CWE-862

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-20535"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-05T02:16:52Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In aidl, there is a possible escalation of privilege due to a missing permission check. This could lead to local escalation of privilege if a malicious actor has already obtained the System privilege. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Patch ID: ALPS11185216; Issue ID: MSV-9039.",
  "id": "GHSA-8mmg-g9gw-84mh",
  "modified": "2026-10-05T12:31:23Z",
  "published": "2026-10-05T03:30:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20535"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.mediatek.com/product-security-bulletin/October-2026"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-6639"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-05T08:16:41Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The AI Chatbot \u0026 Workflow Automation by AIWU plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Sensitive Information Exposure in all versions up to, and including, 1.4.6. This is due to the `getCurrentTaskResults()` method in `modules/workspace/controller.php` being accessible without authentication or authorization checks. The method is not included in the workspace controller\u0027s `getNoncedMethods()` array, the base `getPermissions()` returns an empty array, and all AJAX actions are registered with `wp_ajax_nopriv_` hooks (`classes/frame.php:282`). When tasks are created via features like the Bulk Post Generator, the task parameters \u2014 including the OpenAI API key in plaintext, AI prompts, keywords, and full AI model configuration \u2014 are stored in the database and returned in the JSON response. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to enumerate sequential task IDs and retrieve sensitive configuration data including API keys.",
  "id": "GHSA-8mpj-5qhw-h3qv",
  "modified": "2026-08-05T09:31:18Z",
  "published": "2026-08-05T09:31:18Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-6639"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/ai-copilot-content-generator/tags/1.4.6/classes/frame.php#L282"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/ai-copilot-content-generator/tags/1.4.6/modules/workspace/controller.php#L83"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/ai-copilot-content-generator/tags/1.4.6/modules/workspace/models/tasks.php#L106"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?new=3528734%40ai-copilot-content-generator%2Ftrunk\u0026old=3525474%40ai-copilot-content-generator%2Ftrunk"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wordpress.org/plugins/ai-copilot-content-generator"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/247b1921-70a6-4e65-819a-2895bc395e9f?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-87837"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-21T06:16:50Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The Wava Payment Plugin WordPress plugin before 0.3.10 does not verify the authenticity of incoming payment-provider notifications, nor restrict who may send them, allowing unauthenticated attackers to change the status of any WooCommerce order in the store, including marking an unpaid order as paid and completed, and cancelling other customers\u0027 orders.\n\nIn versions up to 0.3.7 the response additionally returns the affected order\u0027s billing details, disclosing customer names, addresses, email addresses and phone numbers to the same unauthenticated caller.",
  "id": "GHSA-8mpv-23rw-jfjx",
  "modified": "2026-10-21T12:31:06Z",
  "published": "2026-10-21T06:31:15Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-87837"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/76da1b69-aa79-4e9e-a97a-bbaefdeb65fe"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-25396"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-25T17:16:49Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in CoderPress Commerce Coinbase For WooCommerce commerce-coinbase-for-woocommerce allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Commerce Coinbase For WooCommerce: from n/a through \u003c= 1.6.6.",
  "id": "GHSA-8mq2-frfg-qr49",
  "modified": "2026-03-27T15:30:25Z",
  "published": "2026-03-25T18:31:52Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25396"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/commerce-coinbase-for-woocommerce/vulnerability/wordpress-commerce-coinbase-for-woocommerce-plugin-1-6-6-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "next-tinacms-s3"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "23.0.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "next-tinacms-dos"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "23.0.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "next-tinacms-azure"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "14.0.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "next-tinacms-cloudinary"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "26.0.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-59992"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-19T21:56:30Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-19T22:16:40Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe production media handler shipped by `next-tinacms-s3` (`createMediaHandler` in `packages/next-tinacms-s3/src/handlers.ts`) accepts an attacker-chosen `?key=` query parameter and returns an AWS-signed `PutObject` URL whose `Key` is that value, with no check that the key falls under the operator\u0027s configured `mediaRoot`. The same handler\u0027s `DELETE` branch reads `objectKey = (req.query.media as string[])[1]` and dispatches a `DeleteObjectCommand` for that exact key, again unbounded by `mediaRoot`. Any caller that passes the operator-supplied `authorized()` predicate \u2014 i.e. any logged-in CMS editor in a typical TinaCloud / self-hosted deployment \u2014 therefore has write and delete authority over the *entire* S3 bucket the IAM key can reach, even though the package documents `mediaRoot` as the place where editors are scoped. The same shape is present in `next-tinacms-dos`, `next-tinacms-azure`, and `next-tinacms-cloudinary`, so a single design mistake spans every first-party production media backend.\n\n* Project: TinaCMS \u2014 first-party production media adapters (consumed by self-hosted Next.js sites and TinaCloud-backed deployments).\n* Source reviewed: `tinacms/tinacms` @ `main` (`b56dad4`).\n* Deployed artefact validated: `next-tinacms-s3@21.0.3` handler logic, exercised against `@aws-sdk/client-s3@3.665.x` via `aws-sdk-client-mock@4.1.0` (the AWS SDK signs the URL identically whether the bucket is real or mocked).\n* Affected file(s):\n  * `packages/next-tinacms-s3/src/handlers.ts:67-90` \u2014 `GET ?key=` returns presigned `PutObjectCommand` URL with attacker-chosen `Key`.\n  * `packages/next-tinacms-s3/src/handlers.ts:199-223` \u2014 `DELETE` reads `[, objectKey] = media` and issues `DeleteObjectCommand` against attacker-chosen `Key`.\n  * `packages/next-tinacms-dos/src/handlers.ts:79-152` and `:249-278` \u2014 same write/delete pattern, plus a server-side upload that builds the key with `path.join(mediaRoot, prefix + filename)` over attacker-controlled `directory` and `filename`.\n  * `packages/next-tinacms-azure/src/handlers.ts:44-95` \u2014 `uploadMedia` writes `path.join(directory, filename)` with both fields attacker-controlled (no `mediaRoot` configured at all); `deleteAsset` deletes any blob in the container.\n  * `packages/next-tinacms-cloudinary/src/handlers.ts:193-204` \u2014 `cloudinary.uploader.destroy(public_id)` over attacker-chosen `public_id`.\n* CWE: CWE-639 \u2014 Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key. Adjacent: CWE-284 (Improper Access Control), CWE-862 (Missing Authorization on the per-key authority check).\n* OWASP 2021: **A01:2021 \u2014 Broken Access Control** (the operator\u0027s intended `mediaRoot` boundary is enforced only on listing, not on writes or deletes). Secondary: A04:2021 \u2014 Insecure Design (every adapter independently re-implements the same broken pattern).\n\n## Vulnerable code\n\n`packages/next-tinacms-s3/src/handlers.ts:39-98`:\n\n```ts\nexport const createMediaHandler = (config: S3Config, options?: S3Options) =\u003e {\n  const client = new S3Client(config.config);\n  const bucket = config.bucket;\n  let mediaRoot = config.mediaRoot || \u0027\u0027;                 // (1)\n  if (mediaRoot) { /* normalise to \"media/\" form */ }\n\n  return async (req: NextApiRequest, res: NextApiResponse) =\u003e {\n    const isAuthorized = await config.authorized(req, res);\n    if (!isAuthorized) {\n      res.status(401).json({ message: \u0027sorry this user is unauthorized\u0027 });\n      return;\n    }\n    switch (req.method) {\n      case \u0027GET\u0027:\n        if (req.query.key) {\n          const expiresIn: number =\n            (req.query.expiresIn \u0026\u0026 Number(req.query.expiresIn)) || 3600; // (2)\n          const s3_key = req.query.key\n            ? Array.isArray(req.query.key) ? req.query.key[0] : req.query.key\n            : null;\n          if (!s3_key) return res.status(400).json({ message: \u0027key is required\u0027 });\n          if (await keyExists(client, bucket, s3_key)) {\n            return res.status(400).json({ message: \u0027key already exists\u0027 }); // (3)\n          }\n          const signedUrl = await getUploadUrl(bucket, s3_key, expiresIn, client); // (4)\n          return res.json({ signedUrl, src: cdnUrl + s3_key });\n        }\n        return listMedia(req, res, client, bucket, mediaRoot, cdnUrl);     // (5)\n      case \u0027DELETE\u0027:\n        return deleteAsset(req, res, client, bucket);                      // (6)\n```\n\n`packages/next-tinacms-s3/src/handlers.ts:199-223`:\n\n```ts\nasync function deleteAsset(req, res, client, bucket) {\n  const { media } = req.query;\n  const [, objectKey] = media as string[];                                  // (7)\n  const params: DeleteObjectCommandInput = { Bucket: bucket, Key: objectKey };\n  const command = new DeleteObjectCommand(params);\n  ...\n}\n```\n\nAt **(1)** the operator configures `mediaRoot` (e.g. `\"media/\"`), and the package\u0027s `README` documents this as the directory the IAM key is scoped to. At **(4)** the handler signs a `PutObjectCommand` with `Key: s3_key` taken verbatim from `req.query.key`. Nothing between (1) and (4) verifies that `s3_key` starts with `mediaRoot`, so any path the IAM key can reach is fair game. The only filter is the `keyExists` check at **(3)**, which prevents *overwrite* of an existing object but not creation of arbitrary new ones (and not overwrite of objects the IAM key cannot `HeadObject`). At **(2)** the validity window of the produced URL is also attacker-controlled, capped only by AWS SigV4\u0027s 7-day hard limit. At **(5)** the *list* path **does** prefix-join `mediaRoot` (`Prefix: mediaRoot ? path.join(mediaRoot, prefix) : prefix`), demonstrating that the boundary was understood to exist \u2014 it just isn\u0027t enforced on writes. At **(6)** + **(7)** delete extracts the second URL segment into `objectKey` with no prefix check, so `DELETE /api/s3/media/x/anything-in-the-bucket` is a valid arbitrary-key delete primitive.\n\nFor contrast, the same package\u0027s `listMedia` (line 139) does write `Prefix: mediaRoot ? path.join(mediaRoot, prefix) : prefix`, and `stripMediaRoot` (line 100) exists explicitly to peel `mediaRoot` off keys returned to the client \u2014 so the codebase models `mediaRoot` as a security boundary on the read side. The write and delete sides simply forgot to apply it.\n\nThe same misalignment is duplicated in three sibling packages:\n\n* `packages/next-tinacms-dos/src/handlers.ts:115-125` \u2014 upload builds `Key: mediaRoot ? path.join(mediaRoot, prefix + filename) : prefix + filename` over attacker-controlled `prefix` (from `req.body.directory`) and `filename` (from `multer`\u0027s `file.originalname`); `path.join` collapses `..` segments, so a `directory` of `../..` plus a chosen `filename` lands at any key in the bucket. Lines 249-278 reproduce the S3 delete-by-second-segment pattern.\n* `packages/next-tinacms-azure/src/handlers.ts:44-95` \u2014 `uploadMedia` writes a blob at `path.join(directory, filename)` with both values straight out of `formData`. `next-tinacms-azure` has no `mediaRoot` config at all (`AzureBlobStorageConfig` in `src/types.ts`), so the entire container is writable / deletable by any authorized user.\n* `packages/next-tinacms-cloudinary/src/handlers.ts:193-204` \u2014 `deleteAsset` calls `cloudinary.uploader.destroy(public_id)` over the attacker-chosen second segment, deleting any asset in the cloud. The same handler\u0027s `listMedia` (line 110) interpolates `mediaListOptions.directory` directly into a Cloudinary search-expression DSL string (`folder=\"${directory}\"`), giving an authorized user full search-expression injection \u2014 out of scope for this finding but worth a separate report.\n\n## Reproduction (validated locally)\n\nEnvironment: Node 22, `@aws-sdk/client-s3@3.665.0`, `@aws-sdk/s3-request-presigner@3.665.0`, `aws-sdk-client-mock@4.1.0`. The harness vendors `createMediaHandler` byte-for-byte from `packages/next-tinacms-s3/src/handlers.ts` and runs it against a mocked `S3Client`. The AWS SDK signs the URL identically whether the bucket exists \u2014 the resulting URL is the same one a real S3 deployment would hand back to the editor\u0027s browser, so it would PUT against a real bucket without further help.\n\nPoC layout under `/Users/admin/joplin_research/tinacms-s3-poc/`:\n\n```\npackage.json            (deps only)\nhandler-vendored.mjs    (verbatim copy of createMediaHandler, types stripped)\npoc.mjs                 (four exhibits exercising the handler)\n```\n\nHandler is configured the way the package\u0027s `README` documents:\n\n```js\nconst handler = createMediaHandler({\n  config: { region: \u0027us-east-1\u0027, credentials: { accessKeyId: \u0027\u2026\u0027, secretAccessKey: \u0027\u2026\u0027 } },\n  bucket: \u0027editor-media-bucket\u0027,\n  mediaRoot: \u0027media\u0027,                 // editors are \"scoped to media/\"\n  authorized: async () =\u003e true,       // typical wiring: TinaCloud verified user\n});\n```\n\nRun:\n\n```bash\n$ cd /Users/admin/tinacms-s3-poc \u0026\u0026 node poc.mjs\n--- Exhibit A: presigned PUT URL for arbitrary bucket key ---\n  HTTP status : 200\n  signedUrl   : https://editor-media-bucket.s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/index.html?X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256\u0026X-Amz-Content-Sha256=UNSIGNED-PAYLOAD\u0026X-Amz-Credential=AKIAFA...\n  src         : https://editor-media-bucket.s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/index.html\n  signed Key  : /index.html\n  RESULT      : BYPASS  (signed URL writes outside media/)\n\n--- Exhibit B: cross-tenant overwrite via attacker-chosen key ---\n  signed Key  : /tenant-victim/posts/announcement.mdx\n  RESULT      : BYPASS  (cross-tenant write primitive granted)\n\n--- Exhibit C: arbitrary-key DELETE via [...media] route ---\n  HTTP status : 200\n  S3 Bucket   : editor-media-bucket\n  S3 Key      : tenant-victim/posts/announcement.mdx\n  RESULT      : BYPASS  (arbitrary-key DELETE granted)\n\n--- Exhibit D: attacker-controlled ?expiresIn ---\n  X-Amz-Expires: 604800 sec\n  RESULT       : BYPASS  (URL valid far longer than the 1h default)\n```\n\nVerification, in detail:\n\n1. **Exhibit A** \u2014 `GET /api/s3/media?key=index.html`. `mediaRoot=media/` is configured but never consulted on the write path. The handler hands back a SigV4 URL whose path is `/index.html`. PUT\u0027ing any body to that URL would create the bucket-root object `index.html` against the operator\u0027s IAM credentials. For a deployment that fronts the bucket with CloudFront / S3-website hosting, this is a one-shot site-defacement primitive (and, for any CSP that trusts the bucket, a one-shot stored-XSS primitive against the published site).\n\n2. **Exhibit B** \u2014 same primitive, attacker-chosen key `tenant-victim/posts/announcement.mdx`. In the multi-tenant TinaCloud / TinaCMS Cloud deployment shape (one bucket shared across tenants, each tenant assigned a `mediaRoot/\u003ctenant\u003e/` prefix), a Tenant A editor receives a presigned PUT URL for any Tenant B key. Cross-tenant content tampering with no further bug needed.\n\n3. **Exhibit C** \u2014 `DELETE /api/s3/media/anything-here-is-ignored/tenant-victim%2Fposts%2Fannouncement.mdx`. The handler reads the catch-all as `req.query.media = [\u0027anything-here-is-ignored\u0027, \u0027tenant-victim/posts/announcement.mdx\u0027]`, destructures to `objectKey = media[1]`, dispatches `DeleteObjectCommand({ Bucket: \u0027editor-media-bucket\u0027, Key: \u0027tenant-victim/posts/announcement.mdx\u0027 })`. The mock confirms the captured command\u0027s `Key` is the attacker-supplied string. Real S3 will honour the same call. (The mock-captured call confirms the *handler\u0027s* behaviour; the real S3 call requires only `s3:DeleteObject` on the bucket, which the package\u0027s `README` instructs operators to grant.)\n\n4. **Exhibit D** \u2014 `?expiresIn=604800` (7 days, the SigV4 ceiling). The handler accepts it, the resulting `X-Amz-Expires=604800`. Combined with Exhibit A, an attacker who briefly compromises a CMS session (e.g. via a stolen idle browser session or the dev-server CSRF write described in finding 06) can mint a long-lived offline write primitive \u2014 usable for a week with no further interaction with the CMS.\n\nThe four exhibits together: cross-mediaRoot write, cross-tenant write, arbitrary-key delete, and long-lived signed-URL minting.\n\n## Impact\n\n* **Cross-tenant / cross-mediaRoot write.** In any deployment where the bucket holds anything other than this one editor\u0027s `mediaRoot` (multi-tenant TinaCloud, shared corporate bucket, bucket-backed static site), an authorized editor obtains write authority over every key the IAM credential can reach. Concretely: defacement of a static site fronted by the bucket; cross-tenant content tampering; replacement of `*.html`, `*.js`, `*.json` assets that downstream consumers trust. (Exhibits A, B; `handlers.ts:67-90`.)\n* **Stored XSS via uploaded HTML.** S3 returns objects with the `Content-Type` the upload supplies. The presigned `PutObjectCommand` URL carries no `Content-Type` constraint \u2014 the attacker\u0027s `PUT` chooses it. An editor can therefore write an HTML / SVG / JS payload to the bucket-root, and any CDN or origin that serves bucket objects directly to an authenticated SaaS surface inherits stored XSS in that origin.\n* **Arbitrary-key delete (data destruction).** Through `[...media]` the handler treats the second URL segment as a free-form object key. An editor can wipe any object the IAM key can `s3:DeleteObject`, including non-media artefacts like deployment manifests, backups, or other tenants\u0027 files. (Exhibit C; `handlers.ts:199-223`.)\n* **Bucket-policy implications.** The `README` (lines 38-90) tells operators to grant the IAM key `s3:PutObject`, `s3:PutObjectAcl`, `s3:DeleteObject`, and `s3:ListBucket` on the *whole* bucket. The README implies the application code constrains the editor\u0027s actions to `mediaRoot`. Because the application code does not, every operator who follows the README has \u2014 without realising \u2014 granted every CMS editor full write/delete on the whole bucket.\n* **Long-lived offline write primitive.** `expiresIn` is attacker-controlled and not capped by the handler. A single GET request mints a URL valid for up to 7 days (AWS SigV4 ceiling). An attacker who briefly compromises a CMS session can stash one such URL and continue writing arbitrary objects long after the session is revoked. (Exhibit D.)\n* **Same-shape exposure on every other first-party media adapter.** `next-tinacms-dos` (DigitalOcean Spaces, S3-compatible), `next-tinacms-azure` (Blob Storage), and `next-tinacms-cloudinary` (Cloudinary) all duplicate the broken pattern. Azure has *no* mediaRoot config at all, so the boundary that `next-tinacms-s3` advertises but doesn\u0027t enforce isn\u0027t even nominally present in `next-tinacms-azure`.",
  "id": "GHSA-8mq9-5fw2-5rm4",
  "modified": "2026-08-21T18:31:05Z",
  "published": "2026-08-19T21:56:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms/security/advisories/GHSA-8mq9-5fw2-5rm4"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59992"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms/pull/7088"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms/commit/d44558e9b4502d4f4fc2c970d22985339fe2b6ce"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms/releases/tag/next-tinacms-s3@23.0.4"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Tina: Broken Access Control: arbitrary bucket-key write/delete in `next-tinacms-s3` (and sibling production media adapters)"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-4359"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-06-07T02:15:14Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The Frontend File Manager plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Unauthenticated Arbitrary Post Deletion in versions up to, and including, 18.2. This is due to lacking authentication protections and lacking a security nonce on the wpfm_delete_file AJAX action. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete any posts and pages on the site.",
  "id": "GHSA-8mxc-2qjp-x88p",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T04:38:28Z",
  "published": "2023-06-07T03:30:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-4359"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://blog.nintechnet.com/wordpress-frontend-file-manager-plugin-fixed-multiple-critical-vulnerabilities"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026old=2554359%40nmedia-user-file-uploader\u0026new=2554359%40nmedia-user-file-uploader\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail="
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/84c61d00-20c1-4176-a74d-ea6ff6220f26?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-4430"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-05-14T11:16:36Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Unauthorized access to \"/api/Token/gettoken\" endpoint in EZD RP allows file manipulation.This issue affects EZD RP in versions before 20.19 (published on 22nd August 2024).",
  "id": "GHSA-8mxf-4389-q8j9",
  "modified": "2025-05-14T12:31:12Z",
  "published": "2025-05-14T12:31:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-4430"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cert.pl/en/posts/2025/05/CVE-2025-4430"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.gov.pl/web/ezd-rp"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-10536"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-01-07T06:15:13Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The FancyPost \u2013 Best Ultimate Post Block, Post Grid, Layouts, Carousel, Slider For Gutenberg \u0026 Elementor plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized access of data due to a missing capability check on the handle_block_shortcode_export() function in all versions up to, and including, 6.0.0. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to export shortcodes.",
  "id": "GHSA-8mxh-w9w9-hrmg",
  "modified": "2026-04-08T21:32:58Z",
  "published": "2025-01-07T06:32:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-10536"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/post-block/trunk/custom-fields/options/admin-backup.php#L171"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3215521/post-block/trunk/custom-fields/options/admin-backup.php"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/e573648e-215f-4858-a4d3-a3e85119dbcf?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2018-7702"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2018-03-15T01:29:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "SecurEnvoy SecurMail before 9.2.501 allows remote attackers to spoof transmission of arbitrary e-mail messages, resend e-mail messages to arbitrary recipients, or modify arbitrary message bodies and attachments by leveraging missing authentication and authorization.",
  "id": "GHSA-8mxj-8qfg-pg7x",
  "modified": "2022-05-13T01:53:24Z",
  "published": "2022-05-13T01:53:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-7702"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44285"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.sec-consult.com/en/blog/advisories/multiple-critical-vulnerabilities-in-securenvoy-securmail/index.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2018/Mar/29"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-20511"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-276",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-12-16T16:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In getNearbyAppStreamingPolicy of DevicePolicyManagerService.java, there is a missing permission check. This could lead to local information disclosure with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.Product: AndroidVersions: Android-13Android ID: A-235821829",
  "id": "GHSA-8p26-v8p8-whm6",
  "modified": "2022-12-20T18:30:19Z",
  "published": "2022-12-20T18:30:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-20511"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/pixel/2022-12-01"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}