CWE-770
AllowedAllocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete
The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any intended restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated.
3025 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-X477-XP89-WC9R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-02-21 15:30 – Updated: 2023-03-02 18:30Hyperium Hyper before 0.14.19 does not allow for customization of the max_header_list_size method in the H2 third-party software, allowing attackers to perform HTTP2 attacks.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-31394"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-02-21T14:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Hyperium Hyper before 0.14.19 does not allow for customization of the max_header_list_size method in the H2 third-party software, allowing attackers to perform HTTP2 attacks.",
"id": "GHSA-x477-xp89-wc9r",
"modified": "2023-03-02T18:30:31Z",
"published": "2023-02-21T15:30:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31394"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/hyperium/hyper/issues/2826"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/hyperium/hyper/pull/2828"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/hyperium/hyper/compare/v0.14.18...v0.14.19"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-X494-MJ8G-CJ27
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-05 19:24 – Updated: 2026-05-05 19:24Summary
Multiple denial-of-service vectors in gix-pack: unchecked array indexing causes panics on crafted delta data, and uncapped attacker-controlled size headers enable OOM process kills. Both are triggered by malicious pack data received during clone/fetch.
Details
Bug 1: Unchecked array indexing in delta application (CWE-248)
The apply() function in gix-pack/src/data/delta.rs (lines 33-87) reads delta instructions using unchecked data[i] indexing at 7 locations (lines 41, 45, 49, 53, 57, 61, 65). The command byte's bits indicate how many additional bytes follow, but if the delta data is truncated, the index panics:
pub(crate) fn apply(base: &[u8], mut target: &mut [u8], data: &[u8]) -> Result<(), apply::Error> {
let mut i = 0;
while let Some(cmd) = data.get(i) { // first byte: safely checked
i += 1;
match cmd {
cmd if cmd & 0b1000_0000 != 0 => {
let (mut ofs, mut size): (u32, u32) = (0, 0);
if cmd & 0b0000_0001 != 0 {
ofs = u32::from(data[i]); // PANIC: no bounds check
i += 1;
}
// ... 6 more unchecked data[i] at lines 45, 49, 53, 57, 61, 65
Lines 83-84 use assert_eq! (not debug_assert_eq!) that panics in both debug and release builds:
assert_eq!(i, data.len());
assert_eq!(target.len(), 0);
A second location in parse_header_info() (gix-pack/src/data/entry/decode.rs:116-129) also panics on truncated input via unchecked data[0] and data[i].
Note: PR #2059 (merged 2025-06-25) fixed the explicit panic!() for command code 0. The unchecked array indexing is a distinct class that remains unfixed.
Bug 2: Uncapped allocation from attacker-controlled size headers (CWE-770)
Pack entry headers and delta headers encode object sizes as LEB128-encoded u64 values. These sizes are used to allocate buffers before validating the actual data, with no upper bound:
bytes_to_entries.rs:109 Vec::with_capacity(entry.decompressed_size as usize) // UNCAPPED
resolve.rs:461 out.resize(decompressed_len, 0) // UNCAPPED
resolve.rs:190 fully_resolved_delta_bytes.resize(result_size as usize, 0) // UNCAPPED
A 10-byte crafted pack entry can claim decompressed_size = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFF (281 TB). At bytes_to_entries.rs:109, gitoxide calls Vec::with_capacity(281TB) before any decompression occurs. The OS immediately OOM-kills the process. No MAX_SIZE, max_object_size, or equivalent limit exists anywhere in gix-pack.
The allocation at resolve.rs:461 is equally dangerous: decompressed_size from the pack header is cast to usize and passed to Vec::resize(), which allocates and zeroes the full claimed size before the zlib decompressor runs.
PoC
Compiled and executed in Rust 1.94.1 --release mode. All 5 panics confirmed:
[1] delta apply: cmd=0x81, truncated -> PANIC: index out of bounds: len is 1 but index is 1
[2] delta apply: cmd=0xFF, only 3 extra bytes -> PANIC: index out of bounds: len is 4 but index is 4
[3] parse_header_info: empty data -> PANIC: index out of bounds: len is 0 but index is 0
[4] parse_header_info: byte=0x80, truncated -> PANIC: index out of bounds: len is 1 but index is 1
[5] delta apply: assert_eq!(i, data.len()) -> PANIC: assertion failed
For the OOM vector: the allocation path is parse_header_info() -> entry.decompressed_size (u64) -> Vec::with_capacity(size as usize) with no intermediate validation. A minimal pack with a single entry claiming a multi-terabyte size triggers immediate process kill.
Impact
Any application built on gitoxide that clones or fetches from an untrusted remote can be crashed by a malicious server:
- Panic DoS: 1-2 bytes of crafted delta data causes an immediate process abort
- OOM DoS: A single crafted pack entry header causes the process to attempt a multi-terabyte allocation, triggering an immediate OOM kill by the OS
This affects the gix CLI, any application using the gix crate, and CI/CD systems that clone repositories using gitoxide. No fuzz targets exist for gix-pack (issue #703 tracks oss-fuzz integration).
Suggested fix
For panics: replace unchecked data[i] with data.get(i).ok_or(Error::...) and replace assert_eq! with proper error returns.
For OOM: add a configurable maximum object size (similar to git's transfer.maxPackSize) and validate claimed sizes against it before allocating. At minimum, cap allocations to a reasonable default (e.g., 4 GB) and use try_reserve() consistently.
Severity
High. Network vector, no privileges required, user interaction required (clone/fetch). The OOM vector is a single-packet process kill with no recovery.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.68.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "gix-pack"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.69.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-248",
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-05T19:24:15Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nMultiple denial-of-service vectors in `gix-pack`: unchecked array indexing causes panics on crafted delta data, and uncapped attacker-controlled size headers enable OOM process kills. Both are triggered by malicious pack data received during clone/fetch.\n\n### Details\n\n**Bug 1: Unchecked array indexing in delta application (CWE-248)**\n\nThe `apply()` function in `gix-pack/src/data/delta.rs` (lines 33-87) reads delta instructions using unchecked `data[i]` indexing at 7 locations (lines 41, 45, 49, 53, 57, 61, 65). The command byte\u0027s bits indicate how many additional bytes follow, but if the delta data is truncated, the index panics:\n\n```rust\npub(crate) fn apply(base: \u0026[u8], mut target: \u0026mut [u8], data: \u0026[u8]) -\u003e Result\u003c(), apply::Error\u003e {\n let mut i = 0;\n while let Some(cmd) = data.get(i) { // first byte: safely checked\n i += 1;\n match cmd {\n cmd if cmd \u0026 0b1000_0000 != 0 =\u003e {\n let (mut ofs, mut size): (u32, u32) = (0, 0);\n if cmd \u0026 0b0000_0001 != 0 {\n ofs = u32::from(data[i]); // PANIC: no bounds check\n i += 1;\n }\n // ... 6 more unchecked data[i] at lines 45, 49, 53, 57, 61, 65\n```\n\nLines 83-84 use `assert_eq!` (not `debug_assert_eq!`) that panics in both debug and release builds:\n\n```rust\n assert_eq!(i, data.len());\n assert_eq!(target.len(), 0);\n```\n\nA second location in `parse_header_info()` (`gix-pack/src/data/entry/decode.rs:116-129`) also panics on truncated input via unchecked `data[0]` and `data[i]`.\n\nNote: PR #2059 (merged 2025-06-25) fixed the explicit `panic!()` for command code 0. The unchecked array indexing is a distinct class that remains unfixed.\n\n**Bug 2: Uncapped allocation from attacker-controlled size headers (CWE-770)**\n\nPack entry headers and delta headers encode object sizes as LEB128-encoded u64 values. These sizes are used to allocate buffers before validating the actual data, with no upper bound:\n\n```\nbytes_to_entries.rs:109 Vec::with_capacity(entry.decompressed_size as usize) // UNCAPPED\nresolve.rs:461 out.resize(decompressed_len, 0) // UNCAPPED\nresolve.rs:190 fully_resolved_delta_bytes.resize(result_size as usize, 0) // UNCAPPED\n```\n\nA 10-byte crafted pack entry can claim `decompressed_size = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFF` (281 TB). At `bytes_to_entries.rs:109`, gitoxide calls `Vec::with_capacity(281TB)` **before any decompression occurs**. The OS immediately OOM-kills the process. No `MAX_SIZE`, `max_object_size`, or equivalent limit exists anywhere in gix-pack.\n\nThe allocation at `resolve.rs:461` is equally dangerous: `decompressed_size` from the pack header is cast to `usize` and passed to `Vec::resize()`, which allocates and zeroes the full claimed size before the zlib decompressor runs.\n\n### PoC\n\nCompiled and executed in Rust 1.94.1 `--release` mode. All 5 panics confirmed:\n\n```\n[1] delta apply: cmd=0x81, truncated -\u003e PANIC: index out of bounds: len is 1 but index is 1\n[2] delta apply: cmd=0xFF, only 3 extra bytes -\u003e PANIC: index out of bounds: len is 4 but index is 4\n[3] parse_header_info: empty data -\u003e PANIC: index out of bounds: len is 0 but index is 0\n[4] parse_header_info: byte=0x80, truncated -\u003e PANIC: index out of bounds: len is 1 but index is 1\n[5] delta apply: assert_eq!(i, data.len()) -\u003e PANIC: assertion failed\n```\n\nFor the OOM vector: the allocation path is `parse_header_info()` -\u003e `entry.decompressed_size` (u64) -\u003e `Vec::with_capacity(size as usize)` with no intermediate validation. A minimal pack with a single entry claiming a multi-terabyte size triggers immediate process kill.\n\n### Impact\n\nAny application built on gitoxide that clones or fetches from an untrusted remote can be crashed by a malicious server:\n\n- **Panic DoS**: 1-2 bytes of crafted delta data causes an immediate process abort\n- **OOM DoS**: A single crafted pack entry header causes the process to attempt a multi-terabyte allocation, triggering an immediate OOM kill by the OS\n\nThis affects the `gix` CLI, any application using the `gix` crate, and CI/CD systems that clone repositories using gitoxide. No fuzz targets exist for gix-pack (issue #703 tracks oss-fuzz integration).\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nFor panics: replace unchecked `data[i]` with `data.get(i).ok_or(Error::...)` and replace `assert_eq!` with proper error returns.\n\nFor OOM: add a configurable maximum object size (similar to git\u0027s `transfer.maxPackSize`) and validate claimed sizes against it before allocating. At minimum, cap allocations to a reasonable default (e.g., 4 GB) and use `try_reserve()` consistently.\n\n### Severity\n\nHigh. Network vector, no privileges required, user interaction required (clone/fetch). The OOM vector is a single-packet process kill with no recovery.",
"id": "GHSA-x494-mj8g-cj27",
"modified": "2026-05-05T19:24:15Z",
"published": "2026-05-05T19:24:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/GitoxideLabs/gitoxide/security/advisories/GHSA-x494-mj8g-cj27"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/GitoxideLabs/gitoxide"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "gix-pack has multiple DoS vectors: unchecked indexing panics and uncapped OOM allocations from crafted pack data"
}
GHSA-X4GW-5CX5-PGMH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-08 23:01 – Updated: 2026-06-12 19:29SslClientHelloHandler.decode() reads the 24-bit TLS handshake length and, when the ClientHello does not fit in the first record, eagerly allocates ctx.alloc().buffer(handshakeLength) (line 161). The guard at line 140 is handshakeLength > maxClientHelloLength && maxClientHelloLength != 0, and the commonly-used SniHandler/AbstractSniHandler constructors (SniHandler(Mapping), SniHandler(AsyncMapping), AbstractSniHandler()) pass maxClientHelloLength=0 and handshakeTimeoutMillis=0, so the length guard is disabled and no timeout is scheduled. A 16 MiB request exceeds the default pooled chunk size and becomes a huge/unpooled allocation performed immediately. The buffer is retained in the handler until the channel closes.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.2.14.Final"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "io.netty:netty-handler"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.2.0.Final"
},
{
"fixed": "4.2.15.Final"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.1.134.Final"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "io.netty:netty-handler"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.1.135.Final"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-45416"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-08T23:01:04Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-12T15:16:26Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "SslClientHelloHandler.decode() reads the 24-bit TLS handshake length and, when the ClientHello does not fit in the first record, eagerly allocates `ctx.alloc().buffer(handshakeLength)` (line 161). The guard at line 140 is `handshakeLength \u003e maxClientHelloLength \u0026\u0026 maxClientHelloLength != 0`, and the commonly-used SniHandler/AbstractSniHandler constructors (SniHandler(Mapping), SniHandler(AsyncMapping), AbstractSniHandler()) pass maxClientHelloLength=0 and handshakeTimeoutMillis=0, so the length guard is disabled and no timeout is scheduled. A 16 MiB request exceeds the default pooled chunk size and becomes a huge/unpooled allocation performed immediately. The buffer is retained in the handler until the channel closes.",
"id": "GHSA-x4gw-5cx5-pgmh",
"modified": "2026-06-12T19:29:22Z",
"published": "2026-06-08T23:01:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-x4gw-5cx5-pgmh"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45416"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/releases/tag/netty-4.1.135.Final"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/releases/tag/netty-4.2.15.Final"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Netty: SNI handler pre-allocates up to 16 MiB from nine attacker bytes"
}
GHSA-X4H3-G2X4-8GQV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-01 21:30 – Updated: 2026-07-09 13:38OOM error is possible while attempting to add infinite amount of functions to Function Registry.
Affected Spring Products and Versions: Spring Cloud Function 3.2.x: versions prior to 3.2.16 Spring Cloud Function 4.1.x: versions prior to 4.1.10 Spring Cloud Function 4.2.x: versions prior to 4.2.6 Spring Cloud Function 4.3.x: versions prior to 4.3.3 Spring Cloud Function 5.0.x: versions prior to 5.0.2 Older, unsupported versions are also affected.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.springframework.cloud:spring-cloud-function-context"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.3.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.springframework.cloud:spring-cloud-function-context"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.0.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.springframework.cloud:spring-cloud-function-context"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.2.10"
},
{
"last_affected": "3.2.15"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.springframework.cloud:spring-cloud-function-context"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.1.0"
},
{
"last_affected": "4.1.9"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.springframework.cloud:spring-cloud-function-context"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.2.0"
},
{
"last_affected": "4.2.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-40990"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-09T13:38:32Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-01T19:16:39Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "OOM error is possible while attempting to add infinite amount of functions to Function Registry.\n\nAffected Spring Products and Versions:\nSpring Cloud Function 3.2.x: versions prior to 3.2.16\nSpring Cloud Function 4.1.x: versions prior to 4.1.10\nSpring Cloud Function 4.2.x: versions prior to 4.2.6\nSpring Cloud Function 4.3.x: versions prior to 4.3.3\nSpring Cloud Function 5.0.x: versions prior to 5.0.2\nOlder, unsupported versions are also affected.",
"id": "GHSA-x4h3-g2x4-8gqv",
"modified": "2026-07-09T13:38:32Z",
"published": "2026-06-01T21:30:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40990"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://spring.io/security/cve-2026-40990"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Spring Cloud Function Context: Uncontrolled Recursion is possible while attempting to add infinite amount of functions to Function Registry"
}
GHSA-X4HH-FRX8-98R5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-02-01 20:53 – Updated: 2024-10-17 19:47Impacted Resources
bref/src/Event/Http/Psr7Bridge.php:94-125
Description
When Bref is used with the Event-Driven Function runtime and the handler is a RequestHandlerInterface, then the Lambda event is converted to a PSR7 object.
During the conversion process, if the request is a MultiPart, each part is parsed and for each which contains a file, it is extracted and saved in /tmp with a random filename starting with bref_upload_.
The function implementing the logic follows:
private static function parseBodyAndUploadedFiles(HttpRequestEvent $event): array
{
$bodyString = $event->getBody();
$files = [];
$parsedBody = null;
$contentType = $event->getContentType();
if ($contentType !== null && $event->getMethod() === 'POST') {
if (str_starts_with($contentType, 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded')) {
parse_str($bodyString, $parsedBody);
} else {
$document = new Part("Content-type: $contentType\r\n\r\n" . $bodyString);
if ($document->isMultiPart()) {
$parsedBody = [];
foreach ($document->getParts() as $part) {
if ($part->isFile()) {
$tmpPath = tempnam(sys_get_temp_dir(), 'bref_upload_');
if ($tmpPath === false) {
throw new RuntimeException('Unable to create a temporary directory');
}
file_put_contents($tmpPath, $part->getBody());
$file = new UploadedFile($tmpPath, filesize($tmpPath), UPLOAD_ERR_OK, $part->getFileName(), $part->getMimeType());
self::parseKeyAndInsertValueInArray($files, $part->getName(), $file);
} else {
self::parseKeyAndInsertValueInArray($parsedBody, $part->getName(), $part->getBody());
}
}
}
}
}
return [$files, $parsedBody];
}
The flow mimics what plain PHP does but it does not delete the temporary files when the request has been processed.
Impact
An attacker could fill the Lambda instance disk by performing multiple MultiPart requests containing files.
The attack has the following requirements and limitations:
- The Lambda should use the Event-Driven Function runtime.
- The Lambda should use the RequestHandlerInterface handler.
- The Lambda should implement at least an endpoint accepting POST requests.
- The attacker can send requests up to 6MB long, so multiple requests are required to fill the disk (the default Lambda disk size is 512MB, therefore with less than 100 requests the disk could be filled).
PoC
- Create a new Bref project.
- Create an
index.phpfile with the following content:
<?php
namespace App;
require __DIR__ . '/vendor/autoload.php';
use Nyholm\Psr7\Response;
use Psr\Http\Message\ResponseInterface;
use Psr\Http\Message\ServerRequestInterface;
use Psr\Http\Server\RequestHandlerInterface;
class MyHttpHandler implements RequestHandlerInterface
{
public function handle(ServerRequestInterface $request): ResponseInterface
{
return new Response(200, [], exec("ls -lah /tmp/bref_upload* | wc -l"));
}
}
return new MyHttpHandler();
- Use the following
serverless.ymlto deploy the Lambda:
service: app
provider:
name: aws
region: eu-central-1
plugins:
- ./vendor/bref/bref
# Exclude files from deployment
package:
patterns:
- '!node_modules/**'
- '!tests/**'
functions:
api:
handler: index.php
runtime: php-83
events:
- httpApi: 'ANY /upload'
- Replay the following request multiple times after having replaced the
<HOST>placeholder with the deployed Lambda domain:
POST /upload HTTP/2
Host: <HOST>
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundaryQqDeSZSSvmn2rfjb
Content-Length: 180
------WebKitFormBoundaryQqDeSZSSvmn2rfjb
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="a"; filename="a.txt"
Content-Type: text/plain
test
------WebKitFormBoundaryQqDeSZSSvmn2rfjb--
- Notice that each time the request is sent the number of the uploaded temporary files on the disk increases.
Suggested Remediation
Delete the temporary files after the request has been processed and the response have been generated.
References
- https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Denial_of_Service_Cheat_Sheet.html
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "bref/bref"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.1.13"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-24752"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-02-01T20:53:03Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-02-01T16:17:14Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Impacted Resources\n\nbref/src/Event/Http/Psr7Bridge.php:94-125\n\n## Description\n\nWhen Bref is used with the Event-Driven Function runtime and the handler is a `RequestHandlerInterface`, then the Lambda event is converted to a PSR7 object.\nDuring the conversion process, if the request is a MultiPart, each part is parsed and for each which contains a file, it is extracted and saved in `/tmp` with a random filename starting with `bref_upload_`.\n\nThe function implementing the logic follows:\n\n```php\nprivate static function parseBodyAndUploadedFiles(HttpRequestEvent $event): array\n{\n $bodyString = $event-\u003egetBody();\n $files = [];\n $parsedBody = null;\n $contentType = $event-\u003egetContentType();\n if ($contentType !== null \u0026\u0026 $event-\u003egetMethod() === \u0027POST\u0027) {\n if (str_starts_with($contentType, \u0027application/x-www-form-urlencoded\u0027)) {\n parse_str($bodyString, $parsedBody);\n } else {\n $document = new Part(\"Content-type: $contentType\\r\\n\\r\\n\" . $bodyString);\n if ($document-\u003eisMultiPart()) {\n $parsedBody = [];\n foreach ($document-\u003egetParts() as $part) {\n if ($part-\u003eisFile()) {\n $tmpPath = tempnam(sys_get_temp_dir(), \u0027bref_upload_\u0027);\n if ($tmpPath === false) {\n throw new RuntimeException(\u0027Unable to create a temporary directory\u0027);\n }\n file_put_contents($tmpPath, $part-\u003egetBody());\n $file = new UploadedFile($tmpPath, filesize($tmpPath), UPLOAD_ERR_OK, $part-\u003egetFileName(), $part-\u003egetMimeType());\n\n self::parseKeyAndInsertValueInArray($files, $part-\u003egetName(), $file);\n } else {\n self::parseKeyAndInsertValueInArray($parsedBody, $part-\u003egetName(), $part-\u003egetBody());\n }\n }\n }\n }\n }\n return [$files, $parsedBody];\n}\n```\n\nThe flow mimics what plain PHP does but it does not delete the temporary files when the request has been processed.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker could fill the Lambda instance disk by performing multiple MultiPart requests containing files.\nThe attack has the following requirements and limitations:\n- The Lambda should use the Event-Driven Function runtime.\n- The Lambda should use the `RequestHandlerInterface` handler.\n- The Lambda should implement at least an endpoint accepting POST requests.\n- The attacker can send requests up to 6MB long, so multiple requests are required to fill the disk (the default Lambda disk size is 512MB, therefore with less than 100 requests the disk could be filled).\n\n## PoC\n\n1. Create a new Bref project.\n2. Create an `index.php` file with the following content:\n```php\n\u003c?php\n\nnamespace App;\n\nrequire __DIR__ . \u0027/vendor/autoload.php\u0027;\n\nuse Nyholm\\Psr7\\Response;\nuse Psr\\Http\\Message\\ResponseInterface;\nuse Psr\\Http\\Message\\ServerRequestInterface;\nuse Psr\\Http\\Server\\RequestHandlerInterface;\n\nclass MyHttpHandler implements RequestHandlerInterface\n{\n public function handle(ServerRequestInterface $request): ResponseInterface\n {\n return new Response(200, [], exec(\"ls -lah /tmp/bref_upload* | wc -l\"));\n }\n}\n\nreturn new MyHttpHandler();\n\n```\n3. Use the following `serverless.yml` to deploy the Lambda:\n```yaml\nservice: app\n\nprovider:\n name: aws\n region: eu-central-1\n\nplugins:\n - ./vendor/bref/bref\n\n# Exclude files from deployment\npackage:\n patterns:\n - \u0027!node_modules/**\u0027\n - \u0027!tests/**\u0027\n\nfunctions:\n api:\n handler: index.php\n runtime: php-83\n events:\n - httpApi: \u0027ANY /upload\u0027\n```\n4. Replay the following request multiple times after having replaced the `\u003cHOST\u003e` placeholder with the deployed Lambda domain:\n```\nPOST /upload HTTP/2\nHost: \u003cHOST\u003e\nContent-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundaryQqDeSZSSvmn2rfjb\nContent-Length: 180\n\n------WebKitFormBoundaryQqDeSZSSvmn2rfjb\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"a\"; filename=\"a.txt\"\nContent-Type: text/plain\n\ntest\n------WebKitFormBoundaryQqDeSZSSvmn2rfjb--\n```\n5. Notice that each time the request is sent the number of the uploaded temporary files on the disk increases.\n\n## Suggested Remediation\n\nDelete the temporary files after the request has been processed and the response have been generated.\n\n## References\n\n- https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Denial_of_Service_Cheat_Sheet.html",
"id": "GHSA-x4hh-frx8-98r5",
"modified": "2024-10-17T19:47:24Z",
"published": "2024-02-01T20:53:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/brefphp/bref/security/advisories/GHSA-x4hh-frx8-98r5"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-24752"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/brefphp/bref/commit/350788de12880b6fd64c4c318ba995388bec840e"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/brefphp/bref"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/brefphp/bref/blob/2.1.12/src/Event/Http/Psr7Bridge.php#L94-L125"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Bref\u0027s Uploaded Files Not Deleted in Event-Driven Functions"
}
GHSA-X4HH-VJM7-G2JV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-09-20 22:51 – Updated: 2023-09-20 22:51Summary
Faktory web dashboard can suffer from denial of service by a crafted malicious url query param days.
Details
The vulnerability is related to how the backend reads the days URL query parameter in the Faktory web dashboard. The value is used directly without any checks to create a string slice. If a very large value is provided, the backend server ends up using a significant amount of memory and causing it to crash.
PoC
To reproduce this vulnerability, please follow these steps:
Start the Faktory Docker and limit memory usage to 512 megabytes for better demonstration:
$ docker run --rm -it -m 512m \
-p 127.0.0.1:7419:7419 \
-p 127.0.0.1:7420:7420 \
contribsys/faktory:latest
Send the following request. The Faktory server will exit after a few seconds due to out of memory:
$ curl 'http://localhost:7420/?days=922337'
Impact
Server Availability: The vulnerability can crash the Faktory server, affecting its availability. Denial of Service Risk: Given that the Faktory web dashboard does not require authorization, any entity with internet access to the dashboard could potentially exploit this vulnerability. This unchecked access opens up the potential for a Denial of Service (DoS) attack, which could disrupt service availability without any conditional barriers to the attacker.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/contribsys/faktory"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.8.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-37279"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770",
"CWE-789"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-09-20T22:51:09Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-09-20T22:15:13Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nFaktory web dashboard can suffer from denial of service by a crafted malicious url query param `days`.\n\n### Details\nThe vulnerability is related to how the backend reads the `days` URL query parameter in the Faktory web dashboard. The value is used directly without any checks to create a string slice. If a very large value is provided, the backend server ends up using a significant amount of memory and causing it to crash.\n\n### PoC\nTo reproduce this vulnerability, please follow these steps:\n\nStart the Faktory Docker and limit memory usage to 512 megabytes for better demonstration:\n```\n$ docker run --rm -it -m 512m \\\n -p 127.0.0.1:7419:7419 \\\n -p 127.0.0.1:7420:7420 \\\n contribsys/faktory:latest\n``` \n\nSend the following request. The Faktory server will exit after a few seconds due to out of memory:\n\n```\n$ curl \u0027http://localhost:7420/?days=922337\u0027\n```\n\n### Impact\n**Server Availability**: The vulnerability can crash the Faktory server, affecting its availability.\n**Denial of Service Risk**: Given that the Faktory web dashboard does not require authorization, any entity with internet access to the dashboard could potentially exploit this vulnerability. This unchecked access opens up the potential for a Denial of Service (DoS) attack, which could disrupt service availability without any conditional barriers to the attacker. \n",
"id": "GHSA-x4hh-vjm7-g2jv",
"modified": "2023-09-20T22:51:09Z",
"published": "2023-09-20T22:51:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/contribsys/faktory/security/advisories/GHSA-x4hh-vjm7-g2jv"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-37279"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/contribsys/faktory"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Faktory Web Dashboard can lead to denial of service(DOS) via malicious user input"
}
GHSA-X4JJ-H2V8-HQQV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-08 03:32 – Updated: 2026-04-13 21:30tar.Reader can allocate an unbounded amount of memory when reading a maliciously-crafted archive containing a large number of sparse regions encoded in the "old GNU sparse map" format.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-32288"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-08T02:16:03Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "tar.Reader can allocate an unbounded amount of memory when reading a maliciously-crafted archive containing a large number of sparse regions encoded in the \"old GNU sparse map\" format.",
"id": "GHSA-x4jj-h2v8-hqqv",
"modified": "2026-04-13T21:30:34Z",
"published": "2026-04-08T03:32:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32288"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://go.dev/cl/763766"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://go.dev/issue/78301"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/0uYbvbPZRWU"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-4869"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-X4VP-4235-65HG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-03 21:18 – Updated: 2026-03-20 21:13Impact
OpenClaw webhook handlers for BlueBubbles and Google Chat accepted and parsed request bodies before authentication and signature checks on vulnerable releases. This allowed unauthenticated clients to hold parser work open with slow/oversized request bodies and degrade availability (slow-request DoS).
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw(npm) - Affected releases:
<= 2026.3.1 - Latest published vulnerable version at triage time:
2026.3.1(npm) - Fixed release:
2026.3.2(released)
Fix Commit(s)
d3e8b17aa6432536806b4853edc7939d891d0f25
Mitigation
Upgrade to 2026.3.2 (or newer). The fix enforces auth-before-body for affected webhook paths, adds strict pre-auth body/time budgets, and introduces shared in-flight/request guardrails with regression coverage.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2026.3.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.3.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-32011"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-03T21:18:39Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-19T22:16:34Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Impact\n\nOpenClaw webhook handlers for BlueBubbles and Google Chat accepted and parsed request bodies before authentication and signature checks on vulnerable releases. This allowed unauthenticated clients to hold parser work open with slow/oversized request bodies and degrade availability (slow-request DoS).\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected releases: `\u003c= 2026.3.1`\n- Latest published vulnerable version at triage time: `2026.3.1` (npm)\n- Fixed release: `2026.3.2` (released)\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n\n- `d3e8b17aa6432536806b4853edc7939d891d0f25`\n\n## Mitigation\n\nUpgrade to `2026.3.2` (or newer). The fix enforces auth-before-body for affected webhook paths, adds strict pre-auth body/time budgets, and introduces shared in-flight/request guardrails with regression coverage.",
"id": "GHSA-x4vp-4235-65hg",
"modified": "2026-03-20T21:13:02Z",
"published": "2026-03-03T21:18:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-x4vp-4235-65hg"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32011"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/d3e8b17aa6432536806b4853edc7939d891d0f25"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-slow-request-denial-of-service-via-pre-auth-webhook-body-parsing"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw has pre-auth webhook body parsing that can enable unauthenticated slow-request DoS"
}
GHSA-X4X7-9MJ3-H6GW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-04-03 18:30 – Updated: 2025-03-17 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dccp/tcp: Unhash sk from ehash for tb2 alloc failure after check_estalblished().
syzkaller reported a warning [0] in inet_csk_destroy_sock() with no repro.
WARN_ON(inet_sk(sk)->inet_num && !inet_csk(sk)->icsk_bind_hash);
However, the syzkaller's log hinted that connect() failed just before the warning due to FAULT_INJECTION. [1]
When connect() is called for an unbound socket, we search for an available ephemeral port. If a bhash bucket exists for the port, we call __inet_check_established() or __inet6_check_established() to check if the bucket is reusable.
If reusable, we add the socket into ehash and set inet_sk(sk)->inet_num.
Later, we look up the corresponding bhash2 bucket and try to allocate it if it does not exist.
Although it rarely occurs in real use, if the allocation fails, we must revert the changes by check_established(). Otherwise, an unconnected socket could illegally occupy an ehash entry.
Note that we do not put tw back into ehash because sk might have already responded to a packet for tw and it would be better to free tw earlier under such memory presure.
[0]: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 350830 at net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:1193 inet_csk_destroy_sock (net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:1193) Modules linked in: Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:inet_csk_destroy_sock (net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:1193) Code: 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e e9 2d 4a 3d fd e8 28 4a 3d fd 48 89 ef e8 f0 cd 7d ff 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e e9 13 4a 3d fd e8 0e 4a 3d fd <0f> 0b e9 61 fe ff ff e8 02 4a 3d fd 4c 89 e7 be 03 00 00 00 e8 05 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000b21fd38 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000009e78 RCX: ffffffff840bae40 RDX: ffff88806e46c600 RSI: ffffffff840bb012 RDI: ffff88811755cca8 RBP: ffff88811755c880 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000009e78 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88811755c8e0 R13: ffff88811755c892 R14: ffff88811755c918 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f03e5243800(0000) GS:ffff88811ae00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000001b32f21000 CR3: 0000000112ffe001 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: ? inet_csk_destroy_sock (net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:1193) dccp_close (net/dccp/proto.c:1078) inet_release (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:434) __sock_release (net/socket.c:660) sock_close (net/socket.c:1423) __fput (fs/file_table.c:377) __fput_sync (fs/file_table.c:462) __x64_sys_close (fs/open.c:1557 fs/open.c:1539 fs/open.c:1539) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:129) RIP: 0033:0x7f03e53852bb Code: 03 00 00 00 0f 05 48 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 41 c3 48 83 ec 18 89 7c 24 0c e8 43 c9 f5 ff 8b 7c 24 0c 41 89 c0 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 35 44 89 c7 89 44 24 0c e8 a1 c9 f5 ff 8b 44 RSP: 002b:00000000005dfba0 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 00007f03e53852bb RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000000000000167c R10: 0000000008a79680 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 00007f03e4e43000 R13: 00007f03e4e43170 R14: 00007f03e4e43178 R15: 00007f03e4e43170
[1]: FAULT_INJECTION: forcing a failure. name failslab, interval 1, probability 0, space 0, times 0 CPU: 0 PID: 350833 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 6.7.0-12272-g2121c43f88f5 #9 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:107 (discriminator 1)) should_fail_ex (lib/fault-inject.c:52 lib/fault-inject.c:153) should_failslab (mm/slub.c:3748) kmem_cache_alloc (mm/slub.c:3763 mm/slub.c:3842 mm/slub.c:3867) inet_bind2_bucket_create ---truncated---
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-26741"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-04-03T17:15:51Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndccp/tcp: Unhash sk from ehash for tb2 alloc failure after check_estalblished().\n\nsyzkaller reported a warning [0] in inet_csk_destroy_sock() with no\nrepro.\n\n WARN_ON(inet_sk(sk)-\u003einet_num \u0026\u0026 !inet_csk(sk)-\u003eicsk_bind_hash);\n\nHowever, the syzkaller\u0027s log hinted that connect() failed just before\nthe warning due to FAULT_INJECTION. [1]\n\nWhen connect() is called for an unbound socket, we search for an\navailable ephemeral port. If a bhash bucket exists for the port, we\ncall __inet_check_established() or __inet6_check_established() to check\nif the bucket is reusable.\n\nIf reusable, we add the socket into ehash and set inet_sk(sk)-\u003einet_num.\n\nLater, we look up the corresponding bhash2 bucket and try to allocate\nit if it does not exist.\n\nAlthough it rarely occurs in real use, if the allocation fails, we must\nrevert the changes by check_established(). Otherwise, an unconnected\nsocket could illegally occupy an ehash entry.\n\nNote that we do not put tw back into ehash because sk might have\nalready responded to a packet for tw and it would be better to free\ntw earlier under such memory presure.\n\n[0]:\nWARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 350830 at net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:1193 inet_csk_destroy_sock (net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:1193)\nModules linked in:\nHardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014\nRIP: 0010:inet_csk_destroy_sock (net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:1193)\nCode: 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e e9 2d 4a 3d fd e8 28 4a 3d fd 48 89 ef e8 f0 cd 7d ff 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e e9 13 4a 3d fd e8 0e 4a 3d fd \u003c0f\u003e 0b e9 61 fe ff ff e8 02 4a 3d fd 4c 89 e7 be 03 00 00 00 e8 05\nRSP: 0018:ffffc9000b21fd38 EFLAGS: 00010293\nRAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000009e78 RCX: ffffffff840bae40\nRDX: ffff88806e46c600 RSI: ffffffff840bb012 RDI: ffff88811755cca8\nRBP: ffff88811755c880 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000000\nR10: 0000000000009e78 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88811755c8e0\nR13: ffff88811755c892 R14: ffff88811755c918 R15: 0000000000000000\nFS: 00007f03e5243800(0000) GS:ffff88811ae00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\nCS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\nCR2: 0000001b32f21000 CR3: 0000000112ffe001 CR4: 0000000000770ef0\nPKRU: 55555554\nCall Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n ? inet_csk_destroy_sock (net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:1193)\n dccp_close (net/dccp/proto.c:1078)\n inet_release (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:434)\n __sock_release (net/socket.c:660)\n sock_close (net/socket.c:1423)\n __fput (fs/file_table.c:377)\n __fput_sync (fs/file_table.c:462)\n __x64_sys_close (fs/open.c:1557 fs/open.c:1539 fs/open.c:1539)\n do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83)\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:129)\nRIP: 0033:0x7f03e53852bb\nCode: 03 00 00 00 0f 05 48 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 41 c3 48 83 ec 18 89 7c 24 0c e8 43 c9 f5 ff 8b 7c 24 0c 41 89 c0 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 \u003c48\u003e 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 35 44 89 c7 89 44 24 0c e8 a1 c9 f5 ff 8b 44\nRSP: 002b:00000000005dfba0 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003\nRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 00007f03e53852bb\nRDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: 0000000000000003\nRBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000000000000167c\nR10: 0000000008a79680 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 00007f03e4e43000\nR13: 00007f03e4e43170 R14: 00007f03e4e43178 R15: 00007f03e4e43170\n \u003c/TASK\u003e\n\n[1]:\nFAULT_INJECTION: forcing a failure.\nname failslab, interval 1, probability 0, space 0, times 0\nCPU: 0 PID: 350833 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 6.7.0-12272-g2121c43f88f5 #9\nHardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014\nCall Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:107 (discriminator 1))\n should_fail_ex (lib/fault-inject.c:52 lib/fault-inject.c:153)\n should_failslab (mm/slub.c:3748)\n kmem_cache_alloc (mm/slub.c:3763 mm/slub.c:3842 mm/slub.c:3867)\n inet_bind2_bucket_create \n---truncated---",
"id": "GHSA-x4x7-9mj3-h6gw",
"modified": "2025-03-17T18:31:40Z",
"published": "2024-04-03T18:30:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-26741"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/334a8348b2df26526f3298848ad6864285592caf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/66b60b0c8c4a163b022a9f0ad6769b0fd3dc662f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/729bc77af438a6e67914c97f6f3d3af8f72c0131"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f8c4a6b850882bc47aaa864b720c7a2ee3102f39"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-X549-732M-PW36
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-19 21:31 – Updated: 2025-02-19 21:31A lack of rate limiting in the 'Email Settings' feature of PHPJabbers Hotel Booking System v4.0 allows attackers to send an excessive amount of email for a legitimate user, leading to a possible Denial of Service (DoS) via a large amount of generated e-mail messages.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-51297"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-02-19T20:15:34Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A lack of rate limiting in the \u0027Email Settings\u0027 feature of PHPJabbers Hotel Booking System v4.0 allows attackers to send an excessive amount of email for a legitimate user, leading to a possible Denial of Service (DoS) via a large amount of generated e-mail messages.",
"id": "GHSA-x549-732m-pw36",
"modified": "2025-02-19T21:31:38Z",
"published": "2025-02-19T21:31:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-51297"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.phpjabbers.com/hotel-booking-system/#sectionDemo"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/176486/PHPJabbers-Hotel-Booking-System-4.0-Missing-Rate-Limiting.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
Clearly specify the minimum and maximum expectations for capabilities, and dictate which behaviors are acceptable when resource allocation reaches limits.
Mitigation
Limit the amount of resources that are accessible to unprivileged users. Set per-user limits for resources. Allow the system administrator to define these limits. Be careful to avoid CWE-410.
Mitigation
Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place, and it will help the administrator to identify who is committing the abuse. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation
- Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either:
- The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question.
- The second solution can be difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply requires more resources on the part of the attacker.
- recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, typically by using increasing time delays
- uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed.
Mitigation
Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.
Mitigation MIT-38.1
- If the program must fail, ensure that it fails gracefully (fails closed). There may be a temptation to simply let the program fail poorly in cases such as low memory conditions, but an attacker may be able to assert control before the software has fully exited. Alternately, an uncontrolled failure could cause cascading problems with other downstream components; for example, the program could send a signal to a downstream process so the process immediately knows that a problem has occurred and has a better chance of recovery.
- Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.
Mitigation MIT-47
Strategy: Resource Limitation
- Use quotas or other resource-limiting settings provided by the operating system or environment. For example, when managing system resources in POSIX, setrlimit() can be used to set limits for certain types of resources, and getrlimit() can determine how many resources are available. However, these functions are not available on all operating systems.
- When the current levels get close to the maximum that is defined for the application (see CWE-770), then limit the allocation of further resources to privileged users; alternately, begin releasing resources for less-privileged users. While this mitigation may protect the system from attack, it will not necessarily stop attackers from adversely impacting other users.
- Ensure that the application performs the appropriate error checks and error handling in case resources become unavailable (CWE-703).
CAPEC-125: Flooding
An adversary consumes the resources of a target by rapidly engaging in a large number of interactions with the target. This type of attack generally exposes a weakness in rate limiting or flow. When successful this attack prevents legitimate users from accessing the service and can cause the target to crash. This attack differs from resource depletion through leaks or allocations in that the latter attacks do not rely on the volume of requests made to the target but instead focus on manipulation of the target's operations. The key factor in a flooding attack is the number of requests the adversary can make in a given period of time. The greater this number, the more likely an attack is to succeed against a given target.
CAPEC-130: Excessive Allocation
An adversary causes the target to allocate excessive resources to servicing the attackers' request, thereby reducing the resources available for legitimate services and degrading or denying services. Usually, this attack focuses on memory allocation, but any finite resource on the target could be the attacked, including bandwidth, processing cycles, or other resources. This attack does not attempt to force this allocation through a large number of requests (that would be Resource Depletion through Flooding) but instead uses one or a small number of requests that are carefully formatted to force the target to allocate excessive resources to service this request(s). Often this attack takes advantage of a bug in the target to cause the target to allocate resources vastly beyond what would be needed for a normal request.
CAPEC-147: XML Ping of the Death
An attacker initiates a resource depletion attack where a large number of small XML messages are delivered at a sufficiently rapid rate to cause a denial of service or crash of the target. Transactions such as repetitive SOAP transactions can deplete resources faster than a simple flooding attack because of the additional resources used by the SOAP protocol and the resources necessary to process SOAP messages. The transactions used are immaterial as long as they cause resource utilization on the target. In other words, this is a normal flooding attack augmented by using messages that will require extra processing on the target.
CAPEC-197: Exponential Data Expansion
An adversary submits data to a target application which contains nested exponential data expansion to produce excessively large output. Many data format languages allow the definition of macro-like structures that can be used to simplify the creation of complex structures. However, this capability can be abused to create excessive demands on a processor's CPU and memory. A small number of nested expansions can result in an exponential growth in demands on memory.
CAPEC-229: Serialized Data Parameter Blowup
This attack exploits certain serialized data parsers (e.g., XML, YAML, etc.) which manage data in an inefficient manner. The attacker crafts an serialized data file with multiple configuration parameters in the same dataset. In a vulnerable parser, this results in a denial of service condition where CPU resources are exhausted because of the parsing algorithm. The weakness being exploited is tied to parser implementation and not language specific.
CAPEC-230: Serialized Data with Nested Payloads
Applications often need to transform data in and out of a data format (e.g., XML and YAML) by using a parser. It may be possible for an adversary to inject data that may have an adverse effect on the parser when it is being processed. Many data format languages allow the definition of macro-like structures that can be used to simplify the creation of complex structures. By nesting these structures, causing the data to be repeatedly substituted, an adversary can cause the parser to consume more resources while processing, causing excessive memory consumption and CPU utilization.
CAPEC-231: Oversized Serialized Data Payloads
An adversary injects oversized serialized data payloads into a parser during data processing to produce adverse effects upon the parser such as exhausting system resources and arbitrary code execution.
CAPEC-469: HTTP DoS
An attacker performs flooding at the HTTP level to bring down only a particular web application rather than anything listening on a TCP/IP connection. This denial of service attack requires substantially fewer packets to be sent which makes DoS harder to detect. This is an equivalent of SYN flood in HTTP. The idea is to keep the HTTP session alive indefinitely and then repeat that hundreds of times. This attack targets resource depletion weaknesses in web server software. The web server will wait to attacker's responses on the initiated HTTP sessions while the connection threads are being exhausted.
CAPEC-482: TCP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the TCP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service. These attacks exploit the weakness within the TCP protocol where there is some state information for the connection the server needs to maintain. This often involves the use of TCP SYN messages.
CAPEC-486: UDP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the UDP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming the available network bandwidth. Additionally, firewalls often open a port for each UDP connection destined for a service with an open UDP port, meaning the firewalls in essence save the connection state thus the high packet nature of a UDP flood can also overwhelm resources allocated to the firewall. UDP attacks can also target services like DNS or VoIP which utilize these protocols. Additionally, due to the session-less nature of the UDP protocol, the source of a packet is easily spoofed making it difficult to find the source of the attack.
CAPEC-487: ICMP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the ICMP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming the available network bandwidth. A typical attack involves a victim server receiving ICMP packets at a high rate from a wide range of source addresses. Additionally, due to the session-less nature of the ICMP protocol, the source of a packet is easily spoofed making it difficult to find the source of the attack.
CAPEC-488: HTTP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the HTTP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming resources at the application layer such as web services and their infrastructure. These attacks use legitimate session-based HTTP GET requests designed to consume large amounts of a server's resources. Since these are legitimate sessions this attack is very difficult to detect.
CAPEC-489: SSL Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the SSL protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming all the available resources on the server side. These attacks take advantage of the asymmetric relationship between the processing power used by the client and the processing power used by the server to create a secure connection. In this manner the attacker can make a large number of HTTPS requests on a low provisioned machine to tie up a disproportionately large number of resources on the server. The clients then continue to keep renegotiating the SSL connection. When multiplied by a large number of attacking machines, this attack can result in a crash or loss of service to legitimate users.
CAPEC-490: Amplification
An adversary may execute an amplification where the size of a response is far greater than that of the request that generates it. The goal of this attack is to use a relatively few resources to create a large amount of traffic against a target server. To execute this attack, an adversary send a request to a 3rd party service, spoofing the source address to be that of the target server. The larger response that is generated by the 3rd party service is then sent to the target server. By sending a large number of initial requests, the adversary can generate a tremendous amount of traffic directed at the target. The greater the discrepancy in size between the initial request and the final payload delivered to the target increased the effectiveness of this attack.
CAPEC-491: Quadratic Data Expansion
An adversary exploits macro-like substitution to cause a denial of service situation due to excessive memory being allocated to fully expand the data. The result of this denial of service could cause the application to freeze or crash. This involves defining a very large entity and using it multiple times in a single entity substitution. CAPEC-197 is a similar attack pattern, but it is easier to discover and defend against. This attack pattern does not perform multi-level substitution and therefore does not obviously appear to consume extensive resources.
CAPEC-493: SOAP Array Blowup
An adversary may execute an attack on a web service that uses SOAP messages in communication. By sending a very large SOAP array declaration to the web service, the attacker forces the web service to allocate space for the array elements before they are parsed by the XML parser. The attacker message is typically small in size containing a large array declaration of say 1,000,000 elements and a couple of array elements. This attack targets exhaustion of the memory resources of the web service.
CAPEC-494: TCP Fragmentation
An adversary may execute a TCP Fragmentation attack against a target with the intention of avoiding filtering rules of network controls, by attempting to fragment the TCP packet such that the headers flag field is pushed into the second fragment which typically is not filtered.
CAPEC-495: UDP Fragmentation
An attacker may execute a UDP Fragmentation attack against a target server in an attempt to consume resources such as bandwidth and CPU. IP fragmentation occurs when an IP datagram is larger than the MTU of the route the datagram has to traverse. Typically the attacker will use large UDP packets over 1500 bytes of data which forces fragmentation as ethernet MTU is 1500 bytes. This attack is a variation on a typical UDP flood but it enables more network bandwidth to be consumed with fewer packets. Additionally it has the potential to consume server CPU resources and fill memory buffers associated with the processing and reassembling of fragmented packets.
CAPEC-496: ICMP Fragmentation
An attacker may execute a ICMP Fragmentation attack against a target with the intention of consuming resources or causing a crash. The attacker crafts a large number of identical fragmented IP packets containing a portion of a fragmented ICMP message. The attacker these sends these messages to a target host which causes the host to become non-responsive. Another vector may be sending a fragmented ICMP message to a target host with incorrect sizes in the header which causes the host to hang.
CAPEC-528: XML Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using XML messages with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a web service. These attacks are accomplished by sending a large number of XML based requests and letting the service attempt to parse each one. In many cases this type of an attack will result in a XML Denial of Service (XDoS) due to an application becoming unstable, freezing, or crashing.