CWE-352
Weakness AllowedCross-Site Request Forgery
Abstraction: Compound · Status: Stable
The web application does not, or cannot, sufficiently verify whether a request was intentionally provided by the user who sent the request, which could have originated from an unauthorized actor.
Mapping guidance
This is a well-known Composite of multiple weaknesses that must all occur simultaneously, although it is attack-oriented in nature.
While attack-oriented composites are supported in CWE, they have not been a focus of research. There is a chance that future research or CWE scope clarifications will change or deprecate them. Perform root-cause analysis to determine if other weaknesses allow CSRF attacks to occur, and map to those weaknesses. For example, predictable CSRF tokens might allow bypass of CSRF protection mechanisms; if this occurs, they might be better characterized as randomness/predictability weaknesses.
Relationships and members
Modes of introduction
REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
Detection methods
Manual Analysis
This weakness can be detected using tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session.
Specifically, manual analysis can be useful for finding this weakness, and for minimizing false positives assuming an understanding of business logic. However, it might not achieve desired code coverage within limited time constraints. For black-box analysis, if credentials are not known for privileged accounts, then the most security-critical portions of the application may not receive sufficient attention.
Consider using OWASP CSRFTester to identify potential issues and aid in manual analysis.
Effectiveness: High
These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.
Automated Static Analysis
CSRF is currently difficult to detect reliably using automated techniques. This is because each application has its own implicit security policy that dictates which requests can be influenced by an outsider and automatically performed on behalf of a user, versus which requests require strong confidence that the user intends to make the request. For example, a keyword search of the public portion of a web site is typically expected to be encoded within a link that can be launched automatically when the user clicks on the link.
Effectiveness: Limited
Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Web Application Scanner
Effectiveness: High
Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Fuzz Tester
Framework-based Fuzzer
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Automated Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Source code Weakness Analyzer
Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Architecture or Design Review
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)
Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Notes
Relationship
There can be a close relationship between XSS and CSRF (CWE-352). An attacker might use CSRF in order to trick the victim into submitting requests to the server in which the requests contain an XSS payload. A well-known example of this was the Samy worm on MySpace [REF-956]. The worm used XSS to insert malicious HTML sequences into a user's profile and add the attacker as a MySpace friend. MySpace friends of that victim would then execute the payload to modify their own profiles, causing the worm to propagate exponentially. Since the victims did not intentionally insert the malicious script themselves, CSRF was a root cause.
Theoretical
The CSRF topology is multi-channel:
Attacker (as outsider) to intermediary (as user). The interaction point is either an external or internal channel.
Intermediary (as user) to server (as victim). The activation point is an internal channel.
Content history
Contributed usability diagram concepts used by the CWE team.
updated Time_of_Introduction
updated Alternate_Terms, Description, Relationships, Other_Notes, Relationship_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Applicable_Platforms, Description, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationship_Notes, Relationships, Research_Gaps, Theoretical_Notes
updated Potential_Mitigations
Added demonstrative example for profile.
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction
updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Common_Consequences, Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Description
updated Common_Consequences
updated Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations, References
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Relationships
updated References, Relationships
updated Detection_Factors
updated Relationships
updated Applicable_Platforms, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships
updated References, Relationship_Notes, Research_Gaps
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Relationships, Theoretical_Notes
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated References, Relationships
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Alternate_Terms, Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram
updated Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
updated Applicable_Platforms, Name, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
15020 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-5J4M-WJWP-Q2RR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-24 18:31 – Updated: 2026-04-01 18:34Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in HuangYe WuDeng Hacklog Remote Attachment allows Stored XSS. This issue affects Hacklog Remote Attachment: from n/a through 1.3.2.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-46530"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-04-24T16:15:44Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in HuangYe WuDeng Hacklog Remote Attachment allows Stored XSS. This issue affects Hacklog Remote Attachment: from n/a through 1.3.2.",
"id": "GHSA-5j4m-wjwp-q2rr",
"modified": "2026-04-01T18:34:59Z",
"published": "2025-04-24T18:31:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-46530"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/hacklog-remote-attachment/vulnerability/wordpress-hacklog-remote-attachment-1-3-2-cross-site-request-forgery-csrf-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-5J53-63W8-8625
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-19 21:10 – Updated: 2025-12-20 05:46Description
The OAuth login state tokens are completely stateless and carry no per-request entropy or any data that could link them to the session that initiated the OAuth flow. generate_state_token() is always called with an empty state_data dict, so the resulting JWT only contains the fixed audience claim plus an expiration timestamp. [1]
state_data: dict[str, str] = {}
state = generate_state_token(state_data, state_secret)
authorization_url = await oauth_client.get_authorization_url(
authorize_redirect_url,
state,
scopes,
)
fastapi_users/router/oauth.py:65-71
On callback, the library merely checks that the JWT verifies under state_secret and is unexpired; there is no attempt to match the state value to the browser that initiated the OAuth request, no correlation cookie, and no server-side cache. [2]
try:
decode_jwt(state, state_secret, [STATE_TOKEN_AUDIENCE])
except jwt.DecodeError:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
detail=ErrorCode.ACCESS_TOKEN_DECODE_ERROR,
)
except jwt.ExpiredSignatureError:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
detail=ErrorCode.ACCESS_TOKEN_ALREADY_EXPIRED,
)
fastapi_users/router/oauth.py:130-141
Any attacker can hit /authorize, capture the server-generated state, finish the upstream OAuth flow with their own provider account, and then trick a victim into loading .../callback?code=<attacker_code>&state=<attacker_state>. Because the state JWT is valid for any client for \~1 hour, the victim’s browser will complete the flow. This leads to login CSRF. Depending on the app’s logic, the login CSRF can lead to an account takeover of the victim account or to the victim user getting logged in to the attacker's account.
Proof of Concept
Let’s think of an app - AwesomeFastAPIApp. Let’s assume that the AwesomeFastAPIApp has internal logic that uses a UserManager different from the default BaseUserManager. With this manager, when an already logged-in user performs a callback request, the newly provided SSO identity gets linked to the already existing user that made the request.
Then, an attacker can get account takeover inside the app by performing the following actions:
1. They start an SSO OAuth flow, but stop it right before making the callback call to AwesomeFastAPIApp;
2. The attacker tricks a logged-in user (via phishing, a drive-by attack, etc.) to perform a GET request with the attacker's state value and grant code to the AwesomeFastAPIApp callback. Because the library doesn’t check whether the state token is linked to the session performing the callback, the callback is processed, the grant code is sent to the provider, and the account linking takes place.
After the GET request is performed, the attacker's SSO account is linked with the victim's AwesomeFastAPIApp account permanently.
Suggested Fix
Make the state a value tied to the session of the user that initiated the OAuth flow, as recommended by the official RFC. [3]
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "fastapi-users"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "15.0.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-68481"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285",
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-12-19T21:10:40Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-19T21:15:54Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "**Description**\n\nThe OAuth login state tokens are completely stateless and carry no per-request entropy or any data that could link them to the session that initiated the OAuth flow. `generate_state_token()` is always called with an empty `state_data` dict, so the resulting JWT only contains the fixed audience claim plus an expiration timestamp. \\[1\\]\n\n```py\n state_data: dict[str, str] = {}\n state = generate_state_token(state_data, state_secret)\n authorization_url = await oauth_client.get_authorization_url(\n authorize_redirect_url,\n state,\n scopes,\n )\n```\n\n*fastapi\\_users/router/oauth.py:65-71*\n\nOn callback, the library merely checks that the JWT verifies under `state_secret` and is unexpired; there is no attempt to match the state value to the browser that initiated the OAuth request, no correlation cookie, and no server-side cache. \\[2\\]\n\n```py\n try:\n decode_jwt(state, state_secret, [STATE_TOKEN_AUDIENCE])\n except jwt.DecodeError:\n raise HTTPException(\n status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,\n detail=ErrorCode.ACCESS_TOKEN_DECODE_ERROR,\n )\n except jwt.ExpiredSignatureError:\n raise HTTPException(\n status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,\n detail=ErrorCode.ACCESS_TOKEN_ALREADY_EXPIRED,\n )\n```\n\n*fastapi\\_users/router/oauth.py:130-141*\n\nAny attacker can hit `/authorize`, capture the server-generated state, finish the upstream OAuth flow with their own provider account, and then trick a victim into loading `.../callback?code=\u003cattacker_code\u003e\u0026state=\u003cattacker_state\u003e`. Because the state JWT is valid for any client for \\~1 hour, the victim\u2019s browser will complete the flow. This leads to login CSRF. Depending on the app\u2019s logic, the login CSRF can lead to an account takeover of the victim account or to the victim user getting logged in to the attacker\u0027s account.\n\n\\[1\\] [https://github.com/fastapi-users/fastapi-users/blob/bcee8c9b884de31decb5d799aead3974a0b5b158/fastapi\\_users/router/oauth.py\\#L57](https://github.com/fastapi-users/fastapi-users/blob/bcee8c9b884de31decb5d799aead3974a0b5b158/fastapi_users/router/oauth.py#L57)\n\n\\[2\\] \n[https://github.com/fastapi-users/fastapi-users/blob/bcee8c9b884de31decb5d799aead3974a0b5b158/fastapi\\_users/router/oauth.py\\#L111](https://github.com/fastapi-users/fastapi-users/blob/bcee8c9b884de31decb5d799aead3974a0b5b158/fastapi_users/router/oauth.py#L111)\n\n**Proof of Concept**\n\nLet\u2019s think of an app \\- AwesomeFastAPIApp. Let\u2019s assume that the AwesomeFastAPIApp has internal logic that uses a `UserManager` different from the default `BaseUserManager.` With this `manager,` when an already logged-in user performs a callback request, the newly provided SSO identity gets linked to the already existing user that made the request.\n\nThen, an attacker can get account takeover inside the app by performing the following actions:\n\n1\\. They start an SSO OAuth flow, but stop it right before making the callback call to AwesomeFastAPIApp; \n2\\. The attacker tricks a logged-in user (via phishing, a drive-by attack, etc.) to perform a GET request with the attacker\u0027s state value and grant code to the AwesomeFastAPIApp callback. Because the library doesn\u2019t check whether the state token is linked to the session performing the callback, the callback is processed, the grant code is sent to the provider, and the account linking takes place.\n\nAfter the GET request is performed, the attacker\u0027s SSO account is linked with the victim\u0027s AwesomeFastAPIApp account permanently.\n\n**Suggested Fix**\n\nMake the state a value tied to the session of the user that initiated the OAuth flow, as recommended by the official RFC. \\[3\\]\n\n\n\\[3\\] [https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749\\#section-10.12](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749#section-10.12)",
"id": "GHSA-5j53-63w8-8625",
"modified": "2025-12-20T05:46:19Z",
"published": "2025-12-19T21:10:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/fastapi-users/fastapi-users/security/advisories/GHSA-5j53-63w8-8625"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68481"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/fastapi-users/fastapi-users/commit/7cf413cd766b9cb0ab323ce424ddab2c0d235932"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/fastapi-users/fastapi-users"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/fastapi-users/fastapi-users/blob/bcee8c9b884de31decb5d799aead3974a0b5b158/fastapi_users/router/oauth.py#L111"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/fastapi-users/fastapi-users/blob/bcee8c9b884de31decb5d799aead3974a0b5b158/fastapi_users/router/oauth.py#L57"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "FastAPI Users Vulnerable to 1-click Account Takeover in Apps Using FastAPI SSO"
}
GHSA-5J5F-MR3P-J7CR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-31 15:31 – Updated: 2024-08-12 21:31A “CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)” can be exploited by remote attackers to perform state-changing operations with administrative privileges by luring authenticated victims into visiting a malicious web page.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-3083"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-07-31T14:15:07Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A \u201cCWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)\u201d can be exploited by remote attackers to perform state-changing operations with administrative privileges by luring authenticated victims into visiting a malicious web page.",
"id": "GHSA-5j5f-mr3p-j7cr",
"modified": "2024-08-12T21:31:32Z",
"published": "2024-07-31T15:31:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-3083"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.nozominetworks.com/labs/vulnerability-advisories-cve-2024-3083"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-5J77-9G8F-R5R2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-06 09:30 – Updated: 2026-08-07 00:31The Google Authenticator WordPress plugin before 0.56 does not verify a CSRF nonce when saving its two-factor setup, allowing attackers to trick a logged-in user into overwriting their own 2FA secret with an attacker-controlled value, which enables two-factor authentication and locks the victim out of their account.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-14204"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-06T07:16:27Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Google Authenticator WordPress plugin before 0.56 does not verify a CSRF nonce when saving its two-factor setup, allowing attackers to trick a logged-in user into overwriting their own 2FA secret with an attacker-controlled value, which enables two-factor authentication and locks the victim out of their account.",
"id": "GHSA-5j77-9g8f-r5r2",
"modified": "2026-08-07T00:31:09Z",
"published": "2026-08-06T09:30:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-14204"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/9ae793b2-31d4-4a9d-9481-52f07024b07e"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-5J7J-FQ57-VVR8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:31 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:31FastAdmin V1.0.0.20190111_beta has a CSRF vulnerability to add a new admin user via the admin/auth/admin/add?dialog=1 URI.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-11077"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-04-11T02:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "FastAdmin V1.0.0.20190111_beta has a CSRF vulnerability to add a new admin user via the admin/auth/admin/add?dialog=1 URI.",
"id": "GHSA-5j7j-fq57-vvr8",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:31:09Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:31:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11077"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.iwantacve.cn/index.php/archives/191"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-5J8W-6M93-CP7Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-10-16 09:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 08:39Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in Christopher Finke Feed Statistics plugin <= 4.1 versions.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-45605"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-10-16T09:15:10Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in Christopher Finke Feed Statistics plugin \u003c=\u00a04.1 versions.",
"id": "GHSA-5j8w-6m93-cp7q",
"modified": "2024-04-04T08:39:51Z",
"published": "2023-10-16T09:30:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-45605"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/wordpress-feed-statistics/wordpress-feed-statistics-plugin-4-1-cross-site-request-forgery-csrf-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-5J9V-CGRH-QPC9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 03:30 – Updated: 2022-05-17 03:30Multiple cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerabilities in the Corner module for Drupal allow remote attackers to hijack the authentication of administrators for requests that (1) enable or (2) disable corners via unspecified vectors.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2015-3374"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2015-04-21T16:59:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Multiple cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerabilities in the Corner module for Drupal allow remote attackers to hijack the authentication of administrators for requests that (1) enable or (2) disable corners via unspecified vectors.",
"id": "GHSA-5j9v-cgrh-qpc9",
"modified": "2022-05-17T03:30:17Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T03:30:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-3374"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.drupal.org/node/2411741"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2015/01/29/6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/74275"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-5JC2-26G2-H7JV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-16 21:31 – Updated: 2026-04-28 21:35Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in Stepan Stepasyuk MemeOne allows Stored XSS.This issue affects MemeOne: from n/a through 2.0.5.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-23559"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-01-16T20:15:39Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in Stepan Stepasyuk MemeOne allows Stored XSS.This issue affects MemeOne: from n/a through 2.0.5.",
"id": "GHSA-5jc2-26g2-h7jv",
"modified": "2026-04-28T21:35:30Z",
"published": "2025-01-16T21:31:01Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-23559"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/memeone/vulnerability/wordpress-memeone-plugin-2-0-5-csrf-to-stored-xss-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-5JC7-HXVG-4M8X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:54 – Updated: 2024-04-04 01:43The wp-customer-reviews plugin before 3.0.9 for WordPress has CSRF in the admin tools.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2016-10902"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-08-21T13:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The wp-customer-reviews plugin before 3.0.9 for WordPress has CSRF in the admin tools.",
"id": "GHSA-5jc7-hxvg-4m8x",
"modified": "2024-04-04T01:43:58Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T16:54:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-10902"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wordpress.org/plugins/wp-customer-reviews/#developers"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-5JCP-3FGM-MQ63
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 03:53 – Updated: 2022-05-17 03:53Cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in tracking_code.admin.inc in the Tracking Code module 7.x-1.x before 7.x-1.6 for Drupal allows remote attackers to hijack the authentication of administrators for requests that disable tracking codes via unspecified vectors.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2015-4362"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2015-06-15T14:59:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in tracking_code.admin.inc in the Tracking Code module 7.x-1.x before 7.x-1.6 for Drupal allows remote attackers to hijack the authentication of administrators for requests that disable tracking codes via unspecified vectors.",
"id": "GHSA-5jcp-3fgm-mq63",
"modified": "2022-05-17T03:53:58Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T03:53:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-4362"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.drupal.org/node/2445961"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.drupal.org/node/2450135"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.drupal.org/node/2453079"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://cgit.drupalcode.org/tracking_code/commit/?id=77c8c3d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2015/04/25/6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/72958"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
- For example, use anti-CSRF packages such as the OWASP CSRFGuard. [REF-330]
- Another example is the ESAPI Session Management control, which includes a component for CSRF. [REF-45]
Mitigation
Ensure that the application is free of cross-site scripting issues (CWE-79), because most CSRF defenses can be bypassed using attacker-controlled script.
Mitigation
Generate a unique nonce for each form, place the nonce into the form, and verify the nonce upon receipt of the form. Be sure that the nonce is not predictable (CWE-330). [REF-332]
Mitigation
Identify especially dangerous operations. When the user performs a dangerous operation, send a separate confirmation request to ensure that the user intended to perform that operation.
Mitigation
- Use the "double-submitted cookie" method as described by Felten and Zeller:
- When a user visits a site, the site should generate a pseudorandom value and set it as a cookie on the user's machine. The site should require every form submission to include this value as a form value and also as a cookie value. When a POST request is sent to the site, the request should only be considered valid if the form value and the cookie value are the same.
- Because of the same-origin policy, an attacker cannot read or modify the value stored in the cookie. To successfully submit a form on behalf of the user, the attacker would have to correctly guess the pseudorandom value. If the pseudorandom value is cryptographically strong, this will be prohibitively difficult.
- This technique requires Javascript, so it may not work for browsers that have Javascript disabled. [REF-331]
Mitigation
Do not use the GET method for any request that triggers a state change.
Mitigation
Check the HTTP Referer header to see if the request originated from an expected page. This could break legitimate functionality, because users or proxies may have disabled sending the Referer for privacy reasons.
CAPEC-111: JSON Hijacking (aka JavaScript Hijacking)
An attacker targets a system that uses JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) as a transport mechanism between the client and the server (common in Web 2.0 systems using AJAX) to steal possibly confidential information transmitted from the server back to the client inside the JSON object by taking advantage of the loophole in the browser's Same Origin Policy that does not prohibit JavaScript from one website to be included and executed in the context of another website.
CAPEC-462: Cross-Domain Search Timing
An attacker initiates cross domain HTTP / GET requests and times the server responses. The timing of these responses may leak important information on what is happening on the server. Browser's same origin policy prevents the attacker from directly reading the server responses (in the absence of any other weaknesses), but does not prevent the attacker from timing the responses to requests that the attacker issued cross domain.
CAPEC-467: Cross Site Identification
An attacker harvests identifying information about a victim via an active session that the victim's browser has with a social networking site. A victim may have the social networking site open in one tab or perhaps is simply using the "remember me" feature to keep their session with the social networking site active. An attacker induces a payload to execute in the victim's browser that transparently to the victim initiates a request to the social networking site (e.g., via available social network site APIs) to retrieve identifying information about a victim. While some of this information may be public, the attacker is able to harvest this information in context and may use it for further attacks on the user (e.g., spear phishing).
CAPEC-62: Cross Site Request Forgery
An attacker crafts malicious web links and distributes them (via web pages, email, etc.), typically in a targeted manner, hoping to induce users to click on the link and execute the malicious action against some third-party application. If successful, the action embedded in the malicious link will be processed and accepted by the targeted application with the users' privilege level. This type of attack leverages the persistence and implicit trust placed in user session cookies by many web applications today. In such an architecture, once the user authenticates to an application and a session cookie is created on the user's system, all following transactions for that session are authenticated using that cookie including potential actions initiated by an attacker and simply "riding" the existing session cookie.