The Computer Incident Response Center Luxembourg (CIRCL) is a government-driven initiative designed to provide a systematic response facility to computer security threats and incidents.
- Website
- https://www.circl.lu
- info@circl.lu
- GNA identifier
- GNA-1 GCVE registry Recent publications
Recent vulnerabilities
355 GCVE records assigned by this organization as GNA-1GCVE-1-2026-20013 (CVE-2026-94379)
Vulnerability from gna-1 – Published: 2026-09-21 12:35 – Updated: 2026-09-21 12:35| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/ef4dc19c6 | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-09-21 12:30 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/ef4dc19c6.patch
ff6f133b194f… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
ef4dc19c6d4f
|
fix: [security] insufficient check on http methods for the | ff6f133b194f… |
Fix summary
The fix replaces the allowlist-style HTTP method checks (is POST or PUT) with a denylist approach (is NOT GET) in all three security-critical branches of the login() function. This ensures that every non-GET HTTP method—regardless of whether it is POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE, HEAD, OPTIONS, or any other—triggers the bruteforce protection, email OTP verification, and login-failure logging code paths, closing the method-based bypass.
Patch summary
Three conditional expressions in UsersController::login() were changed. (1) The bruteforce-protection guard changed from $this->request->is(['post','put']) to !$this->request->is(['get']). (2) The email-OTP guard changed from $this->request->is('post') to !$this->request->is(['get']). (3) The login-failure handling guard changed from $this->request->is('post') || $this->request->is('put') to !$this->request->is('get'). All three changes invert the logic from an explicit allowlist of methods to a denylist that excludes only GET, so that any other HTTP method is treated as a state-changing login attempt subject to all security controls.
CVSS rationale
AV:N – the login endpoint is network-accessible. AC:L – the attack requires only changing the HTTP method in a request; no race conditions or complex setup. AT:N – no manipulation of the target system is needed. PR:N – the login endpoint is accessible without prior authentication. UI:N – no user interaction required. VC:L – bypass of bruteforce protection enables credential brute-forcing, potentially exposing user credentials. VI:L – bypass of email OTP (2FA) and failure logging compromises the integrity of the authentication process and audit trail. VA:N – no direct denial-of-service impact. SC/SI/SA:N – no secondary system impact is evidenced.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-20 The root cause is that the application validated the HTTP method using an incomplete allowlist (POST, PUT) rather than rejecting all non-safe methods. This is a classic improper input validation flaw where the set of accepted values was not exhaustive, allowing unexpected methods to bypass security logic.
- CWE-285 The security controls (bruteforce protection, OTP enforcement, failure logging) are authorization/authentication enforcement mechanisms that were improperly applied only to a subset of HTTP methods, effectively allowing unauthorized bypass of these controls.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-1 The attacker modifies a parameter of the authentication request (the HTTP method) to alter which security checks are executed, effectively modifying the authentication logic at runtime. This is the closest CAPEC to the observed bypass. Uncertainty: CAPEC-1 typically refers to modifying authentication logic in a more direct sense (e.g., altering credential checks), whereas here the modification is via the HTTP method header. However, no other CAPEC more precisely captures the act of altering a request attribute to skip authentication security controls.
Assumptions to verify
- The exact affected version range is not explicitly stated in the patch; the tag_version_boundary metadata indicates v2.5.47 with 143 commits after the fix, suggesting the fix landed shortly after 2.5.47, but the precise last-affected and first-fixed versions are not confirmed.
- The CAPEC-1 mapping is the closest available pattern; the actual attack vector (HTTP method substitution) is a form of request parameter manipulation that does not have a dedicated CAPEC entry, so CAPEC-1 is used as the best approximation.
- The CVSS vector assumes the MISP instance is exposed over a network and that the login endpoint is reachable without prior authentication, which is the standard deployment model for MISP.
- The patch does not include a test case demonstrating the bypass; the analysis is based solely on the code diff and commit message.
- It is assumed that the MISP framework (CakePHP) does not independently enforce HTTP method restrictions at a middleware layer that would have already blocked non-POST/PUT methods to this endpoint; the patch implies such enforcement was absent.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
5 | 9 | medium | 5 |
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"modules": [
"UsersController (login endpoint)"
],
"product": "MISP",
"programFiles": [
"app/Controller/UsersController.php"
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"repo": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP",
"vendor": "MISP",
"versions": [
{
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}
]
}
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"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "reporter",
"value": "Jeroen Pinoy"
},
{
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"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "iglocska"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
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"value": "\u003cp\u003eThe login() function in MISP\u0027s UsersController.php contained insufficient HTTP method validation for several security-critical code paths. The original code used an allowlist approach, checking only for specific HTTP methods (POST and PUT) before enforcing bruteforce protection, email one-time-password (OTP) verification, and login-failure logging. Because the checks were not exhaustive, an unauthenticated attacker could issue login requests using other HTTP methods and bypass all three security controls simultaneously. Specifically:\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\u2003-\u0026nbsp;the bruteforce blocklisting check and attempt counter were skipped, allowing unlimited credential-guessing attempts without being rate-limited or blocked\u003cbr\u003e\u2003-\u0026nbsp; the email OTP two-factor authentication step was skipped, defeating the second factor of authentication\u003cbr\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\u2003- login-failure events were neither logged nor counted, removing the audit trail and the mechanism that would normally trigger a blocklist entry.\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe security impact is the effective disabling of brute-force protection and multi-factor authentication for any attacker who can craft an HTTP request with a non-POST/PUT method to the login endpoint, potentially leading to credential compromise and unauthorized access to the MISP instance.\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cp\u003eVersion affected: \u0026lt;2.5.47\u003c/p\u003e"
}
],
"value": "The login() function in MISP\u0027s UsersController.php contained insufficient HTTP method validation for several security-critical code paths. The original code used an allowlist approach, checking only for specific HTTP methods (POST and PUT) before enforcing bruteforce protection, email one-time-password (OTP) verification, and login-failure logging. Because the checks were not exhaustive, an unauthenticated attacker could issue login requests using other HTTP methods and bypass all three security controls simultaneously. Specifically:\u00a0\n\n\u2003-\u00a0the bruteforce blocklisting check and attempt counter were skipped, allowing unlimited credential-guessing attempts without being rate-limited or blocked\n\u2003-\u00a0 the email OTP two-factor authentication step was skipped, defeating the second factor of authentication\n\u2003- login-failure events were neither logged nor counted, removing the audit trail and the mechanism that would normally trigger a blocklist entry.\n\n\n\n\nThe security impact is the effective disabling of brute-force protection and multi-factor authentication for any attacker who can craft an HTTP request with a non-POST/PUT method to the login endpoint, potentially leading to credential compromise and unauthorized access to the MISP instance.\n\n\n\n\n\nVersion affected: \u003c2.5.47"
}
],
"impacts": [
{
"capecId": "CAPEC-1",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CAPEC-1 Improperly Controlled Modification of Authentication Logic"
}
]
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV4_0": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "NONE",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"baseScore": 6.9,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "LOW",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-20",
"description": "CWE-20 Improper Input Validation",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
},
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-285",
"description": "CWE-285 Improper Authorization",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"orgId": "00000000-0000-4000-9000-000000000000"
},
"references": [
{
"name": "Security patch",
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/ef4dc19c6"
}
],
"solutions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eThe fix replaces the allowlist-style HTTP method checks (is POST or PUT) with a denylist approach (is NOT GET) in all three security-critical branches of the login() function. This ensures that every non-GET HTTP method\u2014regardless of whether it is POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE, HEAD, OPTIONS, or any other\u2014triggers the bruteforce protection, email OTP verification, and login-failure logging code paths, closing the method-based bypass.\u003c/p\u003e"
}
],
"value": "The fix replaces the allowlist-style HTTP method checks (is POST or PUT) with a denylist approach (is NOT GET) in all three security-critical branches of the login() function. This ensures that every non-GET HTTP method\u2014regardless of whether it is POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE, HEAD, OPTIONS, or any other\u2014triggers the bruteforce protection, email OTP verification, and login-failure logging code paths, closing the method-based bypass."
}
],
"title": "MISP: HTTP Method Bypass of Login Security Controls (Bruteforce Protection and Email OTP)",
"x_gcve": [
{
"extensions": {
"bcp-05-x-01": {
"ai_annotations": [
{
"ai_level": "generated",
"description": "Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.",
"gna_source": 1,
"models": [
{
"gna_source": 1,
"identifier": "qwen3.8:27b",
"name": "qwen3.8:27b",
"source": "ollama"
}
],
"review_status": "review",
"scope": "record",
"tags": [
"ai-computer-assisted:llm-generated",
"ai-computer-assisted:classification"
]
}
]
},
"bcp-05-x-02": {
"x_patch2vuln": {
"assumptions": [
"The exact affected version range is not explicitly stated in the patch; the tag_version_boundary metadata indicates v2.5.47 with 143 commits after the fix, suggesting the fix landed shortly after 2.5.47, but the precise last-affected and first-fixed versions are not confirmed.",
"The CAPEC-1 mapping is the closest available pattern; the actual attack vector (HTTP method substitution) is a form of request parameter manipulation that does not have a dedicated CAPEC entry, so CAPEC-1 is used as the best approximation.",
"The CVSS vector assumes the MISP instance is exposed over a network and that the login endpoint is reachable without prior authentication, which is the standard deployment model for MISP.",
"The patch does not include a test case demonstrating the bypass; the analysis is based solely on the code diff and commit message.",
"It is assumed that the MISP framework (CakePHP) does not independently enforce HTTP method restrictions at a middleware layer that would have already blocked non-POST/PUT methods to this endpoint; the patch implies such enforcement was absent."
],
"capecRationale": [
{
"capecId": "CAPEC-1",
"rationale": "The attacker modifies a parameter of the authentication request (the HTTP method) to alter which security checks are executed, effectively modifying the authentication logic at runtime. This is the closest CAPEC to the observed bypass. Uncertainty: CAPEC-1 typically refers to modifying authentication logic in a more direct sense (e.g., altering credential checks), whereas here the modification is via the HTTP method header. However, no other CAPEC more precisely captures the act of altering a request attribute to skip authentication security controls."
}
],
"commit": "ef4dc19c6d4f029c3173e5fafea75a94c127f8b5",
"confidence": "medium",
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "reporter",
"value": "Jeroen Pinoy"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "iglocska"
}
],
"cvssRationale": "AV:N \u2013 the login endpoint is network-accessible. AC:L \u2013 the attack requires only changing the HTTP method in a request; no race conditions or complex setup. AT:N \u2013 no manipulation of the target system is needed. PR:N \u2013 the login endpoint is accessible without prior authentication. UI:N \u2013 no user interaction required. VC:L \u2013 bypass of bruteforce protection enables credential brute-forcing, potentially exposing user credentials. VI:L \u2013 bypass of email OTP (2FA) and failure logging compromises the integrity of the authentication process and audit trail. VA:N \u2013 no direct denial-of-service impact. SC/SI/SA:N \u2013 no secondary system impact is evidenced.",
"fixSummary": "The fix replaces the allowlist-style HTTP method checks (is POST or PUT) with a denylist approach (is NOT GET) in all three security-critical branches of the login() function. This ensures that every non-GET HTTP method\u2014regardless of whether it is POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE, HEAD, OPTIONS, or any other\u2014triggers the bruteforce protection, email OTP verification, and login-failure logging code paths, closing the method-based bypass.",
"generatedAt": "2026-09-21T12:30:02.387878Z",
"generator": "patch2vuln.py",
"model": "qwen3.8:27b",
"modelComparison": {
"rankings": [
{
"agreementScore": 9,
"assumptionCount": 5,
"confidence": "medium",
"model": "qwen3.8:27b",
"score": 5
}
],
"selectedModel": "qwen3.8:27b",
"selectionMethod": "deterministic-consensus-v1",
"selectionNotice": "The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required."
},
"patchSha256": "ff6f133b194fcd5c913990fce421bd56de7a12e488291a2ec7422d92284e71d8",
"patchSummary": "Three conditional expressions in UsersController::login() were changed. (1) The bruteforce-protection guard changed from $this-\u003erequest-\u003eis([\u0027post\u0027,\u0027put\u0027]) to !$this-\u003erequest-\u003eis([\u0027get\u0027]). (2) The email-OTP guard changed from $this-\u003erequest-\u003eis(\u0027post\u0027) to !$this-\u003erequest-\u003eis([\u0027get\u0027]). (3) The login-failure handling guard changed from $this-\u003erequest-\u003eis(\u0027post\u0027) || $this-\u003erequest-\u003eis(\u0027put\u0027) to !$this-\u003erequest-\u003eis(\u0027get\u0027). All three changes invert the logic from an explicit allowlist of methods to a denylist that excludes only GET, so that any other HTTP method is treated as a state-changing login attempt subject to all security controls.",
"patchTruncated": false,
"patches": [
{
"commit": "ef4dc19c6d4f029c3173e5fafea75a94c127f8b5",
"patchSha256": "ff6f133b194fcd5c913990fce421bd56de7a12e488291a2ec7422d92284e71d8",
"source": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/ef4dc19c6.patch",
"sourceUrl": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/ef4dc19c6.patch",
"subject": "fix: [security] insufficient check on http methods for the"
}
],
"source": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/ef4dc19c6.patch",
"subject": "fix: [security] insufficient check on http methods for the",
"tagVersionBoundary": {
"commits_after_fix": 143,
"repository": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP",
"tag": "v2.5.47",
"version": "2.5.47",
"version_type": "semver"
},
"weaknessRationale": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-20",
"rationale": "The root cause is that the application validated the HTTP method using an incomplete allowlist (POST, PUT) rather than rejecting all non-safe methods. This is a classic improper input validation flaw where the set of accepted values was not exhaustive, allowing unexpected methods to bypass security logic."
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-285",
"rationale": "The security controls (bruteforce protection, OTP enforcement, failure logging) are authorization/authentication enforcement mechanisms that were improperly applied only to a subset of HTTP methods, effectively allowing unauthorized bypass of these controls."
}
]
}
}
},
"recordType": "advisory",
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"cveMetadata": {
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"cveId": "CVE-2026-94379",
"datePublished": "2026-09-21T12:35:18.599403Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-09-21T12:35:24.635Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-21T12:35:24.706090Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED",
"vulnId": "GCVE-1-2026-20013"
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"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.1"
}
GCVE-1-2026-20022 (CVE-2026-94374)
Vulnerability from gna-1 – Published: 2026-09-21 12:24 – Updated: 2026-09-21 12:25| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/4c1a03b20 | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-09-21 12:19 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/4c1a03b20.patch
1079aff9d4e4… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
4c1a03b200fc
|
fix: [security] Strip the client id from module-result event | 1079aff9d4e4… |
Fix summary
The fix adds an unset($report['id']) call in the EventReport processing loop within processModuleResultsData, immediately before the event_id assignment and save() call. This ensures that any client-supplied id field is stripped from the report data, forcing the ORM to perform an insert (new report) rather than an update (existing report), consistent with the existing behavior of the attribute and object loops in the same method.
Patch summary
In app/Model/Event.php, within the foreach loop over $resolved_data['EventReport'] in processModuleResultsData, a single line unset($report['id']); is inserted after $this->EventReport->create() and before $report['event_id'] = $id. A four-line comment is added explaining that module-result import only creates reports and that stripping the client id prevents redirecting save() onto another event's report row. No other files or logic are modified.
CVSS rationale
AV:N – MISP is a network-accessible web application. AC:L – the attack requires only including an 'id' field in a normal module-results submission; no race condition or complex bypass is needed. AT:N – no prior user interaction or attack preparation beyond crafting the payload. PR:L – requires an authenticated user with permission to submit module results on an event (a common MISP role). UI:N – no victim interaction required. VC:L – the attacker can read the content of one specific report they target by id. VI:H – the attacker can overwrite all fields of the targeted report and change its event_id, fully compromising its integrity. VA:N – no availability impact. SC/SI/SA – no impact on adjacent systems; SI:H reflects the integrity compromise of the shared report data store.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-639 The attacker supplies an 'id' value in the module-results payload that the application uses as the primary key for the save() operation, redirecting the write to an object (report row) belonging to a different event. The user-controlled key bypasses the intended create-only semantics and grants unauthorized read/write access to another event's report.
- CWE-472 The 'id' field is assumed to be server-generated and immutable for new records, but the application accepts a client-supplied value and passes it directly to the ORM save() call, allowing the attacker to control which database row is affected.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-126 The attacker tampers with the module-results payload by injecting an 'id' parameter that the application does not expect or sanitize, redirecting the save operation to an arbitrary existing report row. This is the closest CAPEC to the observed attack: manipulating a request parameter to alter application behavior and access an unauthorized object. The mapping is approximate because CAPEC-126 typically describes in-transit tampering, whereas here the parameter is included in the initial request body; however, no more specific CAPEC for mass-assignment IDOR exists in the CAPEC catalog.
Assumptions to verify
- The exact affected and fixed MISP version numbers are not stated in the patch metadata; the tag boundary (v2.5.47, 53 commits after fix) suggests the fix landed after v2.5.47 but the precise fixed release is unspecified.
- PR:L assumes that submitting module results is available to any authenticated user with write access to an event; if MISP requires a more restrictive role (e.g., admin or org admin), PR should be raised to H.
- VC:L assumes the attacker can read only the specific report they target by id; if the reparenting exposes additional data (e.g., related attributes), the confidentiality impact could be higher.
- CAPEC-126 (Parameter Tampering) is the closest available CAPEC; the actual technique is more precisely a mass-assignment / IDOR via unsanitized primary key, for which no dedicated CAPEC entry exists.
- The Co-Authored-By line references an AI assistant (Claude Opus 4.8); it is credited as a tool rather than a human remediation developer.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
5 | 9 | medium | 5 |
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"modules": [
"app/Model/Event.php (processModuleResultsData / handleModuleResults)"
],
"product": "MISP",
"programFiles": [
"app/Model/Event.php"
],
"repo": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP",
"vendor": "MISP",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "2.5.47",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "reporter",
"value": "Jeroen Pinoy"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "iglocska"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "Claude Opus 4.8"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eMISP contains an insecure direct object reference vulnerability in the processModuleResultsData method of the Event model. When processing module results, the code iterates over EventReport entries supplied in the resolved data and saves each one. Unlike the adjacent attribute and object processing loops, the report loop did not unset the client-supplied \u0027id\u0027 field before calling save(). Because the MISP EventReport model\u0027s create() method does not strip the id field, an authenticated user with permission to submit module results could include an \u0027id\u0027 value referencing an existing report belonging to a different event. Upon save(), the ORM would update that existing row rather than insert a new one, allowing the attacker to\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\u2003-\u0026nbsp;read the content of another event\u0027s report by reparenting it into their own event\u003cbr\u003e\u2003-\u0026nbsp;overwrite the report\u0027s fields with attacker-controlled data\u003cbr\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\u2003-\u0026nbsp;change the report\u0027s event_id to redirect ownership.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis constitutes an authorization bypass through a user-controlled key, enabling cross-event data disclosure and integrity compromise. The vulnerability requires an authenticated session with the ability to invoke module result processing on an event.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eVersion affected: \u0026lt;2.5.47\u003c/p\u003e"
}
],
"value": "MISP contains an insecure direct object reference vulnerability in the processModuleResultsData method of the Event model. When processing module results, the code iterates over EventReport entries supplied in the resolved data and saves each one. Unlike the adjacent attribute and object processing loops, the report loop did not unset the client-supplied \u0027id\u0027 field before calling save(). Because the MISP EventReport model\u0027s create() method does not strip the id field, an authenticated user with permission to submit module results could include an \u0027id\u0027 value referencing an existing report belonging to a different event. Upon save(), the ORM would update that existing row rather than insert a new one, allowing the attacker to\u00a0\n\n\u2003-\u00a0read the content of another event\u0027s report by reparenting it into their own event\n\u2003-\u00a0overwrite the report\u0027s fields with attacker-controlled data\n\u2003-\u00a0change the report\u0027s event_id to redirect ownership.\u00a0\n\n\n\n\nThis constitutes an authorization bypass through a user-controlled key, enabling cross-event data disclosure and integrity compromise. The vulnerability requires an authenticated session with the ability to invoke module result processing on an event.\n\nVersion affected: \u003c2.5.47"
}
],
"impacts": [
{
"capecId": "CAPEC-126",
"descriptions": [
{
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"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
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"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"baseScore": 8.3,
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"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:H/SA:N",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
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{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
}
],
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"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-639",
"description": "CWE-639 Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
},
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-472",
"description": "CWE-472 External Control of Assumed-Immutable Web Parameter",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
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},
"references": [
{
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"tags": [
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"url": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/4c1a03b20"
}
],
"solutions": [
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"lang": "en",
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"value": "\u003cp\u003eThe fix adds an unset($report[\u0027id\u0027]) call in the EventReport processing loop within processModuleResultsData, immediately before the event_id assignment and save() call. This ensures that any client-supplied id field is stripped from the report data, forcing the ORM to perform an insert (new report) rather than an update (existing report), consistent with the existing behavior of the attribute and object loops in the same method.\u003c/p\u003e"
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"value": "The fix adds an unset($report[\u0027id\u0027]) call in the EventReport processing loop within processModuleResultsData, immediately before the event_id assignment and save() call. This ensures that any client-supplied id field is stripped from the report data, forcing the ORM to perform an insert (new report) rather than an update (existing report), consistent with the existing behavior of the attribute and object loops in the same method."
}
],
"title": "MISP: IDOR via Client-Supplied Report ID in Module Results Processing Allows Reparenting and Overwriting of Other Events\u0027 Reports",
"x_gcve": [
{
"extensions": {
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{
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"identifier": "qwen3.8:27b",
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]
},
"bcp-05-x-02": {
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"PR:L assumes that submitting module results is available to any authenticated user with write access to an event; if MISP requires a more restrictive role (e.g., admin or org admin), PR should be raised to H.",
"VC:L assumes the attacker can read only the specific report they target by id; if the reparenting exposes additional data (e.g., related attributes), the confidentiality impact could be higher.",
"CAPEC-126 (Parameter Tampering) is the closest available CAPEC; the actual technique is more precisely a mass-assignment / IDOR via unsanitized primary key, for which no dedicated CAPEC entry exists.",
"The Co-Authored-By line references an AI assistant (Claude Opus 4.8); it is credited as a tool rather than a human remediation developer."
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"sourceUrl": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/4c1a03b20.patch",
"subject": "fix: [security] Strip the client id from module-result event"
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"subject": "fix: [security] Strip the client id from module-result event",
"tagVersionBoundary": {
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"tag": "v2.5.47",
"version": "2.5.47",
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{
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GCVE-1-2026-20033 (CVE-2026-94373)
Vulnerability from gna-1 – Published: 2026-09-21 12:16 – Updated: 2026-09-21 12:16- CWE-79 - Cross-site Scripting (XSS)
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/b062698f2 | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-09-21 12:08 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/b062698f2.patch
843bc32d5dc3… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
b062698f2699
|
fix: [xss] via JS innerHTML - as reported by David Andre and | 843bc32d5dc3… |
Fix summary
The vulnerability is remediated by replacing the unsafe innerHTML property assignments with the safe textContent property when setting the display text of dynamically created <option> elements. textContent inserts the value as plain text without parsing HTML, thereby neutralizing any injected markup or script.
Patch summary
In app/webroot/js/contextual_menu.js, within the ContextualMenu class, two lines that set option.innerHTML (one for object-valued entries using value.text and one for scalar entries using value) are changed to option.textContent. No other logic, event handlers, or surrounding code is modified. The change is limited to the two assignment statements in the option-population loop.
CVSS rationale
AV:N: MISP is a network-accessible web application. AC:L: The injection is straightforward once attacker-controlled data reaches the menu options. AT:N: No special targeting of a specific session state is required beyond the data being rendered. PR:L: The attacker must be authenticated to MISP to inject data that will be rendered in the contextual menu. UI:P: The victim must interact with the contextual menu (e.g., open it) for the injected content to execute. VC/VI/VA:N: The MISP server itself is not directly compromised. SC:H/SI:H: The victim's browser (subsequent component) suffers high confidentiality and integrity impact via script execution in the MISP origin. SA:N: Availability of the browser is not impacted.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-79 The patch replaces innerHTML with textContent to prevent HTML/JS injection into the DOM, which is the canonical remediation for DOM-based XSS (CWE-79). The specific sub-type is DOM-based XSS via unsafe DOM API usage (innerHTML), but CWE-79 is the narrowest standard identifier that covers this.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-12 The vulnerability is a textbook DOM-based XSS: attacker-controlled data is written into the DOM via the innerHTML property, causing the browser to parse and execute injected markup/script. CAPEC-12 (DOM-based XSS) is the most precise CAPEC pattern. The mapping is high-confidence because the patch explicitly targets innerHTML-to-textContent in a client-side JS file, which is the defining characteristic of DOM-based XSS.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected version range is inferred from the tag_version_boundary (v2.5.47 with 137 commits after the fix), suggesting the fix landed shortly after v2.5.47; no explicit affected/fixed version strings are provided in the metadata.
- PR:L assumes the attacker must be an authenticated MISP user to inject data that reaches the contextual menu; if an unauthenticated injection path exists, PR could be N.
- UI:P assumes the victim must actively open or interact with the contextual menu for the XSS to trigger; if the menu renders automatically on page load, UI could be N.
- The CAPEC-12 mapping is high-confidence based on the innerHTML-to-textContent pattern, but the exact data flow (which upstream field feeds value.text) is not visible in the patch.
- AT:N assumes the attacker does not need to target a specific user's session; if the payload must be tailored to a particular user's view, AT could be P.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
5 | 9 | medium | 5 |
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"modules": [
"app/webroot/js/contextual_menu.js"
],
"product": "MISP",
"programFiles": [
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],
"repo": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP",
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}
],
"value": "MISP contains a DOM-based cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the contextual menu JavaScript component. The ContextualMenu class populates HTML \u003coption\u003e elements by assigning user-controllable values to the innerHTML property. Because innerHTML parses and renders HTML markup, any untrusted string supplied as the option text (value.text or value) is interpreted as live DOM content rather than plain text. An attacker who can influence the data rendered in the contextual menu can inject arbitrary HTML or JavaScript that executes in the victim\u0027s browser within the MISP application origin. This may allow session hijacking, data exfiltration, or unauthorized actions performed on behalf of the authenticated user.\n\nVersion affected: \u003c2.5.47"
}
],
"impacts": [
{
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"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
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}
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}
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"metrics": [
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"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N",
"version": "4.0",
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}
],
"problemTypes": [
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"description": "CWE-79 Cross-site Scripting (XSS)",
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}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"orgId": "00000000-0000-4000-9000-000000000000"
},
"references": [
{
"name": "Security patch",
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"url": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/b062698f2"
}
],
"solutions": [
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"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
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"value": "\u003cp\u003eThe vulnerability is remediated by replacing the unsafe innerHTML property assignments with the safe textContent property when setting the display text of dynamically created \u0026lt;option\u0026gt; elements. textContent inserts the value as plain text without parsing HTML, thereby neutralizing any injected markup or script.\u003c/p\u003e"
}
],
"value": "The vulnerability is remediated by replacing the unsafe innerHTML property assignments with the safe textContent property when setting the display text of dynamically created \u003coption\u003e elements. textContent inserts the value as plain text without parsing HTML, thereby neutralizing any injected markup or script."
}
],
"title": "MISP DOM-based Cross-Site Scripting via innerHTML in Contextual Menu",
"x_gcve": [
{
"extensions": {
"bcp-05-x-01": {
"ai_annotations": [
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"description": "Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.",
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"draft": false,
"fixSummary": "The vulnerability is remediated by replacing the unsafe innerHTML property assignments with the safe textContent property when setting the display text of dynamically created \u003coption\u003e elements. textContent inserts the value as plain text without parsing HTML, thereby neutralizing any injected markup or script.",
"generatedAt": "2026-09-21T12:08:13.810140Z",
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"tagVersionBoundary": {
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}
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"cveMetadata": {
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"datePublished": "2026-09-21T12:16:38.409984Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-09-21T12:16:44.364Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-21T12:16:44.442452Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED",
"vulnId": "GCVE-1-2026-20033"
},
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}
GCVE-1-2026-20002 (CVE-2026-94372)
Vulnerability from gna-1 – Published: 2026-09-21 12:02 – Updated: 2026-09-21 12:02- CWE-79 - Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/ce10436ae | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-09-21 11:56 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/ce10436ae.patch
c629d71fb493… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
ce10436ae989
|
fix: [security] Escape unknown-cluster samples in the | c629d71fb493… |
Fix summary
The fix applies CakePHP's h() HTML-encoding function to each sample tag name before it is interpolated into the HTML notice. This ensures that any angle brackets, quotes, or ampersands contained in user-supplied tag names are rendered as inert HTML entities, preventing script execution in the administrator's browser.
Patch summary
In app/View/Galaxies/index.ctp, two lines that built $tagSampleHTML via sprintf and implode over the unknownCustomClustersSamples and unknownDefaultClustersSamples arrays were modified to wrap each array with array_map('h', ...) before the implode. This causes every element to pass through CakePHP's h() helper (HTML entity encoding) prior to concatenation into the <li> list markup. No other logic, routing, or authorization changes were made.
CVSS rationale
AV:N: exploited over the network via the web UI. AC:L: the attacker simply creates a tag with a script payload; no race or complex condition. AT:N: no attack-target manipulation required. PR:L: the attacker needs tag-editor privileges (lower than admin) to create the crafted misp-galaxy tag. UI:P: the victim (site admin) must passively view the Galaxies index page for the script to execute. VC/VI/VA:N: the MISP application process itself is not directly compromised; the impact is on the victim's browser session. SC:H: the attacker can read the admin's session cookies, tokens, and data visible in the browser. SI:H: the attacker can perform authenticated actions as the admin via the compromised session. SA:N: no meaningful availability impact on the scope component.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-79 User-controlled tag names (misp-galaxy tags created by a tag editor) are inserted into an HTML page without output encoding, allowing script injection. This is a classic stored XSS (CWE-79) where the dangerous data is persisted in the database and rendered unsafely in a server-side template.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-1 CAPEC-1 is the closest available pattern describing an attacker supplying malicious input that is not properly neutralized before being used in a context where it is interpreted (here, HTML). No dedicated CAPEC for stored XSS exists in the catalog; CAPEC-1 is the narrowest defensible match for an output-encoding failure. Uncertainty: the pattern is broad and does not specifically name XSS, but it is the best available mapping for an input-escaping deficiency.
Assumptions to verify
- The tag_version_boundary (v2.5.47, 45 commits after fix) is interpreted as the fix landing after v2.5.47; exact affected version range is not explicitly stated in the patch and is marked as less_than 2.5.47 with status affected, but this is an inference.
- The 'tag editor' role is assumed to be a lower-privilege role than site admin in MISP's RBAC model, justifying PR:L.
- UI:P (Passive) is used because the victim only needs to load the Galaxies index page; no click or explicit interaction with the malicious content is required. The previous UI:R value was invalid in CVSS v4.0 (valid values: N, P, A).
- CAPEC-1 is the closest available pattern; no CAPEC specifically names stored XSS, so the mapping is approximate.
- The Overmind theme is stated in the commit message as already escaping these values; it is assumed unaffected but no patch evidence for it is provided.
- The Co-Authored-By line for Claude Opus 4.8 is treated as a remediation developer credit per the supplied metadata; it is unclear whether this represents an AI-assisted contribution or a human developer using AI tooling.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
4 | 9 | medium | 6 |
{
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}
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}
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}
],
"value": "The fix applies CakePHP\u0027s h() HTML-encoding function to each sample tag name before it is interpolated into the HTML notice. This ensures that any angle brackets, quotes, or ampersands contained in user-supplied tag names are rendered as inert HTML entities, preventing script execution in the administrator\u0027s browser."
}
],
"title": "Stored Cross-Site Scripting via Unescaped Galaxy Cluster Tag Names in MISP Default Theme Galaxies Index",
"x_gcve": [
{
"extensions": {
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"ai_annotations": [
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"The \u0027tag editor\u0027 role is assumed to be a lower-privilege role than site admin in MISP\u0027s RBAC model, justifying PR:L.",
"UI:P (Passive) is used because the victim only needs to load the Galaxies index page; no click or explicit interaction with the malicious content is required. The previous UI:R value was invalid in CVSS v4.0 (valid values: N, P, A).",
"CAPEC-1 is the closest available pattern; no CAPEC specifically names stored XSS, so the mapping is approximate.",
"The Overmind theme is stated in the commit message as already escaping these values; it is assumed unaffected but no patch evidence for it is provided.",
"The Co-Authored-By line for Claude Opus 4.8 is treated as a remediation developer credit per the supplied metadata; it is unclear whether this represents an AI-assisted contribution or a human developer using AI tooling."
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"cvssRationale": "AV:N: exploited over the network via the web UI. AC:L: the attacker simply creates a tag with a script payload; no race or complex condition. AT:N: no attack-target manipulation required. PR:L: the attacker needs tag-editor privileges (lower than admin) to create the crafted misp-galaxy tag. UI:P: the victim (site admin) must passively view the Galaxies index page for the script to execute. VC/VI/VA:N: the MISP application process itself is not directly compromised; the impact is on the victim\u0027s browser session. SC:H: the attacker can read the admin\u0027s session cookies, tokens, and data visible in the browser. SI:H: the attacker can perform authenticated actions as the admin via the compromised session. SA:N: no meaningful availability impact on the scope component.",
"draft": false,
"fixSummary": "The fix applies CakePHP\u0027s h() HTML-encoding function to each sample tag name before it is interpolated into the HTML notice. This ensures that any angle brackets, quotes, or ampersands contained in user-supplied tag names are rendered as inert HTML entities, preventing script execution in the administrator\u0027s browser.",
"generatedAt": "2026-09-21T11:56:43.983892Z",
"generator": "patch2vuln.py",
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"selectionMethod": "deterministic-consensus-v1",
"selectionNotice": "The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required."
},
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"patchSummary": "In app/View/Galaxies/index.ctp, two lines that built $tagSampleHTML via sprintf and implode over the unknownCustomClustersSamples and unknownDefaultClustersSamples arrays were modified to wrap each array with array_map(\u0027h\u0027, ...) before the implode. This causes every element to pass through CakePHP\u0027s h() helper (HTML entity encoding) prior to concatenation into the \u003cli\u003e list markup. No other logic, routing, or authorization changes were made.",
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"source": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/ce10436ae.patch",
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"subject": "fix: [security] Escape unknown-cluster samples in the"
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"subject": "fix: [security] Escape unknown-cluster samples in the",
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"tag": "v2.5.47",
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"weaknessRationale": [
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"cweId": "CWE-79",
"rationale": "User-controlled tag names (misp-galaxy tags created by a tag editor) are inserted into an HTML page without output encoding, allowing script injection. This is a classic stored XSS (CWE-79) where the dangerous data is persisted in the database and rendered unsafely in a server-side template."
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"dateReserved": "2026-09-21T12:02:13.614Z",
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GCVE-1-2026-20155 (CVE-2026-94277)
Vulnerability from gna-1 – Published: 2026-09-21 09:24 – Updated: 2026-09-21 09:25- CWE-79 - Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/6b7637bf4 | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-09-21 08:45 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/6b7637bf4.patch
c87b2f367c3c… - Confidence
- high
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
6b7637bf4663
|
fix: [security] Escape the galaxy name in the statistics | c87b2f367c3c… |
Fix summary
The fix applies CakePHP's h() HTML-encoding function to the $galaxyName variable before it is passed to sprintf() for HTML output, ensuring that any special characters (angle brackets, quotes, etc.) in the galaxy name are percent-encoded and rendered as inert text rather than executable markup.
Patch summary
In app/View/Users/statistics_galaxymatrix.ctp, the single line echo sprintf(__('A heatmap showing the usage of %s.'), $galaxyName) was changed to echo sprintf(__('A heatmap showing the usage of %s.'), h($galaxyName)), wrapping the user-controlled variable with CakePHP's HTML-encoding helper before interpolation into the HTML document.
CVSS rationale
AV:N: The attack is delivered over the network via the MISP web interface. AC:L: Creating a galaxy with a script-bearing name requires no special timing or race condition. AT:N: No additional attack complexity beyond normal application use. PR:L: The attacker needs an authenticated account with perm_galaxy_editor, a low-privilege role. UI:P: The victim must visit the galaxy matrix statistics page, a legitimate page they may open during normal work; no specific tricked action (click, download) is required. VC/VI/VA:N: The MISP server itself suffers no direct confidentiality, integrity, or availability loss; the payload executes client-side. SC:H: The victim's browser session is fully compromised (cookies, tokens, in-page data). SI:H: The attacker can perform arbitrary actions in the victim's authenticated session. SA:N: No denial-of-service impact on the victim's browser. Assumption: perm_galaxy_editor is a low-privilege role (PR:L); if it requires higher clearance, PR could be H.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-79 The root cause is the direct interpolation of a user-controlled string (galaxy name) into an HTML context without output encoding, allowing script injection. This is a textbook stored XSS (CWE-79).
Assumptions to verify
- perm_galaxy_editor is treated as a low-privilege role (PR:L); if it requires elevated clearance the PR metric should be raised to H.
- The affected version boundary is inferred from the tag v2.5.47 (47 commits after the fix commit); no explicit 'fixed in' version is stated in the patch.
- UI:P assumes the victim voluntarily navigates to the statistics page as part of normal workflow rather than being lured by a crafted link (which would be UI:A).
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
8 | 9 | high | 3 |
{
"containers": {
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{
"modules": [
"app/View/Users/statistics_galaxymatrix.ctp"
],
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}
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"value": "MISP\u0027s galaxy matrix statistics view (app/View/Users/statistics_galaxymatrix.ctp) renders the galaxy name directly into HTML output via sprintf() without any HTML encoding. An authenticated user holding the perm_galaxy_editor permission can create or modify a galaxy whose name contains arbitrary HTML or JavaScript markup. Because the value is interpolated verbatim into the page, any user who subsequently opens the galaxy matrix statistics page will have the embedded script executed in their browser context. This enables session hijacking, credential theft, data exfiltration, or the performance of arbitrary actions on behalf of the victim within the MISP application.\n\nVersion affected: \u003c2.5.47"
}
],
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}
],
"value": "The fix applies CakePHP\u0027s h() HTML-encoding function to the $galaxyName variable before it is passed to sprintf() for HTML output, ensuring that any special characters (angle brackets, quotes, etc.) in the galaxy name are percent-encoded and rendered as inert text rather than executable markup."
}
],
"title": "Stored Cross-Site Scripting in MISP Galaxy Matrix Statistics via Unescaped Galaxy Name",
"x_gcve": [
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"The affected version boundary is inferred from the tag v2.5.47 (47 commits after the fix commit); no explicit \u0027fixed in\u0027 version is stated in the patch.",
"UI:P assumes the victim voluntarily navigates to the statistics page as part of normal workflow rather than being lured by a crafted link (which would be UI:A)."
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"fixSummary": "The fix applies CakePHP\u0027s h() HTML-encoding function to the $galaxyName variable before it is passed to sprintf() for HTML output, ensuring that any special characters (angle brackets, quotes, etc.) in the galaxy name are percent-encoded and rendered as inert text rather than executable markup.",
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"sourceUrl": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/6b7637bf4.patch",
"subject": "fix: [security] Escape the galaxy name in the statistics"
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"cweId": "CWE-79",
"rationale": "The root cause is the direct interpolation of a user-controlled string (galaxy name) into an HTML context without output encoding, allowing script injection. This is a textbook stored XSS (CWE-79)."
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GCVE-1-2025-0004 (CVE-2025-60249)
Vulnerability from gna-1 – Published: 2025-09-25 14:10 – Updated: 2026-09-21 07:41- CWE-79 - Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS or 'Cross-site Scripting')
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| CIRCL | vulnerability-lookup |
Affected:
< 2.16.0
|
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GCVE-1-2026-20250 (CVE-2026-92932)
Vulnerability from gna-1 – Published: 2026-09-17 12:31 – Updated: 2026-09-17 12:40| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/sachertortephp/commit/1c2… | patch |
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| misp | sachertortephp |
Affected:
0 , < 1c2da20cbe3f1e2a91458fe9a017823b7273fdac
(semver)
|
qwen3.8:27b
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-09-17 12:27 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/MISP/sachertortephp/commit/1c2da20cbe3f1e2a91458fe9a017823b7273fdac.patch
a5f13eb5fbce… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
1c2da20cbe3f
|
fix: [security] Gate the https branch of Xml::build() on | a5f13eb5fbce… |
Fix summary
The fix corrects the operator-precedence error by adding parentheses around the scheme check so that both the http:// and https:// branches are gated by the $options['readFile'] flag. After the fix, when readFile is false, neither scheme triggers a network fetch, restoring the caller's intended control over remote reads and eliminating the SSRF vector.
Patch summary
In lib/Cake/Utility/Xml.php, line 110, the condition $options['readFile'] && strpos($input, 'http://') === 0 || strpos($input, 'https://') === 0 is changed to $options['readFile'] && (strpos($input, 'http://') === 0 || strpos($input, 'https://') === 0). A single pair of parentheses is added around the two strpos comparisons so that the || is evaluated before the &&, ensuring the readFile flag gates both URL schemes. One line changed: 1 insertion, 1 deletion.
CVSS rationale
AV:N: the vulnerable function is a library utility reachable through network-facing application code. AC:L: the attacker only needs to supply an input string starting with https://; no race or complex condition is required. AT:N: no need to bypass security controls. PR:N: assumed no authentication is required to reach the code path (assumption; if the calling application requires auth, PR should be raised). UI:N: no user interaction needed. VC/VI/VA:N: the local application's own confidentiality, integrity, and availability are not directly compromised. SC:L: the attacker can read the HTTP response body from the fetched URL (information disclosure from the SSRF target), which is a limited impact on the target system's confidentiality. SI/SA:N: no integrity or availability impact on the target. The vector reflects a low-complexity SSRF with limited confidentiality impact on the remote target.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-918 The primary security impact is that the application issues an outbound HTTPS request to an attacker-influenced URL when the caller intended to disable remote reads. The HttpSocket follows up to 10 redirects, amplifying the SSRF surface. The response is parsed and potentially returned, enabling information disclosure from internal or external targets.
- CWE-670 The root cause is a logic error: the conditional expression does not implement the intended control flow because of PHP operator precedence. The readFile gate is bypassed for the https:// branch, making the guard ineffective for that scheme. This is the underlying defect that produces the SSRF.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-66 The closest CAPEC is SSRF: an attacker supplies a URL (https://...) as input to a server-side function, and the server fetches it over the network. The patch confirms the code path performs an HttpSocket GET with redirect-following. The uncertainty is that the exact attack vector depends on how the calling application exposes Xml::build() input; the CAPEC mapping is based on the confirmed code behavior of fetching a caller-supplied URL.
Assumptions to verify
- PR:N is assumed; if the calling application requires authentication to reach Xml::build() with attacker-controlled input, the PR metric should be raised to PR:L or higher.
- The affected version range is unspecified because the patch metadata does not include version tags or release boundaries.
- The CAPEC-66 mapping is the closest available pattern; the exact exploitation context (which MISP endpoint or API exposes Xml::build() input) is not specified in the patch.
- The HttpSocket redirect-following (up to 10 redirects) amplifies the SSRF surface but is not separately scored; it is subsumed under the SC:L impact.
- The vulnerability requires the readFile option to be set to false; if all callers use the default (presumably true), the practical exploitability may be reduced, but the code still contains the logic defect.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
5 | 9 | medium | 5 |
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"value": "\u003cp\u003eIn the MISP sachertortephp library, the Xml::build() static method in lib/Cake/Utility/Xml.php contains a logic error in the conditional that gates network-based XML fetching. The original condition was written as: $options[\u0027readFile\u0027] \u0026amp;\u0026amp; strpos($input, \u0027http://\u0027) === 0 || strpos($input, \u0027https://\u0027) === 0. Because PHP\u0027s \u0026amp;\u0026amp; operator has higher precedence than ||, the expression is evaluated as ($options[\u0027readFile\u0027] \u0026amp;\u0026amp; strpos($input, \u0027http://\u0027) === 0) || strpos($input, \u0027https://\u0027) === 0. As a result, when a caller explicitly sets the readFile option to false to disable file and URL reading, an input string beginning with https:// still satisfies the condition and triggers a network fetch via HttpSocket (configured to follow up to 10 redirects). The http:// branch is correctly gated by the readFile flag, but the https:// branch is not. An attacker who can influence the $input parameter passed to Xml::build() can therefore force the application to issue an outbound HTTPS request to an attacker-controlled or internal URL, even though the caller intended to suppress all remote reads. The fetched response is parsed as XML and may be returned to the caller, enabling information disclosure from internal services or external targets. This constitutes a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) weakness with an information-disclosure impact. The vulnerability requires that the code path in Xml::build() be reachable with attacker-controlled input and that the readFile option be set to false (or the caller expects it to be false).\u003c/p\u003e"
}
],
"value": "In the MISP sachertortephp library, the Xml::build() static method in lib/Cake/Utility/Xml.php contains a logic error in the conditional that gates network-based XML fetching. The original condition was written as: $options[\u0027readFile\u0027] \u0026\u0026 strpos($input, \u0027http://\u0027) === 0 || strpos($input, \u0027https://\u0027) === 0. Because PHP\u0027s \u0026\u0026 operator has higher precedence than ||, the expression is evaluated as ($options[\u0027readFile\u0027] \u0026\u0026 strpos($input, \u0027http://\u0027) === 0) || strpos($input, \u0027https://\u0027) === 0. As a result, when a caller explicitly sets the readFile option to false to disable file and URL reading, an input string beginning with https:// still satisfies the condition and triggers a network fetch via HttpSocket (configured to follow up to 10 redirects). The http:// branch is correctly gated by the readFile flag, but the https:// branch is not. An attacker who can influence the $input parameter passed to Xml::build() can therefore force the application to issue an outbound HTTPS request to an attacker-controlled or internal URL, even though the caller intended to suppress all remote reads. The fetched response is parsed as XML and may be returned to the caller, enabling information disclosure from internal services or external targets. This constitutes a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) weakness with an information-disclosure impact. The vulnerability requires that the code path in Xml::build() be reachable with attacker-controlled input and that the readFile option be set to false (or the caller expects it to be false)."
}
],
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"value": "The fix corrects the operator-precedence error by adding parentheses around the scheme check so that both the http:// and https:// branches are gated by the $options[\u0027readFile\u0027] flag. After the fix, when readFile is false, neither scheme triggers a network fetch, restoring the caller\u0027s intended control over remote reads and eliminating the SSRF vector."
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"source": {
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"title": "MISP sachertortephp Xml::build() Operator Precedence Bypass Allows Unintended HTTPS SSRF When readFile Is Disabled",
"x_gcve": [
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"cvssRationale": "AV:N: the vulnerable function is a library utility reachable through network-facing application code. AC:L: the attacker only needs to supply an input string starting with https://; no race or complex condition is required. AT:N: no need to bypass security controls. PR:N: assumed no authentication is required to reach the code path (assumption; if the calling application requires auth, PR should be raised). UI:N: no user interaction needed. VC/VI/VA:N: the local application\u0027s own confidentiality, integrity, and availability are not directly compromised. SC:L: the attacker can read the HTTP response body from the fetched URL (information disclosure from the SSRF target), which is a limited impact on the target system\u0027s confidentiality. SI/SA:N: no integrity or availability impact on the target. The vector reflects a low-complexity SSRF with limited confidentiality impact on the remote target.",
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"generatedAt": "2026-09-17T12:27:24.482336Z",
"generator": "patch2vuln.py",
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"patchSummary": "In lib/Cake/Utility/Xml.php, line 110, the condition $options[\u0027readFile\u0027] \u0026\u0026 strpos($input, \u0027http://\u0027) === 0 || strpos($input, \u0027https://\u0027) === 0 is changed to $options[\u0027readFile\u0027] \u0026\u0026 (strpos($input, \u0027http://\u0027) === 0 || strpos($input, \u0027https://\u0027) === 0). A single pair of parentheses is added around the two strpos comparisons so that the || is evaluated before the \u0026\u0026, ensuring the readFile flag gates both URL schemes. One line changed: 1 insertion, 1 deletion.",
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"subject": "fix: [security] Gate the https branch of Xml::build() on"
}
],
"source": "https://github.com/MISP/sachertortephp/commit/1c2da20cbe3f1e2a91458fe9a017823b7273fdac.patch",
"subject": "fix: [security] Gate the https branch of Xml::build() on",
"weaknessRationale": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-918",
"rationale": "The primary security impact is that the application issues an outbound HTTPS request to an attacker-influenced URL when the caller intended to disable remote reads. The HttpSocket follows up to 10 redirects, amplifying the SSRF surface. The response is parsed and potentially returned, enabling information disclosure from internal or external targets."
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-670",
"rationale": "The root cause is a logic error: the conditional expression does not implement the intended control flow because of PHP operator precedence. The readFile gate is bypassed for the https:// branch, making the guard ineffective for that scheme. This is the underlying defect that produces the SSRF."
}
]
}
}
},
"recordType": "advisory",
"vulnId": "gcve-1-2026-20250"
}
],
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"cveMetadata": {
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"datePublished": "2026-09-17T12:31:00.000Z",
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GCVE-1-2026-20158 (CVE-2026-92003)
Vulnerability from gna-1 – Published: 2026-09-15 11:43 – Updated: 2026-09-15 11:43| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/2bf887433 | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-09-15 11:37 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/2bf887433.patch
db6f78e69079… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
2bf887433651
|
fix: [logging] Throttle the two unguarded auth_fail writes | db6f78e69079… |
Fix summary
The fix applies the existing hourly per-key log throttle to the two previously unguarded authentication-failure log writes. The throttle key is now derived from the client's source IP address rather than from caller-supplied input, preventing an attacker from generating unbounded Redis throttle entries. A per-request memo (stored in Configure::read('CurrentRequestAuthFailKeys')) is added to _shouldLog() to prevent duplicate log entries when beforeFilter() executes a second time via CakeErrorController on an exception, ensuring one request produces at most one log entry per key regardless of the operator's log_each_individual_auth_fail setting.
Patch summary
In app/Controller/AppController.php: (1) The 'no authkey' branch in beforeFilter() now calls _shouldLog('noauthkey:' . $this->User->_remoteIp()) before writing the log entry. (2) The 'incorrect length' branch in __loginByAuthKey() now calls _shouldLog('badauthkeylength:' . $this->User->_remoteIp()) before writing the log entry. (3) _shouldLog() is refactored to first check a per-request memo array (Configure 'CurrentRequestAuthFailKeys') to suppress duplicate logging across the double beforeFilter() invocation, then evaluate the log_each_individual_auth_fail setting, then fall through to the Redis EXISTS/SETEX 3600-second throttle, and finally record the key in the memo. The Redis-unavailable fallback (log everything) is preserved.
CVSS rationale
The vulnerable paths are reachable over the network (AV:N) with no authentication (PR:N) and no user interaction (UI:N). The attack complexity is low (AC:L): an attacker simply sends repeated HTTP requests to the MISP API without an API key or with a key of the wrong length. No attack target is required (AT:N). There is no impact on confidentiality (VC:N, SC:N) or integrity (VI:N, SI:N). The availability impact is high (VA:H) because unbounded log writes can exhaust database storage, degrade query performance, and ultimately make the MISP instance unavailable. No secondary availability impact (SA:N) is evident from the patch.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-770 Two authentication-failure log write paths lacked any rate-limiting or throttling mechanism, allowing an unauthenticated remote attacker to generate an unbounded number of database log entries and exhaust storage or I/O resources. The fix adds the missing hourly per-key throttle.
- CWE-400 The unthrottled log writes constitute uncontrolled consumption of database write capacity and disk storage, enabling a denial-of-service condition. CWE-770 is the more specific primary weakness; CWE-400 captures the broader resource-exhaustion impact.
Assumptions to verify
- The tag_version_boundary (v2.5.46, 188 commits after fix) is used as an approximate upper bound for affected versions; the exact fixed release tag is not stated in the patch metadata.
- The log entries are written to a relational database (MySQL/PostgreSQL) via MISP's Log model, based on the createLogEntry() call pattern; the specific backend is not confirmed in the patch.
- The Redis instance used for throttling is assumed to be co-located with the MISP application; a Redis outage degrades to logging everything (fail-open), which is a design choice documented in the patch comments.
- CVSS VA:H assumes that sustained unthrottled log writes can exhaust storage or I/O capacity sufficient to degrade or halt the MISP service; actual impact depends on deployment sizing and disk capacity.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
6 | 9 | medium | 4 |
{
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"affected": [
{
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"app/Controller/AppController.php"
],
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}
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}
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},
{
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"value": "\u003cp\u003eAffected versions of MISP do not consistently apply the existing authentication-failure logging throttle.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTwo API authentication failure branches wrote directly to the \u003ccode\u003eLog\u003c/code\u003e model:\u003c/p\u003e\u2003- API requests with \u003cstrong\u003eno authentication key\u003c/strong\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\u2003- requests supplying an API key with an \u003cstrong\u003eincorrect length\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cp\u003eUnlike other authentication failures, these paths bypassed \u003ccode\u003e_shouldLog()\u003c/code\u003e, so every request could create another durable \u003ccode\u003eauth_fail\u003c/code\u003e entry.\u003c/p\u003eVersion affected: \u22642.5.45\u003cbr\u003e"
}
],
"value": "Affected versions of MISP do not consistently apply the existing authentication-failure logging throttle.\n\n\nTwo API authentication failure branches wrote directly to the Log model:\n\n\u2003- API requests with no authentication key;\n\u2003- requests supplying an API key with an incorrect length\n\n\n\n\nUnlike other authentication failures, these paths bypassed _shouldLog(), so every request could create another durable auth_fail entry.\n\nVersion affected: \u22642.5.45"
}
],
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{
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}
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"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
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"baseScore": 6.9,
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"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "LOW",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
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},
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"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-770",
"description": "CWE-770 Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
},
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-400",
"description": "CWE-400 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption",
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}
]
}
],
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},
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{
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],
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"value": "\u003cp\u003eThe fix applies the existing hourly per-key log throttle to the two previously unguarded authentication-failure log writes. The throttle key is now derived from the client\u0027s source IP address rather than from caller-supplied input, preventing an attacker from generating unbounded Redis throttle entries. A per-request memo (stored in Configure::read(\u0027CurrentRequestAuthFailKeys\u0027)) is added to _shouldLog() to prevent duplicate log entries when beforeFilter() executes a second time via CakeErrorController on an exception, ensuring one request produces at most one log entry per key regardless of the operator\u0027s log_each_individual_auth_fail setting.\u003c/p\u003e"
}
],
"value": "The fix applies the existing hourly per-key log throttle to the two previously unguarded authentication-failure log writes. The throttle key is now derived from the client\u0027s source IP address rather than from caller-supplied input, preventing an attacker from generating unbounded Redis throttle entries. A per-request memo (stored in Configure::read(\u0027CurrentRequestAuthFailKeys\u0027)) is added to _shouldLog() to prevent duplicate log entries when beforeFilter() executes a second time via CakeErrorController on an exception, ensuring one request produces at most one log entry per key regardless of the operator\u0027s log_each_individual_auth_fail setting."
}
],
"title": "MISP Unthrottled Authentication Failure Log Writes Enable Resource Exhaustion",
"x_gcve": [
{
"extensions": {
"bcp-05-x-01": {
"ai_annotations": [
{
"ai_level": "generated",
"description": "Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.",
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{
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"identifier": "qwen3.8:27b",
"name": "qwen3.8:27b",
"source": "ollama"
}
],
"review_status": "review",
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"tags": [
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"ai-computer-assisted:classification"
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}
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},
"bcp-05-x-02": {
"x_patch2vuln": {
"assumptions": [
"The tag_version_boundary (v2.5.46, 188 commits after fix) is used as an approximate upper bound for affected versions; the exact fixed release tag is not stated in the patch metadata.",
"The log entries are written to a relational database (MySQL/PostgreSQL) via MISP\u0027s Log model, based on the createLogEntry() call pattern; the specific backend is not confirmed in the patch.",
"The Redis instance used for throttling is assumed to be co-located with the MISP application; a Redis outage degrades to logging everything (fail-open), which is a design choice documented in the patch comments.",
"CVSS VA:H assumes that sustained unthrottled log writes can exhaust storage or I/O capacity sufficient to degrade or halt the MISP service; actual impact depends on deployment sizing and disk capacity."
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"commit": "2bf8874336518d8c5ef6a42e51e78900ec242630",
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"cvssRationale": "The vulnerable paths are reachable over the network (AV:N) with no authentication (PR:N) and no user interaction (UI:N). The attack complexity is low (AC:L): an attacker simply sends repeated HTTP requests to the MISP API without an API key or with a key of the wrong length. No attack target is required (AT:N). There is no impact on confidentiality (VC:N, SC:N) or integrity (VI:N, SI:N). The availability impact is high (VA:H) because unbounded log writes can exhaust database storage, degrade query performance, and ultimately make the MISP instance unavailable. No secondary availability impact (SA:N) is evident from the patch.",
"draft": false,
"fixSummary": "The fix applies the existing hourly per-key log throttle to the two previously unguarded authentication-failure log writes. The throttle key is now derived from the client\u0027s source IP address rather than from caller-supplied input, preventing an attacker from generating unbounded Redis throttle entries. A per-request memo (stored in Configure::read(\u0027CurrentRequestAuthFailKeys\u0027)) is added to _shouldLog() to prevent duplicate log entries when beforeFilter() executes a second time via CakeErrorController on an exception, ensuring one request produces at most one log entry per key regardless of the operator\u0027s log_each_individual_auth_fail setting.",
"generatedAt": "2026-09-15T11:37:41.625192Z",
"generator": "patch2vuln.py",
"model": "qwen3.8:27b",
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"patchSummary": "In app/Controller/AppController.php: (1) The \u0027no authkey\u0027 branch in beforeFilter() now calls _shouldLog(\u0027noauthkey:\u0027 . $this-\u003eUser-\u003e_remoteIp()) before writing the log entry. (2) The \u0027incorrect length\u0027 branch in __loginByAuthKey() now calls _shouldLog(\u0027badauthkeylength:\u0027 . $this-\u003eUser-\u003e_remoteIp()) before writing the log entry. (3) _shouldLog() is refactored to first check a per-request memo array (Configure \u0027CurrentRequestAuthFailKeys\u0027) to suppress duplicate logging across the double beforeFilter() invocation, then evaluate the log_each_individual_auth_fail setting, then fall through to the Redis EXISTS/SETEX 3600-second throttle, and finally record the key in the memo. The Redis-unavailable fallback (log everything) is preserved.",
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"source": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/2bf887433.patch",
"sourceUrl": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/2bf887433.patch",
"subject": "fix: [logging] Throttle the two unguarded auth_fail writes"
}
],
"source": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/2bf887433.patch",
"subject": "fix: [logging] Throttle the two unguarded auth_fail writes",
"tagVersionBoundary": {
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"repository": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP",
"tag": "v2.5.46",
"version": "2.5.46",
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},
"weaknessRationale": [
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"rationale": "Two authentication-failure log write paths lacked any rate-limiting or throttling mechanism, allowing an unauthenticated remote attacker to generate an unbounded number of database log entries and exhaust storage or I/O resources. The fix adds the missing hourly per-key throttle."
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-400",
"rationale": "The unthrottled log writes constitute uncontrolled consumption of database write capacity and disk storage, enabling a denial-of-service condition. CWE-770 is the more specific primary weakness; CWE-400 captures the broader resource-exhaustion impact."
}
]
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"state": "PUBLISHED",
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GCVE-1-2026-20172 (CVE-2026-92002)
Vulnerability from gna-1 – Published: 2026-09-15 11:24 – Updated: 2026-09-15 11:24- CWE-778 - Insufficient Logging
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/a39b25d2f | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-09-15 09:34 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/a39b25d2f.patch
ab1b5a5a68cf… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
a39b25d2f141
|
fix: [logging] Log auth failures when the throttle cannot | ab1b5a5a68cf… |
Fix summary
The _shouldLog() method now explicitly checks whether the Redis connection is available before attempting to use it. If setupRedis() returns false, the method immediately returns true, causing every authentication-failure event to be logged. This converts the previous fail-closed behavior (silence on dependency failure) into a fail-open behavior for security logging (log everything when the throttle state is unavailable), ensuring that a Redis outage cannot be used to suppress the audit trail of failed authentication attempts.
Patch summary
In app/Controller/AppController.php, the _shouldLog() method was restructured: a new early-return guard "if (!$redis) { return true; }" was inserted immediately after the setupRedis() call, so that an unavailable Redis connection causes all auth-failure events to be logged. The subsequent throttle check was simplified to "if (!$redis->exists(...))" since the null case is already handled. Additionally, a block of commented-out Redis throttle code in the afterFilter() method (lines referencing misp:auth_fail_throttling) was removed as dead code.
CVSS rationale
The vulnerability is reachable over the network (AV:N) because MISP is a web application. Attack complexity is High (AC:H) because exploitation requires the Redis instance to be specifically unavailable at the time authentication failures occur; it is not a simple request. No attack target is required (AT:N). No privileges are needed (PR:N) because the suppressed logs pertain to unauthenticated authentication-failure events. No user interaction is required (UI:N). There is no direct confidentiality or integrity impact on the MISP data store (VC:N, VI:N). The availability impact is Low (VA:L) because the security-logging/audit function is unavailable during the Redis outage, impairing detection and forensic capabilities, but the core MISP service remains operational. No cross-scope impacts (SC:N, SI:N, SA:N).
Weakness rationale
- CWE-778 The system fails to record security-relevant events (authentication failures) when a supporting dependency (Redis) is unavailable. The logging path silently drops all audit entries under a specific operational condition, which is a textbook case of insufficient logging of security events.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected version range is inferred from the tag_version_boundary metadata (v2.5.46 with 189 commits after the fix), suggesting the fix landed before the v2.5.46 release; exact affected version boundaries are not explicitly stated in the patch.
- The CVSS availability impact (VA:L) reflects the loss of the security-logging function rather than a denial of service against the MISP application itself.
- The patch does not indicate whether the Redis throttle was the sole mechanism for auth-failure logging or whether a fallback file-based logger existed; the analysis assumes the Redis-gated path was the primary logging path for auth failures.
- The commit date (2 Sep 2026) is taken at face value from the patch metadata.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
6 | 9 | medium | 4 |
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"modules": [
"app/Controller/AppController.php"
],
"product": "MISP",
"programFiles": [
"app/Controller/AppController.php"
],
"repo": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP",
"vendor": "MISP",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "2.5.46",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "iglocska"
},
{
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"type": "remediation developer",
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}
],
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"supportingMedia": [
{
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"value": "\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAffected versions of MISP use Redis to throttle repeated authentication-failure log entries. The intent is to avoid excessive duplicate logs while still recording failed authentication activity.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eHowever, \u003ccode\u003eUser-\u0026gt;setupRedis()\u003c/code\u003e returns false when Redis cannot be reached. The vulnerable \u003ccode\u003e_shouldLog()\u003c/code\u003e logic only returned true when a Redis instance existed and no throttle key was present. Therefore, when Redis was unavailable, the function did not allow the log write at all, effectively silencing authentication-failure logging for the duration of the outage.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eVersion affected: \u22642.5.45\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e"
}
],
"value": "Affected versions of MISP use Redis to throttle repeated authentication-failure log entries. The intent is to avoid excessive duplicate logs while still recording failed authentication activity.\n\n\nHowever, User-\u003esetupRedis() returns false when Redis cannot be reached. The vulnerable _shouldLog() logic only returned true when a Redis instance existed and no throttle key was present. Therefore, when Redis was unavailable, the function did not allow the log write at all, effectively silencing authentication-failure logging for the duration of the outage.\n\nVersion affected: \u22642.5.45"
}
],
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"description": "CWE-778 Insufficient Logging",
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"value": "\u003cp\u003eThe _shouldLog() method now explicitly checks whether the Redis connection is available before attempting to use it. If setupRedis() returns false, the method immediately returns true, causing every authentication-failure event to be logged. This converts the previous fail-closed behavior (silence on dependency failure) into a fail-open behavior for security logging (log everything when the throttle state is unavailable), ensuring that a Redis outage cannot be used to suppress the audit trail of failed authentication attempts.\u003c/p\u003e"
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"title": "MISP: Authentication failure logging suppressed during Redis unavailability",
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GCVE-1-2026-20138 (CVE-2026-91859)
Vulnerability from gna-1 – Published: 2026-09-15 09:26 – Updated: 2026-09-15 09:26| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/0dae5c072 | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-09-15 09:22 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/0dae5c072.patch
4eeecd38b5b8… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
0dae5c072d86
|
fix: [logging] Stop the error controller overwriting the | 4eeecd38b5b8… |
Fix summary
The fix introduces a per-instance boolean guard ($deferredWriterRegistered) in the AccessLog model so that logRequest() returns early on the second beforeFilter pass, preventing the error controller from overwriting the original request's log entry. Additionally, a $this->create() call is added before $this->save() in saveOnShutdown() to ensure each save issues an INSERT rather than an UPDATE, providing defense-in-depth against accidental row mutation.
Patch summary
In app/Model/AccessLog.php: (1) Added a private $deferredWriterRegistered property (default false). (2) At the top of logRequest(), added an early-return guard: if $this->deferredWriterRegistered is true, return true immediately. (3) Set $this->deferredWriterRegistered = true immediately before register_shutdown_function() so the flag is latched on the first pass. (4) In saveOnShutdown(), added $this->create() before $this->save() to force a new-row INSERT and prevent the model from issuing an UPDATE against a previously saved id. (5) Added explanatory doc-comments describing the double-beforeFilter mechanism and the ClassRegistry single-instance behavior.
CVSS rationale
The vulnerability is exploitable over the network (AV:N) with low complexity (AC:L) by any authenticated user who can trigger an unhandled exception (e.g., via a malformed request). No attack target manipulation is required (AT:N). Low privileges are sufficient (PR:L) as any authenticated MISP user can cause an error. No user interaction is needed (UI:N). There is no direct confidentiality or availability impact on MISP itself (VC:N, VA:N). The integrity impact is low (VI:L) because the access-log row is overwritten with incorrect metrics rather than deleted, and only requests that trigger exceptions are affected. No secondary impacts are identified (SC:N, SI:N, SA:N). The overall severity is low, reflecting a logging-integrity weakness that degrades audit reliability but does not directly expose data or disrupt service.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-778 The access-log mechanism fails to preserve accurate, immutable records of each request. The second beforeFilter pass overwrites the first pass's data, so the log does not faithfully reflect the actual request's duration, query count, memory usage, or SQL activity. This constitutes insufficient logging because the security-relevant audit data is corrupted rather than simply missing.
- CWE-223 The genuine request metrics (duration, query count, memory, query log) are replaced by the error controller's metrics, effectively omitting the security-relevant information that the original request produced. This is a secondary mapping; CWE-778 is the primary weakness.
Assumptions to verify
- MISP requires authentication for the operations that produce access-log entries; PR:L assumes a low-privilege authenticated user can trigger an unhandled exception.
- The affected version range is inferred from the tag_version_boundary (v2.5.46, 190 commits after fix); the exact first-affected and last-affected versions are not stated in the patch metadata.
- The security impact is limited to log-integrity degradation; no direct data exfiltration, privilege escalation, or denial-of-service is evidenced by the patch.
- The double beforeFilter invocation is a CakePHP framework behavior (ExceptionRenderer::_getController calling startupProcess on CakeErrorController) and is not itself a MISP vulnerability, but MISP's AccessLog model did not guard against it.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
6 | 9 | medium | 4 |
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