CWE-352
Weakness AllowedCross-Site Request Forgery
Abstraction: Compound · Status: Stable
The web application does not, or cannot, sufficiently verify whether a request was intentionally provided by the user who sent the request, which could have originated from an unauthorized actor.
Mapping guidance
This is a well-known Composite of multiple weaknesses that must all occur simultaneously, although it is attack-oriented in nature.
While attack-oriented composites are supported in CWE, they have not been a focus of research. There is a chance that future research or CWE scope clarifications will change or deprecate them. Perform root-cause analysis to determine if other weaknesses allow CSRF attacks to occur, and map to those weaknesses. For example, predictable CSRF tokens might allow bypass of CSRF protection mechanisms; if this occurs, they might be better characterized as randomness/predictability weaknesses.
Relationships and members
Modes of introduction
REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
Detection methods
Manual Analysis
This weakness can be detected using tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session.
Specifically, manual analysis can be useful for finding this weakness, and for minimizing false positives assuming an understanding of business logic. However, it might not achieve desired code coverage within limited time constraints. For black-box analysis, if credentials are not known for privileged accounts, then the most security-critical portions of the application may not receive sufficient attention.
Consider using OWASP CSRFTester to identify potential issues and aid in manual analysis.
Effectiveness: High
These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.
Automated Static Analysis
CSRF is currently difficult to detect reliably using automated techniques. This is because each application has its own implicit security policy that dictates which requests can be influenced by an outsider and automatically performed on behalf of a user, versus which requests require strong confidence that the user intends to make the request. For example, a keyword search of the public portion of a web site is typically expected to be encoded within a link that can be launched automatically when the user clicks on the link.
Effectiveness: Limited
Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Web Application Scanner
Effectiveness: High
Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Fuzz Tester
Framework-based Fuzzer
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Automated Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Source code Weakness Analyzer
Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Architecture or Design Review
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)
Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Notes
Relationship
There can be a close relationship between XSS and CSRF (CWE-352). An attacker might use CSRF in order to trick the victim into submitting requests to the server in which the requests contain an XSS payload. A well-known example of this was the Samy worm on MySpace [REF-956]. The worm used XSS to insert malicious HTML sequences into a user's profile and add the attacker as a MySpace friend. MySpace friends of that victim would then execute the payload to modify their own profiles, causing the worm to propagate exponentially. Since the victims did not intentionally insert the malicious script themselves, CSRF was a root cause.
Theoretical
The CSRF topology is multi-channel:
Attacker (as outsider) to intermediary (as user). The interaction point is either an external or internal channel.
Intermediary (as user) to server (as victim). The activation point is an internal channel.
Content history
Contributed usability diagram concepts used by the CWE team.
updated Time_of_Introduction
updated Alternate_Terms, Description, Relationships, Other_Notes, Relationship_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Applicable_Platforms, Description, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationship_Notes, Relationships, Research_Gaps, Theoretical_Notes
updated Potential_Mitigations
Added demonstrative example for profile.
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction
updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Common_Consequences, Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Description
updated Common_Consequences
updated Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations, References
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Relationships
updated References, Relationships
updated Detection_Factors
updated Relationships
updated Applicable_Platforms, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships
updated References, Relationship_Notes, Research_Gaps
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Relationships, Theoretical_Notes
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated References, Relationships
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Alternate_Terms, Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram
updated Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
updated Applicable_Platforms, Name, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
15020 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-933X-5G7R-773Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-09-22 00:00 – Updated: 2022-12-06 16:03Security Inspector Plugin 117.v6eecc36919c2 and earlier does not require POST requests for an HTTP endpoint, resulting in a cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability. This vulnerability allows attackers to replace the generated report stored in a per-session cache and displayed to authorized users at the …/report URL with a report based on attacker-specified report generation options. This could create confusion in users of the plugin who are expecting to see a different result. A security hardening since Jenkins 2.287 and LTS 2.277.2 prevents exploitation of this vulnerability for the Single user, multiple jobs report however, there is no fix at this time. Other report types are still affected.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.jenkins-ci.plugins:security-inspector"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "17.v6eecc36919c2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-41236"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-12-06T16:03:37Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-09-21T16:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Security Inspector Plugin 117.v6eecc36919c2 and earlier does not require POST requests for an HTTP endpoint, resulting in a cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability. This vulnerability allows attackers to replace the generated report stored in a per-session cache and displayed to authorized users at the `\u2026\u200b/report` URL with a report based on attacker-specified report generation options. This could create confusion in users of the plugin who are expecting to see a different result. A security hardening since Jenkins 2.287 and LTS 2.277.2 prevents exploitation of this vulnerability for the _Single user, multiple jobs_ report however, there is no fix at this time. Other report types are still affected.",
"id": "GHSA-933x-5g7r-773q",
"modified": "2022-12-06T16:03:37Z",
"published": "2022-09-22T00:00:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-41236"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/jenkinsci/security-inspector-plugin"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.jenkins.io/security/advisory/2022-09-21/#SECURITY-2051"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "CSRF vulnerability in Jenkins Security Inspector plugin"
}
GHSA-934H-HVXG-J69V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-07 18:32 – Updated: 2025-07-07 18:32In Splunk Enterprise versions below 9.4.3, 9.3.5, 9.2.7, and 9.1.10, and Splunk Cloud Platform versions below 9.3.2411.104, 9.3.2408.113, and 9.2.2406.119, an unauthenticated attacker could send a specially-crafted SPL search command that could trigger a rolling restart in the Search Head Cluster through a Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF), potentially leading to a denial of service (DoS).
The vulnerability requires the attacker to phish the administrator-level victim by tricking them into initiating a request within their browser. The attacker should not be able to exploit the vulnerability at will.
See How rolling restart works for more information.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-20322"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-07-07T18:15:26Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In Splunk Enterprise versions below 9.4.3, 9.3.5, 9.2.7, and 9.1.10, and Splunk Cloud Platform versions below 9.3.2411.104, 9.3.2408.113, and 9.2.2406.119, an unauthenticated attacker could send a specially-crafted SPL search command that could trigger a rolling restart in the Search Head Cluster through a Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF), potentially leading to a denial of service (DoS).\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe vulnerability requires the attacker to phish the administrator-level victim by tricking them into initiating a request within their browser. The attacker should not be able to exploit the vulnerability at will.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eSee [How rolling restart works](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/9.4.2/DistSearch/RestartSHC) for more information.",
"id": "GHSA-934h-hvxg-j69v",
"modified": "2025-07-07T18:32:28Z",
"published": "2025-07-07T18:32:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-20322"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://advisory.splunk.com/advisories/SVD-2025-0705"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9356-6C72-33X9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 01:12 – Updated: 2022-05-17 01:12Multiple cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerabilities in the Bird Feeder plugin 1.2.3 for WordPress allow remote attackers to hijack the authentication of administrators for requests that conduct cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks via the (1) user or (2) password parameter in the bird-feeder page to wp-admin/options-general.php.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2014-9334"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2014-12-24T18:59:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Multiple cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerabilities in the Bird Feeder plugin 1.2.3 for WordPress allow remote attackers to hijack the authentication of administrators for requests that conduct cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks via the (1) user or (2) password parameter in the bird-feeder page to wp-admin/options-general.php.",
"id": "GHSA-9356-6c72-33x9",
"modified": "2022-05-17T01:12:05Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T01:12:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-9334"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/99474"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/129623/WordPress-Bird-Feeder-1.2.3-CSRF-XSS.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2014/Dec/69"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.vulnerability-lab.com/get_content.php?id=1372"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-935F-HM9P-8J6V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:08 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:08concrete5 8.1.0 has CSRF in Thumbnail Editor in the File Manager, which allows remote attackers to disable the entire installation by merely tricking an admin into viewing a malicious page involving the /tools/required/files/importers/imageeditor?fID=1&imgData= URI. This results in a site-wide denial of service making the site not accessible to any users or any administrators.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-8082"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-04-24T06:59:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "concrete5 8.1.0 has CSRF in Thumbnail Editor in the File Manager, which allows remote attackers to disable the entire installation by merely tricking an admin into viewing a malicious page involving the /tools/required/files/importers/imageeditor?fID=1\u0026imgData= URI. This results in a site-wide denial of service making the site not accessible to any users or any administrators.",
"id": "GHSA-935f-hm9p-8j6v",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:08:38Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:08:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-8082"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://drive.google.com/open?id=0B3vXUYdNMECWZTd3SFRnUjllWk0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://twitter.com/insecurity/status/856066923146215425"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://zeroday.insecurity.zone/exploits/concrete5_csrf_dos.txt"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9369-69WJ-7M2F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-09 21:02 – Updated: 2026-07-09 21:02Details
Sink
tools/bazar/services/CSVManager.php line 372-399:
public function importEntry(array $importedEntries, string $formId): ?array
{
if (!$this->importdone) {
// ...
foreach ($importedEntries as $entry) {
$entry = unserialize(base64_decode($entry)); // <-- SINK
$entry = array_map('strval', $entry);
// ...
There is no ['allowed_classes' => false] argument; arbitrary classes are instantiated. The subsequent array_map('strval', $entry) additionally exercises __toString on each top-level array element, doubling the magic-method surface available to a gadget chain.
Source
tools/bazar/actions/BazarImportAction.php:
// formatArguments()
'mode' => (isset($_POST['submit_file']) && !empty($_FILES['fileimport']['name'])) ? 'submitfile' :
(isset($_POST['importfiche']) ? 'importentries' : 'default'),
'importentries' => $_POST['importfiche'] ?? null,
// run()
case 'importentries':
// ...
$importedEntries = $this->CSVManager->importEntry($this->arguments['importentries'], $vID['id']);
break;
$_POST['importfiche'] flows directly to the sink. The mode switches to 'importentries' whenever the request body contains the key, so an attacker need only POST importfiche[0]=<payload>.
Reachability
-
The action is registered as
bazarimport. The defaultBazaRpage (setup/sql/default-content.sql->BazaRpage entry, ships with{{bazar showexportbuttons="1"}}) routes?BazaR&vue=importer&id_typeannonce=<N>toBazarAction::run()->case VOIR_IMPORTER -> callAction('bazarimport', ...)(tools/bazar/actions/BazarAction.php:257-258). So the sink is reachable on a default install with no extra page authoring. -
BazarImportAction::run()calls$this->checkSecuredACL()with the default$adminOnly=true. Only wiki admins (or accounts the admin has added to thebazarimportaction ACL) can execute it. -
The
importentriesbranch does NOT invokeCsrfTokenController::checkToken(...). Greppingtools/bazar/actions/BazarImportAction.phpconfirms the action class has nocsrforcheckTokenreference at all. This is asymmetric with sibling actions:tools/bazar/controllers/FormController.phpdoes callcheckToken('main', 'POST', 'confirmDeleteToken')for destructive operations. The import path skips the same protection. -
Therefore the full kill chain for a remote attacker is:
a. Identify any admin user on the target wiki.
b. Deliver an HTML page (email, chat, link) that auto-POSTs importfiche[0]=<base64-encoded PHPGGC payload> to https://<wiki>/?BazaR&vue=importer&id_typeannonce=1.
c. The admin's session cookie is sent automatically; the action passes checkSecuredACL; the unserialize fires.
Gadget chain availability
composer.json requires doctrine/annotations ^1.11 and doctrine/cache ^1.10. Both have published PHPGGC chains (Doctrine/RCE1, Doctrine/FW1, Doctrine/FW2, etc., from https://github.com/ambionics/phpggc). These chains terminate in either system($cmd) (RCE1) or file_put_contents($php_file, $contents) (FW1) entry-points -- both sufficient to give the attacker shell on the YesWiki host.
This advisory does not include a working PHPGGC chain end-to-end (writing a chain that survives YesWiki's exact dependency-resolved class graph is separate work). The PoC demonstrates the primitive (attacker-controlled class instantiation + magic-method execution); the chain is a downstream exercise using public tooling.
Past advisories cross-check
YesWiki's published GitHub advisories cover XSS, SQLi, arbitrary-PHP-file-write RCE, path traversal, and unauthenticated backup download. None covers an unserialize / PHP-object-injection sink, so this is a novel vulnerability class for the project.
PoC
A self-contained PoC reproducing the inner loop is available; it copies the exact two-line sink and proves that attacker-controlled __destruct runs without booting the full application.
Run:
php poc.php
Output (verbatim):
Crafted importfiche[0] payload (form-ready, urlencoded):
YToxOntpOjA7Tzo2OiJHYWRnZXQiOjE6e3M6NjoibWFya2VyIjtzOjIyOiJQV05FRC1GUk9NLVVOU0VSSUFMSVpFIjt9fQ%3D%3D
== before importEntry ==
[Gadget] __destruct fired with marker='PWNED-FROM-UNSERIALIZE'
PHP Fatal error: Uncaught Error: Object of class Gadget could not be converted to string ...
[Gadget] __destruct fired with marker='PWNED-FROM-UNSERIALIZE'
The two [Gadget] __destruct fired lines (one from inside the loop, one from the engine shutdown after the TypeError) confirm that the attacker-defined Gadget::__destruct executed -- with the attacker-supplied marker -- inside the unmodified importEntry code path.
End-to-end against a live YesWiki install:
curl -i -b "yeswiki_session=<admin_cookie>" \
-X POST "https://wiki.example.com/?BazaR&vue=importer&id_typeannonce=1" \
--data-urlencode \
"importfiche[0]=YToxOntpOjA7Tzo2OiJHYWRnZXQiOjE6e3M6NjoibWFya2VyIjtzOjIyOiJQV05FRC1GUk9NLVVOU0VSSUFMSVpFIjt9fQ=="
(replace the payload with a real PHPGGC Doctrine/FW1 or Doctrine/RCE1 output to obtain RCE on the target host).
Impact
- Authenticated wiki admin who lands on attacker-controlled HTML obtains remote code execution on the YesWiki server (via the cross-site forgery path; no admin interaction with the import UI is required).
- An attacker who has already compromised an admin password upgrades from "wiki content management" to "OS shell on the hosting box".
- The compromise survives the wiki layer entirely: the attacker can write web shells, exfiltrate other sites on shared hosting, modify
wakka.config.php, dump the MySQL database, and pivot from there.
Suggested fix
tools/bazar/services/CSVManager.php::importEntry-- pass['allowed_classes' => false]tounserialize, or, better, replace the base64+serialize transport with the JSON transport the current UI already uses (?api/entries/{formId}POST intools/bazar/presentation/javascripts/bazar-import.js). The serialized-PHP transport appears to be an unused legacy path.tools/bazar/actions/BazarImportAction.php-- add aCsrfTokenController::checkToken('main', 'POST', 'csrf-token', false)guard for the'importentries'mode (and any other state-changing modes). The existingtools/bazar/controllers/FormController.phppattern can be lifted directly.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "yeswiki/yeswiki"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.6.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-52777"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352",
"CWE-502"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-09T21:02:58Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "## Details\n\n### Sink\n\n`tools/bazar/services/CSVManager.php` line 372-399:\n\n```\npublic function importEntry(array $importedEntries, string $formId): ?array\n{\n if (!$this-\u003eimportdone) {\n // ...\n foreach ($importedEntries as $entry) {\n $entry = unserialize(base64_decode($entry)); // \u003c-- SINK\n $entry = array_map(\u0027strval\u0027, $entry);\n // ...\n```\n\nThere is no `[\u0027allowed_classes\u0027 =\u003e false]` argument; arbitrary classes are instantiated. The subsequent `array_map(\u0027strval\u0027, $entry)` additionally exercises `__toString` on each top-level array element, doubling the magic-method surface available to a gadget chain.\n\n### Source\n\n`tools/bazar/actions/BazarImportAction.php`:\n\n```\n// formatArguments()\n\u0027mode\u0027 =\u003e (isset($_POST[\u0027submit_file\u0027]) \u0026\u0026 !empty($_FILES[\u0027fileimport\u0027][\u0027name\u0027])) ? \u0027submitfile\u0027 :\n (isset($_POST[\u0027importfiche\u0027]) ? \u0027importentries\u0027 : \u0027default\u0027),\n\u0027importentries\u0027 =\u003e $_POST[\u0027importfiche\u0027] ?? null,\n\n// run()\ncase \u0027importentries\u0027:\n // ...\n $importedEntries = $this-\u003eCSVManager-\u003eimportEntry($this-\u003earguments[\u0027importentries\u0027], $vID[\u0027id\u0027]);\n break;\n```\n\n`$_POST[\u0027importfiche\u0027]` flows directly to the sink. The `mode` switches to `\u0027importentries\u0027` whenever the request body contains the key, so an attacker need only POST `importfiche[0]=\u003cpayload\u003e`.\n\n### Reachability\n\n1. The action is registered as `bazarimport`. The default `BazaR` page (`setup/sql/default-content.sql` -\u003e `BazaR` page entry, ships with `{{bazar showexportbuttons=\"1\"}}`) routes `?BazaR\u0026vue=importer\u0026id_typeannonce=\u003cN\u003e` to `BazarAction::run()` -\u003e `case VOIR_IMPORTER -\u003e callAction(\u0027bazarimport\u0027, ...)` (`tools/bazar/actions/BazarAction.php:257-258`). So the sink is reachable on a default install with no extra page authoring.\n\n2. `BazarImportAction::run()` calls `$this-\u003echeckSecuredACL()` with the default `$adminOnly=true`. Only wiki admins (or accounts the admin has added to the `bazarimport` action ACL) can execute it.\n\n3. The `importentries` branch does NOT invoke `CsrfTokenController::checkToken(...)`. Grepping `tools/bazar/actions/BazarImportAction.php` confirms the action class has no `csrf` or `checkToken` reference at all. This is asymmetric with sibling actions: `tools/bazar/controllers/FormController.php` does call `checkToken(\u0027main\u0027, \u0027POST\u0027, \u0027confirmDeleteToken\u0027)` for destructive operations. The import path skips the same protection.\n\n4. Therefore the full kill chain for a remote attacker is:\n\n a. Identify any admin user on the target wiki.\n b. Deliver an HTML page (email, chat, link) that auto-POSTs `importfiche[0]=\u003cbase64-encoded PHPGGC payload\u003e` to `https://\u003cwiki\u003e/?BazaR\u0026vue=importer\u0026id_typeannonce=1`.\n c. The admin\u0027s session cookie is sent automatically; the action passes `checkSecuredACL`; the unserialize fires.\n\n### Gadget chain availability\n\n`composer.json` requires `doctrine/annotations ^1.11` and `doctrine/cache ^1.10`. Both have published PHPGGC chains (`Doctrine/RCE1`, `Doctrine/FW1`, `Doctrine/FW2`, etc., from https://github.com/ambionics/phpggc). These chains terminate in either `system($cmd)` (RCE1) or `file_put_contents($php_file, $contents)` (FW1) entry-points -- both sufficient to give the attacker shell on the YesWiki host.\n\nThis advisory does not include a working PHPGGC chain end-to-end (writing a chain that survives YesWiki\u0027s exact dependency-resolved class graph is separate work). The PoC demonstrates the primitive (attacker-controlled class instantiation + magic-method execution); the chain is a downstream exercise using public tooling.\n\n### Past advisories cross-check\n\nYesWiki\u0027s published GitHub advisories cover XSS, SQLi, arbitrary-PHP-file-write RCE, path traversal, and unauthenticated backup download. None covers an `unserialize` / PHP-object-injection sink, so this is a novel vulnerability class for the project.\n\n## PoC\n\nA self-contained PoC reproducing the inner loop is available; it copies the exact two-line sink and proves that attacker-controlled `__destruct` runs without booting the full application.\n\nRun:\n\n```\nphp poc.php\n```\n\nOutput (verbatim):\n\n```\nCrafted importfiche[0] payload (form-ready, urlencoded):\nYToxOntpOjA7Tzo2OiJHYWRnZXQiOjE6e3M6NjoibWFya2VyIjtzOjIyOiJQV05FRC1GUk9NLVVOU0VSSUFMSVpFIjt9fQ%3D%3D\n\n== before importEntry ==\n[Gadget] __destruct fired with marker=\u0027PWNED-FROM-UNSERIALIZE\u0027\nPHP Fatal error: Uncaught Error: Object of class Gadget could not be converted to string ...\n[Gadget] __destruct fired with marker=\u0027PWNED-FROM-UNSERIALIZE\u0027\n```\n\nThe two `[Gadget] __destruct fired` lines (one from inside the loop, one from the engine shutdown after the TypeError) confirm that the attacker-defined `Gadget::__destruct` executed -- with the attacker-supplied marker -- inside the unmodified `importEntry` code path.\n\nEnd-to-end against a live YesWiki install:\n\n```\ncurl -i -b \"yeswiki_session=\u003cadmin_cookie\u003e\" \\\n -X POST \"https://wiki.example.com/?BazaR\u0026vue=importer\u0026id_typeannonce=1\" \\\n --data-urlencode \\\n \"importfiche[0]=YToxOntpOjA7Tzo2OiJHYWRnZXQiOjE6e3M6NjoibWFya2VyIjtzOjIyOiJQV05FRC1GUk9NLVVOU0VSSUFMSVpFIjt9fQ==\"\n```\n\n(replace the payload with a real PHPGGC `Doctrine/FW1` or `Doctrine/RCE1` output to obtain RCE on the target host).\n\n## Impact\n\n- Authenticated wiki admin who lands on attacker-controlled HTML obtains remote code execution on the YesWiki server (via the cross-site forgery path; no admin interaction with the import UI is required).\n- An attacker who has already compromised an admin password upgrades from \"wiki content management\" to \"OS shell on the hosting box\".\n- The compromise survives the wiki layer entirely: the attacker can write web shells, exfiltrate other sites on shared hosting, modify `wakka.config.php`, dump the MySQL database, and pivot from there.\n\n## Suggested fix\n\n1. `tools/bazar/services/CSVManager.php::importEntry` -- pass `[\u0027allowed_classes\u0027 =\u003e false]` to `unserialize`, or, better, replace the base64+serialize transport with the JSON transport the current UI already uses (`?api/entries/{formId}` POST in `tools/bazar/presentation/javascripts/bazar-import.js`). The serialized-PHP transport appears to be an unused legacy path.\n2. `tools/bazar/actions/BazarImportAction.php` -- add a `CsrfTokenController::checkToken(\u0027main\u0027, \u0027POST\u0027, \u0027csrf-token\u0027, false)` guard for the `\u0027importentries\u0027` mode (and any other state-changing modes). The existing `tools/bazar/controllers/FormController.php` pattern can be lifted directly.",
"id": "GHSA-9369-69wj-7m2f",
"modified": "2026-07-09T21:02:58Z",
"published": "2026-07-09T21:02:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/YesWiki/yeswiki/security/advisories/GHSA-9369-69wj-7m2f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/YesWiki/yeswiki/commit/8f70a8d6b8befa0e644d03c785701dbbc55b8fd0"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/YesWiki/yeswiki"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "YesWiki Vulnerable to Authenticated PHP Object Injection in BazarImportAction via unserialize"
}
GHSA-937R-W77W-QXWP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:19 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:19EC Cloud E-Commerce System v1.3 was discovered to contain a Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) which allows attackers to arbitrarily add admin accounts via /admin.html?do=user&act=add.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-21139"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-11-04T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "EC Cloud E-Commerce System v1.3 was discovered to contain a Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) which allows attackers to arbitrarily add admin accounts via /admin.html?do=user\u0026act=add.",
"id": "GHSA-937r-w77w-qxwp",
"modified": "2022-05-24T19:19:43Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:19:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-21139"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Ryan0lb/EC-cloud-e-commerce-system-CVE-application/blob/master/README.md"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-938W-G36G-Q56G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-07-17 15:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 06:10Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in WooCommerce Shipping Multiple Addresses plugin <= 3.8.5 versions.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-36514"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-07-17T15:15:09Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in WooCommerce Shipping Multiple Addresses plugin \u003c=\u00a03.8.5 versions.",
"id": "GHSA-938w-g36g-q56g",
"modified": "2024-04-04T06:10:29Z",
"published": "2023-07-17T15:30:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-36514"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/woocommerce-shipping-multiple-addresses/wordpress-woocommerce-ship-to-multiple-addresses-plugin-3-8-5-cross-site-request-forgery-csrf-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-939P-28H4-46P5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-08-01 21:31 – Updated: 2024-08-01 21:31A vulnerability, which was classified as problematic, was found in SourceCodester Simple Realtime Quiz System 1.0. This affects an unknown part of the file /ajax.php?action=save_user. The manipulation leads to cross-site request forgery. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The associated identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-273351.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-7367"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-08-01T21:16:05Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability, which was classified as problematic, was found in SourceCodester Simple Realtime Quiz System 1.0. This affects an unknown part of the file /ajax.php?action=save_user. The manipulation leads to cross-site request forgery. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The associated identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-273351.",
"id": "GHSA-939p-28h4-46p5",
"modified": "2024-08-01T21:31:41Z",
"published": "2024-08-01T21:31:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-7367"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gist.github.com/topsky979/03ae83fd32a94c85f910c8e3a85fa056"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.273351"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.273351"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.383515"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-93C5-XVHQ-3947
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-03-22 00:00 – Updated: 2022-03-29 00:01The miniOrange's Google Authenticator WordPress plugin before 5.5 does not have proper authorisation and CSRF checks when handling the reconfigureMethod, and does not validate the parameters passed to it properly. As a result, unauthenticated users could delete arbitrary options from the blog, making it unusable.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-0229"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352",
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-03-21T19:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The miniOrange\u0027s Google Authenticator WordPress plugin before 5.5 does not have proper authorisation and CSRF checks when handling the reconfigureMethod, and does not validate the parameters passed to it properly. As a result, unauthenticated users could delete arbitrary options from the blog, making it unusable.",
"id": "GHSA-93c5-xvhq-3947",
"modified": "2022-03-29T00:01:25Z",
"published": "2022-03-22T00:00:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-0229"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/d70c5335-4c01-448d-85fc-f8e75b104351"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-93CP-8H44-P25M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-06-06 15:30 – Updated: 2026-04-01 18:35Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in Giraphix Creative Layouts for Elementor allows Cross Site Request Forgery. This issue affects Layouts for Elementor: from n/a through 1.11.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-30948"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-06-06T13:15:35Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in Giraphix Creative Layouts for Elementor allows Cross Site Request Forgery. This issue affects Layouts for Elementor: from n/a through 1.11.",
"id": "GHSA-93cp-8h44-p25m",
"modified": "2026-04-01T18:35:19Z",
"published": "2025-06-06T15:30:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-30948"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/layouts-for-elementor/vulnerability/wordpress-layouts-for-elementor-1-11-cross-site-request-forgery-csrf-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
- For example, use anti-CSRF packages such as the OWASP CSRFGuard. [REF-330]
- Another example is the ESAPI Session Management control, which includes a component for CSRF. [REF-45]
Mitigation
Ensure that the application is free of cross-site scripting issues (CWE-79), because most CSRF defenses can be bypassed using attacker-controlled script.
Mitigation
Generate a unique nonce for each form, place the nonce into the form, and verify the nonce upon receipt of the form. Be sure that the nonce is not predictable (CWE-330). [REF-332]
Mitigation
Identify especially dangerous operations. When the user performs a dangerous operation, send a separate confirmation request to ensure that the user intended to perform that operation.
Mitigation
- Use the "double-submitted cookie" method as described by Felten and Zeller:
- When a user visits a site, the site should generate a pseudorandom value and set it as a cookie on the user's machine. The site should require every form submission to include this value as a form value and also as a cookie value. When a POST request is sent to the site, the request should only be considered valid if the form value and the cookie value are the same.
- Because of the same-origin policy, an attacker cannot read or modify the value stored in the cookie. To successfully submit a form on behalf of the user, the attacker would have to correctly guess the pseudorandom value. If the pseudorandom value is cryptographically strong, this will be prohibitively difficult.
- This technique requires Javascript, so it may not work for browsers that have Javascript disabled. [REF-331]
Mitigation
Do not use the GET method for any request that triggers a state change.
Mitigation
Check the HTTP Referer header to see if the request originated from an expected page. This could break legitimate functionality, because users or proxies may have disabled sending the Referer for privacy reasons.
CAPEC-111: JSON Hijacking (aka JavaScript Hijacking)
An attacker targets a system that uses JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) as a transport mechanism between the client and the server (common in Web 2.0 systems using AJAX) to steal possibly confidential information transmitted from the server back to the client inside the JSON object by taking advantage of the loophole in the browser's Same Origin Policy that does not prohibit JavaScript from one website to be included and executed in the context of another website.
CAPEC-462: Cross-Domain Search Timing
An attacker initiates cross domain HTTP / GET requests and times the server responses. The timing of these responses may leak important information on what is happening on the server. Browser's same origin policy prevents the attacker from directly reading the server responses (in the absence of any other weaknesses), but does not prevent the attacker from timing the responses to requests that the attacker issued cross domain.
CAPEC-467: Cross Site Identification
An attacker harvests identifying information about a victim via an active session that the victim's browser has with a social networking site. A victim may have the social networking site open in one tab or perhaps is simply using the "remember me" feature to keep their session with the social networking site active. An attacker induces a payload to execute in the victim's browser that transparently to the victim initiates a request to the social networking site (e.g., via available social network site APIs) to retrieve identifying information about a victim. While some of this information may be public, the attacker is able to harvest this information in context and may use it for further attacks on the user (e.g., spear phishing).
CAPEC-62: Cross Site Request Forgery
An attacker crafts malicious web links and distributes them (via web pages, email, etc.), typically in a targeted manner, hoping to induce users to click on the link and execute the malicious action against some third-party application. If successful, the action embedded in the malicious link will be processed and accepted by the targeted application with the users' privilege level. This type of attack leverages the persistence and implicit trust placed in user session cookies by many web applications today. In such an architecture, once the user authenticates to an application and a session cookie is created on the user's system, all following transactions for that session are authenticated using that cookie including potential actions initiated by an attacker and simply "riding" the existing session cookie.