Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-352

Weakness Allowed

Cross-Site Request Forgery

Abstraction: Compound · Status: Stable

The web application does not, or cannot, sufficiently verify whether a request was intentionally provided by the user who sent the request, which could have originated from an unauthorized actor.

Mapping guidance

This is a well-known Composite of multiple weaknesses that must all occur simultaneously, although it is attack-oriented in nature.

While attack-oriented composites are supported in CWE, they have not been a focus of research. There is a chance that future research or CWE scope clarifications will change or deprecate them. Perform root-cause analysis to determine if other weaknesses allow CSRF attacks to occur, and map to those weaknesses. For example, predictable CSRF tokens might allow bypass of CSRF protection mechanisms; if this occurs, they might be better characterized as randomness/predictability weaknesses.

Relationships and members
ChildOf: CWE-345 · View CWE-1000
ChildOf: CWE-345 · View CWE-1003
Requires: CWE-346 · View CWE-1000
Requires: CWE-441 · View CWE-1000
Requires: CWE-642 · View CWE-1000
Requires: CWE-613 · View CWE-1000
Modes of introduction
Architecture and Design

REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.

Detection methods

Manual Analysis

This weakness can be detected using tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session.

Specifically, manual analysis can be useful for finding this weakness, and for minimizing false positives assuming an understanding of business logic. However, it might not achieve desired code coverage within limited time constraints. For black-box analysis, if credentials are not known for privileged accounts, then the most security-critical portions of the application may not receive sufficient attention.

Consider using OWASP CSRFTester to identify potential issues and aid in manual analysis.

Effectiveness: High

These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.

Automated Static Analysis

CSRF is currently difficult to detect reliably using automated techniques. This is because each application has its own implicit security policy that dictates which requests can be influenced by an outsider and automatically performed on behalf of a user, versus which requests require strong confidence that the user intends to make the request. For example, a keyword search of the public portion of a web site is typically expected to be encoded within a link that can be launched automatically when the user clicks on the link.

Effectiveness: Limited

Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis

Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:

Web Application Scanner

Effectiveness: High

Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:

Fuzz Tester

Framework-based Fuzzer

Effectiveness: High

Manual Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source

Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Automated Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Source code Weakness Analyzer

Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Architecture or Design Review

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)

Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Notes

Relationship

There can be a close relationship between XSS and CSRF (CWE-352). An attacker might use CSRF in order to trick the victim into submitting requests to the server in which the requests contain an XSS payload. A well-known example of this was the Samy worm on MySpace [REF-956]. The worm used XSS to insert malicious HTML sequences into a user's profile and add the attacker as a MySpace friend. MySpace friends of that victim would then execute the payload to modify their own profiles, causing the worm to propagate exponentially. Since the victims did not intentionally insert the malicious script themselves, CSRF was a root cause.

Theoretical

The CSRF topology is multi-channel:

Attacker (as outsider) to intermediary (as user). The interaction point is either an external or internal channel.

Intermediary (as user) to server (as victim). The activation point is an internal channel.

Content history
Submission: PLOVER · 2006-07-19 · CWE Draft 3
Contribution: Abhi Balakrishnan · 2024-02-29 · CWE 4.17

Contributed usability diagram concepts used by the CWE team.

Modification: Eric Dalci · Cigital · 2008-07-01 · CWE 1.0

updated Time_of_Introduction

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2008-09-08 · CWE 1.0

updated Alternate_Terms, Description, Relationships, Other_Notes, Relationship_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2009-01-12 · CWE 1.2

updated Applicable_Platforms, Description, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationship_Notes, Relationships, Research_Gaps, Theoretical_Notes

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2009-03-10 · CWE 1.3

updated Potential_Mitigations

Modification: Tom Stracener · 2009-05-20 · CWE 1.4

Added demonstrative example for profile.

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2009-05-27 · CWE 1.4

updated Demonstrative_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2009-12-28 · CWE 1.7

updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2010-02-16 · CWE 1.8

updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2010-06-21 · CWE 1.9

updated Common_Consequences, Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2010-09-27 · CWE 1.10

updated Potential_Mitigations

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2011-03-29 · CWE 1.12

updated Description

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2011-06-01 · CWE 1.13

updated Common_Consequences

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2011-06-27 · CWE 2.0

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2011-09-13 · CWE 2.1

updated Potential_Mitigations, References

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2012-05-11 · CWE 2.2

updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2012-10-30 · CWE 2.3

updated Potential_Mitigations

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2013-02-21 · CWE 2.4

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2013-07-17 · CWE 2.5

updated References, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2014-07-30 · CWE 2.8

updated Detection_Factors

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2015-12-07 · CWE 2.9

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2017-11-08 · CWE 3.0

updated Applicable_Platforms, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2018-03-27 · CWE 3.1

updated References, Relationship_Notes, Research_Gaps

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2019-09-19 · CWE 3.4

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2020-02-24 · CWE 4.0

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2020-06-25 · CWE 4.1

updated Relationships, Theoretical_Notes

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2020-08-20 · CWE 4.2

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2021-07-20 · CWE 4.5

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2021-10-28 · CWE 4.6

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2022-06-28 · CWE 4.8

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2023-04-27 · CWE 4.11

updated References, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2023-06-29 · CWE 4.12

updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2024-11-19 · CWE 4.16

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2025-04-03 · CWE 4.17

updated Alternate_Terms, Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2025-09-09 · CWE 4.18

updated Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2025-12-11 · CWE 4.19

updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2026-10-28 · CWE 5.0

updated Applicable_Platforms, Name, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings

15010 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-3MH6-R7M6-R42X

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:43 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:43
VLAI
Details

In Zabbix before 4.0.28rc1, 5.x before 5.0.8rc1, 5.1.x and 5.2.x before 5.2.4rc1, and 5.3.x and 5.4.x before 5.4.0alpha1, the CControllerAuthenticationUpdate controller lacks a CSRF protection mechanism. The code inside this controller calls diableSIDValidation inside the init() method.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-27927"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-352"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-03-03T17:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In Zabbix before 4.0.28rc1, 5.x before 5.0.8rc1, 5.1.x and 5.2.x before 5.2.4rc1, and 5.3.x and 5.4.x before 5.4.0alpha1, the CControllerAuthenticationUpdate controller lacks a CSRF protection mechanism. The code inside this controller calls diableSIDValidation inside the init() method.",
  "id": "GHSA-3mh6-r7m6-r42x",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T17:43:36Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:43:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27927"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2023/04/msg00013.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.zabbix.com/browse/ZBX-18942"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-3MJ3-396V-7F8P

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-05 02:48 – Updated: 2022-05-05 02:48
VLAI
Details

Cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in the RESTful Web Services (restws) module 7.x-1.x before 7.x-1.2 and 7.x-2.x before 7.x-2.0-alpha4 for Drupal allows remote attackers to hijack the authentication of arbitrary users via unknown vectors.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2013-0205"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-352"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2013-03-19T14:55:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in the RESTful Web Services (restws) module 7.x-1.x before 7.x-1.2 and 7.x-2.x before 7.x-2.0-alpha4 for Drupal allows remote attackers to hijack the authentication of arbitrary users via unknown vectors.",
  "id": "GHSA-3mj3-396v-7f8p",
  "modified": "2022-05-05T02:48:34Z",
  "published": "2022-05-05T02:48:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-0205"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://drupal.org/node/1890212"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://drupal.org/node/1890216"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://drupal.org/node/1890222"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2013/01/21/5"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-3MJJ-J5CV-MF5P

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 02:01 – Updated: 2022-05-17 02:01
VLAI
Details

Cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in admin/conf_users_edit.php in PHP Link Directory (phpLD) 4.1.0 allows remote attackers to hijack the authentication of administrators for requests that add an administrator via the N action.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2011-0643"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-352"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2011-01-25T19:00:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in admin/conf_users_edit.php in PHP Link Directory (phpLD) 4.1.0 allows remote attackers to hijack the authentication of administrators for requests that add an administrator via the N action.",
  "id": "GHSA-3mjj-j5cv-mf5p",
  "modified": "2022-05-17T02:01:58Z",
  "published": "2022-05-17T02:01:58Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-0643"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/64860"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://osvdb.org/70627"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/43032"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/16037"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-3MQ9-PHGQ-F2WV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 01:47 – Updated: 2022-05-17 01:47
VLAI
Details

Multiple cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerabilities in MediaWiki 1.17.x before 1.17.3 and 1.18.x before 1.18.2 allow remote attackers to hijack the authentication of users with the block permission for requests that (1) block a user via a request to the Block module or (2) unblock a user via a request to the Unblock module.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2012-1578"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-352"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2012-09-09T21:55:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Multiple cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerabilities in MediaWiki 1.17.x before 1.17.3 and 1.18.x before 1.18.2 allow remote attackers to hijack the authentication of users with the block permission for requests that (1) block a user via a request to the Block module or (2) unblock a user via a request to the Unblock module.",
  "id": "GHSA-3mq9-phgq-f2wv",
  "modified": "2022-05-17T01:47:59Z",
  "published": "2022-05-17T01:47:59Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-1578"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.wikimedia.org/show_bug.cgi?id=34212"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/78911"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://lists.wikimedia.org/pipermail/mediawiki-announce/2012-March/000109.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://lists.wikimedia.org/pipermail/mediawiki-announce/2012-March/000110.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://osvdb.org/80361"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/48504"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2012/03/22/9"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2012/03/24/1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/52689"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-3MRR-P6XC-FF4F

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-16 21:31 – Updated: 2026-04-01 18:33
VLAI
Details

Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in Somethinkodd.com Development Team EmailShroud allows Reflected XSS.This issue affects EmailShroud: from n/a through 2.2.1.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-23456"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-352"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-01-16T20:15:36Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in Somethinkodd.com Development Team EmailShroud allows Reflected XSS.This issue affects EmailShroud: from n/a through 2.2.1.",
  "id": "GHSA-3mrr-p6xc-ff4f",
  "modified": "2026-04-01T18:33:11Z",
  "published": "2025-01-16T21:31:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-23456"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/emailshroud/vulnerability/wordpress-emailshroud-plugin-2-2-1-csrf-to-reflected-cross-site-scripting-xss-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-3MV2-VMWH-RWFX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-15 18:34 – Updated: 2026-06-09 10:27
VLAI
Summary
AVideo: 2FA toggle endpoint has no CSRF protection, letting an attacker page silently disable a logged-in victim's 2FA
Details

Summary

Type: Cross-site request forgery on the 2FA toggle. plugin/LoginControl/set.json.php accepts POST type=set2FA value=false, calls LoginControl::setUser2FA(User::getId(), false) on the session-authenticated user, and returns. There is no forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest() call, no isTokenValid() check, no X-CSRF-Token/SameSite enforcement, and no re-authentication step. A cross-origin page that the victim visits while logged into the AVideo dashboard issues the POST via a hidden form (or fetch without credentials:"omit") and disables the victim's 2FA in one request. The next phishing/credential-stuffing attempt against that account no longer needs the second factor. File: plugin/LoginControl/set.json.php, lines 1-37. Root cause: the developer relied on the User::isLogged() check at line 9 as the only auth, then dispatched directly into LoginControl::setUser2FA(User::getId(), $value=='true'). Other AVideo state-changing endpoints in the same codebase (videoUpdateUsage.json.php, videoStatus.json.php, videoRotate.json.php, etc.) call forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest('<name>') to compare Origin/Referer against the AVideo domain; this endpoint simply omits the call. The session cookie carries the user's identity on every cross-origin POST, so any attacker page can speak for the logged-in user on this endpoint.

Affected Code

File: plugin/LoginControl/set.json.php, lines 1-37.

<?php
require_once '../../videos/configuration.php';
_session_write_close();
header('Content-Type: application/json');

$obj = new stdClass();
$obj->error = true;
$obj->msg = "";
if (!User::isLogged()) {
    $obj->msg = "Not logged";
    die(json_encode($obj));
}
if (empty($_POST['type'])) {
    $obj->msg = "Type is empty";
    die(json_encode($obj));
}
if (!isset($_POST['value'])) {
    $obj->msg = "value is empty";
    die(json_encode($obj));
}

$cu = AVideoPlugin::loadPluginIfEnabled('LoginControl');

if (empty($cu)) {
    $obj->msg = "Plugin not enabled";
    die(json_encode($obj));
}

$obj->error = false;
switch ($_POST['type']) {
    case 'set2FA':
        LoginControl::setUser2FA(User::getId(), $_POST['value']=="true" ? true : false);  // <-- BUG: no CSRF gate, no re-auth
        break;
}

die(json_encode($obj));

Why it's wrong: disabling a victim's second factor is exactly the kind of state change the AVideo CSRF helper forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest() exists to protect. Compare with objects/comments_like.json.php:18 (forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest('comments_like')) — comments-likes get CSRF protection, but the 2FA toggle does not. Beyond CSRF, security-sensitive toggles like 2FA-disable conventionally also require either the current 2FA code or a password re-prompt: a malicious browser extension, an XSS that lands in any AVideo subdomain, or a compromised tab can otherwise flip the bit silently. None of those mitigations exist here.

Exploit Chain

  1. Attacker hosts https://attacker.example/avideo-2fa-off.html containing: ```html
document.getElementById('f').submit();

`` State: page is live and indexable. 2. Attacker delivers the page to a victim who is logged in toavideo.example(open redirect on a trusted partner, ad campaign, IM phishing link, encyclopedic-looking forum post). The victim's browser opens the page; the form auto-submits to AVideo. State: cross-origin POST hitsset.json.phpwith the victim's session cookie attached (the cookie'sSameSiteattribute is set toLax/Noneby AVideo's defaults so the cross-origin POST succeeds for top-level navigations). 3.set.json.php:9confirmsUser::isLogged()(true, victim's session is valid). Lines 13-19 seetype=set2FA,value=false. Line 30-32 callsLoginControl::setUser2FA(victim_user_id, false)and persists the change. State: victim's 2FA is now disabled inusers.externalOptions.LoginControl.is2FAEnabled. 4. Victim sees a generic "operation completed" JSON response in a redirected browser tab (or no visible feedback at all if the form lands in aniframe). State: victim notices nothing unusual. 5. Attacker (in a separate session) attempts credential stuffing or password-spray againstavideo.example/objects/login.json.php`. Without the second factor, any one of: a previously leaked password, a successful credential-stuffing match, or a spear-phishing-collected password completes the login. State: attacker holds full session for victim's account. 6. Final state: the second factor that the victim explicitly enabled was silently disabled across the wire by visiting an attacker-hosted page. The whole chain takes one HTTP POST and zero clicks beyond the initial visit.

Security Impact

Severity: sec-moderate. CVSS 6.5: network attack, low complexity, low privileges (the attacker themselves are unauthenticated; the victim must be a logged-in AVideo user; this is captured by PR:L because the action's effect requires the victim's session), user interaction required (visit attacker page), scope unchanged, no confidentiality directly, high integrity (the victim's 2FA configuration is silently corrupted), no availability claim. Attacker capability: with one cross-origin POST, the attacker turns a victim's 2FA-protected account into a plain password-only account. Combined with any password leak, credential-stuffing match, or successful phishing of the password, the account is fully compromised. The change is permanent until the victim notices and re-enables 2FA, and AVideo does not raise an audit-log event when 2FA is disabled (see LoginControl::setUser2FA — it simply writes the boolean), so detection is unlikely. Preconditions: AVideo deployment with the LoginControl plugin enabled (the plugin shipping the 2FA feature); the victim is logged in to AVideo at the moment they visit the attacker page; the AVideo session cookie does not have SameSite=Strict (the deployment default is SameSite=Lax per objects/phpsessionid.json.php:53, which still allows cross-origin top-level POSTs from a form auto-submit). Differential: source-inspection-verified. set.json.php does not contain forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest, isTokenValid, verifyToken, or any equivalent string; the entire body of the file is reproduced above. With the suggested fix below, the same cross-origin POST returns a 403 with Invalid Request and the setUser2FA call never fires.

Suggested Fix

Add the same CSRF gate every other state-changing endpoint in this codebase uses, and require the current 2FA code (or a password re-prompt) when the user is disabling the second factor.

--- a/plugin/LoginControl/set.json.php
+++ b/plugin/LoginControl/set.json.php
@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@
 if (!User::isLogged()) {
     $obj->msg = "Not logged";
     die(json_encode($obj));
 }
+forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest('LoginControl-set');
+
 if (empty($_POST['type'])) {
     $obj->msg = "Type is empty";
     die(json_encode($obj));
@@ -28,7 +30,15 @@
 $obj->error = false;
 switch ($_POST['type']) {
     case 'set2FA':
-        LoginControl::setUser2FA(User::getId(), $_POST['value']=="true" ? true : false);
+        $newValue = ($_POST['value'] == 'true');
+        // Require the current 2FA code (or a password re-prompt) when DISABLING 2FA;
+        // turning it on is fine, turning it off needs a step-up.
+        if (!$newValue && !LoginControl::confirmStepUpForCurrentUser($_POST['confirm'] ?? '')) {
+            $obj->error = true;
+            $obj->msg = __('Re-authentication required to disable 2FA');
+            die(json_encode($obj));
+        }
+        LoginControl::setUser2FA(User::getId(), $newValue);
         break;
 }

Defence-in-depth: the AVideo session cookie should be issued with SameSite=Strict for the management dashboard's first-party POSTs; the public read-only player can keep a separate SameSite=Lax cookie. Audit-log every 2FA-disable event with the source IP and user agent so an unexpected disable is visible to the operator.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "WWBN/AVideo"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "29.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-45610"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-352"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-15T18:34:57Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-29T14:16:30Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n**Type:** Cross-site request forgery on the 2FA toggle. `plugin/LoginControl/set.json.php` accepts `POST type=set2FA value=false`, calls `LoginControl::setUser2FA(User::getId(), false)` on the session-authenticated user, and returns. There is no `forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest()` call, no `isTokenValid()` check, no `X-CSRF-Token`/`SameSite` enforcement, and no re-authentication step. A cross-origin page that the victim visits while logged into the AVideo dashboard issues the POST via a hidden form (or `fetch` without `credentials:\"omit\"`) and disables the victim\u0027s 2FA in one request. The next phishing/credential-stuffing attempt against that account no longer needs the second factor.\n**File:** `plugin/LoginControl/set.json.php`, lines 1-37.\n**Root cause:** the developer relied on the `User::isLogged()` check at line 9 as the only auth, then dispatched directly into `LoginControl::setUser2FA(User::getId(), $value==\u0027true\u0027)`. Other AVideo state-changing endpoints in the same codebase (`videoUpdateUsage.json.php`, `videoStatus.json.php`, `videoRotate.json.php`, etc.) call `forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest(\u0027\u003cname\u003e\u0027)` to compare `Origin`/`Referer` against the AVideo domain; this endpoint simply omits the call. The session cookie carries the user\u0027s identity on every cross-origin POST, so any attacker page can speak for the logged-in user on this endpoint.\n\n## Affected Code\n\n**File:** `plugin/LoginControl/set.json.php`, lines 1-37.\n\n```php\n\u003c?php\nrequire_once \u0027../../videos/configuration.php\u0027;\n_session_write_close();\nheader(\u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027);\n\n$obj = new stdClass();\n$obj-\u003eerror = true;\n$obj-\u003emsg = \"\";\nif (!User::isLogged()) {\n    $obj-\u003emsg = \"Not logged\";\n    die(json_encode($obj));\n}\nif (empty($_POST[\u0027type\u0027])) {\n    $obj-\u003emsg = \"Type is empty\";\n    die(json_encode($obj));\n}\nif (!isset($_POST[\u0027value\u0027])) {\n    $obj-\u003emsg = \"value is empty\";\n    die(json_encode($obj));\n}\n\n$cu = AVideoPlugin::loadPluginIfEnabled(\u0027LoginControl\u0027);\n\nif (empty($cu)) {\n    $obj-\u003emsg = \"Plugin not enabled\";\n    die(json_encode($obj));\n}\n\n$obj-\u003eerror = false;\nswitch ($_POST[\u0027type\u0027]) {\n    case \u0027set2FA\u0027:\n        LoginControl::setUser2FA(User::getId(), $_POST[\u0027value\u0027]==\"true\" ? true : false);  // \u003c-- BUG: no CSRF gate, no re-auth\n        break;\n}\n\ndie(json_encode($obj));\n```\n\n**Why it\u0027s wrong:** disabling a victim\u0027s second factor is exactly the kind of state change the AVideo CSRF helper `forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest()` exists to protect. Compare with `objects/comments_like.json.php:18` (`forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest(\u0027comments_like\u0027)`) \u2014 comments-likes get CSRF protection, but the 2FA toggle does not. Beyond CSRF, security-sensitive toggles like 2FA-disable conventionally also require either the current 2FA code or a password re-prompt: a malicious browser extension, an XSS that lands in any AVideo subdomain, or a compromised tab can otherwise flip the bit silently. None of those mitigations exist here.\n\n## Exploit Chain\n\n1. Attacker hosts `https://attacker.example/avideo-2fa-off.html` containing:\n   ```html\n   \u003cform id=\"f\" action=\"https://avideo.example/plugin/LoginControl/set.json.php\" method=\"POST\"\u003e\n     \u003cinput type=\"hidden\" name=\"type\"  value=\"set2FA\"\u003e\n     \u003cinput type=\"hidden\" name=\"value\" value=\"false\"\u003e\n   \u003c/form\u003e\n   \u003cscript\u003edocument.getElementById(\u0027f\u0027).submit();\u003c/script\u003e\n   ```\n   State: page is live and indexable.\n2. Attacker delivers the page to a victim who is logged in to `avideo.example` (open redirect on a trusted partner, ad campaign, IM phishing link, encyclopedic-looking forum post). The victim\u0027s browser opens the page; the form auto-submits to AVideo. State: cross-origin POST hits `set.json.php` with the victim\u0027s session cookie attached (the cookie\u0027s `SameSite` attribute is set to `Lax`/`None` by AVideo\u0027s defaults so the cross-origin POST succeeds for top-level navigations).\n3. `set.json.php:9` confirms `User::isLogged()` (true, victim\u0027s session is valid). Lines 13-19 see `type=set2FA`, `value=false`. Line 30-32 calls `LoginControl::setUser2FA(victim_user_id, false)` and persists the change. State: victim\u0027s 2FA is now disabled in `users.externalOptions.LoginControl.is2FAEnabled`.\n4. Victim sees a generic \"operation completed\" JSON response in a redirected browser tab (or no visible feedback at all if the form lands in an `iframe`). State: victim notices nothing unusual.\n5. Attacker (in a separate session) attempts credential stuffing or password-spray against `avideo.example/objects/login.json.php`. Without the second factor, any one of: a previously leaked password, a successful credential-stuffing match, or a spear-phishing-collected password completes the login. State: attacker holds full session for victim\u0027s account.\n6. Final state: the second factor that the victim explicitly enabled was silently disabled across the wire by visiting an attacker-hosted page. The whole chain takes one HTTP POST and zero clicks beyond the initial visit.\n\n## Security Impact\n\n**Severity:** sec-moderate. CVSS 6.5: network attack, low complexity, low privileges (the attacker themselves are unauthenticated; the victim must be a logged-in AVideo user; this is captured by `PR:L` because the action\u0027s effect requires the victim\u0027s session), user interaction required (visit attacker page), scope unchanged, no confidentiality directly, high integrity (the victim\u0027s 2FA configuration is silently corrupted), no availability claim.\n**Attacker capability:** with one cross-origin POST, the attacker turns a victim\u0027s 2FA-protected account into a plain password-only account. Combined with any password leak, credential-stuffing match, or successful phishing of the password, the account is fully compromised. The change is permanent until the victim notices and re-enables 2FA, and AVideo does not raise an audit-log event when 2FA is disabled (see `LoginControl::setUser2FA` \u2014 it simply writes the boolean), so detection is unlikely.\n**Preconditions:** AVideo deployment with the `LoginControl` plugin enabled (the plugin shipping the 2FA feature); the victim is logged in to AVideo at the moment they visit the attacker page; the AVideo session cookie does not have `SameSite=Strict` (the deployment default is `SameSite=Lax` per `objects/phpsessionid.json.php:53`, which still allows cross-origin top-level POSTs from a form auto-submit).\n**Differential:** source-inspection-verified. `set.json.php` does not contain `forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest`, `isTokenValid`, `verifyToken`, or any equivalent string; the entire body of the file is reproduced above. With the suggested fix below, the same cross-origin POST returns a 403 with `Invalid Request` and the `setUser2FA` call never fires.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nAdd the same CSRF gate every other state-changing endpoint in this codebase uses, and require the current 2FA code (or a password re-prompt) when the user is *disabling* the second factor.\n\n```diff\n--- a/plugin/LoginControl/set.json.php\n+++ b/plugin/LoginControl/set.json.php\n@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@\n if (!User::isLogged()) {\n     $obj-\u003emsg = \"Not logged\";\n     die(json_encode($obj));\n }\n+forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest(\u0027LoginControl-set\u0027);\n+\n if (empty($_POST[\u0027type\u0027])) {\n     $obj-\u003emsg = \"Type is empty\";\n     die(json_encode($obj));\n@@ -28,7 +30,15 @@\n $obj-\u003eerror = false;\n switch ($_POST[\u0027type\u0027]) {\n     case \u0027set2FA\u0027:\n-        LoginControl::setUser2FA(User::getId(), $_POST[\u0027value\u0027]==\"true\" ? true : false);\n+        $newValue = ($_POST[\u0027value\u0027] == \u0027true\u0027);\n+        // Require the current 2FA code (or a password re-prompt) when DISABLING 2FA;\n+        // turning it on is fine, turning it off needs a step-up.\n+        if (!$newValue \u0026\u0026 !LoginControl::confirmStepUpForCurrentUser($_POST[\u0027confirm\u0027] ?? \u0027\u0027)) {\n+            $obj-\u003eerror = true;\n+            $obj-\u003emsg = __(\u0027Re-authentication required to disable 2FA\u0027);\n+            die(json_encode($obj));\n+        }\n+        LoginControl::setUser2FA(User::getId(), $newValue);\n         break;\n }\n```\n\nDefence-in-depth: the AVideo session cookie should be issued with `SameSite=Strict` for the management dashboard\u0027s first-party POSTs; the public read-only player can keep a separate `SameSite=Lax` cookie. Audit-log every 2FA-disable event with the source IP and user agent so an unexpected disable is visible to the operator.",
  "id": "GHSA-3mv2-vmwh-rwfx",
  "modified": "2026-06-09T10:27:26Z",
  "published": "2026-05-15T18:34:57Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-3mv2-vmwh-rwfx"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45610"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "AVideo: 2FA toggle endpoint has no CSRF protection, letting an attacker page silently disable a logged-in victim\u0027s 2FA"
}

GHSA-3MW3-473F-GHGM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-01 15:31 – Updated: 2025-07-01 15:31
VLAI
Details

A cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability exists in the web interface of AVTECH IP camera, DVR, and NVR devices. An attacker can craft malicious requests that, when executed in the context of an authenticated user’s browser session, allow unauthorized changes to the device configuration without user interaction.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-34050"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-352"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-07-01T15:15:22Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A\u00a0cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability exists in the web interface of AVTECH IP camera, DVR, and NVR devices. An attacker can craft malicious requests that, when executed in the context of an authenticated user\u2019s browser session, allow unauthorized changes to the device configuration without user interaction.",
  "id": "GHSA-3mw3-473f-ghgm",
  "modified": "2025-07-01T15:31:09Z",
  "published": "2025-07-01T15:31:09Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-34050"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://avtech.com"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vulncheck.com/advisories/avtech-ipcamera-nvr-dvr-mulitple-vulns"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20161029201749/https://github.com/ebux/AVTECH"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240810225729/https://www.search-lab.hu/advisories/126-AVTech-devices-multiple-vulnerabilities"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/40500"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-3MWR-G9F4-VWJ8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-06-27 15:31 – Updated: 2026-04-01 18:35
VLAI
Details

Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in Looks Awesome OnionBuzz allows Stored XSS. This issue affects OnionBuzz: from n/a through 1.0.7.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-53312"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-352"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-06-27T14:15:53Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in Looks Awesome OnionBuzz allows Stored XSS. This issue affects OnionBuzz: from n/a through 1.0.7.",
  "id": "GHSA-3mwr-g9f4-vwj8",
  "modified": "2026-04-01T18:35:38Z",
  "published": "2025-06-27T15:31:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-53312"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/onionbuzz-viral-quiz/vulnerability/wordpress-onionbuzz-plugin-1-0-7-cross-site-request-forgery-csrf-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-3MXQ-52J7-72FJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-06-13 03:30 – Updated: 2025-06-13 03:30
VLAI
Details

The Digital Marketing and Agency Templates Addons for Elementor plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery in all versions up to, and including, 1.1.1. This is due to missing or incorrect nonce validation on the import_templates() function. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to trigger an import via a forged request granted they can trick a site administrator into performing an action such as clicking on a link.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-5938"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-352"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-06-13T03:15:53Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The Digital Marketing and Agency Templates Addons for Elementor plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery in all versions up to, and including, 1.1.1. This is due to missing or incorrect nonce validation on the import_templates() function. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to trigger an import via a forged request granted they can trick a site administrator into performing an action such as clicking on a link.",
  "id": "GHSA-3mxq-52j7-72fj",
  "modified": "2025-06-13T03:30:34Z",
  "published": "2025-06-13T03:30:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-5938"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/digital-marketing-agency-templates-for-elementor/trunk/includes/importer.php#L242"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/e3447438-1624-451a-a50c-981021399198?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-3P3C-QFRW-WP9F

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-11 12:30 – Updated: 2025-10-11 12:30
VLAI
Details

The Page Blocks plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery in all versions up to, and including, 1.1.0. This is due to missing or incorrect nonce validation on the admin_process_widget_page_change function. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to modify widget page block configurations via a forged request granted they can trick a site administrator into performing an action such as clicking on a link.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-9626"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-352"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-10-11T10:15:44Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The Page Blocks plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery in all versions up to, and including, 1.1.0. This is due to missing or incorrect nonce validation on the admin_process_widget_page_change function. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to modify widget page block configurations via a forged request granted they can trick a site administrator into performing an action such as clicking on a link.",
  "id": "GHSA-3p3c-qfrw-wp9f",
  "modified": "2025-10-11T12:30:59Z",
  "published": "2025-10-11T12:30:59Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-9626"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/page-blocks/trunk/classes/page_blocks.php#L705"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/page-blocks/trunk/classes/page_blocks.php#L710"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/page-blocks/trunk/page_blocks_plugin.php#L96"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/794d1149-5c6a-4e92-bbc9-00d718799df9?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

Mitigation MIT-4
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

  • Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
  • For example, use anti-CSRF packages such as the OWASP CSRFGuard. [REF-330]
  • Another example is the ESAPI Session Management control, which includes a component for CSRF. [REF-45]
Mitigation
Implementation

Ensure that the application is free of cross-site scripting issues (CWE-79), because most CSRF defenses can be bypassed using attacker-controlled script.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Generate a unique nonce for each form, place the nonce into the form, and verify the nonce upon receipt of the form. Be sure that the nonce is not predictable (CWE-330). [REF-332]

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Identify especially dangerous operations. When the user performs a dangerous operation, send a separate confirmation request to ensure that the user intended to perform that operation.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Use the "double-submitted cookie" method as described by Felten and Zeller:
  • When a user visits a site, the site should generate a pseudorandom value and set it as a cookie on the user's machine. The site should require every form submission to include this value as a form value and also as a cookie value. When a POST request is sent to the site, the request should only be considered valid if the form value and the cookie value are the same.
  • Because of the same-origin policy, an attacker cannot read or modify the value stored in the cookie. To successfully submit a form on behalf of the user, the attacker would have to correctly guess the pseudorandom value. If the pseudorandom value is cryptographically strong, this will be prohibitively difficult.
  • This technique requires Javascript, so it may not work for browsers that have Javascript disabled. [REF-331]
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Do not use the GET method for any request that triggers a state change.

Mitigation
Implementation

Check the HTTP Referer header to see if the request originated from an expected page. This could break legitimate functionality, because users or proxies may have disabled sending the Referer for privacy reasons.

CAPEC-111: JSON Hijacking (aka JavaScript Hijacking)

An attacker targets a system that uses JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) as a transport mechanism between the client and the server (common in Web 2.0 systems using AJAX) to steal possibly confidential information transmitted from the server back to the client inside the JSON object by taking advantage of the loophole in the browser's Same Origin Policy that does not prohibit JavaScript from one website to be included and executed in the context of another website.

CAPEC-462: Cross-Domain Search Timing

An attacker initiates cross domain HTTP / GET requests and times the server responses. The timing of these responses may leak important information on what is happening on the server. Browser's same origin policy prevents the attacker from directly reading the server responses (in the absence of any other weaknesses), but does not prevent the attacker from timing the responses to requests that the attacker issued cross domain.

CAPEC-467: Cross Site Identification

An attacker harvests identifying information about a victim via an active session that the victim's browser has with a social networking site. A victim may have the social networking site open in one tab or perhaps is simply using the "remember me" feature to keep their session with the social networking site active. An attacker induces a payload to execute in the victim's browser that transparently to the victim initiates a request to the social networking site (e.g., via available social network site APIs) to retrieve identifying information about a victim. While some of this information may be public, the attacker is able to harvest this information in context and may use it for further attacks on the user (e.g., spear phishing).

CAPEC-62: Cross Site Request Forgery

An attacker crafts malicious web links and distributes them (via web pages, email, etc.), typically in a targeted manner, hoping to induce users to click on the link and execute the malicious action against some third-party application. If successful, the action embedded in the malicious link will be processed and accepted by the targeted application with the users' privilege level. This type of attack leverages the persistence and implicit trust placed in user session cookies by many web applications today. In such an architecture, once the user authenticates to an application and a session cookie is created on the user's system, all following transactions for that session are authenticated using that cookie including potential actions initiated by an attacker and simply "riding" the existing session cookie.