CWE-770
AllowedAllocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete
The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any intended restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated.
3028 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-HCC4-C3V8-RX92
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-01 21:19 – Updated: 2026-04-06 16:46Summary
An unbounded DNS cache could result in excessive memory usage possibly resulting in a DoS situation.
Impact
If an application makes requests to a very large number of hosts, this could cause the DNS cache to continue growing and slowly use excessive amounts of memory.
Patch: https://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp/commit/c4d77c3533122be353b8afca8e8675e3b4cbda98
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.13.3"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "aiohttp"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.13.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-34513"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-01T21:19:22Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-01T21:16:59Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nAn unbounded DNS cache could result in excessive memory usage possibly resulting in a DoS situation.\n\n### Impact\n\nIf an application makes requests to a very large number of hosts, this could cause the DNS cache to continue growing and slowly use excessive amounts of memory.\n\n-----\n\nPatch: https://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp/commit/c4d77c3533122be353b8afca8e8675e3b4cbda98",
"id": "GHSA-hcc4-c3v8-rx92",
"modified": "2026-04-06T16:46:44Z",
"published": "2026-04-01T21:19:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp/security/advisories/GHSA-hcc4-c3v8-rx92"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34513"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp/commit/c4d77c3533122be353b8afca8e8675e3b4cbda98"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp/releases/tag/v3.13.4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "AIOHTTP Affected by Denial of Service (DoS) via Unbounded DNS Cache in TCPConnector"
}
GHSA-HCG3-Q754-CR77
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-12 00:30 – Updated: 2025-04-14 15:38SSH servers which implement file transfer protocols are vulnerable to a denial of service attack from clients which complete the key exchange slowly, or not at all, causing pending content to be read into memory, but never transmitted.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "golang.org/x/crypto"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.35.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-22869"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-04-14T15:38:58Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-02-26T08:14:24Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "SSH servers which implement file transfer protocols are vulnerable to a denial of service attack from clients which complete the key exchange slowly, or not at all, causing pending content to be read into memory, but never transmitted.",
"id": "GHSA-hcg3-q754-cr77",
"modified": "2025-04-14T15:38:58Z",
"published": "2025-04-12T00:30:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-22869"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/golang/crypto/commit/7292932d45d55c7199324ab0027cc86e8198aa22"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/golang/crypto"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/crypto/+/652135"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://go.dev/cl/652135"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://go.dev/issue/71931"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2025-3487"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20250411-0010"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "golang.org/x/crypto Vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) via Slow or Incomplete Key Exchange"
}
GHSA-HCPW-H46R-3C39
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-11-01 19:00 – Updated: 2025-05-06 15:30Xenstore: guests can let run xenstored out of memory T[his CNA information record relates to multiple CVEs; the text explains which aspects/vulnerabilities correspond to which CVE.] Malicious guests can cause xenstored to allocate vast amounts of memory, eventually resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS) of xenstored. There are multiple ways how guests can cause large memory allocations in xenstored: - - by issuing new requests to xenstored without reading the responses, causing the responses to be buffered in memory - - by causing large number of watch events to be generated via setting up multiple xenstore watches and then e.g. deleting many xenstore nodes below the watched path - - by creating as many nodes as allowed with the maximum allowed size and path length in as many transactions as possible - - by accessing many nodes inside a transaction
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-42311"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-401",
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-11-01T13:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Xenstore: guests can let run xenstored out of memory T[his CNA information record relates to multiple CVEs; the text explains which aspects/vulnerabilities correspond to which CVE.] Malicious guests can cause xenstored to allocate vast amounts of memory, eventually resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS) of xenstored. There are multiple ways how guests can cause large memory allocations in xenstored: - - by issuing new requests to xenstored without reading the responses, causing the responses to be buffered in memory - - by causing large number of watch events to be generated via setting up multiple xenstore watches and then e.g. deleting many xenstore nodes below the watched path - - by creating as many nodes as allowed with the maximum allowed size and path length in as many transactions as possible - - by accessing many nodes inside a transaction",
"id": "GHSA-hcpw-h46r-3c39",
"modified": "2025-05-06T15:30:38Z",
"published": "2022-11-01T19:00:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-42311"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/YTMITQBGC23MSDHUCAPCVGLMVXIBXQTQ"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/YZVXG7OOOXCX6VIPEMLFDPIPUTFAYWPE"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/ZLI2NPNEH7CNJO3VZGQNOI4M4EWLNKPZ"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/YTMITQBGC23MSDHUCAPCVGLMVXIBXQTQ"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/YZVXG7OOOXCX6VIPEMLFDPIPUTFAYWPE"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/ZLI2NPNEH7CNJO3VZGQNOI4M4EWLNKPZ"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.debian.org/security/2022/dsa-5272"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://xenbits.xenproject.org/xsa/advisory-326.txt"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-326.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-HF25-HWQC-V6G2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-05-16 00:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 04:11In pushDynamicShortcut of ShortcutPackage.java, there is a possible way to get the device into a boot loop due to resource exhaustion. This could lead to local denial of service with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.Product: AndroidVersions: Android-11 Android-12 Android-12L Android-13Android ID: A-250576066
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-20930"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-05-15T22:15:11Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In pushDynamicShortcut of ShortcutPackage.java, there is a possible way to get the device into a boot loop due to resource exhaustion. This could lead to local denial of service with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.Product: AndroidVersions: Android-11 Android-12 Android-12L Android-13Android ID: A-250576066",
"id": "GHSA-hf25-hwqc-v6g2",
"modified": "2024-04-04T04:11:24Z",
"published": "2023-05-16T00:30:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-20930"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/2023-05-01"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-HF2G-6J7H-98WG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-05 16:41 – Updated: 2026-06-09 18:40Summary
networkMessenger.directMessageHandler in network/p2p/libp2p/netMessenger.go spawns a fresh goroutine for every incoming direct message before the antiflood layer makes an admission decision. There is no semaphore, throttler, or bound on concurrent in-flight spawns.
A single connected libp2p peer can open a DirectSendID stream and send well-formed TopicMessage envelopes with varying sequence numbers. Each accepted direct message reaches directMessageHandler and triggers a fresh goroutine before processor.ProcessReceivedMessage runs. This allows unbounded goroutine growth and node availability degradation from one peer.
This remains present in the latest release v1.7.17: network/p2p/libp2p/netMessenger.go:1060 still spawns go func(msg p2p.MessageP2P) before processor.ProcessReceivedMessage. I also verified current develop commit 10bcfd50, where the same spawn remains at network/p2p/libp2p/netMessenger.go:1115.
This is distinct from GHSA-74m6-4hjp-7226 and GHSA-87m7-qffr-542v. Those advisories concern MultiDataInterceptor decompression/throttler behavior. This report concerns the libp2p direct-message ingress wrapper spawning an unbounded goroutine before processor-level antiflood/admission logic runs. A patch to Batch.Decompress or MultiDataInterceptor does not bound this direct-message goroutine spawn.
Details
The affected path is network/p2p/libp2p/netMessenger.go in directMessageHandler.
The direct-message path transforms and validates the message, looks up the topic processor, then immediately spawns a goroutine:
func (netMes *networkMessenger) directMessageHandler(message *pubsub.Message, fromConnectedPeer core.PeerID) error {
var processor p2p.MessageProcessor
topic := *message.Topic
msg, err := netMes.transformAndCheckMessage(message, fromConnectedPeer, topic)
if err != nil {
return err
}
netMes.mutTopics.RLock()
processor = netMes.processors[topic]
netMes.mutTopics.RUnlock()
if processor == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("%w on directMessageHandler for topic %s", p2p.ErrNilValidator, topic)
}
go func(msg p2p.MessageP2P) {
if check.IfNil(msg) {
return
}
errProcess := processor.ProcessReceivedMessage(msg, fromConnectedPeer)
// ...
}(msg)
return nil
}
The processor-level antiflood decision happens inside ProcessReceivedMessage, after the goroutine, its stack, and the cloned message reference already exist. That means antiflood can bound processing rate, but not goroutine creation rate.
The existing goRoutinesThrottler with capacity broadcastGoRoutines = 1000 is wired into outgoing broadcast paths such as BroadcastOnChannelBlocking, not this incoming direct-message path.
The parallel pubsub ingress path in the same file handles a comparable inbound message surface synchronously:
err = handler.ProcessReceivedMessage(msg, fromConnectedPeer)
So the direct-message path is asymmetric: same transform/check function, same ProcessReceivedMessage callee, but direct-message ingress adds an unbounded goroutine spawn.
Reachability:
directSender.goregistersDirectSendIDas a libp2p stream protocol.directStreamHandlerreads framedpubsub.Messageenvelopes from the stream.directStreamHandlerforwards each message tonetworkMessenger.directMessageHandler.- Any connected peer can send well-formed envelopes to registered topics.
- The
seenMessagescache keys onFrom + Seqno;Seqnois attacker-controlled in the envelope, so incrementing it bypasses dedupe.
PoC
GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting does not appear to allow file attachments in this form, so I am including the reproduction command and captured output inline. I can provide the full Go test file immediately if useful.
The PoC is a Go test file intended to be placed under network/p2p/libp2p/ in a klever-go checkout. It exercises the real network/p2p/libp2p package with NewMockMessenger.
Reproduction:
git clone https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go
cd klever-go
git checkout v1.7.16
# Place dos_directmsg_test.go into:
# network/p2p/libp2p/
go test ./network/p2p/libp2p/ -run TestPoC_ -count=1 -v -timeout 60s
Captured output:
=== RUN TestPoC_DirectMessageHandler_SpawnsGoroutinePerMessage
baseline goroutines: 43
peak goroutines after 500 direct messages: 543 (delta = 500)
final goroutines after drain + GC: 43
POC_RESULT direct=spawn N=500 baseline=43 peak=543 delta=500 threshold=400 final=43
--- PASS
=== RUN TestPoC_SynchronousHandler_NoGoroutineGrowth
baseline goroutines: 47
peak goroutines after 500 synchronous calls: 47 (delta = 0)
POC_RESULT sync=block N=500 baseline=47 peak=47 delta=0
--- PASS
=== RUN TestPoC_DirectMessageHandler_NoThrottlerInPath
all 2000 SendToConnectedPeer calls returned in 2.490708ms -- no throttler blocking
POC_RESULT throttler=absent N=2000 elapsed=2.490708ms
--- PASS
Reading:
- 500 direct messages with slow processors produced exactly 500 new goroutines.
- The synchronous control path produced zero goroutine growth.
- 2000 messages, twice the outgoing
broadcastGoRoutines = 1000capacity, returned immediately, showing no ingress throttler blocks this path.
Impact
A single connected peer can sustain unbounded goroutine spawn growth on a klever-go node. Each spawned goroutine allocates its own stack, holds message references until the processor returns, and adds scheduler and GC pressure before antiflood admission can reject the message.
Under realistic attacker line rate and non-trivial processor latency, goroutine count can grow faster than the runtime drains it, degrading the node's ability to process legitimate traffic. This maps to the SECURITY.md High category: "Denial of Service affecting network availability."
All testing was local only. I did not contact Klever mainnet, public testnet, hosted RPCs, explorers, or third-party production infrastructure.
Suggested fixes:
- Wire
goRoutinesThrottler.CanProcess()or a dedicated ingress throttler before thego func()spawn indirectMessageHandler. - Or remove the goroutine and call
ProcessReceivedMessagesynchronously, matching the existingpubsubCallbackpath.
Disclosure note: I originally sent this report to security@klever.org on 2026-05-13. Since SECURITY.md lists GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting as the recommended channel, I am resubmitting it here.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.7.17"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/klever-io/klever-go"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.7.14"
},
{
"fixed": "1.7.18"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-52879"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-05T16:41:23Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\n`networkMessenger.directMessageHandler` in `network/p2p/libp2p/netMessenger.go` spawns a fresh goroutine for every incoming direct message before the antiflood layer makes an admission decision. There is no semaphore, throttler, or bound on concurrent in-flight spawns.\n\nA single connected libp2p peer can open a `DirectSendID` stream and send well-formed `TopicMessage` envelopes with varying sequence numbers. Each accepted direct message reaches `directMessageHandler` and triggers a fresh goroutine before `processor.ProcessReceivedMessage` runs. This allows unbounded goroutine growth and node availability degradation from one peer.\n\nThis remains present in the latest release `v1.7.17`: `network/p2p/libp2p/netMessenger.go:1060` still spawns `go func(msg p2p.MessageP2P)` before `processor.ProcessReceivedMessage`. I also verified current `develop` commit `10bcfd50`, where the same spawn remains at `network/p2p/libp2p/netMessenger.go:1115`.\n\nThis is distinct from GHSA-74m6-4hjp-7226 and GHSA-87m7-qffr-542v. Those advisories concern `MultiDataInterceptor` decompression/throttler behavior. This report concerns the libp2p direct-message ingress wrapper spawning an unbounded goroutine before processor-level antiflood/admission logic runs. A patch to `Batch.Decompress` or `MultiDataInterceptor` does not bound this direct-message goroutine spawn.\n\n### Details\n\nThe affected path is `network/p2p/libp2p/netMessenger.go` in `directMessageHandler`.\n\nThe direct-message path transforms and validates the message, looks up the topic processor, then immediately spawns a goroutine:\n\n```go\nfunc (netMes *networkMessenger) directMessageHandler(message *pubsub.Message, fromConnectedPeer core.PeerID) error {\n var processor p2p.MessageProcessor\n\n topic := *message.Topic\n msg, err := netMes.transformAndCheckMessage(message, fromConnectedPeer, topic)\n if err != nil {\n return err\n }\n\n netMes.mutTopics.RLock()\n processor = netMes.processors[topic]\n netMes.mutTopics.RUnlock()\n\n if processor == nil {\n return fmt.Errorf(\"%w on directMessageHandler for topic %s\", p2p.ErrNilValidator, topic)\n }\n\n go func(msg p2p.MessageP2P) {\n if check.IfNil(msg) {\n return\n }\n\n errProcess := processor.ProcessReceivedMessage(msg, fromConnectedPeer)\n // ...\n }(msg)\n\n return nil\n}\n```\n\nThe processor-level antiflood decision happens inside `ProcessReceivedMessage`, after the goroutine, its stack, and the cloned message reference already exist. That means antiflood can bound processing rate, but not goroutine creation rate.\n\nThe existing `goRoutinesThrottler` with capacity `broadcastGoRoutines = 1000` is wired into outgoing broadcast paths such as `BroadcastOnChannelBlocking`, not this incoming direct-message path.\n\nThe parallel pubsub ingress path in the same file handles a comparable inbound message surface synchronously:\n\n```go\nerr = handler.ProcessReceivedMessage(msg, fromConnectedPeer)\n```\n\nSo the direct-message path is asymmetric: same transform/check function, same `ProcessReceivedMessage` callee, but direct-message ingress adds an unbounded goroutine spawn.\n\nReachability:\n\n- `directSender.go` registers `DirectSendID` as a libp2p stream protocol.\n- `directStreamHandler` reads framed `pubsub.Message` envelopes from the stream.\n- `directStreamHandler` forwards each message to `networkMessenger.directMessageHandler`.\n- Any connected peer can send well-formed envelopes to registered topics.\n- The `seenMessages` cache keys on `From + Seqno`; `Seqno` is attacker-controlled in the envelope, so incrementing it bypasses dedupe.\n\n### PoC\n\nGitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting does not appear to allow file attachments in this form, so I am including the reproduction command and captured output inline. I can provide the full Go test file immediately if useful.\n\nThe PoC is a Go test file intended to be placed under `network/p2p/libp2p/` in a `klever-go` checkout. It exercises the real `network/p2p/libp2p` package with `NewMockMessenger`.\n\nReproduction:\n\n```bash\ngit clone https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go\ncd klever-go\ngit checkout v1.7.16\n\n# Place dos_directmsg_test.go into:\n# network/p2p/libp2p/\n\ngo test ./network/p2p/libp2p/ -run TestPoC_ -count=1 -v -timeout 60s\n```\n\nCaptured output:\n\n```text\n=== RUN TestPoC_DirectMessageHandler_SpawnsGoroutinePerMessage\n baseline goroutines: 43\n peak goroutines after 500 direct messages: 543 (delta = 500)\n final goroutines after drain + GC: 43\nPOC_RESULT direct=spawn N=500 baseline=43 peak=543 delta=500 threshold=400 final=43\n--- PASS\n\n=== RUN TestPoC_SynchronousHandler_NoGoroutineGrowth\n baseline goroutines: 47\n peak goroutines after 500 synchronous calls: 47 (delta = 0)\nPOC_RESULT sync=block N=500 baseline=47 peak=47 delta=0\n--- PASS\n\n=== RUN TestPoC_DirectMessageHandler_NoThrottlerInPath\n all 2000 SendToConnectedPeer calls returned in 2.490708ms -- no throttler blocking\nPOC_RESULT throttler=absent N=2000 elapsed=2.490708ms\n--- PASS\n```\n\nReading:\n\n1. 500 direct messages with slow processors produced exactly 500 new goroutines.\n2. The synchronous control path produced zero goroutine growth.\n3. 2000 messages, twice the outgoing `broadcastGoRoutines = 1000` capacity, returned immediately, showing no ingress throttler blocks this path.\n\n### Impact\n\nA single connected peer can sustain unbounded goroutine spawn growth on a klever-go node. Each spawned goroutine allocates its own stack, holds message references until the processor returns, and adds scheduler and GC pressure before antiflood admission can reject the message.\n\nUnder realistic attacker line rate and non-trivial processor latency, goroutine count can grow faster than the runtime drains it, degrading the node\u0027s ability to process legitimate traffic. This maps to the `SECURITY.md` High category: \"Denial of Service affecting network availability.\"\n\nAll testing was local only. I did not contact Klever mainnet, public testnet, hosted RPCs, explorers, or third-party production infrastructure.\n\nSuggested fixes:\n\n1. Wire `goRoutinesThrottler.CanProcess()` or a dedicated ingress throttler before the `go func()` spawn in `directMessageHandler`.\n2. Or remove the goroutine and call `ProcessReceivedMessage` synchronously, matching the existing `pubsubCallback` path.\n\nDisclosure note: I originally sent this report to `security@klever.org` on 2026-05-13. Since `SECURITY.md` lists GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting as the recommended channel, I am resubmitting it here.",
"id": "GHSA-hf2g-6j7h-98wg",
"modified": "2026-06-09T18:40:40Z",
"published": "2026-06-05T16:41:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/security/advisories/GHSA-hf2g-6j7h-98wg"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/releases/tag/v1.7.18"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "klever-go: Unbounded goroutine spawn on direct-message ingress enables peer-driven DoS"
}
GHSA-HF3C-WXG2-49Q9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-15 21:21 – Updated: 2025-04-15 21:21Impact
This report is to highlight a vulnerability in XGrammar, a library used by the structured output feature in vLLM. The XGrammar advisory is here: https://github.com/mlc-ai/xgrammar/security/advisories/GHSA-389x-67px-mjg3
The xgrammar library is the default backend used by vLLM to support structured output (a.k.a. guided decoding). Xgrammar provides a required, built-in cache for its compiled grammars stored in RAM. xgrammar is available by default through the OpenAI compatible API server with both the V0 and V1 engines.
A malicious user can send a stream of very short decoding requests with unique schemas, resulting in an addition to the cache for each request. This can result in a Denial of Service by consuming all of the system's RAM.
Note that even if vLLM was configured to use a different backend by default, it is still possible to choose xgrammar on a per-request basis using the guided_decoding_backend key of the extra_body field of the request with the V0 engine. This per-request choice is not available when using the V1 engine.
Patches
- https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/16283
Workarounds
There is no way to workaround this issue in existing versions of vLLM other than preventing untrusted access to the OpenAI compatible API server.
References
- https://github.com/mlc-ai/xgrammar/security/advisories/GHSA-389x-67px-mjg3
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "vllm"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.6.5"
},
{
"fixed": "0.8.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1395",
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-04-15T21:21:04Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nThis report is to highlight a vulnerability in XGrammar, a library used by the structured output feature in vLLM. The XGrammar advisory is here: https://github.com/mlc-ai/xgrammar/security/advisories/GHSA-389x-67px-mjg3\n\nThe [xgrammar](https://xgrammar.mlc.ai/docs/) library is the default backend used by vLLM to support structured output (a.k.a. guided decoding). Xgrammar provides a required, built-in cache for its compiled grammars stored in RAM. xgrammar is available by default through the OpenAI compatible API server with both the V0 and V1 engines.\n\nA malicious user can send a stream of very short decoding requests with unique schemas, resulting in an addition to the cache for each request. This can result in a Denial of Service by consuming all of the system\u0027s RAM.\n\nNote that even if vLLM was configured to use a different backend by default, it is still possible to choose xgrammar on a per-request basis using the `guided_decoding_backend` key of the `extra_body` field of the request with the V0 engine. This per-request choice is not available when using the V1 engine. \n### Patches\n\n* https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/16283\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThere is no way to workaround this issue in existing versions of vLLM other than preventing untrusted access to the OpenAI compatible API server.\n\n### References\n\n* https://github.com/mlc-ai/xgrammar/security/advisories/GHSA-389x-67px-mjg3",
"id": "GHSA-hf3c-wxg2-49q9",
"modified": "2025-04-15T21:21:04Z",
"published": "2025-04-15T21:21:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mlc-ai/xgrammar/security/advisories/GHSA-389x-67px-mjg3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-hf3c-wxg2-49q9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/16283"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/commit/cb84e45ac75b42ba6795145923e8eb323bb825ad"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "vLLM vulnerable to Denial of Service by abusing xgrammar cache"
}
GHSA-HF3X-74C5-WRCM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-20 18:31 – Updated: 2025-11-04 21:31A lack of rate limiting in the 'Forgot Password' feature of PHPJabbers Cinema Booking System v1.0 allows attackers to send an excessive amount of email for a legitimate user, leading to a possible Denial of Service (DoS) via a large amount of generated e-mail messages.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-51334"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-02-20T18:15:24Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A lack of rate limiting in the \u0027Forgot Password\u0027 feature of PHPJabbers Cinema Booking System v1.0 allows attackers to send an excessive amount of email for a legitimate user, leading to a possible Denial of Service (DoS) via a large amount of generated e-mail messages.",
"id": "GHSA-hf3x-74c5-wrcm",
"modified": "2025-11-04T21:31:31Z",
"published": "2025-02-20T18:31:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-51334"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://packetstorm.news/files/id/176512"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.phpjabbers.com/cinema-booking-system/#sectionDemo"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/176512/PHPJabbers-Cinema-Booking-System-1.0-Missing-Rate-Limiting.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-HF7W-MCPW-97MF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-08 15:32 – Updated: 2026-07-08 21:30App::Ack versions before 3.10.0 for Perl allow memory exhaustion via an unbounded context value in a project .ackrc.
ack searches up the directory hierarchy from the current directory for a project .ackrc and loads its options. The -B and -C context options accepted any positive integer, and ack sized the before-context buffer to that value, so a project .ackrc setting --before-context=100000000 made ack allocate a buffer of 100 million elements.
A project .ackrc committed to an untrusted repository can abort ack with an out-of-memory condition.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-49146"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-08T15:16:27Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "App::Ack versions before 3.10.0 for Perl allow memory exhaustion via an unbounded context value in a project .ackrc.\n\nack searches up the directory hierarchy from the current directory for a project .ackrc and loads its options. The -B and -C context options accepted any positive integer, and ack sized the before-context buffer to that value, so a project .ackrc setting --before-context=100000000 made ack allocate a buffer of 100 million elements.\n\nA project .ackrc committed to an untrusted repository can abort ack with an out-of-memory condition.",
"id": "GHSA-hf7w-mcpw-97mf",
"modified": "2026-07-08T21:30:26Z",
"published": "2026-07-08T15:32:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-49146"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/beyondgrep/ack3/commit/45ff5fe77dbd96f7332f31943102291f878f30b8.patch"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://metacpan.org/release/PETDANCE/ack-v3.10.0/source/Changes"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/07/08/8"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-HF8J-65VR-5P3M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:22 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:22The readBytes function in util/read.c in libming through 0.4.8 allows remote attackers to have unspecified impact via a crafted swf file that triggers a memory allocation failure.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-7582"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-02-07T18:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The readBytes function in util/read.c in libming through 0.4.8 allows remote attackers to have unspecified impact via a crafted swf file that triggers a memory allocation failure.",
"id": "GHSA-hf8j-65vr-5p3m",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:22:52Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:22:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-7582"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/libming/libming/issues/172"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-HF8V-4H5P-JJ4Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-15 21:31 – Updated: 2025-11-07 18:30Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in Azure Access Technology BLU-IC2, Azure Access Technology BLU-IC4 allows Flooding.This issue affects BLU-IC2: through 1.19.5; BLU-IC4: through 1.19.5.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-11832"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-10-15T19:15:31Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in Azure Access Technology BLU-IC2, Azure Access Technology BLU-IC4 allows Flooding.This issue affects BLU-IC2: through 1.19.5; BLU-IC4: through 1.19.5.",
"id": "GHSA-hf8v-4h5p-jj4q",
"modified": "2025-11-07T18:30:26Z",
"published": "2025-10-15T21:31:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-11832"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://azure-access.com/security-advisories"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
Mitigation
Clearly specify the minimum and maximum expectations for capabilities, and dictate which behaviors are acceptable when resource allocation reaches limits.
Mitigation
Limit the amount of resources that are accessible to unprivileged users. Set per-user limits for resources. Allow the system administrator to define these limits. Be careful to avoid CWE-410.
Mitigation
Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place, and it will help the administrator to identify who is committing the abuse. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation
- Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either:
- The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question.
- The second solution can be difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply requires more resources on the part of the attacker.
- recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, typically by using increasing time delays
- uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed.
Mitigation
Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.
Mitigation MIT-38.1
- If the program must fail, ensure that it fails gracefully (fails closed). There may be a temptation to simply let the program fail poorly in cases such as low memory conditions, but an attacker may be able to assert control before the software has fully exited. Alternately, an uncontrolled failure could cause cascading problems with other downstream components; for example, the program could send a signal to a downstream process so the process immediately knows that a problem has occurred and has a better chance of recovery.
- Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.
Mitigation MIT-47
Strategy: Resource Limitation
- Use quotas or other resource-limiting settings provided by the operating system or environment. For example, when managing system resources in POSIX, setrlimit() can be used to set limits for certain types of resources, and getrlimit() can determine how many resources are available. However, these functions are not available on all operating systems.
- When the current levels get close to the maximum that is defined for the application (see CWE-770), then limit the allocation of further resources to privileged users; alternately, begin releasing resources for less-privileged users. While this mitigation may protect the system from attack, it will not necessarily stop attackers from adversely impacting other users.
- Ensure that the application performs the appropriate error checks and error handling in case resources become unavailable (CWE-703).
CAPEC-125: Flooding
An adversary consumes the resources of a target by rapidly engaging in a large number of interactions with the target. This type of attack generally exposes a weakness in rate limiting or flow. When successful this attack prevents legitimate users from accessing the service and can cause the target to crash. This attack differs from resource depletion through leaks or allocations in that the latter attacks do not rely on the volume of requests made to the target but instead focus on manipulation of the target's operations. The key factor in a flooding attack is the number of requests the adversary can make in a given period of time. The greater this number, the more likely an attack is to succeed against a given target.
CAPEC-130: Excessive Allocation
An adversary causes the target to allocate excessive resources to servicing the attackers' request, thereby reducing the resources available for legitimate services and degrading or denying services. Usually, this attack focuses on memory allocation, but any finite resource on the target could be the attacked, including bandwidth, processing cycles, or other resources. This attack does not attempt to force this allocation through a large number of requests (that would be Resource Depletion through Flooding) but instead uses one or a small number of requests that are carefully formatted to force the target to allocate excessive resources to service this request(s). Often this attack takes advantage of a bug in the target to cause the target to allocate resources vastly beyond what would be needed for a normal request.
CAPEC-147: XML Ping of the Death
An attacker initiates a resource depletion attack where a large number of small XML messages are delivered at a sufficiently rapid rate to cause a denial of service or crash of the target. Transactions such as repetitive SOAP transactions can deplete resources faster than a simple flooding attack because of the additional resources used by the SOAP protocol and the resources necessary to process SOAP messages. The transactions used are immaterial as long as they cause resource utilization on the target. In other words, this is a normal flooding attack augmented by using messages that will require extra processing on the target.
CAPEC-197: Exponential Data Expansion
An adversary submits data to a target application which contains nested exponential data expansion to produce excessively large output. Many data format languages allow the definition of macro-like structures that can be used to simplify the creation of complex structures. However, this capability can be abused to create excessive demands on a processor's CPU and memory. A small number of nested expansions can result in an exponential growth in demands on memory.
CAPEC-229: Serialized Data Parameter Blowup
This attack exploits certain serialized data parsers (e.g., XML, YAML, etc.) which manage data in an inefficient manner. The attacker crafts an serialized data file with multiple configuration parameters in the same dataset. In a vulnerable parser, this results in a denial of service condition where CPU resources are exhausted because of the parsing algorithm. The weakness being exploited is tied to parser implementation and not language specific.
CAPEC-230: Serialized Data with Nested Payloads
Applications often need to transform data in and out of a data format (e.g., XML and YAML) by using a parser. It may be possible for an adversary to inject data that may have an adverse effect on the parser when it is being processed. Many data format languages allow the definition of macro-like structures that can be used to simplify the creation of complex structures. By nesting these structures, causing the data to be repeatedly substituted, an adversary can cause the parser to consume more resources while processing, causing excessive memory consumption and CPU utilization.
CAPEC-231: Oversized Serialized Data Payloads
An adversary injects oversized serialized data payloads into a parser during data processing to produce adverse effects upon the parser such as exhausting system resources and arbitrary code execution.
CAPEC-469: HTTP DoS
An attacker performs flooding at the HTTP level to bring down only a particular web application rather than anything listening on a TCP/IP connection. This denial of service attack requires substantially fewer packets to be sent which makes DoS harder to detect. This is an equivalent of SYN flood in HTTP. The idea is to keep the HTTP session alive indefinitely and then repeat that hundreds of times. This attack targets resource depletion weaknesses in web server software. The web server will wait to attacker's responses on the initiated HTTP sessions while the connection threads are being exhausted.
CAPEC-482: TCP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the TCP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service. These attacks exploit the weakness within the TCP protocol where there is some state information for the connection the server needs to maintain. This often involves the use of TCP SYN messages.
CAPEC-486: UDP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the UDP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming the available network bandwidth. Additionally, firewalls often open a port for each UDP connection destined for a service with an open UDP port, meaning the firewalls in essence save the connection state thus the high packet nature of a UDP flood can also overwhelm resources allocated to the firewall. UDP attacks can also target services like DNS or VoIP which utilize these protocols. Additionally, due to the session-less nature of the UDP protocol, the source of a packet is easily spoofed making it difficult to find the source of the attack.
CAPEC-487: ICMP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the ICMP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming the available network bandwidth. A typical attack involves a victim server receiving ICMP packets at a high rate from a wide range of source addresses. Additionally, due to the session-less nature of the ICMP protocol, the source of a packet is easily spoofed making it difficult to find the source of the attack.
CAPEC-488: HTTP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the HTTP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming resources at the application layer such as web services and their infrastructure. These attacks use legitimate session-based HTTP GET requests designed to consume large amounts of a server's resources. Since these are legitimate sessions this attack is very difficult to detect.
CAPEC-489: SSL Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the SSL protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming all the available resources on the server side. These attacks take advantage of the asymmetric relationship between the processing power used by the client and the processing power used by the server to create a secure connection. In this manner the attacker can make a large number of HTTPS requests on a low provisioned machine to tie up a disproportionately large number of resources on the server. The clients then continue to keep renegotiating the SSL connection. When multiplied by a large number of attacking machines, this attack can result in a crash or loss of service to legitimate users.
CAPEC-490: Amplification
An adversary may execute an amplification where the size of a response is far greater than that of the request that generates it. The goal of this attack is to use a relatively few resources to create a large amount of traffic against a target server. To execute this attack, an adversary send a request to a 3rd party service, spoofing the source address to be that of the target server. The larger response that is generated by the 3rd party service is then sent to the target server. By sending a large number of initial requests, the adversary can generate a tremendous amount of traffic directed at the target. The greater the discrepancy in size between the initial request and the final payload delivered to the target increased the effectiveness of this attack.
CAPEC-491: Quadratic Data Expansion
An adversary exploits macro-like substitution to cause a denial of service situation due to excessive memory being allocated to fully expand the data. The result of this denial of service could cause the application to freeze or crash. This involves defining a very large entity and using it multiple times in a single entity substitution. CAPEC-197 is a similar attack pattern, but it is easier to discover and defend against. This attack pattern does not perform multi-level substitution and therefore does not obviously appear to consume extensive resources.
CAPEC-493: SOAP Array Blowup
An adversary may execute an attack on a web service that uses SOAP messages in communication. By sending a very large SOAP array declaration to the web service, the attacker forces the web service to allocate space for the array elements before they are parsed by the XML parser. The attacker message is typically small in size containing a large array declaration of say 1,000,000 elements and a couple of array elements. This attack targets exhaustion of the memory resources of the web service.
CAPEC-494: TCP Fragmentation
An adversary may execute a TCP Fragmentation attack against a target with the intention of avoiding filtering rules of network controls, by attempting to fragment the TCP packet such that the headers flag field is pushed into the second fragment which typically is not filtered.
CAPEC-495: UDP Fragmentation
An attacker may execute a UDP Fragmentation attack against a target server in an attempt to consume resources such as bandwidth and CPU. IP fragmentation occurs when an IP datagram is larger than the MTU of the route the datagram has to traverse. Typically the attacker will use large UDP packets over 1500 bytes of data which forces fragmentation as ethernet MTU is 1500 bytes. This attack is a variation on a typical UDP flood but it enables more network bandwidth to be consumed with fewer packets. Additionally it has the potential to consume server CPU resources and fill memory buffers associated with the processing and reassembling of fragmented packets.
CAPEC-496: ICMP Fragmentation
An attacker may execute a ICMP Fragmentation attack against a target with the intention of consuming resources or causing a crash. The attacker crafts a large number of identical fragmented IP packets containing a portion of a fragmented ICMP message. The attacker these sends these messages to a target host which causes the host to become non-responsive. Another vector may be sending a fragmented ICMP message to a target host with incorrect sizes in the header which causes the host to hang.
CAPEC-528: XML Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using XML messages with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a web service. These attacks are accomplished by sending a large number of XML based requests and letting the service attempt to parse each one. In many cases this type of an attack will result in a XML Denial of Service (XDoS) due to an application becoming unstable, freezing, or crashing.