd07e8ddde8e4843ccf998db): fix: [security] Burn paper OTP tokens against the stored https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/f34aee2c7.patch
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CVE-2026-103389 (GCVE-0-2026-103389)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-30 14:25 – Updated: 2026-09-30 15:28| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/8ea5783dd | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-09-30 14:24 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/8ea5783dd.patch
382869c811e8… - Confidence
- high
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
8ea5783ddcfe
|
fix: [security] Galaxy icons are icon names, and the | 382869c811e8… |
Fix summary
The vulnerability is remediated by enforcing strict input validation on the galaxy icon field so that only valid Font Awesome icon names (lowercase alphanumeric characters and dashes) are accepted at write time. The sync/import capture path discards any icon value that does not conform. The correlation graph JSON generation falls back to a safe default icon for any previously stored invalid value. On the client side, both correlation graph scripts now set the icon as a CSS class attribute rather than injecting it as raw HTML, and apply an additional regex sanitization pass. The asset cache-busting version is incremented to ensure browsers load the corrected scripts.
Patch summary
Added a static isValidIconName() method and a regex constant (ICON_NAME_PATTERN) to the Galaxy model, plus a model-level validation rule restricting the icon field to lowercase letters, digits, and dashes. The captureGalaxy() method now blanks out any icon value that fails validation before persistence. CorrelationGraphTool::__createNode() now checks the icon against the validator and substitutes 'globe' for invalid stored values. Both correlation-graph.js and correlation-graphOvermind.js were changed from .html() string concatenation to .attr('class', ...) with a regex strip of non-conforming characters. AppController asset query version bumped from 225 to 226. A new PHPUnit test file (GalaxyIconNameTest.php) validates the icon name rule against known-good and known-bad payloads including the originally reported XSS vector.
CVSS rationale
AV:N: exploited over the network via the MISP web interface. AC:L: no race conditions or special timing; simply set the icon field and wait for a victim to view the graph. AT:N: no manipulation of the attack target required. PR:L: requires an authenticated user with perm_galaxy_editor, which is the default stock User role. UI:A: the victim must actively open the correlation graph of an event containing the affected galaxy cluster. VC/VI/VA:N: the server-side application is not directly compromised; the impact is on the victim's browser session. SC:H: script execution in the victim's session can read cookies, tokens, and sensitive page data. SI:H: the attacker can modify the victim's view, inject content, or trigger actions. SA:N: no availability impact on the system.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-79 The galaxy icon field was stored without validation and later rendered into the DOM via D3 .html(), allowing an attacker to inject and execute arbitrary script in the victim's browser. This is a textbook stored XSS.
- CWE-20 The root enabler is the absence of any server-side validation on the icon field at write time (add, edit, capture). The field accepted arbitrary strings including HTML markup, which was the precondition for the XSS.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-1 The attack pattern is a stored XSS: an authenticated user with galaxy editor permission injects a script payload into a persistent data field (galaxy icon), which is later rendered unsanitized in another user's browser via the correlation graph. CAPEC-1 is the closest and most direct match. No more specific CAPEC entry for stored XSS via a data field rendered by a graphing library exists in the CAPEC catalog, so CAPEC-1 is the best available mapping.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected version boundary is inferred from the tag_version_boundary metadata indicating the fix commit precedes v2.5.48 by 20 commits; no explicit 'fixed in' version is stated in the patch itself.
- The perm_galaxy_editor permission is assumed to be granted to the stock User role as stated in the commit message; the exact role-permission mapping was not independently verified from the patch.
- CAPEC-1 is the closest available mapping; no CAPEC entry specifically describes stored XSS via a graph-rendering library data field, so the general Cross Site Scripting pattern is used.
- CVSS UI:A assumes the victim must navigate to the correlation graph view of a specific event; if the graph is auto-loaded on a commonly visited page, UI could be lowered to Passive.
- The Co-Authored-By line references an AI assistant (Claude Fable 5.1); it is recorded as a tool credit rather than a human remediation developer.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
6 | 9 | high | 5 |
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"value": "\u003cp\u003eThe vulnerability is remediated by enforcing strict input validation on the galaxy icon field so that only valid Font Awesome icon names (lowercase alphanumeric characters and dashes) are accepted at write time. The sync/import capture path discards any icon value that does not conform. The correlation graph JSON generation falls back to a safe default icon for any previously stored invalid value. On the client side, both correlation graph scripts now set the icon as a CSS class attribute rather than injecting it as raw HTML, and apply an additional regex sanitization pass. The asset cache-busting version is incremented to ensure browsers load the corrected scripts.\u003c/p\u003e"
}
],
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}
],
"title": "MISP Stored Cross-Site Scripting via Unvalidated Galaxy Icon Field in Correlation Graph",
"x_gcve": [
{
"extensions": {
"bcp-05-x-01": {
"ai_annotations": [
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"name": "qwen3.8:27b",
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"The perm_galaxy_editor permission is assumed to be granted to the stock User role as stated in the commit message; the exact role-permission mapping was not independently verified from the patch.",
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}
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"cvssRationale": "AV:N: exploited over the network via the MISP web interface. AC:L: no race conditions or special timing; simply set the icon field and wait for a victim to view the graph. AT:N: no manipulation of the attack target required. PR:L: requires an authenticated user with perm_galaxy_editor, which is the default stock User role. UI:A: the victim must actively open the correlation graph of an event containing the affected galaxy cluster. VC/VI/VA:N: the server-side application is not directly compromised; the impact is on the victim\u0027s browser session. SC:H: script execution in the victim\u0027s session can read cookies, tokens, and sensitive page data. SI:H: the attacker can modify the victim\u0027s view, inject content, or trigger actions. SA:N: no availability impact on the system.",
"fixSummary": "The vulnerability is remediated by enforcing strict input validation on the galaxy icon field so that only valid Font Awesome icon names (lowercase alphanumeric characters and dashes) are accepted at write time. The sync/import capture path discards any icon value that does not conform. The correlation graph JSON generation falls back to a safe default icon for any previously stored invalid value. On the client side, both correlation graph scripts now set the icon as a CSS class attribute rather than injecting it as raw HTML, and apply an additional regex sanitization pass. The asset cache-busting version is incremented to ensure browsers load the corrected scripts.",
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"patchTruncated": false,
"patches": [
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"sourceUrl": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/8ea5783dd.patch",
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CVE-2026-103388 (GCVE-0-2026-103388)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-30 14:22 – Updated: 2026-09-30 15:28- CWE-79 - Improper Neutralization of Input in Web Page ('Cross-site Scripting')
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/118528767 | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-09-30 14:12 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/118528767.patch
b68dbd672692… - Confidence
- high
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
118528767735
|
fix: [security] Link a galaxy cluster source only when it is | b68dbd672692… |
Fix summary
The fix restricts the rendering of the Galaxy Cluster source field as a hyperlink to only http:// and https:// URLs by adding a regular-expression check (preg_match for ^https?://) in addition to the existing FILTER_VALIDATE_URL validation. This prevents javascript: and other non-HTTP URI schemes from being rendered as clickable links, eliminating the stored XSS vector. The change is applied consistently in both the default theme and the Overmind theme.
Patch summary
Two view templates are modified. In app/View/GalaxyClusters/view.ctp, the source value is extracted into a local variable and the conditional for rendering an anchor tag now requires both FILTER_VALIDATE_URL and a preg_match against /^https?:\/\//i. In app/View/Themed/Overmind/Elements/GalaxyClusters/View/galaxy_clusters_general.ctp, the same preg_match guard is added to the existing FILTER_VALIDATE_URL check. Net effect: only http(s) URLs produce a clickable link; all other values (including javascript:) are rendered as plain escaped text.
CVSS rationale
AV:N – MISP is a web application accessed over the network. AC:L – no race conditions or special environment needed; storing a javascript: URL is straightforward. AT:N – no manipulation of the attack target required. PR:L – attacker needs galaxy editor privileges (authenticated, non-admin role). UI:A – victim must click the malicious link for script execution. VC/VI/VA:N – the MISP server itself is not directly compromised; impact is on the victim's browser. SC:H – attacker can read cookies, session tokens, and manipulate the DOM in the victim's session. SI:H – attacker can perform actions on behalf of the victim within MISP. SA:N – no direct compromise of the application's security controls or system integrity.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-79 The application renders user-controlled data (the galaxy cluster source field) into an HTML anchor tag without restricting the URI scheme to safe values. Although output is HTML-escaped via h(), the href attribute still accepts javascript: URIs, resulting in stored XSS. CWE-79 is the narrowest defensible mapping.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-64 The attack pattern involves storing a malicious payload (a javascript: URL) in a persistent data field (galaxy cluster source) that is later rendered in a web page, executing script in the victim's browser upon interaction. This is a textbook persistent/stored XSS. CAPEC-64 is the closest and most precise match in the CAPEC catalog.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected version boundary is inferred from the tag_version_boundary metadata (v2.5.48, 26 commits after fix); the exact first affected release is not stated in the patch.
- PR:L assumes galaxy editor privileges are a non-admin, role-based permission; the exact privilege model is not detailed in the patch.
- UI:A assumes the victim must actively click the rendered link; passive rendering without click does not execute the script.
- The CAPEC-64 mapping is the closest available pattern for stored XSS; no CAPEC specifically covers URI-scheme-based stored XSS, so CAPEC-64 is the best fit.
- The Co-Authored-By line references an AI assistant; it is credited as a tool rather than a human remediation developer.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
6 | 9 | high | 5 |
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"url": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/118528767"
}
],
"solutions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eThe fix restricts the rendering of the Galaxy Cluster source field as a hyperlink to only http:// and https:// URLs by adding a regular-expression check (preg_match for ^https?://) in addition to the existing FILTER_VALIDATE_URL validation. This prevents javascript: and other non-HTTP URI schemes from being rendered as clickable links, eliminating the stored XSS vector. The change is applied consistently in both the default theme and the Overmind theme.\u003c/p\u003e"
}
],
"value": "The fix restricts the rendering of the Galaxy Cluster source field as a hyperlink to only http:// and https:// URLs by adding a regular-expression check (preg_match for ^https?://) in addition to the existing FILTER_VALIDATE_URL validation. This prevents javascript: and other non-HTTP URI schemes from being rendered as clickable links, eliminating the stored XSS vector. The change is applied consistently in both the default theme and the Overmind theme."
}
],
"title": "MISP Stored Cross-Site Scripting via JavaScript URL in Galaxy Cluster Source Field",
"x_gcve": [
{
"extensions": {
"bcp-05-x-01": {
"ai_annotations": [
{
"ai_level": "generated",
"description": "Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.",
"gna_source": 1,
"models": [
{
"gna_source": 1,
"identifier": "qwen3.8:27b",
"name": "qwen3.8:27b",
"source": "ollama"
}
],
"review_status": "full",
"scope": "record",
"tags": [
"ai-computer-assisted:llm-generated",
"ai-computer-assisted:classification"
]
}
]
},
"bcp-05-x-02": {
"x_patch2vuln": {
"assumptions": [
"The affected version boundary is inferred from the tag_version_boundary metadata (v2.5.48, 26 commits after fix); the exact first affected release is not stated in the patch.",
"PR:L assumes galaxy editor privileges are a non-admin, role-based permission; the exact privilege model is not detailed in the patch.",
"UI:A assumes the victim must actively click the rendered link; passive rendering without click does not execute the script.",
"The CAPEC-64 mapping is the closest available pattern for stored XSS; no CAPEC specifically covers URI-scheme-based stored XSS, so CAPEC-64 is the best fit.",
"The Co-Authored-By line references an AI assistant; it is credited as a tool rather than a human remediation developer."
],
"capecRationale": [
{
"capecId": "CAPEC-64",
"rationale": "The attack pattern involves storing a malicious payload (a javascript: URL) in a persistent data field (galaxy cluster source) that is later rendered in a web page, executing script in the victim\u0027s browser upon interaction. This is a textbook persistent/stored XSS. CAPEC-64 is the closest and most precise match in the CAPEC catalog."
}
],
"commit": "11852876773554d79ff57937a235d18a1e4473dc",
"confidence": "high",
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "reporter",
"value": "Jeroen Pinoy"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "iglocska"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context)"
}
],
"cvssRationale": "AV:N \u2013 MISP is a web application accessed over the network. AC:L \u2013 no race conditions or special environment needed; storing a javascript: URL is straightforward. AT:N \u2013 no manipulation of the attack target required. PR:L \u2013 attacker needs galaxy editor privileges (authenticated, non-admin role). UI:A \u2013 victim must click the malicious link for script execution. VC/VI/VA:N \u2013 the MISP server itself is not directly compromised; impact is on the victim\u0027s browser. SC:H \u2013 attacker can read cookies, session tokens, and manipulate the DOM in the victim\u0027s session. SI:H \u2013 attacker can perform actions on behalf of the victim within MISP. SA:N \u2013 no direct compromise of the application\u0027s security controls or system integrity.",
"fixSummary": "The fix restricts the rendering of the Galaxy Cluster source field as a hyperlink to only http:// and https:// URLs by adding a regular-expression check (preg_match for ^https?://) in addition to the existing FILTER_VALIDATE_URL validation. This prevents javascript: and other non-HTTP URI schemes from being rendered as clickable links, eliminating the stored XSS vector. The change is applied consistently in both the default theme and the Overmind theme.",
"generatedAt": "2026-09-30T14:12:32.112077Z",
"generator": "patch2vuln.py",
"model": "qwen3.8:27b",
"modelComparison": {
"rankings": [
{
"agreementScore": 9,
"assumptionCount": 5,
"confidence": "high",
"model": "qwen3.8:27b",
"score": 6
}
],
"selectedModel": "qwen3.8:27b",
"selectionMethod": "deterministic-consensus-v1",
"selectionNotice": "The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required."
},
"patchSha256": "b68dbd6726929ff1680daeae2a273fc346e7075d7ded36195994315c19ccf278",
"patchSummary": "Two view templates are modified. In app/View/GalaxyClusters/view.ctp, the source value is extracted into a local variable and the conditional for rendering an anchor tag now requires both FILTER_VALIDATE_URL and a preg_match against /^https?:\\/\\//i. In app/View/Themed/Overmind/Elements/GalaxyClusters/View/galaxy_clusters_general.ctp, the same preg_match guard is added to the existing FILTER_VALIDATE_URL check. Net effect: only http(s) URLs produce a clickable link; all other values (including javascript:) are rendered as plain escaped text.",
"patchTruncated": false,
"patches": [
{
"commit": "11852876773554d79ff57937a235d18a1e4473dc",
"patchSha256": "b68dbd6726929ff1680daeae2a273fc346e7075d7ded36195994315c19ccf278",
"source": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/118528767.patch",
"sourceUrl": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/118528767.patch",
"subject": "fix: [security] Link a galaxy cluster source only when it is"
}
],
"source": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/118528767.patch",
"subject": "fix: [security] Link a galaxy cluster source only when it is",
"tagVersionBoundary": {
"commits_after_fix": 26,
"repository": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP",
"tag": "v2.5.48",
"version": "2.5.48",
"version_type": "semver"
},
"weaknessRationale": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-79",
"rationale": "The application renders user-controlled data (the galaxy cluster source field) into an HTML anchor tag without restricting the URI scheme to safe values. Although output is HTML-escaped via h(), the href attribute still accepts javascript: URIs, resulting in stored XSS. CWE-79 is the narrowest defensible mapping."
}
]
}
}
},
"recordType": "advisory",
"vulnId": "GCVE-1-2026-20256"
}
]
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
"assignerShortName": "CIRCL",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-103388",
"datePublished": "2026-09-30T14:22:36.271Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-09-30T14:22:32.098Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-30T15:28:06.980Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}