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1 vulnerability found for Parasoft Continuous Testing by unknown
GCVE-1988-2026-0497
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[0day-rubbish] Parasoft Continuous Testing Platform 10.7.5-SNAPSHOT anonymous deserialization in the database restore path to JSP command execution as uid=1000 (9.8)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in Parasoft
Continuous Testing Platform 10.7.5-SNAPSHOT, the closed-source commercial
continuous-testing, service-virtualisation and environment-management product
from Parasoft, a United States software-testing vendor headquartered in
Monrovia, California. The affected component is the em web application inside
the vendor's own container image, running on Tomcat 10.1.57 with Jasper and
Java 17. Three first-party defects compose into an unauthenticated
command-execution chain that needs two HTTP requests and nothing else: an
unfiltered ObjectInputStream over an uploaded backup archive, a licensing
filter that decides whether to run at all by testing the raw un-normalised
request URI, and a remember-me authentication service that hands an anonymous
request an authenticated administrator principal when no external security
provider has been configured.
Type and root cause. Unfiltered deserialization of attacker-controlled data,
CWE-502 primary, composed with an interpretation conflict in the licensing
filter, CWE-436 primary and co-equal with CWE-863 as its authorisation
consequence, and enabled by a fail-open authentication branch, CWE-287. The
honest count is three first-party defects rather than one, and that matters to
whoever fixes it, because the defect owners, the fixes and the independent
value to an attacker all differ.
The licensing defect. EMLicenseFilter is 175 lines and behaves as an
authorisation boundary, being what stops an unlicensed instance from serving
its administrative API. Its decision procedure reads the request URI raw at
line 165 and tests it at line 166 against a chain of exemption clauses
including endsWith("about"), endsWith("welcome"), endsWith("forgot"),
endsWith("notlicensed"), contains("/resources/") and contains("/images/"),
none of which is anchored by a separator or a segment boundary. A branch at
lines 167 to 171 additionally reassigns the whole exemption set rather than
accumulating into it when the request accepts JSON. The test has exactly one
consumer in the class: shouldNotFilter() at line 47 calling isLicenseRequired()
at line 48. So a matching URI does not weaken one decision, it suppresses the
entire doFilterInternal() body, including the /tdm/api/v guard at line 99 and
the unlicensed-instance redirect to /em/license at line 118. Because a servlet
container strips semicolon-delimited path parameters from each segment before
it performs servlet mapping, the filter and the router disagree about the
identity of one request: a target of /em/database/restore;welcome is exempted
by the filter and still routed to the restore handler by the container. That
disagreement is the textbook shape of CWE-436. Measured read-only on a live
instance, with the control that carries the argument:
GET /em/database/currentConfig
-> 302, Location: /em/license, zero-length body
GET /em/database/currentConfig;welcome
-> 200, 204 bytes, application/json;charset=utf-8, disclosing the
schema version, the HyperSQL type, the database user and the
jdbc:hsqldb:file URL of the platform's own database files
GET /em/database/currentConfig;about
-> the same 200/204, so this is the clause list and not one word
GET /em/database/currentConfigwelcome (no semicolon)
-> 404, 792 bytes
GET /em/tdm/api/v2/servers;welcome
-> 200, 160 bytes, a well-formed serversResponse XML document with an
empty servers element, so Jersey routed and ran the resource method
the same pair over TLS
-> 200/204 with the bypass and 302/0 without it, so the HTTPS
listener is an equivalent surface and not a redirect shell
The no-semicolon control is the load-bearing row: the only variable that
changed is the presence of a semicolon path parameter, and the outcome flipped
from a licensing redirect to a 200 carrying live database configuration to a
caller who had never authenticated. The bypass is not a skeleton key, and that
was measured rather than assumed: handlers performing their own licensing
check are unaffected, the coverage-agent endpoints reading the license manager
directly and continuing to return 403 with a 90-byte unlicensed body across all
seventeen of their mappings even with the bypass applied, while a server-resource
feature gate kept returning 403 with a 94-byte body. What the bypass unlocks is
everything whose enforcement lives only in the filter, which includes the whole
/em/database subtree and the entire /em/tdm/api/v version tree. One related
first-party defect sits in the same filter and matters for detection: line 113
flushes the response output stream and line 115 then calls setStatus(403), so
licence refusals surface as HTTP 200 with a JSON body carrying status 403,
which makes them invisible to any status-based monitoring.
The deserialization defect. The restore path lands in
com.parasoft.ctp.core.database.backup.AbstractDatabaseBackup, a class of 518
lines and 19,851 bytes:
:14 import java.io.ObjectInputStream;
:111 ObjectInputStream ois = new ObjectInputStream(in);
:112 int numTables = ois.readInt();
:117 TableMetadata tableMetadata = (TableMetadata) ois.readObject();
:126 Connection connection = this.provider.getConnection();
where in is the database.ser member of an uploaded zip. Three properties are
decisive. The cast is applied to whatever readObject() returned, so it
constrains nothing: the gadget executes during the call and the
ClassCastException is thrown afterwards. getConnection() sits nine lines
lower, so no database needs to exist, to be reachable or to accept the supplied
parameters for the payload to have already run, which makes that ordering the
cheapest structural fix available and one needing no understanding of gadget
chains. And the int read at line 112 is consumed before the object read. The
caller is the web-layer controller EMDatabaseController, 1359 lines, whose
restore handler at line 707 or 708 takes a StandardMultipartHttpServletRequest
and hard-compares zip member names against the literals "version.txt" at line
725 and "database.ser" at line 733, a shape check that says nothing about
content. The absence of any filter is not an inference from one search: in the
whole shipped product ObjectInputStream appears in 68 files with 149 occurrences
in the core tree and in 3 files in the web layer, readObject appears in 81
files, and ObjectInputFilter appears in 0 files, jdk.serialFilter in 0 files and
serialFilter in 0 files. Three zeros, across a class name, a system property and
its short alias, in an image unpacked and searched as artefacts against a
positive control of 81 files containing readObject, is a strong result: the
product has no deserialization filtering anywhere in its construction. Two
sibling readObject() calls on the same class of untrusted stream sit in the same
file at lines 323 and 435, in a row-draining routine and a row-binding routine;
they were read from source and not detonated, and they are named so a fix covers
the class rather than the call site.
The fail-open authentication gate. The application has three Spring Security
filter chains and all three register the same remember-me service,
EMRememberMeServices, 483 lines, with the security configuration in
CTPSecurityWebConfig, 318 lines. Neither hop of the chain is an unprotected
route: /database is explicitly matched to authenticated(), and the images
allow-list is /images/welcome/star rather than a doubled-asterisk glob over
/images, so a page written to images/<leaf>.jsp also needs an authenticated
subject at the security layer. Both hops sit behind the authentication
boundary. The finding is therefore described accurately as the product handing
an anonymous request an authenticated administrative principal:
// EMRememberMeServices.java:140-148, abridged
if (request.getHeader("Authorization") != null) {
return null; // :140-142 defer to credentials
}
pstsecClient = PSTSecServiceClient.getInstance(); // :146
if (pstsecClient == null) { // :148 the fail-open branch
return this.createAuthenticationToken("admin", "admin",
EmUserInfo.Role.ADMIN, request);
}
The token registers new SimpleGrantedAuthority("ROLE_ADMIN") and wraps it in a
Spring Security User whose authenticated flag is true, so the resulting
principal is a genuinely authenticated administrator rather than the container's
anonymous principal, and the authenticated() matcher that CTPSecurityWebConfig
line 283 demands for /database is satisfied by it. The condition guarding all of
this is the absence of the external security-provider client, which in the
untouched vendor image, with no setup step performed, does not exist. Measured
with its control in the same run: an anonymous GET of the users/current resource
under the /em/api/v3 context returned 200 with the 39-byte body
{"id":1,"login":"admin","role":"ADMIN"}, and the identical request carrying
Authorization: Bearer garbage returned 401 with an empty body. The control shows
the fail-open branch is specific to requests presenting no credential at all, so
the behaviour is not "authentication is off" but "an absent credential is more
trusted than a wrong one". CSRF is separately not an obstacle, because
CsrfSecurityRequestMatcher is a 28-line class whose anchored exemption alternation
at line 19 includes /database, with GET, HEAD, TRACE and OPTIONS exempt by method
at line 22.
The write primitive and the execution sink. Reconstituting the stream's first
object, a java.util.HashSet, forces a hashCode() on its single element, a
TiedMapEntry wrapping a LazyMap whose transformer factory is a
ConstantTransformer holding attacker bytes and whose decorated map is an
aspectjweaver SimpleCache$StoreableCachingMap whose folder field is an absolute
path:
readObject() -> HashSet.readObject -> HashMap.putVal -> key.hashCode()
-> commons-collections4 TiedMapEntry.hashCode() -> getValue()
-> commons-collections4 LazyMap.get(key) // transform the key
-> map.put(key, value) // invokeinterface, virtual dispatch
-> aspectjweaver SimpleCache$StoreableCachingMap.put(key, byte[])
-> writeToPath(folder + File.separator + key, bytes)
That class was read at the bytecode level to establish four facts, all of which
are what make the write arbitrary. The folder field is declared private final
String, is not transient, and the class declares no readObject of its own, so it
is populated by the inherited HashMap.readObject path through defaultReadObject,
which assigns whatever the stream carries, and both writeToPath and the store
routine read it with an explicit getfield so the compiler has not inlined it.
writeToPath performs getfield folder, builds a StringBuilder, concatenates a
separator and the key, and stores the result, which is the entire function: there
is no forced extension appended to the key, and the value passes a checkcast to a
byte array, so the content is any bytes at all. Validation is absent in every
form, with zero occurrences of File.getName(), Path.normalize(),
getCanonicalPath(), startsWith(), a regular expression or a length truncation in
that write path; keys carrying slashes or relative traversals both work, and
because concatenation with an empty folder yields a leading double separator,
which POSIX treats as a valid absolute path, an absolute destination is reachable
too. And it does not fire on deserialization alone, which is the subtle part:
HashMap.readObject reconstitutes entries through putVal, package-private, final
and not overridden, so it bypasses the overridden put that contains the write,
which is why the TiedMapEntry to LazyMap to Map.put prefix is needed to force a
virtual dispatch. The only content constraint found anywhere is that the bytes
must not be exactly the four-byte sentinel IDEM. In the publish
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
7 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | Parasoft Continuous Testing |
Affected:
unknown
|
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "Parasoft Continuous Testing",
"vendor": "unknown",
"versions": [
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"status": "affected",
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"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "disclosure via Fulldisclosure"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in Parasoft\nContinuous Testing Platform 10.7.5-SNAPSHOT, the closed-source commercial\ncontinuous-testing, service-virtualisation and environment-management product\nfrom Parasoft, a United States software-testing vendor headquartered in\nMonrovia, California. The affected component is the em web application inside\nthe vendor\u0027s own container image, running on Tomcat 10.1.57 with Jasper and\nJava 17. Three first-party defects compose into an unauthenticated\ncommand-execution chain that needs two HTTP requests and nothing else: an\nunfiltered ObjectInputStream over an uploaded backup archive, a licensing\nfilter that decides whether to run at all by testing the raw un-normalised\nrequest URI, and a remember-me authentication service that hands an anonymous\nrequest an authenticated administrator principal when no external security\nprovider has been configured.\n\nType and root cause. Unfiltered deserialization of attacker-controlled data,\nCWE-502 primary, composed with an interpretation conflict in the licensing\nfilter, CWE-436 primary and co-equal with CWE-863 as its authorisation\nconsequence, and enabled by a fail-open authentication branch, CWE-287. The\nhonest count is three first-party defects rather than one, and that matters to\nwhoever fixes it, because the defect owners, the fixes and the independent\nvalue to an attacker all differ.\n\nThe licensing defect. EMLicenseFilter is 175 lines and behaves as an\nauthorisation boundary, being what stops an unlicensed instance from serving\nits administrative API. Its decision procedure reads the request URI raw at\nline 165 and tests it at line 166 against a chain of exemption clauses\nincluding endsWith(\"about\"), endsWith(\"welcome\"), endsWith(\"forgot\"),\nendsWith(\"notlicensed\"), contains(\"/resources/\") and contains(\"/images/\"),\nnone of which is anchored by a separator or a segment boundary. A branch at\nlines 167 to 171 additionally reassigns the whole exemption set rather than\naccumulating into it when the request accepts JSON. The test has exactly one\nconsumer in the class: shouldNotFilter() at line 47 calling isLicenseRequired()\nat line 48. So a matching URI does not weaken one decision, it suppresses the\nentire doFilterInternal() body, including the /tdm/api/v guard at line 99 and\nthe unlicensed-instance redirect to /em/license at line 118. Because a servlet\ncontainer strips semicolon-delimited path parameters from each segment before\nit performs servlet mapping, the filter and the router disagree about the\nidentity of one request: a target of /em/database/restore;welcome is exempted\nby the filter and still routed to the restore handler by the container. That\ndisagreement is the textbook shape of CWE-436. Measured read-only on a live\ninstance, with the control that carries the argument:\n\n GET /em/database/currentConfig\n -\u003e 302, Location: /em/license, zero-length body\n GET /em/database/currentConfig;welcome\n -\u003e 200, 204 bytes, application/json;charset=utf-8, disclosing the\n schema version, the HyperSQL type, the database user and the\n jdbc:hsqldb:file URL of the platform\u0027s own database files\n GET /em/database/currentConfig;about\n -\u003e the same 200/204, so this is the clause list and not one word\n GET /em/database/currentConfigwelcome (no semicolon)\n -\u003e 404, 792 bytes\n GET /em/tdm/api/v2/servers;welcome\n -\u003e 200, 160 bytes, a well-formed serversResponse XML document with an\n empty servers element, so Jersey routed and ran the resource method\n the same pair over TLS\n -\u003e 200/204 with the bypass and 302/0 without it, so the HTTPS\n listener is an equivalent surface and not a redirect shell\n\nThe no-semicolon control is the load-bearing row: the only variable that\nchanged is the presence of a semicolon path parameter, and the outcome flipped\nfrom a licensing redirect to a 200 carrying live database configuration to a\ncaller who had never authenticated. The bypass is not a skeleton key, and that\nwas measured rather than assumed: handlers performing their own licensing\ncheck are unaffected, the coverage-agent endpoints reading the license manager\ndirectly and continuing to return 403 with a 90-byte unlicensed body across all\nseventeen of their mappings even with the bypass applied, while a server-resource\nfeature gate kept returning 403 with a 94-byte body. What the bypass unlocks is\neverything whose enforcement lives only in the filter, which includes the whole\n/em/database subtree and the entire /em/tdm/api/v version tree. One related\nfirst-party defect sits in the same filter and matters for detection: line 113\nflushes the response output stream and line 115 then calls setStatus(403), so\nlicence refusals surface as HTTP 200 with a JSON body carrying status 403,\nwhich makes them invisible to any status-based monitoring.\n\nThe deserialization defect. The restore path lands in\ncom.parasoft.ctp.core.database.backup.AbstractDatabaseBackup, a class of 518\nlines and 19,851 bytes:\n\n :14 import java.io.ObjectInputStream;\n :111 ObjectInputStream ois = new ObjectInputStream(in);\n :112 int numTables = ois.readInt();\n :117 TableMetadata tableMetadata = (TableMetadata) ois.readObject();\n :126 Connection connection = this.provider.getConnection();\n\nwhere in is the database.ser member of an uploaded zip. Three properties are\ndecisive. The cast is applied to whatever readObject() returned, so it\nconstrains nothing: the gadget executes during the call and the\nClassCastException is thrown afterwards. getConnection() sits nine lines\nlower, so no database needs to exist, to be reachable or to accept the supplied\nparameters for the payload to have already run, which makes that ordering the\ncheapest structural fix available and one needing no understanding of gadget\nchains. And the int read at line 112 is consumed before the object read. The\ncaller is the web-layer controller EMDatabaseController, 1359 lines, whose\nrestore handler at line 707 or 708 takes a StandardMultipartHttpServletRequest\nand hard-compares zip member names against the literals \"version.txt\" at line\n725 and \"database.ser\" at line 733, a shape check that says nothing about\ncontent. The absence of any filter is not an inference from one search: in the\nwhole shipped product ObjectInputStream appears in 68 files with 149 occurrences\nin the core tree and in 3 files in the web layer, readObject appears in 81\nfiles, and ObjectInputFilter appears in 0 files, jdk.serialFilter in 0 files and\nserialFilter in 0 files. Three zeros, across a class name, a system property and\nits short alias, in an image unpacked and searched as artefacts against a\npositive control of 81 files containing readObject, is a strong result: the\nproduct has no deserialization filtering anywhere in its construction. Two\nsibling readObject() calls on the same class of untrusted stream sit in the same\nfile at lines 323 and 435, in a row-draining routine and a row-binding routine;\nthey were read from source and not detonated, and they are named so a fix covers\nthe class rather than the call site.\n\nThe fail-open authentication gate. The application has three Spring Security\nfilter chains and all three register the same remember-me service,\nEMRememberMeServices, 483 lines, with the security configuration in\nCTPSecurityWebConfig, 318 lines. Neither hop of the chain is an unprotected\nroute: /database is explicitly matched to authenticated(), and the images\nallow-list is /images/welcome/star rather than a doubled-asterisk glob over\n/images, so a page written to images/\u003cleaf\u003e.jsp also needs an authenticated\nsubject at the security layer. Both hops sit behind the authentication\nboundary. The finding is therefore described accurately as the product handing\nan anonymous request an authenticated administrative principal:\n\n // EMRememberMeServices.java:140-148, abridged\n if (request.getHeader(\"Authorization\") != null) {\n return null; // :140-142 defer to credentials\n }\n pstsecClient = PSTSecServiceClient.getInstance(); // :146\n if (pstsecClient == null) { // :148 the fail-open branch\n return this.createAuthenticationToken(\"admin\", \"admin\",\n EmUserInfo.Role.ADMIN, request);\n }\n\nThe token registers new SimpleGrantedAuthority(\"ROLE_ADMIN\") and wraps it in a\nSpring Security User whose authenticated flag is true, so the resulting\nprincipal is a genuinely authenticated administrator rather than the container\u0027s\nanonymous principal, and the authenticated() matcher that CTPSecurityWebConfig\nline 283 demands for /database is satisfied by it. The condition guarding all of\nthis is the absence of the external security-provider client, which in the\nuntouched vendor image, with no setup step performed, does not exist. Measured\nwith its control in the same run: an anonymous GET of the users/current resource\nunder the /em/api/v3 context returned 200 with the 39-byte body\n{\"id\":1,\"login\":\"admin\",\"role\":\"ADMIN\"}, and the identical request carrying\nAuthorization: Bearer garbage returned 401 with an empty body. The control shows\nthe fail-open branch is specific to requests presenting no credential at all, so\nthe behaviour is not \"authentication is off\" but \"an absent credential is more\ntrusted than a wrong one\". CSRF is separately not an obstacle, because\nCsrfSecurityRequestMatcher is a 28-line class whose anchored exemption alternation\nat line 19 includes /database, with GET, HEAD, TRACE and OPTIONS exempt by method\nat line 22.\n\nThe write primitive and the execution sink. Reconstituting the stream\u0027s first\nobject, a java.util.HashSet, forces a hashCode() on its single element, a\nTiedMapEntry wrapping a LazyMap whose transformer factory is a\nConstantTransformer holding attacker bytes and whose decorated map is an\naspectjweaver SimpleCache$StoreableCachingMap whose folder field is an absolute\npath:\n\n readObject() -\u003e HashSet.readObject -\u003e HashMap.putVal -\u003e key.hashCode()\n -\u003e commons-collections4 TiedMapEntry.hashCode() -\u003e getValue()\n -\u003e commons-collections4 LazyMap.get(key) // transform the key\n -\u003e map.put(key, value) // invokeinterface, virtual dispatch\n -\u003e aspectjweaver SimpleCache$StoreableCachingMap.put(key, byte[])\n -\u003e writeToPath(folder + File.separator + key, bytes)\n\nThat class was read at the bytecode level to establish four facts, all of which\nare what make the write arbitrary. The folder field is declared private final\nString, is not transient, and the class declares no readObject of its own, so it\nis populated by the inherited HashMap.readObject path through defaultReadObject,\nwhich assigns whatever the stream carries, and both writeToPath and the store\nroutine read it with an explicit getfield so the compiler has not inlined it.\nwriteToPath performs getfield folder, builds a StringBuilder, concatenates a\nseparator and the key, and stores the result, which is the entire function: there\nis no forced extension appended to the key, and the value passes a checkcast to a\nbyte array, so the content is any bytes at all. Validation is absent in every\nform, with zero occurrences of File.getName(), Path.normalize(),\ngetCanonicalPath(), startsWith(), a regular expression or a length truncation in\nthat write path; keys carrying slashes or relative traversals both work, and\nbecause concatenation with an empty folder yields a leading double separator,\nwhich POSIX treats as a valid absolute path, an absolute destination is reachable\ntoo. And it does not fire on deserialization alone, which is the subtle part:\nHashMap.readObject reconstitutes entries through putVal, package-private, final\nand not overridden, so it bypasses the overridden put that contains the write,\nwhich is why the TiedMapEntry to LazyMap to Map.put prefix is needed to force a\nvirtual dispatch. The only content constraint found anywhere is that the bytes\nmust not be exactly the four-byte sentinel IDEM. In the publish"
}
],
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"cweId": "CWE-22",
"description": "CWE-22",
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{
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"type": "CWE"
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{
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"description": "CWE-863",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
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"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
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"title": "[0day-rubbish] Parasoft Continuous Testing Platform 10.7.5-SNAPSHOT anonymous deserialization in the database restore path to JSP command execution as uid=1000 (9.8)",
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