CWE-22
Weakness Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
Many file operations are intended to take place within a restricted directory. By using special elements such as ".." and "/" separators, attackers can escape outside of the restricted location to access files or directories that are elsewhere on the system. One of the most common special elements is the "../" sequence, which in most modern operating systems is interpreted as the parent directory of the current location. This is referred to as relative path traversal. Path traversal also covers the use of absolute pathnames such as "/usr/local/bin" to access unexpected files. This is referred to as absolute path traversal.
Mapping guidance
This CWE entry might have children that would be more appropriate.
Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit. Consider children such as CWE-23 (or its descendants) for relative path traversal, or CWE-36 for absolute path traversal.
Relationships and members
Modes of introduction
Detection methods
Automated Static Analysis
Automated techniques can find areas where path traversal weaknesses exist. However, tuning or customization may be required to remove or de-prioritize path-traversal problems that are only exploitable by the product's administrator - or other privileged users - and thus potentially valid behavior or, at worst, a bug instead of a vulnerability.
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis
Manual white box techniques may be able to provide sufficient code coverage and reduction of false positives if all file access operations can be assessed within limited time constraints.
Effectiveness: High
Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Web Application Scanner
Web Services Scanner
Database Scanners
Effectiveness: High
Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Fuzz Tester
Framework-based Fuzzer
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
Effectiveness: High
Automated Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Source code Weakness Analyzer
Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer
Effectiveness: High
Architecture or Design Review
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)
Effectiveness: High
Notes
Other
In many programming languages, the injection of a null byte (the 0 or NUL) may allow an attacker to truncate a generated filename to apply to a wider range of files. For example, the product may add ".txt" to any pathname, thus limiting the attacker to text files, but a null injection may effectively remove this restriction.
Relationship
Pathname equivalence can be regarded as a type of canonicalization error.
Relationship
Some pathname equivalence issues are not directly related to directory traversal, rather are used to bypass security-relevant checks for whether a file/directory can be accessed by the attacker (e.g. a trailing "/" on a filename could bypass access rules that don't expect a trailing /, causing a server to provide the file when it normally would not).
Terminology
Like other weaknesses, terminology is often based on the types of manipulations used, instead of the underlying weaknesses. Some people use "directory traversal" only to refer to the injection of ".." and equivalent sequences whose specific meaning is to traverse directories.
Other variants like "absolute pathname" and "drive letter" have the *effect* of directory traversal, but some people may not call it such, since it doesn't involve ".." or equivalent.
Research Gap
Many variants of path traversal attacks are probably under-studied with respect to root cause. CWE-790 and CWE-182 begin to cover part of this gap.
Research Gap
Incomplete diagnosis or reporting of vulnerabilities can make it difficult to know which variant is affected. For example, a researcher might say that "..\" is vulnerable, but not test "../" which may also be vulnerable.
Any combination of directory separators ("/", "\", etc.) and numbers of "." (e.g. "....") can produce unique variants; for example, the "//../" variant is not listed (CVE-2004-0325). See this entry's children and lower-level descendants.
Content history
Identified weakness in Perl demonstrative example
Provided diagram to improve CWE usability
Identified weakness in "good code" for Python demonstrative example
Provided a demonstrative example in PHP
updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction
Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping
updated Alternate_Terms, Relationships, Other_Notes, Relationship_Notes, Relevant_Properties, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities
updated Description
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Alternate_Terms, Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Name, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationship_Notes, Relationships, Research_Gaps, Taxonomy_Mappings, Terminology_Notes, Time_of_Introduction, Weakness_Ordinalities
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Observed_Examples
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
updated Other_Notes, Research_Gaps
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Relationships
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
updated Demonstrative_Examples
updated Affected_Resources, Causal_Nature, Likelihood_of_Exploit, References, Relationships, Relevant_Properties, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated References, Relationships
updated References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Type
updated Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations
updated Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
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updated Relationships
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
updated Observed_Examples, References
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Detection_Factors
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
updated Observed_Examples
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, References
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
updated Alternate_Terms, Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Name, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
16155 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-55QW-WGP7-HPXM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-17 18:31 – Updated: 2026-04-01 18:32Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') vulnerability in Marco Heine PDF-Rechnungsverwaltung allows PHP Local File Inclusion.This issue affects PDF-Rechnungsverwaltung: from n/a through 0.0.1.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-49287"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-10-17T18:15:12Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027) vulnerability in Marco Heine PDF-Rechnungsverwaltung allows PHP Local File Inclusion.This issue affects PDF-Rechnungsverwaltung: from n/a through 0.0.1.",
"id": "GHSA-55qw-wgp7-hpxm",
"modified": "2026-04-01T18:32:03Z",
"published": "2024-10-17T18:31:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-49287"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/pdf-rechnungsverwaltung/vulnerability/wordpress-pdf-rechnungsverwaltung-plugin-0-0-1-local-file-inclusion-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/pdf-rechnungsverwaltung/wordpress-pdf-rechnungsverwaltung-plugin-0-0-1-local-file-inclusion-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-55VJ-QFC7-JRJC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-09-12 03:31 – Updated: 2024-09-12 03:31A vulnerability was found in 云课网络科技有限公司 Yunke Online School System up to 3.0.6. It has been declared as problematic. This vulnerability affects the function downfile of the file application/admin/controller/Appadmin.php. The manipulation of the argument url leads to path traversal. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-8707"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-09-12T01:15:10Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability was found in \u4e91\u8bfe\u7f51\u7edc\u79d1\u6280\u6709\u9650\u516c\u53f8 Yunke Online School System up to 3.0.6. It has been declared as problematic. This vulnerability affects the function downfile of the file application/admin/controller/Appadmin.php. The manipulation of the argument url leads to path traversal. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.",
"id": "GHSA-55vj-qfc7-jrjc",
"modified": "2024-09-12T03:31:25Z",
"published": "2024-09-12T03:31:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-8707"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.277216"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.277216"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.402917"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wiki.shikangsi.com/post/share/1200e7c6-4514-44e3-980c-298e0b9ccade"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-5639-2J2P-M4MX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-05 23:42 – Updated: 2026-10-05 23:42Summary
On Windows, a TemplateLookup URI beginning with a drive designator (e.g. C:/../../secret.txt or C:\..\..\secret.txt) bypasses the directory traversal check in Template.__init__, allowing reads of files outside the configured template directory.
This is a third, independent instance of the root cause behind CVE-2026-41205 (the // prefix) and CVE-2026-44307 (the backslash form). Both of those fixes normalized a separator spelling. Neither addressed the other way posixpath and ntpath disagree: the drive designator. Both prior fixes remain effective on their own terms; this variant survives them for an independent reason.
Details
The root cause is the same posixpath / os.path mismatch: resolution is done with posixpath, confinement is checked with os.path, which is ntpath on Windows.
# mako/lookup.py -- resolution
247: srcfile = posixpath.normpath(posixpath.join(dir_, u)) # posixpath, always
248: if os.path.isfile(srcfile): # ntpath on Windows
# mako/template.py -- confinement
268: u_norm = os.path.normpath(u_norm) # ntpath on Windows
269: if u_norm.startswith(".."): # never true for a drive URI
posixpath has no concept of a drive, so it treats C: as an ordinary path component; the .. segments pop C: and then escape the template root. ntpath, by contrast, splits the drive off and treats the remainder as rooted, discarding the .. entirely -- so the guard on line 269 inspects a string from which the evidence has already been removed:
| URI | ntpath.normpath (what the guard sees) |
guard fires |
|---|---|---|
//../secret.txt |
..\secret.txt |
yes |
\..\secret.txt |
..\secret.txt |
yes |
C:/../../secret.txt |
C:\secret.txt |
no |
Because the guard cannot fire for any URI beginning with a single-letter drive designator, the traversal is unconstrained, and its depth does not have to be guessed. posixpath.normpath() saturates excess .. segments at the root rather than erroring, so a URI carrying more .. than the template root is deep reaches the volume root and descends from there. A single fixed payload therefore works regardless of where the template directory sits:
template root = <base>/srv/app/templates
'C:/../../../../boot.ini' -> reads <base>/boot.ini
'C:/' + '../'*40 + 'etc/hostname' -> reads /etc/hostname (no depth guess)
'C:/../../../../../etc/hostname' -> TopLevelLookupException (wrong depth)
On Windows the equivalent is C:/../../../../../../../../Windows/win.ini, which reads that file for any template root depth. Only a target addressed relative to the template root needs the .. count to be exact; anything reachable from the volume root does not.
Affected code
mako/template.py:Template.__init__()URI validation usesos.path.normpath(), which on Windows strips the drive and discards the..segments before thestartswith("..")guard is applied.mako/lookup.py:TemplateLookup.get_template()resolves withposixpath.normpath/posixpath.join, whereC:is an ordinary component, then performs the existence check withos.path.isfile().
Reproduction
Windows is emulated with the technique already used by the project's own test suite (test/test_template.py:1398-1401):
import os, ntpath
os.path = ntpath
from mako.lookup import TemplateLookup
lookup = TemplateLookup(directories=["root/tpl"])
for uri in ["ok.html",
"//../../secret.txt",
"\\..\\..\\secret.txt",
"../../secret.txt",
"C:/../../../secret.txt",
"C:\\..\\..\\..\\secret.txt",
"d:/../../../secret.txt"]:
try:
t = lookup.get_template(uri)
print(repr(uri), "-> filename=", t.filename, repr(t.render()))
except Exception as e:
print(repr(uri), "-> REFUSED", type(e).__name__)
Against 1.4.1, with a sentinel file written outside the configured directory:
'ok.html' -> root/tpl/ok.html 'OK' (positive control)
'//../../secret.txt' -> REFUSED (CVE-2026-41205 fix works)
'\..\..\secret.txt' -> REFUSED (CVE-2026-44307 fix works)
'../../secret.txt' -> REFUSED
'C:/../../../secret.txt' -> reads the sentinel
'C:\..\..\..\secret.txt' -> reads the sentinel
'd:/../../../secret.txt' -> reads the sentinel
On POSIX the same URIs are refused, because posixpath.normpath keeps C: as an ordinary component and the .. survive to be inspected. The issue is Windows-only.
Note that d:/../../../secret.txt resolves relative to the template root, not to drive D: -- this is not a cross-drive read. Reaching another drive would require a leading .., which ntpath.normpath renders as ..\..\D:\x and the existing guard catches.
Impact
If an application on Windows passes user-controlled template names or include paths to TemplateLookup.get_template(), an attacker may load and disclose any file readable by the application process on the same volume as the template directory, not merely files adjacent to it. The primary impact is local file disclosure. If the targeted file contains Mako/Python template syntax, it may also be parsed and executed as a template.
As with CVE-2026-41205, the URI is not generally reachable through a raw URL path, since a conforming URL normalizer collapses C:/../.. first. The relevant vectors are query strings, form and JSON bodies, route parameters, and <%include file="${...}"/>.
Remediation
Normalize both sides with the same module. The resolution side already commits to posixpath, so the confinement check should as well:
u_norm = posixpath.normpath(self.uri.replace("\\", "/").lstrip("/"))
if u_norm.startswith(".."):
raise exceptions.TemplateLookupException(...)
This closes the drive case for the same reason it closes //: posixpath treats C: as an ordinary component, so the .. segments survive to be inspected. Verified to block all three drive forms with the full test suite passing.
Credit
Reported by Eurico Nicacio under coordinated disclosure.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.4.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "Mako"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.4.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-102991"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-05T23:42:02Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-30T20:17:26Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nOn Windows, a `TemplateLookup` URI beginning with a drive designator (e.g. `C:/../../secret.txt` or `C:\\..\\..\\secret.txt`) bypasses the directory traversal check in `Template.__init__`, allowing reads of files outside the configured template directory.\n\nThis is a third, independent instance of the root cause behind CVE-2026-41205 (the `//` prefix) and CVE-2026-44307 (the backslash form). Both of those fixes normalized a separator *spelling*. Neither addressed the other way `posixpath` and `ntpath` disagree: the drive designator. Both prior fixes remain effective on their own terms; this variant survives them for an independent reason.\n\n## Details\n\nThe root cause is the same `posixpath` / `os.path` mismatch: resolution is done with `posixpath`, confinement is checked with `os.path`, which is `ntpath` on Windows.\n\n```\n# mako/lookup.py -- resolution\n247: srcfile = posixpath.normpath(posixpath.join(dir_, u)) # posixpath, always\n248: if os.path.isfile(srcfile): # ntpath on Windows\n\n# mako/template.py -- confinement\n268: u_norm = os.path.normpath(u_norm) # ntpath on Windows\n269: if u_norm.startswith(\"..\"): # never true for a drive URI\n```\n\n`posixpath` has no concept of a drive, so it treats `C:` as an ordinary path component; the `..` segments pop `C:` and then escape the template root. `ntpath`, by contrast, splits the drive off and treats the remainder as rooted, discarding the `..` entirely -- so the guard on line 269 inspects a string from which the evidence has already been removed:\n\n| URI | `ntpath.normpath` (what the guard sees) | guard fires |\n|---|---|---|\n| `//../secret.txt` | `..\\secret.txt` | yes |\n| `\\..\\secret.txt` | `..\\secret.txt` | yes |\n| `C:/../../secret.txt` | `C:\\secret.txt` | **no** |\n\nBecause the guard cannot fire for *any* URI beginning with a single-letter drive designator, the traversal is unconstrained, and its depth does not have to be guessed. `posixpath.normpath()` saturates excess `..` segments at the root rather than erroring, so a URI carrying more `..` than the template root is deep reaches the volume root and descends from there. A single fixed payload therefore works regardless of where the template directory sits:\n\n```\ntemplate root = \u003cbase\u003e/srv/app/templates\n\n\u0027C:/../../../../boot.ini\u0027 -\u003e reads \u003cbase\u003e/boot.ini\n\u0027C:/\u0027 + \u0027../\u0027*40 + \u0027etc/hostname\u0027 -\u003e reads /etc/hostname (no depth guess)\n\u0027C:/../../../../../etc/hostname\u0027 -\u003e TopLevelLookupException (wrong depth)\n```\n\nOn Windows the equivalent is `C:/../../../../../../../../Windows/win.ini`, which reads that file for any template root depth. Only a target addressed *relative* to the template root needs the `..` count to be exact; anything reachable from the volume root does not.\n\n### Affected code\n\n- `mako/template.py`: `Template.__init__()` URI validation uses `os.path.normpath()`, which on Windows strips the drive and discards the `..` segments before the `startswith(\"..\")` guard is applied.\n- `mako/lookup.py`: `TemplateLookup.get_template()` resolves with `posixpath.normpath`/`posixpath.join`, where `C:` is an ordinary component, then performs the existence check with `os.path.isfile()`.\n\n### Reproduction\n\nWindows is emulated with the technique already used by the project\u0027s own test suite (`test/test_template.py:1398-1401`):\n\n```python\nimport os, ntpath\nos.path = ntpath\n\nfrom mako.lookup import TemplateLookup\nlookup = TemplateLookup(directories=[\"root/tpl\"])\n\nfor uri in [\"ok.html\",\n \"//../../secret.txt\",\n \"\\\\..\\\\..\\\\secret.txt\",\n \"../../secret.txt\",\n \"C:/../../../secret.txt\",\n \"C:\\\\..\\\\..\\\\..\\\\secret.txt\",\n \"d:/../../../secret.txt\"]:\n try:\n t = lookup.get_template(uri)\n print(repr(uri), \"-\u003e filename=\", t.filename, repr(t.render()))\n except Exception as e:\n print(repr(uri), \"-\u003e REFUSED\", type(e).__name__)\n```\n\nAgainst 1.4.1, with a sentinel file written outside the configured directory:\n\n```\n\u0027ok.html\u0027 -\u003e root/tpl/ok.html \u0027OK\u0027 (positive control)\n\u0027//../../secret.txt\u0027 -\u003e REFUSED (CVE-2026-41205 fix works)\n\u0027\\..\\..\\secret.txt\u0027 -\u003e REFUSED (CVE-2026-44307 fix works)\n\u0027../../secret.txt\u0027 -\u003e REFUSED\n\u0027C:/../../../secret.txt\u0027 -\u003e reads the sentinel\n\u0027C:\\..\\..\\..\\secret.txt\u0027 -\u003e reads the sentinel\n\u0027d:/../../../secret.txt\u0027 -\u003e reads the sentinel\n```\n\nOn POSIX the same URIs are refused, because `posixpath.normpath` keeps `C:` as an ordinary component and the `..` survive to be inspected. The issue is Windows-only.\n\nNote that `d:/../../../secret.txt` resolves relative to the template root, not to drive `D:` -- this is not a cross-drive read. Reaching another drive would require a leading `..`, which `ntpath.normpath` renders as `..\\..\\D:\\x` and the existing guard catches.\n\n## Impact\n\nIf an application on Windows passes user-controlled template names or include paths to `TemplateLookup.get_template()`, an attacker may load and disclose any file readable by the application process on the same volume as the template directory, not merely files adjacent to it. The primary impact is local file disclosure. If the targeted file contains Mako/Python template syntax, it may also be parsed and executed as a template.\n\nAs with CVE-2026-41205, the URI is not generally reachable through a raw URL path, since a conforming URL normalizer collapses `C:/../..` first. The relevant vectors are query strings, form and JSON bodies, route parameters, and `\u003c%include file=\"${...}\"/\u003e`.\n\n## Remediation\n\nNormalize both sides with the same module. The resolution side already commits to `posixpath`, so the confinement check should as well:\n\n```python\nu_norm = posixpath.normpath(self.uri.replace(\"\\\\\", \"/\").lstrip(\"/\"))\nif u_norm.startswith(\"..\"):\n raise exceptions.TemplateLookupException(...)\n```\n\nThis closes the drive case for the same reason it closes `//`: `posixpath` treats `C:` as an ordinary component, so the `..` segments survive to be inspected. Verified to block all three drive forms with the full test suite passing.\n\n## Credit\n\nReported by Eurico Nicacio under coordinated disclosure.",
"id": "GHSA-5639-2j2p-m4mx",
"modified": "2026-10-05T23:42:02Z",
"published": "2026-10-05T23:42:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sqlalchemy/mako/security/advisories/GHSA-5639-2j2p-m4mx"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-102991"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sqlalchemy/mako/issues/441"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sqlalchemy/mako/commit/000ed85e4e48771eff460bf4fc721fb43de80e08"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/sqlalchemy/mako"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sqlalchemy/mako/releases/tag/rel_1_4_2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Mako: Path traversal via drive-letter URI on Windows in TemplateLookup"
}
GHSA-5639-746G-V626
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-23 00:30 – Updated: 2025-12-27 21:30MyBB 1.8.32 contains a chained vulnerability that allows authenticated administrators to bypass avatar upload restrictions and execute arbitrary code. Attackers can modify upload path settings, upload a malicious PHP-embedded image file, and execute commands through the language configuration editing interface.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-53979"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-22T22:16:03Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "MyBB 1.8.32 contains a chained vulnerability that allows authenticated administrators to bypass avatar upload restrictions and execute arbitrary code. Attackers can modify upload path settings, upload a malicious PHP-embedded image file, and execute commands through the language configuration editing interface.",
"id": "GHSA-5639-746g-v626",
"modified": "2025-12-27T21:30:12Z",
"published": "2025-12-23T00:30:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-53979"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://fdlucifer.github.io/2023/01/17/mybb1-8-32-LFI-RCE"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://mybb.com"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-45867"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/51213"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/mybb-authenticated-remote-code-execution-via-chained-vulnerabilities"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-5644-X8WC-2R86
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-07-06 15:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 05:26A directory traversal vulnerability exists in the luci2-io file-export mib functionality of Milesight UR32L v32.3.0.5. A specially crafted network request can lead to arbitrary file read. An attacker can send a network request to trigger this vulnerability.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-23547"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-07-06T15:15:11Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A directory traversal vulnerability exists in the luci2-io file-export mib functionality of Milesight UR32L v32.3.0.5. A specially crafted network request can lead to arbitrary file read. An attacker can send a network request to trigger this vulnerability.",
"id": "GHSA-5644-x8wc-2r86",
"modified": "2024-04-04T05:26:52Z",
"published": "2023-07-06T15:30:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-23547"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2023-1695"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-564G-XWVC-G44Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-01-15 00:01 – Updated: 2022-01-22 00:02ASUS RT-AX56U’s login function contains a path traversal vulnerability due to its inadequate filtering for special characters in URL parameters, which allows an unauthenticated local area network attacker to access restricted system paths and download arbitrary files.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-22054"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-01-14T05:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "ASUS RT-AX56U\u2019s login function contains a path traversal vulnerability due to its inadequate filtering for special characters in URL parameters, which allows an unauthenticated local area network attacker to access restricted system paths and download arbitrary files.",
"id": "GHSA-564g-xwvc-g44q",
"modified": "2022-01-22T00:02:17Z",
"published": "2022-01-15T00:01:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-22054"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.twcert.org.tw/tw/cp-132-5508-59251-1.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-567F-MVHW-X8W5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-16 06:30 – Updated: 2026-08-17 21:31The WPvivid — Backup, Migration & Staging WordPress plugin before 0.9.131 does not sanitise a value taken from an unauthenticated request before using it to build a log file path, allowing an attacker holding a site to site transfer key to create a log file in any existing writable directory of the site, including the web root.
The file name always carries a fixed suffix and the contents are always the WPvivid — Backup, Migration & Staging WordPress plugin before 0.9.131's own log header, so only the location of the file is attacker controlled.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-19725"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-16T06:16:52Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "The WPvivid \u2014 Backup, Migration \u0026 Staging WordPress plugin before 0.9.131 does not sanitise a value taken from an unauthenticated request before using it to build a log file path, allowing an attacker holding a site to site transfer key to create a log file in any existing writable directory of the site, including the web root.\n\nThe file name always carries a fixed suffix and the contents are always the WPvivid \u2014 Backup, Migration \u0026 Staging WordPress plugin before 0.9.131\u0027s own log header, so only the location of the file is attacker controlled.",
"id": "GHSA-567f-mvhw-x8w5",
"modified": "2026-08-17T21:31:19Z",
"published": "2026-08-16T06:30:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-19725"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/999889f4-f8be-4b44-b665-1a94df8d050d"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-567F-R62W-X6CH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 01:04 – Updated: 2022-05-14 01:04Path traversal vulnerability in the administrative panel in KonaKart eCommerce Platform version 8.7 and earlier could allow an attacker to download system files, as well as upload specially crafted JSP files and in turn gain access to the server.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-17108"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-02-03T15:29:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Path traversal vulnerability in the administrative panel in KonaKart eCommerce Platform version 8.7 and earlier could allow an attacker to download system files, as well as upload specially crafted JSP files and in turn gain access to the server.",
"id": "GHSA-567f-r62w-x6ch",
"modified": "2022-05-14T01:04:29Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T01:04:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-17108"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/541742/100/0/threaded"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-568F-PV23-39P4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-08 16:37 – Updated: 2026-09-08 16:37Summary
Published nltk==3.9.4 still contains several XML-reader entrypoints that build parser paths from caller-controlled selectors or trusted-looking index state without preserving the corpus-root boundary.
Details
- Vulnerability type: Path traversal and trusted-root bypass
- Affected component:
FramenetCorpusReader.frame_by_name,FramenetCorpusReader.doc,FramenetCorpusReader.lu,NKJPCorpusReader.header - Affected versions: Published
3.9.4reproduced. Current sourcev3.10.0-rc2acted as a negative control and blocked the same payloads. - Patched versions: Patched in version 3.10.0, which includes the path-safety rejections seen in the release candidate.
- Root cause: Stable reader paths still construct raw XML filenames from unsafe selectors, poisoned index state, or unsafe file identifiers.
I confirmed four public stable entrypoints return parsed outside-root content: a parent-segment traversal frame name, a poisoned fulltext index filename, a poisoned LU id, and an unsafe NKJP header file identifier. Current source rejects the same payloads with explicit path-safety errors, which shows the bug is real but version-scoped to the published stable package.
PoC
Preconditions - The application exposes FrameNet or NKJP reader APIs while trusting NLTK to keep XML parsing inside a corpus root.
Steps
1. Create a minimal FrameNet or NKJP corpus root and place attacker-chosen XML files outside that root.
2. Feed unsafe selectors or poisoned index state into the relevant public stable 3.9.4 APIs.
3. Observe frame_by_name, doc, lu(...).exemplars, or header return parsed outside-root values.
4. Run the same payloads against current source and observe explicit path-safety rejections.
Minimal reproducible excerpt
framenet_frame_definition FRAME_LEAK
framenet_doc_text DOC_LEAK
framenet_lu_text LU_LEAK
nkjp_header_title HEADER_LEAK
Impact
Applications that process attacker-influenced FrameNet or NKJP corpus selectors or state can be made to parse XML outside the trusted corpus root through normal public reader responses.
Remediation
Keep these reader paths on the same root-confinement model as CorpusReader.open() and nltk.pathsec. Reject unsafe path components before constructing filenames from frame names, document filenames, LU ids, or NKJP file identifiers.
Resources
- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/blob/3.9.4/nltk/corpus/reader/framenet.py#L1366-L1369
- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/blob/3.9.4/nltk/corpus/reader/framenet.py#L1456-L1460
- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/blob/3.9.4/nltk/corpus/reader/framenet.py#L1803-L1810
- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/blob/3.9.4/nltk/corpus/reader/nkjp.py#L96-L103
- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/blob/3.9.4/nltk/corpus/reader/nkjp.py#L251-L256
- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/blob/v3.10.0-rc2/nltk/corpus/reader/framenet.py#L1388-L1399
- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/blob/v3.10.0-rc2/nltk/corpus/reader/nkjp.py#L96-L128
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.9.4"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "nltk"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.10.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-62385"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-706",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-08T16:37:18Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nPublished `nltk==3.9.4` still contains several XML-reader entrypoints that build parser paths from caller-controlled selectors or trusted-looking index state without preserving the corpus-root boundary.\n\n### Details\n\n- **Vulnerability type:** Path traversal and trusted-root bypass\n- **Affected component:** `FramenetCorpusReader.frame_by_name`, `FramenetCorpusReader.doc`, `FramenetCorpusReader.lu`, `NKJPCorpusReader.header`\n- **Affected versions:** Published `3.9.4` reproduced. Current source `v3.10.0-rc2` acted as a negative control and blocked the same payloads.\n- **Patched versions:** Patched in version 3.10.0, which includes the path-safety rejections seen in the release candidate.\n- **Root cause:** Stable reader paths still construct raw XML filenames from unsafe selectors, poisoned index state, or unsafe file identifiers.\n\nI confirmed four public stable entrypoints return parsed outside-root content: a parent-segment traversal frame name, a poisoned fulltext index filename, a poisoned LU id, and an unsafe NKJP header file identifier. Current source rejects the same payloads with explicit path-safety errors, which shows the bug is real but version-scoped to the published stable package.\n\n### PoC\n\n**Preconditions**\n- The application exposes FrameNet or NKJP reader APIs while trusting NLTK to keep XML parsing inside a corpus root.\n\n**Steps**\n1. Create a minimal FrameNet or NKJP corpus root and place attacker-chosen XML files outside that root.\n2. Feed unsafe selectors or poisoned index state into the relevant public stable `3.9.4` APIs.\n3. Observe `frame_by_name`, `doc`, `lu(...).exemplars`, or `header` return parsed outside-root values.\n4. Run the same payloads against current source and observe explicit path-safety rejections.\n\n**Minimal reproducible excerpt**\n\n```text\nframenet_frame_definition FRAME_LEAK\nframenet_doc_text DOC_LEAK\nframenet_lu_text LU_LEAK\nnkjp_header_title HEADER_LEAK\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nApplications that process attacker-influenced FrameNet or NKJP corpus selectors or state can be made to parse XML outside the trusted corpus root through normal public reader responses.\n\n### Remediation\n\nKeep these reader paths on the same root-confinement model as `CorpusReader.open()` and `nltk.pathsec`. Reject unsafe path components before constructing filenames from frame names, document filenames, LU ids, or NKJP file identifiers.\n\n### Resources\n\n- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/blob/3.9.4/nltk/corpus/reader/framenet.py#L1366-L1369\n- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/blob/3.9.4/nltk/corpus/reader/framenet.py#L1456-L1460\n- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/blob/3.9.4/nltk/corpus/reader/framenet.py#L1803-L1810\n- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/blob/3.9.4/nltk/corpus/reader/nkjp.py#L96-L103\n- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/blob/3.9.4/nltk/corpus/reader/nkjp.py#L251-L256\n- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/blob/v3.10.0-rc2/nltk/corpus/reader/framenet.py#L1388-L1399\n- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/blob/v3.10.0-rc2/nltk/corpus/reader/nkjp.py#L96-L128",
"id": "GHSA-568f-pv23-39p4",
"modified": "2026-09-08T16:37:18Z",
"published": "2026-09-08T16:37:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/security/advisories/GHSA-568f-pv23-39p4"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-62385"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/pull/3579"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/pull/3581"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/commit/7d1389d0789c1eca56bd0ed444089e0a3972e3ed"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/commit/bf3bf32786791394a1008258b4917a7f2d4dbcda"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/releases/tag/v3.10.0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/nltk/PYSEC-2026-3728.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/nltk-path-traversal-via-framenet-and-nkjp-readers"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "NLTK: Stable FrameNet and NKJP readers parse outside-root XML"
}
GHSA-56G6-3CR7-7XX2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-13 21:33 – Updated: 2026-10-13 21:33Stonewuu ai-fusion-video through 1.2.0 contains a path traversal vulnerability that allows authenticated users to write uploaded files outside the media directory via the subDir parameter of POST /api/storage/upload. Attackers can supply parent-directory sequences that LocalStorageStrategy.storeBytes never normalizes, creating directories and writing attacker-controlled files with chosen extensions anywhere the service account can write.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-110212"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-13T19:18:45Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Stonewuu ai-fusion-video through 1.2.0 contains a path traversal vulnerability that allows authenticated users to write uploaded files outside the media directory via the subDir parameter of POST /api/storage/upload. Attackers can supply parent-directory sequences that LocalStorageStrategy.storeBytes never normalizes, creating directories and writing attacker-controlled files with chosen extensions anywhere the service account can write.",
"id": "GHSA-56g6-3cr7-7xx2",
"modified": "2026-10-13T21:33:37Z",
"published": "2026-10-13T21:33:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-110212"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Stonewuu/ai-fusion-video/blob/v1.2.0/ai-fusion-video/src/main/java/com/stonewu/fusion/controller/storage/FileUploadController.java#L72-L99"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Stonewuu/ai-fusion-video/blob/v1.2.0/ai-fusion-video/src/main/java/com/stonewu/fusion/service/storage/strategy/LocalStorageStrategy.java#L77-L92"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://hackmd.io/@1ExmmukzRMWN7B4gQ4W-4Q/ai-fusion-video-broken-access-control-and-upload-path-traversal"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/ai-fusion-video-through-1.2.0-path-traversal-in-media-upload-subdir-parameter"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.