CWE-22

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "Keras"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.12.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-12638"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-12-02T00:09:26Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-11-28T15:16:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Duplicate Advisory\nThis advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-hjqc-jx6g-rwp9. This link is maintained to preserve external references.\n\n### Original Description\nKeras version 3.11.3 is affected by a path traversal vulnerability in the keras.utils.get_file() function when extracting tar archives. The vulnerability arises because the function uses Python\u0027s tarfile.extractall() method without the security-critical filter=\u0027data\u0027 parameter. Although Keras attempts to filter unsafe paths using filter_safe_paths(), this filtering occurs before extraction, and a PATH_MAX symlink resolution bug triggers during extraction. This bug causes symlink resolution to fail due to path length limits, resulting in a security bypass that allows files to be written outside the intended extraction directory. This can lead to arbitrary file writes outside the cache directory, enabling potential system compromise or malicious code execution. The vulnerability affects Keras installations that process tar archives with get_file() and does not affect versions where this extraction method is secured with the appropriate filter parameter.",
  "id": "GHSA-9g7v-8wxv-mwxp",
  "modified": "2025-12-02T00:09:26Z",
  "published": "2025-11-28T15:30:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-12638"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/keras-team/keras/commit/47fcb397ee4caffd5a75efd1fa3067559594e951"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/keras-team/keras"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://huntr.com/bounties/f94f5beb-54d8-4e6a-8bac-86d9aee103f4"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Duplicate Advisory: Keras keras.utils.get_file API is vulnerable to a path traversal attack",
  "withdrawn": "2025-12-02T00:09:26Z"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-84069"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-27T06:17:06Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The WebFacing\u2122  WordPress plugin before 5.4 does not restrict access to one of its bundled scripts and does not validate a user-supplied path before using it to include a local file, allowing unauthenticated users to perform Local File Inclusion.",
  "id": "GHSA-9g84-3xhq-4hwg",
  "modified": "2026-09-28T03:30:25Z",
  "published": "2026-09-27T06:30:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-84069"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/04965370-b4f4-4629-a9b1-7450fcf6aeee"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "io.hawt:project"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.5.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2017-2594"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-11-04T20:36:05Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2018-05-08T17:29:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "hawtio before versions 2.0-beta-1, 2.0-beta-2, 2.0-m1, 2.0-m2, 2.0-m3, and 1.5 are vulnerable to a path traversal that leads to a NullPointerException with a full stacktrace. An attacker could use this flaw to gather undisclosed information from within hawtio\u0027s root.",
  "id": "GHSA-9g8w-pjpr-prr4",
  "modified": "2022-11-04T20:36:05Z",
  "published": "2022-05-13T01:36:55Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-2594"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017:1832"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2017-2594"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Path Traversal in io.hawt:project"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-52953"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-01-08T03:15:07Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Path traversal vulnerability in the Medialibrary module\nImpact: Successful exploitation of this vulnerability will affect integrity and confidentiality.",
  "id": "GHSA-9g92-whv2-g846",
  "modified": "2025-01-08T03:30:23Z",
  "published": "2025-01-08T03:30:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-52953"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://consumer.huawei.com/en/support/bulletin/2025/1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2010-0680"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2010-02-22T21:30:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in index.php in ZeusCMS 0.2 allows remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via directory traversal sequences in the page parameter.",
  "id": "GHSA-9gcq-4h5g-5wx6",
  "modified": "2022-05-02T06:14:43Z",
  "published": "2022-05-02T06:14:43Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2010-0680"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/11437"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/38237"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2014-1922"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2020-01-24T17:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Absolute path traversal vulnerability in tools/pdfViewer.pl in Koha before 3.8.23, 3.10.x before 3.10.13, 3.12.x before 3.12.10, and 3.14.x before 3.14.3 allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via unspecified vectors.",
  "id": "GHSA-9gf6-9v36-2vfv",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T00:00:35Z",
  "published": "2022-05-17T19:57:17Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-1922"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://bugs.koha-community.org/bugzilla3/show_bug.cgi?id=11660"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://koha-community.org/security-release-february-2014"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2014/02/07/10"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2014/02/10/3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.29.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "knowns"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.30.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-86439"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-25T19:32:05Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Overview\n\nVerified. Multiple **Unrestricted Path Traversal** vulnerabilities exist in the Knowns MCP `docs` and `memory` tools, allowing arbitrary file read, write, and deletion operations outside the project sandbox. The storage layer functions (`Get`, `Create`, `Update`, `Rename`, `Delete`) in both `doc_store.go` and `memory_store.go` concatenate user-controlled paths with `filepath.Join()` without any containment validation. \n\nAdditionally, the `docs.update` action with a `newPath` parameter performs a file deletion via `Rename()`, but is classified as `CapWrite` in the permission registry rather than `CapDelete`. This allows an attacker with a `read-write-no-delete` preset to bypass deletion restrictions and destroy arbitrary files outside the project root.\n\n## Affected paths\n\n| File Path | Role | Vulnerability \u0026 Execution Impact |\n| :--- | :--- | :--- |\n| **`internal/storage/doc_store.go`** | Vulnerable Sink (Docs) | **Path Traversal in File Operations (CWE-22):** `Get()`, `Create()`, `Update()`, `Rename()`, `Delete()` join user-controlled `path` with `filepath.Join(ds.docsDir(), ...)` without validating path containment. |\n| **`internal/storage/memory_store.go`** | Vulnerable Sink (Memory) | **Path Traversal in Memory Operations (CWE-22):** `GetInLayer()`, `Create()`, `Update()`, `Delete()` join user-controlled `id` with `filepath.Join(dir, models.MemoryFileName(id))` without validation. |\n| **`internal/mcp/handlers/doc.go`** | Pass-Through Handler | **Unsanitized Input Propagation:** MCP handlers pass user-supplied `path`, `folder`, `newPath` directly to storage layer without sanitization. |\n| **`internal/mcp/handlers/memory.go`** | Pass-Through Handler | **Unsanitized Input Propagation:** MCP handlers pass user-supplied `id` directly to storage layer without sanitization. |\n| **`internal/permissions/registry.go`** | Authorization Bypass | **Capability Misclassification (CWE-863):** `docs.update` with `newPath` performs file deletion but is classified as `CapWrite`, bypassing `CapDelete` restrictions. |\n\n## Root Cause\n\n### Missing Path Containment in DocStore\n\nIn `internal/storage/doc_store.go`, all file operations use `filepath.Join()` to construct absolute paths without validating that the resolved path remains within `docsDir()`:\n\n```go\n// Get retrieves a doc by its relative path (without .md extension).\nfunc (ds *DocStore) Get(path string) (*models.Doc, error) {\n    path = strings.TrimPrefix(path, \"/\")\n    path = strings.TrimSuffix(path, \".md\")\n\n    // VULNERABLE: No containment check\n    absPath := filepath.Join(ds.docsDir(), filepath.FromSlash(path)+\".md\")\n    if _, err := os.Stat(absPath); err == nil {\n        // ...\n        return ds.parseFile(absPath, path, folder, false, \"\")\n    }\n    // ...\n}\n\n// Create writes a new doc to .knowns/docs/{path}.md.\nfunc (ds *DocStore) Create(doc *models.Doc) error {\n    if doc.Path == \"\" {\n        return fmt.Errorf(\"doc path is required\")\n    }\n    // VULNERABLE: No containment check\n    absPath := filepath.Join(ds.docsDir(), filepath.FromSlash(doc.Path)+\".md\")\n    if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(absPath), 0755); err != nil {\n        return fmt.Errorf(\"create doc dir: %w\", err)\n    }\n    return ds.writeFile(absPath, doc)\n}\n\n// Rename rewrites a doc to a new path and removes the old file.\nfunc (ds *DocStore) Rename(oldPath string, doc *models.Doc) error {\n    // ...\n    oldAbsPath := filepath.Join(ds.docsDir(), filepath.FromSlash(strings.TrimSuffix(oldPath, \".md\"))+\".md\")\n    newAbsPath := filepath.Join(ds.docsDir(), filepath.FromSlash(strings.TrimSuffix(doc.Path, \".md\"))+\".md\")\n    // ...\n    if err := ds.writeFile(newAbsPath, doc); err != nil {\n        return err\n    }\n    if oldAbsPath != newAbsPath {\n        // VULNERABLE: Deletes file at oldAbsPath (can be outside docsDir)\n        if err := os.Remove(oldAbsPath); err != nil \u0026\u0026 !os.IsNotExist(err) {\n            return err\n        }\n    }\n    return nil\n}\n\n// Delete removes a doc file.\nfunc (ds *DocStore) Delete(path string) error {\n    path = strings.TrimSuffix(path, \".md\")\n    // VULNERABLE: No containment check\n    absPath := filepath.Join(ds.docsDir(), filepath.FromSlash(path)+\".md\")\n    return os.Remove(absPath)\n}\n```\n\n**Critical Flaws:**\n- `filepath.Join` resolves `../` sequences natively\n- No post-Join prefix check (e.g., `strings.HasPrefix(absPath, ds.docsDir())`)\n- No rejection of absolute paths or path traversal sequences\n- `Rename()` performs file deletion via `os.Remove(oldAbsPath)`, which can target files outside the docs directory\n\n### Missing Path Containment in MemoryStore\n\nIn `internal/storage/memory_store.go`, memory operations similarly lack path validation:\n\n```go\n// GetInLayer retrieves a memory entry by ID from a specific layer only.\nfunc (ms *MemoryStore) GetInLayer(id, layer string) (*models.MemoryEntry, error) {\n    // ...\n    dir, err := ms.dirForLayer(layer)\n    if err != nil {\n        return nil, err\n    }\n    // VULNERABLE: No containment check for id containing \"../\"\n    absPath := filepath.Join(dir, models.MemoryFileName(id))\n    if _, err := os.Stat(absPath); err != nil {\n        return nil, fmt.Errorf(\"memory %q not found in %s layer\", id, layer)\n    }\n    return ms.parseFile(absPath, layer)\n}\n\n// Create writes a new memory entry to the appropriate layer directory.\nfunc (ms *MemoryStore) Create(entry *models.MemoryEntry) error {\n    // ...\n    dir, err := ms.dirForLayer(entry.Layer)\n    if err != nil {\n        return err\n    }\n    if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0755); err != nil {\n        return fmt.Errorf(\"create memory dir: %w\", err)\n    }\n\n    // VULNERABLE: No containment check for entry.ID containing \"../\"\n    absPath := filepath.Join(dir, models.MemoryFileName(entry.ID))\n    return atomicWrite(absPath, []byte(renderMemory(entry)))\n}\n\n// Delete removes a memory entry by ID.\nfunc (ms *MemoryStore) Delete(id string) error {\n    // ...\n    filename := models.MemoryFileName(id)\n\n    dirs := []string{ms.projectDir(), ms.globalDir()}\n    for _, dir := range dirs {\n        // VULNERABLE: No containment check\n        absPath := filepath.Join(dir, filename)\n        if _, err := os.Stat(absPath); err == nil {\n            return os.Remove(absPath)\n        }\n    }\n\n    return fmt.Errorf(\"memory %q not found\", id)\n}\n```\n\n### Authorization Bypass via Rename-as-Delete\n\nIn `internal/mcp/handlers/doc.go`, the `handleDocUpdate()` function accepts a `newPath` parameter that triggers a rename operation:\n\n```go\nfunc handleDocUpdate(getStore func() *storage.Store, req mcp.CallToolRequest) (*mcp.CallToolResult, error) {\n    // ...\n    if v, ok := stringArg(args, \"newPath\"); ok \u0026\u0026 strings.TrimSpace(v) != \"\" {\n        doc.Path = strings.Trim(strings.TrimSuffix(v, \".md\"), \"/\")\n    }\n    // ...\n    if oldPath != doc.Path {\n        if err := store.Docs.Rename(oldPath, doc); err != nil {\n            return errFailed(\"rename doc\", err)\n        }\n        // ...\n    }\n    // ...\n}\n```\n\nThe `Rename()` function in `doc_store.go` performs file deletion:\n\n```go\nif oldAbsPath != newAbsPath {\n    if err := os.Remove(oldAbsPath); err != nil \u0026\u0026 !os.IsNotExist(err) {\n        return err\n    }\n}\n```\n\nHowever, in `internal/permissions/registry.go`, `docs.update` is classified as `CapWrite`:\n\n```go\n\"docs.update\":  {Capability: CapWrite, Target: TargetDoc, Risk: RiskMedium},\n```\n\nThis allows an attacker with a `read-write-no-delete` preset (which permits `CapWrite` but denies `CapDelete`) to delete files by using `docs.update` with a `newPath` parameter.\n\n## Attack Vector\n\n| Phase | Request / Action | Effect |\n| :--- | :--- | :--- |\n| **1. Arbitrary File Read** | `docs.get` with `path=\"../../../victim/secret\"` | Server reads file outside project root via path traversal in `DocStore.Get()`. |\n| **2. Arbitrary File Write** | `docs.create` with `folder=\"../../../victim\"` | Server writes file outside project root via path traversal in `DocStore.Create()`. |\n| **3. Arbitrary File Delete** | `docs.update` with `path=\"../outside/secret.md\"` and `newPath=\"../../../victim/renamed.md\"` | Server deletes file outside project root via path traversal in `DocStore.Rename()`. Bypasses `CapDelete` restriction because `docs.update` is classified as `CapWrite`. |\n| **4. Memory File Read/Write** | `memory.update` with `id=\"x/../../../../victim/secret\"` | Server reads and overwrites file outside project root via path traversal in `MemoryStore.Update()`. |\n\n## Analysis\n\n### Classic Path Traversal Pattern\n\nBoth `DocStore` and `MemoryStore` follow the same vulnerable pattern: user-controlled input is concatenated with a base directory using `filepath.Join()`, then passed directly to file system operations (`os.ReadFile`, `os.WriteFile`, `os.Remove`, `os.Stat`) without any validation.\n\n```go\nabsPath := filepath.Join(baseDir, filepath.FromSlash(userInput))\n// No containment check: strings.HasPrefix(absPath, baseDir)\n// No rejection of \"..\" or absolute paths\n```\n\n`filepath.Join` resolves `../` sequences, allowing attackers to escape the intended directory:\n- Input: `\"../../../etc/passwd\"`\n- Result: `/project/.knowns/docs/../../../etc/passwd` \u2192 `/etc/passwd`\n\n### Rename-as-Delete Authorization Bypass\n\nThe `Rename()` function performs two operations:\n1. Write the file to the new location (`newAbsPath`)\n2. Delete the file from the old location (`oldAbsPath`)\n\nBoth paths are vulnerable to traversal. An attacker can:\n- Set `path` to a file outside the project (e.g., `\"../../../victim/target.md\"`)\n- Set `newPath` to another location outside the project\n- The `Rename()` function will delete the file at `path` (outside the project)\n\nBecause `docs.update` is classified as `CapWrite` rather than `CapDelete`, this operation bypasses deletion restrictions in `read-write-no-delete` presets.\n\n### Compounding Factor - Unauthenticated Access\n\nDue to the previously identified **Auth Bypass** vulnerability, all MCP tools are accessible without credentials when the server is started without a password, making this a zero-credential attack.\n\n## Fix\n\n*Patch is available right now at [New Release](https://github.com/knowns-dev/knowns/releases).*",
  "id": "GHSA-9gfj-28hw-jchp",
  "modified": "2026-09-25T19:32:05Z",
  "published": "2026-09-25T19:32:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/knowns-dev/knowns/security/advisories/GHSA-9gfj-28hw-jchp"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86439"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/knowns-dev/knowns/commit/09c5a96fd5817b941dc86669278c1a17db10ed4e"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/knowns-dev/knowns"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/knowns-dev/knowns/blob/v0.29.1/internal/storage/doc_store.go#L124-L129"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/knowns-dev/knowns/blob/v0.29.1/internal/storage/memory_store.go#L203-L211"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/knowns-dev/knowns/releases/tag/v0.30.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/knowns-before-0.30.0-path-traversal-via-mcp-doc-and-memory-tools"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Knowns Unrestricted Path Traversal leading to out-of-bounds arbitrary .md file read, write, and deletion in MCP Docs + Memory Tools"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2012-0987"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2012-10-06T21:55:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in edituser.php in ImpressCMS 1.2.x before 1.2.7 Final and 1.3.x before 1.3.1 Final allows remote authenticated users to include and execute arbitrary local files via a .. (dot dot) in the icmsConfigPlugins[sanitizer_plugins][] parameter.",
  "id": "GHSA-9gfm-wp7r-h4wp",
  "modified": "2022-05-17T00:19:31Z",
  "published": "2022-05-17T00:19:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-0987"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/72146"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.htbridge.com/advisory/HTB23064"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/bugtraq/2012-01/0022.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://community.impresscms.org/modules/smartsection/item.php?itemid=579"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/47448"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.osvdb.org/78143"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/51268"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.jenkins-ci.plugins:electricflow"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.1.33"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-46655"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-59"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-10-30T15:02:06Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-10-25T18:17:40Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Jenkins CloudBees CD Plugin temporarily copies files from an agent workspace to the controller in preparation for publishing them in the \u0027CloudBees CD - Publish Artifact\u0027 post-build step.\n\nCloudBees CD Plugin 1.1.32 and earlier follows symbolic links to locations outside of the temporary directory on the controller when collecting the list of files to publish.\n\nThis allows attackers able to configure jobs to publish arbitrary files from the Jenkins controller file system to the previously configured CloudBees CD server.\n\nCloudBees CD Plugin 1.1.33 ensures that only files located within the expected directory are published.",
  "id": "GHSA-9ggw-h9mf-4jh7",
  "modified": "2023-11-02T16:50:54Z",
  "published": "2023-10-25T18:32:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-46655"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jenkinsci/electricflow-plugin/commit/e45ca8428ae45f45ca07611e802eaa0f1484ab50"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/jenkinsci/electricflow-plugin"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.jenkins.io/security/advisory/2023-10-25/#SECURITY-3238"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2023/10/25/2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Jenkins CloudBees CD Plugin vulnerable to arbitrary file read"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.4.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "mobsf"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.4.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-58162"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-09-02T17:12:52Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nThe vulnerability allows any user to overwrite any files available under the account privileges of the running process.\n\n### Details\nAs part of static analysis, iOS MobSF supports loading and parsing statically linked libraries `.a`. When parsing such archives, the code extracts the embedded objects to the file system in the working directory of the analysis. The problem is that the current implementation does not prohibit absolute file names inside `.a`. If an archive item has a name like /abs/path/to/file, the resulting path is constructed as Path(dst) /name; for absolute paths, this leads to a complete substitution of the destination directory: writing occurs directly to the specified absolute directory. the path (outside the working directory).\n\nThus, an authenticated user who uploaded a specially prepared `.a`, can write arbitrary files to any directory writable by the user of the MobSF process (for example, `/tmp`, neighboring directories inside `~/.MobSF`, etc.).\n\nThe key reason is that checking the \"sliding\" paths only takes into account the presence of `..` (relative traversal), but does not take into account the absoluteness of the name and does not compare the normalized target path with the root directory of the extraction.\n\n### What exactly is vulnerable:\n**mobsf/StaticAnalyzer/views/common/shared_func.py**\nFunction for extracting objects from `.a` \u2014 ar_extract\n```\ndef ar_extract(checksum, src, dst):\n    \"\"\"Extract AR archive.\"\"\"\n    ...\n    ar = arpy.Archive(src)\n    ar.read_all_headers()\n    for a, val in ar.archived_files.items():\n        # Handle archive slip attacks\n        filtered = a.decode(\u0027utf-8\u0027, \u0027ignore\u0027)\n        if is_path_traversal(filtered):\n            msg = f\u0027Zip slip detected. skipped extracting {filtered}\u0027\n            logger.warning(msg)\n            append_scan_status(checksum, msg)\n            continue\n        out = Path(dst) / filtered\n        out.write_bytes(val.read())\n```\n- The \u201cslip\u201d check is limited to is_path_traversal(filtered), which looks only for traversal patterns like `..`, `%2e%2e`, `%252e`.\n- Therefore, if the .a archive contains a member named \u0027/tmp/pwned.txt\u0027, MobSF will write it to `/tmp/pwned.txt`, outside the intended working directory.\n\nar_extract is called from:\n**mobsf/StaticAnalyzer/views/common/a.py**\n```\ndef extract_n_get_files(checksum, src, dst):\n    dst = Path(dst) / \u0027static_objects\u0027\n    dst.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)\n    ar_extract(checksum, src, dst.as_posix())\n```\nThe expectation is that extraction happens only under the static_objects subdirectory, but absolute file names inside the `.a` break this assumption by directing writes outside that directory.\n\n### Attack Scenario\n1. The attacker creates a valid AR archive.a, in which the name of one of the members is the absolute path (as an example) /home/mobsf/.MobSF/db.sqlite3. This is done by the standard AR (GNU long filename table) mechanism.\n2. It downloads this one via the web interface or the Static library loading API `.a` in MobSF.\n3. During the analysis, MobSF extracts the contents: due to the absolute name, the resulting path becomes /home/mobsf/.MobSF/db.sqlite3, and the file is created/overwritten outside the working directory.\n4. In our case, the database file was overwritten, which caused MobSF to malfunction.\n### PoC\n1. Using the script, create a file with the payload. In the example, this is \"/home/mobsf/.MobSF/db.sqlite3\"\n\u003cimg width=\"786\" height=\"342\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/0b7aee5c-6938-45cc-b668-9ad19f48c2c5\" /\u003e\n\n2. Connect to the container and verify that the db.sqlite3 file is a database. The scan has not been performed yet.\n\u003cimg width=\"2535\" height=\"1507\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/0cc92da7-91c0-453f-b1ed-080c9cfaa7f1\" /\u003e\n\n3. Upload the file for scanning and then update the page to get a server error.\n\u003cimg width=\"2559\" height=\"1476\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a5b84ace-b853-46ad-9e2e-afad59ed058a\" /\u003e\n\n4. Check the file structure after scanning and see that the file has been overwritten.\n\u003cimg width=\"797\" height=\"213\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/758ba3da-ae25-4c8d-bd8b-932573ca2306\" /\u003e\n\n5. There is a database error in the MobSF log.\n\u003cimg width=\"1724\" height=\"1476\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/cd4211b1-2896-45e0-9934-9425b6035f2a\" /\u003e\n\n### Impact\n1. Arbitrary writing/overwriting of files within the rights of the MobSF process (for example, /tmp, directories with analysis results, logs).\n2. Distortion of analysis results (substitution of artifacts) and undermining the integrity of reports.\n3. Implementation of a system malfunction (overwriting the db.sqlite3 file).\n4. Compromise of the UI (if you have write rights to statics/templates): Stored XSS by overwriting the plug-in.js/template.\n5. Potential escalation of risks with lax configuration of containers/rights (for example, writing to system paths inside the container if the process is running with excessive privileges).\n\n\n### Mitigation\nReject absolute paths and normalize before writing. \n\n\n\n### **Please, assign all credits to Vasily Leshchenko (Solar AppSec)**",
  "id": "GHSA-9gh8-9r95-3fc3",
  "modified": "2025-09-02T17:12:52Z",
  "published": "2025-09-02T17:12:52Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MobSF/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/security/advisories/GHSA-9gh8-9r95-3fc3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MobSF/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/commit/7f3bc086c028c1b50889cab8a15f7b59b7abdaf9"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MobSF/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MobSF/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/releases/tag/v4.4.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "MobSF Vulnerable to Arbitrary File Write (AR-Slip) via Absolute Path in .a Extraction"
}