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    1 vulnerability found for Database by Exasol

    GCVE-1988-2026-0496

    Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
    VLAI
    Title
    [0day-rubbish] Exasol Database 7.1.30 docker-db form: shipped default SYS credential to PYTHON3 UDF os.popen command execution as uid=500(exadefusr), output returned in-band (8.8)
    Summary
    0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in Exasol Database 7.1.30, the in-memory MPP analytical database from Exasol AG (Germany), examined in its docker-db single-container deployment form. The SQL engine is a proprietary C implementation named EXASolution, the server process is exacts, clients speak a proprietary binary SQL protocol on port 8563 rather than HTTP, TLS terminates on that port with a self-signed certificate carrying no subjectAltName, and the vendor's console client exaplus ships inside the image. Three further services share the container: ConfD, an HTTPS JSON-RPC management daemon on 443; BucketFS, an HTTP file service observed on 2580; and an OpenSSH server on 22. The image as pulled is about 6 GB and is distributed through Docker Hub. One fact about this deployment form belongs at the top rather than at the bottom, because it explains why the research is public now instead of being held for a patch. Exasol's own upstream repository warns that the docker distribution is an open source project that is not officially supported by Exasol; that the base image is an end-of-life CentOS 7 release; that official support for docker-db 7 is no longer available and that users should move to a newer release line; that the repository now only contains documentation while the binaries are distributed through Docker Hub; that issues are disabled; and that the project is mainly intended for automatic testing of Exasol deployments. None of that reduces the mechanism, because the credential is a property of the shipping database and the script engine is a supported core feature of the product rather than a container add-on. It does mean that on the vendor's own statements no fix is planned for this deployment form, so there was no patch to coordinate around and holding the finding would have left operators exposed without warning. Only version 7.1.30 in this deployment form was executed. Other 7.1.x releases, the supported non-container installation and the vendor's newer release line share the mechanism, a constant SYS credential plus an unrestricted script language in the UDF engine, and are plausibly affected; none was tested, that is stated as an explicitly labelled inference, and no version range is claimed. Type and root cause. Two defects, separable but jointly decisive, classified as CWE-1392 use of default credentials (primary) and CWE-94 improper control of generation of code (co-equal), with CWE-798 hard-coded credentials, CWE-78 OS command injection, CWE-1188 insecure default initialization and CWE-250 execution with unnecessary privileges recorded alongside, and CWE-284 and CWE-862 reported separately for the absent source-address restriction on 8563 and the absent authorisation distinction for script creation. Neither separately reported item raises a metric. Leg one on its own is a data breach. Leg two on its own is a documented feature. The pair produces an entry point that required no provisioning decision by anyone, because nobody ever created the account an attacker uses, and that converts SQL-layer administrative access into operating-system command execution with the command output returned in-band through the ordinary result set. The credential is the vendor's own published text, not a leak and not an inference. The upstream docker-db README publishes it under the heading "Connecting to the Database", instructing the reader to authenticate with username sys and password exasol. Two image-internal CI test scripts use the same pair against a freshly initialised database on the same port: basic_test.sh:112 carries $X -c n11:8563 -u sys -P exasol -jdbcparam validateservercertificate=0 and basic_sc_test.sh:98 uses -u sys -P exasol as well. Those two files are not in the current upstream repository, which now carries documentation only, so they are cited as artifacts observed inside the 7.1.30 image at /usr/opt/EXASuite-7/EXAClusterOS-7.1.30/docker/test/ and not as repository contents. Nothing rotates the constant, and that was traced rather than assumed: the running controller process command line carries no -defaultSysPasswordHash argument; the [DB:DB1] stanza of EXAConf carries no DefaultSysPasswdHash key; db_jobs.py:104 sets self.sys_passwd_text = secrets.token_hex(20), which generates an additional random password rather than replacing the built-in one; database.py:57 passes -defaultSysPasswordHash only when EXAConf configures it explicitly; and the container's init-sc path does not configure it. Nothing in the container's start path presents a first-login change-password step, sets a must-change flag on the SYS account or refuses service while the constant remains in place, and the README carries guidance about persistent volumes, hugepages, resource limits and license mounting with no instruction to change the SYS password; that absence is as load-bearing as the presence of the constant. The conclusion, corrected once during the research before being accepted, is that the accepted value is a built-in default of the database engine rather than a hash handed to it by the container initialiser, and both the built-in value and the generated random are accepted, which is why random generation in the provisioning code is not a defence. The contrast the product supplies is what makes this a defect rather than a design choice: Exasol generated per-deployment randoms for two of its three service credentials, the ConfD AuthenticationToken and the BucketFS WritePasswd, and did not do so for the most privileged one, and an attacker must read EXAConf to recover either random while sys / exasol is a constant every installation shares and the documentation prints. The sink, in full: CREATE SCHEMA IF NOT EXISTS poc_schema; OPEN SCHEMA poc_schema; CREATE OR REPLACE PYTHON3 SCALAR SCRIPT poc_udf() RETURNS VARCHAR(2000000) AS import os def run(ctx): out = os.popen("id").read() return 'RCE_OUT:' + out / SELECT poc_udf(); Three properties make this a sink rather than a curiosity. The os module is importable with no declaration, allow-list or capability request. The command string is an ordinary Python literal built from what the caller supplied, so shell metacharacters, pipelines and quoting all work, and the measured round used cat /etc/passwd | head -3 whose pipeline was honoured by the shell os.popen starts. And the return value crosses the trust boundary back to the caller through the ordinary result set, which removes the need for any separate exfiltration channel. Sanitisation over what the body does is absent: no module allow-list or deny-list, no policy forbidding os or subprocess, no capability gate, no per-statement approval, no audit prompt and no privilege beyond SYS itself. What does exist is well-formedness checking rather than a security control: the engine validates the language alias, submitting PYTHON instead of PYTHON3 yields its own diagnostic "no definition found for language: PYTHON", and it enforces SQL syntax and the forward-slash script terminator. Both were satisfied by the payload without evasion. That alias diagnostic is worth more than it looks, because it shows script languages are resolved through a named alias table inside the engine, that the table carries the standard aliases PYTHON3, LUA, JAVA and R, and that EXAConf contains no [ScriptLanguages] stanza customising it, so reachability is not conditional on an operator having installed or enabled a language pack. Execution identity, reported exactly as id returned it and not rounded up: uid=500(exadefusr) gid=500(exausers) groups=500(exausers),0(root). This is a dedicated script-execution account, not the database's own service identity, and it is not uid=0. Root appears only as a supplementary group, no escalation to an effective root identity was attempted, observed or is claimed, and nothing in this research should be described as a root compromise. The vendor's README does state that privileged container mode is required for permissions management, UDF support and environment configuration, so the privileged posture is the documented one rather than an unusual one, and gid 0 on Linux governs access to files and devices whose group is root. The whole of what the evidence supports is a conditional sentence: if an attacker in that position could write a setuid binary or reach a device node exposed by privileged mode, an effective root identity would follow. Neither was tested. What was tested is that the group membership is present, and it is reported as an untested escalation position under CWE-250 rather than as an achieved outcome. The isolation boundary was not glossed either. The UDF engine runs in a separate kernel namespace and that isolation is real but partial. A file written by the UDF did not appear in the container's own filesystem view, so the two views are distinct mount namespaces. Yet uname from inside the UDF returned the host kernel release, 5.10.134-19.2.al8.x86_64, which is expected, a namespace not being a hypervisor and the kernel being shared. Consequently the account names in the id output come from the namespace's own view, so even the /etc/passwd read is not asserted to have been the container's file or the host's. Command execution inside that namespace is confirmed and non-blind and is a substantial capability on its own; a host or container escape is not confirmed, not attempted and not claimed, and no cross-namespace file primitive is asserted. This is why the impact ratings rest on the SQL-layer authority of SYS, which does not depend on any of it. Network position, and a claim that was withdrawn. A socket inventory taken inside the running container reported exacts on 8563, bucketfsd on 2580, confd on 443 and sshd on 22, each bound to all interfaces within the container's network namespace. A listener bound to all interfaces inside a container is not the same thing as a listener reachable from a network, and no source-address restriction of the product's own was observed in its configuration or listener behaviour at any point. The vendor's README documents two ways to run the image and they differ exactly on the question that matters. The stand-alone command is docker run --name exasoldb -p 127.0.0.1:9563:8563 --detach --privileged --stop-timeout 120 exasol/docker-db:<version>, and the page explains that port 8563 within the container is exposed on local port 9563 and that the reader should use that port to connect, so the published port is bound to the host loopback; the persistent-volume variant on the same page uses the same loopback-bound publication. The multi-node command is docker run --detach --network=host --privileged -v "$CONTAINER_EXA:/exa" exasol/docker-db:<version> init-sc --node-id 11, and the vendor's note says the example uses the host network stack, that there is no need to expose ports in this mode, and that they are all accessible on the host. The image's FAQ adds that if you want to check from outside the Docker network you need port forwarding, which confirms that host-side reachability is an explicit operator action. Under default bridge networking with no port publication, which several of the README's own example commands use including the license-mount and resource-limit examples, the port is reachable from the host and from every other container attached to the same bridge, which is a logically adjacent topology. The research notes originally asserted that the production docker deployment exposes 8563 on all interfaces by default, and the chain was scored as remotely reachable on that basis. That assertion rested on the state of the researchers' own test harness and on a general expectation about how databases are deployed, not on any product artifact, and it does not survive contact with the vendor's documentation. It is therefore withdrawn in that form in the published advisory and replaced by the narrower artifact-backed set of statement
    Severity
    No CVSS data available.
    Assigner
    VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
    GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
    Impacted products
    Vendor Product Version
    Exasol Database Affected: unknown
    Create a notification for this product.

    {
      "containers": {
        "cna": {
          "affected": [
            {
              "product": "Database",
              "vendor": "Exasol",
              "versions": [
                {
                  "status": "affected",
                  "version": "unknown"
                }
              ]
            }
          ],
          "credits": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "finder",
              "value": "disclosure via Fulldisclosure"
            }
          ],
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in Exasol\nDatabase 7.1.30, the in-memory MPP analytical database from Exasol AG\n(Germany), examined in its docker-db single-container deployment form. The SQL\nengine is a proprietary C implementation named EXASolution, the server process\nis exacts, clients speak a proprietary binary SQL protocol on port 8563 rather\nthan HTTP, TLS terminates on that port with a self-signed certificate carrying\nno subjectAltName, and the vendor\u0027s console client exaplus ships inside the\nimage. Three further services share the container: ConfD, an HTTPS JSON-RPC\nmanagement daemon on 443; BucketFS, an HTTP file service observed on 2580; and\nan OpenSSH server on 22. The image as pulled is about 6 GB and is distributed\nthrough Docker Hub.\n\nOne fact about this deployment form belongs at the top rather than at the\nbottom, because it explains why the research is public now instead of being\nheld for a patch. Exasol\u0027s own upstream repository warns that the docker\ndistribution is an open source project that is not officially supported by\nExasol; that the base image is an end-of-life CentOS 7 release; that official\nsupport for docker-db 7 is no longer available and that users should move to a\nnewer release line; that the repository now only contains documentation while\nthe binaries are distributed through Docker Hub; that issues are disabled; and\nthat the project is mainly intended for automatic testing of Exasol\ndeployments. None of that reduces the mechanism, because the credential is a\nproperty of the shipping database and the script engine is a supported core\nfeature of the product rather than a container add-on. It does mean that on\nthe vendor\u0027s own statements no fix is planned for this deployment form, so\nthere was no patch to coordinate around and holding the finding would have\nleft operators exposed without warning. Only version 7.1.30 in this deployment\nform was executed. Other 7.1.x releases, the supported non-container\ninstallation and the vendor\u0027s newer release line share the mechanism, a\nconstant SYS credential plus an unrestricted script language in the UDF\nengine, and are plausibly affected; none was tested, that is stated as an\nexplicitly labelled inference, and no version range is claimed.\n\nType and root cause. Two defects, separable but jointly decisive, classified\nas CWE-1392 use of default credentials (primary) and CWE-94 improper control\nof generation of code (co-equal), with CWE-798 hard-coded credentials, CWE-78\nOS command injection, CWE-1188 insecure default initialization and CWE-250\nexecution with unnecessary privileges recorded alongside, and CWE-284 and\nCWE-862 reported separately for the absent source-address restriction on 8563\nand the absent authorisation distinction for script creation. Neither\nseparately reported item raises a metric. Leg one on its own is a data breach.\nLeg two on its own is a documented feature. The pair produces an entry point\nthat required no provisioning decision by anyone, because nobody ever created\nthe account an attacker uses, and that converts SQL-layer administrative\naccess into operating-system command execution with the command output\nreturned in-band through the ordinary result set.\n\nThe credential is the vendor\u0027s own published text, not a leak and not an\ninference. The upstream docker-db README publishes it under the heading\n\"Connecting to the Database\", instructing the reader to authenticate with\nusername sys and password exasol. Two image-internal CI test scripts use the\nsame pair against a freshly initialised database on the same port:\nbasic_test.sh:112 carries $X -c n11:8563 -u sys -P exasol -jdbcparam\nvalidateservercertificate=0 and basic_sc_test.sh:98 uses -u sys -P exasol as\nwell. Those two files are not in the current upstream repository, which now\ncarries documentation only, so they are cited as artifacts observed inside the\n7.1.30 image at /usr/opt/EXASuite-7/EXAClusterOS-7.1.30/docker/test/ and not\nas repository contents. Nothing rotates the constant, and that was traced\nrather than assumed: the running controller process command line carries no\n-defaultSysPasswordHash argument; the [DB:DB1] stanza of EXAConf carries no\nDefaultSysPasswdHash key; db_jobs.py:104 sets self.sys_passwd_text =\nsecrets.token_hex(20), which generates an additional random password rather\nthan replacing the built-in one; database.py:57 passes -defaultSysPasswordHash\nonly when EXAConf configures it explicitly; and the container\u0027s init-sc path\ndoes not configure it. Nothing in the container\u0027s start path presents a\nfirst-login change-password step, sets a must-change flag on the SYS account\nor refuses service while the constant remains in place, and the README carries\nguidance about persistent volumes, hugepages, resource limits and license\nmounting with no instruction to change the SYS password; that absence is as\nload-bearing as the presence of the constant. The conclusion, corrected once\nduring the research before being accepted, is that the accepted value is a\nbuilt-in default of the database engine rather than a hash handed to it by the\ncontainer initialiser, and both the built-in value and the generated random\nare accepted, which is why random generation in the provisioning code is not a\ndefence. The contrast the product supplies is what makes this a defect rather\nthan a design choice: Exasol generated per-deployment randoms for two of its\nthree service credentials, the ConfD AuthenticationToken and the BucketFS\nWritePasswd, and did not do so for the most privileged one, and an attacker\nmust read EXAConf to recover either random while sys / exasol is a constant\nevery installation shares and the documentation prints.\n\nThe sink, in full:\n\n    CREATE SCHEMA IF NOT EXISTS poc_schema;\n    OPEN SCHEMA poc_schema;\n    CREATE OR REPLACE PYTHON3 SCALAR SCRIPT poc_udf()\n      RETURNS VARCHAR(2000000) AS\n    import os\n    def run(ctx):\n        out = os.popen(\"id\").read()\n        return \u0027RCE_OUT:\u0027 + out\n    /\n    SELECT poc_udf();\n\nThree properties make this a sink rather than a curiosity. The os module is\nimportable with no declaration, allow-list or capability request. The command\nstring is an ordinary Python literal built from what the caller supplied, so\nshell metacharacters, pipelines and quoting all work, and the measured round\nused cat /etc/passwd | head -3 whose pipeline was honoured by the shell\nos.popen starts. And the return value crosses the trust boundary back to the\ncaller through the ordinary result set, which removes the need for any\nseparate exfiltration channel. Sanitisation over what the body does is absent:\nno module allow-list or deny-list, no policy forbidding os or subprocess, no\ncapability gate, no per-statement approval, no audit prompt and no privilege\nbeyond SYS itself. What does exist is well-formedness checking rather than a\nsecurity control: the engine validates the language alias, submitting PYTHON\ninstead of PYTHON3 yields its own diagnostic \"no definition found for\nlanguage: PYTHON\", and it enforces SQL syntax and the forward-slash script\nterminator. Both were satisfied by the payload without evasion. That alias\ndiagnostic is worth more than it looks, because it shows script languages are\nresolved through a named alias table inside the engine, that the table carries\nthe standard aliases PYTHON3, LUA, JAVA and R, and that EXAConf contains no\n[ScriptLanguages] stanza customising it, so reachability is not conditional on\nan operator having installed or enabled a language pack.\n\nExecution identity, reported exactly as id returned it and not rounded up:\nuid=500(exadefusr) gid=500(exausers) groups=500(exausers),0(root). This is a\ndedicated script-execution account, not the database\u0027s own service identity,\nand it is not uid=0. Root appears only as a supplementary group, no escalation\nto an effective root identity was attempted, observed or is claimed, and\nnothing in this research should be described as a root compromise. The\nvendor\u0027s README does state that privileged container mode is required for\npermissions management, UDF support and environment configuration, so the\nprivileged posture is the documented one rather than an unusual one, and gid 0\non Linux governs access to files and devices whose group is root. The whole of\nwhat the evidence supports is a conditional sentence: if an attacker in that\nposition could write a setuid binary or reach a device node exposed by\nprivileged mode, an effective root identity would follow. Neither was tested.\nWhat was tested is that the group membership is present, and it is reported as\nan untested escalation position under CWE-250 rather than as an achieved\noutcome.\n\nThe isolation boundary was not glossed either. The UDF engine runs in a\nseparate kernel namespace and that isolation is real but partial. A file\nwritten by the UDF did not appear in the container\u0027s own filesystem view, so\nthe two views are distinct mount namespaces. Yet uname from inside the UDF\nreturned the host kernel release, 5.10.134-19.2.al8.x86_64, which is expected,\na namespace not being a hypervisor and the kernel being shared. Consequently\nthe account names in the id output come from the namespace\u0027s own view, so even\nthe /etc/passwd read is not asserted to have been the container\u0027s file or the\nhost\u0027s. Command execution inside that namespace is confirmed and non-blind and\nis a substantial capability on its own; a host or container escape is not\nconfirmed, not attempted and not claimed, and no cross-namespace file\nprimitive is asserted. This is why the impact ratings rest on the SQL-layer\nauthority of SYS, which does not depend on any of it.\n\nNetwork position, and a claim that was withdrawn. A socket inventory taken\ninside the running container reported exacts on 8563, bucketfsd on 2580, confd\non 443 and sshd on 22, each bound to all interfaces within the container\u0027s\nnetwork namespace. A listener bound to all interfaces inside a container is\nnot the same thing as a listener reachable from a network, and no\nsource-address restriction of the product\u0027s own was observed in its\nconfiguration or listener behaviour at any point. The vendor\u0027s README\ndocuments two ways to run the image and they differ exactly on the question\nthat matters. The stand-alone command is docker run --name exasoldb -p\n127.0.0.1:9563:8563 --detach --privileged --stop-timeout 120\nexasol/docker-db:\u003cversion\u003e, and the page explains that port 8563 within the\ncontainer is exposed on local port 9563 and that the reader should use that\nport to connect, so the published port is bound to the host loopback; the\npersistent-volume variant on the same page uses the same loopback-bound\npublication. The multi-node command is docker run --detach --network=host\n--privileged -v \"$CONTAINER_EXA:/exa\" exasol/docker-db:\u003cversion\u003e init-sc\n--node-id 11, and the vendor\u0027s note says the example uses the host network\nstack, that there is no need to expose ports in this mode, and that they are\nall accessible on the host. The image\u0027s FAQ adds that if you want to check\nfrom outside the Docker network you need port forwarding, which confirms that\nhost-side reachability is an explicit operator action. Under default bridge\nnetworking with no port publication, which several of the README\u0027s own example\ncommands use including the license-mount and resource-limit examples, the port\nis reachable from the host and from every other container attached to the same\nbridge, which is a logically adjacent topology.\n\nThe research notes originally asserted that the production docker deployment\nexposes 8563 on all interfaces by default, and the chain was scored as\nremotely reachable on that basis. That assertion rested on the state of the\nresearchers\u0027 own test harness and on a general expectation about how databases\nare deployed, not on any product artifact, and it does not survive contact\nwith the vendor\u0027s documentation. It is therefore withdrawn in that form in the\npublished advisory and replaced by the narrower artifact-backed set of\nstatement"
            }
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                  "type": "CWE"
                },
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                  "cweId": "CWE-1392",
                  "description": "CWE-1392",
                  "lang": "en",
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                  "description": "CWE-250",
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            "orgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
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            },
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            },
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              "url": "https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/exasol-database-default-credential-python-udf-os-popen-rce"
            },
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              "url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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          "source": {
            "defect": [
              "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/30"
            ],
            "discovery": "EXTERNAL"
          },
          "title": "[0day-rubbish] Exasol Database 7.1.30 docker-db form: shipped default SYS credential to PYTHON3 UDF os.popen command execution as uid=500(exadefusr), output returned in-band (8.8)",
          "x_gcve": [
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              "vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0496",
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        "dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:03Z",
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