CWE-22
Weakness Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
Many file operations are intended to take place within a restricted directory. By using special elements such as ".." and "/" separators, attackers can escape outside of the restricted location to access files or directories that are elsewhere on the system. One of the most common special elements is the "../" sequence, which in most modern operating systems is interpreted as the parent directory of the current location. This is referred to as relative path traversal. Path traversal also covers the use of absolute pathnames such as "/usr/local/bin" to access unexpected files. This is referred to as absolute path traversal.
Mapping guidance
This CWE entry might have children that would be more appropriate.
Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit. Consider children such as CWE-23 (or its descendants) for relative path traversal, or CWE-36 for absolute path traversal.
Relationships and members
Modes of introduction
Detection methods
Automated Static Analysis
Automated techniques can find areas where path traversal weaknesses exist. However, tuning or customization may be required to remove or de-prioritize path-traversal problems that are only exploitable by the product's administrator - or other privileged users - and thus potentially valid behavior or, at worst, a bug instead of a vulnerability.
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis
Manual white box techniques may be able to provide sufficient code coverage and reduction of false positives if all file access operations can be assessed within limited time constraints.
Effectiveness: High
Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Web Application Scanner
Web Services Scanner
Database Scanners
Effectiveness: High
Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Fuzz Tester
Framework-based Fuzzer
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
Effectiveness: High
Automated Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Source code Weakness Analyzer
Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer
Effectiveness: High
Architecture or Design Review
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)
Effectiveness: High
Notes
Other
In many programming languages, the injection of a null byte (the 0 or NUL) may allow an attacker to truncate a generated filename to apply to a wider range of files. For example, the product may add ".txt" to any pathname, thus limiting the attacker to text files, but a null injection may effectively remove this restriction.
Relationship
Pathname equivalence can be regarded as a type of canonicalization error.
Relationship
Some pathname equivalence issues are not directly related to directory traversal, rather are used to bypass security-relevant checks for whether a file/directory can be accessed by the attacker (e.g. a trailing "/" on a filename could bypass access rules that don't expect a trailing /, causing a server to provide the file when it normally would not).
Terminology
Like other weaknesses, terminology is often based on the types of manipulations used, instead of the underlying weaknesses. Some people use "directory traversal" only to refer to the injection of ".." and equivalent sequences whose specific meaning is to traverse directories.
Other variants like "absolute pathname" and "drive letter" have the *effect* of directory traversal, but some people may not call it such, since it doesn't involve ".." or equivalent.
Research Gap
Many variants of path traversal attacks are probably under-studied with respect to root cause. CWE-790 and CWE-182 begin to cover part of this gap.
Research Gap
Incomplete diagnosis or reporting of vulnerabilities can make it difficult to know which variant is affected. For example, a researcher might say that "..\" is vulnerable, but not test "../" which may also be vulnerable.
Any combination of directory separators ("/", "\", etc.) and numbers of "." (e.g. "....") can produce unique variants; for example, the "//../" variant is not listed (CVE-2004-0325). See this entry's children and lower-level descendants.
Content history
Identified weakness in Perl demonstrative example
Provided diagram to improve CWE usability
Identified weakness in "good code" for Python demonstrative example
Provided a demonstrative example in PHP
updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction
Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping
updated Alternate_Terms, Relationships, Other_Notes, Relationship_Notes, Relevant_Properties, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities
updated Description
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updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Alternate_Terms, Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Name, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationship_Notes, Relationships, Research_Gaps, Taxonomy_Mappings, Terminology_Notes, Time_of_Introduction, Weakness_Ordinalities
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations
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updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Observed_Examples
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
updated Other_Notes, Research_Gaps
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Relationships
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
updated Demonstrative_Examples
updated Affected_Resources, Causal_Nature, Likelihood_of_Exploit, References, Relationships, Relevant_Properties, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated References, Relationships
updated References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Type
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16185 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-858X-6WP8-WP5C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-25 18:30 – Updated: 2026-06-25 21:31The K2 frontend article-save handler accepts an attachment[N][existing] POST field that is concatenated with JPATH_SITE/ and passed to JFile::copy(). JPath::clean does NOT strip .., and there is no allow-list of source paths. An Author can therefore copy configuration.php (or any other file readable by the web user — including ../../../etc/passwd) into /media/k2/attachments/, then retrieve the contents via the K2 attachment-download endpoint.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-48944"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-25T16:16:36Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The K2 frontend article-save handler accepts an `attachment[N][existing]` POST field that is concatenated with `JPATH_SITE/` and passed to `JFile::copy()`. `JPath::clean` does NOT strip `..`, and there is no allow-list of source paths. An Author can therefore copy `configuration.php` (or any other file readable by the web user \u2014 including `../../../etc/passwd`) into `/media/k2/attachments/`, then retrieve the contents via the K2 attachment-download endpoint.",
"id": "GHSA-858x-6wp8-wp5c",
"modified": "2026-06-25T21:31:29Z",
"published": "2026-06-25T18:30:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48944"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.getk2.org"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-859R-7HR7-6694
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-31 21:31 – Updated: 2026-04-02 15:31An arbitrary file overwrite vulnerability in Zora: Post, Trade, Earn Crypto v2.60.0 allows attackers to overwrite critical internal files via the file import process, leading to arbitrary code execution or information exposure.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-30285"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-31T20:16:26Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "An arbitrary file overwrite vulnerability in Zora: Post, Trade, Earn Crypto v2.60.0 allows attackers to overwrite critical internal files via the file import process, leading to arbitrary code execution or information exposure.",
"id": "GHSA-859r-7hr7-6694",
"modified": "2026-04-02T15:31:38Z",
"published": "2026-03-31T21:31:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-30285"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Secsys-FDU/AF_CVEs/issues/15"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://secsys.fudan.edu.cn"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://zora.co"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-859W-5945-R5V3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-30 17:40 – Updated: 2025-05-02 15:33Summary
The contents of files in the project root that are denied by a file matching pattern can be returned to the browser.
Impact
Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected.
Only files that are under project root and are denied by a file matching pattern can be bypassed.
- Examples of file matching patterns:
.env,.env.*,*.{crt,pem},**/.env - Examples of other patterns:
**/.git/**,.git/**,.git/**/*
Details
server.fs.deny can contain patterns matching against files (by default it includes .env, .env.*, *.{crt,pem} as such patterns).
These patterns were able to bypass for files under root by using a combination of slash and dot (/.).
PoC
npm create vite@latest
cd vite-project/
cat "secret" > .env
npm install
npm run dev
curl --request-target /.env/. http://localhost:5173
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.3.3"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "vite"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.3.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.2.6"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "vite"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.2.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.2.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.1.5"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "vite"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.1.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.4.18"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "vite"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.4.19"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.5.13"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "vite"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.5.14"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-46565"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-04-30T17:40:27Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-05-01T18:15:57Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nThe contents of files in [the project `root`](https://vite.dev/config/shared-options.html#root) that are denied by a file matching pattern can be returned to the browser.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or [server.host config option](https://vitejs.dev/config/server-options.html#server-host)) are affected.\nOnly files that are under [project `root`](https://vite.dev/config/shared-options.html#root) and are denied by a file matching pattern can be bypassed.\n\n- Examples of file matching patterns: `.env`, `.env.*`, `*.{crt,pem}`, `**/.env`\n- Examples of other patterns: `**/.git/**`, `.git/**`, `.git/**/*`\n\n### Details\n[`server.fs.deny`](https://vite.dev/config/server-options.html#server-fs-deny) can contain patterns matching against files (by default it includes `.env`, `.env.*`, `*.{crt,pem}` as such patterns).\nThese patterns were able to bypass for files under `root` by using a combination of slash and dot (`/.`).\n\n### PoC\n```\nnpm create vite@latest\ncd vite-project/\ncat \"secret\" \u003e .env\nnpm install\nnpm run dev\ncurl --request-target /.env/. http://localhost:5173\n```\n\n\n",
"id": "GHSA-859w-5945-r5v3",
"modified": "2025-05-02T15:33:47Z",
"published": "2025-04-30T17:40:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-859w-5945-r5v3"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-46565"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/c22c43de612eebb6c182dd67850c24e4fab8cacb"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/vitejs/vite"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Vite\u0027s server.fs.deny bypassed with /. for files under project root"
}
GHSA-85C9-6XQV-2XCJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:42 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:42Directory traversal vulnerability in ELECOM File Manager all versions allows remote attackers to create an arbitrary file or overwrite an existing file in a directory which can be accessed with the application privileges via unspecified vectors.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-20651"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-02-12T07:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in ELECOM File Manager all versions allows remote attackers to create an arbitrary file or overwrite an existing file in a directory which can be accessed with the application privileges via unspecified vectors.",
"id": "GHSA-85c9-6xqv-2xcj",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:42:05Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:42:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-20651"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jvn.jp/en/jp/JVN98115035/index.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.elecom.co.jp/news/security/20210126-01"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-85CR-Q769-68X2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-04 15:30 – Updated: 2026-07-04 15:30A vulnerability was detected in NousResearch hermes-agent up to 2026.5.16. This impacts the function extract_media of the file gateway/platforms/base.py of the component Live Webhook Endpoint. Performing a manipulation results in path traversal. The attack may be initiated remotely. The exploit is now public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-14628"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-04T13:16:30Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability was detected in NousResearch hermes-agent up to 2026.5.16. This impacts the function extract_media of the file gateway/platforms/base.py of the component Live Webhook Endpoint. Performing a manipulation results in path traversal. The attack may be initiated remotely. The exploit is now public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.",
"id": "GHSA-85cr-q769-68x2",
"modified": "2026-07-04T15:30:23Z",
"published": "2026-07-04T15:30:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-14628"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gist.github.com/YLChen-007/8af7eff27b50bec24b2d0f76dd1c4383"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/cve/CVE-2026-14628"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/submit/845599"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/376144"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/376144/cti"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-85GF-3M67-QQ6H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-26 13:30 – Updated: 2026-05-26 13:30Kenik Camera management Panel is vulnerable to Path Traversal vulnerability. An unauthenticated attacker can send GET request with arbitrary file path and read corresponding files located on the server.
The issue was fixed in version 2026-04-23 of the KG-5260xxxx-IL-(G)2 cameras. Rest of the products were fixed in version 2025-04-21.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-7766"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-25T13:16:26Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Kenik Camera management Panel is vulnerable to Path Traversal vulnerability. An unauthenticated attacker can send GET request with arbitrary file path and read corresponding files located on the server.\n\nThe issue was fixed in version 2026-04-23 of the\u00a0KG-5260xxxx-IL-(G)2 cameras.\nRest of the products were fixed in version\u00a02025-04-21.",
"id": "GHSA-85gf-3m67-qq6h",
"modified": "2026-05-26T13:30:42Z",
"published": "2026-05-26T13:30:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-7766"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert.pl/posts/2026/05/CVE-2026-7766"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-85GG-2GFQ-Q95M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-09 22:16 – Updated: 2026-11-09 22:16A remote/local attacker who can get a symbolic link included in a source-code repository that code-graph-rag analyzes can cause the structural_search and structural_replace tools (backed by AstGrepService, exposed both as MCP tools and as agentic AI tools) to read and -- via structural_replace with dry_run=False -- overwrite arbitrary files outside the configured project root, because the tool's path-containment check (should_skip_path/_classify_file) is performed lexically on the unresolved path and never checks Path.is_symlink() or calls .resolve(), unlike the project's own (correct) validate_project_path decorator used elsewhere.
Tested at commit 90a3ed3cbdc7d3bb8036985b851cc7c9a3ba9c57 (pyproject version 0.0.550), current main at test time. Confirmed this commit already contains the fix for the prior advisory (GHSA-vvr2-h2jp-838m: paginated read_file path traversal) and the newer HTTP-MCP bearer-auth gate (_validate_http_exposure in codebase_rag/mcp/server.py) -- this is a distinct, still-open issue on top of those fixes, in a different component with a different root cause and a strictly worse impact (write, not just read).
Details
AstGrepService (codebase_rag/tools/ast_grep_service.py) backs both the structural_search and structural_replace MCP/agentic tools. It enumerates candidate files with os.walk() and gates each path only through should_skip_path():
codebase_rag/tools/ast_grep_service.py:84-109(_iter_source_files) -- walksself.project_rootwithos.walk(); every non-directory dirent returned (including a symlink pointing anywhere on disk) is treated as an in-scope file.codebase_rag/tools/ast_grep_service.py:61-82(_classify_file) -- the only containment check isshould_skip_path(...)followed byabs_path.relative_to(self.project_root)(line 82);abs_pathis never resolved, so this check is purely lexical/string-based.codebase_rag/utils/path_utils.py:80-109(should_skip_path) andcodebase_rag/utils/path_utils.py:35-37(cached_relative_path) -- computesrel_path = file_path.relative_to(repo_path)without ever calling.resolve()orPath.is_symlink().- Read sink:
codebase_rag/tools/ast_grep_service.py:143-144(search) --source = self._read(abs_path)callspath.read_text(), which Python follows through the symlink to its real target. - Write sink:
codebase_rag/tools/ast_grep_service.py:187-208(replace), line 208 --abs_path.write_text(new_source, ...)whendry_run=False, again following the symlink and overwriting the real target file's content.
This is inconsistent with how the rest of the codebase handles the exact same class of risk. The file read/write/edit tools (file_reader.py, file_writer.py, file_editor.py) are all protected by validate_project_path (codebase_rag/decorators.py:73-75):
full_path = (self.project_root / file_path_str).resolve()
project_root = self.project_root.resolve()
full_path.relative_to(project_root)
.resolve() follows symlinks before the containment check runs, so those tools correctly reject an out-of-root target. path_utils.py's own absolute_path_within_project_root() (codebase_rag/utils/path_utils.py:156-176) documents the same principle explicitly in its docstring: "The resolve() calls are load-bearing: containment is checked lexically, so an unresolved .. segment or symlink would escape the root." -- but should_skip_path()/AstGrepService never applies that pattern.
Reachability: structural_search (codebase_rag/tools/structural_search.py:24-46) carries no requires_approval flag at all -- in AI-orchestrator mode the model can call it autonomously with no human confirmation. structural_replace (codebase_rag/tools/structural_editor.py:52-57) is marked requires_approval=True, but that flag is only enforced by pydantic-ai's own agent loop -- the MCP server path bypasses it entirely: MCPToolsRegistry.structural_replace (codebase_rag/mcp/tools.py:586-596) calls self._structural_editor_tool.function(...) directly, registered with no approval concept at codebase_rag/mcp/tools.py:369-388. Any MCP client that can call tools can invoke structural_replace with dry_run=False in one shot.
Proof of Concept
Dynamically confirmed against the installed package (mgclient/pymgclient mocked, as in the prior advisory's own PoC, since the Memgraph native client isn't needed for this code path).
mkdir -p /tmp/poc_symlink/safe-project-root
cat > /tmp/poc_symlink/outside-secret.py << 'EOF'
API_TOKEN = "sk-live-EXAMPLE-NOT-A-REAL-SECRET-1234567890"
def get_token():
return API_TOKEN
EOF
ln -s /tmp/poc_symlink/outside-secret.py /tmp/poc_symlink/safe-project-root/linked_module.py
import sys
from pathlib import Path
from unittest.mock import MagicMock
sys.modules["mgclient"] = MagicMock()
sys.modules["pymgclient"] = MagicMock()
from codebase_rag.tools.ast_grep_service import AstGrepService
SAFE_ROOT = "/tmp/poc_symlink/safe-project-root"
svc = AstGrepService(project_root=SAFE_ROOT)
matches = svc.search(pattern="API_TOKEN", language="python")
# -> match in reported file='linked_module.py' text='API_TOKEN' (read escape)
changes = svc.replace(pattern="API_TOKEN", rewrite="PWNED_BY_STRUCTURAL_REPLACE",
language="python", dry_run=False)
print(Path("/tmp/poc_symlink/outside-secret.py").read_text())
Actual run output:
[*] Calling AstGrepService.search('API_TOKEN', language='python') ...
match in reported file='linked_module.py' text='API_TOKEN'
match in reported file='linked_module.py' text='API_TOKEN'
[+] READ ESCAPE CONFIRMED: content of the out-of-root file was returned by
structural_search(), attributed to a path 'inside' the project root.
[*] Calling AstGrepService.replace(pattern='API_TOKEN',
rewrite='PWNED_BY_STRUCTURAL_REPLACE', dry_run=False) ...
wrote change to reported file='linked_module.py' matches=2
[*] Outside file content AFTER structural_replace:
------------------------------------------------------------
# Simulated sensitive file OUTSIDE the analyzed project root
PWNED_BY_STRUCTURAL_REPLACE = "sk-live-EXAMPLE-NOT-A-REAL-SECRET-1234567890"
def get_token():
return PWNED_BY_STRUCTURAL_REPLACE
------------------------------------------------------------
[+] WRITE ESCAPE CONFIRMED: a file OUTSIDE the configured project_root
(/tmp/poc_symlink/safe-project-root) was modified by structural_replace
via a symlink placed inside the root.
Impact
Any operator who points cgr (CLI, agentic ask_agent mode, or MCP structural_search/structural_replace tools) at a repository they did not fully audit -- the exact use case this tool is built for ("query, understand, and edit multi-language codebases") -- can have that repository's planted symlink used to:
- Disclose the contents of any file readable by the cgr process (credentials, SSH keys, .env files, sibling project source), via structural_search, with no approval gate at all.
- Overwrite the contents of any file writable by the cgr process, via structural_replace(dry_run=False), bypassing the tool's own approval gate when called through the MCP protocol.
Remediation
Apply the same resolve-then-contain pattern already used by validate_project_path (codebase_rag/decorators.py:73-75) and absolute_path_within_project_root (codebase_rag/utils/path_utils.py:156-176) to should_skip_path. Reject any path whose resolved (symlink-followed) location escapes the resolved project root:
--- a/codebase_rag/utils/path_utils.py
+++ b/codebase_rag/utils/path_utils.py
@@ def should_skip_path(
_is_file = path.is_file() if is_file is None else is_file
if _is_file and path.suffix in cs.IGNORE_SUFFIXES:
return True
+ # Reject symlinks (or any path) that resolve outside the project root,
+ # mirroring validate_project_path's decorator (decorators.py:73-75) and
+ # absolute_path_within_project_root (this module, below).
+ try:
+ path.resolve().relative_to(repo_path.resolve())
+ except ValueError:
+ return True
rel_path = cached_relative_path(path, repo_path)
Concretely: this one change in should_skip_path fixes both _classify_file (search) and the os.walk filtering in _iter_source_files (replace), since both route through it. As defense in depth, _iter_source_files could additionally skip symlinked dirents outright (entry.is_symlink()) during the os.walk.
Credit: Dostxodjayev Abdullox (GitHub: squeeze440)
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.0.586"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "code-graph-rag"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.587"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-87008"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-59"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-09T22:16:41Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-05T21:18:54Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A remote/local attacker who can get a symbolic link included in a source-code repository that code-graph-rag analyzes can cause the `structural_search` and `structural_replace` tools (backed by `AstGrepService`, exposed both as MCP tools and as agentic AI tools) to read and -- via `structural_replace` with `dry_run=False` -- overwrite arbitrary files outside the configured project root, because the tool\u0027s path-containment check (`should_skip_path`/`_classify_file`) is performed lexically on the unresolved path and never checks `Path.is_symlink()` or calls `.resolve()`, unlike the project\u0027s own (correct) `validate_project_path` decorator used elsewhere.\n\nTested at commit `90a3ed3cbdc7d3bb8036985b851cc7c9a3ba9c57` (pyproject version 0.0.550), current `main` at test time. Confirmed this commit already contains the fix for the prior advisory (GHSA-vvr2-h2jp-838m: paginated `read_file` path traversal) and the newer HTTP-MCP bearer-auth gate (`_validate_http_exposure` in `codebase_rag/mcp/server.py`) -- this is a distinct, still-open issue on top of those fixes, in a different component with a different root cause and a strictly worse impact (write, not just read).\n\n## Details\n\n`AstGrepService` (`codebase_rag/tools/ast_grep_service.py`) backs both the `structural_search` and `structural_replace` MCP/agentic tools. It enumerates candidate files with `os.walk()` and gates each path only through `should_skip_path()`:\n\n- `codebase_rag/tools/ast_grep_service.py:84-109` (`_iter_source_files`) -- walks `self.project_root` with `os.walk()`; every non-directory dirent returned (including a symlink pointing anywhere on disk) is treated as an in-scope file.\n- `codebase_rag/tools/ast_grep_service.py:61-82` (`_classify_file`) -- the only containment check is `should_skip_path(...)` followed by `abs_path.relative_to(self.project_root)` (line 82); `abs_path` is never resolved, so this check is purely lexical/string-based.\n- `codebase_rag/utils/path_utils.py:80-109` (`should_skip_path`) and `codebase_rag/utils/path_utils.py:35-37` (`cached_relative_path`) -- computes `rel_path = file_path.relative_to(repo_path)` without ever calling `.resolve()` or `Path.is_symlink()`.\n- Read sink: `codebase_rag/tools/ast_grep_service.py:143-144` (`search`) -- `source = self._read(abs_path)` calls `path.read_text()`, which Python follows through the symlink to its real target.\n- Write sink: `codebase_rag/tools/ast_grep_service.py:187-208` (`replace`), line 208 -- `abs_path.write_text(new_source, ...)` when `dry_run=False`, again following the symlink and overwriting the real target file\u0027s content.\n\nThis is inconsistent with how the rest of the codebase handles the exact same class of risk. The file read/write/edit tools (`file_reader.py`, `file_writer.py`, `file_editor.py`) are all protected by `validate_project_path` (`codebase_rag/decorators.py:73-75`):\n\n```python\nfull_path = (self.project_root / file_path_str).resolve()\nproject_root = self.project_root.resolve()\nfull_path.relative_to(project_root)\n```\n\n`.resolve()` follows symlinks before the containment check runs, so those tools correctly reject an out-of-root target. `path_utils.py`\u0027s own `absolute_path_within_project_root()` (`codebase_rag/utils/path_utils.py:156-176`) documents the same principle explicitly in its docstring: \"The resolve() calls are load-bearing: containment is checked lexically, so an unresolved .. segment or symlink would escape the root.\" -- but `should_skip_path()`/`AstGrepService` never applies that pattern.\n\n**Reachability:** `structural_search` (`codebase_rag/tools/structural_search.py:24-46`) carries no `requires_approval` flag at all -- in AI-orchestrator mode the model can call it autonomously with no human confirmation. `structural_replace` (`codebase_rag/tools/structural_editor.py:52-57`) is marked `requires_approval=True`, but that flag is only enforced by pydantic-ai\u0027s own agent loop -- the MCP server path bypasses it entirely: `MCPToolsRegistry.structural_replace` (`codebase_rag/mcp/tools.py:586-596`) calls `self._structural_editor_tool.function(...)` directly, registered with no approval concept at `codebase_rag/mcp/tools.py:369-388`. Any MCP client that can call tools can invoke `structural_replace` with `dry_run=False` in one shot.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nDynamically confirmed against the installed package (mgclient/pymgclient mocked, as in the prior advisory\u0027s own PoC, since the Memgraph native client isn\u0027t needed for this code path).\n\n```bash\nmkdir -p /tmp/poc_symlink/safe-project-root\ncat \u003e /tmp/poc_symlink/outside-secret.py \u003c\u003c \u0027EOF\u0027\nAPI_TOKEN = \"sk-live-EXAMPLE-NOT-A-REAL-SECRET-1234567890\"\ndef get_token():\n return API_TOKEN\nEOF\nln -s /tmp/poc_symlink/outside-secret.py /tmp/poc_symlink/safe-project-root/linked_module.py\n```\n\n```python\nimport sys\nfrom pathlib import Path\nfrom unittest.mock import MagicMock\nsys.modules[\"mgclient\"] = MagicMock()\nsys.modules[\"pymgclient\"] = MagicMock()\nfrom codebase_rag.tools.ast_grep_service import AstGrepService\n\nSAFE_ROOT = \"/tmp/poc_symlink/safe-project-root\"\nsvc = AstGrepService(project_root=SAFE_ROOT)\n\nmatches = svc.search(pattern=\"API_TOKEN\", language=\"python\")\n# -\u003e match in reported file=\u0027linked_module.py\u0027 text=\u0027API_TOKEN\u0027 (read escape)\n\nchanges = svc.replace(pattern=\"API_TOKEN\", rewrite=\"PWNED_BY_STRUCTURAL_REPLACE\",\n language=\"python\", dry_run=False)\nprint(Path(\"/tmp/poc_symlink/outside-secret.py\").read_text())\n```\n\nActual run output:\n\n```\n[*] Calling AstGrepService.search(\u0027API_TOKEN\u0027, language=\u0027python\u0027) ...\n match in reported file=\u0027linked_module.py\u0027 text=\u0027API_TOKEN\u0027\n match in reported file=\u0027linked_module.py\u0027 text=\u0027API_TOKEN\u0027\n[+] READ ESCAPE CONFIRMED: content of the out-of-root file was returned by\n structural_search(), attributed to a path \u0027inside\u0027 the project root.\n\n[*] Calling AstGrepService.replace(pattern=\u0027API_TOKEN\u0027,\n rewrite=\u0027PWNED_BY_STRUCTURAL_REPLACE\u0027, dry_run=False) ...\n wrote change to reported file=\u0027linked_module.py\u0027 matches=2\n\n[*] Outside file content AFTER structural_replace:\n------------------------------------------------------------\n# Simulated sensitive file OUTSIDE the analyzed project root\nPWNED_BY_STRUCTURAL_REPLACE = \"sk-live-EXAMPLE-NOT-A-REAL-SECRET-1234567890\"\n\ndef get_token():\n return PWNED_BY_STRUCTURAL_REPLACE\n------------------------------------------------------------\n[+] WRITE ESCAPE CONFIRMED: a file OUTSIDE the configured project_root\n (/tmp/poc_symlink/safe-project-root) was modified by structural_replace\n via a symlink placed inside the root.\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAny operator who points `cgr` (CLI, agentic `ask_agent` mode, or MCP `structural_search`/`structural_replace` tools) at a repository they did not fully audit -- the exact use case this tool is built for (\"query, understand, and edit multi-language codebases\") -- can have that repository\u0027s planted symlink used to:\n- Disclose the contents of any file readable by the `cgr` process (credentials, SSH keys, `.env` files, sibling project source), via `structural_search`, with no approval gate at all.\n- Overwrite the contents of any file writable by the `cgr` process, via `structural_replace(dry_run=False)`, bypassing the tool\u0027s own approval gate when called through the MCP protocol.\n\n## Remediation\n\nApply the same resolve-then-contain pattern already used by `validate_project_path` (`codebase_rag/decorators.py:73-75`) and `absolute_path_within_project_root` (`codebase_rag/utils/path_utils.py:156-176`) to `should_skip_path`. Reject any path whose resolved (symlink-followed) location escapes the resolved project root:\n\n```diff\n--- a/codebase_rag/utils/path_utils.py\n+++ b/codebase_rag/utils/path_utils.py\n@@ def should_skip_path(\n _is_file = path.is_file() if is_file is None else is_file\n if _is_file and path.suffix in cs.IGNORE_SUFFIXES:\n return True\n+ # Reject symlinks (or any path) that resolve outside the project root,\n+ # mirroring validate_project_path\u0027s decorator (decorators.py:73-75) and\n+ # absolute_path_within_project_root (this module, below).\n+ try:\n+ path.resolve().relative_to(repo_path.resolve())\n+ except ValueError:\n+ return True\n rel_path = cached_relative_path(path, repo_path)\n```\n\nConcretely: this one change in `should_skip_path` fixes both `_classify_file` (search) and the `os.walk` filtering in `_iter_source_files` (replace), since both route through it. As defense in depth, `_iter_source_files` could additionally skip symlinked dirents outright (`entry.is_symlink()`) during the `os.walk`.\n\nCredit: Dostxodjayev Abdullox (GitHub: squeeze440)",
"id": "GHSA-85gg-2gfq-q95m",
"modified": "2026-11-09T22:16:41Z",
"published": "2026-11-09T22:16:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vitali87/code-graph-rag/security/advisories/GHSA-85gg-2gfq-q95m"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-87008"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vitali87/code-graph-rag/commit/2648c95aa550ce2d9361a8e75ed669d5f4b451b8"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/vitali87/code-graph-rag"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vitali87/code-graph-rag/releases/tag/v0.0.589"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Code Graph RAG structural tools follow out-of-root symlinks"
}
GHSA-85GX-3QV6-4463
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-17 22:20 – Updated: 2026-05-12 13:31Summary
A vulnerability has been found in Dapr that allows bypassing access control policies for service invocation using reserved URL characters and path traversal sequences in method paths. The ACL normalized the method path independently from the dispatch layer, so the ACL evaluated one path while the target application received a different one.
Users who have configured access control policies for service invocation are strongly encouraged to upgrade Dapr to the respective patch version 1.17.5, 1.16.14, and 1.15.14.
Impact
This vulnerability impacts Dapr users who have configured access control policies for service invocation. An attacker who can reach the Dapr HTTP or gRPC API could:
- Use encoded path traversal (ex:
admin%2F..%2Fpublic) to reach an allowed path while the method started from a denied prefix. - Use encoded fragment (
%23) or query (%3F) characters to cause the ACL to evaluate a different path than what was delivered to the target application.
Patches
Users should upgrade immediately to their respective Dapr version 1.17.5, 1.16.14, and 1.15.14.
Details
Dapr supports access control policies for service invocation, which allow operators to restrict which methods an application is permitted to call on a target app. When a request arrives, Dapr evaluates the method path against the configured policy before dispatching to the target.
Prior to this fix, the ACL and the dispatch layer normalized the method path independently. The ACL used purell.NormalizeURLString, which decoded %XX sequences, resolved ../, and stripped # and ? as URL delimiters. The dispatch layer used the raw method string. This mismatch meant the ACL authorized one path while the target application received a different one.
For example, a method of admin%2F..%2Fpublic was normalized by the ACL to public (allowed), but the target application received admin/../public.
The gRPC API was the more dangerous vector because gRPC passes method strings raw — #, ?, ../, and control characters were all delivered literally with no client-side sanitization.
References
This PR signaled to us about the CVE, special thanks to @dbconfession78 for the efforts here and the original PR.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/dapr/dapr"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.17.0-rc.1"
},
{
"fixed": "1.17.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/dapr/dapr"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.16.0-rc.1"
},
{
"fixed": "1.16.14"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/dapr/dapr"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.15.14"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-41491"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-17T22:20:40Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-08T14:16:33Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nA vulnerability has been found in Dapr that allows bypassing access control policies for service invocation using reserved URL characters and path traversal sequences in method paths. The ACL normalized the method path independently from the dispatch layer, so the ACL evaluated one path while the target application received a different one.\n\nUsers who have configured access control policies for service invocation are strongly encouraged to upgrade Dapr to the respective patch version `1.17.5`, `1.16.14`, and `1.15.14`.\n\n### Impact\n\nThis vulnerability impacts Dapr users who have configured access control policies for service invocation. An attacker who can reach the Dapr HTTP or gRPC API could:\n\n- Use encoded path traversal (ex: `admin%2F..%2Fpublic`) to reach an allowed path while the method started from a denied prefix.\n- Use encoded fragment (`%23`) or query (`%3F`) characters to cause the ACL to evaluate a different path than what was delivered to the target application.\n\n### Patches\n\nUsers should upgrade immediately to their respective Dapr version `1.17.5`, `1.16.14`, and `1.15.14`.\n\n### Details\n\nDapr supports access control policies for service invocation, which allow operators to restrict which methods an application is permitted to call on a target app. When a request arrives, Dapr evaluates the method path against the configured policy before dispatching to the target.\n\nPrior to this fix, the ACL and the dispatch layer normalized the method path independently. The ACL used `purell.NormalizeURLString`, which decoded `%XX` sequences, resolved `../`, and stripped `#` and `?` as URL delimiters. The dispatch layer used the raw method string. This mismatch meant the ACL authorized one path while the target application received a different one.\n\nFor example, a method of `admin%2F..%2Fpublic` was normalized by the ACL to public (allowed), but the target application received `admin/../public`. \n\nThe gRPC API was the more dangerous vector because gRPC passes method strings raw \u2014 `#`, `?`, `../`, and control characters were all delivered literally with no client-side sanitization.\n\n### References\n\n[This PR](https://github.com/dapr/dapr/pull/9589) signaled to us about the CVE, special thanks to @dbconfession78 for the efforts here and the original PR.",
"id": "GHSA-85gx-3qv6-4463",
"modified": "2026-05-12T13:31:35Z",
"published": "2026-04-17T22:20:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dapr/dapr/security/advisories/GHSA-85gx-3qv6-4463"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41491"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dapr/dapr/pull/9589"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/dapr/dapr"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Dapr: Service Invocation path traversal ACL bypass"
}
GHSA-85H3-WQ5Q-6X6J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-01-08 15:30 – Updated: 2025-11-04 21:30A directory traversal vulnerability exists in the uploadMib functionality of ManageEngine OpManager 12.7.258. A specially crafted HTTP request can lead to arbitrary file creation. An attacker can send a malicious MiB file to trigger this vulnerability.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-47211"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-01-08T15:15:25Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "A directory traversal vulnerability exists in the uploadMib functionality of ManageEngine OpManager 12.7.258. A specially crafted HTTP request can lead to arbitrary file creation. An attacker can send a malicious MiB file to trigger this vulnerability.",
"id": "GHSA-85h3-wq5q-6x6j",
"modified": "2025-11-04T21:30:59Z",
"published": "2024-01-08T15:30:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-47211"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2023-1851"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.manageengine.com/itom/advisory/cve-2023-47211.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2023-1851"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-85J7-G7FC-F98M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-26 18:31 – Updated: 2025-09-26 18:31A vulnerability was found in Dibo Data Decision Making System up to 2.7.0. The affected element is the function downloadImpTemplet of the file /common/dep/common_dep.action.jsp. The manipulation of the argument filePath results in path traversal. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been made public and could be used.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-11034"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-26T18:15:35Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability was found in Dibo Data Decision Making System up to 2.7.0. The affected element is the function downloadImpTemplet of the file /common/dep/common_dep.action.jsp. The manipulation of the argument filePath results in path traversal. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been made public and could be used.",
"id": "GHSA-85j7-g7fc-f98m",
"modified": "2025-09-26T18:31:23Z",
"published": "2025-09-26T18:31:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-11034"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FightingLzn9/vul/blob/main/%E8%BF%AA%E5%8D%9A%E6%95%B0%E6%8D%AE%E5%86%B3%E7%AD%96%E7%B3%BB%E7%BB%9F.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.325981"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.325981"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.658242"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.