Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-601

Allowed

URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')

Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft

API response cwe.mitre.org

The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect.

2453 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-36P9-4JQP-QVG9

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-19 21:30 – Updated: 2025-08-20 18:30
VLAI
Details

The URL scheme used by Firefox to facilitate searching of text queries could incorrectly allow attackers to open arbitrary website URLs or internal pages if a user was tricked into clicking a link This vulnerability affects Firefox for iOS < 141.

Severity
5.4 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-54144"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-601"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-08-19T21:15:27Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The URL scheme used by Firefox to facilitate searching of text queries could incorrectly allow attackers to open arbitrary website URLs or internal pages if a user was tricked into clicking a link This vulnerability affects Firefox for iOS \u003c 141.",
  "id": "GHSA-36p9-4jqp-qvg9",
  "modified": "2025-08-20T18:30:20Z",
  "published": "2025-08-19T21:30:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-54144"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1946062"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2025-60"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-36RG-GFQ2-3H56

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-07 22:13 – Updated: 2025-07-07 22:13
VLAI
Summary
Better Auth Open Redirect Vulnerability in originCheck Middleware Affects Multiple Routes
Details

Summary

An open redirect has been found in the originCheck middleware function, which affects the following routes: /verify-email, /reset-password/:token, /delete-user/callback, /magic-link/verify, /oauth-proxy-callback.

Details

In the matchesPattern function, url.startsWith( can be deceived with a url that starts with one of the trustedOrigins.

        const matchesPattern = (url: string, pattern: string): boolean => {
            if (url.startsWith("/")) {
                return false;
            }
            if (pattern.includes("*")) {
                return wildcardMatch(pattern)(getHost(url));
            }
            return url.startsWith(pattern);
        };

Open Redirect PoCs

export const auth = betterAuth({
    baseURL: 'http://localhost:3000',
    trustedOrigins: [
        "http://trusted.com"
    ],
    emailAndPassword: {
        ...
    },
})

/reset-password/:token

image
image 1

/verify-email

image
image

/delete-user/callback

image
image

/magic-link/verify

image
image

/oauth-proxy-callback

image
image

Impact

Untrusted open redirects in various routes.

Severity
2.1 (Low)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.2.9"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "better-auth"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.2.10"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-53535"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-601"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-07-07T22:13:14Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-07-07T18:15:28Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nAn open redirect has been found in the `originCheck` middleware function, which affects the following routes: `/verify-email`, `/reset-password/:token`, `/delete-user/callback`, `/magic-link/verify`, `/oauth-proxy-callback`.\n\n### Details\n\nIn the `matchesPattern` function, `url.startsWith(` can be deceived with a `url` that starts with one of the `trustedOrigins`.\n\n```jsx\n\t\tconst matchesPattern = (url: string, pattern: string): boolean =\u003e {\n\t\t\tif (url.startsWith(\"/\")) {\n\t\t\t\treturn false;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif (pattern.includes(\"*\")) {\n\t\t\t\treturn wildcardMatch(pattern)(getHost(url));\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn url.startsWith(pattern);\n\t\t};\n```\n\n### Open Redirect PoCs\n\n```jsx\nexport const auth = betterAuth({\n\tbaseURL: \u0027http://localhost:3000\u0027,\n\ttrustedOrigins: [\n\t\t\"http://trusted.com\"\n\t],\n\temailAndPassword: {\n\t\t...\n\t},\n})\n```\n\n#### `/reset-password/:token`\n\n\u003cimg width=\"481\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/46e7871a-1dad-4375-af94-0446e29aaab6\" /\u003e\n\u003cbr/\u003e\n\u003cimg width=\"518\" alt=\"image 1\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/83abfb53-6fc9-4d1f-918d-9b4ce093c808\" /\u003e\n\n#### `/verify-email`\n\n\u003cimg width=\"549\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/7dd424b7-42a4-4616-aa73-fcc2e3eeb309\" /\u003e\n\u003cbr/\u003e\n\u003cimg width=\"436\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/54f11636-0a3e-4e83-9a09-57c5e8ba98cd\" /\u003e\n\n#### `/delete-user/callback`\n\n\u003cimg width=\"545\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2ff1b217-d069-48fb-81c1-f8c8792d34a4\" /\u003e\n\u003cbr/\u003e\n\u003cimg width=\"492\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/71df11db-9d38-4f34-abe1-add9d60b3486\" /\u003e\n\n#### `/magic-link/verify`\n\n\u003cimg width=\"379\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/6b6b6a8a-59b6-4a65-9df3-57d5b2f6eb0f\" /\u003e\n\u003cbr/\u003e\n\u003cimg width=\"413\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/82a5c9c6-2ea0-44eb-af48-40732657b59e\" /\u003e\n\n#### `/oauth-proxy-callback`\n\n\u003cimg width=\"548\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/d8d2ee51-e9fd-4337-bec3-a70afd1ceacb\" /\u003e\n\u003cbr/\u003e\n\u003cimg width=\"544\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f097d406-b965-4f85-b124-9b0ef1cc2689\" /\u003e\n\n### Impact\n\nUntrusted open redirects in various routes.",
  "id": "GHSA-36rg-gfq2-3h56",
  "modified": "2025-07-07T22:13:14Z",
  "published": "2025-07-07T22:13:14Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth/security/advisories/GHSA-36rg-gfq2-3h56"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-53535"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth/commit/9801d1be53d9da04686b94c6286c53ec97496740"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Better Auth Open Redirect Vulnerability in originCheck Middleware Affects Multiple Routes"
}

GHSA-3735-5339-XFWX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-28 16:40 – Updated: 2026-07-28 16:40
VLAI
Summary
Poweradmin has Host Header Injection in OIDC redirect_uri, SAML ACS/SLO URL, and Logout Redirect Construction.
Details

Summary

Poweradmin v4.3.2 uses the attacker-controlled HTTP_HOST request header as the authoritative source for building callback URLs in its OIDC, SAML, and logout authentication flows without any validation. An unauthenticated attacker can poison the redirect_uri sent to the Identity Provider, causing the IdP to redirect the victim's authorization code to an attacker-controlled server - resulting in full account takeover with no credentials required.

Three independent code paths are affected:

  • Primary (Critical): OidcService::getCallbackUrl() - redirect_uri poisoning
  • Secondary (High): SamlConfigurationService::getBaseUrl() - SAML ACS/SLO URL poisoning
  • Tertiary (Medium): LogoutController::getBaseUrl() - post-logout redirect poisoning

Details

Root Cause

The application constructs absolute URLs dynamically from HTTP_HOST rather than from a trusted configured base URL. The header is fully client-controlled and is not validated before use in any authentication flow.

Poweradmin's own codebase contains the correct pattern - DocsController::getValidatedHost() (line 244) calls isValidHostname() before using the value - but this was never applied to authentication flows.

### Primary: lib/Application/Service/OidcService.php (~line 460)

```php private function getCallbackUrl(): string { $scheme = $this->detectScheme(); // HTTP_HOST taken directly with zero validation $host = $this->request->getServerParam('HTTP_HOST', 'localhost'); $basePrefix = $this->configManager->get('interface', 'base_url_prefix', ''); return $scheme . '://' . $host . $basePrefix . '/oidc/callback'; }

HTTP_HOST is embedded verbatim as redirect_uri in the OAuth 2.0 authorization request sent to the IdP. HTTP_X_FORWARDED_PROTO is similarly used unvalidated for scheme detection.

Secondary: lib/Application/Service/SamlConfigurationService.php (~line 134)

private function getBaseUrl(): string { $configuredBaseUrl = $this->configManager->get('interface', 'base_url', ''); if (!empty($configuredBaseUrl)) { return rtrim($configuredBaseUrl, '/'); // safe path - rarely configured } // Falls through on every default installation $host = $_SERVER['HTTP_HOST'] ?? 'localhost'; ... return $scheme . '://' . $host . $prefix; }

Used to construct SAML ACS URL, SLO URL, and entity ID - all poisonable via Host header. The safe fallback only activates when interface.base_url is explicitly set, which is optional and empty by default.

Tertiary: lib/Application/Controller/LogoutController.php (~line 272)

Same $_SERVER['HTTP_HOST'] pattern used for post-logout redirect URL construction.

PoC

Environment: Poweradmin v4.3.2, Docker, PHP 8.2, OIDC enabled, interface.base_url empty (default).

docker exec poweradmin-container php -r " require '/app/vendor/autoload.php'; putenv('PA_CONFIG_PATH=/app/config/settings.php');

use PowerAdmin\Application\Service\OidcService; use PowerAdmin\Infrastructure\Configuration\ConfigurationManager; use PowerAdmin\Infrastructure\Web\Request;

\$_SERVER['HTTP_HOST'] = 'attacker.com'; \$_SERVER['HTTPS'] = '';

\$config = ConfigurationManager::getInstance(); \$request = new Request(); \$oidcService = new OidcService(\$config, \$request); \$authUrl = \$oidcService->initiateAuthFlow('test');

parse_str(parse_url(\$authUrl, PHP_URL_QUERY), \$p); echo 'redirect_uri: ' . urldecode(\$p['redirect_uri']) . PHP_EOL;

if (str_contains(\$p['redirect_uri'], 'attacker.com')) { echo '[CONFIRMED] Host header injection successful' . PHP_EOL; } "

Output:

redirect_uri: http://attacker.com/oidc/callback

[CONFIRMED] Host header injection successful - redirect_uri contains attacker.com

The redirect_uri in the authorization request sent to the Identity Provider is http://attacker.com/oidc/callback. The victim's authorization code will be delivered to this URL upon successful authentication.

Note on PKCE: PKCE does not mitigate this attack. The attacker initiates the flow themselves and controls both code_challenge and code_verifier.

Impact

Direct Impact

An attacker who can send a request with a spoofed Host header - directly or via a misconfigured reverse proxy (proxy_set_header Host $http_host is the nginx default) - can steal any user's authorization code and gain full authenticated access to Poweradmin. No credentials, malware, or prior access required.

DNS Infrastructure Impact

Poweradmin manages PowerDNS. A compromised administrator account grants full DNS zone control, enabling:

  • MX hijacking - redirect all inbound email to attacker's mail server; intercept password reset emails and 2FA codes for any third-party service registered with the domain
  • SPF/DKIM manipulation - add attacker's IP to SPF, publish attacker's DKIM key → send cryptographically authenticated email as the organization (passes DMARC)
  • Subdomain takeover - point mail., vpn., app. to attacker infrastructure
  • SSL certificate theft - remove CAA records and complete ACME DNS-01 challenge to obtain wildcard certificate *.company.com from any CA
  • Full domain delegation - delegate subdomains to attacker nameserver

CVSS v3.1

┌──────────────────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┬──────────────┐ │ Scenario │ Vector │ Score │ ├──────────────────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────────┼──────────────┤ │ Standard deployment │ AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L │ 8.2 High │ ├──────────────────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────────┼──────────────┤ │ Proxy misconfigured ($http_host) │ AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L │ 9.3 Critical │ └──────────────────────────────────┴─────────────────────────────────────┴──────────────┘

Recommended Fix

Immediate mitigation: Set interface.base_url in config/settings.php - activates the safe branch in SamlConfigurationService immediately.

Code fix for OidcService: Prefer the configured base URL; if absent, validate HTTP_HOST via filter_var($hostname, FILTER_VALIDATE_DOMAIN, FILTER_FLAG_HOSTNAME) before use - the same pattern already implemented in DocsController::getValidatedHost().

Severity
9.6 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "poweradmin/poweradmin"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.2.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "poweradmin/poweradmin"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.3.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.3.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54588"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-601"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-28T16:40:05Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-23T23:16:49Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nPoweradmin v4.3.2 uses the attacker-controlled `HTTP_HOST` request header as the\n  authoritative source for building callback URLs in its OIDC, SAML, and logout\n  authentication flows without any validation. An unauthenticated attacker can poison\n  the `redirect_uri` sent to the Identity Provider, causing the IdP to redirect the\n  victim\u0027s authorization code to an attacker-controlled server - resulting in full\n  account takeover with no credentials required.\n\n  Three independent code paths are affected:\n\n  - **Primary (Critical):** `OidcService::getCallbackUrl()` - `redirect_uri` poisoning\n  - **Secondary (High):** `SamlConfigurationService::getBaseUrl()` - SAML ACS/SLO URL poisoning\n  - **Tertiary (Medium):** `LogoutController::getBaseUrl()` - post-logout redirect poisoning\n\n### Details\n\n***Root Cause***\n\n  The application constructs absolute URLs dynamically from `HTTP_HOST` rather than\n  from a trusted configured base URL. The header is fully client-controlled and is not\n  validated before use in any authentication flow.\n\n  Poweradmin\u0027s own codebase contains the correct pattern -\n  `DocsController::getValidatedHost()` (line 244) calls `isValidHostname()` before\n  using the value - but this was never applied to authentication flows.\n\n  ### Primary: `lib/Application/Service/OidcService.php` (~line 460)\n\n  ```php\n  private function getCallbackUrl(): string\n  {\n      $scheme = $this-\u003edetectScheme();\n      // HTTP_HOST taken directly with zero validation\n      $host = $this-\u003erequest-\u003egetServerParam(\u0027HTTP_HOST\u0027, \u0027localhost\u0027);\n      $basePrefix = $this-\u003econfigManager-\u003eget(\u0027interface\u0027, \u0027base_url_prefix\u0027, \u0027\u0027);\n      return $scheme . \u0027://\u0027 . $host . $basePrefix . \u0027/oidc/callback\u0027;\n  }\n\n  HTTP_HOST is embedded verbatim as redirect_uri in the OAuth 2.0 authorization\n  request sent to the IdP. HTTP_X_FORWARDED_PROTO is similarly used unvalidated\n  for scheme detection.\n\n  Secondary: lib/Application/Service/SamlConfigurationService.php (~line 134)\n\n  private function getBaseUrl(): string\n  {\n      $configuredBaseUrl = $this-\u003econfigManager-\u003eget(\u0027interface\u0027, \u0027base_url\u0027, \u0027\u0027);\n      if (!empty($configuredBaseUrl)) {\n          return rtrim($configuredBaseUrl, \u0027/\u0027);  // safe path - rarely configured\n      }\n      // Falls through on every default installation\n      $host = $_SERVER[\u0027HTTP_HOST\u0027] ?? \u0027localhost\u0027;\n      ...\n      return $scheme . \u0027://\u0027 . $host . $prefix;\n  }\n\n  Used to construct SAML ACS URL, SLO URL, and entity ID - all poisonable via Host header.\n  The safe fallback only activates when interface.base_url is explicitly set, which is\n  optional and empty by default.\n\n  Tertiary: lib/Application/Controller/LogoutController.php (~line 272)\n\n  Same $_SERVER[\u0027HTTP_HOST\u0027] pattern used for post-logout redirect URL construction.\n\n### PoC\nEnvironment: Poweradmin v4.3.2, Docker, PHP 8.2, OIDC enabled, interface.base_url empty (default).\n\n  docker exec poweradmin-container php -r \"\n  require \u0027/app/vendor/autoload.php\u0027;\n  putenv(\u0027PA_CONFIG_PATH=/app/config/settings.php\u0027);\n\n  use PowerAdmin\\Application\\Service\\OidcService;\n  use PowerAdmin\\Infrastructure\\Configuration\\ConfigurationManager;\n  use PowerAdmin\\Infrastructure\\Web\\Request;\n\n  \\$_SERVER[\u0027HTTP_HOST\u0027] = \u0027attacker.com\u0027;\n  \\$_SERVER[\u0027HTTPS\u0027]     = \u0027\u0027;\n\n  \\$config      = ConfigurationManager::getInstance();\n  \\$request     = new Request();\n  \\$oidcService = new OidcService(\\$config, \\$request);\n  \\$authUrl     = \\$oidcService-\u003einitiateAuthFlow(\u0027test\u0027);\n\n  parse_str(parse_url(\\$authUrl, PHP_URL_QUERY), \\$p);\n  echo \u0027redirect_uri: \u0027 . urldecode(\\$p[\u0027redirect_uri\u0027]) . PHP_EOL;\n\n  if (str_contains(\\$p[\u0027redirect_uri\u0027], \u0027attacker.com\u0027)) {\n      echo \u0027[CONFIRMED] Host header injection successful\u0027 . PHP_EOL;\n  }\n  \"\n\n  Output:\n\n  redirect_uri: http://attacker.com/oidc/callback\n\n  [CONFIRMED] Host header injection successful - redirect_uri contains attacker.com\n\n  The redirect_uri in the authorization request sent to the Identity Provider is\n  http://attacker.com/oidc/callback. The victim\u0027s authorization code will be\n  delivered to this URL upon successful authentication.\n\n  Note on PKCE: PKCE does not mitigate this attack. The attacker initiates the\n  flow themselves and controls both code_challenge and code_verifier.\n\n### Impact\nDirect Impact\n\n  An attacker who can send a request with a spoofed Host header - directly or via a\n  misconfigured reverse proxy (proxy_set_header Host $http_host is the nginx default) -\n  can steal any user\u0027s authorization code and gain full authenticated access to Poweradmin.\n  No credentials, malware, or prior access required.\n\n  DNS Infrastructure Impact\n\n  Poweradmin manages PowerDNS. A compromised administrator account grants full DNS zone\n  control, enabling:\n\n  - MX hijacking - redirect all inbound email to attacker\u0027s mail server; intercept\n  password reset emails and 2FA codes for any third-party service registered with the domain\n  - SPF/DKIM manipulation - add attacker\u0027s IP to SPF, publish attacker\u0027s DKIM key \u2192\n  send cryptographically authenticated email as the organization (passes DMARC)\n  - Subdomain takeover - point mail., vpn., app. to attacker infrastructure\n  - SSL certificate theft - remove CAA records and complete ACME DNS-01 challenge\n  to obtain wildcard certificate *.company.com from any CA\n  - Full domain delegation - delegate subdomains to attacker nameserver\n\n  CVSS v3.1\n\n  \u250c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u252c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u252c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2510\n  \u2502             Scenario             \u2502               Vector                \u2502    Score     \u2502\n  \u251c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u253c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u253c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2524\n  \u2502 Standard deployment              \u2502 AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L \u2502 8.2 High     \u2502\n  \u251c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u253c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u253c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2524\n  \u2502 Proxy misconfigured ($http_host) \u2502 AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L \u2502 9.3 Critical \u2502\n  \u2514\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2534\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2534\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2518\n\n  Recommended Fix\n\n  Immediate mitigation: Set interface.base_url in config/settings.php -\n  activates the safe branch in SamlConfigurationService immediately.\n\n  Code fix for OidcService: Prefer the configured base URL; if absent, validate\n  HTTP_HOST via filter_var($hostname, FILTER_VALIDATE_DOMAIN, FILTER_FLAG_HOSTNAME)\n  before use - the same pattern already implemented in DocsController::getValidatedHost().",
  "id": "GHSA-3735-5339-xfwx",
  "modified": "2026-07-28T16:40:05Z",
  "published": "2026-07-28T16:40:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/poweradmin/poweradmin/security/advisories/GHSA-3735-5339-xfwx"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54588"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/poweradmin/poweradmin"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/poweradmin/poweradmin/releases/tag/v4.2.4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/poweradmin/poweradmin/releases/tag/v4.3.3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Poweradmin has Host Header Injection in OIDC redirect_uri, SAML ACS/SLO URL, and Logout Redirect Construction."
}

GHSA-37HP-765X-J95X

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2019-01-04 17:50 – Updated: 2024-09-18 16:08
VLAI
Summary
Django open redirect and possible XSS attack via user-supplied numeric redirect URLs
Details

Django 1.10 before 1.10.7, 1.9 before 1.9.13, and 1.8 before 1.8.18 relies on user input in some cases to redirect the user to an "on success" URL. The security check for these redirects (namely django.utils.http.is_safe_url()) considered some numeric URLs "safe" when they shouldn't be, aka an open redirect vulnerability. Also, if a developer relies on is_safe_url() to provide safe redirect targets and puts such a URL into a link, they could suffer from an XSS attack.

Severity
6.1 (Medium)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "Django"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.10a1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.10.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "Django"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.9a1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.9.13"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "Django"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.8a1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.8.18"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2017-7233"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-601"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2020-06-16T20:54:21Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Django 1.10 before 1.10.7, 1.9 before 1.9.13, and 1.8 before 1.8.18 relies on user input in some cases to redirect the user to an \"on success\" URL. The security check for these redirects (namely ``django.utils.http.is_safe_url()``) considered some numeric URLs \"safe\" when they shouldn\u0027t be, aka an open redirect vulnerability. Also, if a developer relies on ``is_safe_url()`` to provide safe redirect targets and puts such a URL into a link, they could suffer from an XSS attack.",
  "id": "GHSA-37hp-765x-j95x",
  "modified": "2024-09-18T16:08:51Z",
  "published": "2019-01-04T17:50:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-7233"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/django/django/commit/254326cb3682389f55f886804d2c43f7b9f23e4f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/django/django/commit/8339277518c7d8ec280070a780915304654e3b66"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/django/django/commit/f824655bc2c50b19d2f202d7640785caabc82787"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017:1445"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017:1451"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017:1462"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017:1470"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017:1596"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017:3093"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2018:2927"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-37hp-765x-j95x"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/django/django"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/django/PYSEC-2017-9.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.djangoproject.com/weblog/2017/apr/04/security-releases"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3835"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Django open redirect and possible XSS attack via user-supplied numeric redirect URLs"
}

GHSA-37X6-M83P-F654

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-02-22 00:30 – Updated: 2023-03-03 15:30
VLAI
Details

An open redirect issue was discovered in Kibana that could lead to a user being redirected to an arbitrary website if they use a maliciously crafted Kibana URL.

Severity
6.1 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-38779"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-601"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-02-22T00:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "An open redirect issue was discovered in Kibana that could lead to a user being redirected to an arbitrary website if they use a maliciously crafted Kibana URL.",
  "id": "GHSA-37x6-m83p-f654",
  "modified": "2023-03-03T15:30:24Z",
  "published": "2023-02-22T00:30:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-38779"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://discuss.elastic.co/t/kibana-7-17-9-and-8-6-2-security-update/325782"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.elastic.co/community/security"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-384J-85HC-JFQ2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:46 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:46
VLAI
Details

An Open Redirect vulnerability in EpiServer Find before 13.2.7 allows an attacker to redirect users to untrusted websites via the _t_redirect parameter in a crafted URL, such as a /find_v2/_click URL.

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-24550"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-601"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-03-31T22:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "An Open Redirect vulnerability in EpiServer Find before 13.2.7 allows an attacker to redirect users to untrusted websites via the _t_redirect parameter in a crafted URL, such as a /find_v2/_click URL.",
  "id": "GHSA-384j-85hc-jfq2",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T17:46:02Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:46:02Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-24550"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://labs.nettitude.com/blog/cve-2020-24550-open-redirect-in-episerver-find"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-3879-GMGH-P53R

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-19 21:30 – Updated: 2025-08-20 18:30
VLAI
Details

The QR scanner could allow arbitrary websites to be opened if a user was tricked into scanning a malicious link that leveraged Firefox's open-text URL scheme This vulnerability affects Firefox for iOS < 141.

Severity
9.1 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-54145"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-601"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-08-19T21:15:27Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "The QR scanner could allow arbitrary websites to be opened if a user was tricked into scanning a malicious link that leveraged Firefox\u0027s open-text URL scheme This vulnerability affects Firefox for iOS \u003c 141.",
  "id": "GHSA-3879-gmgh-p53r",
  "modified": "2025-08-20T18:30:20Z",
  "published": "2025-08-19T21:30:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-54145"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1946122"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2025-60"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-387W-V9HJ-PH2G

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:06 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:06
VLAI
Details

Machform prior to version 16 is vulnerable to an open redirect in Safari_init.php due to an improperly sanitized 'ref' parameter.

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-20105"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-601"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-06-29T16:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Machform prior to version 16 is vulnerable to an open redirect in Safari_init.php due to an improperly sanitized \u0027ref\u0027 parameter.",
  "id": "GHSA-387w-v9hj-ph2g",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T19:06:30Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T19:06:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-20105"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.tenable.com/security/research/tra-2021-25,https://www.machform.com/blog-machform-16-released"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-38HM-HX7F-67MV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:05 – Updated: 2024-04-04 02:45
VLAI
Details

Open redirect vulnerability in Library Information Management System LIMEDIO all versions allows remote attackers to redirect users to arbitrary web sites and conduct phishing attacks via a specially crafted URL.

Severity
6.1 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2019-6021"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-601"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2019-12-26T16:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Open redirect vulnerability in Library Information Management System LIMEDIO all versions allows remote attackers to redirect users to arbitrary web sites and conduct phishing attacks via a specially crafted URL.",
  "id": "GHSA-38hm-hx7f-67mv",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T02:45:37Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:05:07Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-6021"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ricoh.co.jp/limedio/user"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://jvn.jp/en/jp/JVN45633549/index.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-38HQ-7X33-PHP4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-24 16:20 – Updated: 2026-08-13 17:32
VLAI
Summary
@backstage/plugin-auth-backend: Unauthenticated OAuth account takeover via `redirect_uri` allowlist bypass
Details

Impact

The allowlist matching used by the experimental dynamic client registration and client ID metadata document (CIMD) features in @backstage/plugin-auth-backend matched glob patterns against the full URL string. A * wildcard could therefore match across URL component boundaries: a pattern such as https://*.example.com/callback, intended to allow subdomains of a trusted host, would also match an attacker-controlled URL such as https://attacker.example/x.example.com/callback. This applies to auth.experimentalDynamicClientRegistration.allowedRedirectUriPatterns as well as the allowedClientIdPatterns and allowedRedirectUriPatterns options of auth.experimentalClientIdMetadataDocuments.

An attacker could use this to register an OAuth client whose redirect URI points to a host they control while still passing the allowlist, causing authorization codes to be delivered to the attacker when a victim completes an authorization flow. In addition, allowlist patterns without an explicit protocol could match URLs with any protocol, and redirect URIs containing embedded credentials (user:pass@host) were accepted after the credentials were stripped for matching.

The practical impact is limited. Both features are experimental and disabled by default, and the default allowlist patterns only reference fixed or loopback hosts and are not affected. Deployments are only impacted if they enable one of these features and configure custom allowlist patterns that contain a wildcard in the hostname, or patterns without an explicit protocol.

Patches

Patched in @backstage/plugin-auth-backend version 0.29.2. Patterns are now matched against each URL component separately so that wildcards no longer match across the host and path boundary, patterns without an explicit protocol are rejected as invalid configuration, and redirect URIs with embedded credentials are always rejected.

Note that as part of this fix, a wildcard port no longer implicitly matches every path: a pattern such as http://localhost:* now only matches the root path. Use http://localhost:*/* to allow any port and any path.

Workarounds

Disable the experimental features by removing auth.experimentalDynamicClientRegistration and auth.experimentalClientIdMetadataDocuments from your app-config, which is the default configuration. Alternatively, restrict the configured allowlist patterns to fully specified URLs with an explicit protocol and no wildcard in the hostname, which are not affected by this vulnerability.

Severity
4.7 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.29.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@backstage/plugin-auth-backend"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.29.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-73563"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-601"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-24T16:20:59Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nThe allowlist matching used by the experimental dynamic client registration and client ID metadata document (CIMD) features in `@backstage/plugin-auth-backend` matched glob patterns against the full URL string. A * wildcard could therefore match across URL component boundaries: a pattern such as `https://*.example.com/callback`, intended to allow subdomains of a trusted host, would also match an attacker-controlled URL such as `https://attacker.example/x.example.com/callback`. This applies to `auth.experimentalDynamicClientRegistration.allowedRedirectUriPatterns` as well as the `allowedClientIdPatterns` and `allowedRedirectUriPatterns` options of `auth.experimentalClientIdMetadataDocuments`.\n\nAn attacker could use this to register an OAuth client whose redirect URI points to a host they control while still passing the allowlist, causing authorization codes to be delivered to the attacker when a victim completes an authorization flow. In addition, allowlist patterns without an explicit protocol could match URLs with any protocol, and redirect URIs containing embedded credentials (user:pass@host) were accepted after the credentials were stripped for matching.\n\nThe practical impact is limited. Both features are experimental and disabled by default, and the default allowlist patterns only reference fixed or loopback hosts and are not affected. Deployments are only impacted if they enable one of these features and configure custom allowlist patterns that contain a wildcard in the hostname, or patterns without an explicit protocol.\n\n### Patches\nPatched in `@backstage/plugin-auth-backend` version `0.29.2`. Patterns are now matched against each URL component separately so that wildcards no longer match across the host and path boundary, patterns without an explicit protocol are rejected as invalid configuration, and redirect URIs with embedded credentials are always rejected.\n\nNote that as part of this fix, a wildcard port no longer implicitly matches every path: a pattern such as `http://localhost:*` now only matches the root path. Use `http://localhost:*/*` to allow any port and any path.\n\n### Workarounds\nDisable the experimental features by removing `auth.experimentalDynamicClientRegistration` and `auth.experimentalClientIdMetadataDocuments` from your `app-config`, which is the default configuration. Alternatively, restrict the configured allowlist patterns to fully specified URLs with an explicit protocol and no wildcard in the hostname, which are not affected by this vulnerability.",
  "id": "GHSA-38hq-7x33-php4",
  "modified": "2026-08-13T17:32:47Z",
  "published": "2026-07-24T16:20:59Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/backstage/backstage/security/advisories/GHSA-38hq-7x33-php4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/backstage/backstage/commit/274acc51d22a7dd919cdda49d9086cf12c0b8711"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/backstage/backstage/commit/6370e53bce8b227c63092300594ffde29c006886"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/backstage/backstage/commit/ef606a85545cb6d765e20afd1ff43ae5407a3660"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/backstage/backstage/commit/fdc0d2dcd9a571e3839d7f5de4133c4e242a3a41"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/backstage/backstage"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/backstage/backstage/releases/tag/v1.53.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "@backstage/plugin-auth-backend: Unauthenticated OAuth account takeover via `redirect_uri` allowlist bypass"
}
Mitigation MIT-5
Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

  • Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
  • When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
  • Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
  • Use a list of approved URLs or domains to be used for redirection.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Use an intermediate disclaimer page that provides the user with a clear warning that they are leaving the current site. Implement a long timeout before the redirect occurs, or force the user to click on the link. Be careful to avoid XSS problems (CWE-79) when generating the disclaimer page.

Mitigation MIT-21.2
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion

  • When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
  • For example, ID 1 could map to "/login.asp" and ID 2 could map to "http://www.example.com/". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-45] provide this capability.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Ensure that no externally-supplied requests are honored by requiring that all redirect requests include a unique nonce generated by the application [REF-483]. Be sure that the nonce is not predictable (CWE-330).

Mitigation MIT-6
Architecture and Design Implementation

Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction

  • Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your software: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.
  • Many open redirect problems occur because the programmer assumed that certain inputs could not be modified, such as cookies and hidden form fields.
Mitigation MIT-29
Operation

Strategy: Firewall

Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].

CAPEC-178: Cross-Site Flashing

An attacker is able to trick the victim into executing a Flash document that passes commands or calls to a Flash player browser plugin, allowing the attacker to exploit native Flash functionality in the client browser. This attack pattern occurs where an attacker can provide a crafted link to a Flash document (SWF file) which, when followed, will cause additional malicious instructions to be executed. The attacker does not need to serve or control the Flash document. The attack takes advantage of the fact that Flash files can reference external URLs. If variables that serve as URLs that the Flash application references can be controlled through parameters, then by creating a link that includes values for those parameters, an attacker can cause arbitrary content to be referenced and possibly executed by the targeted Flash application.

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