CWE-22
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
13575 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-F7V2-J977-J9V3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 01:18 – Updated: 2022-05-14 01:18Endress+Hauser WirelessHART Fieldgate SWG70 3.x devices allow Directory Traversal via the fcgi-bin/wgsetcgi filename parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-16059"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-09-07T22:29:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Endress+Hauser WirelessHART Fieldgate SWG70 3.x devices allow Directory Traversal via the fcgi-bin/wgsetcgi filename parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-f7v2-j977-j9v3",
"modified": "2022-05-14T01:18:25Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T01:18:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-16059"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert.vde.com/en-us/advisories/vde-2019-002"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-19-073-03"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/45342"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/107416"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-F7VM-626Q-85QM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 05:50 – Updated: 2022-05-17 05:50Directory traversal vulnerability in the Ternaria Informatica Jfeedback! (com_jfeedback) component 1.2 for Joomla! allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files and possibly have unspecified other impact via a .. (dot dot) in the controller parameter to index.php.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2010-1478"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2010-04-19T19:30:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in the Ternaria Informatica Jfeedback! (com_jfeedback) component 1.2 for Joomla! allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files and possibly have unspecified other impact via a .. (dot dot) in the controller parameter to index.php.",
"id": "GHSA-f7vm-626q-85qm",
"modified": "2022-05-17T05:50:35Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T05:50:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2010-1478"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.org/1004-exploits/joomlajfeedback-lfi.txt"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/39262"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/12145"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/39390"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-F7WF-V2VW-MPCX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-17 19:23 – Updated: 2026-07-17 19:23Impact
context_import passed the caller-supplied filePath directly to fs.readFileSync with no path confinement. A malicious MCP client — or an LLM agent that is prompt-injected into calling the tool — could point filePath at any file readable by the server process, outside any session or export directory:
- Full disclosure (JSON files): a valid-JSON target (e.g. another user's exported session, or a
*.jsoncredential / service-account file) is parsed and imported into the caller's session, then retrievable verbatim viacontext_get/context_export. - Partial disclosure (any file): for a non-JSON target (e.g.
/etc/passwd, an SSH key, a.env),JSON.parsethrows and V8 includes a snippet of the file's leading bytes in theSyntaxErrormessage, which was returned verbatim to the caller.
Both ../ traversal and absolute paths worked — there was no path confinement of any kind.
In a typical MCP deployment the server runs on the developer's machine, so the reachable set includes other users' exported memory sessions, JSON credential/config files, and (in leading-bytes form) .env files, SSH keys, and /etc/passwd. The trigger is a tool argument, so the realistic threat model is an LLM agent prompt-injected into calling context_import, or any MCP client connected to the server.
Patches
Fixed in 0.13.0 (PR #36):
- Imports are confined to a server-owned exports directory (
<DATA_DIR>/exports, overridable viaMEMORY_KEEPER_EXPORT_DIR), resolved withrealpathSync.../traversal, absolute paths outside the directory, and symlink escapes are all rejected. - File read and
JSON.parseare separate operations; read/parse failures return a generic message and never echo file bytes (theSyntaxError-message leak is gone). The database-write path is likewise generic. - An E2E security regression suite covers the reported arbitrary-read and traversal vectors, plus symlink escape, the directory-prefix boundary, and a no-existence-oracle check.
Workarounds
Upgrade to >= 0.13.0. There is no configuration-only workaround for affected versions.
Resources
- Report: GitHub issue #35
- Fix: PR #36
Credit
Reported by Zhihao Zhang (@mcfly-zzh).
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "mcp-memory-keeper"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.13.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-54561"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-209",
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-17T19:23:07Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\n`context_import` passed the caller-supplied `filePath` directly to `fs.readFileSync` with no path confinement. A malicious MCP client \u2014 or an LLM agent that is prompt-injected into calling the tool \u2014 could point `filePath` at **any file readable by the server process**, outside any session or export directory:\n\n- **Full disclosure (JSON files):** a valid-JSON target (e.g. another user\u0027s exported session, or a `*.json` credential / service-account file) is parsed and imported into the caller\u0027s session, then retrievable verbatim via `context_get` / `context_export`.\n- **Partial disclosure (any file):** for a non-JSON target (e.g. `/etc/passwd`, an SSH key, a `.env`), `JSON.parse` throws and V8 includes a snippet of the file\u0027s leading bytes in the `SyntaxError` message, which was returned verbatim to the caller.\n\nBoth `../` traversal and absolute paths worked \u2014 there was no path confinement of any kind.\n\nIn a typical MCP deployment the server runs on the developer\u0027s machine, so the reachable set includes other users\u0027 exported memory sessions, JSON credential/config files, and (in leading-bytes form) `.env` files, SSH keys, and `/etc/passwd`. The trigger is a tool argument, so the realistic threat model is an LLM agent prompt-injected into calling `context_import`, or any MCP client connected to the server.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in **0.13.0** (PR #36):\n\n- Imports are confined to a server-owned exports directory (`\u003cDATA_DIR\u003e/exports`, overridable via `MEMORY_KEEPER_EXPORT_DIR`), resolved with `realpathSync`. `../` traversal, absolute paths outside the directory, and symlink escapes are all rejected.\n- File read and `JSON.parse` are separate operations; read/parse failures return a generic message and never echo file bytes (the `SyntaxError`-message leak is gone). The database-write path is likewise generic.\n- An E2E security regression suite covers the reported arbitrary-read and traversal vectors, plus symlink escape, the directory-prefix boundary, and a no-existence-oracle check.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nUpgrade to **`\u003e= 0.13.0`**. There is no configuration-only workaround for affected versions.\n\n### Resources\n\n- Report: GitHub issue #35\n- Fix: PR #36\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by Zhihao Zhang ([@mcfly-zzh](https://github.com/mcfly-zzh)).",
"id": "GHSA-f7wf-v2vw-mpcx",
"modified": "2026-07-17T19:23:07Z",
"published": "2026-07-17T19:23:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mkreyman/mcp-memory-keeper/security/advisories/GHSA-f7wf-v2vw-mpcx"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mkreyman/mcp-memory-keeper/issues/35"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mkreyman/mcp-memory-keeper/pull/36"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mkreyman/mcp-memory-keeper/commit/84f6dfa692736a34ff36e2d2cf2188b71facf73b"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/mkreyman/mcp-memory-keeper"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mkreyman/mcp-memory-keeper/releases/tag/v0.13.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "mcp-memory-keeper: Arbitrary local file read in context_import via unvalidated filePath"
}
GHSA-F7XC-5852-FJ99
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-25 22:00 – Updated: 2026-03-30 13:53Impact
Users with MockResponse fixtures that use path traversal.
Patches
Upgrade to Saloon v4+
Upgrade guide: https://docs.saloon.dev/upgrade/upgrading-from-v3-to-v4
Description
Fixture names were used to build file paths under the configured fixture directory without validation. A name containing path segments (e.g. ../traversal or ../../etc/passwd) resulted in a path outside that directory. When the application read a fixture (e.g. for mocking) or wrote one (e.g. when recording responses), it could read or write files anywhere the process had access. If the fixture name was derived from user or attacker-controlled input (e.g. request parameters or config), this constituted a path traversal vulnerability and could lead to disclosure of sensitive files or overwriting of critical files. The fix adds validation in the fixture layer (rejecting names with /, \, .., or null bytes, and restricting to a safe character set) and defence-in-depth in the storage layer (ensuring the resolved path remains under the base directory before any read or write).
Credits
Saloon thanks @HuajiHD for finding the issue and recommending solutions and @JonPurvis for applying the fix.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "saloonphp/saloon"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-33183"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-125",
"CWE-22",
"CWE-787"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-25T22:00:43Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-26T01:16:27Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\nUsers with MockResponse fixtures that use path traversal.\n\n### Patches\nUpgrade to Saloon v4+\n\nUpgrade guide: https://docs.saloon.dev/upgrade/upgrading-from-v3-to-v4\n\n### Description\nFixture names were used to build file paths under the configured fixture directory without validation. A name containing path segments (e.g. ../traversal or ../../etc/passwd) resulted in a path outside that directory. When the application read a fixture (e.g. for mocking) or wrote one (e.g. when recording responses), it could read or write files anywhere the process had access. If the fixture name was derived from user or attacker-controlled input (e.g. request parameters or config), this constituted a path traversal vulnerability and could lead to disclosure of sensitive files or overwriting of critical files. The fix adds validation in the fixture layer (rejecting names with /, \\, .., or null bytes, and restricting to a safe character set) and defence-in-depth in the storage layer (ensuring the resolved path remains under the base directory before any read or write).\n\n### Credits\nSaloon thanks @HuajiHD for finding the issue and recommending solutions and @JonPurvis for applying the fix.",
"id": "GHSA-f7xc-5852-fj99",
"modified": "2026-03-30T13:53:42Z",
"published": "2026-03-25T22:00:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/saloonphp/saloon/security/advisories/GHSA-f7xc-5852-fj99"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33183"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.saloon.dev/upgrade/upgrading-from-v3-to-v4"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/saloonphp/saloon"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Saloon has a Fixture Name Path Traversal Vulnerability"
}
GHSA-F823-PHMG-X5FR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-06-29 09:30 – Updated: 2025-11-03 20:14A vulnerability, which was classified as critical, has been found in chatchat-space Langchain-Chatchat up to 0.3.1. This issue affects some unknown processing of the file /v1/file. The manipulation of the argument flag leads to path traversal. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "langchain-chatchat"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.3.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-6855"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-11-03T20:14:58Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-06-29T09:15:24Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "A vulnerability, which was classified as critical, has been found in chatchat-space Langchain-Chatchat up to 0.3.1. This issue affects some unknown processing of the file /v1/file. The manipulation of the argument flag leads to path traversal. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.",
"id": "GHSA-f823-phmg-x5fr",
"modified": "2025-11-03T20:14:59Z",
"published": "2025-06-29T09:30:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-6855"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/chatchat-space/Langchain-Chatchat/issues/5354"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/chatchat-space/Langchain-Chatchat"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.314327"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.314327"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.601162"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Langchain-Chatchat vulnerable to path traversal"
}
GHSA-F82R-JJ5R-6G97
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-04-16 00:30 – Updated: 2024-08-09 18:06A path traversal vulnerability exists in mlflow/mlflow version 2.9.2, allowing attackers to access arbitrary files on the server. By crafting a series of HTTP POST requests with specially crafted 'artifact_location' and 'source' parameters, using a local URI with '#' instead of '?', an attacker can traverse the server's directory structure. The issue occurs due to insufficient validation of user-supplied input in the server's handlers.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.9.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "mlflow"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.12.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-1483"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-04-16T18:06:16Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-04-16T00:15:08Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A path traversal vulnerability exists in mlflow/mlflow version 2.9.2, allowing attackers to access arbitrary files on the server. By crafting a series of HTTP POST requests with specially crafted \u0027artifact_location\u0027 and \u0027source\u0027 parameters, using a local URI with \u0027#\u0027 instead of \u0027?\u0027, an attacker can traverse the server\u0027s directory structure. The issue occurs due to insufficient validation of user-supplied input in the server\u0027s handlers.",
"id": "GHSA-f82r-jj5r-6g97",
"modified": "2024-08-09T18:06:39Z",
"published": "2024-04-16T00:30:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-1483"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/mlflow/mlflow"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://huntr.com/bounties/52a3855d-93ff-4460-ac24-9c7e4334198d"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "mlflow Path Traversal vulnerability"
}
GHSA-F832-268F-JPXX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-03 03:31 – Updated: 2025-12-03 03:31The Modula Image Gallery plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file deletion due to insufficient file path validation in the 'ajax_unzip_file' function in versions 2.13.1 to 2.13.2. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Author-level access and above, to delete arbitrary files on the server, which can easily lead to remote code execution when the right file is deleted (such as wp-config.php).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-13645"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-03T03:15:59Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The Modula Image Gallery plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file deletion due to insufficient file path validation in the \u0027ajax_unzip_file\u0027 function in versions 2.13.1 to 2.13.2. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Author-level access and above, to delete arbitrary files on the server, which can easily lead to remote code execution when the right file is deleted (such as wp-config.php).",
"id": "GHSA-f832-268f-jpxx",
"modified": "2025-12-03T03:31:20Z",
"published": "2025-12-03T03:31:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-13645"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/WPChill/modula-lite/commit/90c8eb982f71b31584d9be9359e3b594e03927d7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/modula-best-grid-gallery/tags/2.13.2/includes/admin/class-modula-gallery-upload.php#L1025"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/modula-best-grid-gallery/tags/2.13.2/includes/admin/class-modula-gallery-upload.php#L1119"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3395701/modula-best-grid-gallery#file5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3407949/modula-best-grid-gallery"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/080683bb-713f-4aa8-b635-90c96f358bec?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-F83H-9VWX-MC3W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 01:26 – Updated: 2022-05-17 01:26Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in SeedDMS (formerly LetoDMS and MyDMS) before 4.3.4 allow (1) remote authenticated users with access to the LogManagement functionality to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the logname parameter to out/out.LogManagement.php or (2) remote attackers to write to arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the fileId parameter to op/op.AddFile2.php. NOTE: vector 2 can be leveraged to execute arbitrary code by using CVE-2014-2278.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2014-2279"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2014-10-17T23:55:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in SeedDMS (formerly LetoDMS and MyDMS) before 4.3.4 allow (1) remote authenticated users with access to the LogManagement functionality to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the logname parameter to out/out.LogManagement.php or (2) remote attackers to write to arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the fileId parameter to op/op.AddFile2.php. NOTE: vector 2 can be leveraged to execute arbitrary code by using CVE-2014-2278.",
"id": "GHSA-f83h-9vwx-mc3w",
"modified": "2022-05-17T01:26:44Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T01:26:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-2279"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/91831"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/bugtraq/2014-03/0101.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://osvdb.org/show/osvdb/104466"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/125726"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://sourceforge.net/p/seeddms/code/ci/master/tree/CHANGELOG"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/66256"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-F842-PHM9-P4V4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-19 12:44 – Updated: 2026-03-25 20:48Details
A Path Traversal and Access Control Bypass vulnerability was discovered in the salvo-proxy component of the Salvo Rust framework (v0.89.2). The vulnerability allows an unauthenticated external attacker to bypass proxy routing constraints and access unintended backend paths (e.g., protected endpoints or administrative dashboards). This issue stems from the encode_url_path function, which fails to normalize "../" sequences and inadvertently forwards them verbatim to the upstream server by not re-encoding the "." character.
Technical Details
If someone tries to attack by sending a special code like %2e%2e, Salvo changes it back to ../ when it first checks the path. The proxy then gets this plain ../ value. When making the new URL to send forward, the encode_url_path function tries to change the path again, but its normal settings do not include the . (dot) character. Because of this, the proxy puts ../ straight into the new URL and sends a request like GET /api/../admin HTTP/1.1 to the backend server.
// crates/proxy/src/lib.rs (Lines 100-105)
pub(crate) fn encode_url_path(path: &str) -> String {
path.split('/')
.map(|s| utf8_percent_encode(s, PATH_ENCODE_SET).to_string())
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
.join("/")
}
PoC
1 - Setup an Nginx Backend Server for example 2 - Start Salvo Proxy Gateway in other port routing to /api/ 3 - Run the curl to test the bypass:
curl -s http://127.0.0.1:8080/gateway/api/%2e%2e%2fadmin/index.html
Impact
If attackers take advantage of this problem, they can get past API Gateway security checks and route limits without logging in. This could accidentally make internal services, admin pages, or folders visible.
The attack works because the special path is sent as-is to the backend, which often happens in systems that follow standard web address rules. Attackers might also use different ways of writing URLs or add extra parts to the web address to get past simple security checks that only look for exact ../ patterns.
Remediation
Instead of changing the text of the path manually, the proxy should use a standard way to clean up the path according to RFC 3986 before adding it to the main URL. It is better to use a trusted tool like the URL crate to join paths, or to block any path parts with “..” after decoding them. But a custom implementation maybe looks like:
pub(crate) fn encode_url_path(path: &str) -> String {
let normalized = normalize_path(path);
normalized.split('/')
.map(|s| utf8_percent_encode(s, PATH_ENCODE_SET).to_string())
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
.join("/")
}
fn normalize_path(path: &str) -> String {
let mut stack = Vec::new();
for part in path.split('/') {
match part {
"" | "." => (),
".." => { let _ = stack.pop(); },
_ => stack.push(part),
}
}
stack.join("/")
}
Vulnerable code introduced in: https://github.com/salvo-rs/salvo/commit/7bac30e6960355c58e358e402072d4a3e5c4e1bb#diff-e319bf7afcb577f7e9f4fb767005072f6335d23f306dd52e8c94f3d222610d02R20
Author: Tomas Illuminati
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.89.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "salvo"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.39.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.89.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-33242"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-19T12:44:28Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-24T00:16:29Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Details\n\nA Path Traversal and Access Control Bypass vulnerability was discovered in the salvo-proxy component of the Salvo Rust framework (v0.89.2). The vulnerability allows an unauthenticated external attacker to bypass proxy routing constraints and access unintended backend paths (e.g., protected endpoints or administrative dashboards). This issue stems from the encode_url_path function, which fails to normalize \"../\" sequences and inadvertently forwards them verbatim to the upstream server by not re-encoding the \".\" character.\n\n---\n\n### Technical Details\n\nIf someone tries to attack by sending a special code like `%2e%2e`, Salvo changes it back to `../` when it first checks the path. The proxy then gets this plain `../` value. When making the new URL to send forward, the `encode_url_path` function tries to change the path again, but its normal settings do not include the `.` (dot) character. Because of this, the proxy puts `../` straight into the new URL and sends a request like `GET /api/../admin HTTP/1.1` to the backend server.\n\n```rust\n// crates/proxy/src/lib.rs (Lines 100-105)\n\npub(crate) fn encode_url_path(path: \u0026str) -\u003e String {\n path.split(\u0027/\u0027)\n .map(|s| utf8_percent_encode(s, PATH_ENCODE_SET).to_string())\n .collect::\u003cVec\u003c_\u003e\u003e()\n .join(\"/\")\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n### PoC\n\n1 - Setup an Nginx Backend Server for example\n2 - Start Salvo Proxy Gateway in other port routing to /api/\n3 - Run the curl to test the bypass:\n\n```bash\ncurl -s http://127.0.0.1:8080/gateway/api/%2e%2e%2fadmin/index.html\n```\n\n---\n\n### Impact\n\nIf attackers take advantage of this problem, they can get past API Gateway security checks and route limits without logging in. This could accidentally make internal services, admin pages, or folders visible.\n\nThe attack works because the special path is sent as-is to the backend, which often happens in systems that follow standard web address rules. Attackers might also use different ways of writing URLs or add extra parts to the web address to get past simple security checks that only look for exact `../` patterns.\n\n---\n\n### Remediation\n\nInstead of changing the text of the path manually, the proxy should use a standard way to clean up the path according to RFC 3986 before adding it to the main URL. It is better to use a trusted tool like the URL crate to join paths, or to block any path parts with \u201c..\u201d after decoding them. But a custom implementation maybe looks like:\n\n```rust\npub(crate) fn encode_url_path(path: \u0026str) -\u003e String {\n let normalized = normalize_path(path);\n normalized.split(\u0027/\u0027)\n .map(|s| utf8_percent_encode(s, PATH_ENCODE_SET).to_string())\n .collect::\u003cVec\u003c_\u003e\u003e()\n .join(\"/\")\n}\n\nfn normalize_path(path: \u0026str) -\u003e String {\n let mut stack = Vec::new();\n for part in path.split(\u0027/\u0027) {\n match part {\n \"\" | \".\" =\u003e (), \n \"..\" =\u003e { let _ = stack.pop(); },\n _ =\u003e stack.push(part),\n }\n }\n stack.join(\"/\")\n}\n```\n---\n\n**Vulnerable code introduced in:**\nhttps://github.com/salvo-rs/salvo/commit/7bac30e6960355c58e358e402072d4a3e5c4e1bb#diff-e319bf7afcb577f7e9f4fb767005072f6335d23f306dd52e8c94f3d222610d02R20\n\n---\n\n**Author**: Tomas Illuminati",
"id": "GHSA-f842-phm9-p4v4",
"modified": "2026-03-25T20:48:34Z",
"published": "2026-03-19T12:44:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/salvo-rs/salvo/security/advisories/GHSA-f842-phm9-p4v4"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33242"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/salvo-rs/salvo/commit/7bac30e6960355c58e358e402072d4a3e5c4e1bb#diff-e319bf7afcb577f7e9f4fb767005072f6335d23f306dd52e8c94f3d222610d02R20"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/salvo-rs/salvo"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/salvo-rs/salvo/releases/tag/v0.89.3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Salvo has a Path Traversal in salvo-proxy::encode_url_path allows API Gateway Bypass"
}
GHSA-F8C9-F59W-G5CX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-20 18:31 – Updated: 2026-02-25 18:31Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') vulnerability in Murtaza Bhurgri Woo File Dropzone woo-file-dropzone allows Path Traversal.This issue affects Woo File Dropzone: from n/a through <= 1.1.7.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-68862"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-20T16:22:14Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027) vulnerability in Murtaza Bhurgri Woo File Dropzone woo-file-dropzone allows Path Traversal.This issue affects Woo File Dropzone: from n/a through \u003c= 1.1.7.",
"id": "GHSA-f8c9-f59w-g5cx",
"modified": "2026-02-25T18:31:28Z",
"published": "2026-02-20T18:31:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68862"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/woo-file-dropzone/vulnerability/wordpress-woo-file-dropzone-plugin-1-1-7-arbitrary-file-deletion-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.