Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-674

Allowed-with-Review

Uncontrolled Recursion

Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product does not properly control the amount of recursion that takes place, consuming excessive resources, such as allocated memory or the program stack.

729 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-QPX9-HPMF-5GMW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-03 17:46 – Updated: 2026-05-05 22:01
VLAI
Summary
Underscore has unlimited recursion in _.flatten and _.isEqual, potential for DoS attack
Details

Impact

In simple words, some programs that use _.flatten or _.isEqual could be made to crash. Someone who wants to do harm may be able to do this on purpose. This can only be done if the program has special properties. It only works in Underscore versions up to 1.13.7. A more detailed explanation follows.

In affected versions of Underscore, the _.flatten and _.isEqual functions use recursion without a depth limit. Under very specific conditions, detailed below, an attacker could exploit this in a Denial of Service (DoS) attack by triggering a stack overflow.

A proof of concept (PoC) for this type of attack with _.isEqual:

const _ = require('underscore');

// build JSON string for nested object ~4500 levels deep
// (for this to be an attack, the JSON would have to come from
// a request or other untrusted input)
let json = '';
for (let i = 0; i < 4500; i++) json += '{"n":';
json += '"x"';
for (let i = 0; i < 4500; i++) json += '}';

// construct two distinct objects with equal shape from the above JSON
const a = JSON.parse(json);
const b = JSON.parse(json);

_.isEqual(a, b); // RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded

A proof of concept (PoC) for this type of attack with _.flatten:

const _ = require('underscore');

// build nested array ~4500 levels deep
// (like with _.isEqual, this nested array would have to be sourced
// from an untrusted external source for it to be an attack)
let nested = [];
for (let i = 0; i < 4500; i++) nested = [nested];

_.flatten(nested); // RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded

An application that crashes because of this can be restarted, so the bug is most relevant to applications for which continued operation is important, such as server applications. Furthermore, an application is only vulnerable to this type of attack if ALL of the following conditions are met:

  • Untrusted input must be used to create a recursive datastructure, for example using JSON.parse, with no enforced depth limit.
  • The datastructure thus created must be passed to _.flatten or _.isEqual.
  • In the case of _.flatten, the vulnerability can only be exploited if it is possible for a remote client to prepare a datastructure that consists of arrays at all levels AND if no finite depth limit is passed as the second argument to _.flatten.
  • In the case of _.isEqual, the vulnerability can only be exploited if there exists a code path in which two distinct datastructures that were submitted by the same remote client are compared using _.isEqual. For example, if a client submits data that are stored in a database, and the same client can later submit another datastructure that is then compared to the data that were saved in the database previously, OR if a client submits a single request, but its data are parsed twice, creating two non-identical but equivalent datastructures that are then compared.
  • Exceptions originating from the call to _.flatten or _.isEqual, as a result of a stack overflow, are not being caught.

All versions of Underscore up to and including 1.13.7 are affected by this weakness.

Patches

The problem has been patched in version 1.13.8. Upgrading to 1.13.8 or later completely prevents exploitation.

Note: historically, there have been breaking changes in minor releases of Underscore, especially between versions 1.6 and 1.9. However, upgrading from version 1.9 or later to any later 1.x version should be feasible with little or no effort for all users.

Workarounds

A workaround that works for both functions is to enforce a depth limit on the datastructure that is created from untrusted input. A limit of 1000 levels should prevent attacks from being successful on most systems. In systems with highly constrained hardware, we recommend lower limits, for example 100 levels.

Another possible workaround that only works for _.flatten, is to pass a second argument that limits the flattening depth to 1000 or less.

References

  • https://github.com/jashkenas/underscore/issues/3011
  • https://underscorejs.org/#1.13.8
  • https://underscorejs.org/#flatten
  • https://underscorejs.org/#isEqual
Severity
5.9 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
8.2 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.13.7"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "underscore"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.13.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-27601"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-674",
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-03T17:46:06Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-03T23:15:55Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nIn simple words, some programs that use `_.flatten` or `_.isEqual` could be made to crash. Someone who wants to do harm may be able to do this on purpose. This can only be done if the program has special properties. It only works in Underscore versions up to 1.13.7. A more detailed explanation follows.\n\nIn affected versions of Underscore, the `_.flatten` and `_.isEqual` functions use recursion without a depth limit. Under very specific conditions, detailed below, an attacker could exploit this in a Denial of Service (DoS) attack by triggering a stack overflow.\n\nA proof of concept (PoC) for this type of attack with `_.isEqual`:\n\n```js\nconst _ = require(\u0027underscore\u0027);\n\n// build JSON string for nested object ~4500 levels deep\n// (for this to be an attack, the JSON would have to come from\n// a request or other untrusted input)\nlet json = \u0027\u0027;\nfor (let i = 0; i \u003c 4500; i++) json += \u0027{\"n\":\u0027;\njson += \u0027\"x\"\u0027;\nfor (let i = 0; i \u003c 4500; i++) json += \u0027}\u0027;\n\n// construct two distinct objects with equal shape from the above JSON\nconst a = JSON.parse(json);\nconst b = JSON.parse(json);\n\n_.isEqual(a, b); // RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded\n```\n\nA proof of concept (PoC) for this type of attack with `_.flatten`:\n\n```js\nconst _ = require(\u0027underscore\u0027);\n\n// build nested array ~4500 levels deep\n// (like with _.isEqual, this nested array would have to be sourced\n// from an untrusted external source for it to be an attack)\nlet nested = [];\nfor (let i = 0; i \u003c 4500; i++) nested = [nested];\n\n_.flatten(nested); // RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded\n```\n\nAn application that crashes because of this can be restarted, so the bug is most relevant to applications for which continued operation is important, such as server applications. Furthermore, an application is only vulnerable to this type of attack if ALL of the following conditions are met:\n\n- Untrusted input must be used to create a recursive datastructure, for example using `JSON.parse`, with no enforced depth limit.\n- The datastructure thus created must be passed to `_.flatten` or `_.isEqual`.\n- In the case of `_.flatten`, the vulnerability can only be exploited if it is possible for a remote client to prepare a datastructure that consists of arrays at all levels AND if no finite depth limit is passed as the second argument to `_.flatten`.\n- In the case of `_.isEqual`, the vulnerability can only be exploited if there exists a code path in which two distinct datastructures that were submitted by the same remote client are compared using `_.isEqual`. For example, if a client submits data that are stored in a database, and the same client can later submit another datastructure that is then compared to the data that were saved in the database previously, OR if a client submits a single request, but its data are parsed twice, creating two non-identical but equivalent datastructures that are then compared.\n- Exceptions originating from the call to `_.flatten` or `_.isEqual`, as a result of a stack overflow, are not being caught.\n\nAll versions of Underscore up to and including 1.13.7 are affected by this weakness.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe problem has been patched in version 1.13.8. Upgrading to 1.13.8 or later completely prevents exploitation.\n\n**Note:** historically, there have been breaking changes in minor releases of Underscore, especially between versions 1.6 and 1.9. However, upgrading from version 1.9 or later to any later 1.x version should be feasible with little or no effort for all users.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nA workaround that works for both functions is to enforce a depth limit on the datastructure that is created from untrusted input. A limit of 1000 levels should prevent attacks from being successful on most systems. In systems with highly constrained hardware, we recommend lower limits, for example 100 levels.\n\nAnother possible workaround that only works for `_.flatten`, is to pass a second argument that limits the flattening depth to 1000 or less.\n\n### References\n\n- https://github.com/jashkenas/underscore/issues/3011\n- https://underscorejs.org/#1.13.8\n- https://underscorejs.org/#flatten\n- https://underscorejs.org/#isEqual",
  "id": "GHSA-qpx9-hpmf-5gmw",
  "modified": "2026-05-05T22:01:45Z",
  "published": "2026-03-03T17:46:06Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jashkenas/underscore/security/advisories/GHSA-qpx9-hpmf-5gmw"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27601"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jashkenas/underscore/issues/3011"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jashkenas/underscore/commit/411e222eb0ca5d570cc4f6315c02c05b830ed2b4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jashkenas/underscore/commit/a6e23ae9647461ec33ad9f92a2ecfc220eea0a84"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/jashkenas/underscore"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://underscorejs.org/#1.13.8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://underscorejs.org/#flatten"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://underscorejs.org/#isEqual"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Underscore has unlimited recursion in _.flatten and _.isEqual, potential for DoS attack"
}

GHSA-QQJX-QV79-G2Q3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:42 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:42
VLAI
Details

There is a stack consumption vulnerability in the lex function in parser.hpp (as used in sassc) in LibSass 3.4.5. A crafted input will lead to a remote denial of service.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2017-11554"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-674"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2017-07-23T03:29:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "There is a stack consumption vulnerability in the lex function in parser.hpp (as used in sassc) in LibSass 3.4.5. A crafted input will lead to a remote denial of service.",
  "id": "GHSA-qqjx-qv79-g2q3",
  "modified": "2022-05-13T01:42:25Z",
  "published": "2022-05-13T01:42:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-11554"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sass/libsass/issues/2445"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1471780"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-QR3M-XW4C-JQW3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-16 21:09 – Updated: 2026-04-24 20:51
VLAI
Summary
ChilliCream GraphQL Platform: Utf8GraphQLParser Stack Overflow via Deeply Nested GraphQL Documents
Details

Impact

Hot Chocolate's Utf8GraphQLParser is a recursive descent parser with no recursion depth limit. A crafted GraphQL document with deeply nested selection sets, object values, list values, or list types can trigger a StackOverflowException on payloads as small as 40 KB.

Because StackOverflowException is uncatchable in .NET (since .NET 2.0), the entire worker process is terminated immediately. All in-flight HTTP requests, background IHostedService tasks, and open WebSocket subscriptions on that worker are dropped. The orchestrator (Kubernetes, IIS, etc.) must restart the process.

This occurs before any validation rules run — MaxExecutionDepth, complexity analyzers, persisted query allow-lists, and custom IDocumentValidatorRule implementations cannot intercept the crash because Utf8GraphQLParser.Parse is invoked before validation. The existing MaxAllowedFields=2048 limit does not help because the crashing payloads contain very few fields.

Severity: Critical (9.1) — CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

Patches

  • v12 line: Fixed in 12.22.7
  • v13 line: Fixed in 13.9.16
  • v14 line: Fixed in 14.3.1
  • v15 line: Fixed in 15.1.14

The fix adds a MaxAllowedRecursionDepth option to ParserOptions with a safe default, and enforces it across all recursive parser methods (ParseSelectionSet, ParseValueLiteral, ParseObject, ParseList, ParseTypeReference, etc.). When the limit is exceeded, a catchable SyntaxException is thrown instead of overflowing the stack.

Workarounds

There is no application-level workaround. StackOverflowException cannot be caught in .NET. The only mitigation is to upgrade to a patched version.

Operators can reduce (but not eliminate) risk by limiting HTTP request body size at the reverse proxy or load balancer layer, though the smallest crashing payload (40 KB) is well below most default body size limits and is highly compressible (~few hundred bytes via gzip).

References

  • Fix for v15: https://github.com/ChilliCream/graphql-platform/pull/9528
Severity
9.1 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "HotChocolate.Language"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "12.22.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "HotChocolate.Language"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "13.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "13.9.16"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "HotChocolate.Language"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "14.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "14.3.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "HotChocolate.Language"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "15.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "15.1.14"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-40324"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-674"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-16T21:09:40Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-18T00:16:36Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nHot Chocolate\u0027s `Utf8GraphQLParser` is a recursive descent parser with no recursion depth limit. A crafted GraphQL document with deeply nested selection sets, object values, list values, or list types can trigger a `StackOverflowException` on payloads as small as **40 KB**.\n\nBecause `StackOverflowException` is **uncatchable in .NET** (since .NET 2.0), the entire worker process is terminated immediately. All in-flight HTTP requests, background `IHostedService` tasks, and open WebSocket subscriptions on that worker are dropped. The orchestrator (Kubernetes, IIS, etc.) must restart the process.\n\nThis occurs **before any validation rules run** \u2014 `MaxExecutionDepth`, complexity analyzers, persisted query allow-lists, and custom `IDocumentValidatorRule` implementations cannot intercept the crash because `Utf8GraphQLParser.Parse` is invoked before validation. The existing `MaxAllowedFields=2048` limit does not help because the crashing payloads contain very few fields.\n\n**Severity:** Critical (9.1) \u2014 `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H`\n\n### Patches\n\n- **v12 line:** Fixed in `12.22.7`\n- **v13 line:** Fixed in `13.9.16`\n- **v14 line:** Fixed in `14.3.1`\n- **v15 line:** Fixed in `15.1.14`\n\nThe fix adds a `MaxAllowedRecursionDepth` option to `ParserOptions` with a safe default, and enforces it across all recursive parser methods (`ParseSelectionSet`, `ParseValueLiteral`, `ParseObject`, `ParseList`, `ParseTypeReference`, etc.). When the limit is exceeded, a catchable `SyntaxException` is thrown instead of overflowing the stack.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThere is no application-level workaround. `StackOverflowException` cannot be caught in .NET. The only mitigation is to upgrade to a patched version.\n\nOperators can reduce (but not eliminate) risk by limiting HTTP request body size at the reverse proxy or load balancer layer, though the smallest crashing payload (40 KB) is well below most default body size limits and is highly compressible (~few hundred bytes via gzip).\n\n### References\n\n- Fix for v15: https://github.com/ChilliCream/graphql-platform/pull/9528",
  "id": "GHSA-qr3m-xw4c-jqw3",
  "modified": "2026-04-24T20:51:04Z",
  "published": "2026-04-16T21:09:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ChilliCream/graphql-platform/security/advisories/GHSA-qr3m-xw4c-jqw3"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40324"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ChilliCream/graphql-platform/pull/9528"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ChilliCream/graphql-platform/pull/9530"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ChilliCream/graphql-platform/pull/9531"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ChilliCream/graphql-platform/commit/08c0caa42ca33c121bbed49d2db892e5bf6fb541"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ChilliCream/graphql-platform/commit/4cbaf67d366f800fc1e484bc5c06dfcf27b45023"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ChilliCream/graphql-platform/commit/b185eb276c9ee227bd44616ff113be7f01a66c69"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ChilliCream/graphql-platform/commit/b9271e6a500484c002fd528dcd34d1a9b445480f"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/ChilliCream/graphql-platform"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ChilliCream/graphql-platform/releases/tag/12.22.7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ChilliCream/graphql-platform/releases/tag/13.9.16"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ChilliCream/graphql-platform/releases/tag/14.3.1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ChilliCream/graphql-platform/releases/tag/15.1.14"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "ChilliCream GraphQL Platform: Utf8GraphQLParser Stack Overflow via Deeply Nested GraphQL Documents"
}

GHSA-QRCQ-HR7G-X7GM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-01-29 00:00 – Updated: 2022-02-04 00:00
VLAI
Details

The comment function in YzmCMS v6.3 was discovered as being able to be operated concurrently, allowing attackers to create an unusually large number of comments.

Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-23889"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-674"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-01-28T21:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The comment function in YzmCMS v6.3 was discovered as being able to be operated concurrently, allowing attackers to create an unusually large number of comments.",
  "id": "GHSA-qrcq-hr7g-x7gm",
  "modified": "2022-02-04T00:00:37Z",
  "published": "2022-01-29T00:00:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-23889"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/yzmcms/yzmcms/issues/61"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-QV48-PW56-MWC4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-18 15:31 – Updated: 2026-07-18 15:31
VLAI
Details

SurrealDB versions before 1.1.0 fail to enforce recursion depth limits when parsing nested SurrealQL statements including IF, RELATE, and attribute access idioms. Authorized attackers can submit queries with excessive nesting depth to cause stack overflow and crash the server.

Severity
6.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
7.1 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-58370"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-674"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-18T14:17:10Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "SurrealDB versions before 1.1.0 fail to enforce recursion depth limits when parsing nested SurrealQL statements including IF, RELATE, and attribute access idioms. Authorized attackers can submit queries with excessive nesting depth to cause stack overflow and crash the server.",
  "id": "GHSA-qv48-pw56-mwc4",
  "modified": "2026-07-18T15:31:49Z",
  "published": "2026-07-18T15:31:49Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb/security/advisories/GHSA-6r8p-hpg7-825g"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-58370"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/surrealdb-before-uncontrolled-recursion-denial-of-service"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-QVXG-WJXC-R4GG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-06-07 16:11 – Updated: 2023-06-07 16:11
VLAI
Summary
Vapor vulnerable to denial of service in URLEncodedFormDecoder
Details

Vapor is an HTTP web framework for Swift. Vapor versions earlier than 4.61.1 are vulnerable to a denial of service in the URLEncodedFormDecoder.

Impact

When using automatic content decoding, e.g. 

app.post("foo") { request -> String in
  let foo = try request.content.decode(Foo.self)
  return "\(foo)"
}

An attacker can craft a request body that can make the server crash with the following request:

curl -d "array[_0][0][array][_0][0][array]$(for f in $(seq 1100); do echo -n '[_0][0][array]'; done)[string][_0]=hello%20world" http://localhost:8080/foo

The issue is unbounded, attacker controlled stack growth which will at some point lead to a stack overflow.

Patches

Fixed in 4.61.1

Workarounds

If you don't need to decode Form URL Encoded data, you can disable the ContentConfiguration so it won't be used. E.g. in configure.swift

var contentConfig = ContentConfiguration()
contentConfig.use(encoder: JSONEncoder.custom(dates: .iso8601), for: .json)
contentConfig.use(decoder: JSONDecoder.custom(dates: .iso8601), for: .json)
contentConfig.use(encoder: JSONEncoder.custom(dates: .iso8601), for: .jsonAPI)
contentConfig.use(decoder: JSONDecoder.custom(dates: .iso8601), for: .jsonAPI)
ContentConfiguration.global = contentConfig

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in the Vapor repo * Ask in Vapor Discord

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "SwiftURL",
        "name": "github.com/vapor/vapor"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.61.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-31019"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-120",
      "CWE-121",
      "CWE-674"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-06-07T16:11:16Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-06-09T13:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Vapor is an HTTP web framework for Swift. Vapor versions earlier than 4.61.1 are vulnerable to a denial of service in the URLEncodedFormDecoder.\n\n### Impact\nWhen using automatic content decoding, e.g. \n\n```swift\napp.post(\"foo\") { request -\u003e String in\n  let foo = try request.content.decode(Foo.self)\n  return \"\\(foo)\"\n}\n```\n\nAn attacker can craft a request body that can make the server crash with the following request:\n\n```\ncurl -d \"array[_0][0][array][_0][0][array]$(for f in $(seq 1100); do echo -n \u0027[_0][0][array]\u0027; done)[string][_0]=hello%20world\" http://localhost:8080/foo\n```\n\nThe issue is unbounded, attacker controlled stack growth which will at some point lead to a stack overflow.\n\n### Patches\nFixed in 4.61.1\n\n### Workarounds\nIf you don\u0027t need to decode Form URL Encoded data, you can disable the `ContentConfiguration` so it won\u0027t be used. E.g. in **configure.swift**\n\n```swift\nvar contentConfig = ContentConfiguration()\ncontentConfig.use(encoder: JSONEncoder.custom(dates: .iso8601), for: .json)\ncontentConfig.use(decoder: JSONDecoder.custom(dates: .iso8601), for: .json)\ncontentConfig.use(encoder: JSONEncoder.custom(dates: .iso8601), for: .jsonAPI)\ncontentConfig.use(decoder: JSONDecoder.custom(dates: .iso8601), for: .jsonAPI)\nContentConfiguration.global = contentConfig\n```\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open an issue in [the Vapor repo](https://github.com/vapor/vapor)\n* Ask in [Vapor Discord](http://vapor.team)",
  "id": "GHSA-qvxg-wjxc-r4gg",
  "modified": "2023-06-07T16:11:16Z",
  "published": "2023-06-07T16:11:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vapor/vapor/security/advisories/GHSA-qvxg-wjxc-r4gg"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31019"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vapor/vapor/commit/6c63226a4ab82ce53730eb1afb9ca63866fcf033"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/vapor/vapor"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Vapor vulnerable to denial of service in URLEncodedFormDecoder"
}

GHSA-QW5H-7F53-XRP6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-05-21 14:28 – Updated: 2024-11-13 16:26
VLAI
Summary
Stack overflow in `ParseAttrValue` with nested tensors
Details

Impact

The implementation of ParseAttrValue can be tricked into stack overflow due to recursion by giving in a specially crafted input.

Patches

We have patched the issue in GitHub commit e07e1c3d26492c06f078c7e5bf2d138043e199c1.

The fix will be included in TensorFlow 2.5.0. We will also cherrypick this commit on TensorFlow 2.4.2, TensorFlow 2.3.3, TensorFlow 2.2.3 and TensorFlow 2.1.4, as these are also affected and still in supported range.

For more information

Please consult our security guide for more information regarding the security model and how to contact us with issues and questions.

Severity
2.5 (Low)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
2.0 (Low)
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "tensorflow"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.1.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "tensorflow"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.2.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.2.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "tensorflow"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.3.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.3.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "tensorflow"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.4.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.4.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "tensorflow-cpu"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.1.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "tensorflow-cpu"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.2.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.2.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "tensorflow-cpu"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.3.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.3.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "tensorflow-cpu"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.4.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.4.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "tensorflow-gpu"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.1.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "tensorflow-gpu"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.2.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.2.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "tensorflow-gpu"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.3.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.3.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "tensorflow-gpu"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.4.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.4.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-29615"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-674"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2021-05-17T21:22:43Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-05-14T20:15:00Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nThe implementation of [`ParseAttrValue`](https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/blob/c22d88d6ff33031aa113e48aa3fc9aa74ed79595/tensorflow/core/framework/attr_value_util.cc#L397-L453) can be tricked into stack overflow due to recursion by giving in a specially crafted input.\n\n### Patches\nWe have patched the issue in GitHub commit [e07e1c3d26492c06f078c7e5bf2d138043e199c1](https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/commit/e07e1c3d26492c06f078c7e5bf2d138043e199c1).\n\nThe fix will be included in TensorFlow 2.5.0. We will also cherrypick this commit on TensorFlow 2.4.2, TensorFlow 2.3.3, TensorFlow 2.2.3 and TensorFlow 2.1.4, as these are also affected and still in supported range.\n\n### For more information\nPlease consult [our security guide](https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/blob/master/SECURITY.md) for more information regarding the security model and how to contact us with issues and questions.",
  "id": "GHSA-qw5h-7f53-xrp6",
  "modified": "2024-11-13T16:26:55Z",
  "published": "2021-05-21T14:28:45Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/security/advisories/GHSA-qw5h-7f53-xrp6"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-29615"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/commit/e07e1c3d26492c06f078c7e5bf2d138043e199c1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/tensorflow-cpu/PYSEC-2021-543.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/tensorflow-gpu/PYSEC-2021-741.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/tensorflow/PYSEC-2021-252.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Stack overflow in `ParseAttrValue` with nested tensors"
}

GHSA-QWM2-W9F2-J6CG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-05 09:31 – Updated: 2026-08-07 00:31
VLAI
Details

A pre-authentication attacker could leverage type nesting to cause a StackOverflowError potentially leading to denial of service.

This issue affects Apache Qpid Proton-Dotnet through 1.0.0.

Users are recommended to upgrade to version 1.1.0, which fixes the issue

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-67552"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-674"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-05T07:16:38Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A pre-authentication attacker could leverage type nesting to cause a StackOverflowError potentially leading to denial of service.\n\nThis issue affects Apache Qpid Proton-Dotnet through 1.0.0.\n\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to version 1.1.0, which fixes the issue",
  "id": "GHSA-qwm2-w9f2-j6cg",
  "modified": "2026-08-07T00:31:08Z",
  "published": "2026-08-05T09:31:15Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-67552"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/4dyg0gycrv55ox4oywqght61b053g8xj"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/08/04/23"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-R292-9MHP-454M

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-24 16:26 – Updated: 2026-08-21 19:08
VLAI
Summary
node-tar: Uncontrolled recursion in mapHas/filesFilter allows uncatchable stack-overflow DoS via crafted long-path tar with member selection
Details

Summary

node-tar (npm tar) contains an uncontrolled-recursion stack-exhaustion DoS in the internal mapHas helper used by filesFilter. When a consumer calls tar.t(...) or tar.x(...) with a non-empty member-selection list, node-tar installs a filter that closes over the recursive mapHas (src/list.ts:33-44). mapHas walks an entry path upward one path.dirname() call per recursion with no segment cap. A single crafted tar with a GNU-L (or PAX-x) long-path header can deliver a path of tens of thousands of /-separated segments (up to maxMetaEntrySize = 1 MiB). The recursion overflows the call stack, throwing an uncatchable RangeError that terminates the Node process on async/streaming consumers.

Root Cause

filesFilter (src/list.ts:27-51) is installed whenever a caller passes a member-selection list (src/list.ts:119-122, src/extract.ts:55-57). Its filter is invoked at src/parse.ts:253 (entry.ignore = entry.ignore || !this.filter(entry.path, entry)) inside Parser[CONSUMEHEADER] — and crucially outside the only try/catch in that method (which wraps new Header at src/parse.ts:179-183). mapHas recurses once per path segment with no depth limit. The Unpack maxDepth guard (src/unpack.ts:342, in [CHECKPATH]) only runs on the 'entry' event, which fires after CONSUMEHEADER has already invoked the filter — so the stack overflows before any depth guard executes. tar.t (list) has no maxDepth at all.

Impact

Unauthenticated, remotely-triggerable denial of service: a ~188-byte gzip (≈26 KB tar) crashes any service that lists or extracts selected members from an untrusted archive (package registries, CI artifact/cache restore, upload processors). On async (await tar.t(...)/tar.x(...)) and streaming/pipe consumers the RangeError escapes the promise as an uncaughtException and terminates the process — standard defensive try/catch around the async call does NOT prevent it. (The synchronous API is catchable; the async/stream paths — the dominant server pattern — are not.)

Proof of Concept

// Build a tar whose single entry has a GNU-L long path of ~12,000 "a/" segments (~26 KB),
// gzip it (≈188 bytes), then have a consumer list/extract with member selection:
const tar = require('tar');
await tar.t({ file: 'evil.tar.gz', gzip: true }, ['some-member']); // -> RangeError, process exit

Empirically reproduced on Node v24.18.0 against built dist/commonjs of node-tar 7.5.20: 188-byte gzip → 26,112-byte tar (12,000 segments) → uncaught RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded → process exit. A control run with no member-selection list (filter not installed) parses cleanly (exit 0), isolating mapHas as the sole cause.

Attack Chain

  1. Entry. Attacker crafts a tar with a GNU L (or PAX x) long-path header whose body is "a/"×~12000 (~26 KB), followed by a normal file entry.
  2. Guard: maxMetaEntrySize caps the meta body at 1 MiB (src/parse.ts:241).
  3. Bypass proof: 26 KB ≪ 1 MiB → accepted (verified: 26 KB archive parsed up to the filter).
  4. Trigger. Victim service calls tar.t({file},[sel]) or tar.x({file,cwd},[sel]) (member selection — a documented, common API).
  5. Guard: Unpack.maxDepth (default 1024) at src/unpack.ts:342; decompression-ratio guard.
  6. Bypass proof: maxDepth lives in [CHECKPATH] on the 'entry' event, which fires after CONSUMEHEADER's filter call — the crash occurs before it (extract exits 1 with default maxDepth). tar.t has no maxDepth. Ratio is ~139× (trivial); no total-bytes cap applies to the uncompressed meta body.
  7. Sink. this.filter(entry.path) → mapHas recurses once per / segment (src/list.ts:39).
  8. Guard: try/catch in CONSUMEHEADER.
  9. Bypass proof: the only try/catch wraps new Header (src/parse.ts:179-183); the this.filter(...) call at src/parse.ts:253 is outside it. The RangeError propagates out of the stream write/'data' path → uncaught exception (verified: process.on('uncaughtException') fires; async await+try/catch does NOT intercept).
  10. Impact. Node process termination; a 188-byte gzip crashes any consumer that lists/extracts selected members from untrusted archives.

Bypass Evidence

  • mapHas recursion is member-name-independent: the crash fires even when the requested members do not match the malicious entry path — the attacker only needs the consumer to use member selection.
  • Standalone mapHas overflows at 20k–30k segments; on the real streaming path (atop write → CONSUMECHUNK → CONSUMEHEADER → filter) it crashes at ≤8k segments (finder's ~12k estimate is accurate for the reachable path).
  • Control (no member list → no filter) parses cleanly (exit 0), isolating mapHas.

Affected Versions

<= 7.5.20 (npm tar). mapHas present verbatim on tag v7.5.20 (latest GitHub release and npm dist-tag latest); no segment/depth cap in src/list.ts or the CONSUMEHEADER filter path; HEAD == 7.5.20, no unreleased fix.

Suggested Fix

Rewrite mapHas iteratively (walk dirname in a while loop with a segment/visited cap), or enforce a hard path-segment limit in Header/Parser independent of maxMetaEntrySize, applied before any per-entry filter runs.

Dedup Note

Distinct from CVE-2024-28863 / GHSA-f5x3-32g6-qm9j "lack of folders depth validation" (that bounds mkdir recursion during extraction via maxDepth in Unpack[CHECKPATH] on the 'entry' event — a different sink, code path, and fix; runs after the filter and does not apply to tar.t). Also distinct from the PAX NUL/numeric-path crash advisories (improper-input-to-fs / type confusion, not recursion) and the gzip-bomb advisory (resource exhaustion on disk writes). None touch list.ts/filesFilter/mapHas or require member selection.

Reported by zx (Jace) — GitHub: @manus-use

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 7.5.20"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "tar"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.5.21"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-73566"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-674"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-24T16:26:16Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-13T18:18:19Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n`node-tar` (npm `tar`) contains an uncontrolled-recursion stack-exhaustion DoS in the internal `mapHas` helper used by `filesFilter`. When a consumer calls `tar.t(...)` or `tar.x(...)` with a non-empty member-selection list, node-tar installs a filter that closes over the recursive `mapHas` (`src/list.ts:33-44`). `mapHas` walks an entry path upward one `path.dirname()` call per recursion **with no segment cap**. A single crafted tar with a GNU-`L` (or PAX-`x`) long-path header can deliver a path of tens of thousands of `/`-separated segments (up to `maxMetaEntrySize` = 1 MiB). The recursion overflows the call stack, throwing an uncatchable `RangeError` that terminates the Node process on async/streaming consumers.\n\n## Root Cause\n`filesFilter` (`src/list.ts:27-51`) is installed whenever a caller passes a member-selection list (`src/list.ts:119-122`, `src/extract.ts:55-57`). Its filter is invoked at `src/parse.ts:253` (`entry.ignore = entry.ignore || !this.filter(entry.path, entry)`) inside `Parser[CONSUMEHEADER]` \u2014 and crucially **outside** the only try/catch in that method (which wraps `new Header` at `src/parse.ts:179-183`). `mapHas` recurses once per path segment with no depth limit. The `Unpack` `maxDepth` guard (`src/unpack.ts:342`, in `[CHECKPATH]`) only runs on the `\u0027entry\u0027` event, which fires *after* `CONSUMEHEADER` has already invoked the filter \u2014 so the stack overflows before any depth guard executes. `tar.t` (list) has no `maxDepth` at all.\n\n## Impact\nUnauthenticated, remotely-triggerable denial of service: a ~188-byte gzip (\u224826 KB tar) crashes any service that lists or extracts *selected members* from an untrusted archive (package registries, CI artifact/cache restore, upload processors). On async (`await tar.t(...)`/`tar.x(...)`) and streaming/`pipe` consumers the `RangeError` escapes the promise as an `uncaughtException` and terminates the process \u2014 standard defensive `try/catch` around the async call does NOT prevent it. (The synchronous API is catchable; the async/stream paths \u2014 the dominant server pattern \u2014 are not.)\n\n## Proof of Concept\n```js\n// Build a tar whose single entry has a GNU-L long path of ~12,000 \"a/\" segments (~26 KB),\n// gzip it (\u2248188 bytes), then have a consumer list/extract with member selection:\nconst tar = require(\u0027tar\u0027);\nawait tar.t({ file: \u0027evil.tar.gz\u0027, gzip: true }, [\u0027some-member\u0027]); // -\u003e RangeError, process exit\n```\nEmpirically reproduced on Node v24.18.0 against built `dist/commonjs` of node-tar 7.5.20: 188-byte gzip \u2192 26,112-byte tar (12,000 segments) \u2192 uncaught `RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded` \u2192 process exit. A control run with no member-selection list (filter not installed) parses cleanly (exit 0), isolating `mapHas` as the sole cause.\n\n## Attack Chain\n1. **Entry.** Attacker crafts a tar with a GNU `L` (or PAX `x`) long-path header whose body is `\"a/\"`\u00d7~12000 (~26 KB), followed by a normal file entry.\n   - **Guard:** `maxMetaEntrySize` caps the meta body at 1 MiB (`src/parse.ts:241`).\n   - **Bypass proof:** 26 KB \u226a 1 MiB \u2192 accepted (verified: 26 KB archive parsed up to the filter).\n2. **Trigger.** Victim service calls `tar.t({file},[sel])` or `tar.x({file,cwd},[sel])` (member selection \u2014 a documented, common API).\n   - **Guard:** `Unpack.maxDepth` (default 1024) at `src/unpack.ts:342`; decompression-ratio guard.\n   - **Bypass proof:** `maxDepth` lives in `[CHECKPATH]` on the `\u0027entry\u0027` event, which fires *after* `CONSUMEHEADER`\u0027s filter call \u2014 the crash occurs before it (extract exits 1 with default maxDepth). `tar.t` has no maxDepth. Ratio is ~139\u00d7 (trivial); no total-bytes cap applies to the uncompressed meta body.\n3. **Sink.** `this.filter(entry.path)` \u2192 `mapHas` recurses once per `/` segment (`src/list.ts:39`).\n   - **Guard:** try/catch in `CONSUMEHEADER`.\n   - **Bypass proof:** the only try/catch wraps `new Header` (`src/parse.ts:179-183`); the `this.filter(...)` call at `src/parse.ts:253` is outside it. The `RangeError` propagates out of the stream write/`\u0027data\u0027` path \u2192 uncaught exception (verified: `process.on(\u0027uncaughtException\u0027)` fires; async `await`+`try/catch` does NOT intercept).\n4. **Impact.** Node process termination; a 188-byte gzip crashes any consumer that lists/extracts selected members from untrusted archives.\n\n## Bypass Evidence\n- `mapHas` recursion is member-name-independent: the crash fires even when the requested members do not match the malicious entry path \u2014 the attacker only needs the consumer to *use* member selection.\n- Standalone `mapHas` overflows at 20k\u201330k segments; on the real streaming path (atop `write \u2192 CONSUMECHUNK \u2192 CONSUMEHEADER \u2192 filter`) it crashes at \u22648k segments (finder\u0027s ~12k estimate is accurate for the reachable path).\n- Control (no member list \u2192 no filter) parses cleanly (exit 0), isolating `mapHas`.\n\n## Affected Versions\n`\u003c= 7.5.20` (npm `tar`). `mapHas` present verbatim on tag `v7.5.20` (latest GitHub release and npm `dist-tag latest`); no segment/depth cap in `src/list.ts` or the `CONSUMEHEADER` filter path; HEAD == 7.5.20, no unreleased fix.\n\n## Suggested Fix\nRewrite `mapHas` iteratively (walk `dirname` in a `while` loop with a segment/visited cap), or enforce a hard path-segment limit in `Header`/`Parser` independent of `maxMetaEntrySize`, applied before any per-entry filter runs.\n\n## Dedup Note\nDistinct from CVE-2024-28863 / GHSA-f5x3-32g6-qm9j \"lack of folders depth validation\" (that bounds `mkdir` recursion during *extraction* via `maxDepth` in `Unpack[CHECKPATH]` on the `\u0027entry\u0027` event \u2014 a different sink, code path, and fix; runs after the filter and does not apply to `tar.t`). Also distinct from the PAX NUL/numeric-path crash advisories (improper-input-to-fs / type confusion, not recursion) and the gzip-bomb advisory (resource exhaustion on disk writes). None touch `list.ts`/`filesFilter`/`mapHas` or require member selection.\n\n---\nReported by **zx (Jace)** \u2014 GitHub: @manus-use",
  "id": "GHSA-r292-9mhp-454m",
  "modified": "2026-08-21T19:08:22Z",
  "published": "2026-07-24T16:26:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar/security/advisories/GHSA-r292-9mhp-454m"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73566"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar/commit/631ae59121bf8fc8a22bbae35f074cb9b789cd4a"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar/releases/tag/v7.5.21"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "node-tar: Uncontrolled recursion in mapHas/filesFilter allows uncatchable stack-overflow DoS via crafted long-path tar with member selection"
}

GHSA-R3X5-R85C-GRP5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-02-02 00:30 – Updated: 2023-02-09 21:30
VLAI
Details

In dotCMS 5.x-22.06, it is possible to call the TempResource multiple times, each time requesting the dotCMS server to download a large file. If done repeatedly, this will result in Tomcat request-thread exhaustion and ultimately a denial of any other requests.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-37034"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-674"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-02-01T23:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In dotCMS 5.x-22.06, it is possible to call the TempResource multiple times, each time requesting the dotCMS server to download a large file. If done repeatedly, this will result in Tomcat request-thread exhaustion and ultimately a denial of any other requests.",
  "id": "GHSA-r3x5-r85c-grp5",
  "modified": "2023-02-09T21:30:29Z",
  "published": "2023-02-02T00:30:15Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-37034"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.dotcms.com/security/SI-65"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}
Mitigation
Implementation

Ensure that an end condition will be reached under all logic conditions. The end condition may include checking against the depth of recursion and exiting with an error if the recursion goes too deep. The complexity of the end condition contributes to the effectiveness of this action.

Mitigation
Implementation

Increase the stack size.

CAPEC-230: Serialized Data with Nested Payloads

Applications often need to transform data in and out of a data format (e.g., XML and YAML) by using a parser. It may be possible for an adversary to inject data that may have an adverse effect on the parser when it is being processed. Many data format languages allow the definition of macro-like structures that can be used to simplify the creation of complex structures. By nesting these structures, causing the data to be repeatedly substituted, an adversary can cause the parser to consume more resources while processing, causing excessive memory consumption and CPU utilization.

CAPEC-231: Oversized Serialized Data Payloads

An adversary injects oversized serialized data payloads into a parser during data processing to produce adverse effects upon the parser such as exhausting system resources and arbitrary code execution.

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