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1 vulnerability found for Database by Exasol
GCVE-1988-2026-0496
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[0day-rubbish] Exasol Database 7.1.30 docker-db form: shipped default SYS credential to PYTHON3 UDF os.popen command execution as uid=500(exadefusr), output returned in-band (8.8)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in Exasol
Database 7.1.30, the in-memory MPP analytical database from Exasol AG
(Germany), examined in its docker-db single-container deployment form. The SQL
engine is a proprietary C implementation named EXASolution, the server process
is exacts, clients speak a proprietary binary SQL protocol on port 8563 rather
than HTTP, TLS terminates on that port with a self-signed certificate carrying
no subjectAltName, and the vendor's console client exaplus ships inside the
image. Three further services share the container: ConfD, an HTTPS JSON-RPC
management daemon on 443; BucketFS, an HTTP file service observed on 2580; and
an OpenSSH server on 22. The image as pulled is about 6 GB and is distributed
through Docker Hub.
One fact about this deployment form belongs at the top rather than at the
bottom, because it explains why the research is public now instead of being
held for a patch. Exasol's own upstream repository warns that the docker
distribution is an open source project that is not officially supported by
Exasol; that the base image is an end-of-life CentOS 7 release; that official
support for docker-db 7 is no longer available and that users should move to a
newer release line; that the repository now only contains documentation while
the binaries are distributed through Docker Hub; that issues are disabled; and
that the project is mainly intended for automatic testing of Exasol
deployments. None of that reduces the mechanism, because the credential is a
property of the shipping database and the script engine is a supported core
feature of the product rather than a container add-on. It does mean that on
the vendor's own statements no fix is planned for this deployment form, so
there was no patch to coordinate around and holding the finding would have
left operators exposed without warning. Only version 7.1.30 in this deployment
form was executed. Other 7.1.x releases, the supported non-container
installation and the vendor's newer release line share the mechanism, a
constant SYS credential plus an unrestricted script language in the UDF
engine, and are plausibly affected; none was tested, that is stated as an
explicitly labelled inference, and no version range is claimed.
Type and root cause. Two defects, separable but jointly decisive, classified
as CWE-1392 use of default credentials (primary) and CWE-94 improper control
of generation of code (co-equal), with CWE-798 hard-coded credentials, CWE-78
OS command injection, CWE-1188 insecure default initialization and CWE-250
execution with unnecessary privileges recorded alongside, and CWE-284 and
CWE-862 reported separately for the absent source-address restriction on 8563
and the absent authorisation distinction for script creation. Neither
separately reported item raises a metric. Leg one on its own is a data breach.
Leg two on its own is a documented feature. The pair produces an entry point
that required no provisioning decision by anyone, because nobody ever created
the account an attacker uses, and that converts SQL-layer administrative
access into operating-system command execution with the command output
returned in-band through the ordinary result set.
The credential is the vendor's own published text, not a leak and not an
inference. The upstream docker-db README publishes it under the heading
"Connecting to the Database", instructing the reader to authenticate with
username sys and password exasol. Two image-internal CI test scripts use the
same pair against a freshly initialised database on the same port:
basic_test.sh:112 carries $X -c n11:8563 -u sys -P exasol -jdbcparam
validateservercertificate=0 and basic_sc_test.sh:98 uses -u sys -P exasol as
well. Those two files are not in the current upstream repository, which now
carries documentation only, so they are cited as artifacts observed inside the
7.1.30 image at /usr/opt/EXASuite-7/EXAClusterOS-7.1.30/docker/test/ and not
as repository contents. Nothing rotates the constant, and that was traced
rather than assumed: the running controller process command line carries no
-defaultSysPasswordHash argument; the [DB:DB1] stanza of EXAConf carries no
DefaultSysPasswdHash key; db_jobs.py:104 sets self.sys_passwd_text =
secrets.token_hex(20), which generates an additional random password rather
than replacing the built-in one; database.py:57 passes -defaultSysPasswordHash
only when EXAConf configures it explicitly; and the container's init-sc path
does not configure it. Nothing in the container's start path presents a
first-login change-password step, sets a must-change flag on the SYS account
or refuses service while the constant remains in place, and the README carries
guidance about persistent volumes, hugepages, resource limits and license
mounting with no instruction to change the SYS password; that absence is as
load-bearing as the presence of the constant. The conclusion, corrected once
during the research before being accepted, is that the accepted value is a
built-in default of the database engine rather than a hash handed to it by the
container initialiser, and both the built-in value and the generated random
are accepted, which is why random generation in the provisioning code is not a
defence. The contrast the product supplies is what makes this a defect rather
than a design choice: Exasol generated per-deployment randoms for two of its
three service credentials, the ConfD AuthenticationToken and the BucketFS
WritePasswd, and did not do so for the most privileged one, and an attacker
must read EXAConf to recover either random while sys / exasol is a constant
every installation shares and the documentation prints.
The sink, in full:
CREATE SCHEMA IF NOT EXISTS poc_schema;
OPEN SCHEMA poc_schema;
CREATE OR REPLACE PYTHON3 SCALAR SCRIPT poc_udf()
RETURNS VARCHAR(2000000) AS
import os
def run(ctx):
out = os.popen("id").read()
return 'RCE_OUT:' + out
/
SELECT poc_udf();
Three properties make this a sink rather than a curiosity. The os module is
importable with no declaration, allow-list or capability request. The command
string is an ordinary Python literal built from what the caller supplied, so
shell metacharacters, pipelines and quoting all work, and the measured round
used cat /etc/passwd | head -3 whose pipeline was honoured by the shell
os.popen starts. And the return value crosses the trust boundary back to the
caller through the ordinary result set, which removes the need for any
separate exfiltration channel. Sanitisation over what the body does is absent:
no module allow-list or deny-list, no policy forbidding os or subprocess, no
capability gate, no per-statement approval, no audit prompt and no privilege
beyond SYS itself. What does exist is well-formedness checking rather than a
security control: the engine validates the language alias, submitting PYTHON
instead of PYTHON3 yields its own diagnostic "no definition found for
language: PYTHON", and it enforces SQL syntax and the forward-slash script
terminator. Both were satisfied by the payload without evasion. That alias
diagnostic is worth more than it looks, because it shows script languages are
resolved through a named alias table inside the engine, that the table carries
the standard aliases PYTHON3, LUA, JAVA and R, and that EXAConf contains no
[ScriptLanguages] stanza customising it, so reachability is not conditional on
an operator having installed or enabled a language pack.
Execution identity, reported exactly as id returned it and not rounded up:
uid=500(exadefusr) gid=500(exausers) groups=500(exausers),0(root). This is a
dedicated script-execution account, not the database's own service identity,
and it is not uid=0. Root appears only as a supplementary group, no escalation
to an effective root identity was attempted, observed or is claimed, and
nothing in this research should be described as a root compromise. The
vendor's README does state that privileged container mode is required for
permissions management, UDF support and environment configuration, so the
privileged posture is the documented one rather than an unusual one, and gid 0
on Linux governs access to files and devices whose group is root. The whole of
what the evidence supports is a conditional sentence: if an attacker in that
position could write a setuid binary or reach a device node exposed by
privileged mode, an effective root identity would follow. Neither was tested.
What was tested is that the group membership is present, and it is reported as
an untested escalation position under CWE-250 rather than as an achieved
outcome.
The isolation boundary was not glossed either. The UDF engine runs in a
separate kernel namespace and that isolation is real but partial. A file
written by the UDF did not appear in the container's own filesystem view, so
the two views are distinct mount namespaces. Yet uname from inside the UDF
returned the host kernel release, 5.10.134-19.2.al8.x86_64, which is expected,
a namespace not being a hypervisor and the kernel being shared. Consequently
the account names in the id output come from the namespace's own view, so even
the /etc/passwd read is not asserted to have been the container's file or the
host's. Command execution inside that namespace is confirmed and non-blind and
is a substantial capability on its own; a host or container escape is not
confirmed, not attempted and not claimed, and no cross-namespace file
primitive is asserted. This is why the impact ratings rest on the SQL-layer
authority of SYS, which does not depend on any of it.
Network position, and a claim that was withdrawn. A socket inventory taken
inside the running container reported exacts on 8563, bucketfsd on 2580, confd
on 443 and sshd on 22, each bound to all interfaces within the container's
network namespace. A listener bound to all interfaces inside a container is
not the same thing as a listener reachable from a network, and no
source-address restriction of the product's own was observed in its
configuration or listener behaviour at any point. The vendor's README
documents two ways to run the image and they differ exactly on the question
that matters. The stand-alone command is docker run --name exasoldb -p
127.0.0.1:9563:8563 --detach --privileged --stop-timeout 120
exasol/docker-db:<version>, and the page explains that port 8563 within the
container is exposed on local port 9563 and that the reader should use that
port to connect, so the published port is bound to the host loopback; the
persistent-volume variant on the same page uses the same loopback-bound
publication. The multi-node command is docker run --detach --network=host
--privileged -v "$CONTAINER_EXA:/exa" exasol/docker-db:<version> init-sc
--node-id 11, and the vendor's note says the example uses the host network
stack, that there is no need to expose ports in this mode, and that they are
all accessible on the host. The image's FAQ adds that if you want to check
from outside the Docker network you need port forwarding, which confirms that
host-side reachability is an explicit operator action. Under default bridge
networking with no port publication, which several of the README's own example
commands use including the license-mount and resource-limit examples, the port
is reachable from the host and from every other container attached to the same
bridge, which is a logically adjacent topology.
The research notes originally asserted that the production docker deployment
exposes 8563 on all interfaces by default, and the chain was scored as
remotely reachable on that basis. That assertion rested on the state of the
researchers' own test harness and on a general expectation about how databases
are deployed, not on any product artifact, and it does not survive contact
with the vendor's documentation. It is therefore withdrawn in that form in the
published advisory and replaced by the narrower artifact-backed set of
statement
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
7 references
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "Database",
"vendor": "Exasol",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "disclosure via Fulldisclosure"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in Exasol\nDatabase 7.1.30, the in-memory MPP analytical database from Exasol AG\n(Germany), examined in its docker-db single-container deployment form. The SQL\nengine is a proprietary C implementation named EXASolution, the server process\nis exacts, clients speak a proprietary binary SQL protocol on port 8563 rather\nthan HTTP, TLS terminates on that port with a self-signed certificate carrying\nno subjectAltName, and the vendor\u0027s console client exaplus ships inside the\nimage. Three further services share the container: ConfD, an HTTPS JSON-RPC\nmanagement daemon on 443; BucketFS, an HTTP file service observed on 2580; and\nan OpenSSH server on 22. The image as pulled is about 6 GB and is distributed\nthrough Docker Hub.\n\nOne fact about this deployment form belongs at the top rather than at the\nbottom, because it explains why the research is public now instead of being\nheld for a patch. Exasol\u0027s own upstream repository warns that the docker\ndistribution is an open source project that is not officially supported by\nExasol; that the base image is an end-of-life CentOS 7 release; that official\nsupport for docker-db 7 is no longer available and that users should move to a\nnewer release line; that the repository now only contains documentation while\nthe binaries are distributed through Docker Hub; that issues are disabled; and\nthat the project is mainly intended for automatic testing of Exasol\ndeployments. None of that reduces the mechanism, because the credential is a\nproperty of the shipping database and the script engine is a supported core\nfeature of the product rather than a container add-on. It does mean that on\nthe vendor\u0027s own statements no fix is planned for this deployment form, so\nthere was no patch to coordinate around and holding the finding would have\nleft operators exposed without warning. Only version 7.1.30 in this deployment\nform was executed. Other 7.1.x releases, the supported non-container\ninstallation and the vendor\u0027s newer release line share the mechanism, a\nconstant SYS credential plus an unrestricted script language in the UDF\nengine, and are plausibly affected; none was tested, that is stated as an\nexplicitly labelled inference, and no version range is claimed.\n\nType and root cause. Two defects, separable but jointly decisive, classified\nas CWE-1392 use of default credentials (primary) and CWE-94 improper control\nof generation of code (co-equal), with CWE-798 hard-coded credentials, CWE-78\nOS command injection, CWE-1188 insecure default initialization and CWE-250\nexecution with unnecessary privileges recorded alongside, and CWE-284 and\nCWE-862 reported separately for the absent source-address restriction on 8563\nand the absent authorisation distinction for script creation. Neither\nseparately reported item raises a metric. Leg one on its own is a data breach.\nLeg two on its own is a documented feature. The pair produces an entry point\nthat required no provisioning decision by anyone, because nobody ever created\nthe account an attacker uses, and that converts SQL-layer administrative\naccess into operating-system command execution with the command output\nreturned in-band through the ordinary result set.\n\nThe credential is the vendor\u0027s own published text, not a leak and not an\ninference. The upstream docker-db README publishes it under the heading\n\"Connecting to the Database\", instructing the reader to authenticate with\nusername sys and password exasol. Two image-internal CI test scripts use the\nsame pair against a freshly initialised database on the same port:\nbasic_test.sh:112 carries $X -c n11:8563 -u sys -P exasol -jdbcparam\nvalidateservercertificate=0 and basic_sc_test.sh:98 uses -u sys -P exasol as\nwell. Those two files are not in the current upstream repository, which now\ncarries documentation only, so they are cited as artifacts observed inside the\n7.1.30 image at /usr/opt/EXASuite-7/EXAClusterOS-7.1.30/docker/test/ and not\nas repository contents. Nothing rotates the constant, and that was traced\nrather than assumed: the running controller process command line carries no\n-defaultSysPasswordHash argument; the [DB:DB1] stanza of EXAConf carries no\nDefaultSysPasswdHash key; db_jobs.py:104 sets self.sys_passwd_text =\nsecrets.token_hex(20), which generates an additional random password rather\nthan replacing the built-in one; database.py:57 passes -defaultSysPasswordHash\nonly when EXAConf configures it explicitly; and the container\u0027s init-sc path\ndoes not configure it. Nothing in the container\u0027s start path presents a\nfirst-login change-password step, sets a must-change flag on the SYS account\nor refuses service while the constant remains in place, and the README carries\nguidance about persistent volumes, hugepages, resource limits and license\nmounting with no instruction to change the SYS password; that absence is as\nload-bearing as the presence of the constant. The conclusion, corrected once\nduring the research before being accepted, is that the accepted value is a\nbuilt-in default of the database engine rather than a hash handed to it by the\ncontainer initialiser, and both the built-in value and the generated random\nare accepted, which is why random generation in the provisioning code is not a\ndefence. The contrast the product supplies is what makes this a defect rather\nthan a design choice: Exasol generated per-deployment randoms for two of its\nthree service credentials, the ConfD AuthenticationToken and the BucketFS\nWritePasswd, and did not do so for the most privileged one, and an attacker\nmust read EXAConf to recover either random while sys / exasol is a constant\nevery installation shares and the documentation prints.\n\nThe sink, in full:\n\n CREATE SCHEMA IF NOT EXISTS poc_schema;\n OPEN SCHEMA poc_schema;\n CREATE OR REPLACE PYTHON3 SCALAR SCRIPT poc_udf()\n RETURNS VARCHAR(2000000) AS\n import os\n def run(ctx):\n out = os.popen(\"id\").read()\n return \u0027RCE_OUT:\u0027 + out\n /\n SELECT poc_udf();\n\nThree properties make this a sink rather than a curiosity. The os module is\nimportable with no declaration, allow-list or capability request. The command\nstring is an ordinary Python literal built from what the caller supplied, so\nshell metacharacters, pipelines and quoting all work, and the measured round\nused cat /etc/passwd | head -3 whose pipeline was honoured by the shell\nos.popen starts. And the return value crosses the trust boundary back to the\ncaller through the ordinary result set, which removes the need for any\nseparate exfiltration channel. Sanitisation over what the body does is absent:\nno module allow-list or deny-list, no policy forbidding os or subprocess, no\ncapability gate, no per-statement approval, no audit prompt and no privilege\nbeyond SYS itself. What does exist is well-formedness checking rather than a\nsecurity control: the engine validates the language alias, submitting PYTHON\ninstead of PYTHON3 yields its own diagnostic \"no definition found for\nlanguage: PYTHON\", and it enforces SQL syntax and the forward-slash script\nterminator. Both were satisfied by the payload without evasion. That alias\ndiagnostic is worth more than it looks, because it shows script languages are\nresolved through a named alias table inside the engine, that the table carries\nthe standard aliases PYTHON3, LUA, JAVA and R, and that EXAConf contains no\n[ScriptLanguages] stanza customising it, so reachability is not conditional on\nan operator having installed or enabled a language pack.\n\nExecution identity, reported exactly as id returned it and not rounded up:\nuid=500(exadefusr) gid=500(exausers) groups=500(exausers),0(root). This is a\ndedicated script-execution account, not the database\u0027s own service identity,\nand it is not uid=0. Root appears only as a supplementary group, no escalation\nto an effective root identity was attempted, observed or is claimed, and\nnothing in this research should be described as a root compromise. The\nvendor\u0027s README does state that privileged container mode is required for\npermissions management, UDF support and environment configuration, so the\nprivileged posture is the documented one rather than an unusual one, and gid 0\non Linux governs access to files and devices whose group is root. The whole of\nwhat the evidence supports is a conditional sentence: if an attacker in that\nposition could write a setuid binary or reach a device node exposed by\nprivileged mode, an effective root identity would follow. Neither was tested.\nWhat was tested is that the group membership is present, and it is reported as\nan untested escalation position under CWE-250 rather than as an achieved\noutcome.\n\nThe isolation boundary was not glossed either. The UDF engine runs in a\nseparate kernel namespace and that isolation is real but partial. A file\nwritten by the UDF did not appear in the container\u0027s own filesystem view, so\nthe two views are distinct mount namespaces. Yet uname from inside the UDF\nreturned the host kernel release, 5.10.134-19.2.al8.x86_64, which is expected,\na namespace not being a hypervisor and the kernel being shared. Consequently\nthe account names in the id output come from the namespace\u0027s own view, so even\nthe /etc/passwd read is not asserted to have been the container\u0027s file or the\nhost\u0027s. Command execution inside that namespace is confirmed and non-blind and\nis a substantial capability on its own; a host or container escape is not\nconfirmed, not attempted and not claimed, and no cross-namespace file\nprimitive is asserted. This is why the impact ratings rest on the SQL-layer\nauthority of SYS, which does not depend on any of it.\n\nNetwork position, and a claim that was withdrawn. A socket inventory taken\ninside the running container reported exacts on 8563, bucketfsd on 2580, confd\non 443 and sshd on 22, each bound to all interfaces within the container\u0027s\nnetwork namespace. A listener bound to all interfaces inside a container is\nnot the same thing as a listener reachable from a network, and no\nsource-address restriction of the product\u0027s own was observed in its\nconfiguration or listener behaviour at any point. The vendor\u0027s README\ndocuments two ways to run the image and they differ exactly on the question\nthat matters. The stand-alone command is docker run --name exasoldb -p\n127.0.0.1:9563:8563 --detach --privileged --stop-timeout 120\nexasol/docker-db:\u003cversion\u003e, and the page explains that port 8563 within the\ncontainer is exposed on local port 9563 and that the reader should use that\nport to connect, so the published port is bound to the host loopback; the\npersistent-volume variant on the same page uses the same loopback-bound\npublication. The multi-node command is docker run --detach --network=host\n--privileged -v \"$CONTAINER_EXA:/exa\" exasol/docker-db:\u003cversion\u003e init-sc\n--node-id 11, and the vendor\u0027s note says the example uses the host network\nstack, that there is no need to expose ports in this mode, and that they are\nall accessible on the host. The image\u0027s FAQ adds that if you want to check\nfrom outside the Docker network you need port forwarding, which confirms that\nhost-side reachability is an explicit operator action. Under default bridge\nnetworking with no port publication, which several of the README\u0027s own example\ncommands use including the license-mount and resource-limit examples, the port\nis reachable from the host and from every other container attached to the same\nbridge, which is a logically adjacent topology.\n\nThe research notes originally asserted that the production docker deployment\nexposes 8563 on all interfaces by default, and the chain was scored as\nremotely reachable on that basis. That assertion rested on the state of the\nresearchers\u0027 own test harness and on a general expectation about how databases\nare deployed, not on any product artifact, and it does not survive contact\nwith the vendor\u0027s documentation. It is therefore withdrawn in that form in the\npublished advisory and replaced by the narrower artifact-backed set of\nstatement"
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-1188",
"description": "CWE-1188",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
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"description": "CWE-1392",
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{
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},
{
"cweId": "CWE-284",
"description": "CWE-284",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
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{
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{
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},
{
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"description": "CWE-862",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-94",
"description": "CWE-94",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
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"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
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"title": "[0day-rubbish] Exasol Database 7.1.30 docker-db form: shipped default SYS credential to PYTHON3 UDF os.popen command execution as uid=500(exadefusr), output returned in-band (8.8)",
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