CWE-22
Weakness Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
Many file operations are intended to take place within a restricted directory. By using special elements such as ".." and "/" separators, attackers can escape outside of the restricted location to access files or directories that are elsewhere on the system. One of the most common special elements is the "../" sequence, which in most modern operating systems is interpreted as the parent directory of the current location. This is referred to as relative path traversal. Path traversal also covers the use of absolute pathnames such as "/usr/local/bin" to access unexpected files. This is referred to as absolute path traversal.
Mapping guidance
This CWE entry might have children that would be more appropriate.
Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit. Consider children such as CWE-23 (or its descendants) for relative path traversal, or CWE-36 for absolute path traversal.
Relationships and members
Modes of introduction
Detection methods
Automated Static Analysis
Automated techniques can find areas where path traversal weaknesses exist. However, tuning or customization may be required to remove or de-prioritize path-traversal problems that are only exploitable by the product's administrator - or other privileged users - and thus potentially valid behavior or, at worst, a bug instead of a vulnerability.
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis
Manual white box techniques may be able to provide sufficient code coverage and reduction of false positives if all file access operations can be assessed within limited time constraints.
Effectiveness: High
Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Web Application Scanner
Web Services Scanner
Database Scanners
Effectiveness: High
Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Fuzz Tester
Framework-based Fuzzer
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
Effectiveness: High
Automated Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Source code Weakness Analyzer
Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer
Effectiveness: High
Architecture or Design Review
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)
Effectiveness: High
Notes
Other
In many programming languages, the injection of a null byte (the 0 or NUL) may allow an attacker to truncate a generated filename to apply to a wider range of files. For example, the product may add ".txt" to any pathname, thus limiting the attacker to text files, but a null injection may effectively remove this restriction.
Relationship
Pathname equivalence can be regarded as a type of canonicalization error.
Relationship
Some pathname equivalence issues are not directly related to directory traversal, rather are used to bypass security-relevant checks for whether a file/directory can be accessed by the attacker (e.g. a trailing "/" on a filename could bypass access rules that don't expect a trailing /, causing a server to provide the file when it normally would not).
Terminology
Like other weaknesses, terminology is often based on the types of manipulations used, instead of the underlying weaknesses. Some people use "directory traversal" only to refer to the injection of ".." and equivalent sequences whose specific meaning is to traverse directories.
Other variants like "absolute pathname" and "drive letter" have the *effect* of directory traversal, but some people may not call it such, since it doesn't involve ".." or equivalent.
Research Gap
Many variants of path traversal attacks are probably under-studied with respect to root cause. CWE-790 and CWE-182 begin to cover part of this gap.
Research Gap
Incomplete diagnosis or reporting of vulnerabilities can make it difficult to know which variant is affected. For example, a researcher might say that "..\" is vulnerable, but not test "../" which may also be vulnerable.
Any combination of directory separators ("/", "\", etc.) and numbers of "." (e.g. "....") can produce unique variants; for example, the "//../" variant is not listed (CVE-2004-0325). See this entry's children and lower-level descendants.
Content history
Identified weakness in Perl demonstrative example
Provided diagram to improve CWE usability
Identified weakness in "good code" for Python demonstrative example
Provided a demonstrative example in PHP
updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction
Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping
updated Alternate_Terms, Relationships, Other_Notes, Relationship_Notes, Relevant_Properties, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities
updated Description
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Alternate_Terms, Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Name, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationship_Notes, Relationships, Research_Gaps, Taxonomy_Mappings, Terminology_Notes, Time_of_Introduction, Weakness_Ordinalities
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations
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updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Observed_Examples
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
updated Other_Notes, Research_Gaps
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Relationships
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
updated Demonstrative_Examples
updated Affected_Resources, Causal_Nature, Likelihood_of_Exploit, References, Relationships, Relevant_Properties, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated References, Relationships
updated References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Type
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updated Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, References
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
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updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
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updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Name, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
16185 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-77X3-723G-RR6J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-05 18:31 – Updated: 2025-12-05 21:30The warehouse management system version 1.2 contains an arbitrary file read vulnerability. The endpoint /file/showImageByPath does not sanitize user-controlled path parameters. An attacker could exploit directory traversal to read arbitrary files on the server's file system. This could lead to the leakage of sensitive system information.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-65878"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-05T17:16:03Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The warehouse management system version 1.2 contains an arbitrary file read vulnerability. The endpoint `/file/showImageByPath` does not sanitize user-controlled path parameters. An attacker could exploit directory traversal to read arbitrary files on the server\u0027s file system. This could lead to the leakage of sensitive system information.",
"id": "GHSA-77x3-723g-rr6j",
"modified": "2025-12-05T21:30:23Z",
"published": "2025-12-05T18:31:11Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-65878"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/W000i/vuln/issues/2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-77X6-R257-2X55
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:31 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:31Directory Traversal vulnerability in the administrative user interface in McAfee Web Gateway (MWG) MWG 7.8.1.x allows authenticated administrator users to gain elevated privileges via unspecified vectors.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-6677"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-07-23T13:29:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Directory Traversal vulnerability in the administrative user interface in McAfee Web Gateway (MWG) MWG 7.8.1.x allows authenticated administrator users to gain elevated privileges via unspecified vectors.",
"id": "GHSA-77x6-r257-2x55",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:31:57Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:31:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-6677"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://kc.mcafee.com/corporate/index?page=content\u0026id=SB10245"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/104893"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-77XJ-RH56-94M9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 00:46 – Updated: 2022-05-17 00:46Directory traversal vulnerability in the eXtplorer module (com_extplorer) 2.0.0 RC2 and earlier in Joomla! allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the dir parameter in a show_error action.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2008-4764"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2008-10-28T02:03:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in the eXtplorer module (com_extplorer) 2.0.0 RC2 and earlier in Joomla! allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the dir parameter in a show_error action.",
"id": "GHSA-77xj-rh56-94m9",
"modified": "2022-05-17T00:46:25Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T00:46:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-4764"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/41873"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/5435"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/28764"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-77XJ-X4RM-935C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-08 17:58 – Updated: 2026-10-08 17:58Summary
When processing an attacker-controlled Protobuf schema, vulnerable versions of
datamodel-code-generator could write a generated weak-import stub outside the
intended __weak_imports__ temporary directory. Absolute import paths and relative
paths containing .. could escape this directory.
An attacker could create directories and new files at locations writable by the process. Relative path traversal could also overwrite existing writable files because the existence check and the stub write used different base directories. An existing absolute target was skipped by the existence check.
Written content was limited to a generated Protobuf syntax declaration,
syntax = "proto2"; or syntax = "proto3";, followed by a newline. This issue did
not provide fully attacker-controlled file contents, and direct arbitrary code
execution has not been demonstrated.
These filesystem side effects occurred before protoc ran. A subsequent
compilation error did not undo them. A user or CI job must process the
attacker-controlled schema for the issue to be triggered, whether the schema is
supplied as a local file or fetched via --url.
The fix has been merged into the parent repository's main branch in
5e94b8f. A patched package release is not yet available.
The technical details and PoC below describe the vulnerable implementation before
that fix.
Affected component
- Repository:
datamodel-code-generator/datamodel-code-generator(formerlykoxudaxi/datamodel-code-generator). - Analyzed at: released 0.80.0 (
pip install datamodel-code-generator==0.80.0) andmain@ commit834731d56c0a90c182a0919f316069cf5ff0659a(2026-09-13). Both contained the identical vulnerable sink. - Sink / entry point (
src/datamodel_code_generator/parser/protobuf.py, line numbers from 0.80.0): - Source:
WEAK_IMPORT_PATTERN(protobuf.py:37) — attacker-controlled capture group. - Sink:
_write_missing_weak_imports(protobuf.py:391-393) —weak_import_dir / import_path+mkdir(parents=True)+write_text. - Timing: called from
_ProtoInputPreparer.__enter__(protobuf.py:333), beforeprotoc.main(...)runs inside thewithbody. - Preconditions: victim runs the tool (CLI or Python API) with
--input-file-type protobufon an attacker-controlled.proto, supplied as a local file (--input) or a remote URL (--url). Requires thegrpcio-toolspackage (Protobuf support). The attacker does not need privileges on the affected system; filesystem effects are limited to locations writable by the code-generation process.
Severity
Proposed: High. CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N = 7.5.
- Scored to match the project's own rating of the sibling path-traversal advisories CVE-2026-55389 / CVE-2026-55390, both
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N= 7.5. This finding is the same attack surface (unvalidated path from a processed schema) with the impact moved from confidentiality (read) to integrity (write), henceC:N/I:H. AV:N: the malicious schema can be fetched over the network via--url, consistent with how the siblings were scored.I:H: attacker fully controls the write path and can create arbitrary directory trees and overwrite existing files; only the file content is constrained (a fixedsyntax = "proto{2,3}";line).A:Nchosen conservatively; overwriting build-critical files (lock files,__init__.py, entry points) can cause availability loss, which would argueA:L.- Honest alternative: if the reviewer treats "the victim must run the tool on the file" as user interaction (
UI:R), the score is 6.5 (Moderate). The project usedUI:Nfor the identical read-path siblings, soUI:Nis used here for consistency.
Details
Source pattern — the imported path is captured with no character restriction:
# protobuf.py:37
WEAK_IMPORT_PATTERN = re.compile(r'^\s*import\s+weak\s+"([^"]+)"\s*;', re.MULTILINE)
Sink — the captured path is joined and written with no boundary check:
# protobuf.py:383-393 (_write_missing_weak_imports)
for import_path in WEAK_IMPORT_PATTERN.findall(text):
if any((include_path / import_path).exists() for include_path in include_paths):
continue
stub = self.weak_import_dir / import_path # no resolve(), no is_relative_to()
stub.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) # arbitrary directory tree
stub.write_text(syntax, encoding=self.parser.encoding)
Two escape mechanisms, both from pathlib's / semantics:
- Absolute path:
Path(".../__weak_imports__") / "/etc/x"==/etc/x(an absolute right operand replaces the base). Creates new files anywhere the process can write. ../traversal:Path(".../__weak_imports__") / "../../x"climbs out of the temp directory.
Why the existence guard (line 389) does not protect the write: it checks
include_path / import_path, using a different base (include_paths) than the
actual write, which uses self.weak_import_dir / import_path. For a relative
path the two bases resolve to different directories, so the guard checks a location
that is not the real write target and misses it — enabling overwrite of existing
files. (For an absolute path the guard and the write coincide, so an already-
existing absolute target is skipped; absolute paths thus create new files but do not
overwrite. Overwrite is reached via the relative-traversal path.)
Timing: _write_missing_weak_imports runs inside __enter__ (line 333), and
protoc.main(...) runs later in the with body. protoc rejects the malformed
virtual path (Backslashes, consecutive slashes, "." or ".." are not allowed in
the virtual path) and the overall command exits non-zero — but the file has
already been written; the filesystem side effect is not rolled back.
Attack path
- Attacker crafts
evil.protocontaining e.g.import weak "/home/victim/.config/x";and/orimport weak "../../overwrite_me.txt";, and gets the victim to process it (third-party schema, or--urlto an attacker-hosted file). _write_missing_weak_importswrites the stub to the attacker-chosen path, creating any intermediate directories and overwriting an existing file (relative case).protocthen fails, but the file(s) are already on disk.
Proof of Concept
Two self-contained scripts (poc/reproduce.sh for --input, poc/reproduce-url.sh
for --url) install the released datamodel-code-generator==0.80.0, serve/point a
malicious .proto, and assert the writes. The PoC drives the released package
unmodified; the sink file's sha256 is recorded in REPRODUCE.md.
Local --input run against 0.80.0 — real output:
[*] installed version: 0.80.0
[test A] absolute-path arbitrary file + mkdir(parents):
[PASS] new file created at attacker-controlled absolute path
[PASS] content is the fixed syntax stub
[test B] relative-traversal overwrite of pre-existing file:
[PASS] pre-existing victim.txt content was overwritten
[PASS] victim.txt now holds the injected stub
==================== RESULT: 4 passed, 0 failed ====================
Remote --url run against 0.80.0 — real output (proto served over HTTP, then the
same writes fire):
[*] serving malicious proto at http://127.0.0.1:<port>/evil_url.proto
[PASS] server actually served the proto (HTTP 200)
[PASS] absolute-path arbitrary file created
[PASS] pre-existing victim overwritten via ../
==================== RESULT: 3 passed, 0 failed ====================
Impact
Any user or CI pipeline that runs an affected version of
datamodel-code-generator on an untrusted
Protobuf schema (a downloaded third-party .proto, or --url to a remote source)
is exposed to arbitrary file/directory creation and overwrite by the schema author,
with the process's own permissions. Concrete harms:
- Overwrite source, config,
.env, lock files, or__init__.py/ entry-point files → project corruption, broken builds, denial of service. - Create arbitrary directory trees / drop files into watched or auto-loaded locations.
Direct arbitrary code execution has not been demonstrated. The written content
is limited to a generated syntax = "proto2"; or syntax = "proto3"; line and is
not fully attacker-controlled.
Resolution
The fix was merged into the parent repository's main branch in
5e94b8f.
The Protobuf input preparer now resolves the dedicated temporary weak-import
directory and each candidate stub path. If a resolved candidate is outside that
directory, it raises SchemaParseError before checking include paths, creating
parent directories, or writing the stub. The containment check rejects
absolute-path escapes and relative .. traversal that would leave the sandbox.
Input-preparation failures also immediately clean up the temporary directory.
Regression tests cover:
- rejection of absolute weak-import paths outside the sandbox;
- rejection of relative
..traversal outside the sandbox; - preservation of a pre-existing file outside the sandbox.
Local tox validation of the patch passed across the Python 3.10–3.14 and formatter matrix, the CI compatibility environments, and the repository checks. Combined line and branch coverage, including the changed files, reached 100%.
A fixed package has not yet been published to PyPI; the latest published version
at the time of this update is 0.80.0. Patched versions remains unset until a
release containing this fix is available. The advisory remains private pending
that release.
References
- GHSA-8359-h9fx-j6v9 / CVE-2026-55389 — datamodel-code-generator arbitrary local file read via JSON-Schema
$refpath traversal (CWE-22/200/610, 7.5, patched 0.62.0). Same class, read primitive; sibling entry point. - GHSA-442q-2j6p-642g / CVE-2026-55390 — datamodel-code-generator arbitrary local file read via XSD
schemaLocationpath traversal (CWE-22/200/610, 7.5, affected>= 0.59.0, <= 0.61.0, patched 0.62.0). Same class, read primitive; the fix sweep that missed the Protobuf entry point. - Python
pathlib—PurePath.__truediv__: an absolute right-hand operand discards the left operand;..segments are not normalized. (https://docs.python.org/3/library/pathlib.html)
Discovery
Found via source review and a reproducing PoC on
datamodel-code-generator/datamodel-code-generator, released 0.80.0 and main @
834731d56c0a90c182a0919f316069cf5ff0659a, 2026-09.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.80.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "datamodel-code-generator"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.59.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.81.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-107377"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-08T17:58:01Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nWhen processing an attacker-controlled Protobuf schema, vulnerable versions of\n`datamodel-code-generator` could write a generated weak-import stub outside the\nintended `__weak_imports__` temporary directory. Absolute import paths and relative\npaths containing `..` could escape this directory.\n\nAn attacker could create directories and new files at locations writable by the\nprocess. Relative path traversal could also overwrite existing writable files\nbecause the existence check and the stub write used different base directories.\nAn existing absolute target was skipped by the existence check.\n\nWritten content was limited to a generated Protobuf syntax declaration,\n`syntax = \"proto2\";` or `syntax = \"proto3\";`, followed by a newline. This issue did\nnot provide fully attacker-controlled file contents, and direct arbitrary code\nexecution has not been demonstrated.\n\nThese filesystem side effects occurred before `protoc` ran. A subsequent\ncompilation error did not undo them. A user or CI job must process the\nattacker-controlled schema for the issue to be triggered, whether the schema is\nsupplied as a local file or fetched via `--url`.\n\nThe fix has been merged into the parent repository\u0027s `main` branch in\n[5e94b8f](https://github.com/datamodel-code-generator/datamodel-code-generator/commit/5e94b8f4203198798ec66b8e48217f70af69a0dc). A patched package release is not yet available.\nThe technical details and PoC below describe the vulnerable implementation before\nthat fix.\n\n## Affected component\n\n- Repository: `datamodel-code-generator/datamodel-code-generator` (formerly `koxudaxi/datamodel-code-generator`).\n- Analyzed at: released **0.80.0** (`pip install datamodel-code-generator==0.80.0`) and `main` @ commit `834731d56c0a90c182a0919f316069cf5ff0659a` (2026-09-13). Both contained the identical vulnerable sink.\n- Sink / entry point (`src/datamodel_code_generator/parser/protobuf.py`, line numbers from 0.80.0):\n - Source: `WEAK_IMPORT_PATTERN` (`protobuf.py:37`) \u2014 attacker-controlled capture group.\n - Sink: `_write_missing_weak_imports` (`protobuf.py:391-393`) \u2014 `weak_import_dir / import_path` + `mkdir(parents=True)` + `write_text`.\n - Timing: called from `_ProtoInputPreparer.__enter__` (`protobuf.py:333`), before `protoc.main(...)` runs inside the `with` body.\n- Preconditions: victim runs the tool (CLI or Python API) with `--input-file-type protobuf` on an attacker-controlled `.proto`, supplied as a local file (`--input`) or a remote URL (`--url`). Requires the `grpcio-tools` package (Protobuf support). The attacker does not need privileges on the affected system; filesystem effects are limited to locations writable by the code-generation process.\n\n## Severity\n\nProposed: **High**. `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N` = **7.5**.\n\n- Scored to match the project\u0027s own rating of the sibling path-traversal advisories CVE-2026-55389 / CVE-2026-55390, both `AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N` = 7.5. This finding is the same attack surface (unvalidated path from a processed schema) with the impact moved from confidentiality (read) to **integrity (write)**, hence `C:N/I:H`.\n- `AV:N`: the malicious schema can be fetched over the network via `--url`, consistent with how the siblings were scored.\n- `I:H`: attacker fully controls the write path and can create arbitrary directory trees and overwrite existing files; only the file *content* is constrained (a fixed `syntax = \"proto{2,3}\";` line).\n- `A:N` chosen conservatively; overwriting build-critical files (lock files, `__init__.py`, entry points) can cause availability loss, which would argue `A:L`.\n- Honest alternative: if the reviewer treats \"the victim must run the tool on the file\" as user interaction (`UI:R`), the score is **6.5 (Moderate)**. The project used `UI:N` for the identical read-path siblings, so `UI:N` is used here for consistency.\n\n## Details\n\nSource pattern \u2014 the imported path is captured with no character restriction:\n\n```python\n# protobuf.py:37\nWEAK_IMPORT_PATTERN = re.compile(r\u0027^\\s*import\\s+weak\\s+\"([^\"]+)\"\\s*;\u0027, re.MULTILINE)\n```\n\nSink \u2014 the captured path is joined and written with no boundary check:\n\n```python\n# protobuf.py:383-393 (_write_missing_weak_imports)\nfor import_path in WEAK_IMPORT_PATTERN.findall(text):\n if any((include_path / import_path).exists() for include_path in include_paths):\n continue\n stub = self.weak_import_dir / import_path # no resolve(), no is_relative_to()\n stub.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) # arbitrary directory tree\n stub.write_text(syntax, encoding=self.parser.encoding)\n```\n\nTwo escape mechanisms, both from `pathlib`\u0027s `/` semantics:\n\n- **Absolute path**: `Path(\".../__weak_imports__\") / \"/etc/x\"` == `/etc/x` (an absolute\n right operand replaces the base). Creates new files anywhere the process can write.\n- **`../` traversal**: `Path(\".../__weak_imports__\") / \"../../x\"` climbs out of the\n temp directory.\n\nWhy the existence guard (line 389) does not protect the write: it checks\n`include_path / import_path`, using a **different base** (`include_paths`) than the\nactual write, which uses `self.weak_import_dir / import_path`. For a *relative*\npath the two bases resolve to different directories, so the guard checks a location\nthat is not the real write target and misses it \u2014 enabling **overwrite of existing\nfiles**. (For an absolute path the guard and the write coincide, so an already-\nexisting absolute target is skipped; absolute paths thus create new files but do not\noverwrite. Overwrite is reached via the relative-traversal path.)\n\nTiming: `_write_missing_weak_imports` runs inside `__enter__` (line 333), and\n`protoc.main(...)` runs later in the `with` body. `protoc` rejects the malformed\nvirtual path (`Backslashes, consecutive slashes, \".\" or \"..\" are not allowed in\nthe virtual path`) and the overall command exits non-zero \u2014 but the file has\nalready been written; the filesystem side effect is not rolled back.\n\n### Attack path\n\n1. Attacker crafts `evil.proto` containing e.g. `import weak \"/home/victim/.config/x\";`\n and/or `import weak \"../../overwrite_me.txt\";`, and gets the victim to process it\n (third-party schema, or `--url` to an attacker-hosted file).\n2. `_write_missing_weak_imports` writes the stub to the attacker-chosen path,\n creating any intermediate directories and overwriting an existing file (relative\n case).\n3. `protoc` then fails, but the file(s) are already on disk.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nTwo self-contained scripts (`poc/reproduce.sh` for `--input`, `poc/reproduce-url.sh`\nfor `--url`) install the released `datamodel-code-generator==0.80.0`, serve/point a\nmalicious `.proto`, and assert the writes. The PoC drives the **released** package\nunmodified; the sink file\u0027s sha256 is recorded in `REPRODUCE.md`.\n\nLocal `--input` run against 0.80.0 \u2014 real output:\n\n```\n[*] installed version: 0.80.0\n[test A] absolute-path arbitrary file + mkdir(parents):\n [PASS] new file created at attacker-controlled absolute path\n [PASS] content is the fixed syntax stub\n[test B] relative-traversal overwrite of pre-existing file:\n [PASS] pre-existing victim.txt content was overwritten\n [PASS] victim.txt now holds the injected stub\n==================== RESULT: 4 passed, 0 failed ====================\n```\n\nRemote `--url` run against 0.80.0 \u2014 real output (proto served over HTTP, then the\nsame writes fire):\n\n```\n[*] serving malicious proto at http://127.0.0.1:\u003cport\u003e/evil_url.proto\n [PASS] server actually served the proto (HTTP 200)\n [PASS] absolute-path arbitrary file created\n [PASS] pre-existing victim overwritten via ../\n==================== RESULT: 3 passed, 0 failed ====================\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAny user or CI pipeline that runs an affected version of\n`datamodel-code-generator` on an untrusted\nProtobuf schema (a downloaded third-party `.proto`, or `--url` to a remote source)\nis exposed to arbitrary file/directory creation and overwrite by the schema author,\nwith the process\u0027s own permissions. Concrete harms:\n\n- Overwrite source, config, `.env`, lock files, or `__init__.py` / entry-point\n files \u2192 project corruption, broken builds, denial of service.\n- Create arbitrary directory trees / drop files into watched or auto-loaded\n locations.\n\nDirect arbitrary code execution has not been demonstrated. The written content\nis limited to a generated `syntax = \"proto2\";` or `syntax = \"proto3\";` line and is\nnot fully attacker-controlled.\n\n## Resolution\n\nThe fix was merged into the parent repository\u0027s `main` branch in\n[5e94b8f](https://github.com/datamodel-code-generator/datamodel-code-generator/commit/5e94b8f4203198798ec66b8e48217f70af69a0dc).\n\nThe Protobuf input preparer now resolves the dedicated temporary weak-import\ndirectory and each candidate stub path. If a resolved candidate is outside that\ndirectory, it raises `SchemaParseError` before checking include paths, creating\nparent directories, or writing the stub. The containment check rejects\nabsolute-path escapes and relative `..` traversal that would leave the sandbox.\n\nInput-preparation failures also immediately clean up the temporary directory.\n\nRegression tests cover:\n\n- rejection of absolute weak-import paths outside the sandbox;\n- rejection of relative `..` traversal outside the sandbox;\n- preservation of a pre-existing file outside the sandbox.\n\nLocal tox validation of the patch passed across the Python 3.10\u20133.14 and formatter\nmatrix, the CI compatibility environments, and the repository checks. Combined\nline and branch coverage, including the changed files, reached 100%.\n\nA fixed package has not yet been published to PyPI; the latest published version\nat the time of this update is 0.80.0. `Patched versions` remains unset until a\nrelease containing this fix is available. The advisory remains private pending\nthat release.\n\n## References\n\n- GHSA-8359-h9fx-j6v9 / CVE-2026-55389 \u2014 datamodel-code-generator arbitrary local file **read** via JSON-Schema `$ref` path traversal (CWE-22/200/610, 7.5, patched 0.62.0). Same class, read primitive; sibling entry point.\n- GHSA-442q-2j6p-642g / CVE-2026-55390 \u2014 datamodel-code-generator arbitrary local file **read** via XSD `schemaLocation` path traversal (CWE-22/200/610, 7.5, affected `\u003e= 0.59.0, \u003c= 0.61.0`, patched 0.62.0). Same class, read primitive; the fix sweep that missed the Protobuf entry point.\n- Python `pathlib` \u2014 `PurePath.__truediv__`: an absolute right-hand operand discards the left operand; `..` segments are not normalized. (https://docs.python.org/3/library/pathlib.html)\n\n## Discovery\n\nFound via source review and a reproducing PoC on\n`datamodel-code-generator/datamodel-code-generator`, released 0.80.0 and `main` @\n`834731d56c0a90c182a0919f316069cf5ff0659a`, 2026-09.",
"id": "GHSA-77xj-x4rm-935c",
"modified": "2026-10-08T17:58:01Z",
"published": "2026-10-08T17:58:01Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/datamodel-code-generator/datamodel-code-generator/security/advisories/GHSA-77xj-x4rm-935c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/datamodel-code-generator/datamodel-code-generator/commit/5e94b8f4203198798ec66b8e48217f70af69a0dc"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/datamodel-code-generator/datamodel-code-generator"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/datamodel-code-generator/datamodel-code-generator/releases/tag/0.81.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "datamodel-code-generator: Protobuf weak-import path traversal allows files to be written outside the temporary directory"
}
GHSA-77XQ-6G77-H274
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-10 21:27 – Updated: 2025-01-21 17:53Impact
What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?
This vulnerability relates to the bypass of directory traversal checks within the is_in_or_equal function. This function, intended to check if a file resides within a given directory, can be bypassed with certain payloads that manipulate file paths using .. (parent directory) sequences. Attackers could potentially access restricted files if they are able to exploit this flaw, although the difficulty is high. This primarily impacts users relying on Gradio’s blocklist or directory access validation, particularly when handling file uploads.
Patches
Yes, please upgrade to gradio>=5.0 to address this issue.
Workarounds
Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?
As a workaround, users can manually sanitize and normalize file paths in their Gradio deployment before passing them to the is_in_or_equal function. Ensuring that all file paths are properly resolved and absolute can help mitigate the bypass vulnerabilities caused by the improper handling of .. sequences or malformed paths.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "gradio"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-47164"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-10-10T21:27:47Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-10-10T22:15:10Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n**What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?**\n\nThis vulnerability relates to the **bypass of directory traversal checks** within the `is_in_or_equal` function. This function, intended to check if a file resides within a given directory, can be bypassed with certain payloads that manipulate file paths using `..` (parent directory) sequences. Attackers could potentially access restricted files if they are able to exploit this flaw, although the difficulty is high. This primarily impacts users relying on Gradio\u2019s blocklist or directory access validation, particularly when handling file uploads.\n\n### Patches\nYes, please upgrade to `gradio\u003e=5.0` to address this issue.\n\n### Workarounds\n**Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?**\n\nAs a workaround, users can manually sanitize and normalize file paths in their Gradio deployment before passing them to the `is_in_or_equal` function. Ensuring that all file paths are properly resolved and absolute can help mitigate the bypass vulnerabilities caused by the improper handling of `..` sequences or malformed paths.",
"id": "GHSA-77xq-6g77-h274",
"modified": "2025-01-21T17:53:30Z",
"published": "2024-10-10T21:27:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gradio-app/gradio/security/advisories/GHSA-77xq-6g77-h274"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-47164"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gradio-app/gradio/commit/08b51590163b306fd874f543f6fcaf23ac7d2646"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/gradio-app/gradio"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/gradio/PYSEC-2024-213.yaml"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Gradio\u0027s `is_in_or_equal` function may be bypassed"
}
GHSA-77XX-HPQW-PRH9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-09 18:30 – Updated: 2026-04-01 18:31Missing Authorization vulnerability in reputeinfosystems ARForms.This issue affects ARForms: from n/a through 6.4.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-32703"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-06-09T18:15:11Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in reputeinfosystems ARForms.This issue affects ARForms: from n/a through 6.4.",
"id": "GHSA-77xx-hpqw-prh9",
"modified": "2026-04-01T18:31:49Z",
"published": "2024-06-09T18:30:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-32703"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/arforms/vulnerability/wordpress-arforms-plugin-6-4-subscriber-arbitrary-file-deletion-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/arforms/wordpress-arforms-plugin-6-4-subscriber-arbitrary-file-deletion-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-782F-4VQ3-MP5H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-03 06:31 – Updated: 2026-11-03 06:31The Academy LMS – AI Course Builder, Quizzes, Certificates & eLearning plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Directory Traversal in all versions up to, and including, 4.0.1 via the 'id' parameter. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with contributor-level access and above, to read the contents of arbitrary .html files on the server. The plugin appends a '.html' extension to the attacker-supplied path before reading it, so files with any other extension — including wp-config.php — are out of reach. The file's contents are returned in full in the REST JSON response's content field.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-120544"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-03T05:18:32Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Academy LMS \u2013 AI Course Builder, Quizzes, Certificates \u0026 eLearning plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Directory Traversal in all versions up to, and including, 4.0.1 via the \u0027id\u0027 parameter. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with contributor-level access and above, to read the contents of arbitrary .html files on the server. The plugin appends a \u0027.html\u0027 extension to the attacker-supplied path before reading it, so files with any other extension \u2014 including wp-config.php \u2014 are out of reach. The file\u0027s contents are returned in full in the REST JSON response\u0027s content field.",
"id": "GHSA-782f-4vq3-mp5h",
"modified": "2026-11-03T06:31:13Z",
"published": "2026-11-03T06:31:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-120544"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/academy/tags/4.0.1/includes/frontend/template/block.php#L12"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/academy/tags/4.0.1/includes/frontend/template/block.php#L267"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/academy/tags/4.0.1/includes/frontend/template/block.php#L30"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/academy/tags/4.0.1/includes/frontend/template/block.php#L50"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?reponame=\u0026old=3723396%40academy\u0026new=3723396%40academy"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/1f0a1439-d10c-4dfc-9a40-7319debe3c51?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-782F-H7V4-M7WC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:32 – Updated: 2025-10-22 00:31The Spring web flows of TIBCO Software Inc.'s TIBCO JasperReports Server, TIBCO JasperReports Server Community Edition, TIBCO JasperReports Server for ActiveMatrix BPM, TIBCO Jaspersoft for AWS with Multi-Tenancy, and TIBCO Jaspersoft Reporting and Analytics for AWS contain a vulnerability which may allow any authenticated user read-only access to the contents of the web application, including key configuration files. Affected releases include TIBCO Software Inc.'s TIBCO JasperReports Server: versions up to and including 6.2.4; 6.3.0; 6.3.2; 6.3.3;6.4.0; 6.4.2, TIBCO JasperReports Server Community Edition: versions up to and including 6.4.2, TIBCO JasperReports Server for ActiveMatrix BPM: versions up to and including 6.4.2, TIBCO Jaspersoft for AWS with Multi-Tenancy: versions up to and including 6.4.2, TIBCO Jaspersoft Reporting and Analytics for AWS: versions up to and including 6.4.2.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-5430"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-04-17T18:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The Spring web flows of TIBCO Software Inc.\u0027s TIBCO JasperReports Server, TIBCO JasperReports Server Community Edition, TIBCO JasperReports Server for ActiveMatrix BPM, TIBCO Jaspersoft for AWS with Multi-Tenancy, and TIBCO Jaspersoft Reporting and Analytics for AWS contain a vulnerability which may allow any authenticated user read-only access to the contents of the web application, including key configuration files. Affected releases include TIBCO Software Inc.\u0027s TIBCO JasperReports Server: versions up to and including 6.2.4; 6.3.0; 6.3.2; 6.3.3;6.4.0; 6.4.2, TIBCO JasperReports Server Community Edition: versions up to and including 6.4.2, TIBCO JasperReports Server for ActiveMatrix BPM: versions up to and including 6.4.2, TIBCO Jaspersoft for AWS with Multi-Tenancy: versions up to and including 6.4.2, TIBCO Jaspersoft Reporting and Analytics for AWS: versions up to and including 6.4.2.",
"id": "GHSA-782f-h7v4-m7wc",
"modified": "2025-10-22T00:31:34Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:32:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-5430"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/application-security/authenticated-file-read-vulnerability-in-jasperreports"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2018-5430"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44623"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.tibco.com/support/advisories/2018/04/tibco-security-advisory-april-17-2018-tibco-jasperreports-2018-5430"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-7835-87Q9-RGVV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-24 16:54 – Updated: 2026-07-24 16:54Claude Code's worktree handling allowed creation of worktrees named ".git" and navigation to worktrees outside the sandbox context, enabling git directory confusion attacks. By exploiting symlink manipulation and git fsmonitor execution during worktree operations, an attacker could overwrite files in the user's home directory (such as .zshenv), leading to code execution outside of seatbelt sandbox restrictions. Reliably exploiting this required the user to clone a malicious repository containing prompt injection content and run Claude Code against it.
Users on standard Claude Code auto-update have received this fix automatically. Users performing manual updates are advised to update to the latest version.
Thank you to hackerone.com/metnew for reporting this issue.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@anthropic-ai/claude-code"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.1.38"
},
{
"fixed": "2.1.163"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-55607"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-59",
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-24T16:54:09Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-29T15:16:41Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Claude Code\u0027s worktree handling allowed creation of worktrees named \".git\" and navigation to worktrees outside the sandbox context, enabling git directory confusion attacks. By exploiting symlink manipulation and git fsmonitor execution during worktree operations, an attacker could overwrite files in the user\u0027s home directory (such as .zshenv), leading to code execution outside of seatbelt sandbox restrictions. Reliably exploiting this required the user to clone a malicious repository containing prompt injection content and run Claude Code against it.\n\nUsers on standard Claude Code auto-update have received this fix automatically. Users performing manual updates are advised to update to the latest version.\n\nThank you to hackerone.com/metnew for reporting this issue.",
"id": "GHSA-7835-87q9-rgvv",
"modified": "2026-07-24T16:54:09Z",
"published": "2026-07-24T16:54:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/security/advisories/GHSA-7835-87q9-rgvv"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55607"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/releases/tag/v2.1.163"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Claude Code: Sandbox Escape via Git Worktree Path Confusion Allows Unsandboxed Code Execution"
}
GHSA-784M-7H8Q-73R2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-24 12:31 – Updated: 2026-08-24 12:31Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Deletion in WooCommerce File Approval <= 10.7 versions.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-28171"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-24T12:16:50Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Deletion in WooCommerce File Approval \u003c= 10.7 versions.",
"id": "GHSA-784m-7h8q-73r2",
"modified": "2026-08-24T12:31:39Z",
"published": "2026-08-24T12:31:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-28171"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/woocommerce-file-approval/vulnerability/wordpress-woocommerce-file-approval-plugin-10-7-arbitrary-file-deletion-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.